



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A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE CHINESE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS: A HISTORY OF THE MIND OF MAN.

L. ADAMS BECK.

THE West has been until late years so disdainful of the thought of the Far East that it is perhaps not so wonderful as regrettable that one of the most remarkable books of the world should have been unknown here except to a few scholars who have been able to perceive its importance in the inheritance of wisdom. But these old days of superiority are passing away, and we are now much more ready to receive intellectual gifts which do not bear the impress of Greece and Rome. It is therefore possible that some notice of a book revealing the faith which helped to mould the life of the Middle Ages in Central Asia, China, and later Japan, may not be unwelcome. The author and his work are alike noteworthy.

Is it known that a journey through Hell and Purgatory was written in China by a man born sixty-seven years before Dante, a man who held the position of spiritual adviser to that great Kublai Kaan who was served by Marco Polo, who was celebrated by Coleridge in his immortal dream of Xanadu? Such a book there is, and this journey is the lesser of its interests, for it is a great epic and allegory of the progress of the Mind of Man, and in this aspect has stranger anticipations of modern thought than even its precedence of the *Divina Commedia*. It antedates the modern science of psychology in a truly remarkable manner, tracing the evolution of the human intellect and spirit through all the turbulence of cruelty and sensuality which lie between the Ape and the Divine—passing through many advances and retrocessions to such a mind as is found in the Buddha or

the Christ. It is a book worthy to be placed beside the *Pilgrim's Progress* of the West, and to some it will be of deeper interest because it begins lower down in the first dim stirrings of conscious thought. These are large claims, and difficult to substantiate in one brief article on a subject which deserves many. Let me therefore give some account of the book and its author, premising that my quotations are from the partial translation by that celebrated missionary Dr Timothy Richard. It has never, so far as I know, been translated otherwise either as a whole or in part. The late Imperial Government of China conferred on Dr Richard a mandarinship with the Red Button of the highest grade, and also decorated him with the Double Dragon.

According to the Imperial history of the Mongol dynasty in China a boy named Chiu Chu Chi was born in the year 1208. Passionately desirous of learning, he retired, on reaching years of discretion, to a temple in the Kwen Lun mountains to study the principles of the Taoist faith, now so degenerate in China. Later it is supposed he was converted to the fuller Buddhism known as Mahayana. His fame soon spread over the empire, for it is the peculiar glory of China that intellectual distinction opens all doors, even the highest, and two Emperors in succession sent for Chiu that they might learn his wisdom and do him honour. Absorbed in his studies, he made no response and continued to tread the secret ways of the spirit. Finally, in the year 1279, when he was an old man, the great Kublai Kaan, who had then firmly established the Mongol dynasty in China, sent two ministers to invite the sage to his Court at Cambaluc (Peking)—an invitation, or rather command, which could not be disregarded, and, accompanied by eighteen disciples, the old man left the Lao Shan Monastery for the world.

It was an eventful journey of four years through perils many and great, for he was wounded in passing through the lawless soldiery, was often obliged to conceal himself, knew what it was to hunger and thirst, and must often have despaired of reaching the King of Kings. Lest he should fail, he sent before him a messenger, counselling the autocrat to cease from plundering and murdering; and this, which would probably have cost any other teacher his life, seems to have inspired the great Kaan with respect, for Chiu was received with the utmost honour at the Court of Cambaluc, and at once entered on his position of spiritual father to the sovereign.

His teaching was noble. He taught the Emperor that his conception of ruling was wholly mistaken, that the

foundation of all lasting government is the service of God and man, and in the midst of barbaric luxury he asserted that to be pure of heart and set free from the lust of this world is the only secret of peace. And the wild man listened. He, descendant of that Chinghis Kaan, the Scourge of God, whose empire covered nearly one-half of the human race, sought to follow in the way marked out for him. To his strong, uncurbed nature these words appeared to be a message from that Unknown Power who terribly raises and puts down the mighty from their seat. He told those about him: "God has given me this teacher that my dead conscience may live. Write down his sayings, that I and my descendants may learn."

And because his words were of other things than worldly power and pride, such as he himself had sounded to the depths, Kublai Kaan addressed Chiu always as Shin Shen—the Immortal.

But whatever the will of the Kaan might have been (and his personal charity became great and noble), rapine and murder continued in China, for the Mongols, as Marco Polo testifies, were hard to hold in leash. Chiu, who later retired to Chi Li, sent his disciples, by order of the Kaan, to release prisoners and deliver those who were in the shadow of death. Under the Kaan he was thus instrumental in saving thirty thousand of the people. He died in 1288, full of years and honours.

So much for the man, though much more should be said of him. His book, known as *A Mission to the Western Heaven*, has for seven hundred years been a classic in China, Korea, and Japan, a vast storehouse for story and drama, a profound influence for good. It has been the subject of countless pictures. The Hon. Mrs Gordon discovered valuable frescoes from it in the Diamond Mountain Facing-South Temple in Korea. They abound in Japan. At Pong-len-ssa it has been acted as a mystery play for the last five hundred years. It is believed to embody the highest spiritual truths; it has been the joy of millions. From these points of view it is of universal interest, and from another not less so. For to Chiu, brooding in the Lao Shan Monastery on the riddle of the painful earth, came the same answer as came to our own later thinkers, and he beheld the history of the Mind of Man, not as a fall from some original perfection and obedience, but as a long ascension from the chaotic and primeval, from the Ape to the Man, from the Man to the Divine. That such a conception should have been possible at such a time, and that it should have been wrought out to the end with such

piercing spiritual insight, is the wonder of this book. Let me condense the story.

The first scene of the epic concerns itself with Creation. Chaos and darkness reign supreme. Light follows; the solids combine into water, fire, and earth. Law is established in place of confusion. In the sea is a great mountain, and on its summit a "Living Stone," animated by the highest forces of nature, of earth, and heaven. This on a predestined day splits asunder and produces a stone egg, and, after exposure to the air, this becomes a Stone Ape, able to creep and run. Gradually becoming conscious, he turns and bows to the four points of the compass, his eyes glowing with light, the rays of which penetrate even to the seat of God in His heavenly palace. God takes pity on the grotesque creature and says: "That far object below is the living principle of life in the Universe." And this is the Mind of Man!

Time went by and the strange light of the Ape's eyes was dimmed. He lived the ordinary life of an ape, feeding on fruits and playing in the wood with troops of other apes. Sometimes, drawing apart, he would sit and watch the rush of the mountain stream, until on a certain day all the apes cried out: "Where does this stream come from? Let us find the source."

They sought long and with ape-like curiosity, and found at last a waterfall issuing from a great cave which none dared enter, until at last the Stone Ape volunteered, and, leaping through the waterfall and the cave, discovered "The Happy Fruit and Flower Garden." The apes, following, took possession, and the Stone Ape became the Beautiful Ape King, and the whole troop entered upon an era of animal plenty and enjoyment.

There seemed no reason why this state of things should not last for ever, but let it be remembered that the Ape King was the child of heaven as well as of earth, and that one keen drop was spilt into the cup which marred its sweetness. One day, when feasting with all his people, the Ape King wept, and, seeing, the astonished apes asked the cause of his grief.

"Although I have been happy, now I dread the future," was all he could say.

But this looking before and after was more than his careless people could understand. There was food, there was sunshine, there was freedom from all restraint—what more could any ape desire? What was there to fear?

"Old age and Death," replied the King.

And at these terrible unknown words all the apes covered

their faces and wept. And at last a strong ape leaped forth and cried in a great voice : " This sorrow is the beginning of life. Of all wonders in the world, three are the greatest—the Buddhas—the Enlightened ; the Immortals ; and the Confucian deities ; for these do not die."

And the Ape King demanded : " Where do these live ? " and the ape replied : " In the world after death. In the ancient depths of the Eternal Mountain."

So the next day the Ape King, laying down his careless joy, went forth in a far search for the Unknown.

In the course of long years he learnt the manners and language of a man, but his heart was the ape's heart as he still wandered in search of an immortality of ape-like bliss. Very fierce, very sensuous was he, with all the instincts of the brute strong upon him, yet with a gleam of something responsive, something of the very far-off Divine which he himself understood not at all. What teacher could he find ?

At last, after long years' journeying, he reached the Cave of the Slanting Moon and Three Stars, and heard that a great teacher known as Wisdom dwelt there and was awaiting a student known as the Truth-Seeker. He was permitted to enter.

Here also Wisdom hath builded her palaces, for the Ape was guided through corridor after corridor, between high places of rose marble and towering gates of splendour—a strange figure in such a school!—to where Wisdom sat enthroned and below him his thirty disciples ranged in order. And here the author pauses to describe that Wisdom :

" His years are eternal as the heavens,
All-glorious is his form.
Wisdom endureth through all the ages,
For he is the Teacher of Law."

And, seeing that fear is the beginning of wisdom, before that glory the brutish figure prostrated himself and, knocking his head upon the earth, besought instruction, while the Master considered his unlikely pupil. Questions were asked, and in great anxiety the Ape reported his strange birth, and again the Master considered. At last the decision was made.

" You are certainly a child of the Divine Power which is above nature. As yet you have no name. I will give you a name."

And the Ape King, laughing for joy, was received as a pupil, and received also the name that was to mark his place in the world. Henceforth he is Sun, the Searcher of Secrets.

The Ape had now become the Thinker, but to what use

should his new powers be applied? He himself was clear on that point. To the avoidance of the hateful victory of old age and death—to the securing of an ape's immortality of pleasure. Various sciences were proposed to him by the Master, but the Searcher only replied: "Will these teach me how to avoid old age?" and when the Master replied: "This they cannot do," the Searcher declined them all. At last, after long beseeching, Wisdom revealed the way.

There are three primal forces—Sex, Mind, and Spirit. The right understanding of these three is the road to immortal life, but it is beset by the three perils which only the wisest can escape. The Ape, lusting for immortality, proud of his knowledge, essayed them, and by the greatest he fell, and was condemned to return to his people once more, but carrying with him the tidings of this strange knowledge which as yet he knew not how to use. They hailed his return with delight, for in his rise they all had risen. All claimed the right he had won for them. They were now of the tribe of the Seekers.

"One family are we now (they cried):
We are all adopted into the House of Heaven."

Let me pause and ask if this parable, written seven hundred years ago, can be excelled as a picture of the clod instinct with the spark which is the Mind of Man? Is there such an allegory elsewhere? The other great teachers have taken man where they found him in his pride of place. Chiu dives into the dim beginnings of reason and spirit.

The task was but begun. The Searcher, having now perceived the power of knowledge, armed himself with weapons of terrible force. He dived beneath the sea and conquered the ancient Rulers, wresting their wealth from them. He soared to the clouds. He dreamed that he entered the Infernal Regions and was victorious over the Lords of Death and Hell; and though this last was but an empty dream, it was real to his pride. But mighty as were now his weapons, his nature was still unchanged. Riotously, cruelly, brutally, he used his strength, and it became clear that the downfall of the world was at hand unless the Searcher of Secrets, gifted with knowledge but far from the paths of wisdom, could be subjected to the Law.

Then to the Supreme, seated in the Golden Palace of Clouds in a strange Chinese heaven with His Ministers, His Princes, and Rulers of Departments about Him (a heaven modelled on the Court of the Emperors at Peking) came the bitter cry of the oppressed earth and sea, and a memorial

was presented by the Dragon Ruler of the Sea. It is couched in exactly the same terms as a subject prince, prostrate before the Throne, would have used in addressing the Son of Heaven: "Your humble Dragon-Master memorialises the Sacred Sovereign of High Heaven"—and then followed the recital of the Searcher's violence, and the appeal for redress. Redress was instantly promised, and the Dragon King (dragons in China are always associated with water) kotowed and departed. Complaints from the Prince of Hades and many more succeeded to this. Clearly the Searcher was a dangerous, blustering being whom none could restrain. All desired vengeance and punishment. What should be done? But the ways of the Supreme are not our ways, nor His thoughts our thoughts. No flash of lightning struck the rebel; he was bidden to an audience in heaven. It was then thought by the Ministers that the mere sight of the Divine might strike terror to his turbulent soul, and all might end well. The Divine meditated but kept His own counsel, and the Searcher was invited, the message being prepared by the Angel of the Literary Star.

Now follows a description of the Heavenly Courts, burning in splendours. The Searcher, haughty and unquelled, marched after the guiding Angel through glorious light in myriad rays, forms of iridescent cloud, and a golden city of radiance. Whether it were that something cried in his soul that he was native to these pomps, whether he regarded them as trappings hiding the Essential, he did not disclose, but he strode like a king into the Presence and stood proudly erect while all else fell upon their faces. "Why," cried all the Heavenly Ministers, "does not the wild Ape do obeisance? Why does he roughly answer, 'It is I, old Sun the Searcher'? Why should he not be killed?"

His august Majesty replied: "The Searcher is but newly a man. How can he understand Court etiquette?" It appeared indeed that the Deity did not take so much account as his Ministers of form and ceremony, for He continued: "We forgive him. He shall have a post in the Heavenly Court. See which is vacant, for this man must serve us."

And behold! the only vacant position was that of Master of the Wild Horses—the lowest position of all. He was simply and solely to look after the wild animals. After a brief trial the Searcher rushed from the Heavenly Courts in a furious anger. What!—be a herder of animals, he who had dreamed of Deity? Better be a King among apes than a servitor in heaven.

So he returned to his apes and their sympathy. "A King become a stable boy? Let us drink and forget the insult!" they cried. And in wrath and now open rebellion he assumed the title, "The Great Holy One, The Equal of Heaven." In other words, he was now Swinburne's "Great God Man, which is God." So old is the cry of defiance!

And now the Great Victorious Spirit was sent to arrest the rebel, and was not victorious. He was received with threats, curses, and battle. Apparently the Mind of Man is unconquerable by warfare. The Celestial Ministers were confounded. Again the Supreme meditated, and an ambassador was sent to the Searcher with the tidings that his rights were recognised. He should enter upon the position of "The Holy One, The Equal of Heaven," at once. He shall try his strength in the manner he himself has chosen. Nothing daunted, the Ape King faced the Supreme with unbroken pride, conscious of victory. Replying only, "I thank you," he entered upon his great position with perfect self-confidence.

Needless to say, ruinous failure followed. Wild with power, he gorged the Peaches of Immortality, he drank himself drunk with the Wine of Heaven, he outraged all the sacred customs which have stood from eternity. And the end of it was that utter terror of himself and all his doings seized him.

"If the Celestial Ruler is disturbed, I fear for my life. Let me go, Go, GO! It is better for me to be a King on earth."

And once more he returned to his apes. Clearly the Searcher was fit neither for the lower nor the higher power, nor did he find heaven at all a congenial abode. Was he then to have the ape's heart all his days, armed with the terrors of knowledge, omnipotent for all but that Achilles' heel of old age and death?

War great and furious ensued, but the knowledge of the Ape was a match apparently for the heavenly host. Or so it was believed on earth.

And then a mystic figure emerged—Kwanyin (in Japanese, Kwannon), the Holy Spirit of God. With her waters of baptism, with her asperging willow spray, she averred that she could tame the wild nature, and make the Ape surrender himself to the influences of the Spirit.

Yes, but not yet. The Baptism with fire must precede the Baptism with water. The catechumen is ready for the first, but not for the second. And the Holy Spirit, abiding her time, stood aside.

For now was brought a very terrible weapon—the Diamond Circle, or Ring, with which “the Huns have been civilised into Buddhas”—a frightful calamity of blood and ruin. It was flung upon the Ape King, and he fell conquered, raging, unconquered in soul, and was flung into the Fiery Crucible, broken by the energising power of God at last, but still utterly defiant. And here the author pauses and comments :

“This history of the Ape is a deep parable.
Man is the Great Holy One and Heaven’s peer,
But for this the Horse and the Ape, the heart and mind, must be subdued.
For true life there is but one Law,
Even that Man should become One with his True Example.”

The Example ? That is God made Flesh. The Buddha, the Christ of Asia, who in his Divinity has lived and suffered as Man amongst men. The Ape had tried conclusions with Power. He was now to try conclusions with Love.

So, having broken his way out of the crucible, he was brought before the Incarnate by the Thunder Generals, raging and blaspheming. He shouted aloud : “Who are you ?”—and the Buddha, smiling from his impenetrable peace, replied that he had come from the Paradise of that God in whom is Boundless Light—Praise be to Him !

But for this the Ape had no ear. He broke into the recital of his own power :

“I practised all arts to be immortal ;
Hating the poor span of human life
I fixed my heart on joining the divine Gods.
If others have succeeded, why not I ?”

And still the untroubled Buddha listened to the tirade of raging pride : “If you are so great, O Searcher—if all power is yours—stand on the palm of my Hand and leap out of it. If you succeed, sit on the throne of Heaven and rule. If you fail, go humbly away and learn the Truths.

So it was agreed. The Searcher could not doubt the result—he who had stormed the sea and sky—how should he fail ? Therefore he took his station on the Hand and leaped.

Now he is rushing through the clouds, away—away ! The Buddha is a small and lessening figure. Who is he to control the Equal of Heaven ? What shall bound the glory of the pride of Man ? The abysses open before him, and still he roars through a subject Universe. Arrogance is loud in his heart. And now the task is accomplished—he has reached the limits of Light and the Eternal Dark, and

before him are the Five Pillars that separate them. The Buddha shall know he is conquered, and upon one Pillar he writes his name in token of Victory—"The great Holy One, The Equal of Heaven," and upon another, in sign of his contempt, he leaves a hateful mark of his presence, and so returns shouting with triumph to the Hand.

And still with his impenetrable smile the All-Wise replied : "You have never left my Hand."

And on the base on one finger was found written the Ape's boast, and on the other the hateful mark of his apish contempt. Man may rush through space ; he may affront the Dawn and the Sunset, but he is still within the circumference of God.

Beaten, baffled, at last humbled, he was now condemned to lie crushed beneath the weight of the hand of Incarnate Love. He was laid beneath the great mountain of the Five Fingers, and there he lay suffering until the Day of Deliverance.

Meanwhile the Holy Spirit had inspired the Emperor of China, T'ai-Tsung (a real historical figure, and greatest of the T'ang dynasty), by means of a journey through Heaven and Hell, to despatch a mission to Heaven in search of the Scriptures which should illuminate mankind. This incident is founded on the fact that in the reign of this Emperor, in the year 629 A.D., a Buddhist priest had made a pilgrimage to India across the frightful deserts in search of the Buddhist Scriptures for the teaching of China, and Chiu thus allegorises a true story. A Pilgrim, named from this famous pilgrim, Yuen Chang, is chosen to set forth on this tremendous quest. But he will need servitors humble, loyal, and strong, to aid him through the dangers natural and supernatural. Who should they be ?

The Spirit of God knew what was determined. She hastened to the mountain, knowing what strength must be harnessed for the salvation of mankind. The Ape could not move, for the weight of the Hand upon him ; but he could speak, and his voice was a cry : "O merciful Kwanyin, a day in this place is as a year. I have lain alone five hundred years. Pity me and I will lead a new life."

So he was told that if he would engage, not as a King, not as a Prince of Heaven, but as the servant of the Pilgrim, the servant of man, there was hope, and to this he thankfully pledged himself.

I wish I might tell the Vision of the Emperor, but this deserves separate treatment.¹ Made wise by his dreadful experience, the Emperor sent forth the Pilgrim, and the

¹ The story of the "Journey through Hell" will be told in the next issue of the HIBBERT JOURNAL.—EDITOR.

mission proceeded on its way. This section is introduced by these remarkable lines :

“The spark of life within and without is ever the same.
In an atom is the whole Kingdom of God.
In one grain are numberless worlds.
There is but one principle in soul and body.
He who knows this must follow the mystery of nature.”

The Pilgrim, Yuen Chang, now approached the Mount of Purgatory, where the Ape lay groaning. The cry of his torment filled the air like thunder : “O my Master, you have come, you have come !”

My Master ! It was a new cry for the Ape King, the Equal of Heaven ! The Pilgrim, having authority, opened his prison ; he was released, and once more he stood in the sunlight—no more the Equal of Heaven, no more the Searcher of Secrets : all that vainglory had gone by. For the Quest he received a new name and a humble one. Henceforth he is Sun, the Practical One, and all the intellectualism which swept the earth and sky was to be harnessed to the lowliest uses of the service of man.

They met a tiger, and Sun slew it and made a robe of the skin to keep his Master warm. After the tiger they met with six thieves—Mr Eye, who loved change ; Mr Ear, who was swift to anger ; Mr Nose, who smelt love ; Mr Tongue, the glutton ; Mr Thought, the covetous ; and Mr Sad, the malcontent ; and all these fell on Sun and beat him cruelly. He worsted them in the end, but appealed to his Master : “If you cannot beat these off, how do you expect to see God ?”

And the Pilgrim thought awhile, and then replied :

“O disciple, when shall we see the Incarnate face to face !”—the heart's cry of many men and ages ! But the Ape also has his dream of God, as we now observe. The Beatific Vision is his quest, and the life lost for the saving of others his road.

For again, when the way was dark and troubles increased and multiplied, the Master cried out :

“There is a mountain of difficulties ahead. We must be careful.” And it was Sun the Practical who replied : “Master, do not be over-anxious. So long as our hearts are right with God there cannot be any serious trouble.” Can this be the Ape of the rebellious pride ? No, it is Sun the Practical, the clear-eyed, who at last perceives the Essential. Not perfect by any means, but with his foot set on the Mount of Vision. One cannot achieve instant perfection—no, not though one has lain in the hand of God. In his very

zeal for the Quest he is sometimes merciless and mistaken ; and at last, in his despair at this turbulent servant who is yet so full of love and valour, the Pilgrim appeals to the Holy Kwanyin, and she provides a Hat of Spikes for Sun—a sort of Crown of Thorns, which will pierce him to the brain when he transgresses. And so, armed with the pangs of Conscience, they go on their way.

It is impossible I should tell the story of the Quest, for the book is twice as long as the New Testament and enriched with many marvels and digressions. One must be well acquainted with Buddhist and Far Eastern thought to follow many parts of it. Nor can I deal with the two lesser servitors. The terrible dangers ; the passionate loyalty of Sun, who could do nothing by halves ; the rage and zeal which, overstepping all bounds, were followed often by the Crown of Thorns—all these I must pass by. The Pilgrim is a noble and dignified figure, the type of the great Chinese scholar. I am certain he was modelled upon the real and famous Yuen Chang, who in the year 629 A.D. had made the awful pilgrimage from China to India in search of the traces and words of the Buddha. The author in this has made noble use of a noble historical personage, as he has also done in his introduction of the greatest of the T'ang Emperors.

At last Sun has learnt his lesson. Humble, faithful, devoted, influenced in all things by the Holy Spirit, Kwanyin, he attends the Pilgrim until they reach the Beautiful Land, and before them stands a great House, and above this the Spiritual Mountain, crowned with the Light of the presence of the Incarnate. A voice greets them : " Is not this the Royal Ambassador from the East in search of the Holy Writings ? "—and they behold an Immortal of heavenly beauty who awaits them at the Gate. Many years he has waited their coming. Tea and food are ordered for the weary ones, and grateful thanks are offered. A fragrant bath is prepared that they may sleep in peace and recover their vigour for the steep ascent of the Holy Hill. Great is their joy, for they believe that all the trials are ended. But there is one more. Suddenly, as they climb, is seen before them a great and terrible river—a stream of living water indeed, but three miles wide, and roaring down in flood ; and how to pass it they know not. In this high allegory it will be seen that the river of Death is also that living water which flows from the Paradise—a strangely beautiful conception.

Even the Pilgrim's high courage is daunted, but Sun fears nothing. There is a bridge—a dangerous bridge of rotting trees, and, though the Pilgrim holds back, Sun runs across it

laughing. The ape nature surviving in him in its higher aspects—its hold on natural things—sends him rejoicing along the breaking Bridge of Dread. But this the Pilgrim cannot do ; he lingers trembling on the brink, and Sun returns to him.

And, as they dispute, they see a Pilot on a broken raft, drifting down stream. He invites them to enter, but the Master still fears very greatly. The broken raft, the perilous flood—how can this be possible to human flesh and blood ? But Sun steadfastly encourages him (the Mind of Man unconquerable and purified in death), and the Pilot cries aloud :

“ Safe is My raft.
Though it is weak it can cross an ocean.
Many are the souls it has ferried.”

Sun the Practical is at least content. He urges his Master forward, and they take their seat on the crazy planks as the Angelic Boat gently moves forward into the great deeps, and the earth they know is left behind.

And now a very beautiful episode. A dead body drifts beside them, and the Master looks upon it in awe and fear, for surely he knows those features, that worn frame ? And Sun, always before him in apprehension now, says smiling, “ Yes, Master, do not fear. That body is none other than your own.” And the Pilot says also, “ Joy is yours. That is your body.” Thus gently is the knot loosed in the waters of the River, and when the Master lands on the farther shore it is as one set free.

Thus rejoicing they gain the shore which seemed so distant, and the Pilot and the raft are seen no more, and in quiet they go their way to meet the welcome of the Great Cherubim, and the author comments :

“ Now is the work finished and the Soul become divine.
To reach the shore of Eternity is the highest wisdom.”

And now, at last, they enter the Great Hero Hall and are presented before the seat of the Incarnate, and falling on their faces do worship ; and Kwanyin, the Holy Spirit, who has guided them through all their perils, rejoices in their joy, and their eyes have beheld the King in his beauty and have seen the Land that is very far off.

To their custody is given the great Scripture for the salvation of mankind. This is the great reward of all their anguish. And to each is given a new name—the last of the names that have marked the falls and struggles of the Ape King. The Pilgrim is sanctified as The Buddha of Sweet

Incense. The Hat of Spikes is removed from the servitor, and he becomes the Strong Man of the Kingdom—The Buddha Victorious in War. Also (delightful touch) the white horse who has borne the baggage throughout the weary journey is not forgotten—how should he be in the Land where all find their true home?—and he is canonised as Chief over the Eight Boards of the Dragons of Heaven. There is room for him too in the Many Mansions.

And the book ends thus—with a great anthem in heaven. For all the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas (the Lovers and Helpers of mankind), the saints, the deities, the spirits and angels, folding their hands, united their voices and sang these words—which indeed are well worthy of study, for in their magnificent catholicity they prefigure that great Church, that mighty Communion of Saints, of which the faint dawn now pierces the night :

“ We take refuge
 In the Ancient God who created Light,
 In the God of Pure Joy,
 In Him who hath no darkness,
 In Varuna (the Heaven-God of the Vedas),
 In Brahma the Creator,
 In Him who is boundless mercy,
 In the Messiah,
 In Him who goes about doing good,
 In Him who is the Lamp of the World,
 In Kwanyin,
 In Mohammed of the great Sea,
 In all the saints of Paradise,
 In all the Angels who serve the sacred Altar,
 In all the mighty Powers throughout the universe.”

I give only a part of the New Song—a song so new that we have not as yet gained even a little knowledge of the harmony it proclaims. But that it prefigures a spherul music none may doubt.

This is a book which raises questions of the deepest interest apart from its spiritual teaching. Marco Polo, his father and uncle, must have been well acquainted with the great saint who wrote it. Is it conceivable that some of the strangely Christian passages may have been influenced by that contact? It is certain that in the Emperor's “Journey to Hell,” with which I hope to deal later, there is more than one reference which inclines one to consider this possibility. The Hon. Mrs Gordon, in her remarkable book, *The Lotus Gospel*, traces many wonderful coincidences between Mahayana Buddhism and Christianity which cannot lightly be set aside. If Christianity and the Buddhism of

the year 100 A.D. and onward coalesce at so many points, as they certainly do, may it not be that in some great future not utterly remote the world may see a union of the greatest faith and the greatest philosophy of all time? To men of good-will the bridge is less difficult to cross than that broken trunk which Sun, the Purified Mind of Man, crossed so fearlessly, and the reward of such an understanding would be greater than thought can conceive.

Here, at all events, is the Far Eastern rendering of the upward struggle. I find it in some respects even more interesting than Bunyan's, because its outlook is higher and deeper. It is more philosophic, if a little less human. It is the work of a scholar and a poet, a man who had surveyed the world with keen eyes and according to great opportunities. The Pilgrimage of Sun is not for his personal salvation, though that is implicit. It is unfettered by the narrow individualism of Calvinistic teaching. It is the example of the life laid down and the immortal gain. It is the answer to some negations of modern science.

It is also not the least of the great gifts which the ancient wisdom of China has yet to offer to the Western world.

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KARMA : ITS VALUE AS A DOCTRINE OF LIFE.

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I. THE Aryan invaders who created the religions and the civilisation of India were polytheists ; and their chief ideas long remained unchanged. Their original conception of the destiny of man after death was that the souls of the good were led by Yama to heaven, where they were clothed in new bodies and lived in pleasure and splendour with the glorified " fathers " and the gods. Far less distinct in their literature is the conception of hell as the destiny of wicked men.

But at an early date, probably somewhere in the seventh century B.C., a new conception of the after-life took form among a small group of thinking men in North India, and gradually won its way to complete acceptance among the Aryan people, and finally among all the inhabitants of the peninsula—namely, the doctrine of transmigration and karma. The central idea of this doctrine is that every act, whether good or bad, inevitably produces for the doer its own recompense in a future life—every good act being rewarded with pleasure or prosperity, every bad act being punished with suffering or calamity. When thought out to its last implications, the doctrine runs that the sum of each man's inheritance—his body, character, capacity, temperament, birth, belongings, and social position—and the whole of his experience in life, whether of happiness or of sorrow, together form the just recompense for his deeds, good and bad, done in former existences. Since, then, a man's inheritance in any one life is proof of his having lived former lives, the theory implies that the series of his lives has had no beginning ; and, since the actions done in any one life necessitate another life for their recompense, there can be no end to the soul's embodiments. Thus an eternal process of transmigration, and an

eternal existence for every soul, were necessarily involved in the conception. The theory also implied that all souls, whether living as gods, demons, men, animals, or plants, were essentially the same, the differences of their station, power, character, and experience being altogether the outcome of their previous actions. A soul living as a man might, through persistence in right living, rise in a future birth to life as a god, or might through abandoned living sink to life as a bug or a plant. Thus every soul was destined to go on eternally, in each life reaping the fruit of the past, and sowing at the same time in his actions seeds which would spring up as joy or sorrow in another existence. Every piece of human experience, whether active or passive, whether joyous or sorrowful, thus became retribution. There was no piece of suffering that was not punishment; there was no piece of joy that was not reward.

At a rather later date there arose the philosophy of the Upanishads, which may be briefly summed in three propositions: (a) within and behind the whole universe there exists the supreme Brahman-Ātman; (b) the human spirit is identical with this joyous, eternal, divine Spirit; (c) the man who rises to knowledge of the Ātman is thereby released from karma, rebirth, and all other bonds, and enters upon a new existence, which is the true life of the soul.

But we must not here give our attention to this attractive philosophy; for our subject is the doctrine of karma. It will greatly simplify our inquiry to deal with karma apart from Release; and we are quite justified in doing so; for there was a period, short or long, between the rise of the karma theory and the appearance of the philosophy of Release;¹ and the vast majority of Indians and other Asiatics who have lived under the doctrine of transmigration and karma have not sought to win Release at all, but have regarded it as being far beyond their reach.

The three religions which teach transmigration are Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Until the coming of Islam, practically the whole population of India belonged to one or other of these faiths; so that the doctrine has had a

¹ It is quite true, as Deussen shows (*Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 342 ff.), that men sought union with the Ātman, before the rise of the karma doctrine, and believed that therein they achieved peace and freedom; but the great quest of Release which created Indian philosophy was essentially a quest of *release from transmigration and karma*, and thus arose as a reaction from the new doctrine. The roots of the four conceptions—transmigration, karma, the supreme Ātman, and emancipation—are all found in the Brāhmaṇas, but the rise of the formed doctrine is later; and the ideas came in two successive pairs.

vast following for more than two and a half millenniums. But that is not all. Buddhism was carried by missionaries beyond the frontiers of India to every part of the continent of Asia and the adjacent islands ; and, while the religion made very little impression on the peoples living to the west of India and in the far north of the Asiatic continent, almost the whole of Central, Eastern, and Southern Asia, and also most of the great islands, accepted it and have lived by it for many centuries. The domain of karma therefore stretches from the western borders of India eastwards through Tibet, China, and Mongolia, and includes most of the islands on its southern and eastern shores. We do not exaggerate if we say that for many centuries it was held by half the human race.

The aspects of the doctrine which moved these people most effectively are probably the following :—

(A) It teaches that every man is personally responsible for his actions, that action and retribution are as inevitably bound together in morality as cause and effect are in material things, that the wrongdoer can in no single instance escape punishment. The doctrine thus responds to the elemental demand of the human conscience, that right and wrong action should receive personal recompense.

(B) It thereby also vindicates the essential righteousness of the universe, and satisfies the moral instinct of those who hold it, whether they believe in the existence of a ruler of the universe or not.

(C) It explains the peculiar inheritance of body, mind, and character which each child seems to bring into the world with him, and the strange inequality of human life, especially the seemingly arbitrary incidence of suffering and calamity on the one hand, and of wealth and prosperity on the other. It is thus a partial solution of the problem of evil.

A doctrine in certain respects similar to the Indian theory appears also in ancient Greece. It seems to have sprung up first in the Orphic cults of Northern Greece, whence it was taken over first by Pythagoras and then by Plato. Scholars were formerly of opinion that Greece must have borrowed from India, or India from Greece ; but research has now made it quite plain that the two are independent growths.¹ That Pythagoras and Plato accepted a theory of transmigration and retribution is proof that elements of real moral value reside in such conceptions.

The Indian doctrine has attracted a number of minds in the West during the past fifty or sixty years. It is regularly

¹ See Keith's article, "Pythagoras and the Doctrine of Transmigration," in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1909, p. 569.

taught in Neo-Buddhism and Theosophy ; and there have also been a few proposals to combine it with Christianity. A somewhat similar doctrine has also appeared in recent years in Western philosophy, usually in connection with a pluralist view of the universe. These cases of Western acceptance of a doctrine of rebirth and retribution are of very great interest to us, as proving that, while karma has been accepted by whole populations only in the centre, the south, and the east of Asia, there are sporadic minds in the West and throughout the world to whom the conception makes a strong appeal.

So far as one can see, the features which attract Western minds are, in the first instance, those we have already noticed as moving the Asiatic mind : its insistence on personal retribution, its vindication of the justice of the universe, and its explanation of the inequalities of human existence. Two other aspects, however, of the idea are often emphasised : first, the seemingly scientific character of karma, its universal sweep and inescapable power, retribution following act as surely as effect follows cause ; and secondly, the impression that the doctrine gives a more rational account of the other world than the Christian conception of immortality.

II. What then are we to make of the doctrine ?

We ought first of all to recognise that it must contain large elements of truth, since, for two thousand five hundred years, so many millions of our fellow-men have made it the foundation of their moral thinking and their moral life. No reflecting man surely can belittle an idea welcomed with eagerness by so many races, and retained with serious confidence for so many centuries. Further, I should like to bear witness that it is my impression, from my many years of personal contact with the Hindu people, that the karma doctrine has exercised a large restraining influence on their daily life. I find it difficult to speak more precisely. The doctrine does not seem to me to rouse men to high moral enthusiasm, nor to give them joy or a beckoning future ; but it does seem to give the ordinary man a settled conviction of the reign of moral law, and to spur him to the effort to be faithful.

We ought to recognise, in the second place, that, since the doctrine is fundamentally a theory of the life of the soul before birth and after death, and since men have no means of observation or of scientific research in those regions,¹ the

¹ The statement is often made that the greatest Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists of the past remembered their former births ; and similar claims

karma hypothesis can neither be proved nor disproved. In this it is precisely like the Christian doctrine of immortality. Thus we cannot ask the direct question, *Is the karma theory true or false?* but must test it in other ways.

Attention had better be directed first to three facts which arise out of the history of the doctrine in India.

(A) The theory of transmigration and karma has been accepted with marvellous unanimity by the people of India as true, and for the common people throughout the centuries it has sufficed as their doctrine of the soul; but the case is very different with the greatest minds. They have certainly never suggested that the doctrine is false, but have accepted it fully; yet it has never proved sufficient for their own souls' life. At no long interval after the formation of the doctrine there came the greatest of all changes in Hindu thought, namely, the rise of the philosophy of Release, which is essentially a reaction against the karma theory. The philosophy was created by the loathing the best men felt for the never-ending round of births and deaths. Although they believed in karma, they could not live by it without discovering a means of escape from it. This historical fact suggests that, despite the elements of moral value contained in the theory, it is defective as a doctrine of the life of the soul.

(B) Considering the massive sweep of the doctrine and the great influence it has exerted over the religious and moral life of India, it is very remarkable that the karma theory, even when reinforced with the philosophy of Release, has never led to any revision of the ancient Hindu law, nor to any serious attempt to think out a criterion of right and wrong.¹ There is practically no ethical philosophy within the frontiers of Hindu thinking.² Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja accept the Hindu law of the sūtras unchanged as the standard of conduct, which is much the same as if we lived by Leviticus; and they never attempt the task of discovering a principle of right conduct. Do not these facts suggest

are now and then made for moderns; but no evidence of any value has ever been given in substantiation of the claim. Certainly, the many narratives in Jain and Buddhist literature, which purport to detail "former lives" of the Tīrthakaras and the Buddhas, and the corresponding material in Hindu literature, would never convince a modern reader that they are real transcripts from life. They are clearly mythology, and usually of a very poor order.

¹ See Professor A. Berriedale Keith, in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, x. 805b, 806b.

² This stands out in most striking contrast with the intellectual and imaginative triumphs of the Hindu mind.

that the karma theory is somehow lacking in moral insight and stimulus ?

(C) There are certain noticeable changes in the karma doctrine which mark the history of Hinduism, from the first century A.D. downwards. They are discussed in an article by Professor Hopkins of Yale.¹ Each of these changes will be found to be an attempt to escape from the stern rigour of the karma law ; and in most cases it will be found that the change is fundamentally inconsistent with the law as originally conceived, and as understood by the most orthodox people adown the centuries until to-day.

The first of these occurs in the *Bhagavadgītā*. In that famous poem we first meet the doctrine of *karma-yoga*. According to the early Upanishads, all actions, whether good or bad, compel the soul to be reborn to undergo requital, and only inaction can lead to Release. The new doctrine in the *Gītā* runs that there is one type of actions which the Hindu can set outside the scope of the doctrine of karma. If he carries out the precepts of the Hindu law with a view to winning the rewards which are promised for their observance, he will necessarily be reborn to enjoy these rewards ; but, if in performing these ordained acts he renounces all the rewards attached to them, the new theory declares that these acts will not sow the seeds of rebirth, but will lead the man on towards Release. Here we have a great inroad made into the law of universal retribution, and nothing is said to make plain why these actions will not ripen to rebirth in accordance with the universal law of karma.² Similarly in the Bhakti sects of later date passionate devotion to the god whom one adores is stated to have the power of doing away with karma and bringing the soul to Release. Other illustrations of this process might be mentioned to show how far this tendency has gone, but what has been already said is sufficient. Clearly the karma theory was so rigorous that many of the best men wished to ease the pressure.

Can we point to any feature of the karma law that will account for these three noteworthy historical facts ?—the dissatisfaction of the best minds with the theory standing by itself, in contrast with its placid acceptance by the masses ; its failure to provoke ethical reflection on the details of the Hindu law and to create an ethical philosophy ; and the many modifications of the theory suggested by the theistic sects.

¹ *J.R.A.S.*, 1906, p. 581 ; 1907, p. 665.

² We can see clearly that men were beginning to appreciate the importance of motive in action ; but the idea is not thought out into a principle, and its application is limited to the precepts of the *dharma*.

The reason seems to be this, that while the karma hypothesis is a brilliant example of generalised thinking, is vividly moral, and deals in a most interesting way with the problem of suffering, yet *the moral ideas on which it is based come from a very early stage in the development of ethical thought and practice.* The community seems to have been at a stage of moral life corresponding to the time in Roman history which produced the Lex Talionis, the time in the history of Israel which created the law, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth."¹ At this stage in their moral education men expect the good man to be rewarded with prosperity and the bad man to be punished with adversity, and expect the reward and the punishment to be the accurately measured equivalent of the deeds done. Clearly, these are the ideas which are embodied in the karma doctrine; and from such moral principles one would hardly expect that a satisfying ethical system could be developed. Hence the dissatisfaction of the nobler minds of India; hence their passion to seek Release and to escape from the karma altogether; hence the barrenness of the doctrine so far as ethical thought is concerned.

But, while the retributive element of karma stands on a level with the ethical ideas of other early peoples, it has one noticeable distinguishing feature, the postponement of retribution to another life. The only other part of the world in which we hear of the emergence of a similar theory is Northern Greece, where, as we have already seen, a doctrine of rebirth and retribution arose, about a century² after the time when karma came to the birth in North India. But the same problem of moral requital was discussed in Palestine also, seemingly at a rather later date;³ and the discussion is reflected in one of the great poems of the world, the book of Job. But, while the problem discussed is the same, the theory that virtue is rewarded with prosperity and vice punished with adversity is decisively rejected in Job.

It seems quite clear that the cause of the thought-ferment was in all three cases the same. Men had been living in the belief that, in this life, the good man is rewarded with prosperity and the bad is punished with adversity; but experience had proved too much for the theory: in its early crude form it is clearly untrue. What, then, were men to

¹ Leviticus xxiv. 19-20.

² Pythagoras flourished in the second half of the sixth century B.C.

³ The date of the book of Job has caused much discussion, but scholarly opinion now tends to place it in the fifth century B.C. See G. B. Gray, Introduction to the *International Critical Commentary on Job*.

think?—How were they to continue to believe in the inherent justice of the universe? In India and in Greece the same solution was found: men laid hold of a theory current in their vicinity, that each soul lives a number of lives; and they placed the good and evil actions in one life, and the retribution in another.

The reason why the decision in the case of the book of Job was so different is to be found in the fact that the religion of Israel was already a living ethical theism¹ when the book was written, while polytheism still reigned in India in the seventh century B.C., and also in Greece in the sixth century. What the precise reasoning was that guided the thinkers of India and Greece we do not know; but it looks as if they could not think of any adequate retribution apart from prosperity and adversity. The thinkers of Israel, on the other hand, while frankly acknowledging that prosperity does not always follow virtue, nor calamity vice, were yet able to hold fast to the belief that adequate justice would be done to every human soul, because of their immovable faith in the absolute righteousness of the one God of the universe.

III. We shall now proceed to bring the karma doctrine under the light of a number of modern ethical conceptions, that we may see whether there is any reasonable justification for our judgment, that it rests on early moral ideas from which a satisfactory ethic cannot be developed.

(a) Since retribution is the most prominent element in karma, we had better begin by bringing the doctrine into comparison with modern ideas on the subject of *punishment*. Some still hold that punishment is retrospective, is merely the dealing out of merited pain to the criminal for his crime; but modern thought is rapidly swinging round to the conviction that punishment is justifiable only when it is corrective, reformatory. In all progressive countries laws, law-courts, reformatories, and prisons are being remodelled with a view to the transformation of the criminal. Regarded from this point of view, then, with all its humanitarian sympathy and practical helpfulness, the karma theory is sadly defective. The sin is done in one life; the suffering it entails comes in another; so that the sufferer does not know what he is punished for. How then can the pain lead to reformation? The truth is the theory comes from the ancient world, when no one thought of punishment as any-

¹ The great prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, and Jeremiah all preceded the writer.

thing but penal ; and it is only the retributive instinct that is satisfied by it.

(b) We shall take *pain* next. The karma theory runs that every piece of suffering which man has to endure is punishment for past sin. Is that credible ? Pain is frequently a most valuable danger-signal, giving a man timely warning that may save his life ; and science shows us that hunger and cold, poverty and want, have been amongst the chief stimulants which from the earliest times have roused men to the struggles which have produced civilisation, and which to-day lead them to discovery, invention, and progress. The modern mind will therefore be disposed to believe that suffering is often stimulative rather than punitive, and will regard the facts which lead us in that direction as providing the beginnings of a theory which will explain on reasonable grounds the presence of a good deal of the physical suffering among us.

(c) Again, modern science makes it perfectly evident that there is a very great deal of *preventable suffering* in the world. On this great truth all our modern medical effort is based, all schemes of education, social reform, social amelioration, and such like. The contrast between savagery and civilisation is in itself proof of how much can be done by human effort. The teaching of karma, on the other hand, is that no single portion of suffering which is due to any soul can be averted. At this moment, the sum total of the suffering which all the souls at present embodied in the world are destined to undergo is inevitably fixed ; and all the struggles of men to prevent the incidence of this pain are doomed to be completely frustrated. There is no such thing as preventable suffering. I do not contend that scientific fact and human experience disprove the karma doctrine, but I do say that they suggest a very different theory of the facts of suffering, and that the more men succeed in doing for the prevention of pain and misery, the less will they be inclined to accept the karma hypothesis.

(d) Human experience shows that a large proportion of the suffering which falls on any individual is caused by others. The slave-master, the unscrupulous labour-employer, the man who suddenly springs a war upon the nations, indeed every single evildoer, causes other people to suffer :

“ Man’s inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn.”

The human race is not a mere agglomeration of individuals, each living a secluded life, shut up in his own personality,

acting for himself only and bearing all the burden of his own deeds—but a vast society, knit together so closely that, when one part suffers seriously, the other parts suffer also, and, when one man sins, the ruin, degradation, and suffering which his sin entails spread like a miasma round him. There is thus a great deal of *unmerited suffering* in the world. These we know to be facts : the karmic idea that no suffering falls on any man except as a fruit of his evil deeds done aforetime, will have little chance of survival face to face with these living conceptions.

(e) Again, we recognise that the good man often voluntarily suffers for others, takes upon himself suffering, that they may escape ; and we regard *self-sacrifice* as the noblest of all heroisms. The men who died for us in the Great War gave up their lives for the sake of those they loved. Here we touch the very heart of modern faith and experience in the matter of suffering.

Now those who hold the karma doctrine honour self-sacrificing heroism as much as we do, and speak of the glory of those who die in battle for the fatherland. But reflect for a moment how such action must be interpreted in accordance with karma. Take the cross of Christ : if we accept karma, then the only true account of His sufferings is this, that they were punishment meted out to Him in just measure for frightful deeds of which He had been guilty in a former existence. So every soldier, whether European or Indian, who passed through immeasurable pain, or who died on the battlefields of France or elsewhere, suffered all in expiation of sins done in a former life. Thus to describe their experience as self-devotion for others is merely to embrace an illusion.

Look at the other side. Even if we shut our eyes to this aspect of karma and agree to call their sufferings and death voluntary acts, heroically welcomed and carried out in genuine self-sacrifice for others, we should have to admit that their heroism was utterly futile, that they died for a mirage. They died to save others from dire calamity, from ravage and ruin, from slavery and death ; but, if the karma theory is true, their loved ones would have been saved as surely apart from their self-devotion ; for no calamity can fall except where karma brings retribution for past sins. No effort on our part can avert calamity or bring calamity : karma will act whatever we do. Thus self-sacrifice is robbed absolutely of its moral splendour, for it is powerless to save others. There are some modern writers who contend that transmigration and karma may be fitted into Christianity.

Surely everyone must feel that, in this matter of self-sacrifice and voluntary suffering for others, the gulf is unbridgeable.

(f) Take next the question of *guilt*. In cases where wrongdoing seriously affects others, the karma doctrine seems to the modern mind seriously inadequate. Take the case of a child born blind as a result of his father's misconduct. Modern science has proved in the most conclusive way possible that the father is the cause of the child's blindness: he is the guilty person. According to the karma doctrine, on the other hand, the child is born blind because of his own sin: he is the guilty person. The Hindu will acknowledge that the father did wrong in living an impure life, but he will also urge that the child who is now his own blind child would have been born blind in some other family if he had lived a pure life. Thus the conception of the father's guilt according to karma is quite different from the modern idea of his guilt. Its sting is largely removed; for his evil life did not injure his child in the slightest.¹ Or take the question of the war once more. We need not decide who the men were who made the war. Whoever they were, we know what immeasurable suffering and loss they brought to the world by their act—the millions of lost lives, the countless shattered bodies, broken families and broken hearts, and all the devastation they caused. What sort of a bill of guilt is thus piled up against them! But, according to karma, they did not cause a single death, a single stab of pain, a single sorrow that would not have come quite apart from their act. Every person that suffered in the war came into the world doomed inevitably, because of his sin, to endure all that came upon him; and the full amount of suffering would have come upon them all if there had been no war. The authors of the war have no particle of guilt of that type lying on them. Clearly here again the modern mind must judge between two moral conceptions which stand worlds apart from each other.

(g) Take next the idea of *individual responsibility for others*, my responsibility for my children, my relationships with my neighbours, my influence on the community I belong to, on the nation and on the race. The discussions

¹ If we think this case out in Hindu fashion, we shall see how completely divorced from facts the karma theory is. Since retribution normally comes not in the life in which the sin is committed but in a later, the karmic explanation of the birth of the blind child of our text would be this, that the child was born blind because of sin he had committed in a former life, while the father and the mother suffered the calamity of having a blind child born to them because of sin committed by each of them in a former life.

we have just had of suffering and guilt show that the modern ideal of responsibility for others does not arise in the same form at all, if the karma doctrine is intelligently held and followed. The whole idea that by a single act I may bring ruin to others is excluded by the karma doctrine. The Hindu unquestionably is trained to do his duty by his parents, his family, his caste, his community, and his country; but the laws which impose these obligations come from the old *dharma*, which took shape in ancient India before the rise of the doctrine of transmigration and karma, and have continued their healthy influence in this regard in spite of it. The whole tendency of karma is individualistic. But, if I cannot by my actions bring upon my children, my townsmen, my fellow-countrymen or others any suffering, disability, or degradation that would not fall on them apart from me, then my responsibility for them is emptied of all real meaning. The distance between the two systems in this regard is of boundless significance.

(h) Take *divine forgiveness*. This conception has no place in the law of karma, and certain large groups of Hindus who interpret karma strictly have definitely denied the possibility of divine forgiveness. That is the position of the Ārya Samāj, for example, to-day. Now, personally, I do not see that the theory of karma is altogether irreconcilable with faith in God's will and power to forgive; for divine forgiveness deals primarily not with any suffering or evil consequences that may necessarily follow from human sin. God's forgiveness is, in the first instance at least, the reconciliation of the repentant sinner to his Father, the establishment of the filial relationship once more; and it is conceivable that someone might believe that God would be reconciled to the sinner and yet inflict on him the full tale of suffering due to him for his misdeeds. But, clearly, the karma doctrine belongs to a totally different moral climate from that in which faith in divine forgiveness arose. Nor is that strange; for, when the karma theory took shape in the seventh century B.C., theism did not exist in India. The men who created the doctrine were polytheists; and therefore the furthest upward stretch which their theology could have taken would have been to suppose that one of the many gods might exercise forgiveness: in such circumstances the Christian idea of the forgiving love of the one God and Father of men could not arise. The modifications of the doctrine of karma, which we mentioned earlier as having taken place in the course of the centuries, arose almost exclusively because of the rise of theistic beliefs in India. The brighter the light

of theism became, the darker karma showed up against it. Thus the man who believes in the fullest sense in the divine forgiveness will not accept the doctrine of karma.

(i) Take *calamity*. What is more common in human life than the tendency, when a man suffers some serious calamity, to exclaim, "What a sinner he must have been!" The karma doctrine raises that natural temptation to the position of an absolute moral law. A little Hindu child-wife suddenly loses her husband: according to karma she must have sinned grievously in a previous life. A rich man suddenly loses all his wealth, a man of high character falls a victim to a frightful accident, or loses all his children by disease: in each case the calamity is the direct result of sin in a former life. Thus the karma theory definitely bids the Hindu, the Jain, and the Buddhist recognise that the person who suffers from calamity has been guilty of heinous sin. In certain Hindu circles the theory, in the case of the widow, is that she must have been unfaithful to her husband in a previous life.

Against this tendency Christ gave His disciples the clearest possible warning upon two separate occasions—when He gave sight to the man born blind,¹ and when He was told about the Galileans, whose blood, by order of Pontius Pilate, was mingled with their sacrifices on the altar in the temple of Jerusalem.² No man who understands the spirit of Christ will turn upon a man caught in sudden calamity and tell him that it is a divine judgment on him for sin. Here once more Christianity stands in full contradiction to karma; and in this case the modern mind will scarcely hesitate as to which suggests the healthier moral attitude.

(j) If calamity is punishment for serious sin, clearly my *pity* will not be drawn out towards the sufferer as it would be if I believed that his was a case of unmerited suffering. The doctrine of karma thus inevitably acts as a serious check on the rise of kindly compassion. The good man will certainly feel pity in any case; but in the mind of every person who holds the doctrine seriously the flow of compassion is necessarily hindered in some degree. In order that it may not be thought that the writer is conjuring up an empty apparition, I here repeat a story which I quoted, from a Brahmo observer, in one of my books years ago:—

"Let me record another instance." It occurred at Madras during one of my visits there. One morning, as I was engaged in my studies in my lodgings, news was brought me that a remarkable Hindu widow had come

¹ John ix. 1-7.

² Luke xiii. 1-5.

with a peculiar mission to the house of a friend of mine. I went to the place to meet her. When there I found a young woman, a widow and an ascetic, majestically seated like a devotee and singing a Tamil song. They told me it was a song in praise of her deity. As she was singing with her hand on her little stringed instrument, big tear-drops were trickling down her cheeks. The psalm over, I began to converse with her through an interpreter. Her whole history was this—she belonged to a respectable middle-class family; and after her widowhood she took a vow of attaching herself as a maid-servant to the Temple of Tirupati. She was still attached to the Temple, and on this occasion had come to Madras to collect funds to give a new set of jewellery to her god. My mind at the time was being seriously exercised by the case of a number of famine orphans whom I had met in the streets. I opened the proposal of starting a shelter and an orphanage for these children, and asked her if she could be a mother to them. My proposal fell flat upon her mind. She did not look upon it as a religious act. As far as I remember, she observed, ‘What have I to do with these children who have lost caste by taking food at the hands of all castes? They are suffering the consequences of their acts in a previous state of existence; who can help them? That is no business of mine.’¹

Personally, I believe this action of the karma doctrine in hindering the rise of pity is the explanation why for so many centuries the tenderness of the Hindu heart was not drawn out towards the misery of the outcastes who lived around them.² To-day things are steadily changing, and noble Hindu hearts have begun to respond to their pitiful need.

(k) Think now of *service towards those in distress*. If karma checks the flow of pity towards men in calamity, clearly it will also tend to hinder the impulse towards loving service. The man who goes out of his way to serve his fellow-man is stirred by two convictions—first, “My brother is in dire need”; and secondly, “I can give him help which will save him from a good deal of suffering.” But the karma theory runs, that as each soul comes into the world a justly fixed sum of suffering is attached to it in punishment of former misdeeds; and no matter what the man himself may

¹ Sastri, *Mission of the Brahmo Somaj*, 56 f.

² This is the more noticeable since some of the Bhakti sects tried to help them religiously.

attempt to do to escape his destiny, and no matter how much others may do to rescue him from suffering, the full tale will inevitably be exacted from him. Thus the karma theory blocks both the springs of service, checking pity, on the one hand, and the hope that service will prove fruitful, on the other. Thus, if we wish to rouse men to service of their fellow-men, we shall not teach them the doctrine of karma.

(1) Finally, take *progress*. We all realise how much of the vigour and life of the modern world is due to belief in the possibility of progress. If men cannot believe that their struggles and sacrifices will prove fruitful, the heart is taken out of them. Now karma declares that it is true, with regard to all the embodied souls in the world at any particular moment, that not only the amount of joy and sorrow that will fall to them, but the general tenor of the lives they are to live is already irrevocably fixed, completely beyond the reach of human effort, of national upheaval, or even of world revolution. Conceive how these convictions will influence the thoughts of the bravest in relation to the hope of bettering the lives of men! Karma necessarily works most seriously against progress.

Thus karma is seen to be inherently inconsistent with each of these master-forces of modern moral life. If a man honestly think the matter through, it is impossible to hold karma along with these lofty moral ideas. It is a stiff old theory, arising out of early ethical beliefs which the moral experience of the world has completely outgrown.

IV. Thus the right estimate of the karma doctrine seems to be that its limitless scope, its moral seriousness, its inescapable clutch give it great attractiveness; that it contains a considerable amount of moral truth; that it has been of large service to the Asiatic peoples who have lived under it; and that the pressure on the European mind of its more inexorable elements, especially the conviction that the soul that sins inevitably suffers, will be distinctly healthy as a counterpoise to materialistic mockings at the moral law, and to flabby ideas of divine forgiveness; but that the more carefully the theory is examined in the light of Christian ethical conceptions, the more unsatisfactory it will be seen to be; and that the progress of modern education and service in Asia, which has already seriously weakened the influence of karmic law in the minds of the educated, will surely if slowly lead to its disappearance.

J. N. FARQUHAR.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.

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THERE has been, of recent years, a good deal of discussion about the relation of religion to philosophy, so that I need not offer any apology for taking up the subject here. I have a further claim to make a few remarks, since my treatment of this topic in my *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* has been much misunderstood. When I call for a rational testing of religious beliefs and contend that metaphysics need seek for no authority outside itself, I intend no disrespect for religion or any other subject. On the other hand, I am so deeply concerned about the future of religion, that I wish, if I can, to save it from the charlatan and the opportunist who are exploiting the unrest of the present age. Bewildered by the conflict between science and faith, the mass of mankind is in a mood to listen to any gospel. The more unphilosophical the new prophet is, the stronger seems to be his appeal. He who frowns down other systems of thought and belief, and preaches his own with a great air of finality and assurance, has the chance of catching the ear of the public. Just now the world is in search of its god, and so presents a very impressive spectacle. The true living God can be found only if we do not divorce feeling from reflection. If we cease to *think* in matters of religion, we shall be led into blind alleys.

At the outset I wish to draw a distinction between religious philosophy, which I repudiate, and philosophical religion, which I advocate. By the former I mean a philosophy which comes to conclusions not on grounds of reason or adequacy to life in the larger sense of the term, but on those of utility in practice or use in life interpreted in a narrow way. I do not mean to say that religious faith, which is the most precious thing in life, is to be dropped out of account in any philosophic endeavour. Nor do I suggest

that religious ideas are to be thrown out simply because they are religious. All that I contend for is, that they are to be accepted in any thought system, not because they are the central features of this or that religion, but because they have inherent weight or value. I protest against the temper which is too lazy to think out philosophical problems and is too ready to accept traditional answers to ultimate questions. I admit that, for those incapable of philosophising, religion is a ready substitute for philosophy, since it also offers a world-view. But such an acceptance of religious views, which is another name for intellectual indolence, is, at any rate in philosophy, a sin. A thinking mind can accept ideas only because they are true. The moment they cease to be true, they cannot have much value even in religion. To a philosopher—and all men, so far as they are thinking beings, are philosophers—only true ideas have religious value. A religion based on truth is a philosophical religion. It is not simply that which appeals to those born in a particular tradition and bred up in a special spiritual atmosphere, but is that which convinces even the searching sceptic. The philosophers, in the vital sense of the term, are those who breathe the mountain air of free-thought and inquiry. Though they are not willing to accept the sacred scriptures in blind faith, they are ever ready to bow down to the dust before the majesty of truth, when once it conquers their intellects. A religion which satisfies the standards of truth is a philosophical religion, and there *is* and there *ought to be* such a religion, since religious nature is also of the divine substance of life.

I do not propose here to give any account of what I consider to be the philosophical religion. My present purpose is only to clear up the relation between religion and philosophy as I understand it, and try to justify my protest against philosophic indolence.

Religion as an integral experience is a genuine form of spiritual life. It is what is deepest and most distinctive in man, belonging to the very essence of his life. As the child is afraid to be alone in the dark, so is man in awful fear in this world until he finds some consoling support in it. Religious experience starts from this need. Man tries to place himself in harmony with the secret of the universe. The religious impulse craves for unity with God or oneness with the whole of being. The characteristic note of all true religious experience is the feeling of an intuitive or perceptual or immediate certitude of God. Religion does not consist in the celebration of ceremonies or acceptance of

academic abstractions, but is an experience of reality, an immediate awareness of God. It is the inevitable flowering of man's life, not estranged from tradition and practice, emotion and reason. The inner experience which each man can have for himself is the only religious revelation possible. It is nothing mysterious or miraculous. It is not something given to man once and for all, in some remote past or distant land. It comes to each man in his own life and with great authority. Each individual is immediately aware of an infinitely greater mind and soul than his own. When overlaid by the traditional element, the object of this awareness seems to vary, and the experience itself seems to take a thousand shapes, from the superstitions of the savage to the universal love of Buddha, the mystic joy of the Upanishadic seers, or the philosophical faith of Plato, in the essential unity and ultimate supremacy of beauty, goodness, and truth. The fashions of approach towards the establishing of a harmonious relation between the finite man and the power greater than himself, also vary from the barbarous sacrifices of the primitive peoples up to the faith and love of the most advanced. From this, it is clear that the religious idea dominates the whole life of man, though its essence consists in the immediate awareness or felt certainty of God. The revelation of reality in the religious experience has a compelling power over the mind of man. In spite of the overwhelmingly emotional character of this experience, the rational element is not absent from it. The sense of objectivity is intense. Before proceeding further, I may observe how philosophy has here an important function to fulfil. Philosophy, or theology as it is called while it functions in the department of religion, has to reconcile this experimental datum with the rest of experience and the rest of experience with it. This is mainly a philosophical problem directly relevant only to those who share the spiritual experience, though it has also its use for others who, though they do not share the experience, still believe in its existence and validity. Thus, even if religion bases itself on an experienced fact, though it does not care to submit to any other authority, there remains for philosophy the essential task of harmonising the different experiences and thereby rendering religion itself self-conscious. Without such a philosophical rethinking into a whole of knowledge, religion would remain a mere superstition.

Religion, as we have described it, though *sui generis*, is a complex experience, a many-sided fact. As an attitude of the whole mind, it involves elements of knowing, feeling, and willing. These aspects cannot be separated from each

other, though they can all be distinguished within the complex fact of religion. Separation in thought is not separation in existence. We may now briefly pass in review the various characters manifested in religious experience, and notice the part played by tradition or dogma, mystic fact or feeling, ethical value, and rational judgment.

Tradition or Dogma.—In living religion there is no subjection to any authority except to the compelling one of immediate spiritual perception. To him who feels the presence of God no further logical proof is necessary. God is *felt* by him, and the feeling seems to silence all doubt. But the compulsion of feeling is subjective and imperfectly communicable. For others who do not share the feeling, the reality of God is uncertain. They have not personally realised the experience. The experimental basis is wanting for them. They have to depend on other people's experiences as embodied in their reflections. They have to work by faith till it becomes sight. They have not yet seen, they can only believe. Living in a fog, they must worship the sun that they have not seen. Through the acceptance of faith they have to gain the experience. The traditional or dogmatic religion becomes the pathway to reality. It provides the clue to the attainment of the truth. Without it, it may not be possible to gain the religious experience. So St Paul wished his Roman correspondents to be filled with "the joy and peace in believing." The venture of faith will be progressively justified in life. The tradition does not become vital truth until it is made one's own, a part of one's life and seen with one's spirit. Only then does religion cease to be external to the mind of man and become the all-pervading principle of life. Tradition is the stepping-stone to truth.

Tradition determines the problems, raises the difficulties, and suggests modes of approach to the attainment of the true. We cannot wholly break away from it. The spiritual truth happens to be formulated in different ways simply because the seers are bred in different traditions. A first view of the history of religion tells us that there are no dependable realities at all in it, while a second view inclines us to think that the experience of the spiritual reality is one, though its logical elaborations are many. There is agreement in the foundational fact that the soul of man is included in something greater and more permanent than itself.

The difficulties of attaining the religious insight scare away many who are tempted to lean on other people's experiences, and thus acquire a religion which is only second-

hand. The weaker brethren are content to enjoy the consolations of religion without themselves being religious. Tradition helps them to live in conformity with the religious requirements, though not out of the religious motive. Religion, popularly understood, is of this kind, dogmatic, traditional, and authoritarian. The distinguishing marks of conventional religion are belief in dogma and dependence on authority. Such a religion is that of the spinal cord and not of the brain. As animals exercise vital functions by the mere force of habit, even when the brain is removed, so do men live believing in the shadow of a shade, doing good to please God, whose reality they have faith in, though not perception of. If the tradition depresses, it is always open to us to say what the good curate said to his parishioners whom he threw all into tears when preaching to them on the Passion: "My children, do not weep so much as that; it happened long ago, and even, perhaps, it is not quite true."

All the same, respect for tradition is not altogether illogical. Tradition tends to convey the intense spiritual experience to other people and, if possible, rouse it in them. It serves as the basis of reflection. It interprets the spiritual experience of man in accordance with the intellectual and moral needs of the age in which it is formulated. The Bible, the Talmud, the Quran, and the Hindu scriptures embody different traditions which speak in different voices. Traditional beliefs deserve considerate treatment, since they have the experience of the ages behind them. Only, we have to remember that the experience is one thing and its expression another. The conception of truth or reality is different from its realisation. The feeling is private and ineffable, while the formula employs words and symbols which are common counters with settled connotations. If we forget the tentative and instrumental character of traditions, we shall be disloyal to the spirit of religion and begin to fight about false issues. The experience is profounder than any theory or tradition. At the time of its formulation, perhaps, the tradition may have represented in an adequate manner what is felt then to be overwhelmingly vital in the experience. We have no need to doubt its value so long as it is stimulating and satisfying. It is supreme till it is surpassed, as being only a partial or one-sided expression of truth. Advance in knowledge makes the formula lose its value, and attempts are made to recover the spirit underlying it and express it in more adequate terms. Beliefs which once had religious value are now discarded, since they are not appropriate to the new intellectual environment. The idea of

eternal punishment possessed for Christendom enormous value for centuries. To-day we feel it to be outraging to our ethical sense of justice, and we are wondering how good people ever came to believe it. The founders of religion have been distinguished by their indifference, if not opposition, to tradition. Taking their stand on immediate perception or direct personal experience, they sometimes flout and fight tradition. They know that every tradition has an idea incorporated in it, and so long as the idea is vital the tradition is valued. But if the idea is extinct the tradition becomes an anachronism. It becomes the task of religious leaders to reinforce tradition and create forms of faith and utterance which would more adequately express the religious experience. By discarding traditional religion, or recasting it, they push religion along. Traditions can live only through an incessant process of testing and reshaping. The history of religion is little else than a repeated reinterpretation and reshaping of old beliefs in view of advancing knowledge and thought. Philosophy insists that religious beliefs should agree with the dictates of true nationality. Only through the work of reflection can we make traditions and faiths, feelings and emotions, symbols of truth and vehicles of ideals. Only then does traditional faith become the substance of things unseen.

We must, now and again, ask whether the traditional religion has any genuine experience behind it, and whether it expresses it in terms of the time spirit. If we avoid such an inquiry, the tradition tends to become a dead one, intolerant of truth and destructive of the spiritual sense. Traditional faith which survives the decay of dogma is ineffective and artificial and opposed to all true religion.

At the present day, we are forced to reconsider inherited beliefs, and bring about a harmony between them and the rest of our experience. Crises in life put ideas to the test, and the recent international war has been very unsettling in its character. The rapid progress of scientific knowledge and the deeper interest in religion have led to a widespread tendency to reform or reconstruct traditional religion, if not replace it by something more rational and less superstitious. Here again is an excellent chance for philosophy.

Mystic Feeling.—Religious experience starts from a fact or a datum. It is a consciousness of God, emotionally coloured. A sense of certitude accompanies it. Philosophy is called upon to scrutinise the subjective feeling and find out to what extent it possesses truth and objectivity. A feeling is valuable only by its results for reflection. A

caustic critic, speaking of James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, remarks that James arrives at no distinction between religion and delirium tremens. The savage finds comfort in his superstition, and the savant strength in his religion. Totems and fetishes are not without psychological efficiency, though they cannot hope to thrive to-day in the world of thought. Through the help of philosophy, we have to find out whether there is anything objective about the religious feeling which is obviously private and personal to each individual. Were religious experience devoid of any objective element, then we should be landed in difficulties. The living God of truth and spirit will be displaced by our ideas of God, the cheap substitutes for which our new prophets are the advertising agents. What has cast ridicule on religion and led some well-intentioned men to discredit all mystic experience as pathological, being only an illusory illumination, mystical ecstasy, or emotional rapture, is traceable to a neglect of rational reflection in religious matters. What is not rational cannot be real. If philosophy does not establish the reality of the object of the mystic consciousness, the mystic experience loses its integrity and value. The attempt of Mr B. Russell to substitute art for religion, and lead us to æsthetic contemplation with its temporary freedom from the Sisyphean struggle with desire, is not satisfactory either as philosophy or as religion. He tells us that the power which exists is evil, and the God whom we can worship is a creation of our own conscience and has no existence outside it. If we do not refuse to recognise facts we have to worship either the wicked reality that exists or a God that does not exist. But we cannot love an unreality or pursue a phantom. It is a vain stretching forth of arms towards something that can never fill them. Religious consciousness firmly believes in the existence of its object, in an ontological sense. There is an ultimate and independently existing reality. The consciousness of immediate contact with reality is no illusion. The truest religion has for its object the highest reality. "That which is filled with the more real is more really filled" (Plato).

Not only should philosophy test the value of the subjective assurances, but it should also take them into account and, so far as they are valid, fit them into its explanatory theory. The implications of the mystic experience which is capable of being roused at any time on compliance with ascertained conditions, require to be explained by any satisfactory philosophy. Mysticism believes in the ultimate

oneness of subject and object, the observer and the observed. Mystic knowledge is the immediate witness of reality to itself. Logical proof comes later and is secondary in its character. The mystic education assumes the position that at the bottom of his soul every individual is in contact with the real. We must rend the veil of appearances to see the eternal life in things. Mystic training consists in a "hindrance of hindrances," or the removal of the clogging obstructions to the manifestation of the real. To break down these separating veils, different religions insist on different disciplines. Worship, which is an essential feature of all religions, in addition to the discovery of truth and the pursuit of the good, has this end in view. It is possible to attain the revelation of the supreme reality in each mind and heart through its own special path. We need not prescribe any one way for all. Through logical insight, through emotional intensity, through the constant practice of some form of the highest, the end may be gained; and when it is gained, the experience seems to have a self-certifying character. And a true philosophy must account for it.

Ethical Implications.—The spiritual intuition gives strength and support, peace and consolation, to man, and sanctifies all phases of his life. Religion is not a mere belief which floats on the surface of man's life, but a dynamic force which stirs the very depths of his soul. Religious views have their implications for life in this world. Religion is also practice of the presence of God. Love of God passes into an intense longing for union with Him, inspiring the individual to an effort to become as perfect as "the Father in Heaven." The ethical aspect of religion has attracted in a special degree the attention of European writers, particularly those of Great Britain. God is more goodness than truth or beauty. From the time the ancient Greeks taught the European world, the good has been put at the centre of the universe. Plato makes Socrates say in the *Phædo* that it is the good which holds the universe together, and the final justification of all things in the world is that they represent the *best* possible arrangement. Kant bases religious truth on ethical consciousness. Religion to him is a postulate of morality. To Butler the secret of the universe is revealed through morals. To him God is the "great moral governor." Carlyle and Newman, Martineau and Matthew Arnold, are preoccupied with the sense of moral responsibility. To Matthew Arnold religion is nothing more than morality touched with emotion, and God the ever-

lasting power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness. According to Dr Galloway, religious consciousness is "man's faith in a power beyond himself, whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service" (*The Philosophy of Religion*). Mr B. Russell in his latest book on Bolshevism defines religion as "a set of beliefs held as dogmas dominating the conduct of life, going beyond or contrary to evidence, and inculcated by methods which are emotional or authoritarian, not intellectual." According to Croce, we have the full and consistent vindication of the moral life in the religious.

It is true that a good life is the service of God, and that ethical considerations establish the reality of God. Yet religion cannot be identified with moral life. The essence of religion consists in the spiritual intuition. However self-evident this intuition may be, it is not philosophically sound till it is known to be adequate in all respects, theoretical and practical alike.

Rational Factor.—The "reason" aspect of religion is emphasised by the thinkers of India as well as Germany, who seek in religion for an ultimate solution of the doubts, disputes, and distractions which beset the thinking mind in this enigmatical world. This enthusiasm for reason has inspired the many mighty efforts of system-building in Germany. Hegel sums up the spirit of German speculative adventure in the statement that "thinking too is divine service." It is the form of worship which the intellectually-minded offer to the divine reality. Simply because religion is a vital issue concerning the deepest needs of humanity, we need not ask philosophy to hold its tongue. The destructive effect of rational criticism on the orthodox beliefs has led some to free religion from the criticism of reason. But reason, which has dealt a deathblow to religious mythology, has in it healing virtues as well. If reflection has inflicted wounds on religious faith, further reflection will heal up the wounds. It is useless to ask us to suppress all thought. We cannot be saved from the exercise of reason. Philosophy is a natural bent of the human mind. Ultimately there cannot be any discord between religious certainty and philosophical truth. God is Eternal Reason. He inspires the deep, religious yearning, and has granted us the gift of reason. It is the function of philosophy to show that the hope in us is not an unreasonable one, and it is possible to reconcile the strenuous life of reason with the reality of religious experience. It is wrong to think, as did some mediæval theologians, and Albert Ritschl in modern times,

that philosophical truth is one thing and religious truth another. However useful such a position may be as a temporary expedient to keep the two, religion and philosophy, safe from mutual interference, on the day of trial they will be found to regret this artificial separation. It is no use considering a theory to be true religiously simply because it has religious value. It cannot have religious value if it has not philosophical justification. A religion which cuts itself off from philosophy cannot meet the deeper needs of our consciousness. Truth is "what man recognises as value when his life is fullest and his soul at its highest stretch" (Bosanquet, *Individuality and Value*, p. 3). Ultimately, nothing can be religiously valuable unless it is logically true. False ideas supposed to possess religious value are tolerated only so long as we refuse to think them or state them clearly to ourselves. In unreflective consciousness, contradictory ideas may sleep together in unbroken harmony without coming into any active collision. But this naïveté and apparently healthy indifference to ultimate problems cannot last long. Even commonsense believes in the unity of thought; and when it becomes aware of contradictions in it, it is forced to reconcile them or give them up. The moment we notice the discord, the effort after inward harmony starts. Not only philosophy but even religion emphasises this unity of thought. The religious experience lifts man above the divided and fragmentary existence in which he usually lives, and reveals to him a unity which only philosophy can bring home to his thought. Mind cannot give up its faith in itself, and philosophy cannot help asserting its rights. Truth is a harmony, and there cannot be a gulf between religion and philosophy.

There are some who ask us to give up all philosophy, since it cramps, stifles and kills life. It is much better to live, love and believe than think, argue and debate. Blessed are they that feel but do not think. This is a false view of philosophy which shuts it off from life. Philosophy, rightly understood, is the inspiring and controlling energy of life. Quoting Chesterton, we might say that the most important thing about a man is his view of the universe; and the question is not whether our philosophy affects our life, but whether in the long run anything else does.

Religious consciousness is practical and personal, being a blend of faith, reason, emotion and will. According as the one or the other element predominates, we have the one or the other kind of religion. Where faith dominates, we have the traditional religion; where reason determines, we

have the philosophical religion; where emotion is uppermost, we have mystic religions; and with most men of the modern times religion is essentially a promoting of morality and goodness. In all genuine religion these four elements are found together, and it is dangerous to the vitality of religion if any one of them is exaggerated out of all proportion or completely sacrificed. Mere tradition, unsupported by reason and lacking the warmth of feeling or the zeal of heroism, is little better than mummery. Purely intellectual religion lands us in empty forms. Mysticism, if it is not to lapse into emotionalism, stands in need of self-criticism. Mechanical goodness, uninspired by spiritual assurance, is boring and ineffective. True religion has in it the four elements of a historic tradition, a mystic fact, an ethical life, and a philosophic judgment. Of them all, the last is the most important, since it has to decide how far the tradition is sustainable, or meaningful; whether the mystic fact is a true revelation of reality; whether the certitude it conveys is merely suggestive or also objective; and whether the ethical value it has is at the expense of truth or otherwise. When such vital questions are to be decided by philosophy, it is not right for the philosopher to start with any prejudice in favour of or against any of the elements. It is philosophy that has to determine the worth of religion, and not religion the philosophic outlook.

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OCCULTISM.

EDWARD CLODD.

I.¹

TENNYSON'S line in *Tithonus*, "Immortal age beside immortal youth," is applicable to the germ-plasm whence each one of us has sprung. It is eternally young and, relatively, deathless. From that remote period in the earth's history when life emerged, this astounding complex substance has carried the material from which have arisen, in advancing succession, from monad to man, the bodies of ancestors countless generations back. And it lives on in the youngest of generations with the unimpaired power of giving origin to innumerable millions—all of them transient offshoots of the World Life-Tree. Eternally productive, it is the marvel of marvels in a universe enfolded in impenetrable mystery. It is the vehicle of mind-power whose advance runs *pari passu* with increase in complexity of brain structure.

A keynote of the doctrine of Evolution is that of continuity. So far as that doctrine has a creed, continuity is a fundamental article of it. "Which faith except everyone do keep whole and undefiled without doubt"—scientifically—"he shall perish everlastingly." The psychical chain is unbroken. There may be leaps, but there are no gaps. The differences between the pulsations of an amoeba and the ecstasies of a saint are differences of degree, not of kind. That which in the lowest life-forms is a simple mechanism is, in the nervous system of the highest life-forms, a complex, highly specialised mechanism. Those who speak with authority are agreed that since man emerged from the proto-human stage there has, "so far as one can judge, been no far-reaching and progressive modification of instincts and emotions"; the fundamental advance being in man's acquisition of the necessary innate power of using his brain—whose cortex is composed of some nine thousand million cells²—to profit by

¹ A second article will appear in January.—EDITOR.

² *The System of Animate Nature*, vol. ii. p. 558, Professor J. A. Thomson.

experience, the accumulated products of which he has handed on to succeeding generations. This was made possible by language, "that stupendous product of the collective mind"! "I think," says Professor Elliot Smith, "it not unlikely that the acquisition of the means of communication with his fellows by vocal symbols may have been one of the essential factors in converting man's ultimate simian ancestor into a real man."¹ By instincts is meant the bundle of habits and activities common to animals of the same species which are transmitted, ready made and in complete working order, by means of the nervous apparatus inherited—great is the mystery of heredity—from their forerunners. Herbert Spencer defined instinct as "a kind of organised memory"; Samuel Butler calls it "inherited memory." However we may define them, instincts are the *prime movers* of animal activities; they supply the driving power by which those activities are sustained. They, primarily, have determined the course of human history, through the affects, or specific emotions, which they have severally aroused: hence, as will be seen, their direct bearing on my subject.

The recognition of this fact has brought about a revolution in the science of psychology. The older theory over-emphasised the part played by the reason in conduct, and took too little account of the persistence of the instincts and emotions. Hence it left the greater part of conduct unexplained, taking for granted that men, in the bulk, are rational beings, and in their actions prompted accordingly. Small blame to them. For the science of comparative psychology, with its evidence that the human mind is part and parcel of the processes of evolution, is barely sixty years old. The pioneers of that science had to walk warily. On the last page of the *Origin of Species* Darwin dared no more than hint that his theory would "throw light on the origin of man and his history"; and in the *Descent of Man*, published twelve years later, in 1871, he explained that his reticence was due to "a desire not to add to the prejudice" against his views. Four years after the *Origin* appeared, Huxley, greatly daring, pushed the theory of natural selection to its logical issue in his lectures on the *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, wherein he shocked not only the "unco guid," but some of his fellow-savants, by the statement that "the attempt to draw a psychical distinction between the animal world and ourselves is futile, and that even the highest faculties of feeling and of intellect begin to germinate in lower forms of life."² As proof of the unpreparedness of the

¹ *Proc. Brit. Academy*, vol. vii. p. 13.

² P. 109 (1863 edition).

scientific world to welcome that brave deliverance, he told me in a letter, which is not the least of my treasures, that a very shrewd friend of his implored him not to publish the lectures, as this would "certainly ruin all his prospects." The shrewd friend was Sir William Lawrence, whose counsel was based on personal experience. He had made an application to the Court of Chancery to protect his rights in respect of a book on the *Natural History of Man* (1819), and this Lord Eldon refused to grant, on the ground that "the book contradicted the Scriptures." What water has passed under the bridges, carrying any amount of "rubbish to the void," since those days, has further example in Sir Francis Galton's *Memories*. He says that when he was at Cambridge "the best-informed men believed that the whole history of the early world was contained in the Pentateuch" (p. 66). So it has come to be: "Old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new." We have proof, heaped like Ossa on Pelion, that man is no exception among living things, and the new psychology, like Wisdom, "is justified of her children." Surveying the whole field of mental life, with all the non-rational and unconscious processes which it covers, the fact stands out clear that the power of conscious reasoning is a later development in psychical evolution. It plays a secondary part in the most highly advanced man. He, no less than the savage, is a creature of impulses; for the emotional, from its very nature, is impulsive. On the whole, he is "a passionate and credulous creature, the slave of his instincts and of the suggestions arising from them, or from the most dubious external sources which may simulate authority"¹ and prefer bogus claims. In his suggestive book on *Social Psychology*, Dr M'Dougall says: "The truth is that men are moved by a variety of impulses whose nature has been determined through long ages of the evolutionary process without reference to the life of men in civilised societies." And he adds that "mankind is only but a little bit reasonable, and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways" (p. 11). In one of his last letters Herbert Spencer says: "In my earlier days I continually made the foolish supposition that conclusive proof would change belief, but experience has long since dissipated my faith in man's rationality."² The philosopher is backed by the divine. In his *Outspoken Essays*, Dean Inge caustically puts it thus: "All we have a right to say is that individuals are occasionally guided by reason; crowds

¹ *The New Psychology*, pp. 14, 158, by A. G. Tansley.

² *Times*, September 3, 1904.

never" (p. 9). Primitive sympathy, begotten of the herd-instinct, and the power of suggestiveness, combine to effect this, and the contention which will run through this discourse is that the believers in Occultism do not act as reasoning beings. To that extent they must be classed among the mentally defective. These facts give pause to think whether the arrogant, self-vaunting term *Homo sapiens* (wise) should not be replaced by the more applicable *Homo insipiens* (foolish). As bearing on this matter, let us take a couple of familiar examples of common incapacity to judge of the value of evidence in the simplest matters, and of the power of credulity. The first, which will occur to most of us, was the credence given to a rumour that on a night in September 1914, thousands of Russian soldiers had crossed England *en route* to the Western front. The story was not inherently improbable, and it was not in the interest of the War Office to contradict it, but the imaginary details which buttressed it betrayed the power of crowd-credulity. The delusion was endemic. Nearly everyone whom you met assured you that he or she had seen the train which conveyed the troops, or that they knew somebody who had. Perhaps "the limit" was reached in the story told by Dr Culpin in his *Spiritualism and the New Psychology*, that one of his friends, a man eminent in a profession which demands clear thinking, assured him that his own brother-in-law was responsible for the arrangement for the railway transport of the troops (p. 57)!

My second example is supplied by the legend of the angel bowmen at Mons, who, led by St George, aided the retreat of our troops. In acceptance of this by a number of presumably intelligent persons credulity reached its nadir. What is the fact? On 29th September 1914 Mr Arthur Machen published in the *Evening News* an imaginary story of help rendered to soldiers by spirits. To quote his own words, the fiction was speedily converted into "a monstrous mass of legend" and widely accepted as an actual occurrence. He accounted for this conversion of vague rumours into facts as due to so prevalent a materialistic view of things ruling at the time, that people were prepared "to believe anything—save the truth" (*John o' London's Weekly*, 12th April 1919, p. 4). Anyway, the story gathered, fungus-like, a mass of testimony of a sort. It was affirmed that dead Prussians had been found on the battlefield with arrow wounds in their bodies. But the arrows were not producible. A wounded lance-corporal asserted that he and his comrades had seen strange lights and outstretched wings during the retreat. A private

named Cleaver, of the 1st Cheshire Regiment, swore to a written statement made before Mr Hazelhurst, a J.P. at Birkenhead, that he was "personally at Mons and saw the visions of angels with his own eyes."

"Truth will out sometimes, even in an affidavit," said a brilliant judge, I think the late Lord Bowen. But in the case of Private Cleaver's sworn statement, which purported to contain "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," there was a flaw. The regimental records show that he was in England at the time!

The myth became a welcome text for sermons. "I am certain," said the Rev. Samuel Chadwick, President of the Wesleyan Conference, "that angels were at Mons, that there were unseen mighty forces that saved our men."

It is a matter for regret that this supernatural help was only spasmodic; had it been rendered more continuously, thousands of lives would have been saved and a terrible war shortened.

As for St George, the Arabs have a tradition that, after his death, he became a Moslem (they say the same of Jesus and his Mother), and that he led his hosts to wholesale slaughter of the infidel Nasrânies, as they call the Christians.¹ Folk-lore and history supply numerous parallel legends of angelic intervention on the battlefield. Quoting some of these, Gibbon, with his mixture of insight and irony, says that "the astonished fancy of the multitude has sometimes given shape and colour, language and motion, to the fleeting but uncommon meteors of the air."² Truly, given the predisposition, fog, mirage, and cloud-processions become causes of optical illusions interpreted as celestial visions.

It is "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." The human nervous system is built on the same lines; and the more unstable that system, the lower is the mentality and the more are men the trembling, affrighted slaves of a heap of superstitions—offspring of fear in the presence of the unknown and the unusual. For, hide it as we may from ourselves, there is a mass of quickly aroused fear in all of us—a heritage from a long animal and human past; potent alike for good and evil. Then, too, there is that power of suggestion whose influence upon the crowd is abiding and dominant. Expectancy prepares it to see and believe what it is told. Is not the lesson therefrom that the art of life consists in that control of the emotions, and that diversion of

¹ *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, vol. i. p. 474, by C. M. Doughty (1921 reprint).

² *Decline and Fall*, chap. xx.

them into wholesome channels, which reason, equipped with the latest knowledge and unfettered in the application of it, can alone effect ?

Thus much by way of warrantable preamble. For it is in the persistent rule of the emotions, and in the unchecked play of non-rational activities, that we find the key to the origin of all the manifold beliefs and practices among barbaric and civilised races which are grouped under the name Occultism. That word is of modern coinage. Like its cognate forms, it is derived from the Latin *occulo*, "to cover over" or "hide," and its appropriateness lies in the fact that nearly all the phenomena of Spiritualism take place in the dark or in a dim red-shaded light. The ingenious explanation of this—which satisfies the credulous—is that the delicately materialised forms of the spirits would be destroyed by the action of unrefracted light rays, strong sunlight being destructive to both animal and vegetable protoplasm. There is an ancient text that "men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil"; and my sympathy is with Dowlas the farrier in *Silas Marner*: "If ghos's want me to believe in 'em, let 'em leave off skulking i' the dark and i' lone places—let 'em come where's company and candles." But if Occultism is a new word, it is, in the ideas which it expresses, and in the history which it embraces, "as old as the hills." It is an outcome of a widespread belief of the lower races in the operation of an impersonal, ceaselessly acting, universally diffused power which, borrowing the word common to the whole Pacific, is called *Mana*. It is by this power that wizards, diviners, medicine-men, and mediums, all the world over, perform their tricks; it is the very stuff of which the vast company of spiritual beings—souls, ghosts, demons, angels good and bad, godlings and gods—are made. It remains a fundamental element in the higher thought—in mysticism, metaphysics, and transcendental philosophies, linking the lower and the higher speculations; thus evidencing that we have more in common with the barbaric mind than we know, or are willing to admit.

" All thoughts that mould the age begin
Deep down within the primitive soul,
And from the many slowly upward win
To one who grasps the whole."

What is Herbert Spencer's "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed"; what is Dean Inge's ever-operating "Soul of the World," but *Mana* ?

The non-living and the living being alike credited with

Mana, there follows the tendency of the primitive mind to project its own personality on the forces of nature. Hence the origin of Animism, or belief in indwelling spirits everywhere. "There is," says Hume in his *Natural History of Religion*, "an universal tendency amongst mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted and of which they are intimately conscious" (Section 3). Anthropological study and research have proved the existence of this "universal tendency." And it is on this animistic foundation that savage, classical, medieval, and modern Spiritualism alike rest. Dreams, to the savage, are real events; they exercise influence on the timid and semi-civilised; and there can be no question that they are the most important factors in creating belief in disembodied or quasi-bodied intelligences among all races, whether savage or civilised. These factors are supplemented by such phenomena as shadows, reflections, echoes, and abnormal states due to disease, or to the illusions brought about by stuffing or starving. Even those of us who know their phantom nature may well pause before the phenomena of dual personalities with whom in our dreams we hold debate, while we supply the arguments for both sides, the individual self being at once victor and defeated.

Occultism may be classified as *lower*, *medial*, and *higher*, each blending inseparably with the other, like the colours of the rainbow. The *lower* Occultism embraces savage and modern Spiritualism. The Society for Psychical Research has recently planted an offshoot in Glasgow, but it has not yet established branches among the lower races. Surely it is a great oversight to neglect a field whose first-fruits already furnish proofs that, whether the spirits play their pranks in Central Australia, Polynesia, Boston, or Bond Street, the same features occur. The apparatus of the Siberian shaman, of the Maori medicine-man, and of the London medium is the same. Raps, taps, and spirit-voices are parts of the contents of the conjurer's "bag o' tricks." "Suppose," says Sir E. B. Tylor, in his classic *Primitive Culture*, "a wild North-American Indian present at a séance in London. As to the presence of disembodied spirits, manifesting themselves by raps, noises, voices, and other physical actions, he would be perfectly at home in the proceedings, because these are part and parcel of his recognised system of nature."¹ The parts of the affair really strange to him would be such things as automatic writing and the aluminium trumpet, by means

¹ Vol. i. p. 155.

of which Mrs Wriedt and other "direct-voice mediums," as they call themselves, converse with the spirits, no "control" intervening. Taking a few examples, one akin to table-turning is supplied by the Tibetans. They believe that the Lama can find stolen objects by following a table which flies before him. A Russian merchant who had lost some goods complained to the chief Lama, who ordered one of his subordinates to take a four-footed bench which, after being turned by him in several directions, pointed to the tent where the goods were hidden. The priest then mounted astride the bench, and it carried him to the tent, where the stolen things were discovered. The men of the Leper Islands in Melanesia build a little house in the forest. A low partition divides it, and a bamboo is put within, half being placed on one side of the partition and half on the other side. They assemble at night to try the presence of a ghost, and sit on one side only of the partition with their hands under one end of the bamboo; they shut their eyes and call the names of the recently dead. When they feel the bamboo moving in their hands they know that the ghost whose name was the last called is present. Then, naming one of themselves, they ask, "Where is Tanga?" and the bamboo rises in their hands, strikes the named, and then sinks back. Thus made sure of the presence of the ghost, they leave the hut, holding one end of the bamboo in their hands, singing as they go, and the bamboo leads them as the ghost within it chooses. In the same way, a club is put at night into the sacred cycas-tree, and when the name of some ghost is called it moves of itself and will lift and drag people about.¹

New Zealand supplies matter for comparison with home products. A brave young chief had died in battle, and his friends asked the Tolunga, or medium, to bring him back. He had kept a diary of his achievements which was missing. At the séance, at which an Englishman, who tells the story, was present, the medium chose the darkest corner. The fire burned down to a red glow. Suddenly the spirit spoke, "Salvation to my tribe," and the dead man's sister, a beautiful Maori girl, rushing into the darkness to clasp him, was seized and held by her affrighted friends. Then came a voice, "a strange melancholy sound, like that of wind blowing through a hollow vessel." It said, "It is well with me, my place is a good place," and the visitor admits that he "felt a strange swelling of the chest." But when the voice spoke again, and said, "Give my large pig to the priest," he says that he was disenchanted. (It is the badge

¹ *The Melaneseans*, pp. 223-4, Bishop Codrington.

of all the sacerdotal tribe. Among the Samoans the priest generally managed to make the departed say what he wished him to say, or to make demands for something which the priest himself coveted.) To return to the Maori story. The Englishman then asked the spirit, "Where have you hidden the book?" Quick came the answer, "Between the Tahutur of my house and the thatch, straight over you as you go into the door." The spirit's brother rushed out and came back with the book in his hand. Then there was heard a voice from the deep beneath the ground, "Farewell." Then from the high air, "Farewell." The deception was perfect. "A ventriloquist, or perhaps the devil," says the narrator.¹

That intrepid explorer, the late Miss Czaplicka, during her travels in Siberia, secured admission to a shamanistic séance, the proceedings at which she described to me as follows:—The shaman sat near a low fire in the tent, the sitters being ranged round him. All were forbidden to touch him or to move, lest the spirits should be disturbed. Where there is a shaman there is always a drum; that and the rattle are indispensable to the magician in the business of savage spiritualism everywhere. The shaman beats the drum gently at the start, then, by degrees, more loudly. The drumming is called "the language of the spirits," whereby they are summoned. It corresponds to the ceremony prefacing performances at our séances, which are usually opened with prayer and singing of hymns. The shaman accompanies the drum-beating with chants, sometimes with imitations of voices of men and animals and of winds and echoes, for he is a skilful ventriloquist. He sings and dances till the drum is no longer beaten, and the fire is put out. Gentle raps or taps of the spirit are heard; the shaman makes a rushing noise as if escaping from the tent. After an interval of a quarter of an hour or more he bumps on the ground to make known his return from the spirit-world. Sometimes he affects exhaustion and waits a while before telling the sitters what messages he has brought from the spirits.²

As to the trance or hypnotic state, the savage has nothing to learn from our mediums. Among the Dene Hareskins tribe of North America the medicine-man starts business by a three days' fast, and then retires to a "magic lodge" in the forest. Here he falls into what is called "the sleep of the shadow"; then the patient comes to him; he sings and

¹ *Old New Zealand*, chap. x (1868).

² See also article on "Ostyaks," Hastings' *Ency. Rel. and Ethics*, vol. ix., by M. A. Czaplicka.

plays the tambour, thereby exorcising the disease-demon, whom he bids quit the patient. Among the Baganda of Uganda the woman-medium is put under restrictions as severe as those which hampered the Roman Flamen Dialis, chief of the priesthood consecrated to the service of Jupiter, while, in the discharge of her functions, she recalls the priestess of Apollo at Delphi. "She first smoked a pipe of tobacco till the god came upon her; she then began speaking in a shrill voice; then sat over a sacred fire when giving the oracle, perspired very freely, and foamed at the mouth. After the oracle had been delivered and the god had left her, she was very fatigued and lay prostrated for a time."¹

As remarked, the value of these examples from savage spiritualism is in their identity in character with those supplied in the performances of modern mediums at home. Did space permit, reference to cases supplied by ancient spiritualism would add confirming witness. The Delphic Pythia survives in the trance medium; the spirit-writing trick through closed slates is eighteen hundred years old, as proven in Lucian's story of the "arch-scoundrel" Alexander of Aboniteichos, who pretended to secure answers from the gods to all who brought him sealed packets containing the questions.² In one form or another, these things repeat themselves; the conjurer, priest, or medium use the same thaumaturgy, and the unreasoning onlookers see in this a proof of the supernatural or the supernatural.

Turning to modern variants, we are all so fed-up with materials, with details as like unto one another as peas in a pod, that only a brace of the most recent examples need be considered; the one being further purported communications from departed spirits, and the other supplying so-called evidence as to "a form of matter unknown to science." Rigid space-limits compel brevity; certainly, avoidance of the examples set by the humour-lacking scholiast who wrote a preface to an epigram and made an index to a sonnet.

The first example is supplied by so-called spirit messages, to the "very remarkable nature" of which Lord Northcliffe bears testimony. These have filled for more than a year many columns of one of his Lordship's papers, the *Weekly Dispatch*.³ They purport to have been re-

¹ *The Baganda*, p. 298, by Rev. J. Roscoe.

² *The Works of Lucian*, vol. ii. pp. 212 ff. (Fowler's translation).

³ This newspaper announced that its Sunday issue of the 7th August last would contain an article by the Rev. Vale Owen on St Paul's knowledge of "psychic science," and the reception of the Ten Commandments "through automatic writing."

ceived by the Rev. Vale Owen from his departed mother through the usual and, as it seems to the critically minded, superfluous channel of a go-between second personality named the "control." Occasionally they come direct from the mother. The earlier messages, which have been issued in book-form under the title of *The Life Beyond the Veil*, had their origin, the reverend recipient tells us, in the urgings of his wife, "who had herself developed the power of automatic writing."¹ So he decided to take down any thoughts "which seemed to come into his mind, projected there by some external personality, and not consequent on the exercise of his own mentality."² "Very doubtfully," he decided to sit in his vestry after Evensong, wearing his cassock—this, apparently as a necessary equipment for receipt of the messages, which at first "wandered aimlessly," but soon took "consecutive form" and sped at "an average rate of twenty-four words a minute." The vehicle of transmission, we are told, is "a celestial-mundane telephonic current,"³ the messages being heard interiorly in much the same manner as one is "able to hum over a well-remembered tune." The spiritual element in them uplifts the receiver "to the boundaries and, on occasion, into the very domain of ecstasy."⁴ Mrs Vale Owen, who died in 1909, "had not during her life shown any interest in the question of spirit communication." The "celestial-mundane telephonic current" started working in 1913, and, since then, has been the vehicle of messages "in a swift and steady stream," which shows no signs of exhaustion. Nor is there any reason why it should, if, as has been humorously suggested, the source is not *Beyond the Veil*, but "*Within the Vale*." They are of the nature to be expected from a man of highly strung temperament, victim of a severe nervous breakdown, who is given to preaching rhetorical sermons, and who, by the exercise of auto-suggestion, has worked himself into the conviction that he has revelations from a spirit-world. They supplement, and, in the omission of repellent detail, compare favourably with, the nauseous particulars supplied in *Raymond* about that invisible realm, such as the supply of unsmokable cigars and of undrinkable whiskies there, and the import of decayed worsted from the earth, whereof to make the white robes of the spirits. In the account of the so-called Celestial Lowlands on which, pending advancement to the plane of the Highlands, Mr Vale Owen's communicators tarry, we learn that the occupants include "ministers of different grades downwards who may scarcely be termed

¹ P. xx.² P. xx.³ P. xxviii.⁴ P. xxviii.

persons." Among these are "fairies, pixies, and elementals generally, . . . water-nymphs and suchlike beings."¹ The manufacture of harps and the building of houses, which, according to *Raymond*, are made of emanations from the earth, go on apace. The harps are for use in colleges "devoted to the study of the best methods of conveying musical inspiration"—ecclesiastical music being a special study, and "the building and ordering of houses are for those who are still on earth." So there is no housing problem in the Celestial Lowlands. Mr Engholm, the editor of the volume, claims that "it supplies the most complete and most detailed statement of conditions in the after-life yet published." Sir Conan Doyle, who, in the words of a *Times* reviewer, "reveals an extraordinary inability to grasp the principles of scientific investigation," out-Herods Herod in the rhapsody which he contributes to it. Tyrtæus-like, he sings of the victory—of a "long battle nearly won. Verily, the hand of the Lord is here."² He knew not what further cause of joy awaited him in further proof of that divine intervention. This was supplied in the photographing of fairies. In May last year he received a letter from a lady "well known in several departments of human thought" (so he describes her), informing him that two photographs of fairies had been taken in a village in Yorkshire, "under circumstances which seemed to put fraud out of the question." "Being," he tells us, "by nature of a somewhat sceptical turn," he felt that, "complete and detailed as was the evidence," something closer was needed to assure personal conviction. The seed fell into receptive soil, since he tells us that he "happened at the moment to be collecting material for an article on fairies, now completed, and had accumulated a surprising number of cases of people who claimed to be able to see these little creatures." Patient inquiry at last brought him into contact with "a member of the Executive Committee of the Theosophical Society, and a well-known lecturer on occult subjects, who was, shall we say, providentially," in possession of the actual negatives.³ Some good prints and lantern slides were prepared from these, and after studying the photographs "long and earnestly with a high-power lens," Sir Conan saw that for which he looked. Again the sober researcher sinks into the rhapsodist. He is carried into "a third heaven." Unlike the Apostle Paul, who "heard unspeakable words not lawful for a man to utter," he breaks into windy bombast. Here is a sample of it:

¹ P. 171.² P. xxxiii.³ *Strand Magazine*, December 1920, p. 463.

"When Columbus knelt in prayer upon the edge of America, what prophetic eye saw all that a new continent might do to affect the destinies of the world? We also seem to be on the edge of a new continent, separated, not by oceans, but by subtle and surmountable psychic conditions. I look at the prospect with awe. May those little creatures suffer from the contact and some Las Casas bewail their ruin? If so, it would be an evil day when the world defined their existence. But there is a guiding hand in the affairs of man, and we can but trust and follow." "Cameras will be forthcoming. Other well-authenticated cases will come along."¹ Enough of this. Of course, the photographs are genuine, and they make a very pretty picture. The fairies have been copied from some illustrated book, cleverly cut out of thin cardboard, stuck in front of a little girl, and then photographed with her. They are clearly of two dimensions only, having length and breadth, but no thickness. Two collaborators—minxes, shall we call them?—Alice and Iris Carpenter—the names are pseudonyms—have "deceived the very elect." More power to their scissors! we say. Another "well-authenticated case" supplies evidence of a sort neither expected nor desired by Sir Conan. The *Daily News* of the 28th April last published copies of photographs of fairies. The "little folk" were cut out of pasteboard by Miss E. R. North, of St Andrews, and arranged in groups amidst moorland scenery, with results as picturesque as those presented by the Misses "Carpenter."

How Spiritualism belies its usurped name, and is materialistic at the core, has further example in séances held in Belfast and Paris, at which the phenomena are purported exudations from the bodies of the mediums, which, it is contended, give evidence of a hitherto unknown form of matter having a spiritistic significance. Here we are plunged in Acheronian swamps over which hang mephitic gases poisoning the soul. At the séances in Belfast, which are opened and closed with hymns and prayers, lulling the company into Dreamland, the medium, Miss Kathleen Goligher, sits on a chair placed on a weighing machine. The "intelligent control," as the spirit assumed to be present is named, is asked to take out matter from the medium's body to be used as a cantilever whereby she can lift a table within reach weighing about ten pounds (the maximum weight of another table is sixteen) with which, apparently, she is not in contact. The control gives raps, and the weight of the medium lessens in proportion to their number, sometimes

¹ *Strand Magazine*, December 1920, p. 468.

decreasing nearly half a hundredweight. Ultimately, these spiritual cantilevers or psychic rapping rods, as they are named, return to the body of the medium. During the performance the room, under the usual conditions, is dimly lighted; no one is allowed to pass between the medium and the table, because it is said that serious bodily harm would thereby occur to her. Doubtless, a damaged reputation might also result. Photographic proof of the reality of the "psychic stuff" is claimed to be supplied by a smear on the negative; but a sceptical eye sees in the smear the mark of a stockinged great toe. The suspicion of trickery that invests the whole business is strengthened by Miss Goligher's refusal of an invitation from the Society for Psychical Research to come to London¹ and submit her psychic stuff (which Dr Crawford avers to having seen and felt) to examination by a mixed body of scientists and conjurers, since this is just the sort of test case which can be dealt with on purely scientific methods. So it must here suffice to say that Mr William Marriott, the most experienced exposé of mediums in this country, told Dr Ivor Tuckett that he could make his weight increase and decrease, and a table rise in the air, under conditions identical with those of the Goligher circle. The reports are based on investigations carried on for the most part solely by the above-named Dr Crawford, a mechanical engineer (he committed suicide in August last); and his theory of psychic force exercised by "invisible operators" as the cause of the levitation of the table has the support of Sir William Barrett, who is satisfied that there is "an unseen intelligence behind these manifestations" (*Threshold of the Unseen*, p. 49). Those who have read Dr Crawford's book on *The Reality of Psychic Phenomena* should follow that by studying as an antiseptic Surgeon Captain Beadnell's critical booklet thereon.² A high authority, Sir Bryan Donkin, says that it is a "superabundant exposure of the massive credulity and of the total defect of logical power displayed by Dr Crawford." Detailed accounts of the performances at Paris fill a ponderous volume entitled *Phenomena of Materialisation*. Numerous photographs therein show a flow of muslin-like exudations—teleplasma, ectoplasm, dynamo-psychic, are among the names given them—from the mouth and other parts of the body of the medium, one Martha Beraud, known as "Eva C." Sir Bryan Donkin tells me that she believes herself to be an incarnation of Thais, a celebrated Greek courtesan—

¹ Dr Schiller is my informant.

² *The Reality or Unreality of Spiritualistic Phenomena*.

anyway, her record is shady ; she was suspected, but escaped conviction, of cheating at séances held in Algiers by the credulous Professor Richet some ten years ago. The matter said to be detachable from and returnable to her assumes fantastic shapes of hands, faces, and vaguely complete bodies.

Narrating his experiences at one of the séances, Sir Conan Doyle says : " I was allowed to look through [a slit in the cabinet], and I saw this stuff as it comes from such a medium—a long, white, stringy substance, hanging from her clothes. I put my hand through the slit and touched it. To my horror, it writhed like a worm. Looking at it clearly, I saw it was not an obvious animal, but it had the element of life in it. Wonderful stuff! For some centuries, I prophesy, it will occupy the very best of human brains to devise its power and meaning." Sir Conan believes that all of us have the power to exude ectoplasm in different degrees. It will be well, I think, to limit the exercise of it to Kate Goligher and "Eva C.," otherwise life might have some unpleasant incidents. Some small bits of the stuff were secured by an enthusiastic believer, Dr von Schrenck-Notzing, and, under the microscope, turned out to be fragments of skin. The evidence, based chiefly on the photographs, is supplied from one source, a woman confederate of Eva C. Only one discordant note is struck throughout. A Doctor Specht, who expressed his belief that the phenomena are due to trickery, was not invited to attend further séances.

If I agree with him, and find explanation in the cleverness of the medium, and the incapacity of the witnesses to give valid judgment, it may be asked, How does she befool them? I reply in the words of one at the mention of whose name we bow in reverence. In a lecture on "Mental Education," delivered at the Royal Institution in 1854, Michael Faraday said, "I am not bound to explain how a table tilts any more than to indicate how, under the conjurer's hands, a pudding appears in a hat. The means are not known to me. But I am persuaded that the results, however strange they may appear, are in accordance with that which is truly known, and, if carefully investigated, would justify the well-tried laws of nature."¹ The *onus probandi* lies on the assertors. At present it is *dictum de dicto*—mere report upon hearsay. Let them bring the evidence into court to be dealt with by scientific methods.

It is matter for comment that, with the rare exception of the late Dr Russel Wallace, the few prominent men of science who are spiritualists are physicists, not biologists.

¹ *Science and Education*, p. 61 (reprint of R.I. Lectures, 1854), 1917.

Given a bias in favour of the occult, the physicist is specially incompetent to weigh the evidence assumed to support it. He ceases, *ad hoc*, to be a reasoning being. The explanation is at hand. His own field of research is one of exact, concrete, and unvarying relation. Study of the complex, mobile living thing lies outside his province; "his familiarity with the transmission of waves of energy in dead material and through space leads him to concepts which cannot justly be applied to living beings."¹ *Per contra*, the physiologist is ever confronted by the vagaries of that inscrutable marvel, the human mind. Something to check cocksureness is always manifesting itself in the delicately poised organism with which he has to deal. The spiritualists complain that biologists refuse to investigate the phenomena which they condemn. As the larger portion of these are of an experiential nature, the evidence being of things said to have been seen and heard, no physical tests to confirm or disprove them can be applied. And, where experimental tests are possible, investigation has been refused, or conditions have been imposed which would reduce the examination to a farce.

Despite the fact admitted by Mr Hereward Carrington, a reluctant defender of the faith as it is in Spiritualism, that the proportion of fraudulent phenomena is 98 per cent., the remaining two per cent. being provisionally admitted genuine in the sense that they have, so far, eluded explanation, the delusion is rampant to-day. Nor is the reason far to seek. We are in a world of unrest; of times of strain and stress, when emotions are at high temperature. Millions of bereaved folk, victims of an accursed war, are coveting assurance of reunion with the loved and lost. The momentous question put by Job, "If a man die, shall he live again?" trembles on their lips, and they crave for an affirmative answer. This is given them by Spiritualism with a definiteness and concreteness which is lacking in that given by the churches; hence its ready acceptance. Eager to know, the sorrowing echo the yearning voiced in *Maud*—

" Ah, Christ, that it were possible
For one short hour to see
The souls we loved, that they might tell
Us what and where they be."

And the mediums say, "It *is* possible."

¹ See Professor Leonard Hill's Introduction to Dr Culpin's *Spiritualism and the New Psychology*, p. xvi.

The tenacious hold of Spiritualism on the many is largely due to the fact that from the time of its revival in America in 1848 it has been a mixture of raps and religion, in the case of some of its leaders with a dash of idealism blended with unlovely material conceptions. Devotional services preface séances, where the popular hymnologist is one Emma R. Tuttle. A verse from her *Spiritual Songster* will suffice as sample of the doggerel which fills the hymn-book :

“ Rap, rap, rap. Rap, rap, rap.
Loved ones are rapping to-night.
Heaven seems not far away . . .
Magical changes these rappings have wrought,
Sweet hope to the hopeless their patter has brought.”

Besides the unhesitating answer to Job's question, the highly-strung sorrowing ones are urged to find proof of it by resort to a medium who, the fee being duly paid, will give them the hungered-for evidence, ocular and aural. Not tactile, because we are told that the etherealised departed cannot be subjected to mortal embrace. On the rare occasions when sceptic hands have sought to touch them, they have left fragments of muslin, or some like diaphanous stuff, with smell of phosphorus, behind them.

In the audacious words of Sir Conan Doyle, Spiritualism is “a new Revelation of God's dealings with man.” It is not an addition to, so much as a supersession of, the Old Revelation. It has been humorously said that when a man gives up belief in God he takes to believing in ghosts, and Sir Conan is one among a large number of converts to Spiritualism who have abandoned orthodoxy—now a term of varying meaning. For the title-deeds of the Old Revelation are found to be more or less invalid ; flaws have been discovered in them, with the inevitable result that defenders of what is left of “the faith once delivered to the saints” are in doubt as to how much of this residue can be retained. They will welcome the ingenious suggestion of Bishop Joseph Hall, of the Commonwealth period, when all the divines were at loggerheads over creeds and catechisms, that the most useful of all books of theology would be one with the title *De paucitate credendorum*—that is, of the fewness of the things that a man should believe. But some limit must be imposed. In his essay on *Turgot*, Viscount Morley, speaking of an ambitious profligate prelate, Loménie de Brienne, says that having espoused that richly dowered bride, the Church, he rose to be Archbishop of Toulouse, and would have risen to be Archbishop of Paris but for the King's “over-scrupu-

lous conviction that an Archbishop of Paris must at least believe in God.”¹

The reluctance of our liberal theologians to face logical issues is helped by a defective sense of lucidity; as Erasmus said of the clerics of his day, “they strike the fire of subtlety from the flint of obscurity.”² But if the creeds are cracking, this is not so much by onslaughts from without as by blows from within, dealt by ecclesiastics in high places: men of the courageous type of Dean Inge, Dean Rashdall, and Canon Barnes, whose praiseworthy aim is to maintain a venerable fabric by measures of reconstruction. Their action recalls a story told in Southey’s entertaining miscellany, *The Doctor*. One Joseph Cook, of Cirencester, a house-painter, had done some decorative repairs in the church in Siddington, an adjoining parish. His bill ran thus:—“To mending the Commandments, altering the Belief, and making a new Lord’s Prayer. 21/” (p. 407, 1848 edition).

But perchance, ere long, differences may be readjusted or wholly disappear. Not many months have passed since there came from America, birthplace of the reborn Spiritualism and land of “many inventions,” this message from its champion inventor, Mr Edison. He says: “I have been at work for some time building an apparatus to see if it is possible for persons who have left the earth to communicate with us. If those who have left the form of life we have on earth cannot use or affect the apparatus I am going to give them, then the chance of there being a hereafter of the kind we think about and imagine disappears. On the other hand, it will cause a tremendous sensation if it is successful.” Indeed it will, especially among the mediums, whose trade will be ruined. So, in a phrase now classic, we will “wait and see.”

EDWARD CLODD.

ALDEBURGH.

¹ *Miscellanies*, vol. ii. p. 55.

² *The Praise of Folly*, p. 141.

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND HUMAN WELFARE.

ALEXANDER B. THAW.

PSYCHICAL Research has begun to suffer almost as much from popularity as it formerly did from neglect. It has suffered not only from a sudden increase of interest among the many, and the dangers and errors this entailed, but its enemies, alarmed by this growing popular interest, and the attraction of its central problem, viz. that of personal survival after death and the possibility of proving it by positive evidence, have assailed it, often unfairly, on intellectual, moral, and religious grounds.

It was, of course, inevitable that a suggestion that there might and must be parallel growths of a community of nations and of a communion of souls would shock minds like those of certain critics who regard reality as something to be reached by purely physical tests, and to be grasped by mechanical theories. But life is not like that. It resembles rather a great adventure, an eternal seeking after an ever-fleeting reality which, nevertheless, though it seems always just escaping us, is yet always so near that, at times, we can even begin to realise it as a part of ourselves, and to believe and understand that by a growth from within outwards, through loving and suffering, and through deeper and wider human understanding, we are becoming a part of it. At the same time we realise all the more that the way of growth is not easy for either individuals or nations. It must always entail the pangs of a new birth. And such a regeneration must nearly always commence by the individual growing conscious of his own great weakness, through some kind of heavy blow, or some deep experience; and then, out of the darkness, beginning to see the light, he actively works towards it, with painful effort, until new strength comes to him. Not otherwise, however swift may

be the awakening, does anyone reach towards any true light, or acquire new power. Only by some such difficult steps is this subject of Psychic Research to be approached, not in our weakness, but in a new strength which we ourselves must make out of the sacred weakness of our grief.

Possessed by the fear that the "general public" will make a coarsely effective religion out of Psychical Research, and "vulgarise" our objects of faith by "certainties," some of the recent critics overlook the fact that many weak, unawakened persons have always tried to approach even Christ and Christianity with trivial and foolish ideas or expectations of finding an easy way. And besides such weaker human beings there are others, who calculate so surely on their own salvation that they might be described as a kind of profiteers in religion. Such as these are quite as ready to materialise the two great central doctrines of Christianity; and, as it has been said, try to hold mortgage both on this world and the next. But of such men we can surely continue to believe that they will have their reward. And if there are now in this world—as seems to be the fact—fewer persons of these kinds than there were in former generations, may we not believe that there has been a new growth of true Christianity?

Certainly as to the doctrine of the Resurrection there has been a definite growth of belief among the general public. And I believe it could be shown that, as against the dogmatic materialism of the past generation, and in connection with this general increase of true faith, the careful and serious study and presentation of Psychical Research have been a strengthening and spiritual aid, both directly and indirectly, to thousands of quiet, earnest persons.

The critic who most fears a moral weakening of the average man by any easy and selfish confidence in his own personal survival, nevertheless finds some encouragement in the thought that there is enough healthy scientific or common-sense materialism in the world to-day to save us from the worst credulity in regard to Psychic Research. It may be equally true that there is enough healthy and growing common sense about spiritual things in the world to save us from the worst credulities of the scientific dogmatism of the past generation. More than that, as the only cure for any growing pain is more exercise, so it is the labour of men of science themselves that has most helped to save us from the two extremes of danger through which we have been passing: on one side the danger of thinking and actually believing that we know all there is to know; and

on the other side the strange and equally paralysing danger of fearing lest we learn too much! Difficult as it seems to believe, even now, with our increasing knowledge both of the ever-widening wonders of the universe and of the limits of the human mind, certain defenders of religion are still possessed with a fear that God may not have succeeded in placing His secrets beyond our reach! Fortunately, during the same time, there has been a true and general spiritual awakening in the world, beneath its show of materialism. And we may surely believe that we, "the people," are growing a little less apt to deceive ourselves as to these things at one extreme or the other; not only less apt to forget that "you have to get up early to be ahead of God," but more apt to remember that there is, for us, each and all, a true dawn and true awakening, and that we need not greatly fear lest we learn His secrets before His own right time.

As for the possibilities of Psychical Research, the forty years of work by a small group of men, seriously working for the first time in history, with little or no public aid, represent only a minimal beginning: sustained, far-reaching efforts will have to be made to bring the subject under even relatively complete scientific conditions and tests. And yet, to the questions of survival, of the life of another world, and of the possibility of communication with the departed, this world of human beings is now beginning to ask for more definite and more human answers. This demand is not largely, as some seem to think, due to a lack of spiritual faith, nor to idle curiosity about the "occult" or "supernatural." Nor is this very real demand for more knowledge to be confused with a selfish craving, for an assurance of personal survival which would dispense us from constantly girding and guarding ourselves for the struggles of this life. On the contrary, it is very certain that the great desire for more knowledge about spiritual things is growing with, and out of, a *greater* spiritual faith; and that this increase of faith is growing with an increase of spiritual knowledge in the world. For now, as never before, we have in one generation shared with each other, all and every one of us, in an unbelievably great and deep spiritual experience.

We can say surely that out of the depths of all this universally shared human experience—yes, even out of the spiritual and physical mire of the war itself—there is growing not only a mutual human resolve that such a war must not "happen" again, but a belief that we owe it to all the

dead to make the resolve a reality. More than this, as we come more and more to feel, as well as to believe, that the dead are not so far away from our life here, we know more and more surely that every right effort counts. And at the same time the meaning of our whole great struggle becomes more clear, and we understand that the only true reality of our life here consists in the working out of this world's problems by the actual outward realisation of the life of the Spirit, through the long struggle. Though earth's flowers and fruits come forth so swiftly in their season, yet we know in our minds, and in our hearts, that every true growth must be a long process; and it must be a growth from within outward, coming to fruit only when the time is ripe.

For it is the whole man that counts, with all his powers, conscious and unconscious, known and unknown. Even more than this he must learn to use his unknown or neglected powers with the help of those which he already knows how to use, and with eyes and mind open in every direction, and a faith renewing itself and him every day, struggling onward with the definite aim of making a better world for all his fellows. But always we must be on the watch against those persons and those ideas by which we may be shut in. If we are more and more free from the habits that grew out of an old bygone necessity for a complete and closed system in religion and in government, yet all the more we must be on guard against the same tendency to set up a closed system, with all its material, inhuman mechanism, alike in Education, in Industry, and most of all in Science.

Modern science, as a way of finding truth by the process of constantly repeated and varied trials, and errors and revisions, has been our greatest aid in seeing, and in getting started on the right road towards true freedom. Yet certain professed followers of science still display the same old tendency to make a rigid mechanical system, with a new sort of dogmatic hierarchy, with professors instead of priests, and with the same ancient distrust of the people.

To this temptation Professor J. Jastrow seems to have yielded in his violent attack on Psychical Research, when he declared :—¹

“ It always requires an effort for emotionalised man to face reality. Thinking after the pattern of wish and prepossession is the easier way. When the ape and the tiger die in human habit, much of misery and degradation is outlived, but by no means all; the

¹ *The Weekly Review*, N.Y., 14th July 1920.

primitive survives and handicaps the intellectual ascent even as it supplies the motive power. Such a Freudian point of view has still to account for the attachment of the surviving mental trend to the suspicion or the disregard of science, for the strong bias in favour of the supernatural in matters psychological. For such is the animus of psychical research, which by descent may be the modernised form—re-staged and re-costumed—of the myth-making trend, but by actual challenge aspires to an esoteric place in the councils of latter-day knowledge. It may as a phenomenon be referred to anthropology, and some of it to pathology; yet there is a residual, of quality if not of type, which, when large allowance has been made for ordinary error and extraordinary delusion, demands a supplementary accounting at the hands of the naturalistic and rationalistic psychologist."

So this "rationalistic and naturalistic psychologist" can see in religious experience or in the most serious Psychical Research nothing more than a bias or animus in favour of the "supernatural." But he appears to be curiously unaware of his own bias. Else he would hardly appeal to that great psychologist and great psychical researcher, William James, to bear him out. "That I regard William James as standing with me," he says, "and the almost unanimous opinion of his fellow-psychologists in the attitude toward that side of 'psychical research' which my review covered, is shown by my citation of a momentous sentence from William James at the head of a review of similar import which appeared in the *Dial* for August."

This "momentous citation," as cited, reads as follows:—
'The chronic belief of mankind that events may happen for the sake of their personal significance is an abomination.'

But one wonders how Professor Jastrow can have so completely "repressed" his memory of the *context* of his quotation. In William James's *Will to Believe*, p. 324, the preceding sentence runs: "But for *mechanical rationalism* personality is an insubstantial illusion." James therefore was *not* expressing *his own* views. Moreover, he continues: "The chronic belief of mankind that events may happen for the sake of their personal significance is an abomination, and the notions of our grandfathers about oracles and omens, divinations and apparitions, miraculous changes of heart and wonders worked by inspired persons, answers to prayer and providential leadings, are a fabric absolutely

baseless, a mass of sheer *untruth*." After thus handsomely stating the case "for mechanical rationalism," William James states his own (p. 325) :—

"But the Society of Psychical Research's *Proceedings* have conclusively proved one thing to the candid reader; and that is, that the verdict of pure insanity, of gratuitous preference for error, of superstition without an excuse, which the scientists of our day are led by their intellectual training to pronounce upon the entire thought of the past, is a most shallow verdict. The personal and romantic view of life has other roots, besides wanton exuberance of imagination and perversity of heart. It is perennially fed by *facts of experience*, whatever the ulterior interpretation of these facts may prove to be; and at no time in human history would it have been less easy than now—at most times it would have been much easier—for advocates with a little industry to collect in its favour an array of contemporary documents as good as those which our publications present. These documents all relate to real experiences of persons. These experiences have three characters in common: they are capricious, discontinuous, not easily controlled; they require peculiar persons for their production; their significance seems to be wholly for personal life. Those who preferentially attend to them, and still more those who are individually subject to them, not only easily may find, but are logically bound to find, in them valid arguments for their romantic and personal conception of the world's course."

Again, on p. 327 he explains that: "The spirit and principles of science are mere affairs of method; there is *nothing* in them that *need hinder science* from dealing successfully with a world in which *personal forces* are the starting-point of new efforts. The only form of thing that we directly encounter, the only experience that we concretely have, is our personal life. The only category of our thinking . . . is the category of personality, every other category being one of the abstract elements of that." It was no doubt his admiration for James that led Professor Jastrow to make this very "personal and romantic" use of James's text. But that such things should happen to him does not speak well for the value, either of the (moral and) "intellectual training" given by "rationalistic and natural-

istic " psychology, or of the verdicts it passes on Psychical Research.

Nor does this case stand alone. In another article¹ he again claims William James as an ally, and reaches an even more extraordinary conclusion. After admitting that " among the leaders of psychic research "—which would, of course, include William James, as well as Sidgwick, Myers, Lodge, Bergson, Schiller, Hodgson, M'Dougall, etc.—" there are so many men whose attainments and personalities command high respect that it cannot be disregarded," he continues: " But if one is acquainted with the literature as a whole with which this restrained and cautious attitude has a definite (though limited) affiliation, one cannot come to any other conclusion than that the way of thinking thus expressed and encouraged by the respectable sponsors of the movement is hostile to the sound thinking upon which human welfare depends."

Here we not only have this champion of rationalism and naturalism measuring truth by its conduciveness to human welfare, but appealing to the *noscitur a sociis* principle to discredit the respectable and cautious investigators of psychical matters, and judging them by their *worst* exponents. Surely it would be as fair to make the heads of the medical profession responsible for the malpractices of every quack and the delusions of every patient!

It may be natural for the rationalistic psychologist to distrust the natural or primitive habits or instincts of mankind *en bloc*. But when he uses such logic as the above to discredit all the serious workers on psychical research, including those working from both the religious and the scientific side, he seems to have yielded altogether too much to his natural bias. In fact, we appear to have here too a survival of a very ancient and primitive distrust, that which one magician or " medicine-man " exhibits towards his rivals, thinking " after the pattern of wish and prepossession," and finding it hard " to face reality."

But nevertheless it is part of the reality to be faced that there is a respectable body of evidence in favour of facts which are distasteful to a rationalistic and naturalistic psychology, and that their bearing on human life and welfare is very momentous. This may be so much the worse for the facts; but it does not seem a very scientific procedure to leave their exploration in the hands of open-minded, though relatively untrained, amateurs.

The truth is that we must all, at one time or another,

¹ *The Weekly Review*, N.Y., 24th November 1920.

frankly face these questions ; and this some kinds of persons will always refuse to do. They will either deny their existence, even as questions, or leave them for others to answer for us. There will, therefore, always be many individuals to say that they disapprove of all human attempts to " lift the veil " by any methods whatever ; just as there will always be persons who disapprove of any kind of self-help.

Nevertheless, difficult and dangerous as such questions must be, they are a close and interior part of our individual life, and a most important part of the problem of our human welfare. Therefore, along with that general problem, it is certain that they are being gradually solved (in the midst of much noise and discussion and the making of many books) by the secret and silent ballot of individual suffrage ! And on this subject, as on others equally difficult, need we greatly fear that all the people will be fooled all the time ? Moreover, as against the autocracy of any kind of dogmatism, I believe (now more than ever) that we are prepared by various awful warnings to realise and to face the fact that our human welfare, our very life as human beings, depends upon our learning how to find out and use the special powers of every individual in order that we may gradually work out living answers to all these questions. By our very difficulties and dangers we are learning that our failure or success depends on our ability, first to find, choose—yes, to produce,—and rightly support the right kind of experts and more and more trustworthy representatives, leaders, and teachers of every kind ; and then to trust them more.

As against the old dogmatic materialism, as well as against all equally unscientific superstition, it is fortunate for Psychical Research that the English Society during the past forty years has developed a number of experts of peculiar ability for the work, men of great talent or even genius, most of them in England. But there were in America two of the best, William James and Richard Hodgson ; also one of the few great, and perfectly pure sources of evidence, in the person of Mrs Piper.

I believe it is fair to say that the greater part of the important literature on the subject in English is contained in the reports of this Society and in the writings of its leading members. I believe, further, that very few, if any, fair-minded persons really acquainted with this literature could come to any other conclusion as to the Piper and similar phenomena but that the evidence, in its character, and from the methods of recording and reporting it, is not explicable by coincidence or delusion, or illusion ; and, second,

that the existence of "telepathy" of various kinds and degrees has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The fact is that all but two or three of the dozen or more leading workers of the Society have used thought-transference between living persons as an hypothesis as far as it could be stretched, then have found themselves compelled to admit that there is positive evidence in these phenomena of communication of a farther-reaching kind; and finally, most of them have been, gradually, one after another, personally convinced of the facts of personal survival and of communication between this world and the next.

Moreover, it is a fact that the best critics of Psychic Research, both as to the evidence and as to the interpretation of the evidence, have come from among these same workers, who have, for the first time in all the centuries, succeeded in making the subject, as Dr Schiller himself puts it, "respectable enough for serious research." These "inside" critics freely grant that an actual, everyday, working proof of telepathy, that is, proof as irresistible as that which we have for wireless telegraphy, is still a thing requiring long-continued and difficult labour, on account of the enormous difficulty of ascertaining the right conditions for the transmission of impressions from one mind to another. Still more freely will they grant that any generally accepted proof of survival may be long in coming. For not only is final scientific proof on any new subject necessarily slow and difficult, but also this most important and most neglected of subjects appears to require persons with rare endowments to provide the evidence; and we cannot as yet find new Mrs Pipers as easily as we can build new wireless stations. Nevertheless there is a steady growth of evidence of the kind which the scientific method requires. It is none the less scientific because it exists not merely in the printed record but in the deepest living memories of an increasing number of men and women, who have personally received that evidence; and who have come to realise more and more, with the careful judgment of their minds, as well as in their bereaved hearts, that their loved ones who have left this world are not far away.

Nearly thirty years ago I shared in one of the best long series of Piper sittings, a series observed and fully reported by Hodgson in the *S.P.R. Proceedings*. As to the effect upon myself, I will only say that the first swift vivid impression of being in communication with those whom we call dead was steadily deepened by each successive experience. It is only too true that there is a vast difference between

personally sharing in one of Mrs Piper's good sittings and reading a report of it. To one who has *had* such an experience, the impression grows, as it were, by a geometrical progression with the growth of evidence tending to prove authenticity in the communication. This evidence was mainly of two kinds. In the first place, nothing more surprising than the constant suggestion, subtly deepened by small touches of the personal characteristics of the individuals who were apparently communicating. This was a no less important part of the whole than the surprising accumulation of communications of statements as to events, often occurring a generation earlier, events or facts certainly never before known to the sitters, but known to other living persons who afterwards confirmed them. These persons were in some cases referred to for that purpose by the communicator. Also it should be said that these persons in many cases lived at remote distances from the place of sitting.

Here we may pause to consider an objection to which undue importance may easily be ascribed. It is said that in physical science successful prediction is the ultimate touchstone of truth, and that the psychical researcher also must achieve it in order to authenticate the supernormal powers he claims to have detected. Now as to this, it is necessary to remark, in the first place, that if and so far as personality and freedom are real, they set a limit to prediction even in the physical sciences, or at any rate deprive it of its claim to absoluteness, and that *a fortiori* this intervention must detract from its accuracy in psychical matters. Now this is precisely what we find. In the reports of Piper sittings, definite statements are not infrequently made that prophecy is impossible, even while positive proof is given of something like it. For instance, in one case a detailed statement was given of coming death, with an accurate description of new symptoms, and of the approximate time, and manner of death, in an invalid of many years, living at a great distance. These new symptoms were at the time unsuspected by any living person, but were found and corroborated later by one of our first physicians. We were distinctly told that reading the future was impossible, but that "Phinuit" clairvoyantly saw the physical condition and inferred that death would probably result in such a manner and at about such a time.

As to the whole general experience, in my own case, the first vivid sense that we were, somehow, receiving actual personal communications has only become more real, and no less vivid, with the passing of the years. I believe this is

true also of the dozen or so persons who shared in the series of sittings; while about as many others, who, though not personally present, had an indirect part in, or were deeply and personally interested in, the sittings, have had a similar awakening to, and acceptance of, the same great reality. Nothing perhaps is so important as the quiet growth of this willingness to accept the new evidence for actual intercommunication between two worlds among quiet, thoughtful persons who have had no personal experience.

Thirty years ago there were not many who considered that the proof of telepathy, that is, the evidence for direct supernormal communication between living minds, was scientifically adequate. Now there are numbers who are willing to treat the evidence for telepathy as they would that on any scientific subject beyond their competence, that is, to take it on trust from those who have made a special study of it. In the same way, knowledge of the far-reaching powers and possibilities of human personality, psychical as well as spiritual, has so far grown that, in spite of the immense difficulties and new possibilities of error and confusion which beset the more momentous question of a proof of communication between the minds of the living and the dead, a growing number of persons are inclined nowadays to keep their minds open to the evidence of such communication, even when they have had no direct personal experience.

In fact, at the present time, those who have had personal experience of one kind or another, and a rapidly growing number of others who, though without such experience, have studied the evidence carefully as they would on any other subject, consider that there is positive proof of communication of such a far-reaching kind that the most pressing problem now is one of interpretation. Our knowledge of the many possible vagaries of human personality, especially of the tricks of the unconscious memory, has grown surprisingly; yet more and more people of all kinds and of all faiths are becoming convinced that personal survival is the most logical explanation of all the evidence, as well as the most natural.

At the same time there are, and perhaps always will be, persons—and not necessarily those least highly personalised—who will urge some theory of a cosmic consciousness or memory as against the relatively simple idea that we may somehow continue to live without our present bodies. Others will incline to something like Maeterlinck's transcendental belief that we, living here in this world, hold all the thoughts and memories of the dead within us.

It is hard to see, however, that these interpretations are easier to understand or to believe than the simple fact of personal survival. Still more difficult is it to see that either of these theories would throw any new light on the position of the human soul in the universe, or on the fact of the reality of the growth of human souls, and of the human spirit, in this world. For, wherever the soul has had its beginning, when we look upon our position in the universe and our life here on earth ; seeing the reality of the soul's growth towards freedom, not apart from, but through contact with a material world ; and knowing all the living and growing realities of love and of freedom, and of the desire for truth and justice ; when we feel the lifting of the heart before the earth's beauty, or in loyalty to the cause of justice and freedom, and to our companions, with whom we share the struggle and the sacrifice for that cause here on earth ; or knowing the lifting of the soul in worship with our fellows,—knowing all these things that are the true reality of our life, it is not difficult to believe that the soul will continue to live and grow in some congenial continuation of our life here. Nor is it necessary, or likely, that we should understand all the external conditions of that next existence. And yet, the more we come to know what we call matter here, the more we can understand how the change from this life to another should seem a natural step to one passing that threshold.

ALEXANDER BLAIR THAW.

ROME.

THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

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SPECULATION about the nature, origin, and destiny of the human soul is a more primitive thing than any formal philosophy, and dates from the childhood of every race. Greek theory on the subject appears first in the Homeric poems, which, in spite of their finished art and the rich material civilisation they reflect, show thought at an early and simple stage. In Homer mental and spiritual processes are normally associated with the body or its several organs; but in connection with the phenomenon of death we find some theory of a separable soul, which flits away from the body, bewailing its fate and leaving the man "himself" a lifeless corpse, and thereafter has a shadowy and joyless existence in Hades. When a ghost revisits earth, it is always with lamentation for the contrast between real life in the body on earth and its miserable counterpart among the dead. This remains the background of popular Greek belief, and here from the first the Greek tendency to clear-cut, *concrete* expression and thought is illustrated; the soul is regarded as a "thing," separable from the body, retaining consciousness after death, but then bereft of all that makes life desirable.

The religious movement known as Orphism, which arose in the sixth century B.C., and profoundly influenced Greek thought, reversed in every respect but one this early and popular theory. To the Orphics the soul is indeed still a thing, distinct and separable from the body; but the keynote of the system is soul's divine origin and native purity and worth, and the degradation it suffers by sojourn within the body, its "tomb" or "prison." Soul is immortal, and passes from one incarnation to another; its release from the taint of bodily life is to be effected by a system of "purification" involving both inward regeneration and the observance of

ritual and sacrament. The purified soul can in the end attain to mystic union with God, and escape from the "grievous woful circle" of successive incarnations. Thus in Orphism the whole emphasis is changed: it is the soul that matters, not the body; and the soul is a personality, essentially akin to God and capable of realising that kinship.

The earliest speculative thinkers of Greece, the Ionian monists, were roughly contemporary with the rise of Orphism, but represented a very different temper. Their scientific inquiries into the material substructure of the world take little account of the moral and spiritual problems of human life. Heraclitus is the only Ionian who touches our subject. He, attacking the problem of knowledge, insists on the unreliability of sense-perception (since the material world is in ceaseless flux) and speaks obscurely of a "Reason" or "Word" (*λόγος*) which is "common," and which all souls may apprehend. He seems to combine the faculties of sensation and reason under his conception of soul, but does not stress the idea of an individual "thing." He recognised its potentialities at least, for he says, "The soul's bounds you may never find, though you search every way."

Contemporary with Heraclitus new philosophic movements rose in the western Greek world of Sicily and South Italy; and here in one direction Orphism became very influential. The Pythagorean brotherhood adopted the theory of transmigration and prescribed for the soul's good a system of ascetic discipline, and they took up their famous mathematical studies apparently as a factor in "purification." Thus philosophy gained a new motive, aspiration to a better life for the soul; and, conversely, intellectual discipline was brought into the service of religion and morality.

The barren monism of Parmenides did not touch human problems; but he influenced later theory by his conception of an absolute object of knowledge (distinct from objects of sense) and his contrast between such "knowledge" of the One and "opinion" about the Many of the material world. With the pluralists who followed him philosophy returned into scientific lines. Empedocles curiously combined an Orphic belief in the soul's transmigration (he calls himself "an exile from heaven and a wanderer") with a purely scientific interest in the problem of sensation, which he solves on a materialist basis by a naïve theory of "emanations" which pass off from the perceptible object to the sentient subject. He exhibits the tendency to range on the one side the religious and moral faculties as the "soul," detachable from the body, and on the other side the sense-

faculty as part of the bodily organism itself. In the crude theory of evolution which he puts forward he seems to make no attempt to correlate the germ of life with the soul as he otherwise conceived it.

Anaxagoras (who also embodied in his atomistic system a theory of sensation by material contact) made a real and important contribution to Greek thought about soul, in connection with his dictum, "All things were mixed together; then Mind came and sorted them out." He first introduces the conception of a moving cause which is *νοῦς*—Mind, intelligence, reasoning thought. Mind gradually brings *cosmos* out of *chaos*; it personifies the reasonable order of things, and has the attributes of God in the aspect of creator and organiser. It is indeed, as Plato and Aristotle complain, a mere *deus ex machina*, starting the cosmic movement and then leaving the process to go on mechanically. A curious feature of the theory is that Mind is described in material terms; it consists of a specially fine and pure kind of particles. It imparts from without a rotatory movement to the mass of matter, and also pervades everywhere within it. Anaxagoras is clearly baffled by the problem of the action of an immaterial force upon material substance. It is important to our inquiry that he distinctly says *all* mind is the same substance. There is, then, affinity between all intelligent creatures; he mentions that man is superior to the beasts in having hands—not, it seems, by reason of a special sort of intelligence. Further, there is affinity between all creatures and the supreme Mind of the world. Heraclitus may have had the germ of this idea, but his world-reason was a vague conception compared with this theory of a conscious intelligence ordering the universe. Thus Anaxagoras is the first to affirm clearly in the sphere of intellect that kinship of human (and infra-human) and divine which the Orphics had affirmed in the sphere of moral and spiritual life.

The Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, were consistent materialists, and declared soul to be made of a particular kind of fine round atoms, mixed with the body in life, breathed out at death, and dispersed like the rest of the body to be used again in the formation of other living creatures. There is no place here for transmigration or divine affinity: life is just a form of bodily development. Sensation is again explained on a theory of material contact; the intelligent and moral faculties are not explained at all.

These scientific philosophers of the fifth century B.C. are contemporary with the humanistic movement of the Sophists, who represented another side of the reaction from barren

metaphysical speculation. They had found a new interest in all moral and political problems; and their characteristic contribution to thought is Protagoras' maxim, "Man" (*i.e.* the individual) "is the measure of all things." This applies to human judgment and conduct the theory of Heraclitus that in a changing world all is unstable and relative. The Sophists, destructive and specious as much of their work was, did immense service to the progress of thought by fixing attention on the life of the human being as a reasoning and moral individual. Socrates, with far greater earnestness of purpose, insisted on this as the primary study, and obviously believed in a soul in the old traditional sense of a responsible moral entity. His maxim, "Virtue is knowledge," does not impair the moral significance of all his teaching; for he declared it a duty to seek that knowledge which would ensure right action. His simple life and disregard of externals emphasised his belief that soul is more important than body; and his fearless pursuit of his ideal through life and up to the hazard of death, with his cheerful and amazing courage in the hour of his execution, would seem to have given one at least of his disciples a new conviction of the reality, the divine kinship, and the certain immortality of the human soul.

Plato, in his theory of soul as in his theory of being, gathers up and fuses into one various conclusions of his predecessors. It is difficult to arrange his statements in order of development, and to detach his sober meaning from the imagery of myth and the ecstatic language of mysticism. But there are some things that he makes unmistakably clear.

Plato believes in a soul—a "thing" in some sense, and in some sense and at some times separable from the body. This soul is of divine origin: its function is, in thought, to correlate divine absolute reality (apprehended by pure knowledge) with the appearances of the material world (apprehended by sensation); and, in will, to impel the body (so long as it inhabits the body) to action harmonious with soul's thought. Its destiny is assimilation to the divine principle whence it came, in an immortal life apart from the body and from the material world. Clearly this conception adopts elements of the Orphic belief—divine origin, superiority of soul to body, divine communion as the goal. Plato also unites for the first time some other features of Greek thought—the interest of the scientists in the problem of sensation, the conception of an intellectual principle in harmony with the reason and law of the world, and the steadily growing sense (both popular and philosophic) of individual moral responsibility in the world of action. He

is, in fact, the first to offer any account of the individual personality as a whole. This is not to say that he attempts to explain what personality is; he does not—he is too wise. He takes for granted the existence of the self; indeed, he takes three fundamental facts for granted—the divine origin and affinity of the self, implying upward aspiration and progress for every human being; the fact of consciousness, both of the world and of oneself; and the fact of freewill and moral responsibility. On these foundations his system is based.

Apart from the obscurities of his often poetical and mystical language, difficulty arises from the fact that with Plato philosophy is not yet subdivided. He does not distinguish metaphysics, ethics, and psychology; he talks about these all at once, though usually with special emphasis on one side or another. This constitutes from one point of view the chief charm and value of his teaching; for life does not subdivide these things, nor does our instinctive thought which finds and discusses them in close relationship. But to the modern mind, trained in the pigeon-hole tradition inherited from the great classifier Aristotle, Plato's system exhibits overlapping and confusion; and his conception of soul is by no means entirely stable and consistent.

His theory may be illustrated by his treatment of the problem of immortality, which he discusses briefly in several places and seriously attacks in the *Phædo*. Soul is immortal, says the *Phædrus*, because it is the origin of all motion; unless soul continues endlessly, the universe must cease to work and to exist. This argument identifies soul with life, and does not seem to imply individual immortality. In the *Republic* (book x.) the argument is from the moral side, and does insist on personal survival. Everything is destroyed by its appropriate "evil"; the "evil" of soul is badness or vice; but that does not destroy soul, for we see bad men who live; therefore no other evil can destroy soul, therefore soul is immortal. The postulate here seems arbitrary and the argument thin.

In the *Phædo* it is clearly personal, conscious survival that is contemplated; successive proofs are offered, and the last is accepted as convincing. (1) The fact of remembrance of pre-natal knowledge (which is here briefly demonstrated), combined with the principle of "alternation" everywhere manifested in the world, is taken to prove a state of life and intelligence after death corresponding to the state before birth. This argument rests partly on intellectual and partly on general scientific considerations. (2) The instinctive

longings of the soul for perfect purity and knowledge, unsatisfied in this life, argue a life beyond—"in the heaven, a perfect round." This is a kind of religious appeal to the justice and reasonableness of the world-order, and rests on the Orphic conception of the soul's divine origin. (3) The soul's whole affinity is for the pure rather than the corrupt, the invisible rather than the visible; even the visible part of the human being lasts in some cases a very long time after death; much more, therefore, the invisible part will last—it is "almost, if not quite, indestructible." This *a fortiori* reasoning, based again on Orphic ideas, is very suggestive, but gives no certain assurance. (4) In an interlude Socrates disproves the neo-Pythagorean theory that soul is a mere "harmony" or condition of the living body, and therefore mortal. The argument here is interesting as re-establishing the conception of soul as a "thing" in itself, *i.e.* the essential importance of personality. (5) The final proof of immortality is metaphysical, or rather is based on that curious mixture of logic and metaphysic which forms the earlier theory of Ideas. Briefly put, the argument is this:—Soul essentially implies (or "carries with it") life, therefore can never admit death. "Dead soul" is as impossible as "dead life" would be. Therefore, when death approaches the living aggregate of body and soul, the soul cannot remain (as the body does) to become "dead," but withdraws whole and alive. Even at full length this proof seems far from convincing; but Socrates' listeners accept it as final, and so we must suppose that Plato thought it, on his own metaphysical ground, satisfactory.

Thus the *Phædo* contains a set of arguments for immortality resting on different grounds, and each only partly convincing. Yet every re-reading of that wonderful dialogue helps to renew conviction on the whole question. Perhaps its strongest argument of all is the calm courage of Socrates himself in face of approaching death, and his simple assurance that "the real *I* is that Socrates who is now talking with you, not that which you will presently see a corpse. . . . When I have drunk the draught, I shall stay with you no longer, but shall be gone away."

Brief reference has been made to the theory of "remembrance" of knowledge gained in a previous life. It may be that Plato uses this conception, Orphic and Pythagorean in origin, merely to represent picturesquely the fact of certain innate or *a priori* elements in human thought, which include (according to his statements) the notion of equality and other mathematic principles, and also such general

ethical concepts as goodness, beauty, justice. It seems equally possible that he really believed, at any rate in his earlier period, in successive "lives" of the soul, and held that in one previous stage of existence it has received some revelation of these fundamental truths. Plato is so essentially a poet and a mystic as well as a philosopher that it is hard to draw a line and say, "This he cannot have seriously believed." He does, however, in the *Theætetus* and other later dialogues, treat some of these *a priori* notions differently, calling them "common" conceptions and postulating them as part of the mind's apparatus without reference to their origin.

Plato's attitude to the doctrine of soul's transmigration between human and non-human bodies is also difficult to determine; here again it seems just possible that he really held the view which he expounds picturesquely, with an ethical purpose, in several passages. If all souls are one in origin, deriving from the divine principle itself, and if soul's activity is (as we shall presently see) essentially moral, such transmigration would be the natural result where the soul, by an upward or downward trend during one incarnation, has shown itself worthy of a more or a less honourable body in the next; unless it has so dissociated itself from the body as to deserve henceforth the purely spiritual disembodied life of the true philosopher. But Plato has nothing serious to say about the souls of animals as such, and certainly attacks the whole question from the human point of view.

Regarded in its intellectual aspect, as the thinking self, soul is for Plato the great unifier of the world of reality and the world of appearance. As these two spheres are primarily one in the thought of the World-Mind (as he declares in the *Timæus*), so they are brought to one in the thought of each individual who thinks aright. The senses register impressions of the material world; the soul, by reason of its pre-natal or innate knowledge of truth, recognises that these impressions are not more than half-truths, but at the same time that they *are* half-truths. It learns to see the One in the Many, and the Many in the One. Partly by appeal to the innate standard, partly by inductive reasoning from many particulars (here Plato follows Socrates), the soul frames its notion of the absolute Form, and there finds rest and satisfaction, being itself akin to the Absolute and Real and Eternal. There is place here for a full theory of physical sensation (expounded in the *Timæus*), for theories of memory and opinion (as in the *Theætetus*), and for all that mystical faith in direct apprehension of truth, here or hereafter, which is found in the *Republic* and the *Phædo*.

Both the intellectual and the moral aspect of soul are represented, but especially the latter, in Plato's famous "tripartite division" given in the *Republic*, and in the myths which correspond to it, such as the allegory of the charioteer and two steeds in the *Phædrus*. Plato says there are three "parts" of soul; but it becomes clear that he means rather three aspects of its activity as a whole. He calls them the reasoning part, the spirited (or passionate, or wilful) part, and the appetitive part. The first represents soul as functioning in pure thought and in union with the divine principle. The second represents soul as the seat of will, emotion, and moral choice; the third, soul as related to the body through its sensations and the appetites they create. Soul at its best is reason; at its worst, it is appetite. Reason and appetite are as a rule in conflict; will is, so to speak, a neutral, capable of siding with either in turn. The philosopher schools his will to keep his body in subjection, and thus to give reason its full play and development. The point of this classification is clear; the precise form varies. In the *Phædo*, "soul" as reason and purified will is set over against "body" as the seat of appetite; the philosophic soul, released at death, has no more to do with appetite, but a less worthy soul passes to another body where appetite again has exercise. In the *Timæus* both will and appetite are called the "mortal soul," because they only function during soul's union with body; for, strictly speaking, reason, in its full purity and independence of body, has no more use for moral will.

The philosophic love of the *Phædrus* and the *Symposium* illustrates the purification of a bodily passion by the aid of will, until it becomes an impulse of pure reason towards highest truth. "Reason" is here and elsewhere an unsatisfactory term, as it might seem to exclude that direct intuition or mystical apprehension of pure Truth and Being which Plato clearly regards as the highest of all the functions of soul. The hope of this final bliss of divine communion, never to be fully attained while in the body, is his strongest reason for insisting on personal immortality.

Plato does not indeed try to explain or define personality; but he does offer in the *Timæus*, as part of his matured theory of the nature of things, a metaphysical account of soul's constitution. He describes mythically, as type of a timeless order, a creation in time by the "Artificer," the universal Mind. This Mind evolves itself in thought. Its first thought is the cosmos as a whole; its second is soul, which is described as the "elder" of body, *i.e.* prior in excellence and importance.

(We are also told that body was fashioned "within" soul.) The elements of which soul is made are the Same (the eternal and absolute One), the Other (the multiplicity of changeful phenomena), and Being (the principle of individual existence). This means that soul is akin to, and so apprehends, at once the eternal unity and the transient multiplicity of things, and unites these faculties in an independent existence; it essentially *is*. The fact of personality is affirmed; the problem is not solved.

Plato's conception of soul is a matter of prime importance in his system. Again and again he emphasises, by one method or another, the divine origin and the high calling and destiny of the individual human personality. Gathering up what was best and most characteristic in previous Greek thought on the question, he gave forth a doctrine which through many channels has worked immeasurable influence on human life. His theory of soul is not merely a philosophy; it is a gospel.

With Aristotle we enter a very different atmosphere. Aristotle has made his subdivision of philosophy, and produces the first treatise on Psychology as such—his *περὶ ψυχῆς*, *De Anima*. He also has to touch the problem of soul in other connections; in his *Ethics* he accepts the facts of personality and moral responsibility, and further asserts that the life of pure reason is the highest human activity, constituting happiness and accompanied by pleasure. His very guarded references to survival after death would seem to be concessions to popular belief. In the *Metaphysics* he lays down the principle that one individual of the species, the parent, is the cause of the next, the offspring; this cuts right across any theory of pre-existence or immortality for the soul. In the *Psychology* he is consistent with this metaphysical view. Soul is defined as "the first actuality of a natural organic body"; it is that which makes really alive a body which may be conceived without soul as potentially alive. A natural organic body, alive, has (we say) a soul. Obviously here soul is no thing apart, as with the Orphics or with Plato; it is a mere abstraction corresponding to the state of being alive. We are again among the scientists; but they cannot at this date ignore soul or refuse to give *some* account of it.

On his own lines Aristotle's analysis of soul is most acute. He is the first thinker to correlate all life in a graded scale of functions. The lowest creature has only the nutritive function—the faculty of mere growth; the highest has all—nutritive, perceptive, appetitive, locomotive, rational. The

precise nature of man's superiority is not made very clear, for a certain "imagination" and "reason" are attributed to all the higher animals. He analyses the senses in great detail, bringing in his favourite doctrine of the Mean by declaring that extremely violent impact destroys sensation. Corresponding partly to Plato's intuitive notions, we have a list of "common sensibles"—motion, rest, shape, size, number, unity. Above the senses come imagination, a sort of surviving or recurring impression from past sensations, and *νοῦς*, or intellect. The latter has two aspects—the passive or receptive, influenced by sensation, and the active or creative, which provides forms of thought by which the recepta of passive intellect are interpreted. Otherwise put, the soul "contains" the universal concepts. The generalising tendency of mind is recognised as fundamental. Consciousness he cannot explain; he suggests that it is somehow to be identified with sensation.

All this is ingenious and important, but introduces a strangely different view of the soul. Greek thought hitherto has regarded soul as a "thing," whether material or spiritual; here it is an abstraction, which corresponds to the sum of our various vital functions, but is not really conceived as a whole.

In the two great post-Aristotelian schools, the Epicureans and the Stoics, we find (accompanied by elaborate theories of the functions of soul) in each case a reversion to one of the older views of the soul as a thing distinguishable and separable from the body. Epicurus follows the earlier atomists in declaring that soul is, like everything else, material; it is made of very fine, light, smooth, round atoms, hence the rapidity of sensation and thought. Partly following Plato and Aristotle, he distinguishes between the irrational soul or vital principle, distributed over the body, and the rational soul, lodged in the heart. The faculty of registering sensation (which is the result of material contact) resides in "a nameless something," as he pathetically calls it, which is one constituent of the rational soul. The other faculties of soul (including pleasure, the criterion of good life) are apparently based on sensation. Being material, the soul is disintegrated after death like the body. Therefore "death is nothing to us"; for when death exists we shall not exist.

The Stoic system is pantheistic on a materialist basis, and human soul is represented as one form of the divine *πνεῦμα*, or breath, which permeates the whole world, only with weaker force in the lower grades of existence. All things are, in this sense, animate. The inorganic object has, as its correlative of soul, *ἔξις* or cohesion—the faculty of holding together.

Plants have cohesion and growth; animals have also soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$); man has, besides soul, intelligence ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$). Aristotle's influence is clear in this grading; the theory that one form of soul permeates all things extends the views of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras.

The soul of man is, to the Stoics, material; but so is the divine soul itself. There is a strange inconsistency between the formal materialism and the fine spiritual teaching of this school. The kinship of the human soul with the divine is firmly emphasised. Cleanthes says, addressing the Deity, "Thine offspring are we, and bear the image of God." The doctrine appears again in later Stoicism, and Marcus Aurelius says, "God has given to each man a fragment of Himself as his intellect and reason." This is in Plato's spirit; but there is a fresh note in the explicit statement that "every race of men contains the seed of the Word." Such universalism, implied perhaps but hardly expressed by Plato, corresponds to the wider cosmopolitan sense of the Hellenistic and Roman world. A limited doctrine of immortality found its way into the Stoic system, no doubt under Platonic influence; it was an immortality of "the wise," lasting only till the final conflagration or end of the age, after which all things would recur as they had been.

In their theory of knowledge and in their ethics the Stoics are again indebted to Plato. An integral part of the former is the doctrine of "innate preconceptions"—not, with them, relics of knowledge acquired in a former existence, but transmitted in the seed from parent to child as part of the inheritance of the soul. In ethics their main principle is life "according to nature," *i.e.* in conformity with the divine reason and purpose immanent in the world. Perfect virtue and wisdom (which they, like Socrates, equate) is not attainable, but progress is always possible. The ideal includes disregard of the body, because the soul is purer and more worthy, and its pleasures alone are to be desired.

Epicureanism and Stoicism alike carry us beyond the limits of the Greek world; and through these schools the two characteristic Greek conceptions of soul pass on to influence later thought—the idea of a material substance, part of the material body, its functions based on mechanical processes, and its life limited by the body's life; and, on the other hand and more typically Greek, the idea of a divinely-born spiritual entity, working through the body yet fundamentally at variance with it, and capable of aspiration and upward progress which ends ideally in union with the divine life itself. The progress of thought is marked, especially

in Plato and in the Stoics, by a growing sense of the fact of personality as a thing inexplicable but fundamental. This development in philosophy corresponds to and reflects that general movement in Greek politics, morals, religion, and literature which brought the individual into continually greater prominence; he ceased to be the mere member of a clan, city, class, or sex, and with the break-up of old communities and the failure of old allegiances the human being *as such* began to emerge as the new hope, and the new mystery, of the world.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS—AN UNCLOSED CHAPTER IN HUMAN THOUGHT.

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It is good sometimes, as we jog along in our smooth-riding waggon of Progress, to steal our way, as it were, to the rear of the vehicle and look back upon the road by which it has come. Then it is that we experience the mental counterpart of that physical sensation of travelling backwards so charmingly described by Michael Fairless in the *Roadmender*. To look backward for a while is to refresh the eye, to restore it, and to render it the more fit for its prime function of looking forwards. There is something less dynamic and more reposeful in a retreating landscape than in an advancing one. A retreating scene appears to be withdrawn gently and smoothly from our gaze; an advancing one intrudes itself with bustle, flurry, and arrogance. This contrast is more especially felt when the vehicle is a rapidly moving one. And as with physical so it is with intellectual vision. We are all the better for the repose and refreshment of an occasional glance backward, the more so since our waggon of Progress is ever being urged forward with accelerated velocities.

To view the matter from another aspect, the history of thought, like that of action, is merely the well-thumbed, left-hand side of the great diary kept by Destiny which stands open at the page of Now. Upon one of those turned-back pages we shall find a chapter with the heading "Epicureanism." Let the record remain open for a time at this page while we read.

These back pages of the diary are always posted in a language which we must needs translate. This chapter, therefore, like all the others, has been variously read because variously translated. Epicureanism and ignoble self-indul-

gence were translatable equivalents to many even of the contemporary readers, and the equation held with many readers of a later day. Epicurus in his fiery tomb purges his errors in a lower depth of Dante's Hell. Macaulay read into the teachings of the Garden "the silliest and meanest of all Systems of Natural and Moral Philosophy." But by the provision of better dictionaries, better translations of this old chapter in human thought are now possible. It is no far cry from the time when Macaulay wrote, but no longer is the Moral Philosophy of the old-time Greek regarded as one of the meanest of all systems, while no system of Natural Philosophy is of keener interest to the scientist of to-day than that adopted by Epicurus.

The Epicurean was not troubled by the question whether the world was the worst of worlds or the best possible. The matter for him was already settled by his assumption that it was the only possible world, inasmuch as it was produced by the operation of fixed and immutable law. It is a sturdy world into which man enters, and this "robustness" was as fully recognised by Epicurus as by any modern philosopher. Running through the whole system, like the solemn hum of the pedal note through a complicated organ-point, was the thought of the essential one-ness of man with nature. Its outlook upon the facts of nature and life was frank and fearless, but neither cruel nor cynical. It was the least exclusive of all those arts of living which were wont to vex old Greece and Rome, and to many, as to "Marius the Epicurean," it must have seemed the "special philosophy of the poor."

It is given to man to break the long sleep of Eternity by one brief waking moment of consciousness; that brief but crowded moment is what we know as Life. Like an uncertain sound arising suddenly in a profound silence and dying away immediately into it, so life with all its noises and commotions troubles for a brief space the everlasting calm and is presently absorbed again into it. Thus Epicurus thought. The problem for him was how to make a wise use of this short period of time salved from eternity. First he deemed it necessary to strip from man certain illusions hugged by him to his hurt. Unable to admit a Mind behind the universe "from end to end sweetly and strongly ordering all things," he insisted that man must be guided only by "the honest action of his own untroubled, unassisted intelligence."¹ To be "untroubled." That was the great consummation, that was the matter of so great moment. "The freedom of the body

¹ *Marius the Epicurean*, i. 125.

from pain and the soul from confusion.”¹ If there were no “kind, eternal friend to man,” there were at least no cruel or capricious gods to vex or destroy. It is true that the existence of the gods was not denied, but all power of interfering for good or ill with the affairs of the universe was wrested from them, and their state was conceived of as calm, care-free, and of perfect happiness. The conception of God was, indeed, no more substantial than a Platonic Idea, serving the Epicurean for the Idea of the absolute felicity. Man is thus enabled to look fearlessly right up into the placid, mysterious face of nature, his impartial mother.

“Untroubled.” That also is to be the wise man’s attitude in facing the fact of death. For he and all things living and non-living are a part of nature, who grants life upon the conditions of a lease but never as freehold. Why, indeed, should we fear death? “When we exist, death is not present to us; and when death is present, then we have no existence.” No vain hope for a life after bodily death is to be indulged in, for the material of soul and body alike is subject to dissolution. The Epicurean is to treat individual death as nature treats it—as a matter of no importance. Yet the rounded completeness of the aphorism does not fully meet the case, for there will always be the objection, as Johnson puts it, that though “annihilation is nothing . . . the apprehension of it is dreadful.” Epicurus has no weapon other than ridicule to meet this objection, but its force was acutely felt by the more sympathetic nature of the poet who in a later age expounded the philosophy to his Roman fellow-countrymen. He reasons persuasively, and says in effect: “Unreasonable man that thou art! When thou hast partaken of the feast of life and the time cometh when the master of the feast is desirous to take leave of his guests, wilt thou be so unmannerly as to refuse to go, or wilt thou take thy departure with bitter complainings that he hath not asked thee to stop longer? If nature could speak, would she not say: ‘Up and go, thou foolish man! I have set out for thee all my variety. Though thou shouldest linger yet to an hundred more feasts, they would be even the same as this. I have nothing new for thee, and there are many awaiting thy place. Up then and go with untroubled mind, for in any case, go thou must.’” The Stoic Emperor, pondering the same matter a century or so afterwards, reasons in similar manner, and his conclusion is no less peremptory: “What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast

¹ Epicurus in Diogenes Laërtius. The translation, as in the case of other citations from Diogenes Laërtius, is that of Professor C. D. Yonge.

made the voyage, thou art come to shore ; get out.”¹ But no Epicurean ever attained the sweetness and benignity of such a thought as this : “ End thy journey in content, just as an olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and thanking the tree on which it grew.”²

The Epicurean is never ashamed of naked realism, and Lucretius starkly, almost brutally, reminds man that his very dust is required for fresh combinations, for one thing shall arise fresh born from the death of another to infinite time, and the particles of man also must ultimately join the ceaseless whirl of the atoms to make

“ . . . another and another frame of things
For ever.”

But, as we have said, the old Epicureanism was no mere systematised expression of pessimism, nor was it a cold abstraction. It was a warm, living entity, and its outlook on life was thoroughly sane. The Epicurean never regarded life as a “ wound ” to be “ healed.” Epicurus speaks of the “ constantly delightful nature of life.” There is, it is true, a strong tincture of melancholy in the case of the Roman poet, and his resignation to the fact of an eternal death is, if we may say so, almost passionate in its intensity ; but an impression is left on the reader almost as though this has its origin in an acuter sympathy which forbids him to look too long or too lovingly upon life’s “ delightful nature ” lest his dearly bought resolution should waver. Perhaps to Lucretius also the apprehension of annihilation was “ dreadful,” for he admits the possibility that in infinite time the same combination of atoms may return and the ego again be reconstructed.³ Epicurus, however, does not appear to suggest this possibility, but accepts the fate of annihilation with calm resignation. There was something strong, something radical, in a philosophy which enabled him to face a painful death with a sweetness and dignity not unworthy of Socrates himself.

It may have been thought strange that in the case of a philosophy admittedly based upon the attainment of happiness by the pursuit of pleasure—even though that pleasure were of the nobler kind—it should have been thought necessary to commence by defending it against a charge of pessimism. But there is nevertheless a substratum of melancholy in all philosophy which views as honestly as Epicureanism the root facts of nature and of life, and this substratum is easily

¹ *Meditations*, iii. 3 (Long’s translation).

² *Ibid.*, iv. 48.

³ *De Rerum Natura*, iii. 847–858.

enough detected on a careful examination. It is, after all, a "bitter doctrine" which these sages have to expound, and Lucretius especially seems to feel this. The Epicurean is not "quieted by hope," but by the absence of it. But this melancholy bred, in the founder of the system, not despair, but a fighting spirit: it is a pugnacious melancholy that we encounter here which strongly reacts upon adverse circumstance, takes grip of fortune, and shakes it as a terrier does a rat. From the very fact that the Grecian sage had no illusions and would permit none to his followers, the right use of the present moment became for him of supreme importance. To be "untroubled" was to be happy; but this tranquil state was only to be obtained by seeking after such pleasures as left no sting behind. Thus there was no place in the system for the grosser hedonism of ignoble enjoyment.

It appeared essential, however, in equipping man for his strong fight for happiness, to provide him with a trusty weapon; and this Epicurus found in the sharp sword of his own personal will. Hence that passionate assertion of man's freedom of will which meets the reader with something of the shock of a surprise, for it is unexpected. "I am able to determine about myself,"¹ thought Antoninus; and so thought Epicurus, the philosopher of another school. It is extremely interesting to study the machinery by which it was held possible for man to be will-free in a universe bounded by law and subject to necessity. There is, says Lucretius, a certain undefined declination of the first principles or atoms in their parallel and perpendicular journey through space, though we are warned that this deviation is so extremely slight that we are scarcely warranted in calling it a deviation. No cause is given for this erratic behaviour of the atoms. The apology advanced for the arbitrary infraction of universal law is merely that it is so slight that it is hardly worth while to call it an infraction. Without attempting to explain or defend this curious confusion of thought, we may yet note one very interesting and pregnant fact. This same declination of the atoms is also made responsible in the Epicurean cosmogony for all the various combinations of matter. That is to say, the prime cause both of will and of the constructive function of nature is the same. It is interesting to note here a germ of the idea of the World as Will afterwards developed at such length by Schopenhauer. Nothing less than this mysterious declination of the atoms is the cause of the formation of the Universe, nothing more than this is the origin of

¹ *Meditations*, vi. 44.

Will.¹ We must confess, with regard to this problem of freedom of will, as it is usually stated, that the indeterminist is in the last resort driven to a position not less insecure than the Lucretian "*clinamen*." But the manner of statement of the problem is, as pointed out by Schopenhauer, of extreme importance. In our own day the question has been experimentally investigated by Galton² and others, while Bergson, by an entirely fresh and original restatement of the point at issue, has thrown upon it a flood of fresh light. Both scientist and philosopher are in agreement in holding that the occasions of full freedom of action are rare; but nevertheless, in the words of the French sage, "The rôle of life is to insert some *indetermination* into matter."³ The average man will not greatly concern himself with the conflicting opinions. Each act of conation creates for him a unique sensation of freedom; and, experiencing this, he will probably hold that in this case the shadow, if shadow it be, is at least as important as the substance.

It is not solely from the point of view of an Art of Living, however, that the system of Epicurus is of such perennial interest, nor is it viewed from that aspect that it bears the most vital relation to the thought of to-day. The natural philosophy bound up with it is a salt which has never lost its savour. It is difficult to be sure how much of this is original and how much taken from Leucippus, Democritus, and other philosophers. The pursuit of natural science was relegated by Epicurus to a subordinate position. The only real test he admits of the adequacy of a theory or explanation is that it be "sufficient to procure happiness and tranquillity." Knowledge of phenomena has no other aim "but that freedom from anxiety, and that calmness which is derived from a firm belief." To derive assistance from a study of nature "for the tranquillity and happiness of life," this is again and again insisted upon as the acid test by which all knowledge is to be judged. Nevertheless, the attitude of the Epicurean towards science was twofold. Where accurate knowledge was obtainable it was to be secured. It is impossible not to detect in Epicurus and Lucretius a very real interest in knowledge for its own sake, and this is one of those delightful inconsistencies which go to make up the human interest of the creed. Where, however, accurate knowledge was unobtainable, these philosophers held it foolish to weary the

¹ Compare ii. 216-244 with ii. 251-262 (*De Rer. Nat.*).

² See *Memoirs of my Life*, pp. 295-296.

³ *Creative Evolution*, p. 132 (Mitchell's translation). See also Sir Oliver Lodge, *Man and the Universe*, p. 40.

intellect by futile search for truth. To meet such cases a kind of speculative bazaar was opened somewhat after the pattern of those cheap emporia which specialise in collecting together articles of the same price. "Don't ask the price of an article, it's a penny." This legend, which often confronts one in such places, was also displayed by Epicurus: "Here they are, these brand-new theories of our own manufacture. Don't ask the relative values of each, they are all of the same worth. Choose which you prefer!" But because of the real seriousness of the pursuit of such knowledge as could be attained with certainty or approximation thereto, some conclusions were enunciated with great earnestness. The outstanding merit of the system was that it did insist most strenuously and even fiercely upon the operation of law in the universe; it did point out in a manner almost modern in its advocacy the practical value of a study of science; and it did recognise the necessity for framing a clear conception of the nature of the atoms or "foundation stones of the universe." It preached vehemently the indestructibility of matter, and by teaching that the atoms themselves were in a state of eternal motion and restlessness, it almost grasped the principle of the conservation of energy.

All this is set forth very earnestly, but if we may judge from Diogenes Laërtius, very dully by Epicurus himself. But in the verse of Lucretius these doctrines become of living interest. Nor would it seem that the philosophy of Lucretius was a mere servile copy of that of his master. He has the imagination and insight of a great poet, his "fusing intellect" enables him to discover many new relations, to combine and mould his material into new organic units. In some directions he strikes out for himself. He wrote on "Social Evolution" ages before Mr Benjamin Kidd was thought of, and he has been described as the "first anthropologist."¹ His enthusiasm saves him from the Epicurean languor even when dealing with obscure problems of natural science. The poet has indeed two ambitions: his first, a burning desire to acquaint his countrymen with what he deems to be the true solution of the riddle of the universe, and thus deliver them from needless fears and anxieties; his second, to be an adventurer, an explorer in the realms of nature. Becoming acquainted with the teachings of the son of Neocles, all things to him

". . . wore a different hue
Thenceforward—pregnant with vast consequence,
Teeming with grand results, loaded with fate."

¹ By Mr Edward Clodd.

This new insight, this priceless possession of his, he desires to share with his countrymen; though, to be sure, that desire is tinged with more than a trace of the Paracelsus spirit which "longs to trample on, yet save mankind." Nevertheless, his absorption in the major problem is scarcely less intense than the keenness with which he pursues the minor. In his very dreams he is tracking phenomena to their source.¹ In his waking moments he is keenly observant, and ever on the alert to press new analogies into his service. In cases where his master would have been content with many alternative solutions of a difficulty, the inquiring spirit of the poet cannot rest without an attempt to isolate that solution which most nearly approximates the truth. He has to the full that "high seriousness" which Matthew Arnold notes as the distinguishing characteristic of a writer of the first rank. The fire of his enthusiasm seems to render ductile the stubborn material provided by his master, and though in the fragments left by Epicurus we may discern all the essentials of the old atomic theory, yet it is only when they are wrought by the magic touch of the poet that we seem fully to recognise that surprising likeness to modern speculation which astounds anew at every fresh reading. It is, of course, easy in the light of present knowledge to see, or to fancy to see, anticipations of modern theory in the guesses of the ancients, and perhaps this tendency has in no case been more overdone than in the case of Lucretius. Yet the wonder of certain lines remains, though we give due heed to this caution. It will suffice to point out that had the philosophers of after ages given a fraction of the attention devoted to Aristotle to the hints of Plato and the bolder assertions of Epicurus and Lucretius, science would not have had to wait until Galileo for a demonstration that all bodies, whether heavy or light, fall through space with equal velocities, nor until Newton for a proof that the natural motion of bodies is rectilinear.

Grecian sage and Roman poet have rested well through the voices and wranglings of the philosophies of two millenniums. One of the problems they set themselves to solve—that of the ultimate properties of the atoms—has now, almost suddenly, become one of deep significance and pressing importance, for within the space of no uncountable number of generations man must solve the problem of how to unlock the jealously guarded stores of energy from their atomic prison-houses, or be for ever undone. The methods employed by Lucretius, if wisely directed, are by no means necessarily

¹ *De Rerum Natura*, iv. 969-970.

barren of practical result. It is yet possible that the scientist in his extremity may implore the aid of the man of imagination to find for him some short cut in his race against time. And since this "esemplastic" power, this intuitive "fusing" type of intellect in its highest form is resident only in the poet, the employment of the poet in the laboratory may not be so absurd a dream as would at first sight appear. Recent discoveries have opened up to the scientist an unaccustomed region in whose tenuous tracts he is able to respire but with difficulty. But a rare atmosphere is no stranger to the poet, for it is his accustomed breath. The poet at least may be able to teach his grosser brother how to respire properly in his new surroundings.

Nature in these latter days has said to man: "Translate the energy stored up in my atoms into the language of useful mechanical work." So far man's best translation has been comprised in the two words "coal" and "oil"; but the translation is inadequate. In his present situation he is like a schoolboy who has attained a respectable position in his class by the aid of a crib, but who, in danger of detection, suddenly finds himself compelled to discard it on pain of being sent to the bottom of the class with ignominy. Man's crib is coal, and nature has just begun to let him know that she suspects him to be using a crib, and to threaten to take it away. Science is endeavouring to learn to construe properly before the crib is lost. It is a race against time, and should time prove the winner, civilisation as we understand it must come to an end; for nature will ruthlessly send man back to the place whence he started, and the degradation once inflicted will be, so far as we can see, final. Some quicker and more fruitful method than the dull plodding which characterises so much of our present-day research must be found. The dull toil which bakes numberless substances in electric furnaces, though necessary, must be supplemented by more lively methods, for there is real tragedy in the fact that whole lives have had to be spent in determining accurately the atomic weights of a few elements. But there are already signs of an awakening. "There are two possible methods of advance," writes Mr F. Soddy, F.R.S. "One is to loose the reins of a brilliant imagination, to let it go for a space untrammelled by the limitations of knowledge, and, only at the end, bring the consequences of the process to be confirmed or rejected by fact. This is a method which, traditionally, has been unduly discouraged by chemists; for it is rare that the most erroneous theory, if original and capable of experimental

test, does not result sooner or later in a substantial increase of experimental knowledge." The late Professor Blackie happily points to Hugh Miller's *Old Red Sandstone* as a book which could never have been written by a mere prosaist.¹ Professors Thomson and Geddes, speaking of another branch of science, say: "Wordsworth, Emerson, Meredith, these and many other Nature poets are perhaps the truest, because the deepest biologists of us all"; thus conceding in full the claim made years ago by a modern poet.² The same authors also acknowledge that to Plato's doctrine of ideal archetypes we owe in no small measure the modern distinction between "homologies" and "analogies" which has proved of such service to evolutionary science.

These are indications, among many others, that the soul of modern science is being "garrisoned anew." Periods of fact collecting, dull but necessary, seem to alternate with periods of fact interpreting. The present age seems to partake of the nature of both. Take up the books, periodicals, and "Transactions" of the world of science. They are still dull enough in the mass, to be sure. But at least it is no longer generally held, even among the rank and file, that good science is an adequate excuse for bad English; and some of our great scientists are also great writers. A few of them, indeed, are men of imaginative, almost poetic insight, as was often the case with their most famous predecessors. This is all to the good, for it is scarcely too much to say that science cannot flourish vigorously in conditions which stunt and dwarf the imagination, of which one parent is wonder. In this respect, the circumstances conditioning great poetry and great science are not so dissimilar after all. It is the vulgarest of vulgar errors to suppose that when we have "explained" a collection of facts we have lessened the wonder of them. On the contrary, we have increased it. For order is always more wonderful than disorder, and the "explanations" of science are invariably demonstrations of order where before was apparent disarray.

These titanic grapples of science with nature must sooner or later culminate in a "last dim battle" wherein the Arthur of science must put forth all power and strength to save man. Material for an epic is here in greater abundance than afforded by the old legend, for the issue is vital and presently with us.

Finally, what have we of to-day to contribute afresh to the

¹ *Notes of a Life*, p. 202.

² Matthew Arnold, *Essays and Criticisms*, i. 82.

solution of the main problem which engaged the attention of Epicurus and Lucretius—the problem of the nature of things? We are not appreciably nearer the solution of that great secret than they were. We have travelled far, but the long road still stretches beyond our utmost horizon. We live on a cooling world, and the age-worn peoples that cluster its surface have seemed, for the most part, to grow cold with it, and there are some who doubt whether there exist a secret worth the knowing. Others there are who fear lest that secret prove to be so monstrous that it were wisdom to be unwise. But there remain also some who have a sure hope that what is behind the Universe is no chill Epicurean god, careless, care free, and unconcerned with the affairs of men, but a Being who is the father of his flock, as Plato thought. The “child that is within us” is afraid of the dark, and no rounded philosophy is competent to dispel that fear. There is a tender story of a Roman poet who could not bear that his little child-friend, whom he loved, should go to Hades unbefriended to face alone the terrors of the darkness, so he found for her foster-parents in that dim land of shades. We too trust that we may find at the last a care at least as tender, which will not suffer us to wander unattended in the gloom, but will guide our path into a fuller light.

E. W. ADAMS.

HAMPTON COURT.

THOUGHTS ON REPARATION.

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IN various particulars the Treaty of Versailles defeats its own aim of realising the highest possible indemnity from Germany, inasmuch as it weakens Germany's only means of raising the money, namely, by export trade. Germany forfeits an important source of ability to pay by the curtailment of her territory in the West, which used to furnish three-quarters of the iron ores and one-quarter of the coal, while she loses agricultural land in the East. These conditions, fixed by the Treaty, are the more crucial in point of Reparation as Germany's imports are at present on a relatively extended scale, both in respect of raw materials of industry and of food-stuffs. The German balance of trade, as it stood before the war, cannot therefore provide the basis for calculations of Germany's future ability to export goods. The latest published figures of exports and imports, indeed, show a large excess of imports over exports, compared with pre-war figures.

But the post-war policy of the Allies likewise handicaps Germany's exporting power. Above all, the deliveries of coal. Coal is the raw material of every industry, notably of the iron, machine, and potash industries, which furnish the staples of export. Now that the international coal situation is less critical, so that even France exports coal and actually sells it back to Germany, and that the English coal-market has been upset by the Convention of Spa, it is to be hoped that a rational inter-European distribution of coal will at last be organised. The Allies ought to realise that the profits France makes on German coal are insignificant in comparison with the amount by which Germany's power of paying Reparation is curtailed by the enforced deliveries of coal. For Germany multiplies the value of the coal several times by the labour she puts into it. The case of other raw materials is parallel. A country naturally poor

in raw materials cannot hand over much wealth under conditions like these. The wealth of Germany consists of her labour, which augments the value of the materials it is expended upon.

The demands of the case may be formulated as follows:— Firstly, if high Reparation payments are to be realised, Germany must be left the use of her natural resources, and the import of further raw materials for working up into goods of augmented value must be facilitated for her.

Furthermore, the handicapping of German goods in the Allied countries in favour of the so-called “key-industries” in England, but no less in France and Italy, weakens the exporting power of Germany and therewith her Reparation power. The same applies to “most-favoured-nation” terms, as laid down for Germany in the Treaty, and to the smuggling in of articles of luxury through the “hole in the west,” which has not even yet been effectually closed. The disabilities of German citizens—commercial travellers, and experts of all sorts—in foreign countries operate in a like direction. The British Colonies, for instance, are still closed to German travellers (two years after the conclusion of peace!). And the condition is enormously aggravated by the sequestration of German private property, the annulling of German concessions, and liquidation of German enterprise throughout the world, notably in the British and French colonial empires, Russia, China, and the territory of our former allies. With the object of combating German commercial influence, the cost of her purchases of raw materials is enhanced, by which means her export markets are restricted, and at the same time her Reparation power cut down.

Secondly, if it be desired to realise high Reparation demands, the disabilities that now hamper German enterprise abroad need to be cleared away, and “most-favoured-nation” terms in the full sense accorded in their place, *i.e.* equal rights and facilities for all in the markets of the world. In the tropical and other “mandatory” colonies the principle of “the open door” should prevail, under which the mother-countries, etc., claim no preferential treatment.

To complete the handicap aspect that militates against Reparation, the rehabilitation of German finance is a further condition of the ability to pay. The abrupt fluctuations of the exchange introduce a speculative element into German economics which counteracts thrift and devotion to work. Moreover, they affect the neighbouring countries in the same way—Great Britain especially—with dumping of German goods, by which the labouring class suffers.

A prime condition of the regulation of German finance is reduction of the inflation of the currency unavoidable under the Peace Treaty and the post-war policy of the Allies. Under this head come in the first place the unreasonably high expenses of the armies of occupation, and the even more costly indemnities to German citizens whose property has been liquidated abroad, and which, under the Treaty, the German Government has to discharge. These indemnities can be met in no other way than by an unlimited issue of paper money. The budget for 1919-20 estimated the cost of the occupation at fifteen milliards, that of the indemnity to its citizens for their property sequestered abroad at ninety milliards of paper marks.

Thirdly, in order to be able to realise high Reparation demands, the road to the rehabilitation of German finance should be smoothed by reduction of the cost of occupation and return of the private property sequestered from German citizens abroad to the former owners, who would unquestionably be in a position to employ it to greater advantage for all concerned than any successor from outside. The German Government should at the same time be pledged to a financial scheme elaborated by experts, which should balance the budget, steadily reduce inflation, and stabilise the exchange. Let it not be overlooked that the revenue raised by the German Government is levied in paper marks, and that gold has to be purchased with these at a ruinous exchange to meet Reparation demands.

Finally, in order to realise these high Reparation demands, it is essential that Germany retain full disposal over her own natural resources (Upper Silesia!). The economic life of Germany must get into swing again as a step towards that of the economic life of the world at large. At no point is German activity so indispensable as in Eastern Europe, in order to render the resources of those regions in raw materials available to general trade again.

In irreconcilable opposition to such aims is the punitive policy affected by France, which stigmatises Germany as the originator of the war, as well as the policy of apprehension that cowers before the revival of Germany. But the logic of facts prescribes a stern dilemma: either revival of Germany and payment of the indemnity the revival renders possible, or no revival and no possibility of payment. Under the pressure of financial necessity, above all, her indebtedness to the United States, France is in urgent need of ready money. The proposals made on the German side point the way.

Britain as an industrial, exporting nation has, in contrast to an agricultural nation like France, which is practically self-contained, most to lose by the disorganisation of the world—above all, regions like Lancashire (the German yarn-market). The English coal-strike appears to many as a development from the Treaty of Versailles. Three millions of unemployed, together with severe depression of trade, brought the pressure of the City to bear upon Lloyd-George in favour of the London Ultimatum (which notoriously was wrung from the French). Then there is the agitation of the Labour Party for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, demanded by Henderson and Ramsay Macdonald, in the interest of British trade and British labour.

The re-entrance of America into the Reparation Commission may point in the same direction, to begin with as "observer with opinion," but in reality with the "casting vote" between Britain and France. Disappointed at the peace of violence and at the victory of secret diplomacy it embodied, the American people at first washed their hands of Europe. But economic considerations rendered this impracticable in the long run. The interests of the United States, as at once the biggest creditor and biggest exporter, are interwoven with the interests of the world at large.

The economic forces here seen in operation must of course be allowed due time to work out. This is the spirit in which the Ministry Wirth-Rathenau approaches the problem, in the honest desire to fulfil the Reparation pledges. May they succeed in navigating the perilous zone of political passions that menace us from the direction of France, and in convincing the world that the stupendous destruction of values in the war can only be redeemed by the creation of fresh values in peaceful industry. But spiritual forces are at work for Germany too. These will sap the foundations of the Treaty of Versailles, built up as it is upon punitive feeling. By this time every intellectual is aware that in the outbreak of the war Germany was not the principal culprit. Sooner or later the world-conscience is bound to awaken to this conviction, and, turning its back upon obsolete methods of violence, to ripen for the conception of the solidarity of Humanity.

"Hope on ever!" in the words of Goethe's sanguine maxim, in an age no less hopeless than this present of our own.

VON SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ.

FREIBURG.

FRESH LIGHT ON THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM.

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ALL study, whether literary or historical, of the first three gospels must start by assuming as an ascertained discovery the dependence of the authors of the first and third gospels for a large part of their material on a document practically identical with the gospel of St Mark. Since Matthew and Luke have in common some two hundred verses not contained in Mark, the hypothesis that they derived these from a second document, now commonly spoken of by the symbol Q, has gained a very general acceptance.

Next in importance to the fundamental discovery of the priority of Mark, I would place two conclusions of critical analysis closely related to one another.

(1) The source (or sources) of the Q material, whatever its exact nature or extent, or in whatever form or forms it lay before Matthew and Luke respectively, must have contained certain items which also appear in Mark in a different and, usually, in a much shorter version. In other words, whatever content we attach to the symbol Q, Q and Mark must have overlapped. In particular it is clear that Matthew and Luke must have had in front of them a version of John the Baptist's preaching, the Baptism and Temptation, the Beelzebub controversy, the parable of the Mustard Seed, and probably certain other sayings, which differed considerably from the version in Mark. The question whether the Marcan and the Q versions are independent, or whether—as I myself argued in an essay in the *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*—in these few passages Mark is quoting from memory from Q, is one which cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

(2) Side by side with this I would place a conclusion, partly anticipated by previous writers, but first clearly demonstrated by Sir John Hawkins in his essay in the *Oxford Studies*, "Three Limitations to St Luke's Use of St Mark's Gospel." Sir John there pointed out that, whereas over a large part of his gospel St Luke is clearly reproducing the story of St Mark, not only in substance and in order, but with the closest verbal agreements, there are two large tracts, viz. Luke vi. 20-viii. 3 and Luke ix. 51-xviii. 14, in which he makes no use of Mark at all. He shows this by a detailed proof that in the very few places within these tracts where Luke has material resembling Mark—the Great Commandment, the Beelzebub controversy, and the Mustard Seed are the most conspicuous cases,—Luke is reproducing a version essentially different from that given by Mark.

I propose in this article to take up the investigation at the point at which Sir John Hawkins laid it down, and I hope to establish a conclusion which may not only advance one step further the solution of the interesting critical problem of the literary relations of the first three gospels, but which has also, unless I mistake, an important bearing on the question of the historical evidence for the life of Christ. Since 1910, when Sir John passed for press the proofs of his brilliant essay, a good deal has been published on the subject, especially by American scholars, and I may perhaps say that I feel the more confidence in the validity of the conclusion reached by my own researches from the fact that it is in accordance with the general trend of the results attained by other workers in the same field. Indeed, if I venture to call it "fresh light," it is only because one can call in a sense "new" any generalisation which, by viewing as whole and from a slightly different standpoint, co-ordinates and completes the diffused detailed discoveries of many workers.

The two tracts in the main body of the Third Gospel (Luke vi. 20-viii. 3 and ix. 51-xviii. 14), in which Luke makes no use of Mark, are described by Sir John Hawkins respectively as "the lesser interpolation" and "the great interpolation." Each of these contains matter which, as it occurs also in Matthew, we may assign to Q (without prejudice to any conception as to the unity or character of that source), alternating with matter peculiar to St Luke, which we will for convenience speak of as L, the Q matter being to the L matter in the proportion of roughly 2 : 3. If with Harnack and others we regard the Lucan parable of the Pounds as the equivalent of Matthew's parable of the Talents, we at once

observe that there is a third similar, though much shorter, "interpolation" (Luke xix. 1-27) also containing material from both Q and L.

But—and here I come to a point fundamental to my argument—there is yet another tract in St Luke's Gospel (iii. 1-iv. 30), made up like these others of Q and L material, in which, as in the "great interpolation," there are indeed points of contact with Mark, but in which nothing or practically nothing is derived from Mark. For, once grasp the significance of the fact that Q as well as Mark had an account of John's preaching, the Baptism and Temptation (for detailed proof of this see *Oxford Studies*, pp. 167-8, 186-7), and that Luke's account is obviously derived from Q, and it is clear that the "disuse of the Marcan source" noticed by Sir John Hawkins in regard to the other "interpolations" applies equally to the section iii. 1-iv. 30.

Add to this one more observation. St Luke's account of the Resurrection Appearances is plainly derived from a non-Markan source, for it places the Appearances in Jerusalem, instead of in Galilee as Mark's original conclusion evidently did. Also, Luke's account of the Last Supper and Passion (xxii. 14-xxiv. 12) in its substance, its order, and its actual wording looks more like an originally independent version of the story enriched by certain additions from St Mark than like a modification of Mark's version.

At once there leaps to the mind the suggestion, surely "interpolation" was the wrong title to give to the non-Markan tracts! The non-Markan sections, taken all together, would form a complete gospel, beginning with the preaching of John and ending with the Resurrection Appearances. It is not these, it is the Marcan sections, that should be styled "interpolations." *The non-Markan sections form the framework of the Third Gospel, and into this framework are inserted at convenient places extracts from the gospel of Mark.* If so, there would be an essential difference in the way in which Mark is used by the author of the First Gospel and by the author of the Third. To Matthew, Mark is the primary source and provides the framework into which matter from other sources is inserted. To Luke the non-Markan document (Q+L)—Proto-Luke, as we may now style it—is the primary authority, and forms the framework into which he fitted materials derived from Mark or from other sources.

Before, however, discussing in detail the hypothesis of a Proto-Luke, I would digress to point out that it in no way conflicts with the generally accepted "two-document hypothesis" which asserts that Matthew and Luke are ultimately

dependent on Mark and Q, meaning by Q a single written source. I believe as firmly as ever that most of the agreements of Matthew and Luke, when Mark is absent, are to be referred to Q. But I desire to interpolate a stage between Q and the editor of the Third Gospel. I conceive that this editor had before him, not Q in its original form (which, I hold, included practically no narrative and had no account of the Passion), but a much longer document (Q+L) forming a complete gospel. This document, which I will call Proto-Luke, would have been slightly longer than Mark, and less than one-third of its total contents consisted of materials derived from Q. Nor, again, does this hypothesis conflict with the view that the author of our present gospel was St Luke, or with the suggestion that St Luke collected some of his materials when in Palestine with St Paul. As I shall show later, the author of Proto-Luke *may* well be St Luke himself, and our present gospel may be his much later and enlarged edition of his own earlier work. All I am concerned to show here is that Q+L lay before whoever wrote the Third Gospel as a single written source.

The hypothesis I have put forward for discussion was suggested in the first instance by the observation that in the Third Gospel Marcan and non-Marcan materials are distributed, as it were, in alternate stripes, and that both the beginning and the end of the gospel belong, not to the Marcan, but to the non-Marcan strain. It is fortified by the consideration that the non-Marcan portions are also of much greater extent. In the section Luke iii. 1 (John's Preaching) to xxii. 14 (Last Supper)—at which point the relation of the two sources becomes more complicated—the non-Marcan material amounts to at least 671 verses, the interpolated Marcan material, even if we assign all doubtful cases to the Marcan source, to only 346.

Again, Luke iii. 1 opens with a sentence containing an elaborate chronological statement: "In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, when Pontius Pilate, etc. . . . the word of the Lord came to John, the son of Zacharias, in the wilderness." This surely reads—I owe the observation to a conversation with Sir J. Hawkins—as if originally it stood as the beginning of a book. The impression is strengthened by the curious position of the genealogy of our Lord (iv. 23). If this had been inserted by the editor of the complete gospel as we now have it, we should have expected to find it, like the genealogy in Matthew, somewhere in chapters i. or ii. in the account of the Birth and Infancy. If, however, it was first inserted in a book which began at iii. 1, its position is

explained; for it occurs immediately after the *first* mention of the name Jesus. L

But perhaps the most convincing proof of the fact that the Q and the L elements in the non-Marcian sections were already combined in a single written source, and that this source was regarded by Luke as of greater value than Mark, is to be derived from a consideration of the way in which he deals with incidents or sayings in Mark, of which other versions are contained in Q or L.

There are five conspicuous instances, two of which, the Beelzebub controversy (xi. 14-23) and the Mustard Seed (xiii. 18-19), may be assigned to Q; two, the rejection at Nazareth (iv. 16-30), and the Anointing (vii. 36 ff.), belong to L; and one, the Great Commandment (x. 25-28), may be either Q or L.

If we look up in a synopsis of the Gospels these passages in Mark, and notice the incidents which precede and follow them, we shall see that, whereas Luke reproduces from Mark everything else in the neighbourhood in its original order, he simply omits Mark's account of these incidents, but gives the other version in a *completely different context*, presumably the context in the source from which he took it. In the cases quoted above, the non-Marcian version is a fuller and more interesting version. But there are other cases where the contrary seems true, *e.g.* the saying about salt, Luke xiv. 34, *cf.* Mark ix. 49-50; the discussion of divorce, Mark x. 2-12, compared with the single verse Luke xvi. 18; the contrast of the rulers of the Gentiles and the Son of Man, Mark x. 35-45, Luke xxii. 24-27. Here Mark's version seems the more vigorous and interesting; clearly, then, Luke's preference is a preference for the source as a whole, not for the intrinsic merit of particular items in it.

Luke's preference for Proto-Luke in comparison to Mark may be further shown, in the case of the Q element in that source, by a comparison with Matthew. When Mark and Q overlap, Matthew carefully conflates the two; *e.g.* in the accounts of John the Baptist, of the Temptation, and of the Beelzebub controversy, he gives not only the Q account, but certain details which occur only in Mark, *e.g.* Matt. iii. 4 = Mark i. 6, Matt. iv. 11b = Mark i. 13b, Matt. xii. 31 = Mark iii. 28. Luke, on the other hand, would appear either to discard the Marcan version altogether, or at least to take over only a few words. Again, when Q and Mark overlap, Matthew, in sharp contrast to Luke, always prefers the context in which the saying occurs in Mark; the Beelzebub controversy and the Mustard Seed may be instanced. But perhaps the best

illustration of both these tendencies is the conflation by Matthew x. 1-16 of the charge to the Seventy (Luke x. 1-12) with Mark's charge to the Twelve (vi. 7-13), and the placing of the combined discourse in the Marcan context.

Again, a similar preference of Proto-Luke may be illustrated as regards the L element in that source by noting certain substitutions of a non-Markan for the Marcan version in the Passion story, *e.g.* the mocking by Herod's soldiers instead of by those of Pilate, the trial in the morning instead of at night, and, most conspicuous of all, Jerusalem instead of Galilee as the scene of the Resurrection Appearances.

It will be observed, then, that Luke tends to prefer the non-Markan to the Marcan version, whether it be the longer or the shorter, and whether it belongs to that element in the source which we can further analyse as being ultimately derived from Q or as belonging to the element which we call L.

The combined document Q+L would be at least as long as, if not longer than, Mark, and would make a complete gospel which might well seem to Luke a far more important and valuable authority than Mark. But this would not be true of either Q or L in separation. The conclusion that Q+L lay before the author of the Third Gospel as a single document, and that he regarded this as his principal source, appears to be inevitable.

Finally, this hypothesis explains why Luke omits so much more of the contents of Mark's Gospel than Matthew does, in particular the so-called "great omission" (Mark vi. 45-viii. 26), which the linguistic investigations of Sir John Hawkins (*Oxford Studies*, p. 61 ff.) show clearly were an original part of the gospel. Mark was to Matthew a primary, to Luke only a secondary, source, from which he would readily jettison material if short of space, especially if much of it seemed of inferior interest (cf. *Oxford Studies*, p. 223).

Granted the existence of Proto-Luke as a complete gospel, on about the scale of Mark though having a somewhat larger proportion of discourse to narrative, it is probable that we ought to assign to it certain sections in St Luke's Gospel besides the five large blocks iii. 1-iv. 30, vi. 20-viii. 3, ix. 51-xviii. 14, xix. 1-27, xxiv. 13 to the end, and such portions of the section xxii. 14 to xxiv. 52 as on a minuter investigation we may decide are not derivable from Mark. We must almost certainly assign to it the clearly non-Markan version of the Call of Peter, James, and John, v. 1-11, and of the Twelve, vi. 13-16, the names not being the same as in Mark. Thus the brief summary, iv. 14-15, the Rejection at Nazareth, the Call of the Three, and the names of the

Twelve, with a word or two of connection, would have made a natural and appropriate transition from the story of the Temptation to the Sermon on the Plain. Probably also xix. 37-44 is from a parallel version of the triumphal entry, and possibly xxi. 34-36 and certain other verses of this Apocalyptic chapter are from Proto-Luke.

Some scholars would go further and see the influence of a source parallel to Mark in some of the minor variants of Luke in places where his narrative is clearly derived in the main from Mark; as, for instance, in the trifling variations by Luke in the story of the Transfiguration, ix. 28-36, the reply to the Sadducees about the Resurrection, xx. 34-38, or in some details of chapter xxii. 1-13, such as the mention of Satan, xxii. 3, or of the names Peter and John, xxii. 8. But I must confess that, to my mind, such details as these, as well as at any rate the majority of the divergences from Mark in chapter xxi., look more like editorial improvements.

The disentanglement of the elements derived from Mark and from Proto-Luke from xxii. 14 onwards has exercised the ingenuity of several scholars who have tried to verify different forms of the hypothesis of a non-Marcian Passion story. In points of detail it is necessarily highly speculative. But, if the general position that Luke preferred Proto-Luke to Mark is correct, we are, I think, entitled to approach the question with the preliminary assumption that everything in this section is derived from Proto-Luke except those verses which there are special reasons for assigning to Mark on account of their close verbal resemblance to Mark and the possibility of their being detached from the context without spoiling the general sense.¹ But St Luke's method is not that of a mere "scissors and paste" compiler. He weaves his materials into a literary whole. Besides, he may well have derived some details from oral tradition. Hence, though I feel that the evidence points decidedly in the direction of his use as his primary source of a written document other than Mark, its disentanglement in detail is not possible with any high degree of certainty.

Granted the existence of such an important document as Proto-Luke, can we in any way determine its provenance?

I think we can. But before putting forward a suggestion on this point, I must emphasise that it is put forward only as a suggestion. The existence of Proto-Luke is, I claim, a scientific hypothesis, which, to a considerable extent, is

¹ As a maximum I should assign to Mark the following list of passages:—xxii. 18, 34, 39-46, 54-65, 69, 71; xxiii. 3, 18-19, 25-26, 34b-38, 44-45, 50-54; but many of these are partly derived from another source.

capable of verification. The suggestion I propose to make as to its *authorship* does not, from the nature of the case, admit of verification in the same way.

My suggestion is that the author of Proto-Luke—by which I mean the person who combined together in one document the materials derived from Q and those derived from other sources, oral or written—was no other than St Luke, the companion of St Paul, and that he compiled it during the two years he spent in Cæsarea while the Apostle was in prison. And I suggest that the same St Luke some twenty years afterwards *expanded his own early work* by prefixing the stories of the Infancy, by inserting extracts from St Mark, and possibly making certain minor alterations and additions. I regard as unanswered, if not unanswerable, the arguments of Renan and Harnack, let alone of numerous English scholars, that the author of the Third Gospel and of the Acts of the Apostles as we now have them was St Luke, the companion of St Paul, who kept the diary which forms the basis of the so-called “we sections” or “travel-document” in the latter part of Acts. But if St Luke wrote the Acts some twenty years later than the events with which it ends (I cannot personally accept an earlier date), there were two periods of literary activity in his life—the period when, while in attendance on St Paul, he wrote the “travel-document”; and the period when, years after the Apostle’s death, he embodied this early sketch into a larger and maturer history. The suggestion I make is that what is true of the Acts is also true of the gospel. He wrote a shorter gospel when in the company of St Paul, and embodied it in a larger history at the later date.

The reason why I conclude that the author of the Third Gospel and the Acts is the same as the author of Proto-Luke is that the “tendency,” that is, the selection of incidents, the emphasis and proportion in the general presentation of Christianity and its history which we find in the two authors, is exactly the same in both.

The author of the “we sections” stayed two years in Cæsarea, the capital of the Herod dynasty; special knowledge of and interest in the Herods is found *both* in Proto-Luke and in the *earlier* part of Acts. He stayed in the house of Philip, the evangelist of Samaria; an interest in Samaria and Samaritans is a notable feature of Proto-Luke, as it is in the preface to the Acts (by the final editor, of course), and in the selection of materials (whoever made it) in the *earlier* part of Acts.

The desire to represent Christ as the Saviour of the world,

accepted by Gentiles but rejected by His own people, is the main theme of the Acts: witness the preface, the whole development of the history as related with its special emphasis on each stage in opening the gospel to a wider field, and the last words of St Paul, "We go to the Gentiles, they *will* hear." So too Proto-Luke, iii. 5-6, adds to the quotation from Isaiah, which he takes from Q, a verse which ends "till all flesh shall see the salvation of God": he traces the genealogy of Christ, not (like Matthew) to Abraham the father of Israel, but to Adam the father of all men; he records as the Master's final commission (xxiv. 47) the command to go to the Gentiles; most significant of all, he narrates, as if it were the first act of our Lord's ministry, the Rejection at Nazareth (though he knew it was *not* the first, since he alludes to previous miracles in Capernaum), because it seemed to him to sum up the history of the Christian message—the Prophet has honour, but not in his own country; and just as Elijah and Elisha had been sent, not to the widows or the lepers of Israel, but to her of Sarepta and to Naaman the Syrian—so it had been with the Christ Himself.

Again that atmosphere of extraordinary tenderness and sympathy somehow made quite compatible with the call to righteousness, sacrifice, and effort; that atmosphere which can be felt rather than demonstrated as the characteristic of Proto-Luke, the interest in the poor, in women, in sinners, in those that men despised—all this appears throughout the Lucan writing, whether it be in the Infancy stories, in the editorial omissions¹ of Marcan materials, or in the Acts. Yet again, what to the historian is one of the weak points of Proto-Luke, his preferring the more to the less miraculous of the two versions of a story laid before him, is in the widest sense a "Lucan" characteristic. Thus Proto-Luke adds to the account of the descent at the baptism of the Spirit as a dove the words "in bodily form" (ruling out the possibility of its being a vision), and he chooses that version of the Call of Peter which includes a miraculous draught of fishes. So the last editor of Acts never seems to have reflected that the speaking with other tongues at Pentecost was a magnified account of the ecstatic "speaking with tongues" which was quite common in the early Church; while the author of the "we sections" sees a resurrection in the recovery of Eutychus even while he records St Paul's own remark to the effect that he was not dead, and apparently never asked whether the

¹ *E.g.* the harsh story of the cursing of the fig-tree, or that of the Syro-Phenician woman, with its reference to Gentiles as dogs, and its implication that our Lord was unwilling to heal such.

serpent which clung to St Paul at Malta was really poisonous or, if so, had actually bitten him.

Lastly, there is the claim advanced in the preface of the Gospel i. 1-4 that the author has enjoyed exceptional opportunities and has taken special trouble to ascertain the facts. This might be justified in an editor piecing together what he regarded as the best three sources available—Proto-Luke, Mark, and the traditions embodied in chapters i. and ii. But it would be much better justified if, at an earlier period of his life, he had himself compiled the document Proto-Luke while resident in Palestine and able to confer with at least some "who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word."

I infer then, not as proved but as probable, that Proto-Luke was compiled by St Luke in Cæsarea about 60 A.D., partly from an early copy of Q, but mainly from traditions which he himself collected, some oral, some possibly already written down; the Aramaic flavour which some scholars have detected in the sections peculiar to his gospel would be accounted for on either hypothesis.

Whether or no the compiler of Proto-Luke was St Luke himself, the historical importance of the critical identification of this source is obvious.

All recent discussion of the historical evidence for the life of Christ has been based on the assumption that we have only two primary authorities, Mark and Q; and, since Q is all but confined to discourse, Mark alone is left as a primary authority for the life. If the conclusions of this article are sound, we must recognise in Proto-Luke the existence of another authority comparable to Mark. It is true that Proto-Luke is later than, and dependent on, Q—but so, possibly, is Mark. The essential point is that *Proto-Luke is entirely independent of Mark*. Where it is parallel to Mark, it would seem to be sometimes inferior in historical value (e.g. the Call of Peter), sometimes superior (e.g. the trial before Herod). Neither Mark nor Proto-Luke is infallible, but they should probably be regarded as on the whole of approximately equal authority. But, if so, this means that far more weight will have to be given by the historian in the future to St Luke's Gospel, and in particular to those portions of it which are peculiar to St Luke.

B. H. STREETER.

THE SALVATION OF THE NATIONS.

LILY DOUGALL.

It is often observed that in this age religion languishes because people are no longer afraid of damnation. They no longer cry to ministers of Christ, like the Philippian jailer, "Sirs, what must we do to be saved?" ; because they do not believe there is any hell to be saved from. Men have ceased to believe in the eschatology of the Jews. Pictures and sculptures of the Last Judgment, adorning our mediæval churches, in which devils are depicted dragging miserable souls to the flames of hell, no longer make any appeal to the latent fears of an average mind. Those who believe in God at all, and teach their children of Him, no longer think of Him as holding the rod or igniting the flame. He keeps no judicial torture-chamber, no army of demons to prod lost souls with red-hot pitchforks. God, men are apt to say, knowing all, will pardon all.

There is in this a vast advance upon the past. Nevertheless, in this modern religious attitude there is also an element which is both foolish and superficial—its lack of insight into the inevitable connection of cause and consequence wherever evil is involved. We reject the tradition of hell. Rightly: but do we therefore believe that God interferes miraculously, whether in this life or the next, between cause and consequence, to prevent an evil act, of omission or commission, from bringing forth its inevitable effect? Is the universe such as to give us reason to suppose that the forces of nature or society, left without control, will contribute to our welfare or the welfare of the race? or that, if we ourselves are slack, indifferent, or stupid, our own spiritual life will escape atrophy? From the wrongs of the past many of the social forces have acquired a false proportion, and are hurling themselves along in a wrong direction. If they are unchecked, economic confusion—class wars, tariff wars, national wars—will ensue, and the pleasant places of life,

which we have seen blossom as the rose, will become the deserts of a chaotic epoch. Again, each one of us, as we pass into the immortal life, will carry within us the inevitable consequences of a lower individual choice—a spirit stunted, ill-nourished, and deformed. If, then, we have any interest either in the advantages of a Christian civilisation for the world or in our own immortal welfare, it behoves us to strain every nerve to improve both that civilisation and our individual selves. For there is no standing still. Deterioration or improvement—personal and social—is the law of life. It is from deterioration, personal and social, that we need salvation. It is only the fool that does not say, “What must I do to be saved?” Decaying interpretations have soiled the word “salvation,” and, like a rusty weapon, it must be cleansed and burnished; but assuredly it is still required.

But salvation as it was preached by Jesus Christ was, to an extent which very few, if any, interpreters of the Gospels have realised, national as well as individual. The Jew of that time, indeed, knew no distinction between national and individual salvation. The law and the prophets had merged individual in national welfare; and it is only necessary to read the Jewish literature of the two centuries preceding, and of the time contemporary with, the life of Jesus to be assured that the national ideal and interest was still the main thing emphasised. The salvation of the whole world, if it was to be saved, or of such part of it as might be saved, depended, according to the Jewish seers, upon submission to the divine Law that governed the Jewish state. The salvation of the Jewish nation itself depended upon the zealous loyalty of its members to the national king, who was none other than Jehovah. Some Jews thought that this zealous loyalty was to be manifested in legal observance and peaceful ritual; a few held that the cause of God required some religious compromise with the culture of the Empire; but there was a growing class that actually taught militarism *in excelsis*, believing that God demanded of them to strike the sword for Jewish freedom, and would reinforce their feeble efforts with the legions of heaven. In all these ideas there was no distinction between a personal and a national ethic: what was right for the Jew was what he believed would bring salvation to his nation; what was right for the nation was binding upon every Jew.

Consider the teaching of Jesus as it struck his first hearers. Who were those who compelled the Galilean peasant to go a mile? They were Roman soldiers, acting as armed police, any man of whom had the right to make one of a conquered

race carry his traps for a certain distance. Who were those pre-eminent defrauders, demanding money and taking away goods? They were the collectors of Roman taxes. Who were those who "used spitefully the people"? Assuredly the arrogant officials, both high and low, of a dominant race rose before the mind's eye of every member of those Jewish crowds to whom Jesus preached. The Jews, intoxicated with their own hereditary divine right—their right not only to be independent of foreign domination but to rule the world,—could not but by their own arrogance provoke arrogance in their conquerors. The Jewish nation, weak and poor but the prouder for that, was at this time vibrating with suppressed revolution. Judas of Galilee had headed a rising; Pilate more recently had ruthlessly quelled in blood a riot in the very Temple; Theudas was soon to head a rebellion. If to members of Sinn Fein in the spring of 1921 had been said, "Forgive your enemies, bless them that persecute you, do good to them that spitefully use you," to whom would they have supposed the words refer? Would not such teaching to them mean the suggestion of a national policy? But, of course, if accepted as such it would be none the less obligatory on every individual.

This policy of national forgiveness proclaimed by Jesus not only stood clear against a dark background of narrow national intolerance, it also implied a complete reversal of contemporary conceptions as to God's attitude towards the enemies of the chosen race. If we study the Book of Enoch, the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, and the Wisdom of Solomon, we shall find that, according to Jewish writers, the best attitude that Jehovah could maintain towards the enemies of His people was "long-suffering." This meant only the withholding of the hidden Divine hand for a time, accompanied by the demand for an impossible repentance—impossible because, in the case of such nations or members of nations as had conquered the Jews, only a complete reversal of the situation, only the submission of the conquering Empire to the conquered Jewish State, could avert the final vengeance of God.

All the pseudonymous religious literature so popular at this period is filled with the hostility of God to the unthankful and the evil. The Jewish law was represented as having been offered to the Gentiles and rejected by them. The sin of the Gentiles as a whole, as did that of wicked members of the Jewish race, consisted in rejection of, or disobedience to, the Law. This was natural, because the thought of the nation as a whole was Jehovah-centric. It was only

a few of the more cultured and well-balanced who could conceive of the Gentile world as owing no allegiance to their law because wholly ignorant of it; for the most part, all Gentiles, considered as godless, are pitilessly consigned to future torments because of their wilful and ungrateful rejection of God's law.¹ The very loyalty of the Jew to his God, therefore, entailed ruthless hostility to the Gentile world.

It was to people who thought thus that Jesus said, in many ways—in more ways than we care to note—"Forgive your enemies." But the forgiveness he taught was no passive endurance, no mere remission of penalty; it was an active generosity; the glad sharing, not only of material possessions, but of religious privilege, with the offender. Love, give to, lend to, bless, pray for, your enemies: that is the teaching. What was its cause and purpose?

To any mind of real statesmanlike insight, at the time when Jesus taught, it must have been clear that the doom of Jerusalem and of the Jewish State was assuredly imminent unless the whole nation changed its fierce, inimical attitude to the Gentile world. On the other hand, it would have been no less clear that the obliteration of the purest conception of a personal God ever known to the world would ensue if the upholders of the Jewish faith made compromise with the worship of Cæsar, or even with the worship of the impassible stoic deity who stood nearest to Jehovah in ethical character. The only way in which both the religious ideal and the national integrity of the Jews could together be saved was by raising the religious ideal to a point at which entire friendliness with, and active benevolence toward, the Gentile world would be consistent with perfect and enthusiastic loyalty to the God of the Jews. *Jesus presented a conception of God which made this dual salvation possible—and obligatory.*

He proclaimed a new Divine character. He said that it was the glory of the perfection of God to forgive His enemies *while they still remained inimical*; to lavish kindness upon them. Loyalty to this God involved the generous and active benevolence of every Jew toward every enemy with whom he came in contact. Can we doubt that this policy of international friendship was one which, however it might have been misunderstood and persecuted at first, would inevitably have saved the Jewish nation from the impending political annihilation, and ultimately would have won to the Divine allegiance all the good-hearted of the earth?

The Jewish nation rejected this teaching about God, and

¹ Book of Enoch, i. 9; xlviii. 8-10. Wisdom of Solomon, iv. 19-20.

therefore the national policy it entailed ; and he who brought the revelation wept in pity. It is only necessary to study the teaching of Jesus impartially to realise how deeply he was impressed, not with the idea of arbitrary and miraculous punishments, but with the natural consequences of evil action. The most pathetic of his reported sayings express his passionate regret for the consequence of his nation's rejection of his message: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, . . . how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!" "If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong to thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes."¹

What the nation was to the Jew the Church became to the Christian ; and Christians took the same attitude toward all who opposed the Church—heathen or heretics—as the Jews had taken toward Gentiles. If the Church had accepted the teaching of her Lord, had suffered all inevitable persecution for the sake of manifesting in the world God's active generosity to non-Christians and heretics, and had taught a love of God too great and glorious to include resentment, too noble for vengeance, too majestic to punish crimes of *lèse majesté*, what would have been the history of our Western civilisation? The Church rejected the national or social aspect of Christian forgiveness, as had the Jewish nation ; and the doom of the consequences of that rejection has devastated Christendom again and again—and of late most terribly.

Well ! we cannot go back and remake history. We cannot judge how far our spiritual forbears might have known their Lord's will ; but to us is given the opportunity to understand and to obey. Upon us will come the blood of all the prophets of God's universal generosity if we do not understand—and, understanding, obey.

What the nation was to the Jew the Church is to the Christian to-day ; and in this connection it does not, for the moment, matter how we define the Church. We may hold ourselves to belong to the spiritual communion of all those in the various Christian associations who seek in sincerity to follow the path of the Master ; we may hold ourselves to belong to some exclusive body that claims that in it alone is the way, the truth, and the life. Our sect may be small and insignificant ; it may be the largest and best organised of Christian societies : but whatever it be, the Christian salvation as preached by Jesus Christ depends upon an

¹ Matt. xxiii. 37 ; Luke xix. 42.

attitude and habit of active benevolence and friendly converse with those who differ from and oppose us. "If ye love them which love you, what thank have ye? . . . and if ye do good to them which do good to you, what thank have ye?"¹

We are not required to think out schemes for the union of the Church with the world, or for the union of nations. We are not asked to embrace any theoretic pacifism, either individual or national. The welfare of a maniac or of a drunken person might be best served by knocking him down or otherwise forcibly preventing him from running amuck; and this might equally apply to a nation. But if the defender be too great-minded for resentment, what is done will be done with reason; and scorn and hatred, or propaganda of scorn and hatred, will be impossible. We are not required to look into the future and adjust all possible difficulties before they arise; we are not even required to make the smallest sketch for our own future plans or those of our neighbours; but, if we would be Christ's, what is absolutely required of us is to seek and obtain from heaven the inward attitude of frank friendship and loving-kindness, first, toward all our Christian brethren who do not company with us; and secondly, toward the world; and especially, and above all, toward any individual or community that injures us or does us despite. And we are required to see to it that this inward attitude of frank friendship is such that it will out. We have not obtained from God the Christ-spirit of friendship unless we find ourselves irresistibly drawn to feast in some way with those religious people who have been to us as publicans and sinners, and especially with those whom we are most inclined to despise. This is the strait gate by which alone we may enter into life, because it opens the only path by which we can bring life into the world; and it is only in finding life for the world that we can find life for ourselves.

Let us not deceive ourselves; the Christian centuries are strewn with the wrecks of zealous souls of whose ultimate and immortal destiny we can know nothing, but of whom both the world and the Church to-day unite in saying that their gain was loss, that they broke not the least but the greatest commandment of brotherly kindness and taught men so, and plunged at last into the unknown ocean of the Life Beyond with that millstone about their necks.

Another thing that allegiance to Christ demands of us is vision of the goal; and that, again, can only be had of God: but it is to be had for asking. When the Lord Christ said, "Ask, and it shall be given you," he was not so much

¹ Luke vi. 32-33.

stating a fact as issuing a command. It is entirely futile to discuss, to preach, to write books, or hold meetings about the reunion of Christendom until before the mind's eye of the majority of individual Christians rises the vision of such a Christianity as may fill the blank, cold spaces of their imagination with longing and delight. To get this vision defined as against its dark background we need to be convinced, not only of the reality of evil, but of what it was that our Divine Founder had the originality to see to be evil—isolation of soul, indifference to the salvation of the world, the love of spiritual privilege, the desire for an exclusive society, the desire to call down fire from heaven upon those who reject him, the desire to judge, to condemn, to give scant measure, the habit of bandaging our eyes with favourite prejudice and thus leading others into the ditch. All this was what he called evil. When we are not keen to be perfect as was our Master in finding our relation to men, and especially to religious men, only in the common and equal relation which we all bear as children of the All-Father; when we do not seek to be perfect as was our Master, condemning the life of the moral and religious Pharisee far more than the life of the acknowledged sinner, ready to die rather than lower the ideal of the generosity of God; when we seek to be above our Master, laying emphasis upon creed and organisation instead of, first, upon the good heart which naturally brings forth good fruit,—then we are living an evil life, and the vision of the Christ that is to be, the Christianity that will unite the world, can never be ours.

Nor can we attain to this vision of the good unless we can see it against the background, not only of the evil life, but of the inevitable consequences of evil. Although the tyrannical potentate of many of the gospel parables is certainly not intended to be taken as a portrait of God, yet the dire and inevitable consequences not only of sin, but of zealous mistake, are constantly and emphatically set forth in those short dramatic poems. In a moral universe evil brings forth evil just as good brings forth good. Thoughts and actions of uncharity and ill-will bring forth wars and plagues and famines, and they make those a permanent possibility because they produce the dwindling of the moral sense, the blinding of the spiritual eye, the disintegrating of the very stuff of the soul—a disintegration, we may note, that also bodes ill for recovery beyond the grave. For two thousand years in Christendom seeds of dissension between sect and sect, church and church, nation and nation, have been sown, and the disaster that we witness to-day was

inevitable. We are apt to think that the nations that are now most despairing are the worst sinners; but there is every reason to believe that the message of the gospel to us is, "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish."¹

The only way to clean land of weeds is to sow a stronger and more valuable crop to outgrow and overgrow and choke off the weeds, taking all nourishment from them. In a moral universe evil can only be overcome of good; but it can always be overcome of good. The kingdom of heaven is thus always at hand; but it can only be perceived by those who have eyes to see.

At present we know, as the world has never known before, how disastrous is the rejection of the doctrine of universal friendship which Jesus taught. We know, as the world has never known before, how terrible is the need of just this universal friendship which he required of men. The Spirit, brooding over humanity, is everywhere awakening the layman to an awareness of the truth which in the past the ecclesiastic has too often failed to grasp. One of our latest thinkers on the social problem writes:—

"We do not look to the New York Chamber of Commerce for language of the pulpit . . . but the report of that Chamber on Industrial Problems makes its first appeal to the moral factor. This, it says, outweighs all physical factors. The British Commission on Industrial Unrest finds no way out except in 'a new spirit: a more humane spirit; one in which economic and business considerations will be influenced and corrected, and it is hoped eventually controlled, by human and ethical considerations.'"²

And again:—

"For any real approach to humanised relations among the nations there is one test: the acquired habit of working openly and generously together, as if the prosperity of one was the prosperity of all. That principle has never been fairly and wisely tried within the nation or without that it did not work. If the ghastly and unclean futilities of war are ever overcome, this enlightened coöperation must be achieved."³

Wise men in all nations are saying the same thing concerning the problems of all secular departments of life. It is

¹ Luke xiii. 8.

² *Labour's Challenge to the Social Order*, J. G. Brooks (Macmillan), p. 19.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

only those still bound in the tradition of the elders—the tradition of tit for tat, the tradition of an eye for an eye, of rebuff for rebuff, of slight for slight, of scorn for scorn—who, in the secular departments of life, reject the doctrine that in friendship and co-operation alone will the salvation of the world be found. Shall the Church of Christ be behind?

If not, we must be up and doing, lifting our hearts to heaven night and day for a new spirit of friendship between Christian and Christian, sect and sect, and between the universal Church and the world. We must seek night and day to attain a vision of what the universal Church of Christ might be if it turned to the world a united front of friendship and that greatness of mind which cannot harbour resentment, which returns good for evil and overcomes enmity with love.

We Christians stand in the world to-day very much where the Jews stood when Jesus proclaimed his message. With all the faults of Christendom, ours is the noblest conception of God, the purest ethic, that the world has known. Jesus saw that the only means by which the Jews could both save their nation-church from destruction and carry to the world a religion uncontaminated by heathen superstitions, was the method of friendship, personal and international. So it is with us. The method of friendship is the divine method, by which the attitude and action of each individual becomes dynamic—like the germ of leaven, like the seed of corn,—moving and nourishing the great human society.

It is evident that in this direction the first step to be taken, the first effort to be made, is to bring about a unity of heart and purpose between the members of all the different Christian churches and societies. Mrs Creighton writes:—

“ We do not seem at the present moment to have advanced in the understanding of the meaning of real peace. Governments and newspapers alike seem to be doing little to promote it. The League of Nations languishes from the want of faith in the possibility of the achievement of its objects. The spirit of hope for the future grows feebler, and the prophets of destruction and ruin grow louder and more vehement. If their prophecies are not to be realised, it can only be by the birth of a new spirit of love amongst classes and nations alike; and it is the Church, which exists to witness for Christ, that must foster the growth of this spirit. It cannot be done by the Church in one land alone. Everywhere those who try to bring it about have to fight against

tremendous odds: selfishness, ambition, the spirit of vengeance and hatred, faithlessness and indifference are all alike arrayed against them. Their common action is hindered by ignorance and mistrust of one another. If the League of Nations is to succeed in its great work, it must have the enthusiastic backing of the religious forces in every country. To make this support effective, the Churches must come together.”¹

Some of us have the opportunity of personally cementing bonds of friendship between Christians of different churches and nations, but very few of us have wide opportunity of this kind; and whether we have or not, we should do well to become active supporters of any guilds or societies which address themselves to this work. The most advantageously placed of these is one that started before the war, and was holding its first conference in Constance at the very moment when war broke out in 1914. At this conference representatives of many churches, covering sixteen languages, were present. The Roman Catholic Church was not represented, but proposed to hold a conference of their own, with identical aims, at Liège directly after, reserving their decision as to future co-operation. The war prevented this conference taking place. The virility of the movement is shown by the fact that while the ninety gathered at Constance were obliged prematurely to separate in order to reach their several countries in safety, they were able to arrange a *World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches*,² with branches in the different countries. This alliance was more or less active during the war, and has survived the war. Many branches of the Christian Church in Great Britain and America are supporting it.

The object of the Alliance, as approved by the International Committee and subsequently ratified by the Constituent Council, is thus expressed:—

“That, inasmuch as the work of conciliation and the promotion of amity is essentially a Christian task, it is expedient that the Churches in all lands should use their influence with the peoples, parliaments, and governments of the world to bring about good and friendly relations between the nations, so that, along

¹ *The Challenge*, 24th June 1921.

² World President, the Archbishop of Canterbury; Hon. British Secretary; Sir Willoughby Dickinson; Hon. Treasurer, The Hon. Stafford Cripps. Offices:—41 Parliament St., London, S.W.1. American Secretary, Rev. H. A. Atkinson. Offices:—75th Avenue, New York City.

the path of peaceful civilisation, they may reach that universal goodwill which Christianity has taught mankind to aspire after."

One extremely good piece of work accomplished by the London Committee was to start the monthly journal *Goodwill*, which struggled on through the war, and still fortunately exists. Immediately after the Armistice the International Committee met in London, where delegates from the neutral countries, Great Britain, and America assembled. The neutrals came in a suspicious mood, but were entirely won over by discovering the real feeling of the British and Americans. In October 1919, immediately after the conclusion of peace, a meeting of the whole International Committee was held at the Hague. The difficulty there was that the French Protestant churches refused officially to send delegates to meet the Germans; but there were members of the French branch of the Alliance present, and one striking event of the meeting was that French, Belgian, and German representatives got together privately and were able to come to a friendly understanding. Last year, at St Beatenburg, the fourth meeting of the International Committee was held, attended by about one hundred members. Twenty-three countries were represented, and a far larger number of confessions. Ten of those present belonged to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The proceedings lasted three days, and were distinguished by remarkable singleness of purpose.

All we who desire the salvation of the nations would do well to do what we can to make this Alliance a real force in the world. We would do well to read its well-edited and informing journal, *Goodwill*, to give the Alliance the support of our influence in every possible way, and to send financial help, of which now, for the first time, it is urgently in need. So far, owing to the generosity of the late Mr Carnegie, the Alliance has had no anxiety with regard to ways and means. It now depends entirely upon the contributions of its supporters. With boundless opportunity opening before it, it is a matter of the greatest moment that the forces which represent the teaching and spirit of Jesus in the world should make themselves a world-power, and the channel afforded by this world-wide organisation is ready to hand.

LILY DOUGALL.

MUSIC AND THE MUSES.

BISHOP MERCER.

THE musical world rings with controversies; the results are scanty and indecisive. Why this failure? One of the protagonists, in answering the question, waxes bold, and roundly declares that few of the controversialists know what they are talking about. He has the grace, however, or the discretion, to qualify this painfully personal solution by laying the blame on the backward state of musical criticism. He may be right; but obviously we cannot stop short here. We go on to ask why musical criticism should lag behind. The larger issues thus raised divert attention from our contemporaries by taking us out into the ample domain of history—the domain in which impersonal tendencies must be appraised, and in which individual achievements sink into truer perspective.

When the survey is thus widened, the causes of the failure are, of course, found to be many and complex. I single out the one that best serves to introduce the subject I have in hand. It will be generally allowed that the conditions under which the distinctively modern art has pursued its phenomenally rapid career have not been favourable to reflection on its deeper significance. Attempts to discover its place in human life as a co-ordinated whole have been fitful and sporadic. The great leaders, impelled by choice or circumstance, have restricted themselves too exclusively to creative production, interpretation, and execution. As a consequence, over-specialisation has wrought its wonted mischief. There are scarcely any fundamental principles in musical criticism which have won their way to a fairly unanimous acceptance, and controversy must perforce be waged on the shifting sands of feeling or convention.

Very noteworthy, therefore, is a statement made by one who is thoroughly representative of the new school of composers and critics, Dr William Wallace. He tells us that the art is now, more than at any previous period, seeking to

come into closer relations with other expressions of man's mind. What does he here imply or assume? That the relations in question are possible; that their influence is a thing to be desired; that their importance has not hitherto been adequately acknowledged; that the more advanced spirits are alive to the defect, and are in search of a remedy. The pronouncement is full of promise. But if the hope it kindles is to be realised, there must be a sufficient measure of agreement about "First Principles." Among the most fundamental of these are definitions of the relations which can, and ought to, exist between music and the basic activities of the human mind.

If the musical world is censured for narrowness of outlook, we must remember that the period thus criticised is that which covers the "modern" phase of the art. For when we go further back, we have to take account of that marvellous people, the ancient Greeks. True it is that their music did not get beyond vocal melody with simple instrumental accompaniments, and that our knowledge of their compositions is very imperfect. But, despite their meagre resources, they thought much and deeply on the nature and function of ordered sound. More especially they were convinced that music is actually in such close relation to nature and to man, that it gives laws to all the harmony in the universe and to every discipline of the mind. Their attitude in this regard finds characteristic expression in the fact that their Muses were no less than nine in number, and that the provinces of these deities included the whole field of science, art, and letters. The banded sisterhood would at times attune their voices and instruments to the lyre of Apollo, and burst into united song in which

"The glory of the sum of things
Would flash along the chords."

These Greeks, in short, had seized intuitively on what we are striving to win by laborious effort. And it will be profitable for us, who have lost their freshness and directness of vision, to put ourselves as nearly as may be at their point of view.

A main activity of the human mind is that stimulated by the phenomena of external nature. It finds expression in cosmic philosophies and the natural sciences. Let us first consider the relations between music and physics. It is interesting and suggestive to recall the origin now usually assigned to the Greek queens of song. It appears that, like the Camenæ of the Latins and the Mermaids of the Teutons, they were at first water-spirits. We infer that the primitives

somehow associated the sounds of running water with music. The question is still undecided how far man's musical faculty was developed by the murmur of streams, the rustling of leaves, the roll of thunder, the warbling of birds, and the like. But whatever conclusions may be reached, the vastly significant fact remains that the very existence of music depends on the sounds produced by "natural" substances. How varied are these sounds! What is more, how subtly they disclose the secrets of inner structure—the thud of wood, the ring or clang of metal, the splash of liquid! "They break forth" (says Deussen) "like the passionate soul of things, like their animating impulse, or as if they were the immediate manifestation of the most essential character from which their forces are derived." And if that which is thoughtlessly called "dead" matter can thus express itself, much fuller is the revelation of meaning in the voices of creatures nearer to man in the scale of being. Between the coo of a dove and the roar of a lion there is a deeper contrast than between the "little sharps and trebles" of the brook and the diapason of a Niagara. The song of some birds trembles on the verge of art without losing a whit of its pure spontaneity. Meredith, in a splendid poem on "The Rising of the Lark," enters with intimate sympathy into the joy and thrill of its "ecstasy to music turned." It is therefore no mere prompting of a shadowy mysticism which leads us to trace a fundamental connection between sound in external nature and sound in music. Wood, reed, brass, membrane have each and all their place and characteristic function. The noblest works in the most ethereal of the arts are inevitably dependent on sonorous timbres which nature herself supplies.

It may be objected that the essential element in music is rhythm, and that even the notes of the nightingale are not "music," but only "musical," because they lack rhythmical structure. It is by no means clear, however, that the songs of birds are always structureless. I know a musician who has taken for the theme of a composition a phrase sung in his garden by a blackbird. Again, is it true that music is always rhythmical? Much Eastern song has no distinct "beats"; Gregorians are much in the same case, not to mention certain up-to-date rhapsodies. But, waiving these points, it cannot for a moment be contended that rhythm is unknown to nature; on the contrary, it is its very pulse. It controls the spin of electrons and the vibration of atoms; the revolution of planets, the making and unmaking of worlds, the unfolding of history and of thought. It is the governing principle of man's own mystic frame, being most prominent

in the systole and diastole of the heart-beat. When the musician measures sounds, he is but obeying, under the direction of conscious art, an impulse that throbs in the whole universe.

“The physical basis of music.” Do we realise that the coldly scientific phrase is pregnant with deeper meanings? Our contracted interpretations of it are rebutted by Urania, the Muse of astronomy who presided over a physical science while enjoying her membership of the tuneful band. To us, the combination of offices is strange. It was not strange to the old-world genius to whose scientific acumen and philosophic insight we owe the noble conception of “the music of the spheres.” Pythagoras, a lover of music, in the course of his experiments with instruments, discovered to his astonishment that the pitch of a note depends on the length of the vibrating string. By careful measurements he calculated the mathematical proportions of intervals, and was thus enabled to express relations between sounds in terms of space. The novelty and the profundity of the ideas suggested fired his imagination; and he at length concluded that nature in every part obeys the laws of sound, and that the movements of the heavenly bodies themselves roll out “sphere music.” His conception has maintained its prestige all down the centuries. And although in the present its employment is usually poetical, its stricter acceptance is by no means rendered impossible. For our perception of sounds, being limited by a particular stage of organic evolution, has a range which is not of universal validity; and it is no hard thing to suppose that, by an indefinite extension in both directions, we might hear the vibrations which now stimulate the sense of sight, or those which reverberate in ether through the revolutions of the planets.

A further and yet more daring speculation is reasonably possible. I preface it by relating an experience of my own. By concentrating my attention on the steady roar and rattle of an express train on a long unbroken run, I can drag out of the confused din notes of every musical pitch, and compel them to sing some simple melody. Gradually my command over them grows until I obtain accompanying harmonies, and at last procure effects which are quite orchestral. The sounds are undoubtedly external, and when once set going are independent of my will; at times they hurry up with disconcerting speed to a cadential passage—an *accelerando* in no wise due to any alteration in the pace of the train. I was foolish enough to think that I was the possessor of a rare, if not unique, faculty until I came across a footnote in James’s

Psychology which deals with similar experiences. But the overthrow of my conceit only clinched the more firmly my conclusion that the formless medley of sounds contains an indefinite number of tones, timbres, harmonies, rhythms, and the like, and that music is there if sought for and extracted by concentrated effort. Imagine, therefore, my interest in an idea espoused by the critic quoted above. We know that white light can be disintegrated into the colours of the spectrum, and re-formed by combining them. Is it not possible that the myriad sounds of music may be waves proceeding from a single world-note, and broken up by the intervention of some unknown medium? And as for reintegration, we have the merging of all casual voices in the hum of a great city.

I lay no stress on this last speculation; I retire on the indisputable truth that music has a physical basis. It is produced by vibrating string, quivering metal, and shaken air, and is thus firmly established in the domains of mathematics and physics. With every increase in the knowledge of the laws which govern the universe, the doctrine of Pythagoras, looked at in grand perspective, gains in scope and significance. Urania has a rightful place in the choir that claimed Apollo for its leader.

I turn from the realm of the external to that of the internal—from the world of matter to that of mind. And first of feeling. What is the relation of music to the emotions? Incontestably one of exceptional closeness. We do not forget that there is a physiological factor; sounds play on the nervous system like the breeze on an Æolian harp. But the specific effect is psychical. There is a mysterious transformation of vibration into music which moves our wonder but eludes our comprehension. However it may be effected, its primary appeal is to the emotions. Recurring to the origin of the Muses, we find that their name is derived from a Greek root which denotes a strongly agitated state of the mind; and from "Muse" came "Music." Thus early did men discover what all subsequent experience has confirmed—that music sways emotion. As George Eliot observes, there is none of man's moods and passions, save perhaps the extremes of pain and grief, which music cannot control; without any reservation, there is none for which it cannot provide some mode of expression. Here, at any rate, intellectualists, expressionists, and other schools are at one, and the relation may be assumed without detailed argument. Controversy arises only when it is sought to determine the status to be accorded to the emotional factor in the full

appreciation of music ; and this knotty question is not before us. The reality of interconnection is established. The search for closer relations in this instance takes the form of a further subtilising of the musician's modes of appeal.

The relation to the will involves questions which may be deferred until the ethical and mystical aspects of our subject come up for discussion. I cannot resist, however, referring to the counsel given by William James. He advises that, after listening to music, we should make some definite resolve and carry it out, lest the indulgence of emotional states should destroy the healthy balance of feeling and action.

The ground becomes treacherous when we seek for the relations that link the art to the intellect. Instead of straightway attacking the problem in its completeness, let me treat of its most salient component, and ask : Can music perform the function of words ? The answer given will materially aid in clearing the way for the main issue. I offer three preliminary observations. First, I rule out attempts at realistic imitation, such as that of twittering birds, a rumbling mill-wheel, or any sound lending itself to reproduction by musical resources. Mimicry is not music, and may be safely ignored. The second point is more important. There is a necessity for the exercise of careful discrimination in separating out the effects of music, taken strictly in and for itself, from accessory ideas suggested by memory, training, association, anticipation, environment, and the thousand and one stimuli which, consciously or sub-consciously, bring intellectual activities into play. The difficulty of the task can only be appreciated by those who have practised psychological analysis ; but it is obvious that in proportion to failure will be the vagueness and inconclusiveness of disputation. And thirdly, I would distinguish wide generalisations and tenuous abstractions from clear-cut concepts—terms like joy, gloom, strength, immensity, from terms like sky, mountain, bird, lover, night. This also is important.

Now for the question as to whether music can express clear-cut concepts. I submit the issue to a crude, but instructive, test. Musicians are no more exempt from toothache than philosophers. Suppose a gifted composer to be a victim. Could he make known the fact through the medium of his art ? At the most he would suggest an undefined sense of " something wrong somewhere " ; but what, where, when, would be sadly undetermined. For anything the hearers could gather, he might be sympathising with the sorrows of a friend or of unhappy Poland, or even striving

to "solve the riddle of the painful earth." If he would make his meaning precise, he must point to his tooth, resort to recitative, or provide a programme. And if it be argued that at least he succeeded in producing a sense of something wrong, the idea is so generalised as to be of little avail for consecutive thought. Indeed, it is not quite certain that it is not a secondary product, suggested by, rather than evoking, the emotion experienced.

Apply this to a classical example. Wagner tells us that in the Pastoral Symphony Beethoven includes the forest, the stream, the meadow, the blue sky, the merry crowds, the loving couple, the song of birds, the flight of the clouds, the growling of the tempest, the pleasure of a repose ideally agitated. But what does Beethoven himself say? The title runs: "Pleasant and serene sensations which are awakened in a man who goes into the country." Again, the name "Pastoral" is almost equivalent to a programme, for it at once raises memories and innumerable trains of associated ideas which may (or may not) be discovered in the music. But if some different name had been given, Wagner's list would be startlingly different. The only item that might survive would be the last—"the pleasure of repose ideally agitated,"—a vague description of an emotional state; and even that is questionably specific. Take another symphony, the Ninth. Does that express joy or liberty? The dispute is interminable; and, but for the knowledge of the circumstances under which the music was written, would be still more hopeless.

And what of Wagner's own device of the *leit-motiv*? He attempts by means of it to express definite ideas. It menaces, assures, predicts; it distinguishes past and future, distance and nearness, cause and effect, friendliness and enmity; its rôle is as varied as is the course of the drama. But in so far as it is successful, it is almost wholly by virtue of associations and suggestions that are external to the music. The sounds are adapted to accompany, and provide emotional expression for, what is intended; but, unaided, they could never define that intention. And this is a conclusion which sound criticism is bound to generalise. Music is unequal to the task of performing the function of words.

So much for the subsidiary question. It would seem that the negative just reached comes dangerously near to being the answer to the complete problem before us—the relation between music and the intellect. It will speedily appear, however, that this inference would be a grievous mistake. To confess that music cannot do the work of verbal

language is by no means the same thing as to deny that it has close affinities with intellectual processes. The mere fact that, during the whole course of its development, it has never ceased to be wedded to words, is sufficient proof that there is an essential relationship between the two modes of expressing meanings. Nay, one of the most satisfactory theories as to the origin of the art is that which refers it to musical speech—the intonations of impassioned expression. Weighty testimony also is borne by the offices and inventions ascribed to the Muses. To Euterpe, the graceful mistress of song, is accorded the invention of the tragic chorus; to Thalia that of pastoral poetry, inseparable from the shepherd's pipe; to Polyhymnia of "the many songs," that of lyric poetry; to Calliope, "the beautiful-voiced," that of minstrelsy and the epic. And coming down to the present day, we think of Wagner, a typical pioneer, of whom a critic says that "the timbre of a sentence seemed to present itself to him before he wrote it—sound was so identified with thought in his conception, that he heard the reverberation of a line before it resolved itself into concrete form."

We find, then, that in every stage of the development of the art there has been an intuitive assumption that music and words can be brought into relations such that each mode of expression gains in significance, force, and value, and that even the greatest among our modern tone-poets have devoted much of their ripest skill to effecting the union. Would it not require reasons of exceptional cogency to overthrow a consensus so striking and consistent? We are almost compelled to infer that the two partners, though differing in feature and temperament, are at one in the deeper recesses of soul-life. Assuredly the burden of proof lies on those who refuse to acknowledge the kinship.

But these facts do not stand alone. Reason comes to the support of intuition. There are obvious analogies between the structure of music and that of verbal statement of meaning; and these analogies rest on mental activities which are undoubtedly intellectual in their fundamental character. You sound a single note. It has the indeterminateness of a noun of which nothing is predicated. Add a third, major or minor. Forthwith there springs into being, not another note, but a structured tone. Browning calls it "a star." The result may be likened to that obtained when two separate terms are related by a copula. In each case the components are mutually conditioned, and are linked in so intimate a fashion that they constitute a perfectly unified complex. Add the fifth of the triad. The number of

relations is increased and the complexity enriched, as when simple terms are qualified by adjectives or subordinate clauses. Add a seventh, and again a new thing makes its appearance. The structure is not merely more composite; it gains an absolutely diverse quality which creates in the hearer a sense of lack of finality. It actively suggests movement onward; as when the two premises of a syllogism, which have formally related the terms, cause intellectual unrest and demand the conclusion.

A parallelism so continuous is singularly impressive. And its persuasive leading is enormously strengthened when we study the building up of those structures which musicians themselves call "phrases" and "sentences." The interconnections of melodic sequences, of progressions of chords, of scales and keys, of sections and movements, of contracted forms, are amenable, not only to æsthetic ordering, but also to laws which can be more or less successfully formulated by the intellect. Parallelism seems too weak a term to describe the facts. For musical structure does not simply run side by side, so to speak, with verbal statements; it reflects in another medium the intellectual processes involved in such statements. It possesses its own immanent logic. The peoples, then, have not been in error when they have assumed that music could be brought into close relationship with meanings; nor the Greeks when they assigned to the Muses both the invention of musical instruments and the inspiring of the balanced periods of poetry and oratory.

I pass to another much-disputed relation—that between music and ethics. I shall avoid, as warily as I may, the moral aspects of art in its formidable generality, and confine my attention to points which are of immediate relevancy. One thing is certain. The Greeks believed that music, purely as such, is capable of exercising directest moral influence. I might adduce as evidence their use of a characteristic product of their genius. The chorus of their finest dramas from time to time interrupted the action to make wise comment, or to reflect upon the consequences of conduct, human and divine. Modulated sound had its distinctive share in enhancing the poet's teaching. But, in this regard, Plato's definition of music says all that need be said—"the movement of sound such as will reach the soul for the education of it in virtue." Nothing could be more explicit. The poet-philosopher buttressed his views with show of dialectic; but in reality he relied upon intuition. In this, as in so much besides, he voiced the soul of his race.

Are there some who repudiate his doctrine? Well,

perchance they will yield to Shakespeare, who is just as explicit :

“The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils ;

Let no such man be trusted.”

Making all allowance for the dramatic vigour of the outburst, there is in it the ring of conviction. An objector may urge such cases as that of Charles Lamb, who, being among the gentlest of souls, asserted of himself : “ Sentimentally I am disposed to harmony, but organically I am incapable of a tune.” We can parry the blow by retorting with the perennially useful saving clause that exceptions prove the rule. Whatever line of defence may be adopted, maugre the tuneless folk, the conviction is as firm now as in olden time that music can possess moral quality and exert moral influence. And as with the relation between sound and meaning, so in this case, the burden of proof lies on those who maintain that the immense majority of lovers of music in every age have gone astray.

Dr Wallace, in treating of this question, appears to take an intermediate position which, besides being of interest from its novelty, may help us to clarify our notions and remove misconceptions. “ There is no man living ” (he writes) “ who can speak of the ethical significance of music ; nay, not even his children’s grandchildren will have the faculty to do so.” This statement (and its context) would seem to grant the possibility of the relation, but to postpone its realisation to a distant future. To illustrate his meaning he reminds us that the ethical significance of Wagner’s *Ring* is discussed from every conceivable point of view, and is still unsettled.

If we would understand the drift of his doctrine, we must ask what is intended by the words “ ethical significance.” Significance, in the proper sense of the term, involves some amount of intellectual apprehension ; and this, again, involves the employment of concepts. Now I have already argued that distinct concepts cannot be expressed through the medium of music. I am therefore more negative than Wallace, inasmuch as I maintain that not in the remotest of futures will the limitation be surmounted. Moreover, in the particular kind of concepts under review, there is an additional barrier : they not only have meaning, but also enjoin commands. “ Thou shalt not steal.” That is one of the simplest of precepts ; and yet I see no reason to suppose that any composer will ever be able to give direct expression

to it. It does not follow, however, that we are therefore warranted in denying to music all ethical quality.

The prevailing conviction can be justified if we eschew specific meanings and formal precepts. Taking the lowest ground, we may surmise that conscientiousness in workmanship will have its effect on those who contemplate or enjoy the product. In other words, if a musical work can absorb conscience, it can likewise manifest it. For example, we are told that, with the coming of the post-Beethoven school, dreary expanses of padding, trivial scale passages, meaningless reiterations were estimated at their true value. What does the term "value" include when used in reference to musical compositions? All will grant an æsthetic factor; many will grant an intellectual. Is it not also true that the nobler and more sincere the mind of the hearer, the less would trivialities and unrealities satisfy his moral sense?

Considerations of a more positive character readily present themselves. The Greeks, with their exquisite sensitiveness to the diverse effects of their recognised modes and rhythms, attributed to them a genuine power of modifying character. Our own psychologists are on their side. They assert, for instance, that popular jazz tunes tend to throw the nervous system into a series of jerky contortions so irregular that they have unwholesome moral consequences. On the other hand, certain large employers of labour have introduced music into their factories with the happiest results; better temper prevails and better work is done. Martial strains can rouse to deeds of heroism. Wrap a man in "soft Lydian airs" and for a while the tension of his moral energy is lowered. Thus does everyday experience corroborate the old Greek view that some kinds of music stimulate the lower nature, and some the higher. There are no distinct concepts conveyed by the sounds; no categorical imperatives are issued; nevertheless moral effects are wrought. And, after all, how could it be otherwise? The old psychology which divided up the mind into separate compartments is discredited. For ordinary purposes we still talk as if will, feeling, and intellect were distinct activities; but when we would be accurate and scientific, we have to remember that the mind acts as an organically composite whole. Now one element is predominant, now another; none, however, is disconnected from the rest or uninfluenced by them. We may therefore hope that as music realises its nobler and subtler potentialities, it will play an increasingly active part in bringing conduct into harmony with the ideals that should govern it.

A question of central interest remains. I refer to those obscure expressions of man's mind which may be roughly grouped under the term "mystical." What is the relation of music to these? In this regard, the views and teachings of the Greeks are not of much avail. Plato and his followers did, indeed, emphasise the function of the faculty which we should call intuition, but without serious study of it. In the present day, on the contrary, there is an almost abnormal amount of enthusiasm for the investigation of mental processes which normally remain below the threshold of consciousness. Owing largely to the diffusion and vogue of the teaching of philosophers like Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and Bergson, the marvels of instinct and the functions of intuition are being eagerly investigated. Concurrently there is a robust revival of occultism, and a quiet, but strong, leaning to mysticism. It is only natural, then, that those who are constitutionally susceptible to the deeper potencies of music should be advocates of transcendental views.

It would be idle to disguise the dangers that beset those who write upon the mystical aspects of our subject. A historian of acknowledged authority, in the course of a racy article on the origin of the art, declares his willingness to "cut out the gushing sentences" if they are found to interfere with the solid argument. It is not given to all to be thus honest with themselves. There are many who, in their anxiety to body forth the inexpressible, are not infrequently sorely tempted to give the rein to exuberance in profundities which pass all comprehension. I choose a mild example. A challenge is issued. "I would welcome any elucidation of a Haydn or Mozart symphony which would demonstrate incontrovertibly that its composer had plumbed to their depths the abysses of man's mind." The demand for incontrovertible demonstration is searching and austere. But what of the test proposed! It sets us wondering who of mortals could survive it. The Muse Erato would preserve us from such lapses. For while to her was attributed the invention of hymns to the gods, the mirth and music of wedding feasts were also within her province. Thus, like a true Greek, she did not permit her mystical flights to loosen her hold on the life nurtured by Mother Earth, nor scorn the restraints of a sober judgment.

The conclusions arrived at when dealing with the physical basis of music have served to show that whatever heights a composer may scale, or whatever abysses he may plumb, he cannot detach himself from the world of matter. The very sounds by which he expresses himself are those of

quivering instruments which gender waves in the gases of the atmosphere. And if it be contended that he appeals to hearing and not to sight, this fact, taken by itself, is rather a weakness than a gain. The organ of hearing is not yet so fully explored as that of seeing; but we know it to be compacted of nerves and tissues; and from the psychological and philosophical standpoints it is of lower rank as an instrument of mind. Further, air is accounted a grosser medium than ether. Not for a moment would I derogate from the peculiar glory of music—its comparative independence of material means; I merely desire to preserve the recognition of relations which give that glory a larger and richer setting. The Muse of Music is not a solitary queen, dwelling on some plane of existence unknown to sense and intellect; she is one of a sisterhood that sings in concert on the slopes of Parnassus.

We have an admirable example of the interblending of the physical, the intellectual, and the mystical in the well-known story of St Augustine's experience when he first heard the choir in Milan Cathedral: "These voices agitated my ears, and the truth flowed into my heart, and thereby warmed the sentiment of piety, and my tears ran down." Consider the elements here combined into a living unity. The basis is a stimulation of the sense of hearing, simply physical. There results a sensation which stirs emotion. The emotion links on to the intellectual faculties; the transformed sounds manifest a power of intensifying conclusions which had been reached by reflective thought—"the truth flowed into my heart." Thereby "the sentiment of piety" is warmed—a sentiment in which moral and religious impulses and intuitions pass beyond the limits of sense and reason into that of the sphere of the mystical. And along with all this there is a response of the physical organism; the ecstatic sense of bliss is conditioned by a tension of the nervous system which finds relief in a flow of tears.

If we duly safeguard the manifoldness of the unity of such an experience, we can willingly admit the truth contained in Beethoven's dictum that "music is a revelation higher than all science and all philosophy." The ecclesiastic and the tone-poet are in accord. Both had felt themselves under a spell which, with a minimum of material resource, could sway their soul-life—a spell the potency of which the mystic has a natural right to exploit and extol.

The strains of a choir evoked in St Augustine a kind of ecstasy which fused with his mood of spiritual fervour. The episode thus presents, in vivid relief, an instance of the

relation between music and religion. A close alliance between the two has existed in every epoch and persisted through all stages of civilisation. Proofs and illustrations would be superfluous. Rowbotham even inclines to believe that the beginnings of both go together and spring from the same source. He remarks that the peoples destitute of instrumental music are likewise comparatively backward in their religious development. At any rate it is safe to assert that the relationship is so close as to amount to kinship. It may be objected that religious communities have periodically risen in rebellion against the use of music in their services. Strangely enough, this is a fact; yet the causes are not so recondite as to cast doubt on the fundamental conclusion. It is always possible for one of the partners to assert itself to the detriment of the other. The music may become too complicated, may develop too exclusively on its own lines, or may attract to itself too large a share of attention, and so lose its devotional character and dwarf the supreme object of public worship. The clash, however, is not between incompatibles, but between competing aims; and reconciliation is therefore always attainable. The passing antagonisms furnish but another reason for lamenting man's inability to conserve proportion in the adapting of means to ends.

I contend, then, that the relation of music to religion is a special case of its relation to mysticism generally. A wide ocean thus stretches out before us upon which it is hazardous to launch. I shall take refuge in briefly recounting the adventures of one who, perhaps more hardily than any of the outstanding leaders of thought, has explored these mist-hidden expanses. I allude to Schopenhauer. Fortunately his notions on this particular subject are not so dependent on his metaphysical premises as to be unintelligible to those who have not studied his system as a whole. This much, nevertheless, it will be useful to bear in mind—that for him Will is the ultimate Reality to which everything that exists can be traced. Music, he holds, is Will trying to express itself in the direct manifestation of feeling.

The three governing agents of music are melody, harmony, rhythm. How are these to be interpreted from the standpoint of a mystic who would resolve, or dissolve, every sort of phenomenon and experience in the all-comprehending unity of a transcendental Whole? Schopenhauer proceeds thus. Melody has as its assumption a fundamental note, from which it wanders through the various notes of the scale until it reaches an imperfect cadence. It thereby gains a

satisfaction which is real, but incomplete. Accordingly it sets forth again by a similar wandering path, and at length returns to the fundamental note and a perfect cadence. It thus presents soul-life with its alternate risings and fallings, its varying degrees of intensity, setting out from the fundamental ground of its being and returning to its source. Harmony consists of a succession of more or less disquieting and satisfying chords, just as the life of the soul is a constant succession of feelings of disquietude and relief. There are only two really fundamental chords, the dominant seventh and the consonant triad ; to these all others may be referred. Similarly, there are only two fundamental states of the will—satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Again, to the twofold distinction of major and minor keys correspond the two fundamental moods—serenity and sadness. Rhythm drives on the melody just as soul-life is driven on by the passage of time ; it is impalpable, but measures out an ordered course. The four voices are the analogues of the four kingdoms—minerals, vegetables, animals, and man. The bass, the most ponderous part, represents matter, the first grade of the objectivication of the will ; it underlies and supports all the forms that rise above it. The soprano moves about lightly and freely, with flowing grace ; it represents the suppleness and variety of mental activities. The intermediate voices utter the desires of the lower stages of organic life. A composition in which these elements are combined, such as a symphony of Beethoven, presents “the greatest confusion which yet has the most perfect order at its foundation, the most vehement conflict, which is transformed at the next moment into the most beautiful concord. It is *rerum concordia discors*, a true and perfect picture of the nature of the world which rolls on in the boundless maze of innumerable forms, and through constant destruction supports itself.”

Fanciful !—do we exclaim ? Possibly. And yet how wonderfully suggestive ! The parallelisms are too arresting, the harmonies too complete, to be altogether the product of imagination. Nor need we be over-scrupulous in admitting that they have some measure of validity. For, as I have already contended, we have to reckon with the fact that music has a physical basis. And those of us who believe in the unity of the cosmos are almost compelled to search for evidences of the unity on some such lines as Schopenhauer has followed. There is a responsible, as well as an irresponsible, mysticism.

I said that, for this philosopher, Will is the ultimate

Reality. It is not matter for surprise, therefore, that he should attribute peculiar significance to the relation between music and the will. He is on the level of ordinary thought when he links consonance to satisfied, and dissonance to unsatisfied, desire. But he dives deeper. He is in sympathy with the Eastern mystics in their doctrine that redemption can only be won by negating the will-to-live. He accordingly lays great stress on the state of passivity induced by the spell of music. The heavings of desire fade into the simplicity of unresisting feeling. The same holds good for the Western type of mysticism if for "passivity" we substitute "quiescent receptivity," or "ecstasy" for "absorption." And thus the art is correlated closely with ideals fostered by the extremest forms of abstract speculation.

At this stage I conclude my brief analysis. Were I to proceed further, I should have to pass in review the formal expressions of mental activity, such as architecture, sculpture, painting, literature, science, philosophy, and the rest. Moreover, there are the social institutions and environments which have conditioned each stage of the development of the art, and which, though often overlooked, have entered into its very substance. But I am content if I have succeeded in showing that music can be linked to the fundamentals—emotion, will, intellect, conscience, religious sentiment, mystical yearnings. All else will follow as matter of detail. If musicians are now seeking to bring their art into closer relation to other expressions of man's mind, they must determine, like the Greeks, to "see life steadily and see it whole." Music exists in germ in the natural order, and is developed by man in obedience to a genuinely natural impulse. The impelling force is one with that which originates and sustains the vast process of which the history of our race forms a part so infinitesimal. Pythagoras was a cosmic thinker when he framed his conception of the music of the spheres. Mazzini is among the latest of his successors. "Music" (he declares) "is the harmonious voice of creation, an echo of the invisible world, one note of the divine concord which the entire universe is destined one day to sound."

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ATONEMENT AND NEW KNOWLEDGE.

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THE Arthur of Tennyson's *Idylls*, looking down on the prostrate form of the sinful Guinevere, pronounces over her this hope of final absolution and atonement :

“Perchance and so thou purify thy soul,
And so thou lean on *our fair father Christ*,
Hereafter in that world where all are pure
We two may meet before high God, and thou
Wilt spring to me, and claim me thine.”

“Our fair father Christ” sounded strangely to me when first I read it. The ascription to Christ of fatherhood, reminiscent of the Middle Ages, perplexes a modern ear. But it proves to be a just ascription. In a sense which is not likely to have been in the mind of a mediævalist, Christ *is* a father to men. He is the begetter of their life, and by that office of parentage He works the Atonement.

The old “transactional” theories of the Atoning Death—the theory of Ransom, of Propitiation by Blood, of Vicarious Punishment—have long been dead, though kept from burial so far by some ingenious refinements of their grossness in recent theology. The “Ethical” theory, convincingly restored by Dr Rashdall in his Bampton Lectures, and too true to be ever superseded, can, I believe, be subsumed in a more comprehensive conception of the Christ-fact, which this paper will endeavour to present.

But first I will ask a reader who may be prepossessed with the current understanding of the Atonement, in which the idea of At-one-ment, unification, has been narrowed to that of the purgation of sin, to re-enlarge the word. The doctrine of the Atonement is the theory of how Christ reunites the world to God. How Christ removes sin, which is the cause of the separation and makes the need of reunion, is an inseparable part of the doctrine, but a part only. The Atonement in the sense of the removal of sin is a phase of

the Incarnation in its sense of making man to be at one with God. The nature and origin of sin are problems which we have really no further solved than by defining sin as a separation of the creature from God the Creator. But if sin is separation, then the removal of sin must be by reunion; and if we can discern the process by which Christ reunites man to God we shall have discerned the method of the Atonement. The theory for which I ask attention is the drawing out of the saying of Jesus, "I am the Life." Christ atones men by giving life to man, life unto God. Of oneness there are degrees and kinds. There is mechanical oneness as in molecular cohesion, chemical oneness as in the combination of fluids, and there is vital oneness, the unity of branches in the vine. It is with this vital oneness that Christ atones: He gives the life unto God.

Fatherhood is the begetting of that which lives, and to speak with Arthur of "our fair father Christ," on whom a sinner must "lean" for restoration, is but to give distincter feature to Christ's self-description, "I am the Life." So we are set to ask, How is Christ the Life? What is Life? What is it to beget?

I do not know what may be the best definition of life in modern biology, but if I define it as the interchange of selfhood between the creative Reality and a creaturely self, my definition will not, I think, be rejected. The life of the herb is an exchange of substances between the seed and the soil, air, and water which are its environment. The higher animals live by the momentarily interchange of inspiration and expiration and the similar intercourse of nutrition. The natural man lives by the same exchange as the animal; civilised man, by the mutual service of state and citizen. Man the Spirit, the creature capable of fall and of redemption, has his life of spirit by intercourse with the environment of the world beyond the horizons of his physical senses, the whole and real world—in a word, with God. This vital union with God is the fulfilment of man's existence. We give it partial names, words correlative to Sin and the Fall, when we call it Salvation or Redemption: Atonement, written At-one-ment, is a more adequate word, if it had not been narrowed in common usage to the measure of those others. Life, which means oneness of the creature with the Creator, oneness effected by the mutual impartment of the human self and the divine Self, is the only competent name of the relation of man to God when that relation is fully realised. This is what is meant when it is said that "The Incarnation is the Atonement": the Incarnation is the

vital union of man and God ; so far as there is incarnation, just so far is there atonement, in the narrower meaning that man's iniquity is taken away and his sin purged. For sin is severance from God, and is done away only by union.

This then is life, the interchange of self between God and His creature Man. What then is it to beget, to do the work of fatherhood ?

This cannot be seen until we analyse more closely the fact of Life. We have called it the self-interchange of two, the Creator and the creature. But life is a more complex fact. It is a mutuality between not two terms but three. This is discernible even on the low level of vegetal existence, where the plant lives by the interchange of seed and seed-plot or near environment, and of both with the whole environment called Nature. At the level of individual existence the threefold relationship becomes more visible : there is in the animal kingdom the mutuality of the family and the member, and of each with the race. More conspicuously, man the social being lives the full human life by the intercourse of human society with the individual, and of both with the divine Whole. Let us give this fact a name and call it the Triune Communion which makes the life of human kind.

How then is a new living thing brought into being ? what is it to beget ? what is it to be born ?

Consider the fact of birth in the natural world. There, to be born is to be brought into the triune communion of life. How does the begetter cause this birth ? Properly speaking, he does not cause it, he can only occasion it. The parent does not create the offspring, but is an agent through whom the creative power causes the birth. He must be himself a living organism, that is, must be in communion with both the Near Environment and the Whole, and must in some way impart the same relation of communion to the new self which is to be born. That new self (it may seem a paradox) must be there already. For if life is the interchange of two selves, each must be there before they can interchange. Michelangelo was right when he pictured the making of man : the Adam of the Sistine chapel, a fully formed human figure awaiting with uplifted hand the touch of the Almighty's finger, is not a necessary convention of art but a truth of philosophy in a symbol. The self of Adam must be there, however inconceivably, that God may make Adam to be. At this point only, the presence of a self to receive contact with the other self, does man emerge out of mystery into our view, out of the Great Deep into the shores of light.

The new self, then, being there, how does the parent introduce it into the triune communion? Let us think first of non-human parentage. In sexual propagation, whether of herb or animal, the new individual is produced by the union of the one seminal element, which we will call the parent, with the complementary element necessary for production of life, a thing external to the parent and a part of the physical environment. This is an interchange or act of life between a living self and the environment. The pre-existent self of the offspring (for even herbs have a pre-existence in the Maker's mind, and God giveth each a body as it pleases Him) forms the union of interchange with the parent. It is thus brought into that relation to the physical environment in which the parent stands, the relation of self-interchange. It is a process which in plant life can almost be followed by the eye, as the pollen and the correlative germinal matter meet, and thereupon a new flower is gendered.

In the kingdom of grace the way of generation is the same, though here our eyes cannot follow it. The Parent, who may be the parent of the flesh or the parent in God to the new Christian, begets a child of God by having himself communion with the spiritual world when he is in contact with the self of the Child. This is best pictured in that most human event, the impartment of religion to a child by a pious mother. We have perhaps thought of this as no way different from the ordinary action of a teacher on a pupil, a truth presented by the one and assimilated by the other. That is not the account of the transmission of religion. What the mother transmits to the child is not a truth she knows but a life she is living. She is, in the act of teaching, exercising her own faith, she is having a communion of spirit with the Christ of whom she is telling the little one: his dawning spirit meets and joins itself to hers, and her communion with Christ becomes also his. The triune fellowship has worked; the love of mother for child and child for mother is a love of each for the Divine One beside the two. So the infant soul is born alive unto the eternal world. The birth of a child of God and a member of Christ is on this wise.

Jesus fulfils His promise, "I am the Life," by an action not merely analogous to this, but identical. In His mortal ministry He brought disciples into the Kingdom by the method which that mother uses with her child. When we talk of Jesus as revealing the Father by His *teaching*, we name a fragment of the fact and leave the substance of the fact unnamed. The revelation was not in word but in power:

not the truth He uttered, but the faith that energised as He uttered it, worked the life unto God in the men and women who companied with Him in Galilee. Their commune of soul with the prophet from Nazareth whose soul was in perfect commune with the Father brought a Peter, a John, a Magdalene into the same vital union with the divine Reality in which He stood: they came to know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom He had sent, and this became life eternal in them. "Master, to whom shall we go away? Words of eternal life hast thou." Ah, not words that only told them of the life, but words that carried the life and sowed it where they fell.

As it was with Jesus the prophet of Nazareth, so was it with Jesus risen in the Forty Days, clothed with the Manhood which could not taste of death: and so is it with the Christ in the Abiding Manhood in all the days. He was and is "our fair father Christ"; He begets us unto a lively hope by His resurrection from the dead. And the manner of the begetting is no other than the manner in which the Man of Nazareth gave a birth into eternal life to His companions in the flesh. It is a human manner: the "glorified Humanity," the Manhood "taken into God," brings His brethren into the glory that is His by an exercise of the powers of that unextinguished manhood. Not in metaphor now, as where a prophet used the figure to speak of Israel's God, but in exact and literal truth the Christ draws His brethren with cords of a man.

This perhaps we have always said of Christ, but it has been a metaphor, a figure of speech as in Hosea's use of it. To-day we can say it not as a figure but a fact. This drawing of men into life unto God is worked by an instrumentality which is not similar to the human agency, but is the same agency.

Hitherto, when a Christian has declared that Jesus Christ was present to his soul in acts of devotion, in moments of perplexity, fear, temptation, venture, he has been speaking in figures. Christ has come to him as a friend might come to sit with him in counsel or stand by him in emergencies: it was *like* the presence and action of a friend. But in our age "the walls of the world roll back." Our growing knowledge of the soul and its activities reveals to us a power of the soul, while still in the mortal estate, to be present and act where it cannot be present with the body. A man thinks a thought or wills an action, and that thought or purpose rises in the mind of a friend at distance, often with such force that a visual image of the sender of that impulse constructs

itself to the receiver's eyes and a message frames itself in his ears. We began by calling this fact "Telepathy," experience of that which is distant from the experient. We bettered the name by re-wording it "Thought-transference." We might again better it if we interpret it under my theory of Life and call it "Thought-conference." For what happens in this experience is not a "bringing across" of something from one mind to another, but a "bringing together" of the two minds so that they unite by interpenetration. They are present the one to the other in the very reality of presence, not that of local contiguity but of an interaction of two conscious selves. It is a vital union, the oneness of two selves that make interchange of the powers of man to know and to do.

Here I am asserting what cannot at the present stage of research be demonstrated. The fact of telepathy is proved, the law of it not yet disclosed. But we need not wait for that further analysis to affirm that the telepathic experience is a functioning of *life*. It is plainly an action of one consciousness on another, and every such action with which psychology is acquainted is an interaction in which each is both agent and patient, gives and receives at once. Speaker and hearer, teacher and learner, can do nothing between them except by the co-operation and mutuality of both consciousnesses. This mutuality of two that are face to face in local contiguity is an act of life, and within the bounds of our hitherto sensuous experience is the highest act. Then a reciprocation of two distant minds, which have, so far as discerned at present, no bridge of communication by any signalling of the senses, must also be an act of life and a yet higher functioning of life.

Can we take a further step and assert intercommunication between a mind in the world of sense and a mind in the world beyond sense? Some very careful and competent observers are declaring that such communication has been detected by their research. Short of accepting their results as certified, one may advance a fact which stands midway between the proved telepathy of living mind with living and the not yet demonstrated telepathy of the discarnate—the fact which in an unscientific age we called the "wraith." A man dying presents himself at the moment of death or soon after, in vision and sometimes in voice, to a far-distant friend who has no reason to expect the death and cannot be supposed to have constructed the vision by the action of his own sole consciousness. The occurrence is far too common to be explained as a chance coincidence of the one man's experience and the other's imagination. Here then is a telepathy of one

who if not yet discarnate is on "the dazzling line where mortal and immortal merge."

If the scientist who already interprets the alleged messages from the dead as a telepathy of the discarnate can claim, as he justly may, that his hypothesis is a *vera causa*, seeing that communication without aid of the normal senses is a fact in nature, we can go yet further and claim that this fact on the horizon of nature and supernature, the vision and voice of the wraith, is a *verissima causa*. This hypothesis, then, that the law of Telepathy, verified among the living, holds for the whole of human existence and not only within the mortal confines—how hopefully shall we carry it into the field of the post-human existence and watch if it covers the observed phenomena of that field!

The crucial fact which our observation encounters there is the appearance of Jesus after death to His disciples. The nature of that event has been a perplexity of Christians for the last two generations. The modern mind has emerged from the simplicity of eighteen centuries and is no longer able to reconcile with its whole of world-knowledge this particular event of the Master's dead body acting at once as flesh acts and as only spirit can act—offering itself to sight, hearing, and touch, as if it were a thing in space, and yet passing through physical obstructions as if free of space; appearing, vanishing, reappearing, and at last ascending, still in the body, into the spaceless and timeless world. Christians reject the "vision theory" but cannot *realisingly* accept the "physical." We do not need either. We have but to think out more carefully than hitherto, by the light of recent discovery, that account of the fact which Jesus gave to those whom His appearing perplexed and scared: "Behold my hands and my feet, *that it is I myself*." "Myself." We want no more. The Self of Jesus was really there. He was there by the working of that law of human spirit by which a self can be present to another self without accompaniment of the body. The spirit, mind, consciousness of Jesus, or however we name the Self of Him—this was present to the friends who saw, heard, and it may be handled Him. It was present by the action of that law of nature which like every other is a law of God, the law that a human mind or self can be present to another mind or self by a mutual act of life one unto other, though body may not be present to body by any contact of the physical organs of sense.

Consider next the case of St Paul, who claims that he too "out of due time" had seen the Lord. Here there is no visual appearance: we may well suppose that to one who, it

seems, had not known the form and feature of the Galilean prophet a recognition by sight was not a mental possibility. Yet Paul was sure that it was Jesus who had met and spoken with him. Christ was there : no body of Him was present, but there was the presence of Himself, irresistibly convincing the antagonism which kicked against the pricks. What is this but a telepathy, the most striking in history after those of the Forty Days ?

Consider last that Christian experience of the Presence of Christ which we may call ecumenical, a fact *quod ubique, quod semper, quod omnibus cognitum est—et cognoscitur*. How does a believer take knowledge of himself that he has been with Jesus ? Not by the assurance of sight or of sound. My theory does not, indeed, exclude the possibility of either, and to a brother believer who tells me he has seen the Lord in visible shape I am ready to answer, "Thou hast seen what thou hast seen," for Jesus I doubt not was there. But that the Lord is risen indeed and appears to His disciples of this day is certified not by the response of eye and ear to that presence, but by an answer to His touch of the whole soul, *an experience of life it receives* when it essays the vital union with Christ in the Abiding Manhood. Of this experience the *mystica unio* of the meditating saint is, it may be, the most characteristic mode, but is one specific mode of the experience, not the norm—there is a life that manifests itself in trance, rapture, ecstasy of the mystic ; but also there is a life that is realised in the reasonings and intuitions of the philosopher, the poet's afflatus, artist's vision, statesman's sagacity, or the direction of the plain man's conduct, the solving of his practical problems, the clarifying of his judgments, and the nerving of him for industry or for venture. If in life's normal course or its emergencies the man attempts to make interchange of thought and will with the mind of Christ, as he has been taught to know of that mind by the first records and the continued tradition, and thereupon health and energy penetrate him, illumining judgment and enabling activity, he knows that a life has quickened between himself and the divine-human Jesus, and knows it with an assurance more sure than eye and ear could render him, uncorroborated by the witness of life received.

This is the theory of the Atonement which I submit. The Lamb of God takes away the sin of the world, not by the single event of His life of self-sacrifice and the death which crowned it, nor by the moralising effect of that historic event upon the conscience of believers, but by the continued action of His human personality upon the person-

alities of men. His Manhood, the "glorified Manhood" of theology, unclothed by the Cross not of its human potency but of its mortal limitations, and by the Rising clothed upon with the divine infinitude of knowledge and power, is for ever delivering us from sin, man by man, through the application to us of His own force of personality. As the believer makes surrender of his mind and will and lets that mind be in him which was and which is now in Christ Jesus, the fire of the divine life in Jesus kindles between the disciple and the Master. The disciple lives unto his Lord, and (may we not dare say it?) the Lord Himself lives thereby a life which is the larger by the increment of this life unto a new disciple. But in thus living unto Christ, whose person is the point in the environment of the Infinite at which the human personality makes contact and can effect union with the final Reality, the believer attains the vital oneness with God, and so receives the At-one-ment by which his iniquity is taken away and his sin purged.

His sin. To those who will object that my theory does not hold a specific account of Sin in its relation to Atonement, I would reply first that the problem is one that "never is but always to be" solved. And then that, if sin be, as all allow, a state of separation and death, it is union and life which must do away with sin. How there came to be sin we do not know: but it is there, and only life can expel it from the soul, as only life can drive disease from the flesh.

There remains to relate this theory to existing doctrines of the Atonement. Some of these, as that of Ransom and Substitution, are really though not confessedly extinct. They are

"Like that long-buried body of the king
Found lying with his urns and ornaments,
Which at a touch of light, an air of heaven,
Slipt into nothing and was found no more."

Not so the "ethical" theory just now restored and re-illuminated by a scholar philosopher. Dr Rashdall (*The Idea of the Atonement*, p. 463) epitomises the doctrine thus:

"Translated into . . . modern language the meaning of the Church's early creed, 'There is none other name given among men by which we may be saved,' will be something of this kind: 'There is none other ideal given among men by which we may be saved except the moral ideal which Christ taught by His words and illustrated by His life and death of love: and there is none other help so great in the attainment of that ideal as the belief

in God as He has been supremely revealed in Him who so taught and lived and died.' So understood, the self-sacrificing life which was consummated by the death upon the Cross has indeed power to take away the sins of the whole world."

This doctrine of the Atonement is a live one ; but if it will accept our enlargement by this conception of the Abiding Manhood of the Atoner it will be of fuller life by a not measurable degree. For we are trusting not to the effect on the mind of " Christ's ideal of life " or His revelation by the Cross that " Love is creation's highest law," but to that and also to the far more potent effect upon the will of an impulsion from the will of the living and present Jesus. Our hope is in the action of a mind and will, human but, in the reach and force of that humanity, infinite with the infiniteness of God. We believe that, by a law of super-nature which in faint and fugitive manifestations can be traced in nature, the Telepathy of Spirit, the Christ's thoughts become our thoughts and His ways our ways : that the sacrifice of Self which He offers eternally in heaven and which is the life-unto-God of His Manhood, is transferred to men yet in the flesh, so that they make on their own part the sacrifice that taketh away sin, because sin is death and sacrifice is life.

Doctrines like prophets are known by their fruits. The fruit due from a doctrine of the Atonement should be its power to construct a whole of theology and a theology which shall be the interpreter of our whole of world-knowledge. That construction is not for our limits. But were it so, it would be attempted in the confidence that from this conception of the Abiding Manhood of Jesus Christ there can be drawn out a theory of the Church, the Creeds, Sacraments, and Order, which shall be a system logically coherent in itself, and coherent (as has been already indicated) with the system of nature ; and further, which will procure us, what is the need of the hour, a method for the Church's mission to the world which shall be both in word and power a Gospel to the Poor.

JOHN HUNTLEY SKRINE.

OXFORD.

MORE ABOUT MIRACLES.

THE REV. T. R. R. STEBBING, F.R.S.

ONE born and bred, baptised and confirmed, ordained both deacon and priest in the Church of England, now late in life challenges the logic of its Articles, the validity of its creeds, the divine right of its oracles. To obtain a hearing for the plain statement of the case at issue proved for a long period strangely difficult. Upon one pretext or another opportunity was refused by those to whom the opinions in themselves could scarcely have been unwelcome—a dominant Society, an enlightened Association, a friendly editor, liberal publishers, and publishing agents. At length, in 1916, as president myself of a scientific association,¹ I boldly, some might say shamelessly, seized the occasion to bring theology and common sense with their opposing claims before an unpacked court of appeal. As a sample of the matters discussed, it was asked whether any reasonable person could really believe that God took a rib out of a man to fashion from it the first woman? At the end of the discourse a brother clergyman warned the audience that my doubts and difficulties had been already disposed of in "ten thousand volumes." He failed to observe that these innumerable repetitions of worn-out fallacies were losing their hold on the consciences of mankind.

In human manufacture the Egyptian pyramids by their size and solidity and endurance may be taken to surpass all others as regal monuments of skill and effort. Suppose now that some tyrant had bidden his slaves rear one of these gigantic edifices nicely balanced on its apex. Would such a design be regarded as evidence of superhuman sagacity? Yet on the simple-minded fiction as to the origin of the female sex has been gradually evolved all the complicated theology which is nominally accepted by all members of the Church of England. If Adam's metamorphosed rib never existed, it could not have been disobedient. In that case, the story of "the Fall" is mythical. For all the supposed consequences

¹ The South-Eastern Union of Scientific Societies' Congress at Tunbridge Wells, 1916.

on what could never have happened some other explanation must be found. The ten thousand volumes will surely have to be re-edited. In the meantime, persons eminent for high qualities of mind and conduct are uneasy, as they may well be, at the thought that Christendom is so much divided in the practice and principles of its religion. While they start with attributing divine authority to a fairy tale, assuredly the divergent fancies resulting from it will remain irreconcilable. A further development of the argument against the popular view of Inspiration was carried out in my small volume, *Faith in Fetters*. When this had found an obliging publisher,¹ it received a welcome indeed in some very unexpected quarters, but as to any official or authoritative recognition, the complete absence of it may be accounted for either as a token of secret approval or by the policy of disdainful silence. Nor is any reference made to these essays by my then fellow-townsmen, Dean Marriott, in his kindly intentioned protest with regard to the article "Thaumaturgy in the Bible."² In that protest it is strange that he can avoid even a passing allusion to the erudite and otherwise remarkable disquisition on "Criticism and Faith," in the same journal, by Dr Wade. The Church of England does not claim to be infallible. There may be errors therefore in its practices and in its professions. Members of the Church who detect and notify such misunderstandings are not on that account to be excluded from its ranks. They are fulfilling an honourable duty.

In the meantime, while arguments are not met by counter-arguments, nor yet openly accepted, concession is made to their force indirectly by revised lectionaries, a rearranged psalmody, a very general suppression of the Athanasian Creed. But nevertheless vast sums are spent on missionary effort to bring all the rest of the world into alliance with the Protestant scheme of Christianity. The teaching, as Dean Marriott remarks, is largely founded on the opinion that "all scripture is given by inspiration of God," and is to be received and believed as the Word of God. Dr Donne (1573-1631) was a justly celebrated exponent of the Protestant faith. In one of his sermons he argues nobly against the use of the rack and other forms of torture in earthly courts of justice. In the same discourse, when treating of divine penalties, he thus warns the evildoer: "That man that died so, with that confidence, thought death his end: it ends his seventy years, but it begins his seventy millions of genera-

¹ Fisher Unwin, London, 1919.

² HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1920.

tions of torments, even to the body ; and he never thought of that." (Sermon on the resurrection of the body.) Mark how this preacher of righteousness is clear-sighted and tender-hearted when dealing with the freaks and ferocities of temporary human law, and then has no compunction in imputing to his divine Lord this savagery of an eternal vengeance. In 1744 was published *The Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul*, by P. Doddridge, D.D. The seventh edition of this treatise in 1834 is no slight evidence of the approving circulation it must have attained. Opening it at a venture, I find what sort of opinions the writer wishes to impress on his fellow-Christians as to life after death, a topic which even to-day is still much debated, but on which Dr Doddridge was able to decide with the utmost confidence. He explains to his readers that "if they have despised the only treaty of reconciliation" (p. 107), they will "pass away the intermediate years of the separate state in dreadful expectation and bitter outcries of horror and remorse." In whatever cavern of that gloomy world they are lodged, the sound of the archangel's trumpet will penetrate their doleful and horrible prison and they must reluctantly leave it to meet their judge. Each "must come forth, and be reunited to a body now formed for ever to endure agonies which, in this mortal state, would have dissolved it in a moment" (p. 108). When Dean Marriott refers to the "Religion of the Bible," can he be endorsing this precious stuff? Can he believe that God is love or anything else that is excellent, and combine with that creed the opinion that He will remake the body of a sinner (however execrable) for the express purpose of its enduring eternal agonies? What dreadful demon, what super-Satan, could be invented to rival such a creator?

Theology has often been treated, even by master-minds, as a protected province, in which more than elsewhere things may be taken for granted, assertions accepted without scrutiny, fallacies left unexposed, claims acknowledged without inquiry into their foundation. Thus all sorts of statements have been considered as of overwhelming importance because their authors calmly declared them to be the Word of God. The rationalist who objects to this has long been exposed to reproach, although Bishop Butler in his *Analogy* (part ii., chapter iii.) says: "I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason, which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even revelation itself." Under his ægis, therefore, passages of Scripture may lawfully be tested. For this purpose an unbiassed mind, so far as such a thing is possible, would

apply the same standard to various religions. When the claims are practically identical, it cannot be reasonable to invest them with peculiar sanctity in one religion and to reject them as simple absurdities in another. In Jewish history we have an incident full of pathos, when Jehovah thrice arouses the child Samuel, in order through him to deliver to the aged high priest a solemn reproof and tragic prophecy. The blind old man accepts without question this dire revelation made uniquely through the mouth of a little boy. It is well known to most educated persons that the Roman Republic was saved in a dangerous crisis by the appeal which his mother Veturia made to the celebrated general Coriolanus. A Greek author, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, contemporary with the Christian era, puts into Veturia's mouth a speech of noble eloquence, closing with her resolve to live no longer if her entreaties were ineffectual. A temple and statue to the goddess Fortune were consecrated in grateful remembrance of the signal service rendered by this heroic woman. The Greek author on this proceeds to say :—

“ It may be agreeable to the purpose of this history, and conducive to the reformation of those, who think that the gods are neither pleased with the honors they receive from men, nor displeased with impious, and unjust actions, to relate the manifestation this goddess gave of her presence at that time, not once, but twice, as it is recorded in the books of the pontifs ; to the end that those, who, religiously, adhere to the opinions they have received from their ancestors concerning the gods, may have no cause either to repent of their belief, or ever to change it ; and that such, as despise the customs of their forefathers, and hold that the gods have no power over the designs of men, may, if possible, alter their opinion ; but, if they are incurable, that they may become still more odious to the gods, and, consequently, more miserable. It is recorded, therefore, that the senate having ordered that the whole expense both of the temple, and of the statue, should be defrayed by the public ; and the women having caused another statue to be made with the money they had contributed among themselves ; and both of them being dedicated together on the first day of the consecration of the temple, one of the statues, being That which the women had provided, spoke intelligibly, and loudly, in the Latin tongue, many being present : The words being translated into Greek, the sense of them is this : Οσιω πολεως

νομῶ, γυναῖκες γαμεται, δεδωκατε με : *Matrons, in due form have you dedicated me.* The women, who were present, as it usually happens in relation to uncommon voices, and sights, would not easily believe that the statue spoke, but took it for some human voice : those, particularly, who happened, at that time, to be thinking of something else, and did not see what it was that spoke, would not believe such as had seen it. Afterwards, when the temple was full, and there happened to be the greatest silence, the same statue pronounced the same words in a louder voice : So that, there was, no longer, any doubt concerning it.”¹

Whether Jehovah of the Hebrews was likely to deliver an admonition to his own high priest in the circuitous manner described in the book of Samuel should excite some doubt in a reflective mind. The rest of the record makes it abundantly clear that the warning was needed. The difficulty of conveying it may have deeply impressed some of the subordinate priests, out of motives perhaps combined of friendliness to the old man and duty to their suffering country. May not some human contrivance have been at their disposal ? In regard to the speaking statue in the Roman temple of Fortune, which Spelman stigmatises as “ a ridiculous tale,” we need not be restrained by any feeling of reverence for pagan pontiffs and the religious beliefs of benighted heathen. Nothing precludes us from suggesting that this “ historic fact ” was merely a trick of ventriloquism.

It is perhaps the case that many educated persons still vaguely hold the scriptural view that heaven is in the sky, so that lightning may fall from heaven and a skyward ascent may be ascension into a heavenly region, making a nearer approach to the presence of God Himself. Sounds from the sky may thus be interpreted as voices from heaven. What would be seen when the heavens are rent asunder (St Mark i. 10) is left to the imagination, but the apparent result of this opening was that a dove settled on the head of Jesus just after his baptism. It must be to many inexplicable that a person already from his birth divine should need any new apotheosis. But that the divine majesty should at one and the same moment present itself in human guise and also in the form or the flutter of an actual or a phantom bird is a record surely stretching the credulity of modern minds to the breaking-point.

¹ *The Roman Antiquities*, translated by Spelman, vol. iii. p. 371, 1758. Plutarch in his *Life of Coriolanus* agrees with Spelman.

The Anglican clergyman on the first day of the week is repeatedly endorsing the opinion that Jehovah blessed the seventh day and hallowed it because on it He had rested from His labours of the previous six days (Exod. xx. 11). Yet the supposed inspiration of Deuteronomy (v. 15) abandons this untenable dogma and gives quite a rationalistic turn to the edict, explaining to the Israelites that their deliverance from Egyptian bondage was why Jehovah their God commanded them to keep the Sabbath day holy. Here, then, is a fluctuating Inspiration at variance with itself. As we no longer have the tables of stone divinely engraved, common sense must be trusted to decide between the two conflicting records. The disquieting thought must surely arise that both sanctions are of purely human devising. At any rate, the Christian Church, while verbally reciting one of them, in practice ignores them both. Among such inconsistencies it may be noticed incidentally that, while many eagerly insist on regarding the varied literature of the Old and New Testaments as one book, "the Bible," they contentedly accept a divorce between them which arises from different renderings of the same names, as Joshua and Jacob in the one, contrasted with the entirely differing sounds of Jesus and James in the other.

If the hierarchies of all the churches of Christendom are now challenged to defend their doctrines and their rituals, to say what they really believe and why they believe it, this is not a new thing. In the fiftieth psalm and the first chapter of Isaiah we hear the protest against those who put their trust in sacrifices and vain oblations and appointed feasts and solemn meetings. Bishop Harold Browne, discussing the statement in Genesis (ix. 3), "Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you," remarks: "It is likely that those who fed and sacrificed sheep, would in the course of time have learned the use of animal food." He evidently supposes that sheep were domesticated before man conceived the happy idea of eating them. Such could be the scientific wisdom of an excellent bishop in 1879! No doubt many bishops nowadays are incapable of such simplicity. But the complicated task of rearranging a tangled theology is too much for their courage. They leave the world to such logic as that of Bishop Horne in 1771, with his comment on the words of Psalm civ.: "Who laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not be removed for ever." The words, he says, do by no means imply that the earth is stationary, or that it is eternal; but only this much, that it is so constructed as to answer its end, and to last the time, for which

it was created and intended." According to this the promise of lasting for ever, in inspired writing, does not mean definitely "lasting for ever," but only the indefinite period of lasting as long as it lasts, which is rather a serious qualification to the promise of everlasting life.

When last year I had the privilege above mentioned of discussing Biblical miracles in this journal, I made allusion to the spasmodically liquefying blood of St Januarius. This has elicited from my medical friend, Frederic Newton Williams, L.S.A., L.R.C.P., a well-known fellow of the Linnean Society, the following record of a personal experience which, in my humble opinion, deserves the widest possible recognition. He says:—

"When at Naples several years ago, I visited the municipal hospital; and after going round called at the hospital dispensary to have a talk with the American pharmacist under whose superintendence the department was. While there, a young acolyte from the *Cathedrale di San Gennao* (St Januarius) came in and asked the pharmacist for the usual mixture for use at the feast which was to take place the next day (the first Saturday in May). With a smile and a few words of banter, the pharmacist prepared a mixture of ox-bile and crystals of Glauber's salt (sulphate of soda), and, keeping the written message, handed it to the messenger to take back to the cathedral sacristy. After thus dismissing the acolyte, the practical pharmacist simply remarked to me that miracles took place nowadays, and this one was prepared in a hospital pharmacy with very satisfactory results. The next morning the pharmacist and myself sat in a café and watched the solemn procession of the liquefied blood from the church of Santa Chiara on its way to the cathedral. Thanks to my genial companion, the 'miracle' was quite successful. He also explained that at the second celebration, which takes place on 16th December in the cathedral only (without a procession), the liquefaction is slower on account of the cooler weather."

It seems that in all ages, while credulity keeps its mouth open, there will ever be miracle-mongers keen to gratify that appetite. Take a case in point. Picture to yourselves thousands of persons anxious to hear a new Prophet. Their motives are various: curiosity idle or reverent, instinctive dislike of his teaching, or loving hopefulness founded upon it. But he is staying with his chosen disciples in a sequestered

region remote from other homes. Of the multitude the well-to-do and prudent have taken with them ample provision for the prolonged and distant excursion. When the preacher of righteousness has finished his discourse, he is filled with compassion for those of his hearers who, having nothing to eat, will faint by the way on their homeward journey. Now is the inspiring power of his Word put to a practical test, and the needful supplies are distributed, not by the creation of material food, but by the quickening in hitherto selfish hearts of loving-kindness, the root and stem, the flower and fruit of all true religion. In this view the baskets full of fragments, which an over-zealous recorder would have us regard as created out of nothing, are a needless addition to the existing universe.

In conclusion, may I produce one more parallel between sacred and secular writings. The fiftieth psalm ends with a trusty and endearing promise, by whatever authority it was spoken, "to him that ordereth his conduct aright will I show the salvation of God."

Scarcely less exalted are the words which the Halicarnassian before quoted puts into the mouth of Veturia when appealing to her son on behalf of their common country:—

"The favor I ask will prove an advantage to us both, for if you hearken to me, . . . you will enjoy a mind pure, and free from all apprehension of the divine anger; and my life will be rendered happy by the honor I shall receive from my fellow-citizens of both sexes while I live; and that honor, when it shall be paid to my memory, as it may well be expected, after I am dead, will cause my name to be for ever celebrated: And, if there is any place appointed for the reception of human souls, after they are disengaged from the body, that subterraneous and gloomy place, the habitation, as it is said, of the unfortunate, will not receive mine, nor the field of Lethe, as it is called; but the exalted, and pure ether, where, they say, those, who are descended from the gods, lead a happy, and a blessed life; to whom she will relate your piety, and the favors, with which you adorned her, and, always, beg of the gods to make you some illustrious returns."

Such a speech expects not a resurrection of the body. It is the soul that holds high converse and makes loving intercession in the heavenly company.

THOMAS R. R. STEBBING.

TUNBRIDGE WELLS.

EDUCATION, THE CURE FOR SOCIAL DISCONTENT.

H. W. HOUSEHOLD, M.A.,

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IT is well, amidst our social and industrial troubles, sometimes to look back a century or so and see whence we have come and by what route. The practice clears the vision and helps us to see ahead. We get some picture of the paths before us, and of the goals, alternative, to which they lead.

In 1807 a President of the Royal Society, speaking in the House of Commons, told his fellow-members, the great majority of whom agreed with him, that, "however specious in theory the project might be of giving education to the labouring classes of the poor, it would in effect be found to be prejudicial to their morals and happiness: it would teach them to despise their lot in life, instead of making them good servants in agriculture, and other laborious employments to which their rank in society had destined them; instead of teaching them subordination it would render them factious and refractory, as was evident in the manufacturing counties; it would enable them to read seditious pamphlets, vicious books, and publications against Christianity; it would render them insolent to their superiors, and in a few years the result would be that the Legislature would find it necessary to direct the strong arm of power towards them, and to furnish the executive magistrate with much more vigorous laws than were now in force."

The occasion of these remarks, the tone of which would shock almost all of us to-day, was a debate upon a Bill for the general provision of elementary schools throughout England. Needless to say, it was not a Government measure. It found few friends in either House, and was killed by the House of Lords upon the advice of the Lord Chancellor and the Archbishop of Canterbury.

The first Factory Act had not then been passed. Not

till 1819 did Parliament take pity on the child and make a first beginning of reform by forbidding his employment in a cotton mill for more than twelve hours a day—for more than twelve hours a day unless, sturdy little fellow, he (or she) was more than nine! It took fourteen more years to raise the age to thirteen and bring the hours of labour down to nine. The reform did not extend beyond the factories. In the coal-pits cruelty unthinkable continued till 1842, and tiny mites of five and six of both sexes still worked for twelve hours a day and more in the dark. After 1842, things were better. No girls or women could be employed underground at all, and no boys till they were ten.

Universal compulsory education, of course, was still nearly forty years away, and there are labour leaders still living who will tell how they left school under bye-laws as soon as they were eight. Slowly, very slowly, conditions have improved. Much has been done, but very much remains to do. To-day no child under twelve may be employed at all, and no child under fourteen may be employed in pit or factory or upon any industrial process. As for education, as soon as peace has been declared with Turkey attendance at school will be compulsory up to the age of fourteen; and the Education Act of 1918, when it has its full effect, will take us further still, unless indeed the reactionary gets the upper hand and we sacrifice our future to a false economy.

The shock of war awoke a brief-lived enthusiasm for education. The early successes of the German taught us that we must discover, develop, and employ all the resources of mind within the country if we would beat him. Now that he is beaten, the old indifference gains once more upon us. Squandermania must be checked, and Mr Fisher, of all men, is a spendthrift. If schooling is to cost so much, we must do without it (only, "we" shall not; it is "they" who will—a very different thing). We could afford to teach men how to kill, no matter what it cost. It is not so plain to us that the safety of the State equally requires that we shall afford to teach them how to live.

For a time after the war had ended we were told that, if we would survive in the great world fight for trade which was to follow, we must still discover brains and develop them with all our war-time diligence. Members of Parliament and platform politicians had no doubt of it—no doubt at all, for eighteen months. But the seed had been sown upon a stony soil. Men and women, boys and girls, were still but a part of the industrial machine. The politician and the employer had advanced so far in a century as to believe for

a few months that it would pay to educate them to a point of technical efficiency. But out of that shallow soil could spring no vision, nor any faith in the power of education, and of education only, to teach men and women how to establish and maintain in safety by vote and influence a great progressive, democratic State, and live as self-respecting and wholly worthy members of it. There is no resolve, no wish even, that this shall be, no conviction that it should.

There are those who still think, with that President of the Royal Society, that education inspires discontent. They are the men who cry out on Mr Fisher, and call for the revision of his Education Act. Mr Fisher, with one of his many illuminating aphorisms, routs these recreants. "Education," he tells us, "does not cause discontent, but heals it." But let us beware. The education that shall do this is more than a bare minimum of reading, writing, and arithmetic; more than a technical training for the workshop or the office. It must be a liberal education, and it must be no exceptional privilege for a favoured few; all must share it. It is but a form of insurance against uttermost disaster.

If we *will* sow the wind, we know the whirlwind follows. An uneducated democracy is a danger to itself and to the world. Let the Russian revolution teach us. An ignorant and down-trodden people, inflamed by hopes that have proved so tragically vain, followed with blind enthusiasm leaders whose sufferings under repression and persecution had distorted their mental growth, and made of them fanatics—honest and most able and therefore most dangerous fanatics. They are extreme men, men of one idea, to the service of which all their reading, all their thinking, all their great intellectual ability, have been steadily directed. They trained themselves, as so many of our young labour leaders are training themselves, to serve a cause; not to seek and follow truth with a single heart. History, as they read it, tells one long tale of wrong. The past has nothing to teach them, so they will not search it; and while they will not, ripe judgment never can be theirs. They take no account of the ways of human nature, or of the age-long story of its action and reaction under the stimulus of circumstances; for, as they judge, the nature of the capitalist is always to exploit and oppress the worker, and there's an end of it. But that is only to kick against the pricks. For knowledge in its widest sense, true knowledge, they have no use. It is too balanced; it makes no partisans. They have made up their minds before they begin their studies, offending against Bacon's golden rule. "Read not," he says, "to contradict and

confute; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider." These men, and those who follow them, are upon a road that leads straight and swiftly to ruin and despair. And that road we too shall surely travel to its end, unless we set the young upon the path of knowledge, and teach them to weigh and consider; to search out with reverence the lessons of the past, and with humility to accept their mission as forerunners of that distant Future which shall be so infinitely wiser, nobler, happier than To-day. For we are not, as some would have it, the heirs of all the ages. Our civilisation is but a transitory phase. It is born of the far past: it will give place to the long hereafter. The learning of the twentieth century has not summed up all knowledge.

"What we have seen and felt, what we think we know," says Grayson in his delightful *Adventures in Contentment*, "are insignificant compared with that which may be known."

Not long ago, coming in from my fields, I fell to thinking of the supreme wonder of a tree; and as I walked I met the professor.

"How," I asked, "does the sap get up to the top of those great maples and elms? What power is there that should draw it upward against the force of gravity?"

He looked at me a moment with his peculiar slow smile.

"I don't know," he said.

"What!" I exclaimed; "do you mean to tell me that science has not solved this simplest of natural phenomena?"

"We do not know," he said. "We explain, but we do not know."

There is after all but a difference of degree between the professor and those early scientists among primeval men, who, observing the vigorous growth of corn self-sown in the broken soil about the burial mounds, attributed it not to the breaking of the soil, but to the presence of the corpse, and taught thenceforward that those who would be progressive and raise crops for food must kill a man and bury him, must make a sacrifice, at the time of sowing. They did not know; they explained. Even Newton did not know, he only explained, when he gave to the world his law of gravitation. Einstein himself can do no more. Time, space, matter, force, mind, God, still present riddles to us beyond our wit to solve. Knowledge is but a relative term. It varies with man's power to observe and to interpret. It is one thing to-day, another to-morrow. Between the Jehovah of the Exodus and the Jehovah of Isaiah the difference is profound. And there is not yet an end of revelation. The God of ten

thousand years hence will surely differ as profoundly from the God whom our doctors of religion preach to us.

"The reading of histories is the school of wisdom," says Amyot in his preface to Plutarch's *Lives*. In that school the boy, the man, even the young man, shall learn intellectual humility, he shall be trained in judgment and shall gain vision. A Darwin, before whose mind is always present the infinite extent of the unknown, is humble. It is the men of little knowledge who are so arrogantly confident, so intolerant. That arrogance and that intolerance threaten danger. They are symptoms of the disease of discontent, which springs from ignorance and old injustice, and for which education is the only cure. One does not heap reproach on those who sicken of some widespread plague. That would be mere idiocy : it would neither heal the sick nor protect the sound against infection. One fetches in the doctor and the nurse and all the apparatus of preventive medicine. It is equally futile, equally impolitic, to reproach the hothead leaders of the labour movement, or the masses who applaud them. When injustice and ignorance are mated, suspicion, folly, ill-considered and precipitate action, even criminal violence, are their rightful progeny. Who from such a union could expect to issue reason in argument, wisdom in judgment, restraint in action, tolerance in relations? Those who condemn the worker and his leaders because of the suicidal folly of so much that they say and do, have not tried to see things from the worker's point of view. They should read what the workers read, and what is a grim tradition among them—the industrial history of the early nineteenth century. It is a tale of iniquitous injustice practised by the employer, with the approval and assistance of Parliament and the law courts; of monstrous hours that made of life a slavery; of wages so low that a man must take poor relief and put his mites of five and six to work if he would live (and those wages would be reduced at the first hint of trade depression, but never raised again upon the advent of renewed prosperity); of trickery that always made of industriousness an excuse to clip something off the rate of pay for piecework; of legislation steadily directed against him; of magistrates who twisted old statutes to silence his protests, and then connived at the flagrant evasion by employers of the few Acts of Parliament that restrained their greed or put a limit to their tyrannous abuse of power.

Treatment such as this leaves memories that are not easily obliterated, and suspicions that import prejudice into every argument. And the bitterness of these memories is intensi-

fied by the daily contrast between the lives of rich and poor. "They make us gain for them by our toil what they spend in their pride," said John Ball nearly six centuries ago; and to the worker's way of thinking it is still the same to-day.

Labour does take narrow and exclusive views. But how should breadth of view and a large tolerance find a way into lives that are spent in poor houses and mean streets, and a drab environment in which cultured intercourse, social amenities, great literature, poetry, art, the drama, travel, and all that makes lives worth living, have no part?

There is only one medicine for what is amiss with labour. Education, a liberal education, alone can cure the sickness and prevent its further spread. And education, this sovereign cure, we stint and dilute till it has lost all power for good. To the great mass of the people we offer as a substitute mere beggarly elements that have no healing in them. As children we lead them, with an air of patronage, up to a little ladder set in a high park wall, beyond which there lies (so they have heard) a copious spring of healing, draughts inexhaustible of literature, history, art, music, for which they are athirst. All that opens the mind and trains the judgment is there, but they may not approach. The wall should be breached, so that all who will may enter; secondary education, like elementary, should be free. But the wall is not breached, and there is still but one way in—the little ladder, before which stands on guard a sentry, the examiner, who, like Odysseus in Hades by the spot where the loud-voiced rivers met, admits but a chosen few out of the mass that surges round. The others he turns back into the thirsty wilderness, where they jostle for the rest of their maimed lives, discontented and irritable, and ever more suspicious of a system which absorbs their best into the world above them, and leaves them apart, hewers of wood and drawers of water, depressed intellectually, socially, and industrially, though formidable by numbers, and armed with all the power of the vote, which ignorance dooms them to misuse.

Who shall wonder that uneducated masses, moved by resentment at the long tale of manifold injustice, and always oppressed by an insistent dread of unemployment, resort to restriction of output, and strike for rates of pay which they cannot (or perhaps will not) earn; or that, when their products in consequence are undersold by foreign competitors, and trade to their own discomfiture falls off, they are ready to believe that their employers are entering upon a wide conspiracy to rob them of their wage once more?

It is folly, but a folly that is the inevitable fruit of

ignorance. If we will permit ignorance to exist when we might dispel it, we must not wonder that we make potential revolutionaries. Until we educate, labour cannot see the truth of things. It can read the seditious pamphlets that the President of the Royal Society was so much afraid of, but it cannot weigh them and consider, for it lacks the wider knowledge and the power of judgment needful to enable it to detect false reasoning and reject with decision bad advice.

H. W. HOUSEHOLD.

CHELTENHAM.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

THE death of Professor G. T. Ladd, of the University of Yale, on 8th August removes from our midst a well-known writer and a contributor to this Journal. Trained originally for the Christian ministry, Dr Ladd was for several years pastor of a Congregational Church before he became Professor of Philosophy at Bowdoin College in 1879. He removed to Yale in 1881, where he occupied a Chair of Philosophy for nearly a quarter of a century. His early work entitled *Elements of Physiological Psychology* (published in 1887) served as a text-book to a long succession of University students; and his later book, which appeared in 1894, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, has also been widely used, the emphasis it laid upon the importance of mental development giving it value, although it can scarcely be said to have thrown new light on the subjects with which it deals. In the *Philosophy of Mind* (1895) the more metaphysical problems raised in psychological science were handled—such, for example, as the nature of the self. As a philosophical thinker Professor Ladd was greatly influenced by Lotze, whose *Dictate* he translated into English. His most distinctively metaphysical treatise is that entitled *A Theory of Reality*, published in 1899, in which he tried to show that the universe consists of real beings of various grades, each grade being distinguished by the amount of self-hood possessed by its members, what we name “things” being, in truth, imperfect and inferior selves, but neither “things” nor self-conscious lives being mere manifestations of the Absolute. The two massive volumes on the *Philosophy of Religion* which were given to the world in 1905 probably deserve more attention than they have hitherto received. They certainly present a very exhaustive treatment of the religious consciousness both from the historical and the speculative points of view.

Now that Meinong is gone, the most original and distinguished philosophical thinker in Germany is undoubtedly Professor Husserl, and we welcome the reappearance of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, which he edits, after an interruption of its publication for five years. The new volume (Band iv; Halle, Niemeyer, 1921) contains four contributions, all of them of value,

dedicated to Husserl on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. The longest, that on "Logik," by Professor Alexander Pfänder, is a piece of work of first-rate importance, and may unhesitatingly be pronounced to be one of the most significant and suggestive treatises on the science that has appeared since Bradley's *Principles* in 1883. With characteristic courage, Professor Pfänder maintains that logic has a distinctive field of its own altogether independent of that which belongs to psychology, and that it in no sense rests upon psychology as its basis. In his view, it is a fundamental error to define logic as the science of thought (*Denken*), for by the term "thought" is all too readily understood the process of thinking, which, as a real occurrence, is part of the subject-matter of psychology. Logic is not the science of thought (*Denken*), but the science of thoughts (*Gedanken*). While thinking is a real, temporal process, which for the time being belongs only to a single thinking subject, thoughts are not real, temporal processes, but ideal, timeless entities. Everything that can be rightly asserted of thoughts—namely, that they can be expressed, communicated, expounded, written down, preserved and arranged—loses its meaning when asserted of thinking, which can neither be expressed, nor communicated, nor arranged. So, too, thoughts but not thinking can be accepted, made clear, thought through, proved, and agreed to. In like manner thinking cannot be verified, established, or refuted, while thoughts can be. Moreover, thoughts are not real constituents, so to speak, of thinking. No doubt, thoughts come forward in thinking and only in thinking. Yet it by no means follows that they are psychical entities or real constituents of the thinking in which they "come forward." The relation between thinking and thoughts is rather a quite unique relation. Language grasps this relation as a relation of production, in so far as it permits us to say that thoughts are formed or created by thinking. But this creation is all the same not a formation of thoughts out of a pre-existing material, as is supposed by those who contend that notions or concepts are obtained out of perceived objects through a process of abstracting, combining, and separating the parts, elements, and aspects of those objects. In that way only objects could be obtained, never concepts. Concepts and thoughts are *not* constructed out of the stuff of which objects are made, but arise as it were out of a stuff *sui generis*. From this point of view Professor Pfänder develops a system of logic of extraordinary interest. He handles first the theory of judgment in a highly suggestive and striking manner, his treatment of existential and impersonal judgments being especially noteworthy. He then proceeds to the theory of the concept, and here too his exposition is wonderfully fresh and illuminative. A third section deals with the fundamental logical laws (identity, contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason), while a fourth section is concerned with the theory of inference. As a whole, it is a piece of work that no philosophical student can afford to neglect. Each of the other three *Arbeiten* in the volume is well worthy of attention. The essay "Ueber die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie," by Roman Ingarden, has to do with a well-worn theme: since

epistemology has for its main problem to determine the nature of knowledge, the conceptual knowledge used in such investigation must itself fall within the province of what is problematical, and hence in using it for the purpose of the inquiry, are we not assuming at the start what we are required to prove? The author tries in an ingenious way to surmount the difficulty; and, I think, not without success. In some "Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee," the writer, Jean Hering, attempts to develop certain distinctions in Husserl's phänomenological inquiry through the aid of the Aristotelian conceptions of $\tau\acute{o} \tau\acute{i} \eta\nu \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$, and $\iota\delta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}$. The first essay in the volume is by Professor Moritz Geiger, "Ueber den Begriff des Unbewussten und die psychische Realität." Professor Geiger argues that the problem of the unconscious leads us inevitably into metaphysical territory, and that it can only be satisfactorily approached by making clear to ourselves the significance of consciousness and of so-called inner experiences (*Erlebnisse*). His contention is that psychical reality must be distinguished from the experiencing which brings it into view. The *esse* of psychical reality no more consists in its being experienced than the *esse* of external objects consists in their being perceived. Nor is every psychical reality even accompanied by an inner experience of it. In our own mature life many psychical occurrences take place without being experienced. It is illegitimate, therefore, to look upon the laws of psychical reality as laws of conscious processes, and psychology will have to deal with the mental life from the point of view of a psychical reality that is not identical with consciousness. Altogether the volume shows that German philosophy is very much alive; and Professor Husserl is to be congratulated upon the brilliance of the work which owes its instigation to him.

The plan of publishing the results of co-operative effort in a book of essays seems to be one that has come to stay. Seven American philosophers (Professors Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellars, and Strong) present a theory of knowledge, which we are told all of them have held for some years, but the final expression of which has been greatly facilitated by mutual criticism, in a volume entitled *Essays in Critical Realism* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1920). The term "critical realism" (which, by the way, was used by the present writer five years ago to designate a very different theory) has no reference to the Kantian philosophy, and is employed apparently to distinguish the doctrine here propounded from the so-called "new realism" that came from America in 1912. The theory which the authors put forward is briefly this:—In the situation which is called perception there are always present three factors: the outer physical event, the mental event, and an appearance or character-complex. This last factor is what is given, the datum, that which is immediately apprehended. It is that from which we start in the act of perception; but we instinctively take what is thus given to be characteristic of real objects. We react to the given characters *as if* they were the characters of real objects, and we find that this belief and those reactions *work*, just as the Copernican theory works, but with over-

whelmingly greater evidence. Knowledge, then, is not a simple relation between the mind and its objects. That which is immediately given is not itself an existent, but an *essence* (i.e. a universal or complex of universals); and the essence is not the object of perception, but the means by which we perceive objects. We know physical things or objects through the medium of directly experienced essences or contents. The theory has, I believe, elements of value. For the last twenty years or more I too have been urging that the content apprehended is not itself an existent, and I have even described it as an essence. But I think the writers I am referring to are wrong in supposing such content or essence to be what in perception is given, the datum. On the contrary, what is given, in the only legitimate sense of the word, seems to me to be the real object; and, as distinguished from the real object, this character-complex or content, so far as I can see, only comes to be at all in and through the act of apprehension being directed on the real object. I fail to understand how, on the view under consideration, the characters apprehended can be properly described—and the writers do so describe them—as the characters of the object, how the given essence can be the essence of the object. As to the status of the content or essence, the several authors, we are told, are not agreed. Professors Lovejoy, Pratt, and Sellars hold that what is “given” is, in all cases, and *in toto* in each case, the character of the mental existent of the moment, although its existence is not given. The other four hold that what is “given” results not merely from this cognitive use of the character of the mental state of the moment, but also, in part, in most cases, from the attitude of the organism, which may not be represented in the character of the mental state. Yet, whichever of these alternatives be adopted, there would appear to be no valid ground for attributing the characters of the datum to the object. Whether, however, the authors’ reasoning be regarded as convincing or not, they have produced a book of great interest, and on a subject which for a long time to come will be uppermost in philosophical discussion.

Another, and more massive, collection of essays has been issued under the editorship of Dr Charles Singer, the second volume, namely, of *Studies in the History and Method of Science* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921). The collection contains fifteen essays in all, most of them dealing with chapters in the history of science. Dr Singer himself contributes a long and valuable study of “Greek Biology and its relation to the Rise of Modern Biology.” Naturally he is chiefly concerned with Aristotle’s biological system and the botanical writings of Theophrastus. He draws attention to the habit of the Greek writers of setting down only their conclusions; while their methods of work, even their verificatory observations, they have almost completely hidden from us. So, too, although the great Greek minds were singularly free from superstition, yet few of them showed an adequate scientific scepticism, but were inclined to accept data without scrutiny, induction without proof. But when the attention of the Greek was once fixed upon the structure or habits of living things, his success in elucidating or portraying them was, it is urged, unrivalled, for then

the living things became part of his own world and not merely of the world around him, personal and not impersonal. It should be mentioned that Dr Singer's article is illustrated by many beautiful plates of ancient drawings of animals and plants. Mr Robert Steele gives an interesting account of "Roger Bacon and the State of Science in the Thirteenth Century." Roger Bacon stands out prominently, he thinks, as the first English leader of scientific thought, and the publication of his remains would be invaluable. There is a long review by J. J. Fahie of Favaro's National Edition of the Works of Galileo; and in it an account is given of Galileo's life and trial. Professor Arthur Platt's interpretation of the difficult passage in Aristotle's *Historia Animalium* dealing with the heart will be of great value to Aristotelian students, and incidentally illustrates the acuteness of Huxley in so far as it confirms a suggestion of his made in one of the early numbers of *Nature*. Dr F. C. S. Schiller's article on "Hypothesis" is written from the point of view of what he calls "a voluntaristic logic." The sole essential of a scientific hypothesis is, he maintains, that it should *work*, relevantly to the problems of the science, and the only condition the logician is entitled to lay down is that the hypothesis accepted should be the one that works best. Finally, there is included a paper on "Science and Metaphysics" read to a Philosophical Society in Oxford some years ago by the late J. W. Jenkinson. It is a noteworthy utterance, a vigorous defence of Hegelian idealism by a leading man of science.

I have referred to Professor Pfänder's able treatise, and now I have also to record the appearance of two very important English additions to logical science. The first part of Mr W. E. Johnson's *Logic* (Cambridge University Press, 1921) is a work of striking originality, and will be reviewed later in these pages. Meanwhile, I may give expression to the gratification students of logic will everywhere feel that this instalment of Mr Johnson's long-promised book is at length in their hands. In including what he calls the "epistemic aspect of thought" within the province of logic, Mr Johnson allows more weight to psychological considerations than Professor Pfänder would do, and the simultaneous appearance of the two works will afford an opportunity for a more penetrative discussion of the matter than it has received hitherto. The other volume alluded to, which has likewise been long expected, is that by Mr J. Maynard Keynes, *A Treatise on Probability* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1921). Mr Keynes tells us that he has been largely influenced by Mr Johnson, Dr Moore, and Mr Russell—that is to say, by Cambridge, which, with great debts to the writers of Continental Europe, yet continues in direct succession the English tradition of Locke and Berkeley and Hume, of Mill and Sidgwick, who, in spite of their divergencies of doctrine, are united in preference for what is matter of fact, and have conceived their subject as a branch rather of science than of the creative imagination.

The concluding portion of Professor C. D. Broad's article on "Alexander's Gifford Lectures" (*Mind*, April 1921), deals with Alexander's theories of mind, the hierarchy of qualities, universals,

and deity. Professor Broad has some pertinent criticism on the now familiar distinction between "enjoyment" and "contemplation." He contends that Alexander is not clear as to whether he means by "enjoyment" a mode of knowledge or only a mode of being, and that this confusion comes pointedly to the front in his treatment of the memory of past states of mind. And in reference to "contemplation," he urges that it is not shown how every act of cognition has an *appropriate* object in the non-mental world. An act of cognition is a certain brain-state with a mental quality. This, presumably, could be produced by causes which have no connection with the object to which such an act is appropriate; so that we might expect such acts to be constantly happening in the absence of any appropriate object. The doctrine seems, therefore, to involve all the difficulties of extreme subjective idealism. In regard to what Alexander calls "deity," the writer thinks that, while it is an integral and important part of Alexander's system, it is not what anyone else means by deity, and that it has been somewhat strained to make it fit in, even verbally, with the concepts of religion and theology. Some fresh light is, I think, thrown on his general philosophical position by Professor Alexander's attractive lecture on *Spinoza and Time* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921). It was, of course, at once evident from the Gifford Lectures that the position had considerable affinity with that of Spinoza; and the object of the present lecture is to inquire what consequences would follow from the substitution of Time for Thought in the Spinozistic Attributes. The chief of such consequences are found to be these: (a) The notion of Substance, in Spinoza's sense, would have to go. The ultimate reality, or Space-Time, would rather be identical with the infinite immediate mode of *motus et quies*, or, discarding the idea of rest as something positive, with Motion. It would be not so much the Substance of which things are modes as the stuff of which they are pieces. (b) There would be no ditch to jump between the ultimate ground of things and things themselves; for things would be, as indeed Spinoza says they are, complexes of motion. (c) The order in the sequence of the modes from the ultimate ground would cease to be merely a logical one, and become temporal. The grades of modal perfection would be no longer a "static series of forms, but a hierarchy produced in the order of time." And (d) thought, instead of being an attribute of the ultimate reality, would become the distinguishing quality of the highest level of empirical things. Yes; but the *fundamental* change would be one which Professor Alexander scarcely brings out with the emphasis it deserves. Substance was, as he indicates, according to Spinoza, not the producing cause of the modes, but their logical ground; and Spinoza's initial difficulty is to make the advance from this logical ground to the infinite immediate mode of *motus et quies*. It will not do to say that "extension being an attribute of God reflected the activity of God's nature, and therefore the modes of extension were intrinsically motion, to correspond with the activity of God" (p. 85); because clearly the "activity of God" is a notion which is irreconcilable with the notion of logical ground. Now, Professor Alexander believes

that the introduction of Time disposes of the difficulty. But (i) that expedient would radically transform Spinoza's whole metaphysic, which is based upon the conception of reality not being a temporal process but a logical system; and (ii) it only disposes of the difficulty *if* it can be shown that Space-Time is identical with Motion. In reference to the latter problem, Professor Alexander still puts us off with a metaphor. It is due, he tells us, to the "restlessness" of Space-Time that it falls of itself into those distributions of motion, those complexes, which are bodies. Time, however, is *not* "restless" in the sense that Professor Alexander requires it to be. The movement of time, as he himself elsewhere tells us, is uniform. When, then, we hear of the "striving" of Space-Time, of its "impulse towards new levels of existence," of its "*nisus*" towards deity, etc., we want surely *some* explanation of how all this accrues to Space-Time simply in virtue of Time being one of its ingredients.

Attention should be drawn to Mr G. C. Field's able article on "Faculty Psychology and Instinct Psychology" (*Mind*, July 1921). Mr Field succeeds, I think, in definitely formulating and illustrating the fallacy into which many of us feel much current psychology is falling—that, namely, of erecting Instinct and the instincts to the same false position as was formerly occupied by the "faculties." If it is a question of two entirely distinct types of behaviour, with no felt resemblance in the conscious experience which accompanies them, and not always or generally found together, it is, as he points out, meaningless to speak of them as due to the same instinct. For that involves the idea that we can understand and think of mental structure or permanent disposition apart from mental function or activity, that we can explain the latter by, and in terms of, the former, which is just precisely what we cannot do. Professor J. W. Scott's thesis in his paper on "Psychology and Idealistic Philosophy" (*Phil. Rev.*, March 1921) is a sufficiently startling one—namely, that the "new psychology," although it does not say anything explicitly about the ultimate reality being an "all-inclusive experience" containing its own articulations, yet does by all indications seem to say that the salvation of the soul lies somehow in that sort of thing. We shall have to wait, however, for a promised future article to see how this amazing contention is made out. The concluding volumes by Mr G. Sidney Brett's *History of Psychology* have been published, the second volume dealing with the Mediæval and Modern Period, and the third with Modern Psychology (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921). In some respects the book will be useful. But it attempts far too much to be really successful. What is wanted is a history of psychology that confines itself more or less to the broad general principles of the science, and shows the way in which development, from that point of view, has taken place.

G. DAWES HICKS.

REVIEWS.

The Nature of Existence. By J. M. E. M'Taggart. Vol. I.
Cambridge University Press, 1921.—Pp. xxi+310.

FOR the last twenty years or so the labours of philosophers have been devoted rather to the investigation of the nature and certainty of alleged scientific knowledge than to the attempt to determine the nature of Reality as a whole by abstract reasoning. This limitation has been mainly the result of bitter experience of the futility of previous attempts at speculative metaphysics. A distrust of elaborate philosophical systems has always characterised England in general, and of late years has been specially characteristic of Cambridge in particular. To all these rules Dr M'Taggart is probably the most eminent living exception. He has always held that interesting and important facts can be proved of Reality as a whole by processes of deductive reasoning. Until lately he thought that this could be done by a method akin to the Hegelian dialectic. In the last work that he published before the present one his position was that the dialectic method is logically sound, and that it is applicable to the actual world, but that in the argument used by Hegel there are certain mistakes of detail, although the final result is substantially correct.

In the present work he has departed considerably further from Hegel. He still thinks that the dialectical method of reasoning, when properly understood, is logically sound. He still thinks, so far as I can gather from this volume, which is only the first of two, that Reality is of much the same nature as Hegel, on M'Taggart's interpretation of the Absolute Idea, asserted it to be. But he no longer thinks that Reality is such that the dialectical method applies to it. His present argument is a perfectly straightforward deductive one. At various stages new premises are introduced, but these are supposed either to be *a priori* self-evident propositions, or to be empirical propositions which everyone will in fact grant. There are only two of the latter used in this book, viz. (i.) that something exists, and (ii.) what exists has parts. Even the latter can be dispensed with if a certain important proposition, which M'Taggart introduces later on, and which he holds to be self-evident, be granted. And, unless it be granted, the most exciting things in the book cannot be proved.

I think it must be admitted that no *general* objection can be taken to such a method, however sceptical we may personally feel as to whether anything really important can be proved about Reality as a whole in this way. Each transition must, of course, be scrutinised to see if it is logically sound; but this is equally necessary with any deductive argument on any subject. It may be said at once that M'Taggart is most unlikely to be caught in a purely logical fallacy. The other place where careful scrutiny is needed is at the introduction of each new premise. There are two great dangers about propositions that are alleged to be self-evident. One is that they may prove to be merely verbal. Another is that you may accept them simply because you can see no alternative; and your failure to see an alternative may arise, either through lack of the necessary experience or imagination, or through an unconscious desire *not* to see it.

M'Taggart is fully awake to the second danger. This first volume is mainly a general discussion of categories, but in the next its results are to be applied to concrete problems, like human survival. M'Taggart sees quite clearly that here one is liable to be biassed by one's wishes, and that, in any case, the fact that we can *think* of only one sort of thing that fulfils the conditions laid down for existents in general does not *prove* conclusively that Reality can only *consist* of existents of that kind.

The first danger, I think, hardly gets the attention that it deserves. It seems to me that in a long chain of reasoning a word is liable to have one meaning in the self-evident premise in which it is first introduced, and another in some of the remote consequences that are deduced from this premise. Probably, if you give it this second meaning, the premise will no longer seem self-evident. I should say that the word "part" in M'Taggart's reasoning is liable to this objection. It is certainly ambiguous, and it certainly plays an important rôle in the development of the system; yet its ambiguity is nowhere explicitly noticed.

A great deal of M'Taggart's argument turns on alleged infinite regresses. He has no objection to infinity, as such, but he holds that certain kinds of infinite regress are vicious. His argument at many places takes the form: Unless so-and-so be true of Reality there will be an infinite regress at this point, and it is of the vicious kind. He seems to have taken over, without question, from Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, the doctrine that an infinite regress is vicious when and only when it concerns the "meaning" of some concept. In view of the extreme ambiguity of the word "meaning," and of the important part that infinite regresses play in the argument, it would have been wise to give an independent discussion of the whole subject.

These are the main general criticisms that can be made on M'Taggart's argument. To enter into detailed criticism of particular transitions would be out of place here. I will, therefore, confine myself to mentioning some of M'Taggart's main results, and some of the more important and doubtful of his premises.

He first tries to show that, in dealing with the existent, we are dealing with the whole of Reality. The actual argument seems to me

to be in places very thin ; but the discussion is valuable as containing some excellent remarks on the nature of judgment, truth, and falsehood. M'Taggart rejects propositions, in the sense of Meinong's Objectives, and holds that truth and falsehood can be adequately dealt with by assuming nothing but facts, acts of judgment, and an ultimate relation of correspondence between the two.

M'Taggart now passes on to the category of substance. He defines it, rightly, as it seems to me, in such a way that events, states of mind, and many other entities which would not usually count as substances, do so. He accepts as self-evident that no two substances agree with each other in *all* their attributes, although they might agree in all those attributes which do not involve relations. He then tries to prove from this that every substance has a description which (i.) applies to it alone, and (ii.) is entirely in terms of general characteristics. The proof is performed by threats of a vicious infinite regress. I am not at all clear that the regress is vicious, and the proposition itself appears to me to be highly doubtful. It seems to me that, whenever we try to give a sufficient description of any existent, we have to bring in a reference to some substance (even if it be only a certain moment of time) which is known bodily by acquaintance. Thus a description like "the worst woman in London" contains an *explicit* reference to the substance London, and only becomes exclusive through a further *implicit* reference to the date at which the speaker uses the phrase.

M'Taggart next tries to prove that, if we arbitrarily suppose any substance to be different from what it actually is in any characteristic, we have no right to assume that any other substance would remain the same in any respect. This he calls the *Principle of Extrinsic Determination*, and carefully distinguishes from the *Intrinsic Determination*, which holds between one attribute and another when the first implies the second. The former is universal and reciprocal; the latter—which is the essence of what we mean by causation—is not universal, and is not in general reciprocal. In connection with the last point, there is an admirable discussion of Causation and of Induction.

Probably the most important, and certainly the hardest part of the book, is that which starts by dealing with the notion of Groups of Substances. The best example that one can take of this conception is a spatial whole, such as England, and the various sets of parts into which it can be cut. Any set of divisions which exactly fit together, without overlapping, to make up the surface of England, is a Set of Parts of England ; and such a set of parts is a Group. All the various sets of parts of England are said to have the same Content. The meanings of all these terms are quite clear for a substance, like England, which has extensive magnitude. M'Taggart applies them, however, to all kinds of substances, an extension which seems to me to call for a good deal of discussion.

This brings us to the crucial point of the whole system. It seems self-evident to M'Taggart that every substance has content, *i.e.* that it has sets of parts, and that every part in every set has sets of parts,

and so on without end. Now, when this is combined with the proposition, which he claims to have proved earlier, that every substance must have an exclusive description in general terms, we are threatened with an infinite regress, which he holds to be vicious. The only way to avoid the regress is to suppose that every substance has a set of parts whose sufficient descriptions imply sufficient descriptions of their own and all subsequent sets of parts. This subject is treated under the title of Determining Correspondence. The matter is too technical for discussion here, and the reader must be referred to M'Taggart's book. It is enough to say that the only example that M'Taggart can suggest of a substance which fulfils the required conditions is a society of percipient beings who perceive each other, themselves, and the parts of each other and themselves, and so on, and perceive nothing else. Certain other conditions have to be fulfilled by their perceptions, which render these beings, on the face of them, rather unlike ourselves. Thus at last, and by a very peculiar route, we reach a proof that a certain kind of Spiritual Pluralism is probably the only satisfactory description of Reality as a whole.

In the next volume the details of this view will no doubt be worked out, and an attempt will be made to reconcile it with the many *prima-facie* appearances to the contrary which the world, as we think we know it, presents. In the meanwhile, philosophers cannot do better than to study this most interesting volume carefully, so as to make themselves familiar with the general topography of the Celestial City, before it finally descends from the University Press.

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The Rational Good: A Study in the Logic of Practice. By L. T. Hobhouse.—London: George Allen & Unwin, 1921.—Pp. 165.

THIS volume is the first of a series of three books in which Professor Hobhouse proposes to deal with the fundamental principles of sociology. Here he is concerned to lay the foundations of a rational system of ethics, while the other volumes, which will be eagerly awaited by all students of society, are presumably to deal with the applications of ethical principles to the problems of social structure and evolution.

The title admirably indicates the aim of the work, which is to discover whether there is a rational criterion or standard of values in human life to which human conduct and social institutions may be referred for judgment. The plan followed by Professor Hobhouse may be briefly indicated. There is, first, a psychological inquiry into the nature of the springs of action with a view of determining the actual rôle of reason in the practical life. Then follows an analysis of what is meant by the terms "rational," "good," and "rational good." A more concrete account is then given of the ideal of life in two chapters entitled "The Realised Good" and "Applications."

A concluding chapter, "Implications," deals with the relations of Professor Hobhouse's theory to the utilitarianism of Mill and the ethical idealism of Green, and with the bearing of the main results of his ethical investigations upon the metaphysical problem of the nature of reality as a whole.

The psychological position is to a large extent based upon, and perhaps needs to be supplemented by, Professor Hobhouse's other works, notably *Mind in Evolution* and the earlier portions of *Development and Purpose*. It should supply a badly needed corrective to the very widely prevalent tendency to belittle reason and to glorify the elements of impulse. This so-called anti-intellectualism has many sources, but undoubtedly the advocates of reason are themselves largely to blame; for they often seem to regard reason in its theoretical aspect as a sort of abstract faculty of drawing conclusions from premisses, and will, or reason in its practical aspect, as a unique activity determined to action by principles different from those that underlie the impulses. As against such abstract views of reason and will, the tendency to emphasise the rôle of the impulses is perhaps in the right direction. But it is not difficult to show that this anti-intellectualism is open to much the same sort of objection as the intellectualism which it attacks. Both are guilty of instituting too sharp a separation between impulse and will, between sense and thought. Professor Hobhouse gives an extraordinarily lucid and helpful account of the nature of impulse, feeling, desire, and will, which is directed to show that, on the one hand, in man the simplest impulse is profoundly modified and is never a bare impulse, while on the other will is not a unique and simple activity, but a principle or tendency permeating a body of impulses and desires and giving them unity of aim and purpose. The practical reason consists of the mass of impulse-feelings harmonised, or in the process of finding harmony. It is "the synthesis of impulses made aware of its goal." Its rôle is not exhausted in the elaboration of means to ends, but is rather to harmonise the impulses by subordinating them to broad and coherent ends. It may be described as a principle of growth and integration, an effort towards harmony. Just as in the world of thought reason tries to connect the isolated elements of experience and to discover their grounds in some unifying principle, so in the sphere of practice reason seeks to form life into a harmonious whole, to effect a synthesis of the impulses in the light of principles and ends which find a response in the depths of our nature. Reason, therefore, is not an authority overriding impulse, but a principle or unity or effort towards harmony, working within the impulses and seeking to weld them together into a harmonious system.

Coming now to the central part of his book, Professor Hobhouse shows that by the term "good" we mean that which appeals to someone's feelings, and through feeling evokes a response or movement tending to maintain and further that to which it refers. "The judgment 'This is good,' however, is not only the expression of an attitude but also the assertion of a fact, and the fact which it asserts is a harmony between an experience and a feeling." Strictly speak-

ing, it is the total relationship of harmony between an experience and a feeling that is good. We may, however, speak of any term that enters into the relationship as good "by right of membership."

The analysis of the "rational" follows very closely the account that will be familiar to readers of the *Theory of Knowledge* and of *Development and Purpose*. The essential characteristics of the rational are interconnection, consilience, system, harmony, or mutual support. It would be strange if the world of conduct, of values, were shut off completely from the world of truth, if reason had no function to fulfil in the practical sphere. Accordingly, Professor Hobhouse seeks to show that there is a rational good, a good, *i.e.*, in which the whole body of impulse-feeling is linked up into a harmonious system, guided and sustained by all-embracing purposes. Such a good is rational according to all the tests of rationality, since it may be shown to be self-consistent, interconnected, and objective, in the sense that it is based on universal principles inherent in the system as a whole. The good generally is a harmony with some disposition of mind; the rational good is harmony carried consistently through the world of mind and its experience, a harmony of mind with itself and its objects, a consilience of all living experience in a comprehensive system of purposes. Such a rational good is obligatory or binding, Professor Hobhouse argues in Kantian fashion, because it is rational: the constraint that it imposes upon us is analogous to the constraint that reason imposes upon us in the sphere of knowledge.

The view of the good as harmony may easily give rise to misunderstanding. If I have followed Professor Hobhouse aright, he does not mean to argue that the goodness of an act or impulse consists merely in the fact that it is compatible with and complementary to the fulfilment of other impulses in a comprehensive system. The act has a value of its own which consists primarily in the fact that it is the object of a favourable disposition or satisfies a felt demand. So far it would be good, even if it were not a member of a harmonious system. On the other hand, a good is *rational* if it is capable of entering harmoniously into a system of goods. The case before us is, I think, strictly comparable with that of cognition. Here, too, a test of rationality is systematic connection. But when I say the proposition A is B is true, I do not mean that its truth consists *merely* in its consilience with other judgments, A is C, A is D, etc. Each of these judgments must have a certain plausibility of its own, and the truth of each must in any case consist in something besides its membership or capacity of incorporation within a system. So, too, in the case of the rational good, the goodness of the elements entering into the system does not consist merely in the fact that they are capable of being harmonised with other elements of experience, but consists primarily in that each element represents a harmony of experience with feeling. At the same time the *rational* good is *good*, firstly, because it satisfies the important impulse towards unity or effort towards harmony (which is so far one impulse among others); and secondly, because by definition it is a harmonious incorporation of goods, *i.e.* harmonies

of feelings with experiences into a comprehensive system, *i.e.* a harmony of harmonies.

In this connection one would like to ask Professor Hobhouse whether, in his view, all satisfied impulses are intrinsically good, except, *i.e.*, in so far as they conflict with the satisfaction of other impulses of oneself or others? If not, then the goodness of an impulse must consist in something else than the fact that there is a harmony of feeling with experience in regard to it. Further, one cannot but wish that Professor Hobhouse had added to his general arguments as to the logical characteristics of a rational system, and the claim that the sphere of values must be amenable to reason, some direct proof that the things we call good do in fact form, or are capable of forming, a system.

The conception of the good as developmental harmony has, as Professor Hobhouse points out, much in common with the principle of general happiness, particularly as worked out by Mill. It differs, however, from the latter profoundly in its psychology of the springs of action, in its view of the nature of obligation, and particularly in refusing to consider happiness in abstraction from the mode of life in which happiness is found. The good, according to Professor Hobhouse, may be defined as "happiness in the fulfilment of vital capacity, in a world adapted to mind." There are, however, passages in Mill which come very closely to Professor Hobhouse's view, as, *e.g.*, when he explains in chapter i. of the essay on Liberty that when he appeals to utility he means utility in the largest sense, "grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being."

Professor Hobhouse's discussion of the relation of his own view to the ethical idealism of Green is of especial interest, notably for the light it throws upon the problem of self-sacrifice and of the relation between the good of the individual and the good of society. His view is that "self-development as such does not remain part of the social ideal. Rather, all personal development is good so long as it is capable of harmony; the wider the sphere of development, the greater the good attained."

The view of the good as rational postulates a moral order which is universal, independent of any particular social organisation, binding upon all rational beings that come into relation with one another. It involves, *i.e.*, the notion of Humanity perhaps of all conscious beings as a unity. But Professor Hobhouse is anxious to point out that this unity must not be personified, and that it must not be conceived as something already achieved, but rather as a principle of growth or development, an effort towards harmony gradually widening in scope and comprehensiveness, a unity that may be described perhaps as a unity of spirit. These implications of his ethical theory are taken by Professor Hobhouse at least to confirm the view of reality reached by him in his *Development and Purpose* as a result of an elaborate survey of the empirical facts of evolution and an analysis of the nature of development and teleology. According to the view there put forward, reality is an interconnected system developing in time, the ground of whose development lies within the

system and is found to consist in the principle of rational harmony or love. This principle is not coextensive with reality, nor is it even the ground of reality, but the ground only of the development within it. The elements of discord are equally real. The function of the principle of harmony and of reason is to subdue them or incorporate them within a harmonious system. The effort towards harmony in the world-process is essentially purposive, and implies the existence of a central mind, though we may be unable to describe adequately the form of unity that such a mind would possess. The theory is essentially optimistic, and implies a belief that ultimately the principle of harmony will dominate the universe.

These large issues cannot, of course, be fully discussed here. I content myself with asking two or three questions. It may perhaps be conceded that a comprehensive survey of the empirical facts of mental and social evolution does point to the operation of a principle of unity or effort towards harmony. But are we, except as a matter of faith, justified in extending this principle to the whole world-order? May it not be that the category of end or purpose, though important in dealing with problems of human and animal evolution, is inadequate when applied to the whole cosmic process? May it not be that though the process of human evolution must be grounded in the nature of the real, it is yet not so significant for the real as to determine the latter's *essential* character?

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Our Social Heritage. By Graham Wallas. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921.—Pp. 292.

THIS is a worthy successor to Professor Graham Wallas's earlier books, *The Life of Francis Place*, *Human Nature in Politics*, and *The Great Society*. In spite of the looser connection of the separate chapters, it will probably strike his readers as the most mature as well as the most alive and brilliantly written of them all. Mr Wallas is doing for social psychology what William James did for individual psychology, in making it a living force in contemporary thought, but he goes beyond James in pressing home its teaching against the intellectual inertia which he regards as the main vice of the time.

His text in the new volume is the now familiar distinction between "nature" and "nurture," and the necessity which that portion of nurture which we owe to the social process of teaching and learning lays upon us of improving upon it by self-conscious effort, if we are to escape the social atrophy and stagnation that threatens us. The task can only be carried through by "co-operation in work and thought"; but it must be a co-operation illuminated by a far wider human sympathy and a far clearer eye to what is required by "the good life" than are as yet common. It is impossible in a short notice like this to give any idea of the trenchant criticism of men and institutions which these twelve

chapters contain, or of the wealth of happy illustration, drawn from a singular width of scholarship combined with a no less singular width of practical experience, with which the writer presses it home. It is only possible to mention one or two of the chapters which will appeal particularly to different classes of readers. The present-day politician will have his attention fascinated by the chapter on "Group Co-operation," in which the psychology of the leading figures in the First Dardanelles and in the Mesopotamian Reports is subjected to scorching criticism and made responsible for their failure to rise to the requirements of the situation. To the general social student the central and longest chapter in the book on "Professionalism" will probably be the most interesting. Since its appearance the attack it contains on the professional spirit in law, medicine, the army, and education has gained in pointedness by the publication of the no less brilliant statement of the opposite side of the question in Mr R. H. Tawney's searching book on *Acquisitive Society*. Perhaps someone in the *Hibbert Journal* will attempt a wider treatment that will reconcile these conflicting points of view. It is in this chapter that the writer develops, as against the advocates of Guild Socialism, what seems to me an irrefragable argument for a decisive control by "representatives of the community"—in other words, by the State. Students of the Constitution should be grateful for the attempt Mr Wallas makes in the chapter on "Constitutional Monarchy" in the interest of a true working democracy to "see through make-believes to reality." Deprecating the taboo that society puts upon the discussion of institutions which arouse passion, he firmly insists: "The whole of this book is meaningless if the effort required to make our own working conception of the world resemble as nearly as may be the facts is not as worth while in politics as it is in the natural sciences" (p. 238). But it is to the last chapter, on "The Church," that readers of the *Hibbert Journal* will probably most readily turn to ascertain the writer's view of our religious heritage. The argument turns on the contrast between the appeal of the best minds in the Church to the "considerate attention of men of goodwill" and the moral and intellectual inertia that pervades one portion of the establishment, the glorification of subconscious and savage survivals in the human soul that is so disquieting a note in another. If the Church ever really offered any clear guidance in "long-range ethical problems" (which Mr Wallas doubts), it has entirely abdicated this office to-day. What it is mainly suffering from is "the absence of a consistent and helpful metaphysical 'world-outlook'" (p. 259). Such an outlook, however, he seems to regard as inconsistent not only with Christian orthodoxy, but with Christianity of any kind. "I myself think it more probable that the children or grandchildren of most of those who reject the main dogmas of Christian orthodoxy will cease to call themselves Christians; and that Christian tradition will come to be represented in the Western nations by a minority of born mystics and their followers" (p. 283). What he seems in the same self-revealing passage to suggest is "something more like the philosophies of Zeno and Epicurus in the Roman

Empire." It is a challenging chapter, and seems to demand a more authoritative answer than, so far as I know, it has yet received.

It is an ungrateful task to turn to criticism of so sincere and appealing a book, but there is one side in which, with all his clearness of vision, the writer seems to me to show a curious limitation, amounting to more than the normal blind-spot, and accounting in large degree for the disappointment which some critics have expressed in the book from the side of constructiveness. Mr Wallas takes his stand upon *self-conscious thought and will* as the keynote of the intellectual and moral world of to-day. Yet there is no attempt to analyse this notion. The writers who, like Mr Ernest Barker, have occupied themselves with it are set aside as "metaphysical philosophers" (p. 251) who are prepared to ride roughshod over "psychology." I think that a closer study of their work would have led to a different view. William James defined metaphysics as only "a particularly obstinate effort to understand," and the writers in question are simply those who appeal from a psychology, which has too much neglected the idea of the self and all that this involves for human thought and conduct, to the psychology which makes it the head of the corner in any attempt to reach "a consistent and helpful world-outlook." It is just such a psychology that we miss in this book. Its absence, we venture to think, accounts for the failure in the very interesting chapter on "Liberty" to arrive at a reconciliation between the negative and the positive ideas of freedom that so confusingly run in and out of the discussion. It is accountable also for the fragmentariness and unsatisfactoriness of the chapter upon "Science," where the problem of the reconciliation of freedom and necessity is raised but left unanswered. It will be found, I believe, to explain also what even the enemies of Christianity must feel to be a certain blindness to the elements of moral and religious truth which Christian theology from St Augustine to Dante and Aquinas, and thence to the present day, has sought with all its dogmatism and errors to express, and which Mr H. G. Wells has shown to have been the preserving salt in the worst ages in the history of the Church. Taking a wider point of view still, one might ask whether it is not just a psychology of the mind in relation to its world (in other words, of the idea of the self) that is wanted to show, if not why there is a "social heritage" at all, at least why we are under any obligation to take its defects with the seriousness that Mr Wallas so rightly and so eloquently demands that we should. Without such a psychology our social heritage hangs in the air; its call is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness. It stands for a fact, but for no appeal to a conscience. I am not asking Mr Wallas to exchange his own bright colours for the "grey in grey" with which philosophy commonly works, but to remember what Jeremy Bentham (more than anyone else perhaps his own master) said of "question-begging epithets," and to think it possible that there may be something underlying the work of the "metaphysical philosophers" which is of vital importance for constructive social theory.

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The Shaping Forces of Modern Religious Thought. By Archibald B. D. Alexander, M.A., D.D.—Glasgow: MacLehose, Jackson & Co., 1921.—Pp. viii + 445.

THE title of this volume indicates, in a measure, its aim, but does not altogether prepare us for the careful investigation of the origins of modern theological tendencies which gives the work its essentially historical character. To those who are interested in the history of speculative thought, Dr Alexander is already well known through his *Short History of Philosophy*, and he here attempts to do for theology what his previous work has done for philosophy in general. One is inclined to think that the book before us marks a distinct advance upon its predecessor, and that in particular its more limited range lessens the necessity for the statement of unelaborated details and so makes possible a most welcome fulfilment of the author's promise that the book will be critical and constructive as well as historical. Only occasionally do we see more of the trees than of the wood, and note rather regretfully the apparent neglect of favourable opportunities for criticism, if not for construction.

Dr Alexander conceives of the history of theological thought since the Reformation as illustrating two tendencies—an objective and a subjective, emphasising on the one hand the Divine sovereignty, and on the other the inward religious consciousness, the one expressing itself intellectually and the other emotionally, the one transcendental and the other immanent; and the interplay of these tendencies suggests to him that the most satisfying theology will be of such a character as to do justice to both sides of spiritual reality, appreciating equally the Divine manifestation and the human realisation. Throughout the three sections into which the book is divided this idea is dominating, and gives a unity to the book as a whole. At the same time, we feel that it is occasionally a little difficult to approve of the sacrifice of chronological sequence which is rendered necessary by the plan adopted.

The first section of the book—under the heading of “Foundational Types”—deals with the more outstanding phases of religious thought from the Reformation to the end of the eighteenth century. In the second section Dr Alexander extends what might be called his “catchment area,” and surveys the contributory streams flowing from literature, Biblical criticism, and science into the main current of modern religious thought. In the last part he returns to the main stream, and takes up the study of nineteenth-century theology in the stricter sense of the term. It must be confessed that this arrangement results in certain breaches of continuity and alterations of emphasis which it is at first sight a little difficult to justify. Why, e.g., should the influence of the idealistic philosophy be regarded as only a “contributory factor,” especially in view of the author's emphatic recognition of the value of Hegelianism, and his characterisation of it as “a real endeavour of the human mind to grasp the stupendous idea of God, as at once Absolute and Eternal, and also related to and revealed in the manifold in time of life and history”? (p. 317).

Indeed, throughout his work our author seems to be a little hesitating as to how far he is justified in ascribing theological influence to philosophy. At one point he seems to dismiss almost too easily the possible influence upon contemporary religious thought of the pantheistic refinements of Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno, whereas he very readily recognises the metaphysical support which pietism found in the "amor intellectualis" of Spinoza. Again, we are tempted to ask why Carlyle and Ruskin should be promoted to the more honourable third part of the book while the influential contemporary poets are relegated to a place in the second part, amongst the "contributory factors"?

At the very beginning of the period under review examples are found in Luther of the subjective and in Calvin of the objective type of theological thought. Incidentally, the question is discussed as to the importance of the personal influence of these two leaders upon the total Reformation movement; but the chief interest of the opening chapter lies in the exposition of Calvinism. Dr Alexander brings out clearly the sense of vocation and the feeling of security and confidence inspired by this creed, and at the same time explains why the paralysing consequences of a non-moral fatalism did not follow upon obedience to it. He shows that the "election" of Calvinism was election to repentance and sanctification, and therefore precluded satisfaction in a state of sin. He might have gone further and pointed out also that even for the average man a motive to virtue was found in his anxiety to reassure himself, through the consciousness of his own moral action, that he was indeed in a state of grace. In the following chapter the judgment which is passed upon the scholasticism of the post-Reformation controversies seems to us severe but not unjustifiably condemnatory.

The seventeenth century in English theological history is marked by the conflict between the Puritan and the Anglo-Catholic parties. While fully appreciating the good qualities of the Anglo-Catholic writers—especially Hooker,—and admitting that "they meant well and did excellent work in their own day" (p. 98), our author contends that the Puritans have left the more distinctive mark upon history. Puritanism stood for something deeper and broader than did Anglo-Catholicism, and while the excrescences of the former have disappeared, "the profounder principles of the Sovereignty of God, and the sanctity and vocation of the human soul, with all the vital truths connected with this conviction, lived on and became the permanent contributions of this age to its successors" (p. 99).

Of the rationalism of the eighteenth century, with its somewhat superficial deistic systems, Dr Alexander gives an illuminating account. He condemns the deistic tendency to reject everything which could not justify itself at the bar of the logical understanding, and rightly contends that "a religion without mystery is a religion without God" (p. 109). The deficiencies of deism connect themselves closely with failure to realise the immanence of God and a tendency to regard religion as somewhat artificially tacked on to nature from the outside. The value of Butler's reply to deism is estimated as of moderate worth, and it is probably just to say, in

reference to this theologically depressing century, that "he stands out as the sole heroic figure in the somewhat motley crowd of British apologists" (p. 123).

After a brief chapter dealing with phases of pietism both British and continental, and bringing his main history down to the close of the eighteenth century, Dr Alexander passes to an estimate of the idealistic philosophy as a "contributory factor." He finds that the idea of the Incarnation is the very nerve of Hegel's system, and that Hegel's philosophy as a whole had profound effect in emphasising the conception of historical development, in breaking down the deistic separation of God from the world, and in strengthening a spiritual rather than a materialistic attitude. But while Hegelianism secured that the central problem of theology would henceforth be Christological, for Hegel himself the idea of the Incarnation was much more important than the *fact*, and he can hardly be said to have realised the full significance of the historical Jesus, who remains a symbol rather than a realisation of the union of God and man.

In his chapter on the relations of religion and science, Dr Alexander traverses well-worn ground. He indicates three phases of the struggle—the dominance of theology, the period of independence and conflict, and the period of mutual respect and co-operation. In regard to the first phase, the useful point is made that the original discouragement of science was not due merely to the Church's love of power and greed of gain, but arose from zeal for the honour of God and dread—intelligible enough in those days of magic and witchcraft—of the consequences of knowledge. It will be a matter of general consent that we have now passed into the third of the phases above indicated, and that science, having given up the attempt to do homage to unity by explaining the higher by the lower, is now ready to become the ally of theology, which by prescriptive right treats of the spiritual and ought to have as its aim the construction of a spiritual philosophy of the world of such a character as to be acceptable also to science.

The chapters on the contribution of literature and Biblical criticism to theology are not the most satisfactory in the book, and suffer from too great attention to details. But the valuable elements in this contribution are emphasised again in the concluding section. Here the author returns to the main stream of theological thought, and, beginning with a masterly exposition of Schleiermacher's theology, traces the influence of the latter upon the school of Ritschl and later upon the pragmatic and psychological attitude of more recent thinkers. The subjectivity of Ritschl and his successors is rightly connected with the agnostic effect of the more negative part of Kant's philosophy, and the more objective disposition of Kaftan is welcomed.

One of the most acutely penetrating and interesting chapters in the book deals with the Tractarian Movement in England. This is well described as a protest against the religious deadness which was the result of deism, and it is also regarded as a reaction against the agnosticism which prevailed in much of the liberal thought of the early nineteenth century. This reaction did not, however, go far enough. It resulted, as, *e.g.*, in Newman, in a sacrifice of the

justifiable claims of reason and a timid flight to the protection of authority. Religious conviction was made to rest on emotional rather than on intellectual grounds, and a species of subjective agnosticism was the result. There will be general agreement with our author when he says: "Newman would have had no sympathy with the school of Spencer or even the teaching of Schleiermacher, if even he knew their dogmatic positions; but one may see here how men starting from different standpoints, when they attempt to suppress any element in the wholeness of their rational consciousness, do injustice to the full objectivity of truth and inevitably land themselves in some form of scepticism" (p. 335). Dr Alexander repeatedly expresses his apprehensions regarding the consequences of subjectivism, and he might have found some relief and comfort if he had given a larger place to the philosophy of T. H. Green and the Neo-Hegelians generally. It would have been of great service also if the scheme of his work had allowed him to include an estimate of one of the most influential books of recent years—Professor Pringle Pattison's *Idea of God*. But it would be almost ungracious to refer to these omissions in view of the exceedingly clear and valuable statement of modern theological problems which rounds off the historical investigations. While the dangers of subjectivism are strongly emphasised, it is at the same time recognised that mere "theocentricity" may result in a conception of God as a "lifeless abstraction—a blank, featureless entity" (p. 315). Avoidance of either extreme will be secured by the discovery of some higher category which will unite the ideas of Immanence and Transcendence, and help us to realise that God is in the world, animating it, but yet controlling it, not absorbed in it to the detriment of His own Divine personality. Towards such a solution Dr Alexander contends that we shall be helped most of all by a reconsideration of the problem of the person of Christ. The theology of to-day and of to-morrow must be Christo-centric, basing itself securely upon an estimate of the historical Jesus, and at the same time seeing in His life and death not historical facts merely, but the central meaning of the universe and the ultimate significance of the relation of God and man. "Christ constitutes the problem of Christianity, and the problem of God and man as well" (p. 421). The few pages of summary in the final chapter form a fitting conclusion to a book which will undoubtedly be regarded as a most important contribution to modern theological learning and speculation.

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Christianity in its Modern Expression. By G. B. Foster, late Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Chicago. Edited by D. C. Macintosh.—New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921.—Pp. xiii+294.

THE title of this volume needs explanation. We have before us the dictated portions of lectures delivered by the author to his theo-

logical classes when he was Professor of Systematic Theology in Chicago. To each section there are added notes of the remarks with which the main topics were illustrated. The first half of the book deals with the Dogmatics, and the remainder with the Ethics, of the Christian Religion. In attempting to estimate the value of such a work, the critic is hampered by two difficulties: one, that the lectures were apparently delivered before the war, and consequently we have to make allowances for our own emotional displacement; in the second place, no information is given as to the date up to which the lectures were given. On the other hand, these two circumstances enable us to measure the extent to which the author succeeds in reaching a genuinely objective standpoint. How far do his conclusions stand the test of the great trial through which we are passing? And then, to carry the matter to first principles, how far do his foundations of dogma and of ethics include all that should rightly be included? Let us take the latter question first, and then we may be able to deal with the former.

Christianity, we are told, presents itself as in conflict with other modern views of the world, with æsthetic or naturalist pantheism, with pessimism, with scepticism (p. 38). This last category does not leave me altogether comfortable. Did the author mean that the critical attitude is anti-Christian? Are we prepared to say that the pantheist or the pessimist are to be excommunicated? In fact, the pantheism of Fechner, the pessimism of Thomas Hardy, the scepticism of Newman, help to constitute in their respective ways our modern mind. If Christianity is to be ever regarded as the absolute religion, it must contain and resolve these distinctions. And indeed the author suggests that the conflict in question is in the sphere of religion when he goes on to say that it is not faith against science, but faith against faith.

Hence, when he attempts to substantiate the truth of the Christian faith, he succeeds precisely because his formula is capable of a general statement. In the first place, there is the judgment of value. Christianity has value in that it promotes both "culture and the fellowship of culture" (p. 41). More than that, it helps to realise the divine kingdom. In a similar way the Jew can speak of his own noble faith. Nor would such statements be necessarily false of the Mohammedan and the two great Hindu religions. Systems of philosophy, in their turn, though of narrower extent, demand a hearing. The modernist is no innovator, if he would comprehend in his religious regard the categories thus enumerated, and if he recognises these other schemes of values.

But Foster goes on to supplement the value judgment in such a way as to differentiate the Christian religion from all others. The mere value judgment alone is form without content. The historical person, Jesus the Messiah, furnishes the positive content or, in Foster's words, the proof by revelation. And here I venture to offer a suggestion. The term Christ has very little connotation to my ear other than that of the name Jesus. And from observation I imagine it is the same with many other people. Milton, according to the Con-

cordance, uses the name Messiah some nineteen times in his poetry, Christ once. The substitution of the Hebrew for the Greek term puts the name into historical perspective. A touch of Milton's scholarship is seen in his phrase, Jesus Messiah. Let the reader test the creeds, the versions of the New Testament, not to speak of later writings, by this substitution, and he will be prepared for a conclusion which distinguishes the more recent modernists from their immediate predecessors—a conclusion for which Foster scarcely prepares us.

Foster himself goes to the extreme of scepticism when he says: "A jury of twelve scholars would scarcely agree on oath with reference to any historical fact in the life of Christ." Loisy marks the reaction in his *Jésus et la Tradition Évangélique*, "The general traits of the historical physiognomy of Jesus and those of his career are marked clearly and certainly enough" (p. 10). It is by this exaggerated historical scepticism that Foster dates himself. He makes no reference to Schweizer, Tyrrell, and Loisy. In fact, it was by the correct interpretation of the Messianic tradition about Jesus that Schweizer began the revolution which was carried still further by Tyrrell in his *Christianity at the Cross-Roads*.

It remains, therefore, to show how the later modernism which restores Jesus to the eschatology of the first century can carry the solution of our difficulties one stage further than the point reached by Foster. Jesus, inspired by his sense of vocation, moved along an inevitable path to the conflict with the established order of things, which ended with his death. In full knowledge he threw himself against a resistance which would crush him. And those who follow him cannot, any more than he, come to complete terms with the world. The claim, therefore, that Messianic persons should make this world a possible place for kings or for workmen, is simply directed to the wrong address. And the present signs of a collapsing civilisation are not to be debited to the Messianic Church. Since when did the Church undertake the support of the world with which by profession she is at enmity? "I came not to send peace, but a sword." It was not the Church which created the world of the war. It was the industrial system working in conjunction with the application of science to the destruction of human life. As little was the world before the war created by Messianic persons. There is no sign that these same persons will make terms with the new world to be created by any actual labour movement. Hence, so far as Foster suggests that the Messianic tradition furnishes the frame in which we may fit the existing moral order, we are bound to criticise his suggestions in this later light. The whole fair world as it is, in fact, must be to some extent renounced. Unless, therefore, a religion involves the element of conflict with things as they are, it cannot be universal. When we use the terms Kingdom of God, the spiritual, the true, the beautiful, the good, we imply a state of tension, an opposition to the existing order. And this tension will impel some individuals to action. And so far as the individual is thus impelled to action, even to the extent that he clashes with, or even is destroyed by, the world, he may be regarded as a follower of, or even as the incarnation of,

the Jewish Messiah in a sense that can never be applied to the followers of Mohammed or Buddha. Whether or not we can say with Paul, "If we be dead with the Messiah, we believe that we shall also live with him," does not lessen the authority of the inner vocation with which we seek the best in order to fulfil our character.

Tyrrell at the end said: "I feel that my past work has been dominated by the Liberal-Protestant Christ, and doubt whether I am not bankrupt." And again; "I hope that I am wrong, but I feel that I have been reading the Gospel all my life with nineteenth-century glasses, and that now scales as it were have fallen from my eyes." It is indeed remarkable that Tyrrell should say also, almost in the language of Schweizer: "Faith in Christ never meant merely faith in a teacher and his doctrine, but an apprehension of his personality as revealing itself in us." And so Tyrrell rises to the universal form of religion. In Eucken's words: "Through conflict and the triumphant realisations of spiritual life into which the conflict eventually passes, the whole life of the Spirit is deepened and renewed."

How different Foster's book seems now! The whole second part, which deals with ethics, can no longer be regarded as based necessarily upon the words of the Master. It would lie outside the scope of this notice to make any attempt at criticising details. Only one remark may be permitted. The ethics of Jesus were subordinate to his vocation, and may be paralleled from the finer utterances of his time. But so far from lessening our interest and obedience, this knowledge drives us upon the commonplace of the Syrian East, the vernacular of thought and language alike, in order the more fully to set Jesus against his background. And here a familiar feature once more appears. The language of Jesus, like that of the prophets, is that of a poetically inspired man. The authority of the Messiah did not lack a suitable style of utterance. And conceding for the moment that we cannot mark off with absolute certainty in the Synoptic Gospels the very sayings of Jesus, we can affirm that he possessed a characteristic manner which is not inadequately conveyed by our tradition. There is an intimate relation between fine emotion and fine expression. I regret that the author has somewhat neglected the form of his lectures. He is more happy in the detached sayings which light up very brilliantly page after page.

Yet it was well worth while to gather together these lecture notes. For anyone to whom the method of Schweizer is repellent, they furnish a well-considered and balanced account of Christianity in its modern form, and especially in its American form. I miss a discussion of the influence of the negro upon American Christianity, and must fall back upon *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. But we have a similar problem ourselves. The true missionary spirit consists perhaps not so much in the presentation of our own religious beliefs to other persons, as in the willingness to treat all human beings as participating in our own human destiny.

FRANK GRANGER.

The Life of Christ : A Short Study. By Rev. R. J. Campbell, D.D. Oxon.—London : Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1921.—Pp. ix+367.

DR R. J. CAMPBELL has now given to the world the result of many years of thought upon Jesus Christ. As conceived by the writer, Jesus was a visitant from a supernatural sphere, who raised dead people, even Lazarus, and walked on the sea (by levitation, such as D. D. Home is said to have practised). This Jesus raised his body from the grave and “assimilated it into its spiritual background” (p. 346). Jesus fed a multitude with a few barley loaves, and did the act twice, because two records are given in the Gospels, one to five thousand men, another to four thousand. This Jesus was probably Virgin-born, for he came from another world or sphere, from heaven, and made “a new start” on earth (p. 82). But how is all this known to Dr Campbell?

“It is the Jesus presented to us in the *continuous experience* of the living Church with whom we have acquaintance, not a Jesus dis-interred from written records. The Jesus of the Gospels and Epistles is the projection of the experience of the apostolic Church. . . . We know Jesus in the New Testament because we already know Him in the Church which gave us the New Testament. . . . The only right method of approach to the Jesus of the New Testament is through the *living witness*, the witness of His continued presence with His Church. No other method can yield any but misleading results. . . . The New Testament is a collection of letters and tracts upon one and the same apostolic story. . . . It is the story of the Son of God, who came down from heaven to give life unto the world, the story which in concentrated form constitutes the substance of the Christian creed to this day” (pp. 16–22).

All this may be true, but Dr Campbell cannot get stories of historical miracles out of such experiences of the Church in its continuous experience of the “Christ.” Thus, the feeding of the five thousand is probably based on the story of Elisha in 2 Kings iv. 42–44 : “A man brought the man of God twenty loaves of barley. . . . And he said, Give unto the people that they may eat. His servant said, What! should I set this before a hundred men? But he said, Give the people that they may eat; for thus saith the Lord, They shall eat, and shall leave thereof. So he set it before them and they did eat, and left thereof.” In the Gospels the loaves are few, they are of barley (John vi. 9), the people are many, a doubt as to giving is expressed, and overcome: and the people leave some over of the bread. Similarly, stories of Jesus raising the dead are told based on stories of Elijah and Elisha: so of curing leprosy. It is hard to resist the idea that the feeding of the five thousand is a miracle-story told from a Church parable, or symbolic story of “Jesus” as the Bread of life: and that such is the explanation in John vi. 35: “I am the Bread of life.” All the stories of miracles were once symbolic stories of the inner Christ.

Dr Campbell believed much of this once, I understand: but his free spirit seems to have been somewhat clouded by the strain on his

nervous system in America, I fear, so he has taken rest (really nerve-rest) in the Church of England, and relies on Church authority for the view he now takes of the Gospel stories. Is not this a pity? May he yet recover the old freedom and verve! He says "Jesus" is given in the Church experience. True: but *history* is not so given. The Church experiences an Ideal Life, to some extent. The Church did not realise the Ideal Life of God in men *to the full*; e.g. the sense of freedom from subservience is not taught in the New Testament. Wives and slaves were told to obey their husbands and masters in everything; such was the old Eastern view. But to some extent the Church felt the Ideal Life of divine love to all men, sincerity and humility, and taught this, and called it "Jesus Christ." So down the ages has it been felt and taught.

Yet this experience of "Christ" by the Church does not give historicity to the stories in the Gospels, any more than the experience of the life-force by the worshippers of Dionysus gave truth to their stories of how the god behaved on earth (see Euripides' *Bacchæ*). Some early Christians felt "Christ," but later came the stories of the miracles. These were at *first* symbolic descriptions of what the Ideal or "Christ" did *in souls*. He healed the spiritually blind, deaf, and dead. The word "dead" is actually used in Ephes. v. 14 for "dead in sin." He spiritually fed the soul: i.e. the Christ was the Ideal Life of God in souls ("Christ in you"), and this Ideal Life healed and fed men, and these men composed symbolic stories of Christ which later came, by the unspiritual outer circle of Christians, to be regarded as miracles of a *man* Jesus. But perhaps there was no man Jesus. "He" was the Infinite in the finite.

The inner circle knew this. They called themselves "Gnostics." These Gnostics go back to pre-Christian times (see *Ency. Brit.*, article "Gnosticism," in eleventh edition). But later the outer circle expelled the inner circle, and set up the Apostles' Creed to assert, as Ignatius had done, that Jesus was truly born, truly died, truly rose from the grave. So Christianity became a dogma of what was supposed to have happened in history. The symbolic ritual became a transubstantiation into real "flesh and blood"; and the glory departed!

Dr Campbell is right, then, in saying the Church experiences "Christ": but it was an inner divine Ideal (Matt. v. and vi.) that the Church felt and loved. The records of symbolic stories of healing, and walking on the sea of trouble, and raising those dead in sin, became historised. Yet that process was not effected by the Church's inner experience of Christ, but by the lack or dwindling of that experience. As the vision faded the symbols of spiritual experience became misunderstood and historised, and after A.D. 70 they began to be written as stories of a *man* Jesus, who never lived. "Jesus" (=Joshua=Jehovah as Saviour) originally was the Gnostic MAN, the Heavenly Man divine, who was crucified into the universe, as the pre-Christian Gnostics taught. Jesus was the Jewish Gnostic name for the Stoic *Logos spermatikos* of whom Philo wrote so much, and the parable of the Sower was originally a Gnostic parable of God as sowing the Logos as soul-seed into bodies of men.

All this must now be recovered, *is* being recovered. Dr Campbell's contribution is in insisting on the Church as experiencing Christ, *i.e.* Christ as the ideal life divine. The deduction that the miracle stories are therefore true is a *non sequitur*, for they are literary productions by writers who misunderstood the symbolic terms of the earlier mystic Christians (Gnostics). The Ideal must be recovered, and more fully known as the Will of the crucified God, and must be applied to the life of to-day.

GILBERT T. SADLER.

LONDON.

The Holy Catholic Church: An Anglican Essay. By Hakluyt Egerton.—London: The Faith House, 22 Buckingham Street, 1921.—pp. 93.

THE fallacy that pervades Mr H. Egerton's booklet is one common to theologians—the failure to distinguish between the phenomenal and the metaphysical. If words have any meaning, the term "Visible" can be applied only to appearances. The "Visible" Church comprises the individual members, including the governing body, the written creeds and formularies, the ceremonial and ritual observances. Such expressions as "the Body of Christ," when applied to it (pp. 13, 14), represent theological and mystical ideas in the same way and degree as do those, *e.g.*, of "the Incarnation" and "Transubstantiation." All have an historical or physical substratum as their starting-point, which must not be confused with the metaphysical superstructure. There is, in point of fact, no "Visible" Catholic Church. What is so called is either a mental projection which varies with individuals, or a society of men and women, organised under one government, of international extension and unbroken traditions, of which the sole and unique example is the Roman Catholic Church. If anyone chooses to believe that he belongs to "the Body of Christ," he is entitled to hold this belief, but not to identify, in any sense, this vague and mystical notion with a "visible" church on earth.

The writer is so far consistent in his inconsistency that, having once made Christ (p. 14) the invisible centre of his "Visible" Church, he perceives the absurdity of excluding from it the non-conforming bodies (pp. 68–9). His views on authority are in harmony with this, thus evidencing the same mixture of inconsistent and incompatible elements: "Authoritative systems (p. 63) are effective through what may be called 'their appeal to life'—in other words, through a helpfulness which invites our trust and wins our consent." Such a pragmatism of authority is essentially opposed to the traditional doctrine that historical facts and metaphysical propositions must be accepted as intellectual truths (p. 47 ff.). The writer acknowledges the importance of the individual factor (pp. 41, 51), but attempts to rear upon it a new foundation for the ecclesiastical edifice. But the opposition is merely disguised by the effort to bring traditional belief into harmony with a true psychology.

The same breadth of outlook leads the writer to take up a position

which, as that of a convinced High-Churchman, is distinctly interesting. He accepts the Papal judgment that there is no "intention" in the Anglican Ordinal to make a sacrificing priest, a want of intention which is sufficiently proved by the deliberate excisions. Holding, however, that the Sacrifice of the Mass is the central core of the Church's ceremonial and devotional system, his defence of the Anglican position is at once ingenious and unusual. The priesthood, in his view, resides not in a caste, but is the prerogative of all the faithful. So far he shares the opinions of some other modern High-Churchmen. But can this equally be said of his detailed application? For, according to him, the Sacrifice of the Mass is not a valid rite unless the laity receive the elements (pp. 79, 80). Truly we are here a long way from the stiff formalism of scholasticism! It is a view which would be accounted heresy by the Roman Catholic Church and by many High-Church traditionalists. It would be tabooed equally, on other grounds, by all Moderate High-Churchmen and Evangelical Anglicans. It is, however, the more valuable on that account, as being no mere acceptance of tradition, or result of environment, but a genuine expression of the individual religious spirit. And true religion must always be individual and personal, even when partially disguised under the mask of a so-called "universal" belief.

The Article speaks wiser than our author allows (p. 13). A "visible church" is, and can only be, "a congregation," which provides, indeed, a *milieu*, but cannot create the religious spirit. If, even in intellectual matters, "*quot homines, tot sententiæ*" is true, the religious spirit can only live in that atmosphere of freedom which is the breath of its life. "The spirit bloweth where it listeth."

H. C. CORRANCE.

HOVE, SUSSEX.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE CAMBRIDGE CONFERENCE OF THE CHURCHMAN'S UNION IN 1921.

THE REV. F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, D.D.

I VENTURE to think that it may be of interest to have the impressions of one who was present at the Conference of Modernists at Girton College, Cambridge, especially as the main subject discussed was one which he himself, and even more so his friend and colleague Professor Lake, had provoked by a book entitled *Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. i., which had been jointly edited by them, as well as by the writings of Dr Lake, *The Stewardship of Faith and Landmarks*. The papers read at this Conference are published in the September number of the *Modern Churchman*, under the title of "Christ and the Creeds"; but it is only with the first part that the present paper proposes to deal.

The Anglican branch of the Church has been singularly averse to face the difficult subject of the fundamentals of Christianity. The Lambeth Conference prudently shelved it, and the Churchman's Union deserves no little credit for bringing it before thoughtful Christians. Indeed, no small courage was displayed by its members in insisting that it should be discussed. Even a bishop was found gravely to warn the Modernists not to allow so dangerous a topic as the meaning of Christ to the Christian Church to be discussed in public, and he begged them, this time *ex animo* in the most literal sense, to avoid allusion to so dangerous a theologian as Professor Lake, against whom the Church in its wisdom finds no better defence than the smoke-clouds of silence. But the committee stuck to its guns, and the Conference took place.

The readers of the papers were most carefully selected; and it was hoped that they would give as little cause for

offence as possible. It may not be invidious to say that the protagonists were Dr Hastings Rashdall, the Dean of Carlisle; Dr E. W. Barnes, Canon of Westminster; and Dr Bethune Baker, Lady Margaret Professor at Cambridge. Only the first named of these is, I believe, a member of the Churchman's Union. By each, however, an important aspect of Christianity was severally represented. Dr Rashdall is, above all things, a philosopher: in Dr Barnes mathematical science has a most competent exponent, and he is, in addition, deeply interested in social and economic questions. Dr Baker has made a special study of purely theological subjects, and is particularly distinguished for his opposition to Harnack's view of the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds.

But because the other readers of papers may be less known it does not follow that they are less competent. Mr Nowell Smith, the only layman, is headmaster of Sherborne School, a most distinguished Oxford scholar and a profound thinker. Mr C. W. Emmet has a wide reputation as a New Testament scholar; Canon Tollinton is the editor of *Clement of Alexandria*; Mr Lightfoot and Mr Hunkin, representing the younger scholarship of Oxford and Cambridge, are regarded by their universities as coming men. Mr Parsons, the only reader personally unknown to the writer, was a Fellow of University College, Oxford, and the paper he produced is in itself sufficient recommendation.

As a rule, in conferences the papers are excellent and the discussions irrelevant, sometimes almost beneath contempt. In this, however, the speakers were at least as good as the readers. Professor Burkitt's words were weighty in the extreme, and must be mentioned hereafter. Mr T. R. Glover, though not a Churchman, was an invited speaker; and he seldom is content with beating the air. Dr Rendall spoke for the conservative position in a way which impressed the Conference; and Mr J. M. Thompson, whose book on Miracles raised such a storm in Oxford a few years ago, propounded questions which were by no means easy to answer. On the whole, therefore, Modernism in England could not have been much better represented. The Conference, however, had not the benefit of the trenchant utterances of the Dean of St Paul's; and many would have liked to have heard Professor Lake, had he been in England, explain his position.

The proceedings opened with an introduction to the subject by Dr Glazebrook, the Chairman of the Council. It was a really brilliant summary of the Christological controversy in the days of the councils. Perhaps he em-

phased unduly that the philosophy of the Nicene creed is unbiblical—it seems to many the logical outcome of Johannine theology; the statement that “Jesus was for him [St Paul] the pre-existent Messiah, of whom the book of Enoch told,” may be questioned. But, as Dr Glazebrook is fond of classical quotations, I will say :—

“Ubi plura nitent in carmine non ego paucis
Offendar maculis.”

His paper was admirable: one passage is particularly significant :—

“As they gradually lost the early conception of Jesus Christ which made Him a fit mediator, they turned more and more to another mediator whose humanity could not be disputed. As her Divine Son was removed from the sphere of real humanity, the Virgin Mary was promoted (not by decisions of councils, but by the pressure of the popular will, to which theologians yielded one by one) to occupy the vacant place. We see her gradually invested with such superhuman attributes as qualify her to be a mediatrix. She is pronounced by successive writers to be ever-virgin, free from all taint of sin, and a sharer in the work of redemption. She rises from the grave and ascends visibly to heaven, in order that she may plead for mankind.”

Is it possible that the Jesus of Modernism is taking the place of the Blessed Virgin of medieval piety? It certainly seems so from the tone of some of the papers that follow.

The first morning was occupied by Mr Emmet and Mr Lightfoot on the topic, “What do we know of Jesus?”

Mr Emmet’s contention was that in the *Beginnings of Christianity* the portraiture of Jesus was inadequate; and it is necessary to quote him at length in order to understand the point at issue between the two schools of Modernists.

“We have recently had put before us a view which suggests that, though Jesus existed, He did not really count. Drs Lake and Foakes Jackson appear to give us the picture of a very commonplace and uninspiring prophet, differing from the prophet of the Liberal-Protestant in that He only taught much what other people had already taught, except for a few original remarks which were either untrue or quite unpractical. He allowed His followers to address Him as ‘Sir,’ and He spoke of someone else as the Son of Man.

“We can really gather little more than this from *The Beginnings of Christianity* and *Landmarks of Early Christianity*. None the less, I stress the phrase ‘appear to give us’; for I am confident that we have not here their full mind. They were dealing with certain problems in isolation, and there were other sides real to them as to us which they rather took for granted, and perhaps believed their readers were taking for granted as well. Still, their challenge remains, and in all friendliness we must accept it. The fundamental criticism on these books is that they fail historically because they make Jesus unimportant and uninteresting. Such a view explains neither the figure of Jesus as given in the Gospels nor the impact of Jesus on His age.”

The controversy here turns on the meaning of “failing historically.” The keynote of all the subsequent papers is the “overwhelming personality of Jesus” and His uniqueness as the Teacher. To ignore this is to be “unhistorical.”

Now, nobody does this; and Mr Emmet quotes the present writer to show that he has not. But what are the facts when applied to the history of the Church in regard to the personal qualities and the unique teaching of the Human Christ?

In the first place, in nearly every paper stress is laid on the influence of Jesus on His personal followers. The historian may well ask who these were. It is true in Acts there are many allusions to the Twelve, which Matthias joined as a disciple who had been with Jesus; but what is known of any of them? Of course, if the author of the Fourth Gospel is John, the son of Zebedee, and Matthew wrote the First Gospel, we have an impression made by Jesus on two of them. But how many of the scholars in the Churchman’s Union admit this? In Acts eleven of the Twelve, including John, are a silent chorus, with Peter as spokesman. None of the other principal characters in the book—Barnabas, Stephen, Philip, Mark—can be proved to have been with Jesus. Paul and his companions and Apollos certainly were not. The “fathers” seem to have known as little about the immediate disciples as ourselves. Even the synoptic Gospels witness to the opinions of the second generation. The Marcan Gospel, as we have it, says very little of Jesus as an unique moral teacher or a revealer of His own claims, though the point of view throughout is that Jesus is shown to be the Messiah Himself. There remains St Peter. If his First Epistle be genuine, we have the testi-

mony of a personal follower. But is the Jesus of that document the figure portrayed in the Synoptists? The speeches of Peter in Acts dwell not on the gracious Jesus of the parables, or even of the Sermon on the Mount, but on the risen and ascended Lord exalted to God's right hand and proclaimed as Lord and Christ. There is the allusion to His miracles in Peter's words to Cornelius, that He went about as a benefactor (*εὐεργετῶν*), etc.; and these are surely not the *ipsissima verba* of the Galilean fisherman.

Further, the people among whom Christianity spread most rapidly were not natives of Palestine: the Gospel made little or no progress in Galilee. Those who embraced Christianity were men for the most part unacquainted with the very scene of His ministrations—converted by preachers who themselves had never seen Jesus.

But it is undeniable that we have the synoptic picture of Jesus; and no one can deny its charm. It is in itself a miracle that it has been preserved to us. But what evidence have we that it made the impression alleged by the Modernists? To quote the words of Canon Barnes:—

“ We do not affirm that the Lord's Person and work have been central in Christianity in the past. There is much to be said for the view that they were, from the end of the second century to the close of the Middle Ages, concealed beneath alien ideas derived from the mystery-religions; that the Reformation was the hammer which broke the husk within which, under God's providence, the kernel had been preserved during the decline and eclipse of European civilisation.”

The writer himself cannot go so far as this, nor even agree with Canon Streeter, who, more correctly, told him in a conversation that the Jesus of the Synoptists revived in Francis of Assisi. In the Reformation it was Christ the one and only Saviour which was the attraction. It appears that the synoptic Christ lived in the love the Christians bore one another, in their heroism in the plagues of Carthage and Alexandria, in St Antony's self-abnegation, and in holy souls in all ages. But it is quite true that from the days of Acts to those of Liberal Christianity it was the Christ who rose from the dead and ascended who was the centre of interest. Why, then, should those who are endeavouring to account for the spread of Christianity in the ancient world be called “ bad historians ” because they do not dwell on a factor which their modernist critics themselves admit had little influence till a late date, even though that factor is the

personality of Jesus ? Their neglect may be due to "bad philosophy," but not to "bad history."

It is necessary to pass, though reluctantly, over the intervening papers by Mr Lightfoot, Canon Tollinton, and Mr Hunkin, which contain many passages well worth quoting, to that of Canon E. W. Barnes, one of the most-quoted preachers in the English Church. He has been subject to no little criticism for his utterances about the early stories in Genesis ; but in his sermon at the close of the Conference he told them that he is an Evangelical :—

"I am an Evangelical ; I cannot call myself a Modernist. As you know, I answer all the questions just asked in the old way. Probably all who have been present would wish to assert that they also are Evangelicals, firmly convinced that the Gospel of Jesus is the religious message of God to man. Yet one or two, in discussing subjects where language cannot adequately express feeling, have seemed to doubt whether the Jesus of history was the unique Person in whom St Paul and St John saw the Only-begotten Son."

He begins his paper by describing Jesus : "He was a Jew in whom was no gentile blood. . . . His origin was humble. He came from a workman's home. It is unlikely that He had an exceptional education. . . . He probably knew Greek. Clearly, His natural ability was great," and so forth. The portrait is that of a religious genius, obviously human, and the terms employed strike one as slightly patronising. As we have seen, this Jesus was scarcely understood or appreciated till the time of the Reformation ; but "as religion grows in purity," He will come to His own. His death is of the utmost importance and cannot be separated from His life.

"The Gospel cannot be separated from the Cross by which it was sealed. Man serves God and advances towards his divinely appointed destiny by struggle and pain ; and Jesus in yielding up His life gave all that a man can give to do God's will. . . . He died that the kingdom of God might come. We rightly deem Him Lord of the Kingdom of His Father because he was its perfect Servant. All who strive to enter in profit by His services ; they are to this extent enriched by the redemptive power of His innocent suffering. . . . The Life which was consecrated on the Cross should show how man should love God and how God has purposed to give man Eternal Life through such love."

Well expressed and eloquent as this passage is, it does not describe what was known as "evangelical" teaching, which laid stress on the redemptive, sacrificial, and saving power of the Cross of Christ. An Evangelical would no more accept this than he would Canon Barnes' description of the humbly born descendant of David who rose superior to an imperfect education. As a matter of fact, the tone of the paper is one of pious rationalism disguised in beautiful language.

For criticism the Canon has little or no patience:—

"In me the objective picture of Jesus portrayed by the Synoptists kindles reverence and love. The subjective interpretation of Jesus made by the first builders of Christian theology I feel to be true: such spiritual understanding as I have leads me along the road they travelled. The authors of such a book as *The Beginnings of Christianity* appear to reach what we may not unfairly term rejective conclusions by an ingenuity of atomic disintegration which a physicist might envy. Yet, when the process ended, Jesus still lives, great and unexplained. St Paul was more than an aggregate of the life-cells of which God secretly fashioned him: patient and painful dissection will not reveal the secret of his Master's personality."

This seems to be illogical. Criticism is evidently harmless if after it "Jesus still lives, great and unexplained." Then why grudge it being thorough, and minute? The more important a subject the keener the criticism it demands. Jesus, as is the contention of the whole paper, is the central figure in human history on whom the future of the race of man and possibly, as is suggested, much more depends. Can any criticism be too minute to discover the truth about Him? And assuredly Canon Barnes' description of the purely human Jesus at the beginning of his paper is criticism, though possibly not as searching as that which most trained theologians employ.

The paper goes on to discuss the scientific difficulty raised by the antiquity of the human race, and sensibly remarks that it is unimportant whether Christ came four thousand or four million years after man appeared on this planet. Towards the close the writer speaks of sin being as "terrible as Jesus declares it to be." Now, no one would deny that sin was a terrible thing in His eyes; but where among His authentic utterances do we find Him thus denouncing sin in the abstract? Towards some sins—notably hypocrisy, cruelty,

and callous selfishness—He was unsparing, but He had said nothing of the depravity of the human race nor of God's anger with mankind as sinners. This is markedly Pauline ; and the whole passage shows the tendency to read the system of a developed Christianity into the recorded teaching of the Master. It is on a par with an earlier declaration that Jesus "built up a clear, coherent system of theology. The Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, the kingdom of God, Eternal Life—the whole purpose of man's existence as a creature of God was plainly set forth."

Very different in his attitude towards criticism was Mr Nowell Smith. "I imagine," he said, "that the choice of this subject for this morning's discussion was mainly determined by the desire to counteract the supposed tendency of what are called 'disturbing books,' such as the *Beginnings of Christianity*, the tendency to relegate the Person and work of Jesus to the background or, shall we say, to the wings of the picture?" Assuredly, this was not the avowed purpose of the Conference ; throughout there was a feeling on the part of the leaders that the line should be drawn at advanced criticism ; but unofficially the Conference was strongly in sympathy when Mr Nowell Smith professed himself strongly on the side of Dr Lake and spoke of his *Stewardship of Faith* as "a book to me of compelling sincerity and power."

If, however, those who arranged the papers had thus far escaped the Charybdis of Professor Lake, they found a Scylla in the last three papers : "Christ as Logos and Son of God," by Dr Rashdall ; and "Jesus, Human and Divine," by Dr Bethune Baker and Mr Parsons ; for in these the theology of the new orthodoxy stood revealed. Dr Rashdall spoke as a philosopher, and in his letters to the newspapers, repudiating the opinions ascribed to him, he markedly declared himself to be entirely out of sympathy with those of Dr Lake. As a matter of fact, the publicists judged rightly that his conclusions were as extreme as any to be found in Lake's published works.

He rightly recognises that the centre of the whole controversy as to the purpose and work of Jesus on earth is the relation of His human to His divine nature, the problem which distracted the Church in the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries. The first to raise the question was Apollinarius, a great opponent of Arianism at the end of the fourth century, who declared that in the Incarnation the Logos supplied the place of the human soul in the body of Jesus. In this he followed the early Greek fathers who were satisfied to maintain the reality of the flesh of the Word made man,

without trying to explain how the Incarnate Lord could be true man if He were no more than one in human form but entirely divine in all other respects. This view, however, though condemned in words, was really held by most of the fathers—including, according to Dr Rashdall, Athanasius; and when Nestorius seriously attempted to refute the heresy his protest caused a storm of indignation throughout the Christian world. Finally, a compromise was agreed upon. Jesus suffered as man, and performed wonders as God; He had a human soul and will: in the words of the Athanasian Creed, He was “perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting.” The controversy wore itself out; but Dr Rashdall is right in saying that “orthodoxy” for the most part was really Apollinarian. That is to say, Christ manifest in the flesh was God upon earth; that though it was admitted that He had exhibited human affections, He was still Omnipotent, and Omniscient, the Ruler and Creator of the Universe; that every word He spoke—and that means every utterance of His recorded in the four Gospels—was infallible truth. Further, that He brought to us atonement to God, was the only hope of fallen humanity, the only Saviour who could deliver us from the wrath to come. That He was Man as well as God was clearly taught by Scripture and by the Church; but to ordinary piety the Manhood was much the same as the drop of vinegar, to which some of the fathers compared it, in the infinite ocean of Divinity.

Dr Rashdall sets himself the task of proving that the reality of the Manhood of Jesus is compatible with a doctrine of His Divinity.

He lays down several propositions: (1) that Jesus did not claim Divinity; (2) He had a human soul, intellect, will; (3) that His human soul had no pre-existence, that which pre-existed was the Logos; (4) the Divinity of Christ does not imply omniscience; (5) that “divine” and “human” are not mutually exclusive terms: all men are partakers of the divine nature.

The conclusion to all this must be given in Dr Rashdall’s own words:—

“If we once recognise that it is especially in the moral consciousness at its highest, and in the lives which are most completely dominated by such a moral consciousness, that God is revealed, then it becomes possible to accept the doctrine that in a single human life God is revealed more completely than in any other. If we

believe that every human soul reveals, reproduces, incarnates God *to some extent*; if we believe that in the great ethical teachers of mankind, the great religious personalities, the founders, the reformers of religions, the heroes, the prophets, the saints, God is more fully revealed than in other men; if we believe that up to the coming of Christ there had been a gradual, continuous, and on the whole progressive relation of God (especially, though by no means exclusively, in the development of Jewish Monotheism), then it becomes possible to believe that in one Man the self-revelation of God has been signal, supreme, unique. That we are justified in thinking of God as like Christ, that the character and teaching of Christ contains the fullest disclosure both of the character of God Himself and of His will for man—that is (so far as so momentous a truth can be summed up in a few words) the true meaning for us of the doctrine of Christ's Divinity."

This may be good philosophy, but can it be called historical Christianity? Jesus is portrayed as an unique teacher and revealer of God and the supreme moralist, but did the Church so present Him? The unbroken tradition is that he was God in Man, saving those who accepted His proffered salvation. Primitive Christianity, in its earliest form, was perhaps little interested in the question of His pre-existence, but by the time of the Fourth Gospel it was accepted as the logical conclusion of His declaration, "Before Abraham was, I am." The Incarnation then came to be regarded as a voluntary act on His part, as is expressed in the *Te Deum*: *Tu in liberandum suscepturus hominem non horruisti Virginis uterum*.

Dr Rashdall attempts to explain the doctrine by accepting the Pauline trichotomy of human nature as partaken of by Christ as body, soul, and spirit. The human soul of Jesus had no pre-existence any more than His flesh. The Spirit, which is the Divine Logos, existed from all eternity. But the Logos is impersonal and cannot be distinguished from the Father. Once more to quote the actual words:—

"There remained, indeed, the problem of the relation between this 'Word' which was God and yet incarnate in the human Jesus, and the Father-God, whose only-begotten Son He was. Was this Word personal or impersonal? If personal, how can we escape Polytheism? And if the Logos be identified with the one God, what becomes of the distinction between Father and Logos?"

Jesus, then, was a man, distinguished from all other before or since by His unique knowledge of the Father, His spiritual insight, and His perfect moral purity. His pre-eminence was due to the fact that He more than any other man partook of the Divine Logos. How does Dr Rashdall know this? Mainly through the synoptic presentation of Jesus—for he rejects the Fourth Gospel,—and this knowledge can only be verified by a searching investigation into what is authentic information as to the historic Jesus.

In fact this philosophy is more disappointing than the old system which it endeavours to displace. The work of the ancient councils is at least logical, and has a definite basis—the Scriptures of the Church, acknowledged to be a divine revelation. But instead of this position towards the Bible the Anglican Modernist takes refuge in the results of a criticism which stops short when it seems to lead to dangerous conclusions. The result, however, judged by Dr Rashdall's paper, is to retain the Divinity of Christ and to divest it of any meaning, and to give a decidedly Unitarian explanation of the Incarnation. Professor Bethune Baker is terser and franker when he says, "When I say that the man Jesus is God, I mean that He is for me the index of my conception of God."

The difficulty in which the modern Liberal school finds itself is that of constructing a new system which will appear like the old, whilst fundamentally different. Its disciples want to substitute *Jesuanity* for Christianity, and to induce themselves and the world to believe that no material change has been made. Christianity, to most who accepted it, was essentially a supernatural faith. Its Founder had commended Himself by the wonders that He wrought, and had been declared to be the Son of God with power by His rising from the dead. His Name became a saving power. To believe in Him was to escape death. His sacraments bestowed on His followers a new life. By what stages His followers developed a theory as to His relation to God, it is here unnecessary to explain: suffice it to say that within a century of His death He was acknowledged as the Son in a unique sense. From the first He was the Saviour of those who believed on Him, and has continued so to them, whether Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant. That is Christianity.

The modern man came with his growing scepticism as to the supernatural, the miraculous. He sought to eliminate these elements and to place his belief on the basis not of wonder but of reason. Impatient of the divisions among Christians on what appeared trivial and unimportant matters,

he desired the fundamental truths of Christianity to be put in the plainest and least controversial form. Hence arose rationalism and the deism expressed in the title of the book *Christianity not Mysterious*. Science contributed to the desire for a religion which did not demand a belief in the incredible; and finally the criticism, first of the Old, and secondly of the New Testament shook the very foundations of the older belief. Modernism in England has tried to satisfy all these demands. It has presented a non-miraculous, non-mysterious, easily understood, non-sectarian, and popular religion. The only question is whether this is Christianity. At the head is placed the human Jesus of history, a gifted teacher of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, and, to quote Dr Barnes, one "gifted with rare psychical strength. His power to cure disease was remarkable." This Jesus is credited with being accurately reported as regards His words and many of His acts by the Synoptists, and, when convenient to His admirers, by St John. He is credited with much which He never so much as hinted at—as, for example, to quote the sermon to the Conference, that "The kingdom of God is a social ideal." His death was a supreme example of self-sacrifice to hasten the kingdom; nor is His resurrection denied; but as no important doctrines are deduced from them, as He is presented as a Teacher rather than a Saviour, these events lose the significance they possessed for old-fashioned Christians. But even then, so wonderful is the portrait of Jesus preserved in Christian tradition, that it is possible to construct an ideal in Jesus of all that man should be. Yet this worship of the ideal man is not Christianity, which is the acceptance of salvation through Christ alone; nor is the figure that of the Jesus of history. As Schweitzer pointed out, the real Jesus Christ is far too mysterious to be accounted for by the methods of modern Liberalism, and the story of the development and widespread influence of the religion which bears His name is far more complex than that of the arresting personality of a remarkable character upon His immediate disciples.

The short speech of Professor Burkitt at the Conference really contributed more to the solution of the question than did any of the carefully elaborated papers. In a few words he indicated the results of his study of St Francis of Assisi, and showed clearly that the intense adoration which he received after his death was far less due to the beauty of his life than to the belief that as the end drew near he had miraculously received the *stigmata* or marks of his crucified Master on his hands, feet, and side. It was the same with

Jesus : not the rational appreciation of Him as a teacher and moralist, but the wonder which His miracles, and, above all, His resurrection, inspired, made Him the Lord of millions who hoped for salvation through His sacrifice and triumph over the grave—though in both instances the character of the person on whom the miracles were wrought must be taken into account,

And so it is, the Professor pointed out, with all that stirs man's religious feelings. There must necessarily be a miraculous element—understanding by miracle, not the old view that it is a reversal of the known laws of nature, but that it inspires wonder or marvel at something we are unable to account for. The wonder may be at the mystery of nature or of the universe ; it may be the admiration of the power which restores health and even life ; it may be moved by the contemplation of God working in the world or in the human heart, or by the grace felt to be gained by some religious rite ; it may be manifested in the sudden change wrought in a man by strong religious emotion, which, in some way, changes the whole motive of his life. But whether in the universe, or in healing, or in sacraments, or in conversion, there must be this element of wonder to promote that reverence for some power, outside ourselves and incomprehensible to us.

Modernist Churchmanship in England fails in two respects. It is too rational and also too unscientific. In its desire to save Protestantism it has protested against the catholicism in the Anglican community, whilst its anxiety for the future of the Church has made its leaders repudiate those who are determined to follow criticism to the full. It will have to choose one side or the other, for the fence on which it is now sitting is giving way.

The Anglo-Catholic party was never so strong as it is to-day. In its ritual, constantly adopting forms of devotion hitherto avoided by the most advanced in Churchmanship, it has recognised the need for the element of wonder necessary to religion. The priest is becoming more and more sacrosanct, a man standing between heaven and earth, with powers of binding and loosing ; in the churches everything is done to increase the elements of awe and worship : the Mass is invested with all the pomp which impresses the miracle of the Presence upon the devout ; the modern Roman rite of Benediction is a constant reminder of the sacramental nearness of the Redeemer ; the Communion of Saints is emphasised by their renewed cultus. It is hardly too much to say that, but for the worldly and interested policy of

the Vatican, there would be a rush to Rome. The weak spot in this movement is a tendency to intolerant exclusiveness and to keep its followers in such tutelage that freedom of thought is hampered and real progress becomes impossible. This is manifest wherever the Catholic priest exercises the power he desires to possess. In a certain sense he shields his people from actual sin, but at the expense of their intellectual and even of their moral growth. On the other hand, Catholicism is strong in its appeal to the religious emotions and in the authoritative way in which its doctrines are advanced. Granted the principles of Catholic dogma, it is difficult to deny its conclusions. It is much the same with Protestant orthodoxy, which, however, is daily losing ground, whilst Catholicism is on the whole advancing.

Opposed to this tendency is a very small body of theologians in England prepared to sift the matter to the bottom. Few in number, they are regarded as almost negligible; but, however few they may be as individuals, their method is sound; for they are following in the steps of scholars whose views, rejected with scorn in their lifetime, have been calmly appropriated by the best accredited teachers of succeeding generations. At the present time these are regarded with less disfavour by the Catholic than by the Liberal wing of the Church, the reason being that *fas est ab hoste doceri* is possible to those whose dogmatic defences are strong, but not so to those who practically possess none.

To counteract these two widely opposite views the modern Churchman has set up a figure of which the Catholic says, "This is not the Christ I worship"; and the critic, "This is not the Jesus of history." Its position at present has all the disadvantages of a middle party in a cause where compromise seems well-nigh impossible.

The extracts which have been made from the report of the Conference are an indication of the excellence of the papers, and prove that the Churchman's Union includes some of the most thoughtful men and women in the Anglican community; for there is not a single paper from which some striking passage could not have been culled if the object had been solely to demonstrate the intellectual strength of the Liberal party. It is but just to say that most of its prominent members are marked by the authorities as dangerous, despite the fact that the present writer is inclined to deplore their caution in regard to biblical and historical criticism.

And this raises the question how far reunion is possible, or even desirable, if scholarly modernism is to be ignored? A Harvard professor once wisely remarked that the differ-

ences in Christendom were now rather horizontal than perpendicular. He meant that we consider the Churches to be as rocks divided from one another by precipices. On each height the leaders stand, wishing that the chasms might be filled in, and all might be united on one mountain. But the fact is that the more serious fissures are beneath their feet. Each height is divided into orthodox, moderate, and ultra-critical strata, which those on the summits are careful to ignore. They assume an essential unity on fundamental truths, which may have existed sixty years ago, but has long disappeared. Organised Christianity shows a growing tendency to discourage thinkers and students, and to exalt the claims of less inconvenient Christians who will carry on the business of the Churches, and dull their minds by restless activity. But unity can only come when men are agreed that the supreme object of theology is the search for God, who is truth. When this is realised, it will again become "The Queen of the Sciences."

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MODERN CHURCHMEN OR UNITARIANS ?

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THE conference of Modern Churchmen at Cambridge in August last has aroused general interest in the religious world and no little misunderstanding. As a result, Modern Churchmen have been accused of holding views ranging from Buddhism to Unitarianism. To meet all the charges is neither possible nor desirable. Some may be curtly dismissed with the words of Lightfoot : "to reply to them is to give them a significance which of themselves they do not possess." The charge of Unitarianism stands on a different footing. It is a serious one, and demands serious attention. A well-known Unitarian layman recently wrote of the principal speakers at the Cambridge conference that he could not see where their position differed from his own ; yet added, "there must be an important difference, or they would not be where they are and I should not be where I am." The intention of this article is to make this difference clear : in short, to explain why Modern Churchmen are members of the Church of England, and why they intend to remain so.

I do not doubt that a number of Unitarians believe that Modern Churchmen ought, on moral grounds, to secede from the English Church and join the Unitarian body, and can only regard their unwillingness to do so as being due to the warm attraction of life-long religious and social associations and the pain which the

"Animula, vagula, blandula,
Hospes, comesque corporis,"

has in parting from the body in which it has dwelt so comfortably. Others may take a harsher view and condemn them as those, who, while claiming to be truth-seekers, yet,

for the sake of the truth, will not sacrifice posts of considerable emolument and dignity. Others, again, while professing themselves unable fully to understand the Modern Churchman's position, would regard harsh judgment as an eminently unchristian act.

Obviously it is time that the Modern Churchman explained himself. In my effort to offer this explanation I write not as an official representative but as a typical Modern Churchman.

Without wishing in the least to confuse the issues, I have to confess at the outset that I have some difficulty in being quite sure what Unitarianism is or what it stands for precisely outside its great affirmation, "Theology and Piety alike free."¹ Some will add that Unitarianism also stands for the great affirmation, "God is One." This, however, is not sufficiently distinctive. The English, Greek, and Roman Churches make the same affirmation when they recite the Nicene Creed: "I believe in one God." Others will affirm that what distinguishes the Unitarian from his fellow-Christian is that he denies the doctrine of the Trinity. To-day, however, this denial is not a safe criterion. Dr Stanley Mellor, one of the most influential of Unitarian ministers, in his Presidential Address to the Provincial Assembly of Lancashire and Cheshire, in 1920, plainly indicated this. He said:—

"We must cease to confound ourselves and confuse others by a wrong use of words; we must abjure the tendency to narrow our life's principle to the confines of a disputed sectarian name, and a yet more disputable theology. Some amongst us may be Unitarians: others very decidedly are not Unitarians—but Unitarianism, a form of belief which is honourable in itself, and yet more honourable because of the noble minds that have held it, is *not* the basis of our fellowship, or the breath of our life. Our soul and being's aim is freedom."²

This statement by Dr Mellor is no novelty in Unitarianism.³ As far back as 1871, Curteis, in his Bampton Lectures, cites Dr Beard as saying: "regarding the person of Christ, various

¹ The motto of Manchester College, Oxford, and one which, unlike many mottoes, is most nobly adhered to.

² *Inquirer*, August 14 and 21, 1920.

³ James Martineau said, in an address at the Leeds Conference in 1888, "If anyone, being a Unitarian, shrinks on fitting occasion from calling himself so, he is a sneak and a coward. If, being of our Catholic communion, he calls its chapel or its congregation Unitarian, he is a traitor to his spiritual ancestry and a deserter to the camp of its persecutors."

opinions are held by Unitarians . . . ranging from the high Arianism of Milton to the simple Humanitarianism of Belsham, corresponding alike to the pre-existent Logos of John and 'the man approved of God' of Luke. There are other Unitarians who decline speculating on the point."¹

The explanation of this was given to me some fifteen years ago by that cultured scholar W. E. Addis, who, though in full communion with the Church of England, was then Professor of Old Testament at Manchester College, Oxford. His explanation came to this: the Unitarians are not a static body: they are in process of evolution: to a greater extent than larger and less mentally alert bodies of Christians they are open to the manifold influences of modern science, sociology, and psychology. But some are more progressive, others less so. Hence they may be roughly divided into two schools, which might, although not with perfect accuracy, be denominated traditional Unitarians and modern Unitarians. The traditional Unitarians are of the Deistic type: they draw a sharp distinction between the transcendent God and His creature man; they deny the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation; declare God to be the only proper object of worship, and condemn as idolatrous the worship of Jesus, whom they regard as merely human. The modern Unitarians, of whom the revered James Drummond was a notable example, are Theists and not Deists. Moreover, unlike the traditional Unitarians, who would affirm that the Divine "substance" and the human "substance" are different, that Man is essentially human and God essentially divine, the modern Unitarians would affirm that Deity and humanity are of the same "substance."

It would be quite possible, therefore, to find a number of parallels between the papers read at the Modern Churchmen's conference and the utterances of modern Unitarians.² This

¹ *Bampton Lectures*, 1871, 4th ed. (1878), p. 312.

² As an example of such parallelism, I give some extracts from Dr James Drummond's *The Way of Life* (vol. ii.):

"That Jesus is the Son of God has been cheerfully conceded or zealously maintained by his disciples; but the counterpart of this truth, that Man is the Son of God, and that the Divine relationship, which has been so clearly revealed in Christ, exists potentially in all, has not been so readily admitted. . . ."

"Examining now more nearly the idea of sonship, we may observe that it implies a spiritual likeness to God. The perfect Son is the express image of the Father; those who are less richly endowed with 'the spirit of adoption' more distantly reflect His glory. . . ."

"God stands to us in the same relation as we bear to little children,

parallelism is not due to the direct influence of Unitarianism on Modern Churchmen, but to both having been influenced by modern philosophy and modern criticism. Modern Churchmen and modern Unitarians have both moved from traditional positions in the direction of a higher synthesis.

But for all this, there still remain serious differences of view and of temperament between them.

First, there is a serious difference in their attitude towards dogma. The Modern Churchman's attitude towards dogma was admirably stated by the late Auguste Sabatier in a lecture on the vitality of Christian dogmas and their power of evolution. He said that the ever-present, but not self-imposed, task of all Christian thinkers consisted in the application of criticism to the ancient dogmas in order to disengage their vital principle, and prepare for this vital principle a new expression. By this means the evolution of dogma is achieved. The purpose of these thinkers is not to destroy dogmas, but to set free their living principle from the decaying form in which it is enclosed and to prepare for it new forms in harmony with modern culture.

"The forms of dogma begin to grow old from the day they are consecrated by general consent. . . . The Church lives on and continues her experiences through the ages, while the dogmatic formula, from the day when it is adopted, remains stationary. A sort of rupture, a sort of disagreement more or less open, is produced almost immediately between this stationary formula and the conscience of the advancing Church. Who is to restore the equilibrium and create harmony? Who is to settle the terms of conciliation and make the transition between yesterday and to-day? Who is to knit together the chain which links the generations and the centuries and to keep the dogma supple and malleable by bathing it constantly in the warmth of Church life? Who is to make peace in the communities . . . by enlightening them? Must not this be done by the teaching of dogmatics so far as this teaching answers to its ideal?"¹

from whom we may be definitely removed in intelligence and goodness, but who nevertheless have an intelligence and goodness essentially the same as ours. . . ."

"No limit can be set to our growth in the Divine image; for the soul seems capable of indefinite expansion. . . ."—Chap. ii., on "Man, the Son of God."

¹ *The Vitality of Christian Dogma*, by Auguste Sabatier (A. & C. Black, 1898), pp. 82 f.

A thoughtful attempt to realise this ideal is seen in Professor A. V. G. Allen's really great lectures on "The Continuity of Christian Thought." One aspect of the spirit which prompts it is expressed with lyric fervour by that prophetic poet (or should it not be poetic prophet?) Arthur Hugh Clough : ¹

" ' Old things need not be therefore true,
O brother man, nor yet the new ;
Ah ! still awhile the old retain,
And yet consider it again !

The souls of now two thousand years
Have laid up here their toils and fears,
And all the earnings of their pain,
Ah ! yet consider it again ! "

The Modern Churchman, then, has no desire to destroy or dissolve the great dogmas of the Christian Faith. He is convinced that they contain inestimable spiritual values. He is convinced also that the Christian Church cannot enjoy fullness of life without them. But he is equally sure that the Church cannot do with them in the form in which it has inherited them from a distant past. They need criticism and reformulation, and he knows there can be no finality in the process. "All truths are but shadows save the last." In consequence, the Modern Churchman's position is not an easy one. He is attacked on the one side by the religious revolutionary who would reject and destroy the ancient Christian dogmas, and on the other side by the traditionalist who would keep the dogmas in their present form, and accuses the Modern Churchman of being a traitor and an infidel when he criticises them and tries to reformulate them.

It is quite true that there is much discussion amongst Modern Churchmen about the retention and interpretation of the Creeds at present in use. But the question at issue among them is not, Creeds or No Creeds ? but, New Creeds or the Old Creeds ? or, New Creeds or the Old Creeds with New Interpretations ? and also, What is the proper use of Creeds ? Should they be used devotionally or as dogmatic tests ? The Modern Churchman demands not the abolition of dogma, but its reformulation or reinterpretation.

Here we conceive he differs strongly even from the modern Unitarians, whose attitude towards dogma, combined with the solvent powers of a destructive criticism, has led them to reject certain historic Christian dogmas which the Modern

¹ Clough resigned his Fellowship at Oriel College, Oxford, for conscience' sake.

Churchman is convinced the Church ought to teach if she would not suffer a most serious loss of vitality and vigour.

One of the most important of these is the dogma of the Incarnation. Although we acknowledge that the Incarnation is held in various degrees and forms among Unitarians, yet I think I am not wrong in saying that in many cases they undervalue the Incarnation, and in other cases do actually deny it. Modern Churchmen may not have a doctrine of the Incarnation which satisfies traditionalists, and they may not have a doctrine of the Incarnation which satisfies rationalists, but they do hold the essence of the doctrine of the Incarnation as expressed in the Pauline phrase: "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." They are convinced that to part with that great affirmation would be to deprive the Church of an article of the Faith second only in importance to the dogma of the Fatherhood of God, and one without which the Fatherhood of God becomes liable to Pantheistic dissipation or Deistic petrification. Hence the Modern Churchman feels that the Unitarian valuation of Christ is one which, if adopted by Christians generally, would enormously lower the vitality and saving power of the Church. Historically, the Christian Church is built on Jesus Christ. Some Unitarians would build it on the Fatherhood of God alone. The Modern Churchman would insist that this basis is not sufficient. Whenever and wherever the Christian Church has made little of Jesus Christ, it has failed as a saving power. Whenever and wherever the Christian Church has made much of Him, it has been vital and vigorous. Dr Mellor, in the address quoted above, urges it as a Unitarian desideratum: "We must regain our central loyalty to Jesus Christ." The motto of a progressive and vital Christianity must be "Jesus is Lord."

That affirmation in its fullest and highest form is expressed dogmatically in the statement that in the historic Jesus the Christian beholds Deity under the limitations of humanity. That affirmation, like the belief in the Fatherhood of God, is supra-rational. It is an affirmation of faith: its proof lies beyond reason. But it is an affirmation which must be accepted by the Christian reason as well as by the Christian conscience, for it is indispensable to a Church which is destined to embrace humanity. The declaration that "Jesus is God" is inadequate and ambiguous, as Mr Edwyn Bevan has acutely pointed out in a recent essay:¹ the declaration that "Jesus is a God" is heretical and futile. Some years ago, reading a notice set up at the entrance of a Coptic Church in Cairo—

¹ *Hellenism and Christianity* (Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 270.

"Give us money for the sake of our God Jesus,"—I remember saying to myself, "No wonder these Christians are absolutely incapable of converting Muhammadans to the Christian Faith." But I am equally sure that the declaration "Jesus is Man" or "Jesus is the Man" is equally inadequate. Historically no victorious form of Christianity has conquered with that declaration alone. It is the conviction that Unitarianism has failed just in so far as it has shrunk from presenting Jesus Christ as God and Man which makes Modern Churchmen feel the inadequacy of Unitarianism.

Again, in the eyes of the Modern Churchman, the dogma of the Trinity is too lightly dismissed by the Unitarians. The Modern Churchman, whilst he feels the objections to the traditional form of that doctrine, and the ludicrous, not to say devastating, misunderstandings to which it is exposed, yet regards it as the best doctrine of God in existence. It contains and retains spiritual, moral, and even metaphysical values which Buddhistic Pantheism, Islamic Deism, and Unitarian Theism do not possess. The doctrine of a Divine Being transcendent, immanent, incarnate, the God of nature, the God of history, the God of the rational, moral, and spiritual consciousness in man, is preserved in a practical and popular form by its means. Certainly, there is need that its antiquated and ambiguous definitions should be developed and restated, but the Modern Churchman declines to part with it.¹ The doctrine of the Trinity in Unity is a good doctrine of God to live with and a good doctrine of God to live by. There are in it, as St Augustine said of Holy Scripture, "Pools wherein lambs may drink, and depths wherein elephants must swim." Its seemingly self-contradictory affirmations preserve a practical balance which other doctrines of God fail to secure. A careful study of the life of Frederick Denison Maurice, the true father of English Modernism, himself brought up in Unitarianism, brings out in striking fashion both the strength and the weakness of Unitarianism in this matter.²

¹ Such a restatement is thus summarised by Prof. E. Ménégoz in his *Étude sur le Dogme de la Trinité* (Paris, Librairie Fischbacher, 1898):

"Nous pouvons maintenant formuler notre notion de la Trinité; le Père, c'est le Dieu transcendant; le *Logos*, c'est le Dieu immanent dans l'humanité, se révélant dans l'histoire et manifesté dans sa plénitude en Jésus-Christ; le Saint-Esprit, c'est le Dieu interne, immanent en nous, rendant témoignage à notre esprit. Plus brièvement: le Père est le Dieu *transcendant*, le Fils est le Dieu immanent *objectif*, le Saint-Esprit est le Dieu immanent *subjectif*. Et ces trois ne sont qu'un" (p. 23).

² *Life and Letters of F. D. Maurice*, by his son (Macmillans). See especially his letter to D. J. Vaughan, vol. ii. p. 349 (1884).

There is another matter connected with dogma in which the Modern Churchman is not in agreement with the traditional Unitarian. This is the proper proof of dogma. Luther held that to produce an efficient theology three conditions were necessary: *tentatio, oratio, meditatio*—moral effort, prayer, reflection. And Anselm, a greater theologian than Luther, said "*Pectus facit theologum.*" The Modern Churchman feels that a dogma must satisfy a threefold test before it can be regarded as true. No dogma can be accepted which is irrational; neither can it be accepted if it outrages the moral consciousness; nor can it be accepted if it removes its holder from communion with God. This testing of dogma is a slow and difficult process. The supreme test of dogma is the test of the moral and spiritual character of those who hold it. Of dogmas as of trees, "by their fruits ye shall know them." However rational a dogma might seem to be which in practice made Christians sullen and exclusive, however rational a dogma might seem to be which deprived them of faith and hope in God and communion with God, the Modern Churchman could only regard it as either untrue or wrongly formulated.

The traditional Unitarian, like the traditional Churchman, seems to the Modern Churchman to be too intellectualist or rationalist in his conception of the proper proof of dogma. But here, as in other matters, the modern Unitarian and the Modern Churchman are drawing together.

Here I ought perhaps to enter a caveat. The Modern Churchman in this matter would not vilify reason, nor would he side with those traditional Churchmen who seem to think that an alleged historical fact can be proved to be an historical fact by appealing to the evident comfort or even moral strength which it gives to those who believe it to be historical. An alleged historical fact can only be proved to be a fact by its proper historical evidence. Nevertheless, it may contain, though purely mythological, certain moral or spiritual values which ought to be retained in the Christian Faith; and it is the duty of the theologian to discover how this can be done; but he will only achieve this if, in addition to the rational test of the truth of dogma, he has also a moral and spiritual test.

There is another matter in which Unitarians and Modern Churchmen differ. It is in their liturgical ideals. No reader of *The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford*, with its account of Unitarian worship in the smaller centres, can feel attracted by its unemotional and unæsthetic Puritanism. But here again the modern Unitarians have made great strides in the larger centres, and dullness, coldness, and ugliness are being

eliminated from their public worship. But this is not all. The Modern Churchman could not feel at home in an assembly for Divine worship from which the worship of Jesus is definitely excluded. There seems to be subconsciously present in such worship the chilling influence of a great negation. The worship of Christ goes back to Stephen the proto-martyr, who dies with the prayer on his lips, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Moreover, in that most triumphant of Christian writings, the Apocalypse of John, the redeemed, although they worship neither saints nor angels, yet unite in adoration and in offering thanksgiving and blessing and honour and power to Him that sitteth upon the throne and unto the Lamb. Such worship seems to the Modern Churchman the best form for the affirmation of the belief in the doctrine of the Incarnation to take. The language of devotion, as in the *Te Deum*, or *Gloria in excelsis*, is superior in every way to the language of dogma, and, as Tyrrell emphatically urged, *lex orandi* is *lex credendi*. Moreover, it was by Christ-worship that the great James Martineau saw "a way out of the Trinitarian Controversy." It is worth while to give an outline of his argument :

"To understand the Father of the early Church," he says, you must go back "till you reach a primeval solitude. Not mere vacancy do you find there, but a poised and brooding cloud. To this dormant potency, that is but does not breathe, theologians gave the name of Father." The Father, "contemplated in Himself, presents only a bare immensity—a dark blank of possibility,—the occult potency of all perfection, but itself realises none." The Father, he affirms, is absent from the Unitarian creed. Unitarians, he contends, really worship the Son, though they call on Him as the Father. Examine (he would say to the Unitarians) "what you mean when you speak of God : what are the attributes, what the acts, that mark Him to our mind ? Creative thought, guiding Providence, redeeming grace . . . they are the distinctive characteristics of *the second*, not of the first personality. Everything that you can say to convey a just conception of your God—that He spread the heavens—that He guards Israel—that He dwelt in the human Christ—that He rules the unsuspecting world, and abides with the conscious heart of the Church—*all* you will discover registered among the characteristics of the Son."¹

¹ This summary is taken from the article "Who is the Christian Deity ?" by James Collier in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, 1907, p. 836.

Again, Modern Churchmen differ from traditional Unitarians in their view of sacraments. For the Unitarian sacraments seem to be bare symbols: for the Modern Churchman, they are effective symbols (*signa efficacia*). They help, in proper conditions, to achieve for the devout and faithful recipient what they symbolise to him. The old Broad Churchman's view of sacraments was much like that of the Unitarians, but the Modern Churchman, who is influenced by the teaching of psychology, although he does not take an *ex opere operato* view of the sacraments, is yet a strong believer in their power to assist the moral and spiritual life.

But this difference of view between traditional Unitarians and Modern Churchmen as to sacraments is but an aspect of the greater difference in their attitude to the Church. The attitude at least of the older Unitarians was Protestant, individualistic, sectarian. Doubtless, it was the bitter experience of persecution and intolerance which Unitarians endured at the hands of their fellow-Christians, rather than their own personal predilections, which was the cause of their sectarianism. It is no easy matter to love a Church which regards you with abhorrence because you love truth more than you love her.

But there is truth in the saying *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. It is as true for the Doctor of Theology as for the humble believer. The following statement by Auguste Sabatier will make this clear. In a lecture delivered to theological students and teachers he points out that there are two conditions needful in the case of the theologian who would serve the Church:—

- (1) He must belong to his age;
- (2) He must belong to his Church;

and for this reason: it is in his own soul that the religious principle of the Church and the philosophical thought of the age must meet and be united before they can generate a formula for the Church's faith. Hence the theologian must live the life of the Church because the dogmatic transformation in which he is collaborating cannot be accomplished from without or by a foreign or hostile power.¹

The Modern Churchman has the deepest admiration for the Unitarian's courageous love of truth and the magnificent fight which he has made for intellectual freedom in the study and teaching of the Christian religion. He desires for himself the same courageous truthfulness and for the Church the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

same measure of intellectual freedom, but he knows that to leave the Church is the way to defeat his aim. Everyone within the Church of England who is opposed to intellectual freedom is urging the Modern Churchman to secede, or demanding his expulsion. But, as it is not intellectual freedom generally for which he is contending, but intellectual freedom within the Church of England, the Modern Churchman must himself remain within the Church of England and serve her with love and loyalty if he is to gain for her that intellectual freedom. And in doing this he does not feel that he is doing anything subversive or revolutionary. He is but reminding the Church of one of those fundamental principles, innate in her very being, for which she must stand because she claims to be Christian, and for which some of her noblest sons have stood and suffered.

Moreover, to-day, in the face of a world dominated by materialism and passing into agnosticism, the crying need is for Christian unity. We need the Catholic Church, but we need that it should be organised in such a way that it can become Catholic. To-day it is but a feeble congeries of sects, an ineffective aggregate of associations. The Modern Churchman feels that Unitarianism on the institutional side cannot command the future : it is not sufficiently comprehensive and many-sided. In the modern world it represents a certain Christian intellectual aristocracy, just as the Quakers represent a certain Christian mystical aristocracy. Both bodies ought, with their magnificent witness, on the one hand to the need for intellectual freedom in religion, and, on the other hand, to the need for spirituality in religion, to find an honoured place within the Catholic Church of the future, and, as a first step, I hope within a reformed and rejuvenated Church of England. But much as the Modern Churchman honours both bodies, it will be plain that he cannot leave the Church of England to join them. Such a step would be fatal to his ideal of a great, united, free, spiritual, historic, many-sided, Catholic Church.

The method he has adopted to promote his ideal may seem unduly cautious to the Unitarian. If the Modern Churchman is cautious, it is not for personal reasons. As a student of history, he has two warnings before his eyes. They are contained in the history of sixteenth-century Protestantism and of present-day Roman Catholic Modernism. The Protestant Reformation, with the cry of "Freedom" on its lips, passed from the tyranny of Roman dogmatism to the tyranny of Protestant dogmatism : abhorring the idolatry of the Mass, it substituted the idolatry of the Bible : it exchanged the

Right Divine of popes to govern wrong for the Right Divine of kings to do the same : it taught implicitly the duty of schism if the doctrine and practice of the dominant party in the Church did not commend themselves to the minority. It split Christendom and weakened it, and it failed very largely to reform it. The Continental Modernist movement, with the cry of " Truth " on its lips, has passed with extraordinary rapidity from criticism to scepticism, and from membership in the Roman Church to a position in which it is outside every Christian Communion. We do not sit in judgment on either Protestants or Continental Modernists, but they warn our reforming movement against the dangers of sectarianism and scepticism.

Mrs Humphry Ward, in her two books *Robert Elsmere* and *Richard Meynell*, presents the student of Anglican Modernism with the story of the two methods. In the former she favoured the policy of going out ; in the latter she favoured the policy of staying in. Her verdict runs thus :

" The first Modernist bishop who stays in his place, forms a Modernist chapter and diocese around him, and fights the fight where he stands, will do more for liberty and faith in the Church, I now sadly believe, than those scores of ' brave forgotten dead ' who have gone out of her for conscience' sake."

With this verdict Modern Churchmen agree.

HENRY D. A. MAJOR.

OXFORD.

THE MODERN MOVEMENT IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

PHILIP H. BAGENAL.

A CURIOUS recrudescence of religious passion and panic and a complete want of balance swept over the British press during the autumn of last year which is worth noting as a sign of the times. The occasion of this very unprofitable seizure was the Cambridge Conference of Modern Churchmen in August, which was organised by a society called the Churchmen's Union for the Advancement of Liberal Religious Thought. Probably a very large number of newspaper readers had never heard of the Union before, although it was founded in 1898, and its existence was probably better known to Bishops and theologians than to the ordinary man in the street. But when daily and evening papers suddenly exclaim in headlines of alarming intensity that bombs are being thrown at Christianity (in the holiday times too), and the pulpits of the Church of England reverberate the dreadful news, it may be useful to get at some facts antecedent to this journalistic explosion of wrath against a religious society and a theological school of thought.

The Churchmen's Union is, of course, the lineal descendant of the old Broad Church movement with which the names of Frederick Denison Maurice, Charles Kingsley, and Dean Stanley are still so vividly connected. They in their turn had followed the traditions of such men as Whately, Hampden, Thirlwall, Colenso in the earlier part of the Victorian era.

But before the Churchmen's Union came to birth in 1898 there had been in existence for fifty years a private society known as the C.C.C. colloquially, otherwise the Curates' Clerical Club, which still survives. It was a discussion club to which most of the Broad Churchmen in this country at that time belonged, and of which, in its early days, Maurice, Kingsley, and Stanley had been members. The existence of

the C.C.C. was no doubt, if not the sole, at least the most significant body then existing whose concern was with theological liberalism. What then was the theological background of the end of the last century just before the founding of the C.U.? The long controversy between science and religion consequent on Darwin's *Origin of Species* was dying down, and was being succeeded by the current conflict between history and religion. The new method of historical criticism and its application to Christian doctrine therefore was in full career thirty years before Dean Rashdall's paper was read in the conference hall at Girton College. And yet its significance had never occurred before to the journalists of the twentieth century, who no doubt look down with contempt on the Victorian Age. They had even forgotten Dr Gore's outbreak of liberalism on inspiration in *Lux Mundi*. And yet the cleavage between Christian thinkers occasioned by such scientific discoveries as Darwinism was much less deep and disturbing than that of historical research and criticism with Anglo-Catholic orthodoxy. The old leaders of thought in the Church had given way during the interval between the sixties and the eighties to other teachers, such as Matthew Arnold, Sir John Seeley, Dr Hatch, Dr Sanday, and Dr Edwin Abbot. The effect of historical criticism was everywhere being felt. It was clear that restatement and reinterpretation of religious belief as against mediæval acceptance was recognised by the modern outlook. Who would take up so difficult, nay, dangerous, a task? Men looked round, and wished and wondered. The need was great. Many realised quite clearly the lack of organisation. Others saw that opportunities for the exchange of ideas and a nearer fellowship between the clergy and the laity were peremptorily required. Instances of clerical persecution pointed to the necessity of some form of Vigilance Committee to defend clergy attacked for liberal teaching and preaching. In fact, some organisation for the spread of views more in consonance with the assured results of critical and historical methods seemed an undeniable call of a new epoch in life and thought. Many suggestions were made to found an organisation, but the elder men were generally against it in principle. They said, like Dean Stanley, that Broad Churchmen were not a party, but a school of independent thought within the Church.

Almost to the end of the century men like Llewellyn Davies, Brooke Lambert, and Bradley Alford held that there was no essential unity amongst liberal Churchmen, and that a too pronounced divergence and independence of

standpoint would soon split any organisation. Moreover, the evils of partisanship were at the time so obvious in the war between Protestant and Anglo-Catholic organisations that men with wider views and sympathies were not willing to be harnessed to any too pronounced definition in spiritual matters. Clearly new men and new measures were required.

A chance circumstance favoured an attempt. This was the sudden appearance in 1898 of a weekly paper called the *Church Gazette*. It was owned and edited by the Rev. W. Routh, a clergyman of the Church of England. It advocated a liberal view of theology, freedom of criticism and research, a comprehensive National Church, and the rights of the laity to a responsible position in that Church.

Life and liberty, in fact. Here, at all events, was a raft to stand upon. The paper immediately opened its columns to the advocates of Broad Church views. A correspondence was set on foot by the Rev. H. C. Rosedale, vicar of St Peter's, Ladbroke Gardens, advocating a conference of those who held such views. This, after a preliminary meeting in Bradford in Congress week, accordingly came to pass on 28th July 1898 in London. The following resolutions were then passed :—

“1. That this meeting desires to express its sense of the necessity of taking steps in order to unite the body of Churchmen who consider that dogma is susceptible of reinterpretation and restatement in accordance with the clearer perception of truth attained by discovery and research.

“2. That in order to prevent the falling away of the thoughtful and educated from the Church, this meeting pledges itself to support an organisation which shall unite together all such Churchmen.

“3. That a provisional committee be appointed to meet and consider the best steps to be taken to give effect to the above resolutions.

“4. That the *Church Gazette* be the official organ.”

Unfortunately, the *Church Gazette* only survived a short time. Its courageous and self-sacrificing editor spent a considerable sum of money on the venture, but received insufficient support to enable him to continue it. But it was undoubtedly the mustard-seed of the Churchmen's Union.

No time was lost in putting these resolutions into action. Further meetings of the provisional committee laid the foundations of the Society,⁷ and drafted the aims and objects of the Society, which was then named and remains the Churchmen's Union for the Advancement of Liberal Religious Thought. The Society was formally inaugurated on 31st October 1898 at a successful meeting at the Church

House, Westminster. A year after, on 6th October 1899 (the eve of the Church Congress), the first annual meeting took place, by Dr Rosedale's invitation, at St Peter's parish-room, Bayswater. It was preceded by a celebration of Holy Communion, as it has been ever since on similar occasions.

It is an interesting coincidence that the same Churchman whose name has recently been so much in evidence before the public, viz. the Very Rev. Hastings Rashdall, Dean of Carlisle, should have preached the first annual sermon of the Society of which he is so distinguished an ornament and faithful adherent.

The first report of the Union, dated 6th October 1899, is memorable for its declaration of the aims and objects of the Society, which, with some expansion on the social side, remain to-day. They run as follows :—

“1. To defend and maintain the teaching of the Church of England as the historic Church of the country and as being Apostolic and Reformed.

“2. To uphold the historic comprehensiveness and corporate life of the Church of England and her Christian tolerance in all things non-essential.

“3. To give all the support in their power to those who are honestly and loyally endeavouring to vindicate the truths of Christianity by the light of scholarship and research, while paying due regard to continuity of work for such changes in the formularies and practices of the Church of England as from time to time are made necessary by the needs and knowledge of the day.

“4. To work for the restoration to the laity of an effective voice in all Church matters.

“5. To encourage friendly relations between the Church of England and all other Christian bodies.”

Thus the little ship was launched on the stormy waters of Church politics, without influence or wealth, with only the expressed goodwill of a few score of friends and supporters. But there was at the head a group of well-equipped scholars earnest and self-sacrificing in the pursuit of liberty of thought and expression, and confident that they were on the right path to secure truth and comprehensiveness in the Church of England. How would they fare?

From the very first the Society had received letters of encouragement from such broad-minded men as Dean Farrar, Dean Bradley, Dean Lefroy, Dean Fremantle, Dr Welldon, Archdeacons Sinclair, Madden, and Waugh, and other names that were well known in Church circles of all parties. But also it had become an object of suspicion,

fear, and dislike from both ritualists and evangelicals. The tactics of a conspiracy of silence were adopted, and when that failed to muzzle the movement there followed misrepresentation and a campaign of unworthy innuendo.

During the first ten years of the century members increased but slowly, and finance was a grave difficulty. The funds were always infinitesimal. It speaks much for the ideals and spirit of the movement that it lives and thrives to-day. Gradually the existence of the Society became known. Lord Avebury, Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff, Dr R. H. Charles (now Archdeacon), Professor H. E. T. Bevan, Professor R. K. Douglas, Dr E. A. Wallis Burge, and Professor Shuttleworth were amongst its early adherents. Prebendary Kitto placed St Martin's Hall at the disposal of the Union for its meetings and lectures. Amongst its preachers and lecturers, who were not necessarily members but sympathisers, were the following:—Professor Percy Gardner, D.Litt.; Rev. Dr J. K. Cheyne; Rev. Professor Bonney, F.R.S.; Rev. Canon Barnett, M.A.; Rev. Chancellor Lias; Rev. Canon Reith; Rev. Prebendary Grane; Rev. Dr Smyth Palmer; Rev. Canon M'Coll; Rev. A. L. Lilley (now Archdeacon); Rev. Canon Papillon; Right Hon. R. B. Haldane, K.C., M.P.; Rev. A. W. Hutton; Rev. A. J. Carlyle; Rev. Canon (now Bishop) Hensley Henson; the present Dean of St Paul's (Dr Inge); Rev. Dr Caldecott; Rev. Professor Driver; H. Bompas Smith, M.A., Headmaster of Queen Mary's School, Walsall; Rev. C. Shaw Stewart; Rev. Ronald Bayne, and many others. Rev. A. B. Boyd Carpenter, brother of the then Bishop of Ripon, always a friend of the Union, was one of the first chairmen of the Society. Having regard to the exigencies and material difficulties of the situation, the leaders of the movement recognised the necessity of relying mainly on the educational side of their propaganda. By lectures and the distribution of leaflets, drawing-room meetings and manifestoes in the Metropolis, the activities of the Union became known. By watching the various crises and emergencies which arose early in the century with increasing frequency, and then striking in with a manifesto or declaration of the Union's attitude on the questions of the day, the Union made its existence felt.

The first years of the century were an uphill struggle to keep the organisation afloat. During this period the presidents of the Union were successively Rev. Professor Henslow; Rev. Dr Morrison, now Rector of St Marylebone's Church; the late Sir C. Thomas Dyke Acland, formerly M.P. for many

years of a Cornwall constituency ; and then Professor Percy Gardner, the present lay-president, so well known in the fields of history, archæology, and divinity. For many years the Rev. W. Manning, M.A., rector of Chipping Barnet and rural dean, was secretary to the Union. Those who know the ups and downs, the spiritual despondency and the material difficulties of pioneers of opinions in England, can understand and admire the patience and persistent courage of the leaders of the movement under such troubles. To all outward appearances, with apparently a small and dispersed following, and certainly a slender exchequer, it seemed a forlorn hope. But behind the little vanguard there were thousands of men and women of education who had long been alienated by the excesses of ecclesiastical extravagances and religious bigotry and ignorance, and who saw in the Churchmen's Union a new star to which they could hitch their wagon and patiently wait for further developments which were shortly to arise.

The need of an organ in the press had always been apparent to the leaders of the Modern movement, but their attempts in that direction had been unfortunate. For a short time the *Church of England Pulpit* served as the organ of the Society, and the leaders met in its offices in Fleet Street. That arrangement did not last long.

In November 1904, however, another effort was made in this task of liberal theology by members of the Union, and a quarterly magazine called the *Liberal Churchman* was set on foot and ran until November 1908 under the able editorship of the Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Amongst its contributors were Canon Hensley Henson, now Bishop of Durham ; Rev. (now Dean) Rashdall ; Rev. W. R. (now Dean) Inge ; Professor Percy Gardner ; Professor Caldecott ; Rev. H. D. A. Major, and others. From the point of view of ability and literary presentation of the new school of theological thought the venture might very well challenge criticism, but a quarterly magazine did not meet the needs of the times, which demanded greater continuity and more regular emphasis. The returns could not justify the expenditure, and the publication was regretfully discontinued.

Two years afterwards, however, the *Modern Churchman*, "a magazine to maintain the cause of truth, freedom, and comprehensiveness in the Church of England," sprang into life. It was founded and is still edited by the Rev. H. D. A. Major, M.A., now Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford, a New Zealander by birth and a graduate of his native University as well as of Oxford, his later Alma Mater (Exeter College).

Since April 1911 the magazine has increased its circulation and influence year by year until it has reached an audience far beyond the members of the Churchmen's Union, whose official organ it at once became. Its courage and plain speaking united, inspired, and strengthened many who were almost inclined to despair of the National Church. What *Tracts for the Times* were for the High Church party in the Oxford movement, that the *Modern Churchman* has been for the Broad Church party to-day.

During 1903-4 the Church was much agitated by various doctrinal discussions in the periodicals. Canon Hensley Henson's contribution on "The Bible of the Future" raised a great hubbub for its plain speaking in favour of modern criticism. Dean Fremantle's utterances on the Virgin Birth at a meeting of the Churchmen's Union also came in for an onslaught. This particular subject produced an interesting episode.

One of the objects of the Society was to do what was possible to defend Church of England clergy and scholars in the right of freedom of thought and expression in religious opinion. In 1903 the case of the Rev. Mr Beeby, vicar of Yardley Wood, Worcester, became one of public interest. This gentleman had written an article in the HIBBERT JOURNAL on "Doctrinal Significance of the Miraculous Birth." The Bishop of Worcester (Dr Gore) took action at once and inhibited the writer. The Council of the Union published a protest against the Bishop's action in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for April 1904 disapproving of Dr Gore's methods.

The Council considered that it struck at the reasonable liberty of the scholarly clergy, and the question was accordingly raised at the next annual meeting of the Union. An animated discussion took place which is worth recording. Sir Edward Russell said, in moving the adoption of the Report, that the alternative of the Church lay between freedom of thought under episcopal sanction and encouragement, and the ideals of Lord Halifax and the English Church Union.

Canon Hensley Henson said he had been called a stone of offending or rock of offence. He was sorry to hear it, but a religious teacher was beyond all others under an obligation to be absolutely honest in thought and speech. He protested against men who endeavoured to do their duty being paraded as traitors and infidels. It was a very familiar method in the earliest stages of a controversy to create an atmosphere of prejudice and unreasoning opposition. That method, it seemed, was now being pursued in the Church of England by highly

placed individuals who were their protectors against waves of unreasoning prejudice, and by the clerical press almost without exception. There was a real danger lest a wave of obscurantism should be worked up which would do infinite harm to religion in England. Every English Churchman who cared for honesty, for liberty of thought, and for the future of Christianity in England should come forward and oppose this danger. The Canon is now a Bishop, and there is no reason to think he has gone back upon his views.

The Rev. Dr Rashdall also spoke very frankly on the same subject. He said that the holding of critical views compatible with essential Christianity should not exclude men from the Church of England, or from holding office within it. He could hardly trust himself to speak of the manner in which the Bishop of Worcester had worried Mr Beeby into resignation by threatening letters. Every great attack on "heretics" had in the end resulted in a gain to liberty. Bishop Colenso had been excommunicated for not believing the whole Pentateuch was written by Moses; but the least learned of Bishops would hardly express such a belief in public now. Violent things had been said against the Bishop of Worcester himself in connection with *Lux Mundi*; yet now the canon of orthodoxy in the Church was what the Bishop believed. It was largely owing to the Archbishop of Canterbury's wisdom and moderation that they had been spared a collective pronouncement by the Bishops on such subjects. Christianity could not possibly continue the religion of the modern world unless separated from traditional views which the progress of criticism had made untenable. Inspiration was not limited to the Bible. Incarnation did not rest on the fact of the Virgin Birth.

Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff said that a very large proportion of the clergy seemed to be living in a dream. The number of laymen of his generation who sincerely believed in a large proportion of the doctrines they listened to was not very great, and the number was decreasing.

Revision of the Book of Common Prayer has been a subject of controversy for years without very much practical advance. Beautiful the Prayer Book services are, but they present admitted defects which too often exclude a number of religious people from the Church of England and conscientious men from her ministry. It is impossible to preserve uniformity of use, and it is difficult to accommodate the feelings of Anglo-Catholics, Evangelists, and Modern Churchmen.

It will suffice to put on record the views of the last-named

as part of the movement. The following is the petition sent before the Enabling Bill was passed by the Council of the Churchmen's Union to the Lower House of Convocation on the Revision of the Book of Common Prayer :—

“The Council of the Churchmen's Union—founded in 1898, for the advancement of liberal religious thought, and particularly for the attainment of such changes in the formularies and practices in the Church of England as from time to time are made necessary by the needs and knowledge of the day—beg to affirm their deep thankfulness for the Report of the Committee of your Reverend House on Revision of the Book of Common Prayer, and respectfully to lay before you the following considerations :—

“(I.) They beg especially to support these proposals of the Committee :

- (a) The suggested reforms with regard to the Order for the Burial of the Dead.
- (b) That Minority Report on the *Quicumque Vult* which advocates the transfer of this venerable document to the end of the Prayer Book for the purpose of doctrinal and historical study by the learned : or, if this proposal should not commend itself to your House, then the Majority Report advocating the substitution of the word ‘may’ for the word ‘shall’ in the prefatory rubric.
- (c) The Resolution against arbitrary alteration of the customary conduct of Divine Service.
- (d) The Resolution in favour of a revision of the Lectionary.
- (e) The addition of Prayers for Home and Foreign Missions, and for the Convocations.
- (f) The acceptance of the result of Biblical Criticism in the text of the Epistle for the first Sunday after Easter.¹
- (g) The permission to use the two evangelical Commandments in the Communion Office.
- (h) The permissive use of the Bidding Prayer, noting that in the 13th line from the end the words ‘to God’ should follow the words ‘add unfeigned praises,’ otherwise, in the second line below, the expression ‘for His inestimable love’ is obscure.
- (i) The exceptional and conditional permission to communicate allowed to those not confirmed.

¹ “There are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost : and these three are one” (1 St John v. 7).]

- (j) The deletions from the first Exhortation, and the amended Collect in the Form of the Solemnisation of Matrimony.
- (k) The alternative Absolution in the Order for the Visitation of the Sick.
- (l) The important relief of conscience provided by the changed Question in the Ordering of Deacons.

“(II.) They further pray for permission to commend to the consideration of your Reverend House these further reforms :

- (a) The addition to the ‘ Prayers upon Several Occasions ’ of prayers conceived with suitable power and dignity, enriching the volume of common petition.
- (b) The substitution in the present translation of the Apostles’ Creed of the word ‘ Hades ’ for the word ‘ Hell,’ and of the word ‘ Spirit ’ for the word ‘ Ghost,’ and the substitution of the terms of the Apostles’ Creed so amended for the terms now used in the Baptismal Service.
- (c) The adoption of some such liberty in the use of the Psalter as is permitted in the American Church.
- (d) The permission to the Minister to read the Epistles or Gospels from the Revised Version.
- (e) The desirability of giving some permission for the use of extempore prayer.
- (f) The permission to use the Litany to the Lord’s Prayer and to conclude with ‘ The Grace.’”

It is worth noting that the Bishop of Carlisle, in his notable sermon before the Church Congress in 1909, voiced a plea for brevity and simplicity in the Christian Creed. His memorable words were : “ The more complex the Creed the more it obstructs the Christ. . . . Until we return to the simplicity and affectionateness of the New Testament Creed, we have no right to claim the promise of the Saviour that he will draw all men unto Himself. . . . In simplicity and love lies the secret of Catholic Churchmanship ; in complexity and exclusiveness lies schism.”

In the year 1905–6 the famous Letters of Business were issued by Parliament in consequence of the recommendations of the Royal Commissioners on Ecclesiastical Discipline. The Council took immediate action on the matter, and issued the following petition to the Houses of Convocation, asking that regard should be had to the following principles :—

“ I. (1) The essential comprehensiveness of the Church

of England, which they desire to maintain to the fullest extent recommended by the Royal Commissioners.

“(2) The consequent need for elasticity in its ordinances, preserving as great latitude of doctrine and practice as is compatible with the character of the Church of England as a reformed church.

“(8) A full and frank recognition of the established results of modern learning in regard to the Books of Holy Scripture, the history of the Church, and the developments of its creeds and formularies.

“(4) The encouragement of liberal thought and free and independent study among the clergy, in accordance with their ordination promise ‘to be diligent not only in reading the Holy Scriptures, but in such studies as help to the knowledge of the same.’

“(5) Full recognition of the rights of the laity to a voice in the Councils of the Church.

“II. They earnestly hope that their Lordships and the members of the Lower House of Convocation will not, by canon or otherwise, approve that part of the Commissioners’ recommendations which relates to the procedure in prosecutions for heresy or ritual prosecutions. They regard the present constitution of the Final Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical cases as affording to all parties in the Church of England the best security for liberty of thought and opinion, and view with alarm the power which the recommendations seem to secure to a majority of the Bishops by narrowing the limits of comprehension by deciding questions which the Church of England has deliberately left open, and thus practically adding to the doctrines of the Church.

“III. They further hope that the present opportunity will be taken to remove certain difficulties, some of which now prevent the educated laity from joining without serious mental reservation in the Church Service, while others put a strain on the consciences of the clergy and of candidates for ordination.

“The difficulties to which they refer, and certain other defects in the liturgy, would be removed by alterations which should include—

- (1) The cessation of the compulsory use of the Athanasian Creed.
- (2) A revision of the Old Testament lessons for Sunday.
- (3) Some liberty in the use of the Psalter.
- (4) An alteration in the form and manner of making of Deacons from ‘*Do you unfeignedly believe all the*

Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament ? to 'Do you believe that Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to Salvation?' as in the form of Ordering of Priests.

5. The optional substitution of the two commandments of the Gospel for the Decalogue in the Service of the Holy Communion.
6. The disuse of the first part of the Communion Service.
7. The abbreviation of the preface to the Marriage Service.
8. The optional use of the long exhortation in the Communion Office.
9. The shortening of the Baptismal Office and the substitution of the terms of the Apostles' Creed as used at Morning and Evening Prayer for the terms now used in that Office.
10. The avoidance of certain repetitions and archaic expressions in the Services."

The petition was presented to Convocation by the Bishop of Winchester and Canon Hensley Henson.

Such were the principles and opinions put forward sixteen years ago when the Letters of Business were first opened. Excluding the passing of the Enabling Bill into the Church Assembly Act, not a single one of the specific practical changes suggested by the Council has been carried through, although probably they would all be endorsed by the great majority of the laity.

The most important event in the ecclesiastical world during the year 1906 had undoubtedly been the introduction of the Education Bill. Members of the Churchmen's Union had probably not been altogether agreed about it any more than any other section of the Church of England—all the more so because political differences of opinion cut across the line of ecclesiastical division, but it may be safely assumed that few of them followed the intemperate lead of the more militant prelates in root-and-branch opposition to the principle of the Bill. Amid much that was lamentable in the tone of discussion on the subject, the Council felt that the controversy had revealed very prominently the existence of a large body of opinion in the Church of England—representing a considerable minority of the Bishops and clergy, and perhaps a majority of the laity—which had no sympathy with narrow, aggressive sacerdotalism. They felt that while the terms of the Bill might well have been more favourable to the Church but for the provocation afforded

by the Act of 1902, the proposed settlement would at least secure that the education of the country shall continue to be religious without being dominated by a section of the Church, whose opinions and aims were totally out of harmony with the theological temper of the nation at large, of the bulk of our own laity, and of the more progressive clergy. It is true that religious teaching based upon the Bible and given by the lay schoolmasters and schoolmistresses was not necessarily liberal in character, but it was at all events probable that its tone would reflect and keep pace with the gradual expansion and development of religious thought in the nation at large.

At various times during the past twenty years efforts have been made by the opponents of freedom of criticism to muzzle the scholars and students of the day in spite of Dr Gore's old championship in 1884 and 1904. In a sermon delivered before the University of Oxford and published, Dr Gore said: "It is impossible in any way to withdraw the historical basis of Christianity from the freest and frankest criticism. If there exist persons who say, 'Let the Old Testament be frankly criticised, for it is not so important, but not the New Testament, for it is vital,' the claim must be repudiated utterly. In proportion to the important issues which hang upon the New Testament records must be the frankness of the criticism to which they are submitted."

That statement should be remembered in its bearing on what follows. The prospects of Modern Churchmanship in 1914 were strengthened by several incidents: the Thompson case, the publication of *Foundations*, the Kikuyu controversy, and a large number of liberal books published during the previous months by such writers as Canon Vernon Storr, Dr Winstanley, Dr Latimer Jackson, the Revs. A. Fawkes, J. R. Cohu, etc. etc.

But the extremists of the E.C.U. made great efforts in the beginning of the year to stem the rising flood of modern criticism. Several memorials carefully prepared to damage the position of the Churchmen's Union were presented to Convocation, and much pressure brought to inflict a severe blow on the new school of thought, and to restrict that freedom which English Churchmen still enjoy in doctrinal and ecclesiastical questions.

In reply, the Union drew up a petition to Convocation, which was presented by Dr Burge, then Bishop of Southwark, now Bishop of Oxford, and supported by the Bishops of Lincoln and Hereford.

It ran as follows :—

“Whereas matters of grave import have lately been brought before your Reverend House concerning the intellectual freedom of the Clergy and the relation of Episcopal to non-Episcopal Churches :

“We, the Council of the Churchmen’s Union, desire respectfully to lay before your Lordships’ House the urgent considerations following :—

- I. The Church of England has at all periods since the Reformation included both those who do not and those who do accept the doctrine of the ‘Apostolical succession’ and the necessity of Episcopacy as a matter of *jus divinum*. We earnestly trust that your Lordships will do nothing to curtail the liberty in this respect which the formularies of our Church allow, and which its Clergy and Laity have hitherto in practice enjoyed.
- II. We trust that nothing will be done to make it more difficult for individual Bishops, other Clergy, and Laymen, to act as their own conscience and judgment direct in the matter of co-operation and religious fellowship with the members of non-Episcopal Churches.
- III. We regard it as a matter of grave importance that the clergy should be encouraged to study and discuss reverently and freely the critical and historical problems which are forced upon the modern student of the Old and New Testaments, to publish the result of their studies, and to face the task of interpreting and restating the traditional doctrines of Christianity in such ways as may be demanded by newly discovered truth.
- IV. While asserting without reserve our belief in the Incarnation and Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, we submit that a wide liberty of belief should be allowed with regard to the mode and attendant circumstances of both.
- V. We believe that real study, thought, and discussion will be discouraged if clergymen, who, in matters not affecting the essential truth of Christianity, arrive at conclusions which are opposed to traditional or momentarily dominant opinions, are to be removed from their offices or denounced as dishonest for retaining them. We venture to recall to your Lordships the dictum of Archbishop

Temple, 'If the conclusions are prescribed, the study is precluded.'

- VI. We dutifully and respectfully pray your Lordships to remember how often in the past, when the Episcopate or the Convocations have attempted to pronounce authoritatively upon scientific, critical, or historical questions, they have committed themselves to positions which are now by practically universal consent admitted to be untenable."

The Modern movement in religious thought in the present century may be said to have finally found itself in two events—the foundation of the *Modern Churchman*, and the establishment of the Conferences which became known to the public from the title of its organ and the press. The former brought together in a definite shape the views of a large body of clergy and laity who had for many years been isolated in various parts of the country without permanent means of expression. In proportion to its members the influence of the Churchmen's Union was far from insignificant, but for some years its existence was hardly known to any beyond its own immediate circle, except to its bitterest enemies. The appearance of the *Modern Churchman* changed all this. It offered sympathy to those who, discontented with the condition of the National Church, had drifted into indifference and had become alienated from its ranks. This drift of educated moral and religious men and women from membership was a serious loss to the Church, which it was the object of the Union to arrest and repair. The position of the Society to-day shows that its aims and objects have succeeded beyond expectation. Its name is now known far and wide, and its views have to be taken into account in the religious world.

The best proof of this is the wonderful attention and space given by the press of the country last autumn to the proceedings of its latest Conference at Cambridge. These Conferences were commenced in 1914, and have continued ever since. The first was organised in the spring before the war broke out, and was held at Ripon on 8rd to 7th July. Unlike the Church Congress, they were continued throughout the war. The idea underlying the Conference was to initiate meetings among Churchmen of different degrees of knowledge and experience, yet all of whom felt the pressure of modern knowledge and ways of thinking, and desired to see them employed in the service of the Christian religion. What a wide horizon of inquiry was opened is best appreciated by

giving the subjects of the Conferences which have been held since 1914 :

At Ripon, 1914, the subject was "Christ, the Creed, the Church." At Rugby in 1915, "Religious Teaching," "Kikuyu Problems," "Urgent Church Reforms," "Training of the Clergy." At Oxford, 1916, "Christian Ethics." At Cambridge, 1917, "The Church: its Origin, Functions, Authority, Sacraments, Freedom, and Psychology." At Cambridge, 1918, "The Psychology of Religious Experience." At Kensington, 1919, "The Ideals of Modern Churchmen," "Present-day Problems." At Oxford, 1920, "Modern Knowledge and Traditional Christianity." At Cambridge, 1921, "Christ and the Creeds."

It may be asked, who is responsible for the Modern movement? It is not a personal question or a one-man movement. There is no Newman to-day. The root of it is to be found in the new learning, the new science, the new geology, the new history, the new psychology—all these demanded long ago a new acknowledgment and revelation, and a new reconstruction of the old theological position. Modern Churchmen, or, as we should prefer to call them, New Churchmen, are only responding to the new religious environment, and have been so led to be teachers and leaders of the new movement which was bound to come. The Christian religion in its development created dogmas, rites, and ceremonies, institutions and formulas suitable to past ages but not to the age of to-day. There must be readjustment on a higher and more spiritual plane, more intelligible to a new world.

It may be claimed for the pioneers of the movement that they toiled not in vain through the darkness and prejudice of ignorance to new truths and fresh visions of the Kingdom on earth. They reached forward without hesitation and touched the taproots of the Church's troubles. To revalue old traditions, to demand new methods of interpretation in creeds and scripture, to make the Universal Church a reality by reunion—these have been the elements of its action. May it not be said they are in all humility worthy of Him who said, "Behold, I make all things new"?

PHILIP H. BAGENAL.

WIMBLEDON.

COLUMBA :
SAINT, STATESMAN, AND POET.

521—1921.

LAUCHLAN MACLEAN WATT, D.D.

I.

IF Ireland received from Scotland a superlative gift of godliness in St Patrick, she more than repaid her debt in St Columba.

He was not, of course, the first who lit the lamp of God in Scotland. Ninian's Whithorn was a century and a half earlier than Iona, and there were traces of a Christian settlement in the West even before Columba's day. It feels strange to read in the *Litany of Angus the Culdee* references to "seven bishops of Hy." Whatever else that signifies, it points to the existence of a Christian community of some kind there, probably under the influence of St Brendan's establishment at Eilach-naomh. Indeed, in the old Irish *Life* it is stated that when the saint landed he was met by two bishops, probably the remnant of the above. O'Donnell suggests that they were Druids in disguise; but we need not resort to necromantic explanations.

Of course, there was Mungo or Kentigern, too, whom Columba visited on the banks of the Molendinar, where they exchanged pastoral staves. Yet these were, in their effect, really only local, and their candle either perished with them or flickered almost to extinction. But in the door which Columba opened he left the cross, and no man could shut it.

He was the first to carry Christianity over the wild mountain-wall of the Grampians. And with him, as with Knox later, the school kept pace with the church. In fact, as Skene truly says, for centuries no Pictish boy learned his letters save at the knee or through the influence of a Columban monk; and Iona itself became the school of a wide

world, sending professors to Cologne, Louvain, Paris, and elsewhere.

Columba was the father of Scottish literature, and the pioneer of Scottish education; but he was more than that. He was the great sower of the seed of civilisation in the fields of Pictland and Gaeldom, the fruition of which, by the unifying power of his great ideal, was, in reality, the Scottish nation. He stands on the border-line between Christianity and paganism, a strong but kindly, kingly figure, shining in the dark. His race was royal, and he was naturally a leader of men. He was of a radiant spirit, strongly tempered with the stern passion of a warrior when necessity called—a dove with a lion's heart.

Of course, much myth and legend crept in among the truth regarding him, through the ages. But the *Life* by Cumen the Fair, seventh abbot of Iona, only sixty years after the saint's death, and that by Adamnan, the ninth abbot, only eighty-two years after that event, are sufficiently near contemporary records of their subject to contain a clear substratum of fact.

Adamnan's work, written originally between the years 691 and 693, is extant in the copy made by Dornbene, who died in 713, abbot-elect of Iona. It is the oldest book that can be proved to have been written in Scotland, and is, of course, in Latin. Adamnan incorporated in it the work of Cumen, so that it carries within its pages an earlier authority than its own date. Dornbene, in a colophon, gives his name as copyist. His transcript was carried to the Celtic monastery of St Gall, in Switzerland; but it passed through intermittent disappearances until, in 1845, Dr Ferdinand Keller of Zurich found, among unknown rubbish, in a book-chest in the public library of Schaffhausen, a manuscript which has been practically proved by Dr Reeves to be the actual document. That eminent scholar edited the biography in 1857, collating it with six other versions, and producing a work which retains the finality of authoritative scholarship, illumining by its learning and research the life and work of the establishment of Iona, as if in a fresh revelation. It forms one of the issues of the Bannatyne Club. Those who cannot secure this edition may find satisfaction in the little pocket volume of the *Life* edited by Huyshe, in Routledge's New Universal Library, which can be had for a few pence. It will be a pleasant companion in the island of the saint.

There is also an old Gaelic *Life*, in reality a kind of Homily for the saint's day, on the text from Genesis xii., "Get thee

out of thy land and thy kin, and thy father's house, and go into the land which I shall show unto thee" (*Exi de terra tua et de cognatione tua, et de domo patris tui, et vade in terram quam tibi monstravero*). Manuscripts of this, dating from the tenth century, are preserved in the Advocates' Library, Edinburgh, in the *Leabhar Breac* at Dublin, and in the Irish *Book of Lismore*. A translation by Hennessy, with collation of the three versions, is to be found in the Appendix to the second volume of Skene's *Celtic Scotland*. Martin, in his *Description of the Western Islands*, says: "The life of Columbus, written in the Irish character, is in the custody of John Macneal in the Island of Barry; another copy of it is kept by MacDonald of Benbecula." What became of these, unless the Edinburgh copy is one of them, is not known. Professor Donald Mackinnon places that manuscript at about the end of the fifteenth century.

The *Life* written or compiled in 1532 by instruction of Manus O'Donnell, afterwards chief of Tircconnell, to which sept Columba belonged, professes to have gathered together out of the drift and accretions of a thousand years all the traditions and authentic stories that could be found in regard to one of whom his kin were so proud. This manuscript, preserved in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and published this year by the University of Illinois, is, as Professor Donald Mackinnon said, a splendid monument of Irish clannishness, eloquence, and caligraphy.

These are the sources of authorities. But the monograph by Montalembert in his *Monks of the West* gives a most delightful and vivid understanding of the saint's life and character, and holds a place of its own.

II.

Columba was born at Gartan in Donegal on 7th December 521; and he was a Christian from his birth. The wave of Patrick's gospel tide had rocked his cradle. A Churchman who founded churches and monasteries, he stood right in the heart of the storms of his time. But when he was forty-two years old he figured over-prominently in the bloody battle of Culdremhne, and it became the pivot of his career. Tradition attributes to this battle a twofold provocation, and puts the minor one first. It is said that King Diarmid had offended Columba by a decision against him in a very curious question. St Finnian of Moville had brought from Rome a beautiful Psalter transcribed from the second version of the Vulgate of St Jerome. Columba, his pupil, a lover of books

and poems, sat up three nights and copied it, apparently without authority. For Finnian claimed the copy as his by right; and the case was referred to King Diarmid. Of course, in all probability the king had never a question of literary copyright before him in his life; but he fell back upon a mother-wit interpretation of ancient law, and gave as his decision, "Le gach bo a boinean, agus le gach leabhar a leabhran,"—that is, "To every cow her calf, and to every book its copy." To this decision Columba would not bow. But Diarmid had been guilty of a greater offence. He had snatched from the care of Columba his ward, Curnan son of the King of Connacht, and had put him to death. This meant not only sacrilege in the violation of sanctuary, but an outrage on Columba's honour, and an insult to the great clan of O'Donnell through him. Columba flung the flame of his eloquence among his people; the northern princes rose and, aided by the men of Connacht, marched against King Diarmid, whom they defeated in the stubborn field of Culdremhne, where three thousand were slain.

In the Royal Irish Academy is preserved a Psalter, called the *Cathach* or *Battler*, because a battle was said to have been fought over it, and because it was long deemed to have been a powerful help in conflicts. It used to be carried thrice around the army on the breast of a priest, and if he were free from mortal sin it ensured the victory. It is associated in tradition with the episode of Culdremhne. Taken abroad by an O'Donnell who was exiled through the Stewart troubles in the time of James the Second, it was brought back to Ireland, having been discovered on the Continent, in 1802. The beautiful casket in which it had been preserved since the seventeenth century was reverently opened. Inside was found a decayed wooden box, and therein a mass of vellum, stuck together and hardened into a solid lump. Skilfully, carefully, and lovingly, leaf was separated from leaf. It was found to be in reality a fragmentary Psalter—fifty-eight leaves, from Psalm 31 to Psalm 106—bearing evidence of hasty transcription, and, from its text and character, supporting the belief that it may have been this very book that caused such sorrow and such slaughter long ago.

Nevertheless, there is another tale to the effect that the volume of which St Finnian was the proud possessor was a copy of the Gospels, so precious to him for its beauty that, with the keenly jealous love of a bibliophile, he would not allow any eye but his own to look upon it. It was probably the earliest copy of the Vulgate that had reached Ireland, and it is noteworthy that the *Book of Durrow*, which is said to have

been transcribed from a manuscript written in great haste by Columba's own hand, is almost purely a Vulgate version. Whichever of these be the true story, it is easy to believe, when we consider the value which St Finnian seems to have put on his possessions, that he would feel relieved to see his pupil at least out of reach of his library. At the same time, though it seems like sacrilege to brush the dust off a fine old story, it is difficult to accept it, when one remembers the deeply affectionate relationship that existed between Finnian and Columba.

In Aberdeenshire is preserved a beautiful casket called the *Breacbeannachd*, with which are associated the name of Columba and the tradition of its having been borne around the army before going into battle; though it has never been suggested that here we might have a competitor of serious import with the Irish relic.

Two years after the battle Columba was sailing away, an exile, from Ireland. It is said that he was banished for the blood he had been instrumental in shedding—sent forth by St Molaise of Innismurry, at the Synod of Tailte, under sentence of perpetual expatriation, to seek for God as many souls in conversion to Christ as he had lost in the dark day of passionate conflict. The shadow of Culdremhne haunted his memory, as did the day of Arddreyd dog the steps of Merlin in the Forest of Caledon.

His desire was that he should not land on any place from which he could behold his dearly loved Ireland. It is said that this was, in fact, a part of his punishment; but it might well be a self-inflicted deprivation, lest the sight of home should turn him from his purpose. The persistent legend is that he went ashore on Oransay; but lo! when he climbed the hill, away down on the verge of the west lay the blue hills of home, like a dream. So again they moved forward, until they stepped out upon Iona, a hundred miles from Ireland and thirty from the Scottish mainland—the holiest island of our people ever since.

It is recorded by Adamnan that in that very year Columba lived with King Conal in Knapdale, and the cave-chapel at Cove, on Loch Caolisport, has been by an old tradition associated with this period of residence. It has even been asserted that this was his first church, before he went on to Iona; but the other tradition has overshadowed this and been accepted. It would seem rather to have been the relic of a visit with a political purpose, bearing on the wider issue of the saint's designs in regard to the future of the Dalriádic folk.

In Iona he builded a settlement of wattle for himself and his comrades, and dedicated it to God. And there he worked day and night. He was a lover of books, reading, writing, praying, thinking, planning continually. His literary energy was indomitable and indefatigable. The *Gaelic Life* says: "Thrice fifty noble lays he made, some, wonderful, in Latin, and some, in Gaelic, beautiful."

He is credited with as many as three hundred noble books, most of which must of course have been transcriptions. Even Greek is mentioned by Dallan Forgaill the Bard as being among his accomplishments, though that must have been scant. Yet the accomplishments of the Irish monks were wide and varied. Cormac, in his *Glossarium*, used Greek words freely, though his etymologies are naturally fantastic to the scholarship of to-day. The Iona monks were familiar with the Latin Scriptures; and Adamnan quotes Josephus, Jerome, and Juvenius. Their caligraphy was marvellous. The *Book of Kells*, the *Book of Deer*, and manuscripts in St Gall and elsewhere are proofs of the attainments, in this respect, of the Irish scribes.

Columba himself only laid aside his pen at last to die. He was writing a copy of the Psalter, and he felt Death's touch upon his shoulder. "I am done," said he. "Baitene can finish it."

III.

Why he really left Ireland is not so difficult to see after all. The commonly received explanation of the battle of Culdremhne, which was the climax of a stormy life in Ireland, appeals, of course, to romance. So also does the story of a perpetual exile from his native land. Yet the excommunication was either not in perpetuity, or it was not persisted in. For he was back in Ireland for the Synod of Drumceatt; and he made no fewer than ten visits to the old country, according to Adamnan. It is true that Adamnan twice speaks of the affair of Culdremhne in connection with the date of the saint's departure from Ireland, but he mentions his excommunication as being for "some pardonable and trivial reason." And he distinctly makes his pilgrimage a voluntary one, as being "for Christ's sake." His act might well be in fulfilment of some vow for the propagation of the gospel, for the Irish Church and the spirit of the saint himself were avowedly missionary in ideal. The oldest *Life* says it was "for the love and favour of Christ," and mentions no other cause. Bede, under the year 565,—a mistake of two years—says: "Then came to Britain from Ireland a

presbyter and abbot . . . Columba by name, to preach the word of God to the provinces of the Northern Picts, that is, to those who are shut off from the southern districts by steep and rugged mountain chains." Both Tighernac and the *Annals of Ulster* say that the saint was in his forty-second year, which fixes the date of his arrival in Iona for 563, and so agrees with Adamnan. The discrepancy of dates may easily have arisen from the fact that Bede was thinking of the journey to the stronghold of King Brude, while the others are speaking of his actual arrival in Dalriáda.

But there is more than a glimmer of another reason, for which a very powerful plea can be advanced. His time was one of intense interest to the Gaels, for it was the time of a struggle very vital for them.

King Cairbre *Rigfoda*—Bede's Reúda, and the Riáda of tradition—the "tall king" or "long-in-the-arm"—had given his name to the territory in Antrim which, about the year 200 A.D., he had established as his own when forced to leave Munster on account of famine. When his people carried their fortunes to the West of Scotland, three centuries later, they carried the name with them, calling the place in which they settled Dalriáda. Why those people had struck out from Ireland, leaving Antrim for Argyle in 502, under Fergus Mòr MacEre, has never been fully shown. It is true that St Patrick is said to have prophesied that this Fergus should one day not only be a king, but father of kings in that land; but it was either from necessity for elbow room, or in the spirit of adventure, or, it may be, through attraction of kinship in blood and tongue with those who were already there. This Irish settlement was girded on the south by the Firth of Clyde; on the east by Drumalban—"the backbone of Scotland," as Adamnan called it, until to-day the watershed of Argyle and Perth; to the north the line ran over the Moss of Crinan, and then, passing westward through craggy Morven, found issue to the Atlantic by way of the Island of Mull. It was thus practically identical with the county of Argyle as we now know it.

Those immigrants were Christians, however crude their creed. The Northern Picts, on the other hand, were pagan in what beliefs they held. The Gaels, therefore, however smoky their lantern, and however dim their candle, were light-bearers. And whatever their purpose, they had tenacity in it, for, even though within the enfolding pincers of enemy folk, they held their own. It was to them Columba's heart turned, and to reach them he steered across the sea. For this colony of his own blood was in a perilous phase—threat-

ened, indeed, with something like actual extermination at the hands of the Picts of the north and east. Its prosperity and encroachment upon Pictland had, in fact, drawn to it the attention of the great King Brude, who had driven it, in 560, into Kintyre. In this great reverse we have the real provocative of Columba's mission. For he was not only a notable Churchman who had done distinguished work in Ireland as such, but he was a princely master of secular policy, with a prominent share in a great battle. He had the rousing qualities of a leader of men, the passion of a poet, and the devotion of a patriot. There would seem to have been in his adventure the suggestion of a thrust of the sword of the spirit to thwart and counteract the sword of the flesh. He carried oversea not only a great religious fervour and ecclesiastical acumen, but vision which had within it political wisdom and spiritual sagacity. It seemed, indeed, to have been anticipated that he should deal somehow with the existing situation; for, though the pseudo *Prophecy of St Berchan* is really of date some centuries later, it may be taken as the expression of a traditional opinion on the purpose of the journey of the saint, when it says :

“ Woe to the Pict to whom he eastward goes.
The thing that's there he knows ;
Nor happy he
An Irish king beneath the Pict should be.”

Columba was, besides, of Dalriádíe royal descent. He had thus a twofold call.

He and his company came with the conquest of Pictland written for them in the Book of Destiny. Their enterprise was, indeed, one of the greatest voyages in history; for he laid the foundations of a secular as well as a spiritual kingdom.

He was a leader of stupendous vitality. The wildest mountains, the fiercest denizens of the rocky places, the angriest threat of rudest tyrants, carried no fear to his soul. He knew his destiny, and he never shrank from it. He moved through the gloom, kindling hope and liberty. For thirty-four years he tended the fire of Christ, and the little isle of the west became the centre of God's kingdom in Scotland and Ireland. He gathered into his community in Iona all to whom highest impulses had spoken; and his monks became torch-bearers and path-makers for the whole land, and beyond it. In their coracles they crossed the seas, and through the deserts wore a way for Christ. Far-off islands, broken and ruined by age-long weatherings, pierced and worn by ceaseless surge of wild ocean storms, were touched with

wonder of love by them. Away over the desolations, filled with superstition and strife that tried to turn them back, they reached remotest straths, and founded holy shrines that to this day still bear their leader's name, or the names of those who were his faithful children in the Faith. Not for drowsy ease or for refuge from life's failure did those men seek the cloister, but because the face of a redeeming love had looked into their hearts, and they could fear no man's face thereafter. It was the breeze out of the misty west, the breath that blew down the mountain passes and along the Highland straths, that carried the message of Christ all over Scotland.

The mark of the Iona community was its missionary energy. It was felt far and wide. It left its traces in England, in France, and over the Alps into the plains of Northern Italy. Even Iceland was not too remote for the faithful from the western isle. Consider how many must have gone down in the deep with their frail vessels in the attempts to reach such distant goals! But still the Cross went on, climbing the steepest places, and fording the ocean at its deepest and wildest.

The most important and history-making journey of the saint himself was that which led him to the very stronghold of the great Pictish King Brude, near the river Ness. The old Gaelic *Life* does not make such demands upon credulity in regard to miracles wrought by the sign of the Cross on the gates of the royal stronghold, and elsewhere, as Adamnan does. Be sure that in this interview the saint had more in his mind than the mere founding of churches, or necromantic contests with the king's magic men. His move was a sound piece of policy, for the king meant the people, then; as later, in the sixteenth century, a chief's conversion meant the conversion of the clan. He had allowed two years to pass from the time of his landing ere he made this journey; but it may be taken that before he ventured he had made his influence felt right on through Lochaber and into the very presence and environment of the king. We can see traces of that activity in the records of Adamnan. Undoubtedly, in that meeting is to be seen the quickening of the germ of a united Scotland, the root-seed of a nation. Through it the Picts received not only the uplift of the Christian faith, but that touch of the civilisation of Ireland which held them for a century and a half; and peace seems to have been secured for the Dalriadic Scots. He consolidated the position of these in 575, through the great Synod of Drumceatt, when Aidan, the King of Dalriada, was, by his influence, acknowledged as a monarch independent of Ireland—a fact that

later was also acknowledged by the Pictish king. Aidan had been educated in Iona, and proved himself to be the kind of sovereign whom the affairs of Dalriáda positively required. According to Tighernac, Adamnan, and the chronicles, he was wise in policy and prosperous in administration. Like James the First, he set himself at once strenuously to organise his realm, suppressing the robbers of Galloway, who had kept his borders in unrest, and making leagues with his Cymric neighbours of Strathclyde. In this we may be sure we can discover the guiding influence of Columba. But Ethelfrith of Northumbria, stirred by ambition or by jealousy, attacked the Cymri of the north; and Cadwallon secured the help of Aidan to repel what was in reality their common foe. Ethelfrith, however, overthrew combined Scot and Cymri at Degsastan, and made his name a thing of terror for the dwellers in the region from Clyde to Forth. Columba had died six years earlier, on 9th June 597, and we seem to feel the loss of his wisdom and guidance.

IV.

Iona has become part and parcel of this man's memory. To the Gael it always is *I-Choluim-Chille* for his sake. Bede said, "It long remained venerable to many people of the Scots and Picts." And Samuel Johnson uttered only the truth when he spoke of it as "that illustrious island which was once the luminary of the Caledonian regions, whence savage clans and roving barbarians derived the benefits of knowledge and the blessings of religion. . . . That man is little to be envied whose patriotism would not gain force upon the plain of Marathon, or whose piety would not grow warmer among the ruins of Iona."

Its very name has been construed into vital and prophetic contact with him, through a philology falsely so called. It really is I or Hi. In Latin form, on the page of Adamnan, this was *Ioua*; but by a misreading of a copyist it was rendered *Iona*. Adamnan is at pains to point out that Columba's name in Gaelic and in Latin means "a dove," and that the Hebrew word for "dove" is *Iona*, which helped the misreading. And so an ecclesiastical mysticism leapt at the coincidence, and believed that divine Providence had actually designed that the two should be linked by destiny together. And thus it has remained.

The early clergy of the Celtic Church were usually married, but those in Iona were celibate. In fact, it looks

as though they were misogynists, for to the saint himself is attributed the ungracious saying :

“ Far am bi bo bi’ ban,
Agus far am bi ban bi’ mollachd ”;

that is to say :

“ Where there is a cow there is a woman,
And where there is a woman there is a curse.”

Eilean-nam-ban on the shores of Mull, opposite Iona, is said to have been the abode of the wives of artisans employed about the monastery. There is, however, now a proverb which atones for the old cynicism, in which the island is spoken of as *I nam ban bhoidheach*, that is, “ Iona of the beautiful women.”

Columba was succeeded, in Irish fashion, by his own kin, as heads of the establishment. Baitene, his first cousin, was second abbot ; Laiseren, another cousin, was the third ; the fourth was a second cousin ; and the fifth was a nephew of Laiseren. It was not really till the tenth abbot that the line was broken.

Iona had, in its ecclesiastical usages, differences which were bequeathed to a late day, and which were only obliterated by a majority vote at Whitby in 664 A.D., involving the dispersion of the community. The Church of Rome came through England into Scotland as an invasive force, having been delayed by the struggles involved in the Saxon conquest ; but, when she came, it was by overthrowing a native Celtic Church that she established herself here. The Church in Britain was shut off from the rest of Christendom for nearly two centuries after the withdrawal of the Roman imperial authority. During that period the ecclesiastical custom and ritual on the European continent underwent several changes, including the mode of fixing the date of Easter, which became a topic of keen controversy with the Celtic Church. At Whitby, Colman of Lindisfarne, as the opponent of Wilfrid, afterwards Archbishop of York, led the controversy against the Romish usages, before the king, in presence of the barons and clergy. In that conference the tradition of Peter as custodian of the keys touched the fears of the king, Oswy, lest on his last journey he might, if he roused a grudge in Peter’s heart by voting against his representative, find the door of heaven closed to his knocking. So his decision went against the native Church. But Iona remained obdurate, retaining also the tonsure of St John—from ear to ear, while that of St Peter is coronal—through

ridicule which declared that this was the invention of Simon Magus, and had been brought to Ireland by the swineherd of that King Leary who had so bitterly opposed St Patrick ! It was only in the year 716 that she capitulated, and a schism ensued. The dependent monasteries among the Picts were firm against the change, and defied even the edicts of King Nechtan, who in 717 drove them across Drumalban, from his realm.

Bede says of Iona : " That island is accustomed to have as its ruler always an abbot-presbyter, to whose jurisdiction the whole province and even the bishops themselves must be subject, by an unusual custom, following the example of its first teacher, who was no bishop but a presbyter." In the Scottish system the bishops were members of monasteries, and subject to their abbot, who was head alike in secular and spiritual affairs. The Abbot of Iona was supreme not only there, but in all the houses originating from or affiliated to it in Ireland and in Scotland.

Iona never recovered from the smashing blows of Norse invasion. The monastery was burned six times by the rovers, who left the dead as record of their passing. In the year 806, sixty-eight were murdered ; and in 986, on the eve of Christmas, the Abbot and fifteen monks were killed. The library was scattered ; the relics of the saint removed, and finally dispersed, and no man knows to-day where his ashes really lie. The sanctity of the isle, however, remained as a holy memory, and in later days it became the place of rest for the dust of the great after their activities were ended. I-Choluim-Chille was, for the devout, the chosen spot for their awaking in Judgment Day, finding a proud pillow near the chapels for their sleep.

The Hebrides came into the hands of Scotland in 1072 ; and the saintly Queen Margaret rebuilt the monastery which the Norseman had laid in ruin. She was a strenuous opponent of the usages of the Celt, and pressed home her opposition with all the weight of her husband's prestige behind her. Passing over again to the Norse sway, the place experienced many vicissitudes, till the Lord of the Isles resolved to establish Romish religious orders in his territory ; and, in 1203, Benedictine monks and black nuns entered into possession, the present buildings rose, and Rome settled into Iona till the sixteenth century. Since then, however, the gospel has been preached in Iona in the language in which Columba spoke to the people, by the national Church, whose, to-day, the holy buildings are.

V.

In the Bodleian Library is preserved a manuscript of verses attributed to Columba, all that could be gathered in the sixteenth century ; and fifteen poems in his name are in the O'Clery manuscript, treasured in the Burgundian Library at Brussels. It is, of course, difficult to decide what of all this is actually his. Yet, though they were gathered late, and may have the touch of other hands, tradition is tenacious, and it may be taken that they do express his utterance and his thought. They breathe deep piety, warm love of nature, and love of home, as the following renderings, which I have made, of portions of them, show.

It cost him sorrow to leave Ireland, as this song torn out of his heart says :

“ How swift is my coracle sailing,
Leaving Derry behind on the lea,
To the land of the ravens, dark Alba :
Ah ! sad is my errand for me !

I look back through my sorrow to Erin,
With good-bye to her women and men ;
And my eyes are all misty with weeping,
For I never may see them again.”

It is an old cry of the Gael, over the seas sailing far from home, even alongside of the thought of a returning !

And again he cries :

“ Were the wage of Scotland given me
From the centre to the sea,
One wee house this night in Durrow
Would be dearer far to me.

Sweet the grove of oaks, and often
Did its quiet my heart control.
Ah ! the angels oft-times yonder
Whispered wonder to my soul ! ”

In the crash of thunder and terror of lightning's flame he is said to have composed a prayer which has a fine dignity and chaste sweetness in it :

“ Before Thy face the angels fall,
And heaven's loud-swelling anthems cease.—
Move where the rolling thunders call,
And fold about their anger peace.

So 'mong my thundering passions move,
O make my heart Thy dwelling-place ;
So make the casket of Thy love
Worthy the jewel of Thy grace.”

And again, in the *Allus*, supposed to have been written after his great battle :

“ We praise Thee, God, the Three in One,—
 The Father, Spirit, Christ the Son . . .
 We change and fade and pass away,
 But Thine is the eternal day.
 Around Thee all earth's ages run,
 But still the same
 Thy deathless Name,
 Thy love divine, Thou Three in One ! ”

He was haunted by the tender memory of home. His heart never ceased to look across the waters singingly. Thus, very sweetly :

“ Happy he who hears in Durrow
 Songs ascending, heavenward seeking,
 And the wind among the elm trees
 As a harper sweeps his string ;

And the glad notes of the blackbird,
 And the lowing of the cattle,
 And the cooing of the cuckoo
 At the opening door of Spring.”

He loved to watch the changing ocean, and to listen to the ceaseless song of nature. Thus in a famous poem he says :

“ To rest on a rock in Uchd Alein
 How sweet that would be,
 Always beholding
 The face of the sea,—
 Hearing the song divine the waves go singing,—
 The wonderful quire of the deep—
 And the cry of the wild birds winging,
 As with music through heaven they sweep,—
 The tides' unceasing wonder,
 The wrestle of ebb and flow,
 That with tumultuous thunder
 Beat on the crags below ! ”

The elegy of the bards spoke truly of him through Dallan Forgaill, their chief, of what he was, and not for his age alone. He had saved them from extinction in the great day of Drumceatt ; and so he was to them what he was to many, “ the soul's light . . . God's messenger dispelling fear . . . learned, chaste, charitable . . . physician of the heart . . . shelter to the naked . . . a consolation to the poor . . . There went not from the world one who was more constant for remembrance of the Cross.”

His day was as full as ours of things that deafened the

still, small voice—the clash of sect and party, the cry of greed, the clang of war, the glamour of a thousand calls to the passions of men. But this princely soul held on the way of light and right. As he said :

“ What soul his God can praise
In these dark days
When Truth has staggered from her place
And veiled her face ?
Who but the man that from his path has hurled
A dying world ? ”

And so he speaks still to us the open secret of the consecrated life and the power of unselfish service.

One cannot help recalling his prophecy on his dying day : “ Small and mean though this place is, yet shall it be held in great and uncommon honour, not alone by Scottish kings and their folk, but also by rulers of strangers. Even the saints of other Churches shall regard it with uncommon reverence.” And to-day proves the truth of it.

A little while, also, before he died he said :

“ I mo chridhe, I mo ghraidh,
Ann ait' guth manaich bi' geum ba ;
Ach mu'n tig an saoghal gu crìoch
Bi'dh I mar a bha.”

And now, after all the ages, again the voice of praise and prayer for his sake rises from the ancient fane beside the waves, fulfilling the words :

“ O island of my heart, most dear to me,
The low of kine shall quiet the melody
Of chanting monks ; yet ere the world is past
Thou shalt be as thou wast.”

LAUHLAN MACLEAN WATT.

EDINBURGH.

OCCULTISM.

EDWARD CLODD.

II.

THE belief in telepathy—namely, that one mind can communicate with another mind, no matter what distance in space divides them, independently of the recognised channels of the sense-organs, or of the use of any mechanical apparatus—is widespread. Ninety per cent. of people among whom the question is raised will at once cite some experience which has satisfied them that telepathy is proven, and among the remaining ten per cent. there will be waverers. One startling incident, one dream fulfilled, suffices as the swallow to make their summer. The high priests of Spiritualism are cited as authorities from whom there can be no appeal, as if mere authority had any validity. Sir Oliver Lodge is convinced that “telepathy, as a recently discovered fact, opens a new and obscure chapter in science” . . . “so that the distance between England and India is no barrier to the sympathetic communication of intelligence in some way of which we are at present ignorant.” Sir William Barrett is satisfied that it is one among other phenomena to which “the laws of the physical universe are inapplicable,” and “which transcend knowledge derived from our sense-perceptions.” “Unless,” he adds, “we reject all testimony . . . there can be no doubt that a distant person can, by his directed thought, or by a dream, create a phantom of himself in the mind of a distant percipient” (*Psychical Research*, pp. 109, 113). But, he candidly says, “How telepathy is propagated we have not the remotest idea,” and he dismisses as futile the analogies between it and wireless telegraphy and radio-activity which ignorance suggests. So, in their admission of nescience, both physicists take shelter under the maxim, “Obscurum per obscurius,” which, freely rendered, is, “Whatever you know nothing about, assume to be the cause of everything else.”

It was disconcerting to read in Dr M'Dougall's book on

Body and Mind, published in 1911, that he regarded the evidence for the reality of telepathy "to be of such a nature as to compel the assent of any competent person who studies it impartially." But in his recently published *Group Mind* that eminent psychologist abandons that definite position and admits that "telepathic communication has not hitherto been independently established," and that "if and in so far as it occurs, it does so sporadically and only between individuals specially attuned to one another." So Dr M'Dougall's recantation is only partial.

Let us briefly consider what physiology has to say on the subject. All our knowledge is derived from sense-impressions. The sense-organs have specialised nerve-endings, each of which is tuned to receive and transmit its special form of energy. Sound-waves cannot stimulate the optic nerves, nor light-waves stimulate the aural nerves, nor does the sensation of smell result from tactile stimuli; and so on through the series. Each of the sense-organs transmits the stimuli to the receiving central nervous system, *i.e.* the brain, and perception results through the changes set up in the cortex or layer of grey cellular substance which, as it were, roofs-in the cerebrum, and is the material basis of mind, the seat of the as yet unexplained problem of consciousness. Therein are localised the psychic centres to which the several sensory nerves transmit the reports which they receive from the outer world. It is interesting to note, by the way, that recent research indicates that, unlike the cells of the body generally, the neurons or nerve cells, if destroyed, cannot be replaced; but, failing this, they last the entire life of the individual of whom they form a part. They are perpetual cells of the greatest importance for the preservation of the commonwealth of the social organisation of the body. Each human brain is built on a uniform plan; it is boxed up in a bony, skin-covered, usually hair-covered skull. It is insulated from every other brain, and contains no indication that any part of it is specialised to receive stimuli from any channel other than the sense-organs, or in some way—as to which both Sir Oliver Lodge and Sir William Barrett confess ignorance—from any ethereal or other subtle vibrations.

To quote Sir Ray Lankester:

"Telepathy is simply a boldly invented word for a supposed phenomenon which has never been demonstrated. It is an unfair and unwarranted draft on the credit of science which its signatories have not met by the assignment of any experimental proof. There is not

one man of science, however mystic and credulous his trend, among those who pass this word 'telepathy' on to the great unsuspecting, newspaper-reading public, who will venture to assert that he can show to me or to any committee of observers experimental proof of the existence of the thing to which this portentous name is given."¹

Space alone prevents citation from physico-psychologists who speak with authority—namely, Sir Bryan Donkin, the late Sir Thomas Clouston, Dr Bramwell, and others, all of whom testify to the negative results in their search for evidence of telepathy.

How then can the numerous occurrences grouped under telepathy be accounted for? Theories formulated by men of science can be proved or disproved by experiment and observation; and when, after repeated tests, the results anticipated by the theory are found to be unvarying, it is established. Given the chance and the capacity, every person can verify those results for himself. But the difficulty which confronts any effort to examine evidence in support of telepathy—and this applies to other branches of the occult—is that its believers can offer only personal experiences; experiences fitful, limited, and rarely exactly repeated, to which no experimental tests are possible. They cannot be put in a crucible or under a microscope. Even were it possible to capture the experience at the moment of its occurrence, by what means could it be verified?

The one and all-sufficing argument which demolishes the telepathic theory is that what is assumed to be due to telepathy is explained by coincidences. These impress the imagination, they beguile the believer to take the line of least resistance, and the ease of the way leads him to false conclusions. Francis Bacon's shrewd comment on the inferences drawn from "Dreams and Predictions of Astrologie" hits the bull's-eye. In "Prophecies" he says: "First that Men marke when they hit and never marke when they miss." The myriad number of dreams unfulfilled count as nothing against one dream that comes true; and it would be little short of miraculous if, in the crowded incidents of our lives, a certain proportion of them were not coincidental with happenings elsewhere.

Careful sifting of the stories told in proof of telepathy establishes the fact that those in which some weak link in the

¹ Letter to the *Westminster Gazette*, Dec. 15, 1903. See also Sir Ray's *Kingdom of Man*, p. 88.

chain of evidence is not detected are few, if any. It is not a question of wilful inaccuracy or distortion, but of defects due to the treachery of memories, especially in regard to what is essential—correctness of dates and details. "It seems difficult to place any limit on the untrustworthiness of human testimony, especially in cases where the emotions are involved, or where there is craving for edification."¹

Anxiety concerning absent ones begets premonitions which, if they happen to be fulfilled, make belief in telepathy unshakable. Imagination exaggerates the closeness of the coincidence, and assumes correspondence of time which, on examination, is found invalid. Nevertheless, a whole system of belief in thought-transference is built on the fragile foundation of dreams about persons, distance from whom emphasises solicitude, and to whom some dreaded disaster has happened at or about the time when they were in the thoughts or dreams of folks at home.

There are no possible means of knowing what is the percentage of coincidences to the unnumbered millions of brains. To some of us there has come the agony of loss of dear ones far away, but the message travelled, not by brain-waves from the dying, only by the mechanical letter or cablegram. In the late war, how few are the recorded cases of what are called telepathic communications! There were thousands passing sleepless nights wondering how their fathers, sons, and brothers fared in the trenches, from whom no message sped through the air. No matter: a coincidence here and there, duly made public, kept alive faith in telepathy. If such direct transmission and receipt of energy as telepathy assumes is possible, mind acting on mind at a distance, why has so valuable a means of communication been neglected? Why did not our generals in the late war abolish as superfluous the so-called "Intelligence Department" and tap-off by telepathic methods what plans were in the brains of the enemy's generals, or *vice versa*? Why did I not apply the same method to get at the brain of some astute financier, and know therefrom what securities should be bought and what should be sold? With such a psychical instrument at command, telegraphs and telephones could be scrapped, correspondence dispensed with, even speech made unnecessary. But the prospect that telepathy may become a satisfactory substitute for existing means of communication will be fulfilled at the Greek Kalends. Experiments to establish the validity or otherwise of telepathy or thought-

¹ *Telepathic Hallucinations*, p. 36, by Frank Podmore.

transference have been carried on by some researchers, notably by Dr Coover at the Leland Stanford Junior University of California. He "selected" a card from a pack of cards, depicted it sharply in his imagination, and "willed" for fifteen or twenty seconds that it should come into the mind of another individual who was present and making efforts to receive the telepathic communication. The other individuals who were also to receive the message were favourably inclined to telepathy; at the conclusion of the experiment they were to name the cards and at the same time to indicate the degree of certainty with which they answered. In all, 10,000 experiments were made. The number of correct answers was precisely what it should be by the ordinary laws of chance, without any telepathic effort whatever. The percentage of correct answers was precisely the same as when no "willing" was attempted. A further set of experiments was made on ten "sensitives," five of whom were mediums and believers in telepathy. Their answers were found to be in no respect more accurate than those of the students—in fact, to be identical with what might be expected from the laws of pure chance.

To those who are swayed by bias in favour of the supernatural, what has been said will not carry conviction. "Ephraim is joined to idols: let him alone." But if it be possible to wean the believer from a spurious cult and arrest its further advance, it may be effected if he will read *The Road to En-Dor*. Lieut. Jones, the chief actor in the tragic-comedy told in that book, with his fellow-conspirator Lieut. Hill, was a prisoner of war at Yozgad in Turkey. He sought to escape boredom by constructing an oujia board, the performances on which by himself and others in the camp gave him the hint to make planchette-writing the vehicle of messages purporting to come from discarnate spirits. He and his fellow-plotter carefully memorised details of war news and items of general gossip which, for the most part forgotten by others, enabled them to build up a mass of material to pass as spirit-messages. They devised an ingenious code which shows how the tricks of the Zancigs and all other so-called thought-readers can be worked with or without speech. They fooled a hundred of their fellow-prisoners and won the confidence of the Turkish Commandant and his interpreter by playing on their avarice in professing to know where some buried treasure was hidden. This was part of a plan to secure more liberty and chance of escape; but it failed. Then they feigned madness, were certified insane and sent to a hospital in Constantinople, the "spirit-messages"

throughout playing the magic part, which, as Lieutenant Jones says in his preface, were received by his fellow-prisoners as "from the world beyond" or "from other minds in this sphere." He adds that the arrival of Sir Oliver Lodge's *Raymond* in the camp only served to confirm their credulity: hence, "we do know that in the face of the most elaborate and persistent efforts to detect fraud it is possible to convert intelligent, scientific, and otherwise highly educated men to spiritualism by means of the arts and methods employed by 'mediums' in general." The armistice secured the repatriation of the *soi-disant* lunatics.

Widespread among intelligent people is the belief that certain persons possess a special faculty of divining the locality of water or of metalliferous veins, and, in former days, of discovery of buried treasure. That it finds believers and exponents among Spiritualists is no wonder, because it has affinity with the theory of telepathy in the assumption that the dowser is gifted with a psychical faculty for his task. The late Dr Alfred R. Wallace had no doubt that "all true dowsing is due to spirit impression";¹ and Sir William Barrett, who has written copiously on the subject, sees in the divining of the existence of underground water the presence of a supersensuous perceptive faculty "in the dowser."² This obscure perceptive power or instinctive detection of the hidden object of his search may not excite any consciousness of the fact on the part of the dowser, but it may be adequate to produce a nervous stimulus which will start the involuntary muscular action that twists the forked rod held by the dowser in somewhat unstable equilibrium.

We have, in the words of St Paul to the Ephesians, to "wrestle against spiritual wickedness in high places." In the Editorial Notes of *Discovery, the Monthly Popular Journal of Knowledge*, of September 1920, I read with some surprise an unqualified support of Sir William Barrett's hypothesis. The editor, Dr Russell, says that "it seems quite certain that this power [the dowser's] is genuine. For more than four hundred years stories describing it have been current." That antiquity of record proves validity is a strange argument for a Doctor in Science to employ. Dr Russell continues: "Something causes the dowser to twist the twig . . . the cause is psychical certainly, and not physical. There is no physical action between the water, or whatever it is that is being sought, and the twig. Murmurs in the literature about electrical, thermal, or radio activity show merely the ignorance

¹ *Letters and Reminiscences*, vol. ii.

² *Psychical Research*, p. 183.

of the writer in the elements of natural science." We must say unto the editor of *Discovery*: "Physician, heal thyself."

Among well-nigh every people there is found belief in the magical power of rods or wands. Rhabdomancy lies many centuries behind the four to which Dr Russell limits it. Did space permit, it would be interesting to trace the history of one of the oldest examples in the long, probably never to be closed, list of superstitions and illusions. Suffice it to say that the forked hazel or willow twig is in direct descent from the caduceus of Mercury, whose assumed magic powers link it with the broomstick of the medieval witch, whereon she rode through the air. It was formerly much in request for the detection of thieves and other criminals, but among ourselves its use is limited to dowsing. Some of the professors of that art dispense with it: they think that the impulse from the hidden spring or vein comes direct, evidencing itself by nausea or nerve-tremors—thus shifting the seat of activity from the rod to the body. (Some of us occasionally have similar sensations not to be connected with dowsing.) As it is admitted that the twig sometimes bends where no water is, that must be eliminated as a cause of the bending. If, on the other hand, the water is found in the absence of the twig, that must be eliminated as a cause of the discovery. So the question is narrowed to the psychology of the dowser. Excluding suggestions of trickery, is he in the possession of a special psychical faculty, or is he the victim of a delusion?

The answer, unlike the water sought after, lies on the surface. The movement of the dowsing-twig is not due to any occult property which emanates from the thing hidden. It is explained by the muscular fatigue resulting from the effort of keeping the hands and fingers in one position. The strained hands seek relief, and, as they move, the forked twig moves with them mechanically. While the cooler-headed can control this muscular relaxation, those who are mentally absorbed in the strange procedure find their tired hands (tired, though they are unconscious of it) suddenly turning, and the twig flies upwards in a way which they can neither explain nor control. These are the honest, self-deceived dowsers, who have been sufficiently numerous to establish a belief in the existence of a mysterious agency causing the twig to "duck."¹

I think that both geologists and hydrologists are agreed that not only is it not difficult to find water well distributed throughout this island, but that it would be more difficult to

¹ See "The Divining Rod," chap. xxxix., *Diversions of a Naturalist*, by Sir Ray Lankester.

miss it. Given careful observance of the lie of the land, of indications of nearness of water in surface rocks and of their water-bearing properties or the reverse, and of external signs and levels, there will be no need of exceptional shrewdness to indicate where wells may be sunk. At any rate, the facts of the distribution of underground water seem to be fatal to the common belief that the diviner's sensations are caused by the nearness of water at the points where these sensations are specially felt, or that he possesses any peculiar or abnormal faculty for its discovery. Experiments with water-finders, and examination of their claims, go to prove this. A report on investigations carried on under the leadership of Prof. Wertheimer, Principal of the Merchant Venturers' Technical College, Bristol, during 1904-5, schedules the result of sundry experiments, failure on the part of the dowser being explained thus: "consciously or unconsciously someone influenced him by thought-transference." Here are the Professor's conclusions: "In so far as these experiments have gone, I am inclined to believe that the motion of the dowser's rod, and the sensations which he experiences, are not due to any cause outside himself. The experiments do not answer definitely the question whether or not dowsers have the power to find water; but I think they show (a) that experienced dowsers did not give the same indications in the same place, and (b) that the movements of their rods were, in several of the experiments described, due purely to subjective causes" (*Times*, 27th September 1906).

Eight years later a committee of diviners and scientists, the chief expert among these latter being Mr William Whitaker, F.R.S., well known for his work in Applied Geology, chose the neighbourhood of Guildford for a series of demonstrations. The conclusions at which the committee (of course excluding the dowsers) arrived are in harmony with Professor Wertheimer's. They are "that whatever sensitiveness to underground water may exist in certain persons, of which some evidence may be given, it is not sufficiently definite and trustworthy to be of much practical value. Moreover, the lack of agreement with each other shows that it is more a matter of personal mentality than of any direct influence of the water. The diviners as a rule confine their attention to small streams of water; and as there are few places where these cannot be found, they may well show a large percentage of success." Yet with such evidence against them, physicists there are, as references already given show, who ignore the Law of Parsimony, the logical principle that no more forces or causes should be assumed than are necessary to account

for the effects. Thus does Occultism, by a mass of gratuitous assumptions, retard approach to the discovery of truth. Hume's axiom holds the field: "As finite added to finite never approaches a hair's-breadth nearer to infinite, so a thing incredible in itself acquires not the smallest accession of probability by the accumulation of testimony."¹

Apparently the Masters in the Spiritualistic Israel have limits to their credulity: hence they look askance on palmistry. But it cannot be excluded from the occult. It has its roots deep down in, and draws sustenance from, that pre-human, inherited instinct of curiosity which is one of the most powerful and insatiate of all instincts, source of wonder, and impetus to that spirit of inquiry without which no discovery or invention or progress in any direction would have been possible. In the case of palmistry the instinct of curiosity is stimulated by the common desire to know the future and predict what of fate or fortune it holds. Round that momentous question the spirit of man revolves, like planet tethered to sun. Palmistry has a high antiquity. Its origin is to be sought for in the speculative East as far as China, rather than in the practical West, whither it was probably brought by gypsies. It has a literature of its own in India, where to this day it is practised by a special caste of Brahmans called Joshi. In his *Historiæ Animalium* (i. 15), Aristotle observes that long-lived persons have one or two lines which extend through the whole hand, while short-lived persons have lines not thus extended. Medieval writers, among whom may be cited Erasmus in his *Colloquy*, "The Old Man's Dialogue," have much to say on a subject which, down to the present day, fills a number of treatises witnessing both to the seriousness and the unconscious humour of their authors. The latest among these is a *Catechism of Palmistry*, dealing with every phase of the subject in six hundred and thirty-seven answers to questions, based on delineations of tens of thousands of hands by the compiler. "The British Institute of Mental Science (Incorporated) has selected the work as its text-book for candidates who are examined for its diplomas."

Palmistry rests its case on an assumed connection between brain and hand as supplying a key to character, and on the doctrine of "Signatures," which, among its many symbolic vagaries about lines and markings, connects planetary influences with the hand. Its professors do not neglect other and more rational keys to interpretation of character and temperament supplied by facial expression and general

¹ *Life and Correspondence*, vol. i. p. 480.

movements, adding to these conscious or unconscious self-revelations by the subject, enabling them sometimes to form a judgment so correct as to strengthen belief in occultism.

The palmist deals with the monticuli or mounts of the hand and their markings, and with the lines between them, giving prominence to the thumb as the outstanding feature, concerning which, as an important factor in man's evolution, he is on solid ground. Astrological significance is given to the seven mounts, which are named after the planets, while the four chief lines of the hand are interpreted as indicating by their length the duration of life. Thus a psychic or predictive meaning is given to purely mechanical conditions of the organ.

The creases and infoldings of our hands are produced by the action of the muscles, the foldings being "so disposed that the thick loose skin shall be capable of bending in grasping, whilst it is held down to the skeleton of the hand by fibrous lines of attachment so as to prevent its slipping, with consequent insecurity of grip." The same lines and mounts are present in the hands and feet of the anthropoid apes; the so-called lines of love, life, health, and so forth, are present alike in the simian and the human hand, and, presumably, should have the same interpretation. But the authorities at the Zoological Gardens, apparently, have not deemed it worth while to submit the destiny of the big apes to the forecast of the palmist. That the mystic lines are found on the palms of stillborn babes should give added cause of hesitancy to consult the West End prophets. The matter may be summed up thus: there is as much warrant for reading fortunes in the lines of the hands as for reading them in the creases in the knees of trousers and in the elbows of coats.

The list of further occupants of the lower plane of Occultism includes medium-trainers, psychotherapists or faith-healers, dealers in Memphis screens, psychostatists or soul-weighers, spirit photographers, phrenologists, believers in luck-bringers, astrologists, numerists, *et hoc genus omne*.

The extent to which Occultism flourishes, what allied organisations knit together its several branches, and how active and eager is their propaganda, can be known only by reading the various organs of the cult, as *Light*, the *International Psychic Gazette*, the *Occult Review*, and the fortune-telling *Raphael's Prophetic Messenger* and *Old Moore's Almanack*. The advertisement columns of these periodicals supply the names and addresses of the professors of the several arts, and also information as to the meetings of the

various associations. Those who desire initiation into the mysteries of mediumship can secure this at a moderate cost, even without the trouble of personal tuition. One advertiser offers to teach "psychic development" for a guinea: that sum ensures twelve monthly lessons by post and answers to all questions. Another "normal psychist and telepathist," so he thus describes himself, offers the same advantages for half a guinea; while for the modest sum of sixpence there can be had, post free, a *Manual of Directions for Beginners at Séances*. Psychotherapists offer cures at preposterously low fees. Their methods promise immediate relief from neuralgia, toothache, and headache; from gout, sciatica, and influenza in a few minutes; and from appendicitis, neurasthenia, internal tumours, and cataract in a few visits.

There was recently shown in a jeweller's window in the town where I live a drawing of an arm in which the blood was depicted as flowing in a broad red stream from the third finger direct to the heart. This was to prove that by wearing an anti-rheumatic ring, which has "magnetic" studs inside it, on the third finger of the left hand, the uric acid is drawn from the blood and the complaint cured. The gradual discoloration of the finger is proof of the success of the remedy. The ring, priced at from five shillings to five guineas, is, as we are told, "worn by Members of the Royal Family, the Nobility and Gentry, and by thousands of eminent personages throughout the world."

Following the "absent treatment" in vogue among Christian Scientists, who, on prepayment of fees, transmit to the afflicted the telepathic energies which radiate from the "Healing Word," a lady psychiatrist will cure patients of any complaint by correspondence, the condition being that the details respecting it are accompanied by the fee. There can be had from dealers in "goods for the occult," at the cost of half a guinea, "vitic rods to restore energy to the anæmic, and to arrest senile decay"; while for the same amount there can be bought "Memphis Psychic Screens" for observing the hypothetical exudation named "human aura"—ephemeral, enigmatical protuberances of various degrees of density projected momentarily from the bodies of certain mediums and vanishing in the twinkling of an eye.¹ Two shillings and ninepence is asked for "Memphis Incense," the purpose of which is not stated. Perhaps it has narcotising properties whereby those who inhale it are lulled to clairvoyance, as was the priestess of Apollo by the miasmatic vapour issuing from the cleft in the Delphian rock. Sir

¹ See HIBBERT JOURNAL, Oct. 1921, p. 60.

Oliver Lodge attaches importance to "the somnambule conditions, when the conscious or noticing aspect of the mind is latent, and when the things which influence the person are . . . either something internal or else something not belonging to the ordinary known universe at all." As Matthew Arnold puts it :

" Born into life, who lists
 May what is false hold dear,
 And for himself make mists
 Through which to see less clear."

In the occult atmosphere the Krypton-charged fog never lifts. Poetic imagination, using art as its handmaid, has encircled the heads of divine beings and sacred persons with discs or halos ; sometimes, as in the case of medieval saints, the whole body is depicted as enveloped in a nimbus or cloud-like vestment. Tradition tells of dazzling lights emanating from the divine and holy at certain crises of their lives, as in the transfiguration of Jesus, when His raiment shone white as snow—so brightly that no fuller on earth could whiten it (Matt. xvii. 2 and Mk. ix. 3). Paul, on the road to Damascus, could not be seen for the glory of the light which surrounded him (Acts xxii. 11); and when Moses came down from Sinai the skin of his face shone "so that the people were afraid to come nigh" him (Exod. xxxiv. 30). "A certain Abbot Simeon of Constantinople, who lived in the eleventh century, maintained that the monks, by long fasting and prayer and by fixing their eyes on their stomachs, would see within their bodies an Uncreated Light. This gave rise to a doctrine so-named, and to a controversy which lasted nearly a century and threatened to rend the Eastern Church in twain. That Church still stands pledged, in virtue of an unreversed decision of a Council, to belief in the Uncreated Light."¹ The occultist seizes on these and kindred examples from Eastern and Western hagiology as evidence that ecstatic conditions render the body translucent, intensifying the aura which emanates from and plays round seer or saint. The auric colours are said to proceed from the higher or "astral" self, or, more mundanely, from the nervous system. But as they are visible only to the eyes of faith, through which it is the privilege of the clairvoyant to see them, there is ample scope for the creation of symbols and assumption of the several functions which are assigned to the chromatic elements composing the aura. In an article on "The Psychic Significance of the Cat," in the *Occult Review*

¹ Athelstan Riley's *Mount Athos*, pp. 193-5.

of June 1917, that animal is said to have "a green aura," as to the purpose of which the writer is discreetly silent. But surely the limits of extravaganza are reached in a statement made in a recently published book, entitled *Miadoxia*, wherein the author, "a Priest"—he withholds his name,—speaking of the Reserved Sacrament, says that "sensitive psychics are at once aware of its presence, and some even assert that a brilliant radiance emanates from it." Very old is the belief that cloud-like forms, like wraiths and phantoms, appear to leave the body at death, but their tenuity often eludes mortal vision. Such is the explanation given by Dr Fournier d'Albe, "greatly bold in speculation," as one of his followers describes him. Both of them take seriously the reports of an American, Dr Duncan M'Dougall, of Boston, that experiments carried out in weighing the body both before and after death appear to show a decided loss of weight at the moment the person expires. The very second when this happened was determined by the dropping of the scale; in each case there was a loss of weight of from half an ounce to an ounce. This, with an ingenuity more creditable to his heart than his head, Dr M'Dougall assumed represented the soul-weight. When a dying dog was placed in scales balanced to the fraction of an ounce, the weight at death in every case remained the same. Against the argument as to the non-survival of the animal which the experiment would seem to support, there should be cited the communication from Raymond Lodge's control, the little Indian girl Fedá, that he has "a nice doggie with him"!

Patience, already tried by this insipid stuff, shall not have boredom added thereto by details of the astral body which occultists believe is a replica of the physical, compounded of diaphanous matter, and visible only to clairvoyants. I name it only to show that it has links with the astrology of to-day. Since the remote period when watchers of the skies interpreted human destiny by the movements of the stars belief in that connection has been persistent. Our daily speech bears unconscious witness to the significance which once inhered in such words as jovial, mercurial, saturnine, martial, consideration, influence, and disaster. There was established in 1913 an Occult Club for the study of astrology, the opening date being fixed after study of the stars. One of our eminent writers, lately deceased, was a convinced believer in that spurious science. He accumulated a library on the subject, and, under a pseudonym, published more than one book about it. "If they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" The advertisement

columns of the *International Psychic Gazette* give answer: "Human life is the science of the stars. Send me your birth-time and one shilling postal order," says one advertiser. Another offers an astrological chart, with career outlined, for three shillings. For fourteenpence you can learn your place in the zodiac, to what diseases you are subject, how to cure them, and whom to marry. And so on, *ad finem*. As to prophecy, in his issue for the current year Old Moore's forecast for May is that "the stationary position of Venus will give cause for festivities and rejoicings in England and will also benefit Palestine in its internal development. Saturn will bring dire trouble on Moscow, and at home there will be many casualties in places of amusement, more especially in the Metropolis. The life of a king is threatened, and some postal or transport strike is imminent."

Astrologists and numerists meet together in the assignment of a spiritual vibration to each number in its connection with vibrations from the planets. Here it must suffice to refer to what is said about the number seven. "It has," we are told, "a very fine psychic vibration of red, and when this powerful energy is transmuted on to the higher soul-plane it is purified into pink, and brings with it the vibration of love and sympathy. It represents the triumph of spirit over matter." In the Highest Sphere seven is the seven-lettered name of God. In the Sphere of Intellect there are seven angels; in the Heavenly Sphere seven planets; in the Lower Sphere there are the integral members and the seven holes of the head. Shakespeare's "seven ages" is quoted in further proof of the climacteric years of human life, a superstition on which is founded the belief that special changes and perils occur at periods which are multiples of seven, and which explain customs such as those attaching to the attainment of legal manhood at twenty-one years and the granting of leases for seven years and multiples of seven. But such is his mentality that the occultist must go far afield to account for what is under his nose.

Space is left for only the briefest reference to other superstitions which are on my list. Such are phrenology and mascotolatry. Both are flourishing. There is no lack of charlatans who profess to find the key to mental and moral faculties in the bumps of the skull. They might, as has been said, with equal warrant try to find out whether there were bullion or banknotes inside a safe by handling the knobs and bosses on the door. And there is no lack of dealers in luck-bringers, nor lack of wearers of them, to whom they are more than a joke. Smile as they may when they are

challenged, there will come evidence of lurking belief that the mascot has power for good or evil.

In ascending to the *medial* plane of Occultism we make escape from the grossness of the *lower*, but the atmosphere remains hazy. Echoing Tertullian's famous saying that he believed that a dogma was true because it was impossible, St Serafina piously exclaimed: "O luminous obscurity, so clear to all who love you!" The mystic is ever the cryptic. The dwellers on that plane use a language not easily "understood of the people." They tell us that they are endowed with powers conferred only on a privileged few, whereby there are apprehensible by them alone the secrets of the cosmos. To quote from one of their chief exponents, they claim that these powers are the possession of "certain perfected individuals of human lineage, that there exists a secret science of nature and of man to which access can be gained only by the duly initiated." Occultism claims that the range of the senses can be enormously extended psychically, and the imperfection and inaccuracies of the normal senses progressively corrected by the natural development of the power of the human organism itself. Such being the conditions of research, it follows inevitably, it is said, that this order of science must necessarily be secret, for it can be proved and authenticated only by those and to those who are possessed of such power, these constituting a hierarchy of ever loftier grades reaching even up to Deity itself. "These reported perfected men claim to be the masters of inexhaustible sources of occult scientific knowledge attained by means of laborious and carefully trained psychical and spiritual powers, the nature of the lowest of which may be deduced from a study of abnormal psychical phenomena and of the traditional system of psychology and mental discipline in India and other Eastern lands."¹ Since these favoured supermen tell the secrets of the Universe only to their equals, the withholding of their names and addresses is not surprising. The nearest approach to these mysterious mortals seems to be within the well-barred frontiers of Tibet, where, like the gods of Lucretius, the Mahatmas dwell "in sacred, everlasting calm," utilising their "world-etheric Akaz force" as the occasional vehicle of letters to Theosophists. We know these cranks by their labels — Swedenborgians, Rosicrucians, Neo-Pythagoreans, modern Esoteric Buddhists, and so forth: all of one essence in their pretensions. They are in agreement with Spiritualism in belief that there is communication with the departed; but

¹ Art. "Occultism," Hastings' *Encycl. of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ix. p. 444.

they deprecate the employment of mediums, and profess ability, by the exercise of their occult power, to establish direct relations with the Beyond.

They abstain from speculations about the nature and activities of unseen agencies, leaving these to Spiritualists of the type of the late Dr Alfred Russel Wallace. In his *World of Life* he speaks contemptuously of the current notions about archangels and angels; he says that they are an "apparently gratuitous creation of the theologians," and dismisses them as hangers-on or loafers in the court of heaven. A course of study on comparative mythology would have taught him that the origin of belief in these winged abnormals has been traced to Chaldean and Hittite sources. Probably he had not read an essay on the *Comparative Anatomy of Angels*, by Fechner, the father of experimental psychology, in which he demonstrates that they have no legs because, in the first step to a state of spherical perfection, these organs would disappear. But Dr Wallace sticks to a creation of his own. He says that "it seems only logical to assume that the vast, the infinite chasm between ourselves and the Deity is to some extent occupied by an almost infinite series of grades of beings, each successive grade having higher and higher powers in regard to the origination, development, and control of the universe. The supreme, infinite Being might, for instance, impress a sufficient number of his highest angels to create by their will-power the primal universe of ether with all those inherent properties and forces necessary for what was to follow. Using this as a vehicle, the next subordinate association of angels would so act upon the ether as to develop from it, in suitable masses and at suitable distances, the various elements of matter which, under the influence of such laws and forces as gravitation, heat, and electricity, would thenceforth begin to form those vast systems of nebulae and suns which constitute our stellar universe" (pp. 393-4). Support—*quantum valeat*—is given to Dr Wallace's angelolatry by some messages from the control named "Astriel" to the Rev. Vale Owen. Astriel informs him that the stellar power of transmitting light is due to the activity "of myriads of spiritual beings all working in conjunction." And Sir Oliver Lodge joins hands with Dr Wallace in belief in the help rendered to men "by other beings and in other ways." He adds that he holds "this to be literally true." The thin, treacherous crust of these speculations rests on the bedrock of animistic belief which they share in common with the savage.

The dwellers on the *higher* occult plane will have no deal-

ings with those on the *lower* and the *medial*. They are repelled by the necromancy of the one and the word-spinning of the other, although, since their experience can be stated only in metaphor, they must submit to the charge of obscurity. Mysticism is not a concrete system of thought, or of speculation on origins and processes. It has neither creed nor ritual; hence no sect is begotten of it, nor any organised Church built upon it. It is a temperament whose source and sustenance lie in the emotions—never in reason. Vague and elusive are all attempts at clear and precise definition of it; perhaps the nearest thereto is that of Professor Edward Caird, who says that it is “that attitude of mind in which all other relations are swallowed up in the relation of the soul to God” as Absolute Reality.¹ The mystic is assured of the immanence of the divine, as Dean Inge puts it: “The soul is in immediate communion, real or supposed”—(the Dean’s qualification should be noted)—“with the Soul of the World.” Hence the assumption, to which science can give no support, that there are sources of knowledge other than those of which the senses are the only vehicle.

The blend of the serious and the vulgar is, primarily, an American product; hence we find mysticism thus described by one of its exponents in that country: “To recognise our own divinity and our intimate relation to the Universal is to attach the belt of our machinery to the power-house of the universe.”²

The late Frederick Myers struck a loftier note in his *Saint Paul* :—

“Then let me feel how infinite around me
Floats the eternal peace that is to be;
Rush from the demons, for my King has found me;
Leap from the Universe, and plunge in Thee.”

Here, in such absorption, arguments have no force and experiments no place; the inner light cannot be submitted to spectroscopic analysis; the occult has unrestricted play.

Both Mysticism and Quietism have produced some of the nobler types of humanity both in East and West, seeking, amidst the turbulence of the world, “some roadside dells of rest,” and far be it from me to pour scorn on these lofty souls or to link them with the necromancers whose pretensions and performances are subjects of their contumely. But aloofness tends to sterility and dehumanising, easily passing into self-interest and barrenness, because of withdrawal from

¹ *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii. p. 210.

² *An Encyclop. of Occultism*, p. 294.

spheres where duty is paramount in its demands. Moreover, danger arises when, his emotions uncurbed, the mystic passes into the ecstatic. Then are begotten illusions of voices heard, visions seen, and other abnormal phenomena, details of which fill wearying biographies of Saint and Sufi.

Varied as are the forms and phases of Occultism, ranging from the grossly material to the ultra-transcendental, they are one in essence. To borrow a term from chemistry, they are allotropic, *i.e.* in variation of qualities without change of substance, as *e.g.* in the brilliant diamond and the lustreless graphite, both of which are crystallised forms of carbon.

In dealing with Occultism, science discharges its functions in explaining it. It has traced its origin to the stage in man's evolution when the emotions of fear and curiosity had unchecked play, and when the reasoning faculty was in that embryonic stage from which it is emerging with painful slowness. Its long history is made bare; its place in the unfinished chapter of illusions is assigned. But let us live in no fool's paradise as to its forthcoming defeat and death from the weapons which science hurls against it. Argument will not arrest the mischief working in our midst; nor decrease the crowd of those in whom the wish to believe kills the desire to know. History has many an example to show that delusions and errors do not perish by controversial warfare: they perish only under the slow and scarcely perceptible operation of changes which are fatal to them. The atmosphere is altered; the organism can neither respire nor respond, and it dies. Thus, save where there still lurks the ignorance which is its breath of life, has perished belief in witches and kindred superstitions, as of were-wolves and their kind; thus everywhere, where the conception of an unbroken order of nature is extended, the area of a spurious supernatural shrinks.

EDWARD CLODD.

ALDEBURGH.

MATERIALISM AND OCCULTISM.

E. WAKE COOK.

RIGHTLY read, the wondrous revelations of physical science would bring the hardest-headed atheist to his knees in awe and adoration of the Stupendous Power thus made manifest. But they have been wrongly read, and have encouraged a shallow materialism, which has struck at the roots of religion and weakened the moral sanctions just when they needed strengthening immeasurably by means more potent than any yet employed.

Science has put into our hands terrible forces of destruction, and promises still more potent powers, beneficent when rightly used, but devastating in Hunnish hands. Thus physical science has weakened religion and the moral restraints when it should have increased man's sense of responsibility in the ratio of the increased power it has given him. We thus see the perils of one-sided culture.

But Nature never loses her balance. Side by side with the magnificent advance of physical science there has grown up a complementary spiritual science which corrects the shortcomings of the former. It places religion on a firmer footing than ever, and strengthens the moral sanctions in a way that the Churches, with their war of conflicting creeds, can never do. This restoring of culture to its all-round completeness is the only thing that can save civilisation from its manifold menace. But this saving science has been despised and rejected of men, as ever. The saddest chapter in human history is the reception given to new truth. We go on repeating the same old blunder age after age, we stone our light-bringers, and are always wrong. It is too humiliating thus to belong to an ever-defeated army. We should always hail new truth as a possible revelation of God; and the very fact that it is opposed by the old guard is strong presumptive evidence in its favour. The Pharisees crucified our Lord; the priests made Galileo recant, and they have

opposed tooth and nail every advance in science. And now, to complete the tragic comedy, we see scientists in their turn are adopting priestly intolerance and are opposing the newer science, as the priests opposed their science. How quickly Dr Martineau detected the incipient Popishness, and how felicitously he characterised it, when he said of one of Tyndall's assertions, "This is not science: it is a decretal adorned with a scientific nimbus"!

The Protestant reaction against the priestly abuses of the Romish Church went too far, "and the baby was poured out with the bath water!" A number of invaluable truths were thrown away as mere superstition. This reaction started that materialistic rationalism which is one of the greatest enemies of the Churches. It might safely be asserted that almost every "superstition" is a fiction founded on a fact. We are rooted in the Infinite, the source of all our thoughts and ideas, and of that all but unerring instinct, and the higher intuitions. So "superstitions" are promptings from the same source which get misinterpreted, misread, or misstated through verbal blunderings, exaggerations, or sheer perversion. To suppose there is nothing in them is hopelessly irrational. In fact, so-called "Rationalism" is reason in blinkers; it is the label of the all but closed mind. The *soi-disant* Rationalist begins his psychology by eliminating soul, and all the higher and finer parts of our nature—everything, in fact, that cannot be crushed into inadequate materialistic explanations, which explain nothing. Modern Spiritualism is really a Higher Rationalism, which takes the whole gamut of human nature—sense, soul, and spirit—and interprets all by unfettered reason. It takes all that is good in all systems and reconciles them in higher synthesis, forming a loosely articulated body of philosophy head and shoulders above any other. Founded on science, interpreted by philosophy, it ascends to a world-embracing religion.

A glorious inheritance of the Churches, cut off by the Protestant reaction, was the long chain of Pentecostal manifestations which are the subject-matter of the new spiritual science. From the time of the Apostles there were sporadic echoes of Christ's "miracles." There were healings, visions, etc. There were the ecstatic experiences of the Neo-Platonists, and the revelations of Jacob Boehme, which take their place in the history of philosophy; and there were the multitude of Mystics, whose exaltation of faculty baffles the mundane reason. There were the marvels in the lives of the Saints, abundantly testified ere canonisation was granted. One of the last to be canonised should, perhaps,

take the first place in the galaxy—the wondrous Joan of Arc, every word of whose history is attested on oath, and to whom we mentally bow the knee. The angel maid with her angel voices stands as a Sphinx-like riddle no rationalistic Œdipus can solve. It can only be solved by those despised pioneers of the new science, who are blessed with the greatest of all boons—the open mind and the seeing eye. The retention of her hold on these Spiritualistic phenomena has been a tower of strength to the Romish Church, and she has held her sway despite her creedal tyranny which tends to keep her children in spiritual swaddling clothes, when unfettered growth of the spirit is the high road to God and the source of the beatitudes; and despite, too, of her inconsistency in attributing all such supernormal happenings and revelations to the Devil when outside her fold, or when the teachings contradict her own—as they generally do.

The most significant fact is that these supernormal manifestations are coeval with humanity. Mr Clodd himself has shown this conclusively, and he has built up an impregnably strong case for exactly the opposite conclusion to that at which he has, unfortunately, arrived. Through all history, sacred and secular, barbaric and classical, the same story runs. It runs all through the Bible, and blazes out as a new constellation in the New Testament. The Apostles continued the wondrous tale, which was carried on by the Fathers and the whole galaxy of the Saints. Every one of the “miracles” of Christ is echoed in the lives of the Saints. This is, of course, a source of suspicion; and it was perhaps as well that the accounts of all wonders should have been submerged under a flood of scepticism, so all that is true in them might emerge purified from the dross. That there should be exaggeration, much pure invention, and the magnifying of molehills into mountains, goes without saying; but that there should be no fire under these vast volumes of smoke it is impossible to believe. That it is all lying and chicanery no man who wishes himself to be believed will venture to assert. We judge a man by his judgment of others; so it is wise to be charitable. Above all, it is a thousand times wiser to believe too much in wonders than to believe too little. Compare the outlook of a century ago with the realities of to-day, and see how the most brilliant forecast of possible discoveries of that time has been exceeded in all directions. In like manner will our highest forecasts be exceeded by the achievements of the coming time.

Truth is infinite, Existence is infinite; and the larger, the grander the conception of it, the more certain is it to

be true. Narrowness is the one manifest falsity ; so every creed, every system of thought—nay, every branch of science itself—is condemned in the ratio of its narrowness. As already stated, many scientists have shown a priestly intolerance of the opening phases of that Newer and grander Science of the Future towards which their own efforts are but scaffolding.

Mr Clodd, in the first of his articles on "Occultism,"¹ classes Spiritualism among all the other savage superstitions, as he is pleased to call them. So let us take it as the latest, the most illuminative phase of Occultism. Here is a clergyman's view. The Rev. H. R. Haweis said years ago, and the case has grown in strength immeasurably since :—

"Take up your Bible, and you will find that there is not a single phenomenon which is recorded there which does not occur at seances to-day. Whether it be lights, sounds, the shaking of the house, the coming through closed doors, the mighty rushing winds, levitation, automatic writing, the speaking in tongues, we are acquainted with all these phenomena ; they occur every day in London as well as in the Acts of the Apostles. . . . It is incontestable that such things do occur, that in the main the phenomena of Spiritualism are reliable, and happen over and over again, under test conditions, in the presence of witnesses ; and that similar phenomena are recorded in the Bible, which is written for our learning. It is not an opinion, not a theory, but a fact. There is chapter and verse for it, and that is what has rehabilitated the Bible. The clergy ought to be very grateful to Spiritualism for this, for they could not have done it themselves."

But whether the clergy will be grateful to Mr Clodd for laying a sacrilegious axe to the root of all religions, and the higher beliefs, is for them to say. These spiritual phenomena are at the root of all the higher forms of religion, and are only absent from those truncated forms which can be described as "ethics touched by emotion." So intimately are they associated with the higher forms of religion, such as Christianity, that the true inwardness of such religions cannot be understood by those unacquainted with the modern manifestations. Mr Clodd has shown the universality of these phenomena ; and Dr Alfred Russel Wallace, O.M., thirty-five years ago said they were as well proved as any fact in science. Since then the Society for Psychical Research has

¹ HIBBERT JOURNAL, October 1921.

collected a whole library of carefully sifted evidence, and other evidence is accumulating faster than it can be printed. For twenty-five years I devoted three or four hours a day to reading the literature, and to investigating the phenomena of Spiritualism. I found the subject so vast, so interwoven with all history, with all phases of thought, that I can safely say that any religion, philosophy, or system of thought which ignores it is impoverished and out of date; and their teachers are playing *Hamlet* without the Prince.

The philosophy of Spiritualism is a unique blend of science, philosophy, and religion; which reconciles materialism and spiritualism and, without any conscious eclecticism, endorses, and incorporates all that is true in all systems.

It is founded on the grandest conception of the Cosmos, of Existence as a whole, ever given to man. As one writer said of the first great work of the Father of Modern Spiritualism, "Never has there been presented at one view a cosmogony so grand, a theology so sublime, and a future destiny of man so transcendent." Two clergymen pronounced it "the most surprising prodigy of literary history." This work, *The Principles of Nature: Her Divine Revelations*, ran through over forty costly editions in America, but is almost unknown and not to be got in England. Remarkable as the post-war developments have been, the beginnings were much more remarkable and important, yet they are all but unknown to our English writers, who unwittingly truncate and impoverish their stupendous subject. The later writings deal with the fact and the conditions of communication with the next world, and the character and the splendours of that world, and the floods of light all these new revealments throw on religion. The earliest works gave a complete history and philosophy of the Universe, and a philosophy of Life which solves or illumines the practical problems with which we are now struggling. The wonder of the first great work being that it was dictated throughout in hypnotic trance by Dr Andrew Jackson Davis, who was then an uneducated youth just out of his teens. The work is generally called *Nature's Divine Revelations*. The case of Davis, the Poughkeepsie Seer, was a little like that of Jacob Boehme, but more wonderful, and is the most significant in the whole history of psychology.

It would be interesting to know how Mr Clodd would fit this *fact* into his *theories*.

The crying need for to-day is for some great reconciling power that would still the war of creeds which set men fiercely fighting when they should be co-operating. The

menace of the devastating powers placed in men's hands by a one-sided science must be corrected by a more complete science which shall meet all the manifold needs of man, and raise his sense of responsibility to heights equal to his increased powers, and one which shall not be confined to those merely physical aspects which have encouraged a shallow materialism. The spiritual is ultimately the more powerful, and the New Spiritual Science is the only thing that offers the slightest ray of hope of a saving unity. This science bears the same relation to old-world Occultism as astronomy bears to astrology, and as chemistry bears to alchemy; or as Christianity bears to the barbaric beliefs of primitive peoples.

As already said, the subject-matter of the new science consists of just those supernormal phenomena which are at the root of all religions. It thus starts with one unifying bond. Its first work is to bring down to the bed-rock of science the basic doctrines of all religions, the reality of an after-life and of communication with those who have passed the glorious portal of "death." These have already been amply demonstrated to the satisfaction of all reasonable persons who know the overwhelming weight of the evidence. But that is a life-long study, it will soon be demonstrated to the meanest capacity. When the fundamentals of all religions are thus brought to the bed-rock of science, there will be established an underlying unity. Science knows no boundaries, and is the common property of all peoples. It overleaps the barriers of Babel, and is universal in its appeal. On such a world-wide foundation alone can there be unity in religion.

But this foundation once laid, all the differences of creed are meaningless. All communications from the next stage of existence show that a man starts the next life from the point he leaves this, there being no break of continuity. As he has sown, so must he reap. His beliefs may retard or accelerate his progress, but have little or no effect on his ultimate destiny. The more ignorant and bigoted he was on earth, the longer it will take him to outgrow his errors. His actions on earth will determine his immediate future. Instead of finding himself confronted after "death" by an external tribunal, awarding blessedness or punishment, he finds the tribunal within, and from its judgments there is no escape. No form of belief, no indulgences, forms of absolution, no death-bed repentance, can save him from the divinely appointed consequences of his actions. There can be no progress for the hardened criminal until the first

movements of spiritual growth awaken his conscience ; then he sees his misdeeds in a fierce search-light, and he will suffer sympathetically what he has made others suffer—this being the essential condition of progress. While he will see his crimes in such a lurid light, he will also see all extenuations ; so his sufferings will be apportioned by Divine Justice, not by man's purblind vindictiveness. Against all punishment inflicted from without we can steel ourselves, and stoically bear it ; but against the stabs of conscience there is no defence : we must pay the uttermost farthing.

We must remember that the Bolsheviks and other extremists are not merely materialists or atheists : they are fierce anti-religionists who have no restraints but present expediency. The appalling powers science is placing in such hands is a menace which can only be met by the scientific demonstration of the reality of an after-life, and the inevitability of appropriate punishment for all crimes and the misuse of power. It is the *inevitability* of punishment, not its severity, that counts.

While all misdeeds are thus automatically—so to speak—punished in the exact ratio of their badness, all spiritual culture, all good deeds will carry their own reward. When all religions, or all phases of religion, are thus brought into line by the scientific demonstration of the reality of an after-life and its conditions, doctrinal differences among the Churches must tend to disappear. All souls are “doomed to be saved,” as God has never lost grip of His creation, and a man's earthly beliefs cannot alter the Divine plan. In view of the infinity of truth and the smallness of even the largest creeds, their differences are as nothing, and that these differences should raise men to the fiercest hatreds of which they are capable is one of the most amazing things in this amazing world. Religion should unite all men in one Brotherhood under the Fatherhood of God ; but creedal religions are the great obstacle in the way : they separate, and inflame religious animosities. So all the God-belittling creeds must go, and be replaced by a vaster scientific religion big enough for all, in which individual spiritual growth will be encouraged rather than repressed by creedal fetters which are a form of death.

With the establishment of such a unifying religion, all the sectional Churches will have lost their *raison d'être*, and there should be no obstacle to a union of all the Churches. Then they will have a grander mission than ever. In view of accelerating growth of knowledge, new means for its diffusion must be established. The Church must be the

means of the Higher Education; and sermons must be University Extension Lectures, embracing everything pertaining to the mental and spiritual life of the community. The medical and the clerical functions will tend to unite, as Christ united healing with teaching. The glorious vista of usefulness for the Church of the Future must be left to those blessed with the scientific imagination.

Forced by the urgency of the case, and greatly daring, I have thus ventured into the perilous realms of prophecy. But "the prophetic soul of the world dreaming on things to come" has sometimes to use humble voices, the great and learned being immersed in other affairs, or they are in the fetters of the past, and some have too great a burden of dignity to entertain messengers from the other world who come in questionable guise. We have yet to realise that we are neck-deep in oceanic currents setting to distant, and dimly discerned shores; we may swim against these Gulf Streams as vigorously as we please, but we are carried thither all the same. The things I have forecast are on this stream of tendency and will come about, not by this or that voluntary movement, but by the inexorable logic of events.

E. WAKE COOK.

CHISWICK, W.

THE VALUE OF PLATO'S LAWS TO-DAY.

MRS A. M. ADAM.

SOME years ago a distinguished scholar living in the north of England invited a neighbour to meet a guest who was staying with him, "because," he said, "you are the only two people in this country who have read the *Laws* of Plato." This estimate was doubtless below the mark even then, and it is safe to say that the number of our compatriots who have read through the work to-day would need the fingers of more than two hands for their counting; yet the fact remains that the book is known to but few.

There are two main reasons why this should be so. The first is very good and sufficient, namely, that the Greek is extremely hard, and that hitherto little help has been available. Jowett's is, I believe, the only English translation in existence, and apparently his version of the *Laws* cannot be bought except in company with the other four volumes of his Plato. What with the length and intricacy of Plato's sentences in the *Laws*, the intellectual strain required to disentangle truth from—shall we say fiction as a euphemism for error?—in Jowett, and the wearisome meandering of Stallbaum's notes, it is no wonder that the *Laws* remains unread. Now, however, we may hope that the difficulty will be much lessened, with the appearance of the edition by Dr E. B. England, recently published.¹ The second reason for neglect of the *Laws* is its reputation as a dull book. This, I hope to show, is a delusion; if rightly handled, it will be found of intense interest for its bearing on questions which meet us at every turn to-day.

We need not deny that the *Laws* is a book on which the art of skipping may well be practised; that is due partly

¹ It is good to hear that a Loeb translation in capable hands is under way.

to its unfinished state, and partly to a decline in the faculty of artistic concentration owing to Plato's age: reference to events whose date is known makes it pretty sure that he was past sixty-five, and very likely past seventy, at the time of writing the first book. Many readers will find the civil and criminal codes contained in the sixth, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth books uncongenial; yet to-day these portions are becoming recognised as invaluable for the history of pre-Roman law, and when Mr Ernest Barker, in his *Greek Political Theory*, says of the last four books that "they are not only the finest parts of the *Laws*—they are also among the finest of all the writings of Plato," it is only right to refrain from an over-hasty judgment; the dullness may be in the eye, and not in the picture that is presented to it.

It is common to describe the *Laws* as a work of disillusioned old age. Plato had failed to establish in Sicily his ideal state, under an ideally wise ruler; and in a depressed mood he set out to construct a makeshift policy as best he could, following up (according to Professor von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, in his recent book, *Platon*) a double line of theoretical and philosophical constitution on the one hand, and on the other, practical regulations thrown in by shovelfuls from the files of enactments drafted for the use of the abandoned Dionysian state, and to a large extent founded on legal provisions actually in existence in Athens. Maybe the genesis of the book can be viewed in a more cheerful light. The ideal state of the *Republic* would only work if provided with a perpetual supply of entirely wise, entirely virtuous, and entirely incorruptible persons, who should rule according to their own unfettered judgment. Plato recognises that this state of things is precarious, and therefore, as he puts it in the *Politicus*, he thinks that he will act like a wise physician, who, when he goes on a journey, leaves written instructions for his patients to use in his absence. Plato would prefer the physician to be always present, so as to vary the treatment as required; he would like to place unlimited power in the hands of living Guardians (in the *Republic's* sense of the term) who should teach the masses to emerge from the cave and bear the light of day as far as in them lies; but, failing that, he will put into a compendious form the practical wisdom which he has gained in the course of a long life, for the guidance of those who come after. And not merely into a compendious form of cut-and-dried laws; the laws as a whole, and particular enactments also, have introductions—preludes, he calls them, to the

lawgiver's "strains" or formal "hymns"¹ of law, wherein their high purpose is set forth and elucidated.

In the *Republic* the possibility of divergent views among the Guardians is not contemplated, and rightly, because each individual Guardian should have reached full knowledge of the Good, and therewithal have attained, not only complete certainty of the right course to pursue in any given case, but freedom from all temptation to give way to unworthy motives. But even in the *Republic* we are given to understand that the city of perfect and infallible rulers is only to be found as an "ensample in the heavens," and in the *Laws* Plato goes so far as to make the following declaration (691c): "There is not, dear friends, any soul of mortal man, which, in youth and irresponsibility, can endure possession of supreme power over men, without becoming filled with foolishness, the greatest of diseases, and thereby bringing upon him the hatred of his best friends and the speedy loss of his dominions." "Give too much sail to a ship, too much food to a body, or too much power to a soul, and all is up." And again (in 875b) we find that although a person may have a theoretical conviction that public good should take precedence of private advantage, yet, "if he subsequently finds himself an absolute and irresponsible ruler, he will never be able to stand fast by this conviction, . . . but his mortal nature will continually drive him to the pursuit of personal advancement and private gain." Since, therefore, as seems indicated, no human virtue in youth or age can be found firm enough to withstand the poison of arbitrary power, Plato has recourse to the much-abused and universally adopted expedient of modern times, and appoints a series of committees, to administer the state to the best of their collective judgment, in accordance with the principles of wisdom and justice laid down by its original legislator. Recognition of human limitations, rather than disillusionment, may be held to be the origin of the practical spirit shown in the *Laws*.

The framework of the book is of the simplest: an Athenian, a Cretan, and a Spartan fall into talk about political theory, while they take a walk in Crete on a hot day.² After three

¹ A play on the sense of the word νόμοι, "tunes" and "laws."

² It is astonishing that a mistranslation of 722c should still stand in Jowett's 3rd edition. At that point the company have reached their place for lunch, having done nothing but talk about laws since they set out in the early morning, and yet they are only on the fringe of the subject. The Athenian says: "Dawn has given way to noon, and here we are in this exquisite gem of a resting-place." Jowett's version is: "All this time

books, in which the principles of politics and education and the origins of society are discussed, we are told that Crete has charged the Cnossians to organise a new colony. This news sets the Athenian off on making a new constitution for it. He declares the contents of the first three books to be a prelude to the hymn of the new state-construction. The remaining nine books are this "hymn," consisting partly of particular "hymns" or laws, and to a greater extent of preludes to these laws, wherein there is not much of the philosophy of heaven or earth that is left untouched. For all the good they do, the Cretan and the Spartan might just as well disappear. It would be interesting to know whether Plato on a revision would have cut them out, or given them a larger part to play from the fourth book onwards. The fifth book is a monologue for the Athenian, and a magnificent monologue too.

The word "education" is so much overworked in these days that there is danger lest our ears should be blunted to its significance, through mere force of repetition. A new edge may be given to our perceptions, if we discover that twenty-three centuries ago lifelong education, as the fundamental principle of a nation's welfare, was inculcated with a force which blue-books and stirring harangues may possibly equal, but cannot surpass. About eighteen months ago the Final Report of the Adult Education Committee, under the chairmanship of the Master of Balliol, was published. I take from it the following paragraph, emphasised by type in small capitals (p. 5): "The necessary conclusion is that adult education must not be regarded as a luxury for a few exceptional persons here and there, nor as a thing which concerns only a short space of early manhood, but that adult education is a permanent national necessity, an inseparable aspect of citizenship, and therefore should be both universal and lifelong." Very good; but the point seems to be driven closer home, when we read in the *Laws*, 807b (especially if we can read it in Greek), that after all the necessary machinery of food and clothing is provided, there remains a work "which is the greatest of all works, prescribed by righteous ordinance. . . . There ought to be no secondary work which may be a hindrance to the work of supplying the body with due exercise and tendance, and the soul with studies and training. Nay, every night and every day are really not from early dawn to noon have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat," notwithstanding that he rightly has, in his summary of the whole work: "The companions start at dawn and arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates the fourth book about noon."

enough for one who pursues this end to achieve completeness. Wherefore, since this is so, all freemen ought to make apportionment of their time through the whole of the twenty-four hours, starting we may almost say at dawn, and going on without break until the next dawn and sunrise." This formidable advocacy of adult education is rubbed in by Plato as he proceeds: "It may appear unseemly for the lawgiver to talk of many small details of household management, including the duty of doing without sleep at night, for those who are to guard the whole city with scrupulous care. For that any single citizen should continue asleep the whole of any single night, and should not be seen by his whole household to wake up and get up always before any of them, this might be accounted disgraceful by all . . . and unbecoming to a free man. . . . Also that the lady of the house should be called by her maids and should not herself be the first to wake them, this is what . . . everybody in the house should hold disgraceful" (if I remember rightly, Mrs Beeton's *Household Management* is of the same opinion). "All ought to get up while it is still night and do a large part of their public and household duties, rulers in the cities, and the masters and mistresses in their private houses. For much sleep is not naturally appropriate either for our bodies, or for our souls, nor yet for our activities physical or mental; no one who is asleep is worth a brass farthing, any more than if he were not alive. But whosoever of us has the highest regard for life and thought stays awake as much of the time as he can, only keeping for sleep what is expedient for his health, and that is not much, when he has got well into the habit. But rulers who keep awake are a terror to the bad, to foreign enemies as well as citizens, while they are admired and honoured by the just and temperate, and are useful to themselves and all the state." What would Plato have said to Mr Gladstone's favourite morning boast: "I've done my nine hours"?

If education has to be continued until senile decay sets in, it is likewise to be started at the earliest possible moment. Expectant mothers are to be strengthened by judicious exercise, and infants should absorb the elements of rhythm by living, if possible, as though they were always rocking on the sea, now in a swinging cradle, now being carried with rhythmical motion in their nurses' arms. Perambulators did not occur to Plato's inventive brain, and evidently there was no shortage of domestic help in his day, for he not only recommends that strong nurses should be chosen (in view of the ordinance that the children, when out for airings, should

be carried up to the age of three), but that there should be an allowance of "more than one" nurse per child.

We are apt to think that official administration of education in our day, at any rate since Mr Fisher has become President of the Board, has been hoisted on to a very high pedestal; but Mr Fisher would doubtless allow precedence to the Prime Minister. The Minister of Education in the *Laws*, on the other hand, is described as holding by far the greatest of the more distinguished offices of state (765e). The reason why he is thus exalted is worth giving in Plato's words, slightly condensed: "For the first growth of every plant or animal, tame or wild, if it makes a good start, is of the highest importance towards placing a fitting crown on the excellence that properly belongs to it. Now man, we hold, is a tame animal; nevertheless, although when he meets with right education and has a happy disposition he becomes the most divine and gentlest of creatures, if he be nurtured inadequately or ill, he is the wildest of all the offspring of mother earth."

When the Minister of Education gets to work upon the three-year-old, now allowed to use his legs, a Montessorian school of twentieth-century pattern is provided. From the age of three to that of six, the children are to meet at village temples, under the charge of select nurses, whose duty it is to superintend without obtruding themselves; for the rest, the children are to be left to their own spontaneous amusements, which they cannot fail to find out when they meet together. After this we enter on the study of Eurythmics, whose apostle, M. Jacques Dalcroze, does, I believe, give Plato the credit of being the source of his inspiration. The wise Athenian in the *Laws* has noted the inability of all young things to keep quiet "whether with limbs or voice; they must ever be leaping and frisking, as it were dancing with pleasure, and uttering all manner of sounds. But whereas other animals have no sense of order—to which we give the name of rhythm and harmony—or the lack of it in their movements, to us the gods have been given as our fellow-dancers, and they have granted to us that power to perceive and delight in rhythm and harmony by which they move us, linking us to one another with songs and dances, calling them merry minstrelsy, a name akin to mirth."¹ Very well, then; shall we say that education first comes by the help of the Muses and Apollo? And shall we identify the uneducated man with the man who is unable to dance, and set down

¹ A play on *χοροί* and *χαρά* (Jowett: "These they call choruses, a term which is naturally expressive of cheerfulness").

as educated the man who can dance so as to pass muster (653*d* ff.)? Of course the Athenian's friends assent, but he reminds them that participation in a "chorus" means two things, actual movement of the limbs, and song, so that the final definition of an educated man is, the man who can sing and dance. What text could be more appropriate for the promoters of morris-dancing and folk-song in the home of Shakespeare

The Athenian had, however, an important reservation to make: "So-and-so sings beautifully and dances beautifully; are we to add that this cannot be, unless he also sings beautiful songs, and dances beautiful dances?" It is agreed to make this addition, and this quickly leads to the conclusion in the first place that appreciation of what is good in music and dance (what a pity it is that we have no single word like *χορεία* to express both!) is better than technical skill debased to unworthy use, and secondly that all postures and movements and all tunes that express virtue of soul or body are beautiful, and all that express vice are the absolute opposite.

The important thing for us to notice is Plato's insistence that the choicest art shall be offered to the infant mind. Simple it may, or rather ought to be; a child may prefer a conjurer or a fairy play to Shakespeare (very likely it will not), and it will find "Polly, put the kettle on" easier to grasp than Vaughan Williams' *Sea Symphony*; but its soul must be fed on the first-rate, if it is to grow aright. All depends, Plato declares over and over again, in words a good deal more forcible than those used by most modern educational writers, on the formation of the right temperament: *ἦθος*, character or heart, must come through *εἶθος*, habit or training. Plato would have no mercy on those elders who pick out inferior dramatic performances at bazaars as something nice to take the children to. Of course he would keep the grown-ups from them too if he could, but at least *their* bias is determined, and less disastrous consequences are likely to follow from adult misuse of time. But few of us will agree with him in the means whereby he proposes to exclude second-rate music from the community. "Find out the best tunes," he says in effect, "store them up as they do in Egypt, and never allow any new ones." We should like to meet Plato face to face; to have the opportunity of complimenting him on his denunciation of restless craving for novelty, and to inquire respectfully whether stagnation may not also be a national danger.

Once the instinctive desire for rhythmical activity is started on the right road by means of a judicious mixture

of Mme Montessori, M. Daleroze, and Mr Cecil Sharp's folk songs and dances, the Minister of Education attends to the supply of instruction in reading, writing, lyre-playing, and mathematics. In fact, Plato's theory of primary education may be summed up as our conventional three R's *plus* one—Reading, 'Riting, 'Rithmetic, and Rhythm; and of these, the last shall be first, for on it is based the whole of the subsequent moral, spiritual, and intellectual development. Is it not plain that many of our most advanced educational enthusiasts are, consciously or unconsciously, but humble followers in the wake of Plato? The Froebelian concreteness of the first steps in arithmetic should be noted. "Give the children," he says, "fruits and garlands to do sums with, in a lively game." Ruskin paraphrases "fruits and garlands" by "cowslip bells and daisy-chains" (*Fors Clavigera*, vii. 309).

Further study for ordinary citizens consists of elementary mathematics and geography; the latter subject is to be taught practically in the course of service in the National Guard; Plato holds it to be one of the advantages of such service that scout patrols learn to know their country thoroughly—"a study second in value to none" (763*b*). On the physical side, training tends to assimilate itself to military drill as the age of the pupils increases. Plato is, however, emphatically not a militarist, and is vehement in his diatribes against Sparta, where the aim of education is the manufacture of soldiers. In his admiration for the ancient Dorian confederacy, where, if one of the three states sinned against the federal laws, the others were bound to punish the transgressor, we see assent to the principle of the League of Nations (684*b*).

Instruction in dance and song give way to riding, shooting, and wrestling, but all are taught solely with a view to the defence of the country. The *practice* of choral dancing survives for all ages at festivals. The passages describing the function of the "old men's choir"—age limit for membership thirty to sixty—are very amusing (664, 670, 812*b*). The choir is called the chorus of Dionysus, because the elderly men need a draught of wine in order to stimulate their unsupple limbs to activity. Dance and sing they shall on occasion due, however ludicrous the notion may seem to the Athenian's companions; but, in addition, a more important duty awaits them: their province is to be guardians of taste for the community. As teachers of music and literature of the right kind they are to exercise a lifelong influence over the young, continuing, even when they have passed the age of sixty and can no longer *enchant* the youthful

mind by their own *chanting*,¹ to guide them to the songs and tales that will inspire them with a love of things pure and of good report, more effectually than any direct exhortation.

Hitherto I have been careful to use the neutral word "children," in describing Plato's schemes for the production of good citizens. A few years back it would have been tempting to dwell on his lamentation over the reduction of a state's power for usefulness by one-half, if its women are allowed to lie fallow, and so to be incapable of doing their share of service. Now it is no longer necessary to use the *Laws* as a textbook for the promotion of women's admission to citizenship, but it is still surprising how comparatively seldom appeal was made to Plato's pages during the controversy. The view of Wilamowitz, in his book *Platon* already referred to (published 1919), is interesting. He thinks that no man was ever so unfriendly to women, or did them such disservice, as Plato; if on the other hand you inquire where first women were recognised as equal with men in dignity and honour, the answer is, "In the Fatherland." It is true that Plato is intellectually convinced, but, as with many later champions, his convictions are apt to slip out of his mind, owing to the attitude prevailing in his day, so that he has as it were to remind himself forcibly from time to time that, as a rule, wherever the word "man" occurs in his provision for state regulation, state education, and state service, the words "and woman" should be mentally added. Making allowance for change of circumstances, it is remarkable how closely the part actually played by women in the defence of their country has resembled that imagined in the *Laws*, book vii. Very few would have foreseen this before 1914.

The director of education must be elected from the body called "guardians of the law" by all magistrates, and undergo stringent tests of fitness after election. He must not be under fifty, and should, if possible, be the father of sons and daughters. He holds office for five years. It makes us smile to find, among the precise directions which the lawgivers feel it their duty to lay down for him, a recommendation of the *Laws* as the sort of manual that it would be advisable for a teacher to use as a literary textbook. Indeed, Plato goes so far as to say that teachers who are unwilling to obey this injunction should be dismissed.

Attendance at school is to be compulsory; for the children are not to go to, or refrain from, school at the pleasure of their parents, inasmuch as they should be thought of as belonging to the state rather than to their parents (804a).

¹ ᾗδαις ἐπάδειν ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς.

This ordinance leads us to Plato's collectivism, which may be described as enlightened public spirit based on education. Without music and gymnastic, soul and body are nothing worth; riches exist solely for the sake of soul and body, and no pursuit of them should be allowed to hinder the full development of the soul foremost, and secondarily of the body. Private property is allowed, but the individual's portion is owned by the state as well; the owner is a kind of trustee for his holding to the community.

Without going into the details of the constitution, attention may be drawn to the strangely scriptural or modern ring of some of Plato's aspirations. For instance, great care is taken to prevent anyone from becoming very rich, for the reason that it is impossible for the exceedingly rich to be conspicuously good (743*a*). There must be a limit to the wealth allowed, and the state must see to it that no one falls below a certain poverty line. Any property in excess of the maximum must be handed over to the state and the gods who protect it (744 *f.*). Is there any other instance in ancient times of a super-tax of 100 per cent. planned or put into operation in a real or imaginary state? In 955*d* it is suggested that the government should choose, each year, whether it will impose an income-tax or one based on capital; no doubt it would adopt the former alternative in specially prosperous years. Only resident aliens may engage in retail trade, and on them is imposed something very much like an excess profits tax (850). Plato dislikes all trade, and would discourage it as far as possible; but, with regard to such foreign trade as is essential to the existence of the state, he is a full-blown free-trader: "Let there be no dues either for exports or for imports" (847*b*); but the importance of key industries is recognised by the injunction that there should be no exports of things necessary to remain in the country; also control of the supply and manufacture of armaments must be in public, never in private, hands. He would prefer not to plant his city near the sea, because such a situation tempts to foreign trade, which is a demoralising occupation; you get too rich and too restless by it (704 *ff.*). Equally demoralising it is to have a navy, for the curious reason that a land-army is more likely to run away in battle, if it knows that it has ships whereupon it may take refuge.

Plato sets his face uncompromisingly against any sort of class legislation: "To those who frame laws for the benefit not of the whole state but of particular persons, we refuse the name of citizens, and call them sedition-mongers" (715*b*); and his objections apply equally to rulers who use

for their own ends advantages of birth or wealth, and to a dictatorship of the proletariat. "Common good binds a state together, private gain rends it in pieces" (875a). To this maxim Dr England cites an apt parallel from L. March Phillips in *Land and Water*, July 17, 1915: "The social cement consists of the free will which each individual surrenders to society." Plato insists continually upon the necessity of striving after the true communism of mutual goodwill and readiness to place powers and possessions at the service of all. Parents should not take thought to pile up riches for their children; abundant reverence, not gold, is the heritage which they should bequeath, and in their lifetime the lawgiver exhorts them to show reverence to their offspring by abstinence from unseemliness in word or deed, rather than to demand external marks of respect for themselves. In our city let there be no privilege of age or of class, but let all contend without let or hindrance for the prize of virtue (739c, 729, 781a). Women of our day who meet with opposition to their appointment as magistrates or jurors might well point to 768b: "Those who have no right to share in the administration of justice feel themselves entirely without part in the state"; also the foreshadowing of women police may be mentioned (784c), since women marriage overseers, whose duty it is to patrol the city, to admonish suspected offenders against the law, and to bring the refractory into court, are in many respects comparable with the recent additions to the blue-uniformed guardians of order. Mendicancy is entirely forbidden, for it is inconceivable that a decently ordered community should fail to succour genuine distress; therefore beggars are frauds, and when found should at be once deported, "that the country may be quite unsullied by this species of animal" (936c).

Students of the *Republic* will miss in the *Laws* the impassioned description of the noble education which those who are to guide the ship of state should undergo. It is, however, implied at the end of book xii.; possibly its compressed form may be due to Plato's sense that age was getting the better of his strength. His conviction is as firm as ever that the supreme guardians of the city must have a training (far exceeding the education provided in the *Laws* for all and sundry) which shall enable them to hold fast by the divinity of the soul, to understand astronomy and the laws of nature generally, and to see the connection of the sciences, so as to bring laws and man's disposition into harmony with the mind of God; but "to explain this

will need much discourse, if it is to be done aright " (968c). He contents himself, then, with the briefest sketch of a remarkable institution, the Nocturnal Council, so called because it sits daily while it is still dark until sunrise, in order to perfect the laws, and take all measures which may foster righteousness among the people, adopting to this end whatever foreign institutions may be thought to be of service. The manner of choosing these guardians, and their powers, as well as their training, we must leave undefined; but if once we could hand over our city to this "divine assembly," then the kingdom of heaven would no longer be a dream but a waking reality. One thing is essential, namely, that not only must the Council consist of persons of ripe age, but each elder must choose a younger man (or woman?) as a colleague, and the Minister of Education, with his predecessors who are still living, must be among the members. For community of young and old in counsel "truly saves the whole city" (965a).

We do not need to inquire how far Plato's institutions would work in practice. One and all, they are devised with the aim of making "the whole state such an image of the best and noblest life" as makes the truth of tragedy, and, we may add, of all other worthy art (817b). It is sometimes good to remind ourselves that, if we wish to find direct and dignified expression of some favourite measure for improving the welfare of mankind, we cannot do better than search for it at the fountain-head whence many of these ideas have trickled down to us. Again and again we shall realise how prone we are to forget the source from which our wisdom is drawn.¹

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¹ Mr H. Pitman, M.A. Oxon., Lecturer at Bristol University, has pointed out to me that Ruskin's translations from the *Laws* and comments thereon in *Fors Clavigera*, vi. and vii., have probably brought many working-class readers into contact with the spirit of Plato's writings.

LOGIC AND THE IMAGINATION.

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THE contempt for mere logic felt by nearly everyone, even at times by logicians themselves, is a fact of experience needing little testimony. The philosopher and the plain man are not, perhaps, so remote from one another as often they are thought to be, and the plain man, although he is prone himself to employ it, is notoriously suspicious of logic-chopping. And so philosophers in their non-philosophic moments have a tendency, more than a little marked, to return to the ways of the plain man in thought, which is living rather than thinking, experiencing rather than reconstructing experience ideally. Hume's weariness at the tyranny of a logic which compelled him to be a sceptic, which made him, in Berkeley's phrase, "ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well," his very human joy of relief in living the life which logically he could not sanction, is well known. "I am . . . affright'd and confound'd with that forlorn solitude in which I am plac'd in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who, not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell'd all human commerce, and left utterly abandon'd and disconsolate. . . . Most fortunately it happens that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose and cures me of this philosophical melancholy. . . . I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse and am merry with my friends, and when after three or four hours amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold and strained and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any further And to what end can it serve . . . ? . . . No, if I must be a fool, my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable." ¹

So it has been to a greater or lesser extent all through

¹ *Treatise of Human Nature*, pt. iv. sect. 7.

philosophical history. The results of that intellectual stoicism which is to the philosopher almost as a fine asceticism is to the man of religion, must have been the cause of much heartburning in philosophers themselves, as well as of contempt in the minds of those who do not understand, to whom logical consistency means nothing but pedantry. That Plato the creator should have so mutilated the functions of poetry and art, is a culmination often lamented; that Kant, whose ideal was knowledge, should have been brave to deny it; that in our own day Mr Bradley, who believes that a true philosophy must satisfy *all* sides of our nature, should conclude that "the finite is more or less transmuted, and as such disappears in being accomplished";—these are but a few out of the many sacrifices upon the altar of what these philosophers thought to be, perhaps mistakenly, a logical consistency. It is a fine and a sad thing that it should be so, and the tragedy often seems to us to be more fully a tragedy in the true sense just because it must be so, because it is the consummation of the philosophic character to be true, to be loyal, in that way. And that such tragedies should exist is perhaps in a way a partial refutation of Mr Bradley's own famous and brilliant half truth, that philosophy consists in "the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." Philosophy is to do more: it is to stick to the bad reasons, even although they contradict our instincts.

But are such tragedies necessary? And may not one half of the half truth be equally true with the other half? Must instinct and natural sentiment, must the loves and desires which pulse through us like spring in the veins of youth, be suppressed and choked by the tyrant which we call our reason? Is not Plato great just because he has so much fine instinct and feeling, and might he not have been in one respect even greater if his instincts about art had ruled rather than reason? And is not Kant often arid and untruthful just because in philosophy as in his private life he was cut off from life? And is not perhaps Mr Bradley's philosophy not fully satisfactory because it does not carry out its own ideal of truth—namely, to satisfy the *whole* of human nature, instincts as much as anything else,—but rather rests on a principle of an even yet too formal logic?

Of course the controlling and restraining influence of thought and logic is not for a moment to be denied. A philosophy which reverts to instinct and undifferentiated feelings¹ is unworthy of its name. Instincts and feelings, indeed,

¹ We shall in this essay use the terms "feeling," "instinct," in a popular, and not in any strict psychological, or biological, sense.

can be names for the most primitive, the least evolved sides of our nature, and to turn to these as supreme guides in the supreme pilgrimage of knowledge would be to sink on the journey into the mires of relativity. Each man to himself would be the measure of all things, and truth as we sank deeper would retreat for ever beyond the horizons of subjectivity. No, thought and feeling, intellect and instinct, logic and life, must, whatever befall, go hand in hand whilst we pursue knowledge, and what we must understand quite clearly is their relationship. We imagine that the supremacy of logic, the overgrowth of its importance in the minds of philosophers, has been responsible for the stunting of their true instincts and feelings, instead of bringing these true instincts and feelings to a greater and richer maturity in reason. Once again, we cannot, at the outset, emphasise too strongly that it is no mere retreat into any blind feeling or instinct that we advocate. We must accept no theory of intuition which is a denial of knowledge altogether; we must not for a moment entertain the idea that there is any salvation for the philosopher who lapses into looseness or easiness of thought. It is not the necessity for the clearness in thought which logical method demands, that we deny; we believe only that logic and intellect should be the servants rather than the masters of human experience—that it should be realised that the language of poetry and imagination is not simply more stimulating, but may be more deeply true, than the prose of philosophy. If it is feeling in any sense that we exalt, it is the feeling of those who above all are best entitled to feel—the men of religion and vision, or those whose constant companion is beauty, whose hearts and bodies are thrilled continually with a sense of wonder in the something beyond them which they cannot understand. It is the higher and the elemental, not the lower and the elementary (in the popular sense), which we praise. We maintain that, although the poet and the philosopher, as such, are never identical, yet it is to the heights of the poet (and not to the depths of the amœba) that the philosopher must sometimes reach, if his philosophy is to have lasting truth. His daily task as philosopher may not be to remain on those heights; but he must have seen the vision, or perish indeed.

William James strikes a happy balance when he says, "Philosophy . . . sees the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar . . . by its poetry it appeals to literary minds, but its logic stiffens them up." And perhaps the two essential characteristics of philosophy are summed up when we combine James's "Philosophy is an

unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly " with Plato's " Philosophy begins in wonder," and say that philosophy is the consistent and obstinate attempt to understand those things which fill us with wonder.

The word logic, we said, to many people has an unpleasant flavour. This might in some cases originally have been due to a reaction from Scholastic dryness, but to-day is probably attributable simply to the unfortunate tendency in thinkers to substitute logical methodising for living interpretation of reality. But the condemnation of logic by the literary and artistic-minded is apt to lead to a blank wall if pushed far enough. Their impatience means something very definite, no doubt, and is more, they would maintain, than shyness at a mere name; but what it means they would find it hard to tell. For they are all obliged to think, at least in some fashion, and to deny the value of thought would be to deny the value of their contention. But logic has as its subject matter simply the form of thinking and knowledge in general. Logic books define it as the science of the forms of thought, and so on, and as such it is surely harmless enough. It is difficult to see how anyone could even offer logic, the *science*, as a substitute for life. Clearly its critics cannot mean this.

Logic as a science has suffered from the faults, accentuated in the post-Aristotelian schools, of a too great formalism, and it has been the task of logicians like Mr Bradley and Mr Bosanquet to connect it more with concrete thinking. For all thinking, as has sometimes been forgotten, is concrete thinking, in the limited sense that it is thought of objects. It is these objects, or, if we like, the concrete nature of reality, which determine the nature of thinking itself, so that the categories of thought and the categories of reality are not two, but one, looked at from different aspects. The matter of thought has its fundamental influence upon the form, and it has been the aim of modern logic to show this influence, to emphasise differences in the kinds of thinking according to the different classes of objects thought of, rather than to merge all differences in order to obtain formal neatness such as in the Laws of Identity, Contradiction, etc.

But while it is not logic as a science which is attacked by the plain man and the poet alike, who are very unlikely to know anything of that science, yet the formalism which within logic exercised its evil influence had its indirect effect on the concrete thinking, or, better, the concrete thoughts, the system of which is metaphysics. Forgetting the fundamental fact that logic is the laws of thinking about objects and derives its character from these objects, philosophers themselves

reversed the procedure and tended to judge their experiences, to value them, to accept or reject according as they conformed or not to the demands of logic. A modern example of this domination by a logical principle is the first book of *Appearance and Reality*. Space, time, change, whole of parts, etc., the concrete experiences of everyday life, are rejected as appearance, as not fully real *per se*, because, simply, they will not conform to the logical principle of non-contradiction! Logic, which we presume was born from the loins of life, grows up to be the tyrant who usurps her throne. When the issue arises, 'Logic or life?'—life is thrust aside and logic reigns supreme.

That logic should ever dominate life in the minds of philosophers is due possibly also to a vicious ambiguity in the word "law." The tyro in logic is taught that logic, like ethics, is a normative and not a natural science, and that their "laws" are different from those of nature because they prescribe what ought to be, and do not tell what is. That these normative laws should have any meaning is due, of course, to their being subservient in both cases to an ideal; the ideal in the case of ethics being goodness, and in the case of logic being truth. If we would think truly we must be logical. But to submit to being bound hand and foot is the sign of an attitude towards logical laws something similar to the attitude towards a legal code strengthened by sanctions. Or the obedience to the "laws" of thought becomes almost, as we suggested, the manifestation of an ascetic religion of the intellect. We must obey it, like Kant's categorical imperative, even if it means the death of all desires. Now, if, *per impossibile*, these "laws" of thought were flexible enough to guide us to the grasp of reality as it is, then, perhaps, if the ideal of truth were accepted, these laws would be absolute and inviolable except at our peril. But the argument itself is *per impossibile*, just because these so-called binding normative "laws" of what *ought* to be in thought are themselves only very general abstractions, on the mental side, of what *are* the laws of things, objects, of the nature of reality. Of objects or reality generally, regarded without much stress being laid on contents or qualities, they may be true. Of particulars they are, as we shall endeavour to show, often palpably false. General laws, like the laws of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and so on, can never do other than lag far behind life. They have their limited spheres, but farther than that it is unwise to push them. Perhaps it is the realisation of this which is to-day leading logic from formalism towards a healthier epistemology, which

has been called a blend of logic, metaphysics, and psychology. An account of how we do think truly in this concrete way is likely to lag less than any mere formalism dictating to us how *a priori* we must think.

And yet we must ask, before coming to any definite conclusions about the limits of logical laws, what is the very large element of truth which they contain, and why should it be there? Logic in certain spheres of thought seems to work perfectly and unerringly; in others only it falls short. Take, for example, the law of non-contradiction, that two contradictory predicates cannot be true of the same subject at the same time: A cannot be white and not white at once. This seems true, and is true, within its just limits, and we make use of it, or consistency, in judging the validity of an argument. It seems to work very well so long as we are dealing with clearly defined things, subjects and predicates which can be marked down and held firmly in a proposition. But take an example, one of many crucial ones for logic, in which the subject cannot be thus confined, in which its identity appears indefinable, almost mysterious. Take, for example, a predication about something which is changing—the glowing white-hot bar of iron which is rapidly cooling to a dull blue-grey. The paradoxes of Heraclitus at once occur to our minds. It is white and it is not white—this seems true not merely of successive moments (when the formal law of contradiction would not be invalidated) but of the same moment. It is like the answer that not only can you not step into the same river twice, but you cannot even step into the same river once. The law of contradiction introduces the notion of time, even if only for the sake of excluding real time, and it is necessary for it to do so; but the notion of continuous time is one which cannot be expressed in a logical proposition. We may say with some logicians that the iron bar is a different subject each time, seeing it is a changing one, and that therefore there is no violation of contradiction. If an entirely new reality jumps into being at each instant, change offers no problem for logic. But it does, we should reply, offer problems for experience, and for metaphysics, which is the attempt to explain experience. Metaphysics must at least begin, not by accepting a prejudice from formal logic, but by accepting facts as they are. The fact in this case is that subject and its predicates (white and intensely hot, red and very hot, etc.) are somehow one in a way which it is impossible to make clear in any logical concepts. We are all like Heraclitus in our idle moments, by the seashore, by the flowing river, beneath the rising smoke. “Is it the

same or different?" we ask lazily. And our conclusion, lazy perhaps, but inevitable, is that it is at the same time both the same and not the same, the same and different. If we are logicians (and what philosopher even can be so consistently by the seashore?) we shall conclude either that the subject is different at each moment (if so, why do we call it "the"?), or that the same subject has different predicates at different moments (and how again can that be if it is the same subject, for the predicates qualify the subject?). But what, after all, is a moment? Laziness may win where logical method loses, for logical method cannot reply, and but wearies itself by its endless questions and answers.

The simple principles of formal logic which at first sight seem to hold everywhere, and at second sight do not, are influenced, we are convinced, by something very like a spatial metaphor. In the above instance the logician is unhappy because he cannot think of two colours (symbolising two different temperatures) occupying the same patch (symbolising the same volume) at the same time. It is possible, we believe, to show that the principle of non-contradiction is somewhat the same kind of principle as that which makes it impossible for me to picture two static bodies as occupying the same space at the same time. That A and B (taking B as something with qualities which are not the qualities of A) should instantaneously occupy the same space is impossible; to say that A and B do occupy the same space is not impossible, but it is untrue. And the statements, "A is occupying space S at moment M," and "B is occupying space S at moment M," are contradictory, because A and B are spatially exclusive. The term "contradictory," we maintain, is based on something like this analogy of spatial exclusiveness. Aristotle's law is that "it is impossible that the same predicate should belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same way." And it seems very much the same to say that P cannot at the same time qualify and not qualify S, because one qualification excludes the other; as that A and B cannot "qualify" the same volume of space by occupying it, because they are spatially exclusive. To say, "A square an inch long cannot at the same instant be white and not white," is very much the same as saying, "Two squares, one white, and one black, each an inch long, cannot coincide because mutually exclusive." "Exclusive" here is literally spatial, and we maintain that, although its use is of course not always literally spatial, yet the metaphor remains, influential in the background. We should be facetious if we pushed the crude analogy. Non-

contradiction is simple, ultimate, not to be reduced to terms of anything else. All we would emphasise once more is that formal logic, to be effective, must regard subjects and predicates as simple—must cut things neatly apart from one another and pin them down for purposes of convenient manipulation, sorting predicates from subjects in different boxes, like sorting the pieces of a puzzle. Sophisticated formal logicians would probably reject the above suggestion as a caricature, but however they may define the limits of a procedure of a method like Euler's circles, they can never escape from the taint of a spatial way of thinking—a way of thinking which, moreover, must abstract from all considerations of real time. Neither the subject nor the predicate may change.

It is not, of course, true to say that, because logic is based on a spatial metaphor, therefore the only objects to which it can be said to apply are spatial objects. That would be ridiculous. But it is true to say that because logic is based on the principle of one-thing-at-a-time, that because it likes definite subjects and definite predicates, because in a word its object-matter is not life, or any reality, except in the limited sense of "pieces" of reality, because it deals with abstractions which must remain identical with themselves,—therefore it is incapable of expressing truth about reality or life, except in so far as reality is, or can legitimately be regarded as, static, and in "pieces." It is because it is the habitual attempt of human kind to prepare reality for digestion in thought, by masticating it, as it were, in small pieces, that logic plays such an important part in everyday discussion. For such rough purposes reality submits to formalisation.

It is where the subject cannot be so clearly cut apart from the predicate, where even the identity of the subject is a metaphysical problem, that formal logic fails in being so abstract. Where reality will not submit to being cut up, there formal propositions fail. But since this abstraction is not only the function of formal logical propositions, but of all thought whatsoever, it is essential to consider how far abstraction is a help, how far a hindrance, in the attainment of truth.

It is obvious that the highest as well as the lowliest thought can express only one thing at a time, and only a very few things one after the other, because our minds become quickly tired. Thought expresses itself in propositions which are abstractions, and which in themselves, if they are true of reality, are only true because they refer to certain points of reality. Propositions and judgments can never be

substitutes for reality itself just because they express knowledge about reality. Propositions have that nature, and it is no discredit to the propositional form of knowledge that it cannot do what it never professed, namely, to transport us from knowledge of reality to the being of reality itself. It would obviously not be knowledge if it could do so. Neither, indeed, can any form of knowledge, however direct, not even vaunted intuition itself, break down the essential knowledge relation between subject and object. If I know a chair, if I know myself, it is still I and the chair, I and the self, and I do not become identical (except in an important metaphorical sense, *see below*) however close my acquaintance with the object of knowledge. It must not therefore be thought that we are criticising knowledge in the propositional form because the subject stands off from the object, and knowledge is still *about* it. All knowledge, of whatever kind, must be about something. What we have perhaps been doing implicitly, and must continue to do explicitly, is to distinguish between knowledge in the propositional form, which takes time to state, and which is probably, however many propositions we make, never exhaustive, and knowledge of the direct kind, or knowledge by acquaintance, of which perception is an example. I may make a thousand true judgments about a chair, and in doing so doubtless may enrich my knowledge and observation of the chair, but it is the chair as a whole about which I make propositions, and that has been given as a whole in perception. Knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge of complex wholes; knowledge by description, in the form of propositions, is knowledge of parts, taken one at a time.

It is denied by some that there can be any true knowledge of parts, because there are no such things as parts. The world is a whole, a unity, a system, and the full explanation of any part of the world leads to an account of the world as a whole. So that there are no complete finite truths about finite things—the only truth is Whole Truth. In that sense true propositional knowledge is impossible, because it is abstract; it separates content from being, “what” from “that,” it proceeds as if we could isolate a piece or aspect of reality in a proposition; and that, according to this theory, is impossible. Nothing can be isolated from its context in the world; relations between things are not external like links between railway carriages, but internal and “penetrating” into the nature of the terms they relate. Relations are the adjectives of terms, and so terms without relations are non-existent.

We, on the other hand, should not go so far as to say there can be no true knowledge which is propositional, but would assert that in certain spheres of reality relations are external, in others they may legitimately be regarded as external; that in these latter spheres propositions can be true (in the only way in which propositions can be true, namely, in expressing truth about aspects of reality), but that beyond those spheres propositions are only helpful in emphasising salient characters of a knowledge which is experience, and therefore inexpressible in words at all.

Whatever the term "internal" relation may mean, the term "external" is certainly a metaphor, and a spatial metaphor, like "isolate," "separate," "link." (It would be interesting, as M. Bergson has done so far, to trace fully the influence of the spatial metaphor upon thought.) And, being a metaphor, the baldest and most obvious case in which external relations do truly hold would be a case in which two static things were literally outside one another, *e.g.* two

squares A and B, A being, say, an inch to the north of B, $\frac{A}{B}$.

In this case the nature of the square A is absolutely self-contained, and we can make true geometrical propositions galore about it, as a square, without bringing in anything outside its own area. Or we may again judge about its size, its colour—judgments which again might be literally and absolutely true. And, on the other hand, when we talk of its relation to B, which again is decided by its relation to the North Pole, these relations are literally outside, or external to, its relations as a square, and do not affect its being one whit, unless we define it not simply, say, as "red square twelve inches long," but add, "an inch to the north of B." We may have a red square twelve inches long anywhere on the face of the earth, or, we suppose, disregarding relativity, the universe, and its relation to B or anything else is irrelevant, unless by special hypothesis we agree to make it relevant.

This is such a crudely simple case that we may be accused of caricaturing the issue. External relations mean, we shall be told, something more than this. And, so far as by that is meant that all propositions which are true are not about literally spatial entities, we agree. But where the literal division in space is not used, the metaphorical one is. Most of our categorical judgments, or those which can by a little ingenuity be turned into such, are of this kind. "How cold!" "A is coming down the street," "The fire has gone out," are literally and absolutely true, because we can with

legitimacy cut them off from all relations and treat them as external. And we can treat them legitimately as external to everything else because they are so. These selections from reality are not mutilations of reality, because reality in certain aspects presents itself in pieces. An apple is red and hard and sweet as well as being a red, hard, sweet apple. These qualities, no doubt, have an organic, internal connection, but as qualities they are single and external.

But it is just as we ascend to the region of the organic, the changing, the moving, and beyond it to æsthetic wholes, to the wholeness of experience, to the wholeness of the universe itself, that difficulties arise. Still the propositional form is used, and still, if its limits are realised, with full justification. There is still a narrow sense in which propositions in this sphere may be literally true, and there is a broad sense in which they are invaluable, even if not literally true. Take, for example, propositions about organisms. The science of botany is, like all other sciences, a science of propositions. In dealing with a plant, *e.g.*, it makes propositions about properties and functions and parts. But, according to any theory which is vitalistic in feeling, there are no isolated parts, strictly speaking, but everything is merged through functioning in the complex unity of the whole. What meaning, then, do we give to "parts"? Simply the most obvious meaning possible, namely, spatial parts which are external to one another, and so have external relations in that sense. We make propositions about the leaves, the flowers, the stem separately and in rotation, because on the one hand it is necessary, as judgments take time to utter, and on the other hand because these parts, as spatial, are real. The sap goes "up" the tree trunk to the leaves, is "there" transformed, returns "downwards," and so on. All this is true because the tree is a real thing in space, and, as such, has parts. In so far as anything can be regarded as having spatial characteristics, judgments about them, as such, may be literally true. The most likely to be strictly true are those about directly spatial qualities such as shape, colour, etc., although if we regard them as changing, as they continually do in an organism, we are faced with the problem of change with which we began. Still, propositions about spatial qualities are fairly safe, and about functions, regarded as movements "down" and so on, a little less so. Organic functions are something which can never be fully expressed *in* propositions, though the nature of these functions certainly is realised by the help of propositions. This is the "broad sense" in which propositions are invaluable.

Propositions are invaluable in so far as they are stepping-stones to the truth which is beyond propositions. Propositions are in their nature, as we suggested, piecemeal; they regard reality for their purpose as having static, isolated predicates, and in so far as reality can be said to be static, and have isolated predicates, they are true. By the addition of such propositions about realities we may come to have a fairly true notion of realities. But our true notions of them is, obviously enough, something more than our knowledge of the meaning of the propositions taken separately. To revert once more to the case of perception, although my perception of an object is made richer by propositional knowledge about it—"we see what we set out to see,"—yet perception is a unique knowledge of wholes, of things in their relations, all at once, a knowledge which propositions can never compass, even if it were their purpose to do so. The life-blood of knowledge is experience; knowledge is always of experience and is its interpretation. So, in order to *know* even the simplest things, we must *be*. In the lower, commoner everyday affairs, where needs are practical and the world is divided into fairly well-defined boundaries, distinction and not assimilation is uppermost, and, as our thoughts about these things are clearly defined by the use of words, it is easy to formalise them into distinct propositions which are either true or false, and which must not, if they are not to be false, disobey laws like that of non-contradiction. In the higher experiences of complexes, of change, of wholes of parts, etc., propositions are like convenient landmarks which enable us to see the general lie or contour of the land as a whole. In the sphere where formal logic holds sway, where things are either literally or metaphorically "outside" one another, these relations are either "external" or may be so regarded, and there do we have knowledge in parts. But even here it is knowledge about something *experienced*. In the sphere of higher knowledge, on the other hand, where exist the objects which metaphysics is largely concerned with—change, time, the nature of the æsthetic and the organic whole, the self, the nature of God,—propositions, though essential (for how can we proceed, except through propositional knowledge?), are, as abstract, less adequate than ever, and the power of intense vision which is able to fill in what dimly lies between the perceived landmarks, which is able, by a kind of strong outgoing imaginative sympathy, to synthesise into a whole that which it can only partially experience, this seems of more fundamental importance than ever for philosophy.

Or have we reversed the true order? Is it not rather that we experience wholes first, and then make propositions about their fundamental characteristics? Is it that we construct an experience as filling between the propositional landmarks which are knowledges about aspects of reality, or is it that we realise first, directly, though confusedly, and perhaps on a lower feeling level, the experience as a whole, and afterwards make it explicit and filled with meaning by definite judgments? The answer is that both are valid as methods of attaining true knowledge, but that in so far as possible it is a richly analysed *experience—knowledge* which philosophy requires if it is to reveal to us in any measure the nature of reality. To assume, in making judgments (which in their nature must always be abstract), relations as external where they are not literally so, is only justified if it enriches our direct knowledge of wholes as wholes, in their internal relations. The knowledge thus gained of internal relations, the relations as imaginatively seen from the inside, as it were, is just the knowledge which enables us to understand in the least what a whole is. For example, in the case of an æsthetic whole, although a critical analysis of line and form and colour and subject, in the case of a picture; or a phrase, cadence, balance, etc., in the case of a piece of music, will enrich my perception; although analysis is the condition of true synthesis; yet nothing can take the place of my perception itself, and my perception is essentially, by imaginative sympathy, of the thing as it is in itself, in its *internal* relations. Whether we begin by propositions or by a vague unanalysed experience, knowledge is always more than an aggregate of propositions; it is an assimilation, it must end in the habit of mind, the true philosophic mind, which thinks of wholes readily, and more, thinks of parts always in their living relation to wholes.

We must then conceive of a wider meaning of truth than that which can properly be applied to propositions. All knowledge, we said, must be "knowledge about," in the sense that knowledge never means identity of subject and object, knower and known. But we are able, by using the method of direct imaginative sympathy, which indeed must be present if there is to be real knowledge at all, to get much closer, as it were, to our objects, in very much the same way, although it is more difficult, as the way of perception. The higher truths are not identity of knower and known, but are acquaintance, experience, which may be *expressed* to others through the language of imagination, but which can never in any literal sense be told, because they are untellable. Literal

truth (*e.g.* "A is coming down the street") usually means some kind of exact correspondence, we should hold ; but the deeper knowledge which is the knowledge by a deeper and subtler and more difficult experience, can scarcely be recognised by any such simple test. It is the truth which poets and visionaries find, and to tell how it is tested for its truth is hard. Its test must at least be experience of the highest and widest kind—that experience which we know to be true because it touches not merely one, the logical, reasonable side, but all sides of our nature. In these high spheres life is indeed bigger than logic, and we follow a bigger ideal of truth.

In the most formal of all types of logic the question of truth scarcely enters. Ideas are cut off from their references (as far as ideas can ever be cut off from their references), and treated merely in their relation to one another in accordance with the formal "laws" of thought. This logic is simply a more or less unexciting intellectual game with a few rigid rules, and if truth means anything at all here, it simply means playing according to the rules. But the supposition of truth in most of our everyday thinking is a supposition that the ideas are of reality, and that in some way they must "correspond" with reality to be true. To be true, a proposition or an argument must be consistent according to the formal laws, *and* it must be "true to the facts." As we come to deal with the more complex objects of thought—change, æsthetic wholes, organisms, the universe,—the laws of formal consistency seem to break down and correspondence of a higher kind than before seems to take the place of the earlier. It is of a higher kind because it is not simply the correspondence of isolated propositions which perforce must be abstracts from reality, which are true *per se*, but a living apprehension which must be, to be true, the apprehension of the reality as a whole, and of which propositions are but the symbols, the important landmarks. Finally, and highest of all, there are the highest and most ineffable truths, which can never be translated into the prose of propositions, because by that translation their subtle spirit would be lost, which can be but imperfectly suggested through the rhythmic media of literary, or artistic, or even musical expression ; and only to those who have experienced something of that sublimity already, to those who are receptive and sensitive. This untranslatable and but partly expressible truth is nothing but an experience of the intensest kind, in which knowledge and feeling are one and are inseparable.

If we seem, to the mind of any philosopher, to be preach-

ing an ideal of truth, the aim of philosophy to which philosophy can never attain, how can we justify our position? Certainly not by merging or in any way confusing the functions of philosophy and poetry. It may be true that in the prose of the poets (we must never forget the great Hebrew poets), as well as in their poetry, are to be found those flashes of insight which less often illumine the pages of many philosophy books. And we may hold that it is when philosophers forget for a moment their system-making and turn back to the vital experiences which can only be communicated through the language of imagination, that they seem to be nearer the reality which they seek by their thoughts to understand. It may be that "poetry is the finer breath of all knowledge," that we must "ask him who lives, what is life? ask him who worships, what is God?" But philosophy is not poetry, neither are philosophers as such called to be poets. Philosophy is not a series of divine inspirations, it is, plainly enough, the systematisation of experiences, of insights into realities, so that we may better be able to comprehend reality as one whole. All we would urge, and we feel that it is sometimes forgotten, is that the philosophers who do in their judgments seek to understand experience and reality as a system, should live vitally, should be fired with the wonder of reality as poets are. Systematisation and the strenuous intellectual effort of weighing and balancing we must have, but that in itself is arid and empty, is not philosophy any more than poetry is. Both are essential, and for the highest philosophy an intensity and a breadth of feeling is required which is not less than that of the highest poetry.

It is good that philosophers should ask themselves these questions as they sit in their studies with closed windows writing about the universe.

Our emphasis on experience as essential for truth in the highest sense breaks down any hard-and-fast dualism between ideas and objects, and, though it insists on the distinction between knower and known, it assumes them to be at one, so that in perfect knowledge the known would be simply realisation of the object in the knower. And this is so of the more common truths also, though it is concealed by their apparent duality, a duality which is expressed in the crudest form of correspondence, namely, the naïve view that ideas "copy" the realities. But the copy theory is of course worthless, is scarcely a theory at all, and for truths of the simplest kind, *e.g.* that sugar is white and hard, we require experience of the facts, not experience "copying" them. My ideas do not copy, or, strictly speaking, "correspond with" reality,

they take hold of reality, they are ideas of reality, they are themselves experiences of reality. In the highest spheres we have seen how direct and intimate a thing this experience is—so much so that it would be crude to speak of copying or even of corresponding. Because in commoner truths experiences are less intimate in the sense of being less personal, because it is so simple to translate into words my experience that sugar is hard, so that Tom, Dick, or Harry can understand it and know it to be true, therefore it is easy to separate these propositions, which are thought of as being “composed” of ideas, from those who make them. Propositions in this sphere are mostly regarded not as judgments, as judgments of experience of a person, at all, but simply as an arrangement of ideas, expressed in words, and given; which are true or false according as they “correspond” to reality or not. This artificial abstraction, the cutting off of ideas both from things and from the minds which must have experienced them if they are to be ideas at all, is but another aspect of an abstract logic which in its nature must deal only with external relations, and must cut an idea out from its environment in order to deal with it propositionally. If we see, however, that it is an abstract way of dealing with ideas which were really originally experiences, we shall see that there is really no transition in principle from the truth of logic, which can be thus dualistic and abstract, to the truth of our highest experiences, which are concrete, and in which knower and known are as nearly at one as in finite experience they can be. If in our highest experiences we seem to *be* what we know (and this is only at best a vivid metaphor, and any theory of intuition taking it literally is false), whilst in our ordinary experience objects seem more “outside” us (thus arises the crude copy theory), that is only because whilst in the latter there is no particular interest beyond a practical one, and to know requires no intense outgoing of conative feeling, in the former there is an intense realisation in us which pulses through our whole being, as it were, and which makes it impossible to preserve an attitude of detachment and coolness. To know the universe, if that were possible, and to know a pea might be in principle the same, there would in both instances be a unity of knower with known; but usage is right when it condemns as a pedant the fool who talks of “being at one with” a pea.

The transition from the sphere of formal logic to the highest reaches of thought and experience is a transition from truth which is impersonal, to truth which can only be partially expressed in the language of imagination guided by

feeling, and which is inseparably connected with personality. Anyone can make a true statement about a piece of sugar, but only Shakespeare and his kind can express the inmost character of human nature. So also it is easy to understand and to refute plain truths and falsehoods. But we must ourselves have experience to understand the deepest experience of the poet. Truths of this kind, as intimate and unique expressions, seem almost to depend on the minds of those who discovered them; and if ever it is true to talk of truth as creation, as making something new which was not there before, it is true here. Truths with the stamp of a Shakespeare or a Wordsworth upon them are surely Shakespearian or Wordsworthian truths, would never have existed had it not been for Shakespeare and Wordsworth, and are not fully true when we think of them apart from their authors, apart from the words in which they are expressed. This is perhaps scarcely less true of the great philosophers in their supreme moments, and that is perhaps why a direct study of them is so much more fruitful than mere reading about them in a history of philosophy.

The gradation, then, is this. First is the stage of the gross logical proposition—well named “proposition,” because it is so gross that it contains little more than dead words with their minimum of meaning. The proposition is as independent of mind as it is possible for anything in words (not nonsense) to be. It involves no direct feeling or belief on the part of anyone, it is something in external relations standing by itself. Any fool can assert a proposition with the only truth of which a proposition is capable. Next is the stage of the judgment, from which all propositions originally must come, and which indeed to be explicit requires propositional expression. A judgment is regarded as relating to a mind, involving belief, and feeling, and meaning, which, if it cannot be entirely or mainly personal, yet is tinged with psychic individuality. “This orange is yellow” is by itself a proposition with universal meaning. If *I judge*, however, that “this orange is yellow,” my judgment, being mine, has a flavour of me; I believe, I feel, I have tendencies about it. Judgments, like propositions, regard reality one part at a time, and regard for their purposes relations as external. From the judgment we pass to the higher stage, a stage of experience, which issues in judgments, and is enriched by them, but which itself is simply experience and nothing more. The importance of the psychical factor is here immense. In the highest stage of all, which is the stage of the experience which poets have in their great moments, and of which we have said so

much, this experience is untranslatable directly into judgments, because it is so personal (even while it is universal), but it is partially expressible in the language of imagination.

But although we believe that truth must have a wider meaning than the truth of the proposition or judgment, that the most ineffable truths are only to be experienced through art, particularly poetry (as that is able, through words, to touch directly or indirectly all sides of our nature), yet once more we reiterate, perhaps *ad nauseam*, that we must not be supposed to believe that philosophy should lapse into poetry or any other kind of rhapsody. Thought is such a hard taskmaster that such license might be used in excuse for an unpermissible vagueness of thought. But if Plato, the greatest of all philosophers, can count wonder as the origin of philosophy, if "the cowardly and mean man," according to him, can have no part in it, if he must have "magnificence of mind" and be "the spectator of all time and all existence," if in the service of truth "he will know and live and grow truly imitating that with which he holds reverential concourse,"—then surely we should not be censured for holding that only in going beyond mere thought can philosophers realise the thought that is true. It is not the function of the philosopher merely to gape. He must do his everyday work, which is among judgments. But for a man, and for a philosopher of all men, to stand sometimes alone—"to gaze," like Whitman, after studying astronomy, "in perfect silence at the stars," this surely is not a little or a needless thing?

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THE FATHER OR THE STATE ?

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THE fallacy of arguments based on averages can seldom have been better exemplified than by Miss Eleanor Rathbone in her lucid and persuasive article on "Wages according to Family Needs," in the June number of the *HIBBERT JOURNAL*. If the figures worked out for her by the London School of Economics are to be accepted as valid for the whole country, it is evident that a new factor has been introduced into the ethics of the wage problem. Considering the anxious study bestowed for the last fifty years on social and industrial problems, it is not a little curious that neither politician nor philanthropist, economist nor statistician, has hitherto realised that, at any one time, less than 10 per cent. of wage-earning men over the age of twenty have more than three children dependent on them, and that 52 per cent. of male wage-earners have no dependent children at all. In the light of these facts, the confessed failure of the present generation to secure the physical well-being of the next, is so discreditable to both its head and its heart, that fresh light on the subject will be welcomed by all thoughtful people.

The advocates in every country of the State Maintenance of Children were naturally much heartened by the Bill which passed the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales in 1919, and which signalled the entrance of their cause into practical politics. Its essential proposals may briefly be summarised as follows: (1) that the minimum wage should henceforth be estimated on the sum necessary to maintain a man and his wife at the current cost of living; (2) that all employers should contribute, in proportion to the number of men they employed, to a common State fund, called the Maintenance of Children Fund, and that out of the pool thus formed the wives of the employed men should receive an allowance for each dependent child. The wages directly paid to the workers would thus be decreased, but each child would

enter the world endowed with a pension up to the age of maturity.

Miss Rathbone accepts the wage calculated according to the needs of a man and his wife, but contends that the New South Wales Bill fails to cover the case of all children. She therefore urges that the State should directly undertake the duty of providing for the rising generation, and would doubtless argue that the amount which the general community would pay in increased taxes would be practically recouped to it by the lowered prices consequent on decreased wages.

It is evident, however, that a powerful Department would necessarily be set up to supervise the rearing of the children for whom the State was paying, and that this Department, like all other powerful departments, would find its pleasure and its profit in constantly enlarging its powers and its functions, and in handling ever-increasing sums of money. It is also clear that the leaders of the organised trades would continue to struggle for an ever-rising standard of comfort for their members. In all classes of society, "Enough is always a little more than one has," and many a man with a thousand a year feels poverty-stricken. It is therefore not improbable that, within a few years, the general public would find itself paying as high wages as before, and maintaining through its taxes the workers' children in addition.

It would be apart from the purpose of this article, however, to discuss the probable consequences of this, or to expatiate on the obvious difficulties of introducing a new family system into a country like England. All human problems are at bottom ethical, and all legislation must finally be judged by its tendency to produce healthy, industrious, and high-minded citizens, or their contraries. It is therefore on this aspect of State Maintenance for Children that the writer desires to dwell. There is no denying the attractiveness of the proposal, especially to those who possess first-hand knowledge of the abominable handicaps under which hundreds of thousands of working-class mothers at present rear their families. They are often expected to maintain six children on precisely the same sum as that on which they kept one or two, they are harried and harassed by hordes of officials, they have no enforceable legal claim on their husbands for a shilling. Nevertheless, one hesitates.

For the last fifty years men and women of good-will have toiled ceaselessly for social betterment, each scheme in its turn being proclaimed as the one thing needful.

Yet, when the net result was, in 1917, for the first time

fairly faced, it turned out that half the men of the nation between the ages of seventeen and forty-three could only be classed as C. 3's or worse, and that, as the Prime Minister stated, England had a greater proportion of unfit than had any other belligerent country. So dramatic and tragic a demonstration of the inefficacy of social reform up to date should surely give pause to the advocates of new specifics. Doubtless many causes co-operated to frustrate the confident hopes of the reformers. Only one is germane to the present criticism. These schemes and systems, so admirable in theory, so indefeasible on paper, have often ended in failure because their authors miscalculated the reaction of human nature to them. Take, for instance, the Maternity Benefit, which was designed to secure for working-class mothers a little ease of mind and body in their times of trial. Who foresaw that the doctors, by the easy expedient of raising their fees, would transfer practically the whole amount from their patients' pockets to their own?

It must therefore be carefully considered whether the measure under discussion would in the long-run benefit the rising generation, or whether it might not bring about a state of affairs in which they would be worse off than they are now. Old-fashioned folk, who object to the transference of the pecuniary burden of the family to the general community, have hitherto been little perturbed by the active and able advocacy of the new doctrine. They relied on the fact that the enormous expense involved would deter even the boldest Chancellor of the Exchequer from incorporating it in his budget. Miss Rathbone, however, tells us that the endowment of children is recommended to New South Wales as a measure of economy.

The Government report on the financial provisions of the Bill of 1919 estimated the average number of children per male employee over the age of twenty to be one, and that to provide directly for these children, instead of increasing the rate of pay for all wage-earners, would effect a saving of over £5,000,000. But how would the financial position be affected in New South Wales if, in the near future, the average number of children rose to three or four? Or, to state the case as it would immediately concern ourselves, is it probable that the number of men in this country with more than three children dependent on them would remain at 10 per cent. were each child certain of a weekly grant of ten or twelve shillings?

As compared with its position in 1914, England is a poor country. Its accumulated capital has largely disappeared, its commercial status is threatened by powerful rivals, and

the industrial triumphs of the Victorian age are unlikely to be repeated. The danger of an artificially stimulated birth-rate, which should coincide with a diminishing power of the adult world to provide the newcomers with food and shelter, needs no emphasis. No political or industrial organisation can save the workers from exploitation when their numbers press too severely on the available means of subsistence. Desperate men cannot stand out for terms. The failure of the proletariat to secure any fair share of the stupendous increase of wealth, consequent on the introduction of machinery in the early nineteenth century, was largely due to the rapid growth of their numbers. This is the way, indeed, in which Progress constantly breeds Poverty.

The advocates of child endowment in England are by no means blind to the above considerations, but they believe that an Act could be so framed that the risks would be negligible. Obviously, the matter is not one for dogmatism. The judgment of each individual must ultimately depend on his or her personal estimate of the forces at work. One pleads, however, that this estimate should be based on some real insight into the lives of those inarticulate millions who crowd together in their shabby streets, and whose response, instinctive rather than rational, to legislation makes it a failure, or a success.

The views expressed below must be taken as the outcome of many years' close and, the writer thinks she may claim, affectionate intercourse with a considerable number of intelligent married working-women, living in a London water-side district. Their social and economic status can perhaps be best described by saying that their husbands before the war earned from 24s. to 35s. a week. According to Mr Sidney Webb, only 26 per cent. of the male workers in 1912 earned more than the latter sum. Most of these women have led cruelly hard lives. Only by the heroic sacrifice of all personal ease and pleasure have they contrived to keep their homes in being, their children fed, and their husbands content. One would have supposed that they would have seized on the idea of State endowment for children as a struggling swimmer clutches at a raft. These experienced, careworn homemakers of the poor, however, view the proposal with suspicion and misgiving. This would be, of course, no final or conclusive argument against the scheme, even if all working-class wives shared their distrust. One of the oddest traits of human nature is the way in which people become prejudiced in favour of disabilities to which they have grown accustomed, and all reforms have been resisted by those who ultimately

benefited by them. Nevertheless, the fact that these women hesitate to grasp the greatest bribe ever held out to any section of any electorate, is so remarkable that it may well repay examination. They are not doctrinaires; they are unbiassed by any social or political theory, but their energies have been concentrated on the narrow world in which they live, and their personal and family survival has depended on their understanding the forces which dominate and control it. Their profound conviction is that the removal from the father of pecuniary responsibility for his children would inevitably demoralise him; and they believe that nothing which degrades men, in the long-run benefits their wives and children.

They are persuaded, in the first place, that the system would bring about a great increase in the number of boy-and-girl marriages. Some of the fundamental difficulties of life arise from the fact that certain physical powers and desires develop earlier than do the moral and mental ones which should control them. As things are, economic considerations in all classes bring to the latter a much-needed re-enforcement. The well-to-do usually view the calf-loves of their sons with considerable equanimity. They know that the lads realise that marriage without the means of maintaining a wife would result in social and pecuniary ruin, and they trust to the bracing effect of this knowledge. Among the workers the same deterrent operates, though to a somewhat less degree. The youth of nineteen may be desperately in love with a lass of seventeen, but he knows that not only would marriage involve an unpleasant and continuous lowering of his standard of comfort, but that it would expose him to the reprobation of his domestic world. According to the census returns of 1911, only 12,040 males married under the age of twenty-one. Unfortunately, owing to the abnormal conditions consequent on the war, the next returns will probably show a great increase in this number. It is not only the promptings of passion which tempt adolescent lads to an early plunge into independent life: the crowded state of the little homes means considerable discomfort for everybody, and friction often arises between the boys and their fathers. Times of prosperity in the cotton districts, when young folk of both sexes were earning high wages, have always been characterised by a large number of premature matings. The knowledge that a yearly baby would mean a yearly addition to the family income would inevitably act as a similar encouragement to young fellows to escape from parental control, and to set up housekeeping with the first chits who attracted their inexperience.

It will be asked, both by those who believe that national well-being is bound up with a high birth-rate and by those who see in early unions the only cure for sexual immorality, Why not? Hitherto the steady opposition of the poor to the early marriage of their sons has been based on three considerations. First, it was felt that the lads were bound in honour to repay some of the cost of their nurture by remaining at home for a few years and contributing to the family exchequer. This obligation would naturally vanish were the boy reared at the expense of the State. In the second place, the parents had only too great reason to anticipate that the adventurous Benedick would be shortly back on their hands, with a wife and child in addition. This danger would be lessened. The third objection would remain; but it is the one to which the young people concerned would be the least likely to listen. Among the workers, even more than in other ranks of society, the happiness or misery of a man's whole life depends on his selection of his mate, and the older generation know that the youth of nineteen or twenty is too immature to choose wisely, and that he is neither mentally nor morally fit for the responsibilities of a head of a household. "Them's the sort of marriages," said one observant dame, "where the wife gets a black eye within the fortnight." In such unions, too, the babies tend to come thick and fast, and the wife becomes an unattractive, worn-out drudge before she is thirty. One doubts, too, if, even as regards the moral question, matters would be improved. As far as one's experience goes, it is not as a rule the young unmarried man who "gets a girl into trouble," but the older man to whom his wife and home have ceased to appeal.

On the other hand, it is fairly argued that the establishment of children's pensions would enable many young men, belonging to the so-called comfortable classes, to marry, and that their families would serve as a counterpoise to the present disturbing process whereby society is being mainly recruited from the ranks of its least successful citizens. One doubts, however, if, for one desirable marriage thus promoted, the community would not have to face the consequences of half a dozen undesirable ones.

Within the privacy of their homes, furthermore, women speak very plainly on another point. The relief of the father of all pecuniary liability for his offspring would, they declare, tend to destroy whatever continence at present exists within the marriage relation. They insist that the physical demands of men on their wives would, in thousands of cases, be remorselessly increased, and that families of ten

or twelve children would become common. It must be realised that, to the majority of working-men, Luther's view of marriage seems the natural and right one. In extenuation it may be pointed out that both the Church, by its marriage service, and the State, by the low status it accords to the wife, have done what in them lay to encourage this way of thinking. Nevertheless, at present, prudential considerations exercise considerable influence, and women who have unrivalled opportunities of knowing the facts assert that some measure of birth control, based on the conviction, "We can't afford to keep no more," is exercised in almost all families. The efforts are usually spasmodic, and sometimes reprehensible, but they sensibly reduce the number of births.

Under a system of child endowment, all forms of self-control would be felt to be unnecessary. Even quite decent men would be conscious of no wrong-doing. They would feel they were but obeying the dictates of nature, and would meet hostile criticism by repeating the current cant about the supreme value of the child to the State. As a matter of unsentimental fact, it is the adult who constitutes the strength of the State, and not the child.

A worse form of evil would, moreover, easily arise. Professor Karl Pearson has recently pointed out that were the endowment extended to illegitimate children, a new profession for a low class of women would spring up—as, indeed, we are told happened under the old Poor Law. A more disastrous result would be the rise of a low class of men whose sole work would be the begetting of legitimate children, each of whom would bring a trickle of hard cash into the home. One contemplates with dismay the provision of such a temptation to sloth, self-indulgence, and sensuality.

True, many optimistic investigators into social conditions see little force in the above forecasts. They argue that, under a system of adequate child endowment, large families would no longer mean squads of ill-nourished and diseased boys and girls, but would be sources of national wealth and strength. Supposing this turned out to be true, it would not save the mothers from the moral and physical wreckage consequent on over-fertility, and, fortunately, it is too late in the day to deny that they are ends in themselves, just as much as are their husbands. Besides, is there any probability of the country, in the near future, being able to provide adequately for a great number of new mouths? It is also maintained that the independence conferred on her by her weekly receipts would enable the married woman

to hold her own in the matrimonial relationship, and that she could refuse to bear more children than she felt wise. In some cases this doubtless would happen. In many more, Mill's dictum would once again be exemplified—that no legislation can really protect a person who is legally in the power of another. The man could still refuse to give his wife a penny of his wages, and could make life intolerable for her in a hundred ways.

Furthermore, it is denied that it would be possible for the father to live on his children's pensions, even were he base enough to wish so to do. The allotted sums would only be sufficient for the children's needs, and natural affection, reinforced by Government inspectors, would be a sufficient guarantee that the money was properly applied. This, doubtless, would be the case in thousands of families—families in which now every nerve is strained to give the children a good start in life. But would such fathers constitute a sufficiently large numerical majority to render innocuous the relaxation of effort by men of a different calibre? No farmer minds a few tares—but what if they choke and kill out the wheat? The State would be bound to fix the endowment at a sum which could be justified to educationalists as adequate, and this would inevitably leave a margin in households where the standard of living was lower. Does anyone imagine that a woman who out of the pensions had provided for her brood an abundant dish of Irish stew could, or would, refuse her dinnerless husband a share? Or that, if a man failed to provide the wherewithal for the rent, she would risk eviction rather than satisfy the landlord with some of the children's money? Besides, it is often impossible to distinguish between a man's unwillingness to seek a job and his inability to find or keep one. Were the marriage even a tolerably happy one, the mother would be certain to give her man the benefit of the doubt. At least half the workers of the country have such a poor physique that they would not be accepted for ordinary military duties, and a wife could not lightly brush aside the plea of her delicate husband that he was not fit to go to work.

It is clear that the question of the endowment of children is intimately bound up with another question. How would the system affect the general production of the country? Would not most men work less? Only by the remorseless use of the whip of hunger has animate nature been driven along its upward path, and to most human beings effort is painful. Only a small minority work for love of work, or because they desire to find self-expression.

The advocates of family endowment rely on the example of the middle classes. They point out that a doctor or lawyer earning £500 or £600 a year does not relax his efforts to increase his income because he and his are no longer in danger of actual want. He works to gratify his social ambition, to send his boys to the university, to provide for his old age. It is indeed probably true that the most strenuous part of the nation's tasks is done by those who are far removed from want. Every student of human nature, however, is aware that men of another temperament exist. The outside public sometimes wonders why the authorities of the labour world often oppose social palliatives. It is because they realise the natural apathy and indolence of human nature, and they know that among the bulk of their followers any considerable diminution of personal hardship and suffering would be followed by a lukewarm attitude towards reforms the leaders consider fundamental.

Miss Rathbone herself suggests that the falling off in production which followed the raising of wages on the coal-fields, and of which the mine-owners so bitterly complained, was due to the fact that the young unmarried men found they could secure all the comfort they cared about at the cost of less exertion. The Unemployment benefit was justified by the circumstances of the post-war period, and undeniably has saved many homes from disaster. But there has been a reverse side to the medal. Everyone knows of men who settled down contentedly to live on the weekly payments, letting their wives scrape together, as best they could, whatever else was absolutely necessary. It has not been uncommon to hear working-class women exclaim in their dismay at the deterioration in the habits of their mankind, "It's the worst thing Government ever done; it's made the men downright lazy." It would take a bold prophet to affirm that children's pensions would not have a similar effect.

Another consideration remains. How would the confiscation of his domestic responsibilities affect the moral and spiritual nature of the man himself? As one marvels at the heroism, the fortitude, the self-abnegation, which so often lie concealed behind the tousled hair and draggled skirts of the working-class mother, one realises how much, in all essential things, the human race owes to the helplessness of its young. Hitherto, the father also has had his share in the divine discipline, to his own great ultimate advantage. To argue that men, through the taxes they paid, would still be supporting the children, is surely futile. To face a day's hard, monotonous toil because Johnnie wants a pair of boots,

or to refrain from an evening's jollity with one's mates because Mary must have cod-liver oil, belongs to a totally different moral order from that involved in paying taxes because one dare not do otherwise. True, the father could still supply sweets, or even music lessons, but such accessories lack the urgent appeal of primary physical needs. Churches and creeds have risen and fallen, as they are rising and falling to-day, but through parenthood and the little unremembered charities of home life the moral training of the individual has gone on. Love grows by sacrifice, and love is the fulfilling of the law.

Miss Rathbone ends her article by a challenge to her critics to propose a better scheme. One fervently hopes, however, that, whatever experiments in child nurture we are destined to see tried, the authors of them will realise that it is impossible, in the long run, to benefit the rising generation by removing from a large proportion of the adult population the main incentive to the good life.

ANNA MARTIN.

LONDON.

THE GLOOM OF DEAN INGE.

THE REV. W. J. FERRAR, M.A.

IT was in 1911 that Dr W. R. Inge appeared in London in the character of Dean of St Paul's. To the ordinary man nothing unusual seemed to have happened. Only a Cambridge professor who for a period of his life had been identified with Oxford, and preached a set of Bampton Lectures on a theme which sounded dreamy and unpractical, and had for a short time held a London living in a fashionable neighbourhood without attaining great popularity, was promoted at a rather early age to a position in the Church of great prestige and remarkable opportunity. There did not seem any likelihood that he would adorn it with supreme distinction; indeed, there were groans from certain quarters, inasmuch as for many years the Chapter of St Paul's had been more or less a centre of pronounced High Church opinions.

Under a succession of men, some scholarly, some brilliant, all saintly and determined, the Cathedral, once bare and colourless, had been transformed by costly reredos and mosaics into the likeness of the great Roman Catholic churches abroad, music and ritual had been elaborated, and a gentle but constant Anglo-Catholic warmth radiated from its ministrations. The greatest of English preachers had dogmatised in silvery or arousing oratory from its pulpit, the most attractive of English organists had filled its domed vaults with superb music, and the devoutest children of the Church of England, gathered from the four corners of the Empire, had learned in its vast spaces to worship God in the beauty of holiness. It was known that the new Dean was little in sympathy with such traditions, and that he stood in no sense in the line of Liddon and Scott Holland.

But something unusual had happened. A master-mind had at a comparatively early age been placed on one of the most important traditional pedestals of the national life, such a position as men normally attain when their heads are

grey and their armour rusted. To those who knew it seemed a story from the world of spirits. The ordinary man did not recognise that those Bampton's with the dreamy title were a remarkable achievement, which, combined with the spirit of the times, had already effected a transformation of the general outlook on religion and life; that they had made Mysticism a force to be reckoned with, gathered up and focussed a world of unorganised spiritual ideas, and put in their right relations the claims of the spiritual and institutional in religion. English religion and ecclesiastical dogmatism could never be quite the same as they were before Inge ascended the pulpit of St Mary's in 1899. Nor did English people realise the acuteness of the arguments of his American Lectures, their psychological subtlety and British common-sense, the caustic emphasis that fell cruelly on the fundamentals of Romanism, the alertness of the hand that drove nail after nail into its pretensions. Nor did they suspect that in Inge was the rare combination of a scholar of supreme distinction, who in his youth had swept the academic board, a philosopher of wide range, sure grasp, and subtle analytic faculty, and one keenly interested in the affairs of national, imperial, economic, and social life—as earnest and sure of his ground in these matters as in the criticism of Silver Latin, or the interpretation of Plotinus, Hegel, or Bergson.

It was not in the pulpit of St Paul's that the Dean was discovered by the Londoner. If I remember correctly, it was upon the platform of Sion College on the Thames Embankment that he received the baptism of gloom. It was at a meeting connected with some organisation for Churchwomen that the Dean's utterances first became good "copy." With that delightful dash of the unexpected, to which we are now accustomed, he poured out upon an audience innocent of political or economic knowledge, and prepared for the usual doses of platitude, the rich and intoxicating wine of a characteristic attack upon the accepted principles of democracy and applied socialism. The journalist was present and listened with delight, and next morning the mantle of gloom had fallen on Inge's shoulders. The staid Church of England, just learning to flirt coyly with strikers and labour leaders, had found in her quiet nursery an incorrigible, an *enfant terrible* whose caustic epigrams foretold the results of her conduct, a Jeremiah who, looking around him, could see "certain idols of the market-place commanding the lip-service of the politician, but of robust faith or clear vision little or none," and arraign "a Government in a state

of the most pitiable imbecility, cowering before every turbulent faction, and attempting to buy off every threat of organised lawlessness." The symptoms of national disintegration, and their certain result in absolute disaster, were the theme of many addresses and articles. Economic law, foolishly disregarded, would soon exact its penalty. Yielding to labour's increasing cries for more places in the sun would bring inevitable doom upon commerce and prosperity. It seemed a dark outlook, and the epithet of gloom carelessly applied at first became his settled habit in the popular mind. It was signed and sealed by *Punch*, and entered into the national possessions with such things as a statesman's hat and an author's portentous bulk. Thus the title of pessimist was given by popular verdict. And it is probable that the Dean will be considered a man of gloom till his life's end. As a summing-up of the trend of his personality and teaching this is as misleading as most labels affixed by the popular mind.

It is true that he has riddled with unfaltering shots the idea of a sure and automatic progress in human affairs, which was the dominant assumption of the last century; but, for all that, he admits penitently in a footnote that "though there is no law of progress, yet there is no law which forbids progress." In what may seem to his critic an unusually genial moment, but certainly one which represents his real conviction, he stated at St Andrews, "There is no ground for pessimism about the future of the race, if we take very long views." In days like ours there is no pessimism in acknowledging that troublous times await us; rather there is optimism in the faith that religion and philosophy will be sufficient protection to those who trust, though the heaven fall.

It is true that the condition of our national resources, and the incidence of taxation, remind him of nothing so much as of that of the Roman Empire in the hour of its decay in the third century, when, as with us, the middle classes were made the milch-cows of the populace and the upper class, even to the point of extinction, and the State perished with the perishing of its thrifty commercial classes; but the Dean is too good an historian to hold that modern conditions are identical with the ancient, or that our rising proletariat, merged more and more in the class that it seems to displace, has not in it promising elements for the future quite unlike the pampered dregs of Roman civic populations and the cosmopolitan remnants of Roman ex-service men.

It is true that he marks with a Miltonic sourness the assimilation of the National Church to the Catholic pattern,

and the growth of "pullulating rites, externe and vain," as lowering the Church's influence, and influencing a sentimental minority not in the best way; yet the Dean is too good a psychologist not to recognise the part that the emotions play in all religion, too good an æsthetic to disregard the claims of beauty, and the Dean of too stately a Cathedral not to realise that the Church has reaped some advantages from the Oxford Movement.

The Dean no doubt held gloomy views of the national future in the days before the war; the results of "Europe's co-operative suicide," as the *Outspoken Essays* show, have not made his immediate outlook more rosy. To him the laws of economics in the world of fact remain what they ever were: English operatives demand impossibilities, and futile statesmen show their futility when they mortgage the well-being of posterity, and hand out readily to the many-headed beast the supplies that ought to be husbanded. Yet he is no pessimist; for this reason the Dean is a Platonist through and through, and a Platonist cannot be a Pessimist. A Platonist believes in an eternal order, in which the highest principles that man recognises exist in ever-undiminished force and reality. Truth, Beauty, and Right are not lights that man has fortuitously discovered in his path of evolution. If they were, they would ever be in danger of being extinguished in this or that secular catastrophe. But they have never been lost: for a moment submerged in ages of decadence, they have ever re-arisen in their old beauty to guide men on. Man's fidelity to these master-lights of all his seeing is the thing that matters, and the trust in their invincible attraction and unfailing habitation of the human mind is optimism realised.

Now, no modern mind has more acutely appreciated the undying significance of the Platonic heritage, the doctrine that ideals pursued here are only a pale copy of those ideals existing in their reality above, and that the order of earth at its best is but a muddled effort to approximate to the heavenly pattern; no modern voice has more clearly enunciated in modern terminology the essentials of the Platonic system, or more sagely criticised the idols of the lecture-room of to-day; untainted by pragmatism, unattracted by Bergson, Dean Inge continues to move in the orbit of Plato. Modern systems worked out from merely human elements become pessimistic, as the actual development of humanity gives less and less material for hope; but the system based on a reality independent of humanity, however the earthly vessel suffer loss, can retain its hopefulness.

It is true that the riddle of the painful earth has ever been a hard one for the Platonic philosopher. Plato himself could only offer us parables in explanation of the pain and strain of life. The idealist, face to face with the problem of evil, has either to say that evil is unreal, or that it is an imperfect form of good. War, lust, and crime are hard to accommodate with the sphere of perfection yonder. What relation have they to the mind of God, wherein the realities dwell? An optimist by profession, the Platonist has often seemed to disregard facts in order to uphold his theory. And yet his theory is right in face of the facts.

But Dean Inge is a Christian Platonist, and, like his forerunners at Alexandria and Cambridge, has inherited from a more sacred source just that addition which makes Platonism invulnerable. For when Christianity is wedded with Platonism it is as if a new and sure pedestal were placed beneath to underpin a beautiful statue that somewhat lacked stability. Christianity was from the first "salvation by hope," being the religion of redemption. It proclaimed the conquest of sin, it gave a meaning to suffering, it introduced sympathy into the Divine nature. In this way Christianity supplements Platonism just where persistent optimism necessitated the Platonist's adoption of something of a pose. The optimism of the Christian is never a pose, it is the essence of a life—a delusion, if you will, but a direct expression of living experience. And this essential optimism is thoroughly at home with the Platonic spirit, as has again and again been proved in the history of Christian thought. It is this optimism that marks Dean Inge; he is convinced, with his favourite Julian of Norwich, "All shall be well, all shall be well, and all manner of thing shall be well."

The possessor of a singularly mordant wit, as merciless as that of Swift, Dean Inge occasionally expresses himself somewhat extravagantly; the colour of a brilliant antithesis or a striking figure of speech attracts his sensitive eye, and carries him into paradox. Such a wit makes philosophy vivid and delightful, but our grosser intelligence sometimes forgets to reduce the picture to its due proportions.

Apparent "gloom" may thus turn out a twilight of the gods, and bitter satire only pleasant raillery. The man "who has often thought that we may be wrong in not admitting a sense of humour in the Creator," and remarks that "there are some animals, such as the mandrill, the hippopotamus, and the skunk, which surely can only have been made for a joke. We may have the same suspicion about some members of our own species," deserves not only

the gratitude of his readers, but their assurance that they will not always take his hard sayings *au pied de la lettre*.

It must sadly be confessed that the present leaders of the Church lag sadly behind their forerunners both in intellectual eminence and also in the power of vivid appeal to educated laymen. The days are gone by when scholars like Lightfoot, Stubbs, and Creighton sat on the Episcopal bench. With some brilliant exceptions, the English clergy are no longer "stupor mundi." The stress laid upon pastoral activity has contributed to the rise of a different order of men of very limited intellectual interests.

Nor even so are they of the type of Farrar—cultivators of their own garden, but widely recognised outside its narrow area. It is possible that a dinner-party of London people of good standing would hardly know the surname of a single English bishop except perhaps that of their own diocesan.

In both directions Inge is an exception. As an authority on the mystics, he challenges the attention of all students of religion, while he has carried the study of Plotinus further and interpreted him more lucidly than any modern thinker. At the same time, his is a name recognised by every educated person: his caustic epigrams are quoted, his phrases remembered, his political and economic views exaggerated as they pass from mouth to mouth. The newspaper makes him a familiar figure in the first-class carriage from the suburbs, and in the third as well.

It is safe to say that more Londoners know of Dean Inge than of any other leading Churchman. This is not to say that they understand his message. It is still true, as Goethe said, that "die Engländer sind eigentlich ohne Intelligenz"; and as Creighton echoed, "An Englishman is not only without ideas, but he hates an idea when he sees it." And this accounts for the quite misleading labels they affix to men like the Dean. It seems impossible to change these labels once they are affixed, though they simply caricature great personalities. Something similar has affected the popular representation of the author of *Philosophic Doubt*, and of Lord Haldane.

But the Dean's very eminence will always leave him something of an enigmatic figure. As he is caricatured in the popular print, so he is too angular to be fitted into any ecclesiastical compartment. His opposition to all institutional Christianity, except the bare minimum, cuts him off from the High Church party; he would be more akin in temper to the older Evangelicals, were he not quite open to the decisions of sane criticism and so well versed in the widest

culture ; being a mystic, he sounds a depth of piety that makes a great cleavage between him and the practical Liberal of the day, from whom he is equally divided in political views. Thus Dean Inge stands very much alone. It is the penalty of his mysticism, which, as he says, causes the soul " to break in succession every form in which it tends to crystallise." Life to such a mind is a continuous outgrowing, a constant march onwards, an unwearied quest of the real Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. Strange that such a seeker should earn no name but that of Pessimist, and seem but a gloom-clad Hamlet on the stage of life !

W. J. FERRAR.

COWFOLD, SUSSEX.

THE NATURE OF MAN.¹

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A FEW years ago Élie Metchnikoff published a book entitled *The Nature of Man: Studies in Optimistic Philosophy*. That interesting work is chiefly concerned with the great problem of Death—with the problem, that is, of adjusting human emotions and human understanding satisfactorily to the common doom of living creatures. In Metchnikoff's view that problem has been mainly responsible for the existence of religions and philosophies. In his belief religions and philosophies have not been able to deal with the problem satisfactorily; but their failure, says he, is no reason for despair; for it is his conviction—and here we see why he deemed his study to be one in optimistic philosophy—that the problem can be satisfactorily solved by science, and in particular by the science of biology, for the process of dying is one of the processes of life. And so his book aims at being an important contribution to what may be called the science or the philosophy of death.

I hope that this address upon "The Nature of Man" may appear to the reader, as it appears to the writer, to be likewise a study, or the result of a study, in optimistic philosophy. It is not of death, however, that I intend to speak, but of life. I desire to look towards the possibility—to contemplate the possibility—of a valid philosophy, or a science, of human life.

The core of my message is a certain concept—a concept regarding the essential nature of man. The concept is, I believe, both new and important—strictly new, if I be not mistaken, and tremendously important. This judgment I may express with propriety, because the idea in question did not originate with me. I should be proud if it had. I encountered it a little less than a year ago in an unpublished

¹ Address delivered at the annual meeting of the Columbia University Chapter of the Society of Phi Beta Kappa, 31st May 1921.

manuscript which by good fortune it became my privilege to examine. And so the conception is mine only by acquaintance, by meditation upon it, by a steadily growing sense of its significance, and by adoption—adoption of it, I mean, as an inspiring idea of great beauty and as a fruitful working hypothesis. The manuscript, I am happy to report, is now being published (by E. P. Dutton & Company) in the form of a book entitled *The Manhood of Humanity: The Science and Art of Human Engineering*, and will appear very soon. The author of it is a Polish nobleman, Count Alfred Korzybski, a native citizen of Warsaw, by temperament a poet and philanthropist, by training and experience a mechanical engineer and soldier, twice wounded in the war; about six years ago transferred as a military expert to North America, where, both in the United States and in Canada, he worked hard in the cause of freedom.

The book is, in my opinion, a momentous contribution to the best thought of these troubled years—momentous in what it contains, even more so in what it suggests, and most of all, I dare say, in the excellent things it will eventually help men and women to think and say and do. I am not going to review it. Having examined the work carefully and reflected much upon it, I am convinced that its significance can be grasped and felt only by reading the work itself, re-reading it, and pondering it. The work deals with a wide variety of ideas; these do not constitute a mere collection; they constitute a system spiritually interlocked in many ways. • Among the ideas of the system there is one which dominates all the rest, binding them together, giving them their proper order, their life, their light, and their significance—its place in the system is like that of the sun in the solar system. That central idea is Korzybski's concept of man—a concept of what is characteristic of humankind; it is, in other words, a thesis purporting to state what that is in virtue of which we human beings are human. I desire, in the first place, to present that thesis, or conception, as clearly as I can, for consideration both now and in the future; it will be my further aim to indicate some of the bearings it seems to me to have upon the cardinal interests of mankind.

The World War has, indeed, constrained us to think about realities as we never thought before, and there is one thing of which we are all of us convinced—it is only by thinking of realities that we may hope to solve the pressing problems of the world. That is a great gain and is full of promise, but it is only a beginning. In dealing with realities it is of the highest importance to have just conceptions of them. I

desire to emphasise the prime importance of concepts that correspond to facts; for, in order to deal successfully with the great human problems of our time, it is not sufficient to have enthusiasm, sincerity, and goodwill; we know that, in addition to these excellent things, it is indispensable to acquire true conceptions of the realities involved. Now, of all the realities with which we humans have to deal, of all the realities involved in the present perplexities of the world, it is evident that the supreme reality is man. It follows that of all the questions which in reflecting upon the ills of our time we *must* ask, the supreme question is: What is man? What is a human being? What is the defining or characteristic mark of humankind? In the scheme of Nature, what is the place—the distinctive place—of the human class of life?

The sovereign importance of that question seems perfectly evident, and is thus evident *a priori*. Have we propounded it to ourselves? In the published thought of recent years I see no sign that we have; if we have, it seems not to have led us to the discovery of anything fundamentally new or fundamentally important. It is safe to say that we have not asked the question—at all events not seriously. And it seems strange that we have not; for many questions closely connected with it, and naturally leading to it, we have asked. Rudely reminded of the dismal things of human history, we have asked: What is the explanation of them? Can we prevent their recurrence? And, if so, how? Keenly aware of the present plight of the world, we have asked: What is the cause? Are we under the dominion of a malevolent fate? Or is there a cure? And, if there be a cure, what is the remedy? In trying to answer these great questions, we have been led to ask others—questions about ethical systems or ethical beliefs, about national or racial philosophies, about education, about industrial methods, about economics, about jurisprudence, political science, and theories of government. We have beheld the amazing progress of invention, of natural science, of mathematics, and the technological sciences; we have seen their swift conquests of space, time, and matter; we have seen our globe thus rapidly reduced to the small dimensions of an ancient province; we have seen many peoples of divers tongues, traditions, customs, and institutions consequently constrained to live together as in a single community; we have seen that there is thus demanded a new ethical wisdom, a new legal wisdom, a new educational wisdom, a new economical wisdom, a new industrial wisdom, a new political wisdom, a new wisdom in the affairs of government; for the new wisdoms our anguished times cry aloud; we have

heard the answers—which are in the main but reverberated echoes of the wailing cry mingled with the chattering voices of excited public men who know not what to do ; knowing that the welfare of the world, since it depends at once upon *all* the cardinal forms of human activity, demands team-work of them and therefore *equal* progressiveness in all of them, we have compared the swift advancement of the genuine sciences on the one hand, with the slow, uncertain, halting pace of the so-called social sciences on the other ; we have been astounded by the contrast ; in the crumpled and broken condition of our civilisation we behold the appalling consequences of the mighty disparity ; and so we have asked why it is that the social sciences—of ethics, education, jurisprudence, economics, politics, and government—have lagged so far behind that the system of human relationships throughout the world has been strained and torn asunder like an immense network of wire rent by a cyclone. This very important question has led to some curious results. It has led to the invention of doctrines that alarm—doctrines and proposals that we are wont to call radical, revolutionary, red. Is it true that our thinking has been too radical ? The trouble is that, in the proper sense of that much-abused term, our thinking has not been radical enough. Our questionings have been eager and wide-ranging, but our thought has been shallow ; it has been emotional and it has been daring, but it has not been deep. We have, indeed, known that the character and status of the so-called human or social sciences depend upon what man *is* ; but we have not reflected upon the fact that they depend also, in equal or greater measure, upon what we *think* man is. The fact of this fundamental dependence, had we considered it, would have led us to a further reflection—it would have led us to wonder whether the backwardness, the mediæval-mindedness, the disastrous lagging of the social sciences may not be due to their having at their base or in their heart a fundamentally false conception or false conceptions of what is really characteristic of humankind. It is evident that, if our thinking had reached that point, we could not have failed to ask ourselves the supreme question : What is man ?

Why have we not in these times asked that fundamental question ? Doubtless it is because we have assumed, in the main unconsciously, that we know the answer. For why inquire when we are sure we know ? Is our assumption of knowledge in this case just ? Have we really known, do we know now, what is, in fact, the idiosyncrasy of the human class of life ? Do we critically know what we, as representatives of man, really are ?

What are the concepts of man that our generation has inherited? Broadly speaking, they are of two types. One of them is biological or zoological; the other one is mythological. Some of us hold the former one; some of us the latter; and some of us probably hold both of them; for, though they are mutually incompatible, mere incompatibility of two ideas does not necessarily prevent them from finding firm lodgment in the same brain. According to the zoological conception, man is an animal—a kind of species of animal. This conception has at least one merit: it regards human beings as natural—as creatures having a place in the scheme of Nature. This merit the mythological conception has not; according to it, man has strictly no place in Nature; he is, indeed, neither natural nor supernatural, but is both at once—a kind of miraculous union, compound, or hybrid of the two. Such, then are the concepts of man that now reign throughout the world and that have so reigned from time immemorial. And such are the concepts that have fashioned our so-called human or social sciences in so far as these have been and are fashioned by what we humans consciously or unconsciously *think* man is.

Are the concepts true? Or rather, we must ask—since they cannot both of them be true—is one of them true?

It should not amaze us to find that both are false; for the concepts are man's and their object is man; thus the difficulty is unique; it is that of a self-conscious being having to regard its *kind* as an object, and rightly conceiving what the object is. In respect of the mythological conception, there are no doubt some who are disposed to treat it ironically, as it was treated by Plato. "We must accept," said he, "the traditions of the men of old time, who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods—that is what they say,—and they must surely have known their own ancestors. How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods? Although they give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they declare that they are speaking of what took place in their own family, we must conform to custom and believe them." But this gentle irony—the way of the Greek philosopher—is not the way of the Polish engineer. The latter is not, indeed, without a sense of humour, but in this matter he is tremendously in earnest; deeming it to be immeasurably important for all mankind, he treats it with the utmost seriousness; and he bluntly affirms, boldly and confidently, that neither the mythological conception nor the zoological conception of man is true; he denies outright that man is a species of animal, and similarly denies that humans are compounds of natural and supernatural.

What is the error in those traditional conceptions? It is, he contends, of the same kind in both of them, and fundamental. It is the kind of error that consists in what mathematicians call confusion of types, and what Korzybski calls mixing of dimensions.

We may speak of, say, the class of geometric points or of the class of spheres, but we cannot speak logically of a class composed of points *and* spheres, for there is no such class; or we may speak of the class of water-drops or of the class of oceans, but not logically of a class of water-drops *and* oceans; the types are different, and must not be confused; to talk as if there were such a class is to talk nonsense, and it would be the same if we tried to discourse rigorously about a class composed of stars *and* rays of light. The matter is even clearer in terms of dimensions, or dimensionality. Here is a straight line—it has length only—it is a one-dimensional thing; it is not a point; it does contain points and it has some point properties; but, if on this account we called it a point, we should be guilty of a type-confusing blunder. Next consider a surface, say a plane—it has length and breadth—it is a thing of two dimensions; it contains points and lines, and it has certain point properties and certain line properties; but we do not call it a point or a line; if we did, the blunder would be a dimension-mixing blunder. Once more, here is a solid, say a cube—it has length, breadth, and thickness—it has three dimensions; it has surfaces, and it has certain surface properties, but it is not, therefore, a surface; if we called it a surface, or if we were to say it is a surface mysteriously combined with some miraculous influence from outside the universe of space, then in either case we should be guilty of treason against the eternal law of types or dimensions.

Next, consider the great life-classes of our world—their patent cardinal distinctions and relations; and let us begin with the class of plants. I offer only a rude sketch. Plants, we say, are living things. How are they characterised as a class, positively and negatively? They take in, chemically transform, organise, and appropriate the basic energies of sun, soil, and air; but they have not the *autonomous* power to move about in space; together they constitute the lowest order or class or type or dimension of life—say, for convenience, the life-dimension I.; being, as indicated, binders of the basic energies of the world, the plants are, in Korzybski's nomenclature, the basic-energy-binding, or chemistry-binding, class of life. What of the animals? Like the plants, animals too take in, transform, organise, and appropriate the energies of sun, soil, and air, though in large part they take them

already prepared by the plants ; but, unlike the plants, animals possess the *autonomous* power to move about in space—to creep or crawl or swim or run or fly ; it is thus evident that, compared with plants, animals belong to a higher type or dimension of life—say the life-dimension II. Because they are distinguished by their autonomous power to move, to abandon one place and occupy another, and so to appropriate the natural fruits of many localities, the animals are called space-binders—the space-binding class of life.

And now we come to the crux. What are we to say of man ? Like the animals, human beings have the autonomous power to move—the capacity for binding space,—for taking now one and now another “ place in the sun ” with the goods thereof ; and it is plain that, if human beings had no capacity of *higher* order, men, women, and children would indeed be animals. But what are the facts ? They are familiar ; let us, if we can, reflect upon them as if they were unfamiliar, for that is half the secret of philosophy and of science too. Long, long ago, a quarter or a half-million years ago, there came into existence upon this globe—no matter how—a new kind of beings ; they did not know what they were ; they knew nothing of the world, nothing of its size or shape or place in the universe, nothing of its resources, their locations or properties, nothing of natural law ; they were without guiding maxims, precepts, or precedents ; they had no science, no philosophy, no art, no wealth, no instruments, no history—not even tradition : and yet, compared with the animals, which they hunted and which hunted them, they were marvels of genius ; for there was in them a strange new gift—a strange new energy,—that mysterious power in virtue of which they did the most wonderful of all things—*initiated* the creative movement called Civilisation. That power, first manifest in the infancy of our race, is the power that invents ; the power that imagines, conceives, reasons ; it is the power that makes philosophy, science, art, and all the other forms of material and spiritual wealth ; the power that detects the uniformities of Nature, creates history, and foretells the future ; it is the power that makes *progress* possible and actual, discerns excellence, acquires wisdom, and, in the midst of a hostile world, more and more determines its own destiny. The animals have it not, or, if they have, they have it in a measure so small that we may neglect it, as mathematicians neglect infinitesimals of higher order. Observe *how it relates us to that mysterious thing called Time*, which so many thinkers are just now, as never before, engaged in studying, each in his own way. By virtue of that familiar yet ever-strange human power, each genera-

tion inherits the fruit of the creative toil of bygone generations, augments the inheritance, and transmits it to the generations to come; thus the dead survive in the living, destined with the living to greet the unborn. If this be poetry, it is also fact. Past, Present, and Future are not three; in man they are spiritually united to constitute *one living reality*.

And now we are at length prepared to grasp Korzybski's great concept. Because this capacity for binding time, under a law of ever-increasing amelioration, is *peculiar* to man or is at all events his in an incomparable degree, the class of human beings is to be conceived and scientifically defined to be the Time-binding class of life. We have here, evidently, a new dimension, a new type, of life—life-in-Time. Animals are binders of space; man is a time-binder. But here a word of caution. Since, like the animals, man too binds space, may we not say that man is a time-binding animal? No; to say that would be the same kind of blunder as to say that a solid is a surface because it has surfaces and some surface properties, or to say that fractions are a species of whole numbers because they happen to have some of the properties of whole numbers. It is fatal to confuse types or to mix dimensions. Time-binding activity—the defining mark of man—may involve, and often does involve, space-binding as a higher involves a lower; but to say that, therefore, man is a species of animal—a time-binding species thereof—is like saying that a solid is a species of surface, or that water is a species of oxygen, or that wine is a species of water, or that a violin is a species of wood, or that definite integration is a species of addition, or that a symphony is a species of sound.

Such, then, is the new conception of man—the conception of a being whose character and appropriate dignity consist in his peculiar capacity or power for binding time. It is intelligible to all, and is universal in its interest and appeal. Our sense of its significance will grow as we meditate upon it. The author, I believe, is right in his belief that it marks the beginning and will guide the development of humanity's manhood. I wish it were possible to examine here some of its bearings on the cardinal interests of mankind; but I can do no more than barely allude to a few salient considerations.

One of them is that, though we human beings are indeed not a species of animal, we are *natural* beings: it is as natural for us to bind time as it is natural for fishes to swim.

That fact is fundamental. Another, also fundamental,

is this : time-binding power—the characteristic of humanity—is not an effect of civilisation, but is its cause ; it is not a civilised energy, it is the energy that *civilises* ; it is not produced by wealth, whether material or spiritual, but is the source and creator of wealth.

I come now to the gravest consideration. Inasmuch as time-binding is the characteristic of humanity, to study and understand man is to study and understand the nature of his time-binding energies ; the laws of human nature are the natural laws of these energies ; to discover these laws is a task of supreme importance, for it is evident that upon the natural laws of time-binding must be based the future science and art of human life and human welfare.

One of the laws we already know—not indeed precisely, but fairly well, we know its general type—and it merits our best attention. It is the natural law of progress in time-binding or civilisation-building. Each generation of (say) beavers begins where the preceding generation began ; that is a law for animals : there is no advancement, no time-binding—a beaver dam is a beaver dam. Contrast this with human life. Man invents and discovers and creates. An invention or discovery or creation once achieved, what happens ? Each invention leads to new inventions, each discovery to new discoveries, each creation to new creations ; invention breeds invention, science begets science, the children of knowledge and art and wisdom produce their kind in larger and larger families ; each generation begins, not where its predecessor began, but where it *ended* ; things already done become instruments for the doing of better things ; the Past survives in the living achievements of the dead ; the body of these achievements—invention, science, art, wisdom—is the living capital of the ever-passing Present, inherited to be held in trust for enlargement and for transmission to future man ; the process is that of time-binding : Past and Future are thus united in one eternal Now owning a law of perpetual growth and continual progress.

What is the law thereof—the natural law ? We see at once what it is : it is that of a rapidly increasing geometric progression : if P be the progress made in a given generation, called the first, and if R be the ratio, then the progress made in the second generation is PR , that in the third PR^2 , and that made in the single T^{th} generation will be PR^{T-1} . Observe that R is a large number, and that the time T enters as an *exponent* ; and so the expression PR^{T-1} is called an *exponential function of Time*. This is an amazing function ; as T increases, the function not only increases, but does so

at a rate which itself increases according to a similar law, and the rate of increase of the rate of increase again increases in like manner, and so on endlessly, thus sweeping on towards infinity in a way that baffles the imagination and the descriptive power of speech. Yet that is the law—the natural law—for the advancement of civilisation—immortal offspring of the marriage of Time and human Toil.

And here arises a great question which I have hardly time enough to touch. The question is: Has civilisation always advanced in accord with the mentioned law? And, if not, why not? The time-binding energies of man have been in operation long—300,000 to 500,000 years, according to the witness of human relics, ruins, and records of the caves and the rocks. If progress had followed the mentioned law throughout that vast period, our planet would no doubt be now clothed with a civilisation so advanced that we are powerless to imagine it or to conceive it or even to conjecture it in dreams. And yet that law is a natural law of the time-binding energies of man. What has been the trouble? What the main trouble has been is pretty plain. As already said, what we human beings do depends, not merely upon what we are, but, in equal or greater measure, upon what we *think* we are. From time immemorial the characteristic energies of our humankind have been hampered by the false conception that man is a species of animal, and hampered by the false conception that man is a miraculous mixture of natural and supernatural. Throughout the long period of our race's childhood, from which we have not yet emerged, those misconceptions have lain athwart the course of civilisation. All that is precious in present civilisation has been accomplished in spite of them. The goods, the glorious achievements, of which they have *deprived* the world, we cannot now know, but the subtle ramifications of their *positive* evil we can trace in a thousand ways. And it is our duty to trace them. Whoever performs the duty will be appalled. I cannot dwell upon the matter here. Suffice it to say that, if we humans do not, in fact, constitute a perfectly natural class of life, then there never has been and never can be a human ethics having the understandability, the sanction, and the authority of natural law; if we do constitute such a class of life, but continue to *think* we do *not*, the result will be much the same—our ethics will continue to carry the confusion and darkness produced by the presence in it of mythological elements. If, on the other hand, human beings continue to regard man as a species of animal, then the social life of the world in all its aspects will continue to reflect the

misconception ; especially our ethics, which subtly pervades, colours, and fashions all of the social sciences, will continue to be—what it always has been in large measure—a zoological ethics, animal ethics, the ethics of tooth and claw, space-binding ethics, the ethics of strife, violence, combat, and war.

So it has been, but it will not continue so to be if we have the wisdom to learn the fundamental lesson of our recent experience. It is this : the World War was an unforeseen, sudden, cataclysmic demonstration of human ignorance of human nature—a demonstration, pitiless as fate or famine, that human beings have never rightly conceived man to be what man is—not a mixture of natural and supernatural nor a species of animal, but the natural agency for those time-binding energies in the world whose peculiar function it is to produce Civilisation, and to do so in conformity with the law of an increasing exponential function of time.

The concept is easy to grasp. Once it is understood, human life will accord with human nature, the time-binding energies will be freed from the old bondage, and Civilisation will at length advance in accord with its natural law as the great forward-leaping exponential function of Time. There will be great changes and many transfigurations. Education—education in home, school, and church—will have for its supreme function to teach the children of man what man is and what they are. Ethics will abandon the space-binding standards of animals and will become *human* ethics based upon the natural laws of the time-binding energies of man. Freedom will be freedom to live in accord with those laws, and righteousness will be the quality of life that does not contravene them. The social sciences of ethics, education, economics, politics, and government will become what they never have been—genuine sciences ; fashioned by a just conception of man, they will co-operate to fashion the State ; and the State, which may ultimately embrace the world, will rescue itself from ignorant politicians and commit its destiny to the guidance of *honest* men who *know*.

And when guided by honest men who know—when guided, that is, by the coming science of human engineering, which will be intelligence applied to human affairs—then and only then our human Civilisation—the living issue of time-binding toil, mainly that of the dead—will advance, not haltingly as hitherto, but, as said, in accord with the natural law thereof, in a warless world, swiftly and endlessly.

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EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONALISM.¹

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It will be seen that my subject contains two terms about which there exists considerable diversity of opinion. I refer to the words Education and Internationalism. In the case of the former, differences will manifest themselves when we seek to define its legitimate objects and its possibilities; while in the case of the latter, the word itself is ambiguous, and stands for at least two entirely different things. Nothing could be further from my purpose than a desire to dogmatise; but I must endeavour to state precisely what I conceive the relations to be between education and citizenship, and what meaning I attach to the word Internationalism.

Education is an end in itself. It aims at laying hold of the best in a man, drawing it out, and developing it. For the mind it does what a course of physical exercises will do for the body. Mr Sandow, or Mr Muller, does not undertake to adapt the human body for the task of coalheaving, or for boxing, though incidentally a thorough course of training will make a man a better coalheaver and a better boxer. So a good education does not undertake to make a man a lawyer, or a chemist, or a citizen, although it will undoubtedly help him to become any one of these things. I mention the citizen along with the chemist and the lawyer advisedly. For citizenship does demand education. The day is long past when the plain common sense of the man-in-the-street could be deemed adequate for the solution of political problems. Politics—the ordering of the whole external life of the people—has become a science, the widest and the most difficult of the sciences, and for its practice long and arduous training

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is essential. One of the principal causes of the deplorable condition of affairs to-day is that politicians have failed to keep intellectually abreast of politics. We indeed stand in need of a "Business Government"; not a body of financial and commercial magnates who, outside the narrow limits of their own particular branch of business, are frequently as ignorant as, and far more prejudiced than, the man-in-the-street; not the soldier at the War Office, or the sailor at the Admiralty, or the banker at the Exchequer, or the professor at the Board of Education. For politics is itself the business which our new statesmen must be proficient in. They must have a comprehensive and accurate knowledge of history and geography, jurisprudence and economics—above all, of men and their ways. Thus politics will cease to be a little side-line which an ambitious man can add, at his pleasure, to the more serious and real tasks of life.

The world has now become, at least in name, democratic. A hundred years ago settled democracy was to be seen, in the Old World only in Switzerland, and in the New World in the United States. To-day monarchical states are as difficult to find as democratic states then were; while among civilised peoples autocracies have simply ceased to exist. But it should be clearly realised that, as a form of government, democracy is on its trial. Far too many people are disposed calmly and unconcernedly to acquiesce in the transition from autocracy to democracy, as they would in any ordinary process of nature, regarding the present type of State as final. The mistake is a profound one; for in politics there is no finality, nor is there any sort of necessity for the ultimate triumph of democracy. It has come because the old forms of government rendered themselves intolerable; it will endure only if it succeeds in doing better.

The war has accomplished one great task: it has made the world safe for democracy. But behind that task there lies another, equally important, and far more difficult: the making of democracy safe for the world. The sword has been in the past a great civilising instrument. It can accomplish much: it can overthrow long-established dynasties, humiliate mighty empires, shatter the most deeply rooted institutions. In other words, it can destroy. By saying this, I do not depreciate its work. Destruction is often the indispensable prelude to construction. And yet, let there be no mistake about this: the work of building is more important, more difficult, and finer. That is the task now lying before us. Democracy must be taught to behave itself decently in the new habitations prepared for it at such great cost. The

teacher must supersede the soldier. To education we must turn our thoughts.

Here we are more especially concerned with the part which history—past and present—can play in that education. As already stated, the study of history is an end in itself, and no historian worthy of the name would dream of having in mind any but one object, the search after truth. History teaching must be given no bias. Unhappily, in the past this salutary rule has been only too frequently transgressed. We have seen schools made the breeding-grounds of a narrow-minded patriotism, and teachers the slaves of governments. For most tyrants have fully realised the inestimable advantage of having the teaching profession on their side, and have sought to control its members, sometimes by bribery, sometimes by intimidation, more often by authorising only their known supporters to teach. Some time ago an appeal was made, on behalf of the League of Nations Union in England, to teachers of history to endeavour to help the objects of the League among the pupils in the schools. Now, if that meant that teachers were expected to teach a distorted view of the past, and to pick out just those facts which are likely to serve these objects, all real lovers of history would refuse utterly and absolutely to consider the suggestion for a moment. For my own part, I do not think that anything of the sort was expected of them. As I understood the appeal, it meant that a broader, and not a more narrow, view of history should be taken; not that certain things should be ignored, but that certain other things, hitherto neglected, should henceforward be given due prominence. Unquestionably, too much has been made in bygone days of wars, diplomacy, intrigues, and national rivalries, and too little of the efforts of mankind to cultivate the arts of peace and to dwell amicably together.

Granting all this, how can history help us? Has it its lessons and its laws, in the light of which we can learn to tread the uncertain future? Too much must not be expected, for I would say most emphatically that history is not a science; that it never repeats itself; and that nothing even approaching a scientific law can be deduced from a study of the past. For if we take any event and look at it closely we shall soon discover that it is itself but the sum of a large number of other events, the slightest alteration in any one of which would lead to a totally different result. The likelihood of the whole series recurring, in identical manner, is so remote that it amounts practically to an impossibility. As a wise old Greek said, many centuries ago, you cannot

step twice into the same stream. In history we are dealing with the free wills of individuals, and we cannot predict the future. Nevertheless, history, if it never repeats, does often resemble itself. Certain causes tend to produce the same results, under generally similar conditions. This seems to be the view of many famous men who have found in history a torch to illumine the dark places of the present. The great Napoleon, according to Mr Fisher, "found in history, not only an encyclopædia of important facts, but the base of the moral sciences, the torch of truth, the destroyer of prejudices." One who had read widely, and pondered deeply over the past, the learned Bishop Stubbs, wrote: "The experience of the past *can* be carried into the present; study gives us maxims as well as dry facts." And if we turn from the dead to the living we find the President of the Royal Historical Society saying in an inaugural lecture at Oxford: "We must draw the moral, whether we will or no: conscious that much nonsense has been talked under the name of 'the philosophy of history,' that nothing is so cheap and so easy as to knock together ingenious theories from insufficient data, we yet hold that history has its lessons, and that they can be discovered and taught." One more quotation, this time from the preface to a recent book by the headmaster of Eton, himself a historian of distinction: "It is only by studying the politicians of the past that we can hope to be just to the politicians of the present, and that is a lesson which every civilised community needs to learn. The study of history will not in itself make us either optimists or pessimists, for both temperaments can find food in the failures and follies of the past, but it will at least make our hopes and fears more reasonable and our judgments more secure."

In the concluding part of this paper I shall endeavour to indicate what I consider to be the most fruitful lines upon which a study of the past should proceed in order to make it a suitable preparation for world-citizenship. But, before proceeding, we must clear our ideas about the last of the big terms in our subject—Internationalism. The first difficulty is that people who really know better will persist in confusing the terms Nation and State; so that, when such a word as Internationalism is come across, one never feels quite sure what the meaning is. To define a State is comparatively easy, for it has long been a technical term in international law. It means, "A political community, the members of which are bound together by the tie of common subjection to some central authority, whose commands the bulk of them habitually obey." Any community possessing these char-

acteristics is sovereign and independent, and so vested with legal personality in the eye of international law. A Nation is much more difficult to define. The best definition I have met with is the following, taken from a brilliant essay by Mr Alfred Zimmern: "A Nation is a body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy, and dignity, related to a definite home-country." The same author goes on to say: "Nationality, like religion, is subjective; Statehood is objective. Nationality is psychological; Statehood is political. Nationality is a condition of mind; Statehood is a condition of law. Nationality is a spiritual possession; Statehood is an enforceable obligation. Nationality is a way of feeling, thinking, and living; Statehood is a condition inseparable from all civilised ways of living." Let us bear the words in mind, for we shall revert to them presently: "Nationality is a way of feeling, thinking, and living." There, in my opinion, if anywhere, we have our goal clearly defined. Now, let us see what we have learned from these two definitions. We see that Scotland, Wales, pre-war Bohemia, and Poland were Nations but not States; that Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Germany were States but not Nations; and that Portugal, Italy, and Holland were practically Nation-States. International law would therefore, with greater accuracy, be styled Inter-State law; and the existing League of Nations obviously is a League of States.

Now, to me it seems that Statehood is a matter of only secondary importance compared with Nationality, though it had become an obsession with the leaders and masses of the "oppressed nationalities" after 1848. It was only natural that they should have come to attach so much importance to it, for it was the manner in which they reacted to the repressive policy of the great States of which they were component parts. The Renaissance and Reformation had given the world the ideal of the sovereign unitary State. Suppression and assimilation became the main business of kings and senates. There was to be everywhere, within the confines of the same State, one law, one religion, one language, one mode of life. Inevitably a sense of outraged patriotism was born among the subject peoples. Irishmen refused to adopt the new fashions in religion. Welshmen refused to abandon the use of their ancient tongue. Scotsmen refused to renounce their clan organisation and sentiment in favour of Dutch finance and a shopkeeping policy. I have chosen my examples from Great Britain, where the system was seen at its mildest. Abroad, on the Continent, liberalising

tendencies did not begin to work until a much later date; and in the German Empire we find, as late as the twentieth century, the hideous anachronisms of linguistic oppression and land expropriation. The big State interfered with its subjects' ways of "feeling, thinking, and living": in other words, there was conflict between Nation and State. The result of this was that subject nationalities came to identify emancipation with the acquisition of sovereign rights. To be a Nation they conceived it necessary to be a State as well. In this I believe them to have been profoundly, though no doubt naturally, mistaken. Every Nation, however humble and however small, ought to enjoy complete liberty to live its own free life after its own heart; but there is no reason at all why it should not be able to do so while living in that political association which we call the State, along with other similar groups. What the various national groups really need is not sovereignty but liberty. I am quite willing to admit that at the present juncture the only way, in many cases, of making sure the enjoyment of complete freedom was to confer sovereignty as well. But do not let us confuse what is but the passing effect of recent tyranny with what is fundamental and eternal. Let me take leave of this point with a quotation from Lord Acton, one of the wisest as well as most learned men who ever turned his attention to politics:—

"By making the State and the Nation commensurate with each other in theory, this principle practically reduces to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the State's boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilisation in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence."

If this theory were to be embraced in its entirety, and the Nation-State accepted as the final type of human political organisation, there would be an end of all talk of a World-State. A policy of Poland for the Poles, France for the French, Ireland for the Irish, if carried to its logical conclusion, would be the inauguration of a new dark age for the world, with more intense national rivalries, with more bitter hatreds,

than anything ever witnessed in former times. Not along that road does political salvation lie. The small State, and especially the Nation-State, is an anachronism. Both are enemies of international peace and freedom.

If this verdict be accepted, we shall not despair of being able to set up, some day, a World-State. That, in fact, will be the easiest part of our task. For, after all, questions of organisation are comparatively simple; it is when we approach the spiritual that difficulties arise. If States could be persuaded to abandon their sovereignty (as individuals have been persuaded to abandon their complete freedom), there would be no reason why a Super-State should not be erected. The real difficulty would not consist in setting it up, but in making sure that it would not develop into the worst tyranny that the world had ever seen. Safeguards would be required if the free life of its component parts were to be protected and preserved. Whenever anything of the kind has been attempted in the past it has failed; and it has failed just for this reason, that, while giving peace and prosperity, order and stability, it denied liberty. This was the case of Rome ages ago, and it was the case of Germany only yesterday. As a British subject, though not an Englishman, allow me to observe in passing that the most successful attempt in the world's history at reconciling the freedom of numerous small Nations with the existence of a great State has been made by the British Commonwealth, erroneously styled an Empire. On a small scale, history affords a striking and instructive example of this in the Union between England and Scotland. There the two States were fused into one, while the two Nations lived on as before.

Until comparatively recently foreign politics were the affair of sovereigns and their most trusted advisers. Even those countries, such as Britain, which had won the greatest measure of political freedom allowed that peace and war, and the making of treaties, pertained to the king's prerogative. That is the theory of the British constitution to the present day. The king declares war. The king makes peace. The king may annex part of a foreign country; or he may present an English county to some foreign State—and all this without consulting Parliament. Even more was this the case in other monarchical States.

A professional diplomatic service, with long-established rules, etiquette, and traditions, had grown up; but this likewise was absolutely outside the scope of Parliamentary authority. Ambassadors and their staff were aristocrats in every sense of the word. They did not derive their authority

from the people, and directly they were not responsible to the representatives of the people. For the most part, they were men of the strictest integrity and undoubted patriotism. Many of them worked abroad at great personal sacrifice, serving their country according to their lights. It was admitted that only a man of considerable private fortune could enter the diplomatic service at all ; and agents returned from a long period of exile abroad with diminished means and with little enhancement of fame. Not much was expected of them in the way of education. Lord Clarendon, who was British Foreign Secretary in the 'sixties, declared that the knowledge of history demanded of an ambassador could be learnt in a week and forgotten in a week. The essential things were a knowledge of the French language, a pleasing address, and as much as possible of that mysterious and elusive commodity called tact.

These things being so, can we wonder that the people at large took singularly little interest in foreign affairs at all ; and that, when occasionally they were roused for a moment from their indifference and apathy, they should show boundless ignorance and a total lack of judgment ? For international relations is, of all departments of politics, that in which knowledge is of greatest value. It is quite impossible for a man, however stupid and careless, to go through a year without having some knowledge of the domestic problems of his native land forced upon him. Being obliged to wear the shoe, he will probably discover, or at least try to discover, where and why it pinches. But if his country remain at peace he may easily go through life knowing practically nothing about foreign lands. In this matter geography is, of course, a factor of much importance. Great Britain, being an island, has lived a far more isolated life than the majority of its Continental neighbours. The average Englishman seldom sees any country save England, seldom hears any language save English, and seldom sees any man who is not either an Englishman or a British subject. He consequently views all foreigners with that instinctive dislike and dread which the mysterious and unknown always excite !

This dislike and lack of understanding of foreigners have been accentuated by the treatment of history and geography in schools. Now, the one chance of giving a man a little insight into alien civilisations is in the classroom at school, before he embarks upon the great tasks of life. Unfortunately, this unique opportunity has only too frequently been neglected or, worse, deliberately abused. In the first case no attempt is made to depreciate foreign nations, still less to

inculcate hatred of them ; the boy is simply taught the history of England alone, so that for him England inevitably becomes the centre of the whole universe, around which other States revolve, harmoniously or inharmoniously as the case may be. It can, I think, be said with confidence that no reputable English teacher asserts the superiority of England, still less that he endeavours to instil a hatred of Germany, France, or America. Those countries are simply ignored. Unhappily for our world, German teachers were not content to stop there ; nor would a patriotic and paternal Government have allowed them to stop there had they desired to do so. They conceived it to be their duty to prove the superiority of their national achievements over those of all other countries. They were the God-chosen nation, the peculiar people. Every child was taught to regard all Germans as superior beings, and their culture as the acme of achievement in that direction. More than that : in many cases envy and hatred of other States were deliberately inculcated. For, as Mr Zimmern has somewhere remarked, culture was, for them, something learnt at school, something national, not something individual, something which every German put on in virtue of his nationality.

Now, if any progress in Internationalism is to be made, all these old ideas must be for ever and completely set aside. World-history must be taught ; and every student must be made to see that his own country is but one out of many, and not necessarily the best. It is not the importance, but rather the insignificance, of one's fatherland that needs to be emphasised. Then it must be shown that culture is something international ; and that German culture, or French culture, or English culture is something very much poorer than culture itself. Teach culture-history if you will, but let the student realise that many streams have gone to make the mighty river which we call by that name, and that the contributions of the small nations are as considerable as those of the great Empires.

It was Galilee that gave us our religion ; the little city of Athens that gave us our political philosophy. It was Florence that achieved the greatest conquests in Renaissance literature and art. It was Geneva that saved Europe in the sixteenth century. And be it not forgotten that it was a *little* England that produced Shakespeare and the Elizabethan poets.

Still more important is it to realise (as Mr Zimmern has reminded us) that civilisation means *character*, and is therefore essentially individual and not national. " It is moral,

social, and political. It signifies the rule of law, both against anarchy on the one hand, and against tyranny on the other. And it also signifies the making of men fit for free institutions." In this sense it is true to say that Britain has been civilising India; for tyranny has been abolished, and the sovereignty of law has taken the place both of anarchy and of despotism. Moreover, the people are being led, slowly but steadily, into the ways of self-government. Fortunately, we have not conceived it our duty to impose upon India British culture. Civilisation, again, means progress in the art of living in society. Extreme individualism is inhuman. The founder of the science of politics described man as essentially a "political" or "social" animal; and the founder of Christianity usually spoke of a "kingdom." The great watchwords are Justice, Liberty, Responsibility. Now, there obviously is no such thing as American liberty, Japanese liberty, Italian liberty; no such thing as English justice, German justice, Spanish justice; no such thing as French responsibility, Polish responsibility, Turkish responsibility. These things are not national, they are universal. And so when Prince Bülow states (as he does in his book *Imperial Germany*) that there must be conflict between civilisations, he is misusing terms, and saying what is palpably false. But I am far from suggesting that our schools should teach that colourless thing called Internationalism; nor would I have them exalt the merits of that most unsatisfactory type of human being, the cosmopolitan. The man without a nation is lost; he is like an uprooted oak, which can only wither and die. The great force making for cosmopolitanism is industrialism. That is the great leveller of the world to-day. And when a man cuts himself off from his particular national inheritance, when his heart ceases to beat more quickly at the name of his native land, he is well on the way toward a repudiation of all that is romantic, all that is spiritual, all that is best in life. As the Dean of St Paul's has said, it is a poor sort of Englishman who does not feel a lump in his throat when the white cliffs of Dover come into sight. It is the past that refreshes; it is the past that inspires; it is the past that purifies and strengthens a man to play a worthy part in the present. We have already seen that a society which repudiates it altogether is certain to end in crass and sordid materialism.

We are very far from wanting men to forget the deeds of their ancestors; what we would have them do is to glory in those that were creditable. Let the Greek boast of Pericles, of Leonidas, of Themistocles, and of Plato. Let the Italian cherish with pride the memory of St Francis, of Dante, of

Leonardo, and of Garibaldi. May the day never dawn when the Swiss forget William Tell, or the French Joan of Arc, or the Jews Judas Maccabeus. The world-community which we are striving to create will be the richer for all these memories. For it takes all sorts to make a world; and a dull level of uniformity would be too great a price to pay even for a cessation of wars. You will recollect the memorable words said to have been uttered after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln: "Now he belongs to the ages." With equal truth might it have been said: "Now he belongs to mankind." We must learn to glory in one another's great men, and in one another's great deeds. People like Lincoln perform services for the whole world while honestly serving their own nation; and they are the true types of international men. This, if any, is the kind of education in present-day Internationalism which we can give.

The task is a heavy one; for at least in the recent belligerent countries the masses have awakened to a keen, if ephemeral, interest in foreign affairs. We hear of the democratisation of foreign policy. Secret diplomacy is denounced. British workmen are expressing an opinion as to the expediency of making Germany pay. Tyrolese peasants are discussing the possibility of reconstructing the old pre-Bismarckian Germanic Confederation. Now, all this is excellent, and a very definite step forward, provided it is accompanied by real, serious education in foreign affairs. As Lord Bryce has remarked, to make men into intelligent citizens you must perform two extraordinarily difficult tasks: you must teach them to reflect and judge, and you must provide them with unadulterated facts to reflect and pass judgment upon. "A democracy which has only learnt to read, without learning to weigh and to discriminate, is a much greater danger to the world than its illiterate ancestors, for it is much more liable to be misled. Without judgment the man follows his favourite newspaper blindly, hoping all things, believing all things. Now, a man who does that is no whit better than the man who, in the old days, voted according to the directions of his landlord or his priest."

In the remaining part of this paper we can now address ourselves to the two questions—(1) How can the study of the past promote Internationalism? (2) How can the present be so studied as to enable men to ascertain the facts, and to pass judgment upon them?

Towards an answer to the first question there are two possible lines of approach. We can take the whole span of recorded history (say ten thousand years) and show how

certain great tendencies have been at work, eliminating racial distinctions, reducing the number of spoken languages, abolishing barriers between nations, establishing a fairly universal and uniform material civilisation, making the achievements of the human mind in the domains of science and art the common property of the race, and gradually inducing a sense of world-community. Or we can trace the deliberate effort made by men to live amicably together and to settle their quarrels without an appeal to arms. The verdict of history is more cogent as an argument than the verdict of science, since the periods it deals with are shorter and the facts it dwells upon more familiar. We have all been interested and comforted by the teaching of Professor Nicolai in his extraordinarily able book *Die Biologie des Krieges*. It is good to be told by one of the foremost of living scientists that war is old-fashioned, clumsy, and contrary to the process of Nature. Unfortunately, the processes of Nature, though sure, are exceedingly slow, and it is cold comfort to be told that in the natural order of things war may have disappeared in a hundred thousand years. No doubt it is extremely desirable that man should take long views; but, unhappily, he persists in refusing to do so. In his children, his grandchildren, and even his great-grandchildren he will take a warm and lively interest; their sorrows will grieve him and their happiness fill him with joy. But beyond the fourth generation all real and practical interest dies. An argument which looks forward even two hundred years is likely to effect little when it conflicts with man's evil passions—greed, jealousy, hatred. If, however, we limit ourselves to the period of recorded history, there is good reason to believe that many of the causes which, in days gone by, have helped to produce wars are growing weaker and even disappearing altogether. Scientific inventions, by bridging the gulfs of time and space, have made the world a very small place, whose essential unity is being realised more and more. How completely dependent one part is upon another was perhaps not completely perceived, even by those in high places, until they were brought face to face with the difficulties attending the payment of war indemnities. The thought of a victorious nation being unable to afford to accept an indemnity from its vanquished foe would have seemed to our forefathers the hallucination of a lunatic!

But scientific inventions are not the only causes which we perceive at work knitting mankind more closely together. A number of extremely useful and striking facts have been

brought together by Lord Bryce to illustrate this process. In the first place, we notice that nations have steadily been growing fewer in number. Fifty-five nations followed Xerxes in his expedition against Greece, while there are to-day, in what was then the Persian Empire, only seven. Even if we make a large allowance for vagueness in the use of the term "nation," the fact is one of great significance. Then, again, languages have also been growing fewer in number. There are now fifteen along the shores of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, where there must have been at least fifty in the days of Alexander the Great. Conquest has been at work drawing men together for centuries. History knows nothing of a time when there were no wars. The "noble savage," so dear to the heart of eighteenth-century philosophers, is as much a figment of the imagination as Little Red Riding Hood or Jack the Giant-killer. Assyrians and Egyptians, Hittites and Lydians, were striving for mastery at the very dawn of history. The "balance of power" is a doctrine of extreme antiquity; and the argument for substituting, by force if necessary, a superior culture was as cogent in the fourth millennium B.C. as in the twentieth century A.D.! Hand in hand with conquest went colonisation, diffusing in an ever-expanding circle the underlying ideas of a common civilisation and a kindred culture. Commerce also has played an important part, from the days of the Phœnicians to our own. Religion became a unifying force as soon as worship broke off its association with a particular locality or people. In the hands of Paul, Christianity became a world-religion. The religion of Buddha as well as that of Mahomet made the same claim. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of religion as a factor in world-history. Indeed, Lord Bryce, who is perhaps the most learned as well as the most judicious of living historians, has told us that, if we had to select any one stream of history as the central stream since the days of Tiberius, ecclesiastical history would be that stream.

Mr Marvin has made us perfectly familiar with the part which philosophy and literature, science and art, have played as unifying forces, and we need not dwell upon it here. Meanwhile, the process by which smaller groups are being extinguished, or absorbed, or assimilated continues to operate. Population may be expected to increase. The standard of living will probably continue to rise. Languages have been becoming extinct at the rate of one in every two years; and we may ere long see the whole world speaking about ten. Small nations will be effaced; and although new ones may

perhaps appear (as in Canada as the result of the blend of British and French), the total number will almost certainly decrease. Religion is rapidly ceasing to act as an insurmountable barrier; and the only serious obstacle left is colour.

But we must now turn for a moment to the other line of approach already suggested, *i.e.* the deliberate effort of men to live peaceably together.

Leaving on one side the uncivilised and semi-civilised peoples, a sense of community has been recognised and acknowledged among nations for many centuries. Frequently, it is true, they went no further than doing lip-service to it, and it was seldom allowed to interfere seriously with schemes for self-aggrandisement. Nevertheless, the thought was there, rising sometimes to the dignity of an ideal, and not often openly and blatantly repudiated. The classical world had left a rich legacy. From Greece had come the conception of the "good life" and of "citizenship." Aristotle had taught men that man could not find himself except in association with his fellow-men. In Sparta this teaching led to a rigorous suppression of the individual; but in the Athens of Pericles, when allied with a firm belief in liberty, it produced the finest type of civic and individual life that the world perhaps has ever seen. From Rome came the idea of a world-empire, founded upon one law and one administrative system, and giving order, peace, and prosperity to all.

The spirit of Rome passed into the mediæval Papacy and the mediæval Empire, both of which claimed to be its sole heir. In spite of incessant conflict arising from this claim, they agreed upon one point—the world was to be one.

Then came the Reformation, breaking up the old mediæval unity, dismembering the Church, and strengthening the forces making for national independence and sovereignty. France had been travelling steadily in that direction since the days when the misguided patriotism of the Maid of Orleans had, by expelling the English, destroyed the opportunity of Paris of becoming the centre of a vast empire, stretching from the Orkneys to the Mediterranean. In Germany the authority of the Emperor had been growing steadily more attenuated, while the numerous princes, bishops, and free cities had been winning a more complete control over their own affairs. In England Henry VIII. allied himself with the innovating tendencies in religion, with the result that King in Parliament became supreme in Church and State alike. The "Prince" so cynically described by Macchiavelli, the Leviathan of the more humane Hobbes, arrogated to himself, within his own territorial

limits, all power, temporal and ecclesiastical. For a time, in international relations, discord and anarchy reigned supreme. At its worst the mediæval Papacy had exercised a moderating influence, while the conflict of claims between it and the Empire had served to keep alive a certain amount of liberty. But now there appeared a number of sovereign States, each a law unto itself, acknowledging no common superior, and admitting no duty to one another. Self-interest came to be the chief maxim of statesmanship, and success its only criterion. So things went on, until Western Europe drifted into the hideous and brutal crimes of the Thirty Years' War.

But this state of affairs could not long continue. It was so bad that it worked its own cure. A new doctrine was evolved, according to which States are units in a great Society, the members of which have mutual rights and obligations. From the later years of the sixteenth century this doctrine began to take shape and to be taught. First came Balthazar Ajala, then Albericus Gentilis, then Francisco Suarez, and, finally, the father of international law, Hugo Grotius. Henceforward Christian civilised States were deemed to constitute one family. The result was the formation of the European Concert, and the attempt, which we get all through the nineteenth century, to settle the affairs of the world without recourse to war. Let us not depreciate or belittle this attempt. It is not by ignoring or despising the past, not by cutting ourselves away from it (even were such a thing possible), that we are likely to make solid progress in the future! The record of the Congresses which met between 1815 and 1822, as well as the concerted action of the Powers in the affairs of Greece, Turkey, Egypt, China, Africa, deserve sympathetic and careful, if also critical, study. In practice there was much selfishness, duplicity, and half-veiled rapacity; but in word and in theory there was a frank acknowledgment that nations have mutual obligations, that the affairs of one country are now, to some extent, the affairs of all, and that there exists a common standard of fairness and justice. Two generations of historians have poured scorn upon Prince Metternich for attempting to govern the world by conversation. We, perhaps, would do better to reserve a portion of our contempt for the great statesman whose sovereign remedy was blood and iron! The Metternich regime came to an end in 1848. But his ideas survived him; and we soon find the Concert as active and vigorous as ever. Subsequent developments are too familiar to need even a passing allusion—from the

Congress of Berlin to the Hague Conferences ; from the Hague to the Great War ; from the Great War to the League of Nations.

We must now rapidly conclude with a few words about the question which we have still left unanswered : How can the present be so studied as to enable men to ascertain the facts, and to pass judgment upon them ? To this question there can be but one answer—the Newspaper. In large-scale democracies, such as exist everywhere at present, there is no other way of making men conversant with contemporary events in foreign lands. Innumerable debating societies have discussed the question, whether the invention of printing has been more of a curse or a blessing. When one contemplates the position of newspapers in the world to-day, when one realises their influence and the use which they make of it, the old question acquires a new meaning and a new interest. Indeed, as we read beneath the surface of nineteenth-century European history a doubt arises as to whether freedom of the press has been an unmixed blessing. Take, for example, the few fatal hours which elapsed between the publication of the Ems telegram and the declaration of war by France. In those critical hours the newspapers of Germany and those of France (especially those published in the two capitals) strove with might and main to fan the flames of popular fury ; and were I asked to answer the question, Who plunged Europe into the Franco-Prussian War ? my answer would be—not Bismarck, not Grammont, not Moltke, not Napoleon, not Eugénie, but the Paris and Berlin journalists ! To a lesser extent the London journalists were responsible for the war between Britain and the Boer States of South Africa.

The relation between Press and Government is an interesting one. The old device of controlling the Press was soon discontinued, for papers known to be mere mouth-pieces of those in authority lost all their influence. Napoleon was as great a journalist as he was a soldier. Bismarck invented the more subtle method of hiring papers, generally supposed to be free and unofficial, to express his views. The relations between Press and Foreign Office in England were fully discussed in Parliament a few weeks ago. The *Times* had given deep offence to the Government, and Ministers retaliated by depriving it of certain sources of foreign news hitherto enjoyed. In a reply to the Premier, Lord Northcliffe pointed out that his sources of information were superior to those of the Foreign Office ! This was true as far back as 1875, when de Blowitz revealed the German

designs for a new attack upon France ; and in 1878, when the same enterprising correspondent succeeded in obtaining a copy of the Treaty of Berlin before the Congress had formally risen. One also remembers the war correspondence of Archibald Forbes for the *Daily News*.

There are many other things which may render newspaper reports quite unreliable. Every paper is a business concern ; it must pay its way, and if possible yield substantial dividends. To win popularity, and so increase its circulation, will therefore be an ever-present temptation. Worse still, it may be run in the interest of a group of business men ; and thus an apparently fair and innocent article on foreign policy may have as its real and ultimate aim the winning of "concessions" for a group of greedy and unscrupulous speculators. We see certain tendencies at work. The proprietor has ousted the editor ; and the standard of the paper for integrity has been consequently lowered. News is coming to be falsified, rather by selection and by insinuation than by direct falsehood. The "leading article" has lost much of its former importance.

If, therefore, we are to study contemporary history profitably, we must bear all these things in mind. We must believe nothing simply because a newspaper has said it. It is only by long training in the use of evidence and by unflagging vigilance that anything resembling the truth can be learned. In every case numerous reports must be collated. In addition, certain questions should always be asked, *i.e.* : What party or interest does the journal usually support ? Is there anything in this event likely to appeal to it ? Who is the correspondent to whom we owe the story ? Is he possessed of wide knowledge and a sound judgment ? Moreover, what are his sources of information ? Even the verdict of an honest and able correspondent should by no means be accepted without investigation. The file of any big newspaper is a standing testimony to the capacity of even the best journalists for making mistakes. On a path so beset with difficulties, the ordinary student, wishing to keep in touch with events abroad, would avoid daily newspapers altogether and devote himself to weeklies and to the scholarly articles which appear regularly in the big magazines.

At the close of this long discussion we have all, I fancy, come to see one thing very clearly—that there is no short cut to Internationalism. For it is a matter of toleration, understanding, and mutual trust ; a feeling of the dignity of a common citizenship. But we simply will not believe that

world peace is a mere will-o'-the-wisp which, in all ages, has drawn good men from the quest of saner things. To the so-called "century of hope" has succeeded a "century of despair." Yet the student, on his lonely watch-tower, surveying the pageant and procession of the ages, will surely conclude that the despair of the new is as great an exaggeration as was the optimism of the old. But the New World will not appear merely by watching, or even by prayer; it will only come by hard work and strenuous endeavour. So we, if we are endued with any spark of the divine wisdom, will strive unceasingly to call it into being.

W. WATKIN DAVIES.

BRISTOL.

THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

H. C. SHAWCROSS.

IT is now two and a half years since peace was formally concluded between this country and Germany, but very little has been done since then to make that formal peace a real one, whilst much has happened to perpetuate the atmosphere of war. In consequence, the two countries view each other with much the same feelings as during the actual period of hostilities.

At this we cannot wholly wonder. The Press has gained such an unprecedented power over the minds of the people, that public opinion is often based, if not on falsehood, on half-truths, or on truths divorced from their context, or on truths distorted by being seen out of proportion. Nor can we be surprised at this ready acceptance of the printed word, when we consider how mechanical is the upbringing of the ordinary citizen ; how from his earliest years he is practically forced to accept all that he is told, to do all that he is bid, and in most cases neither to question nor to think at all.

This easy gullibility of the public, by which in time of war the various Governments profited in order to foster belief in the rightness of their cause and ardour for success, is exploited by them in time of peace to obtain sanction for reaping to the utmost the fruits of victory. Thus the dogma of Germany's sole responsibility, which proved so useful in arming the peoples for war, is now serving equally well to enforce the terms of peace. The Germans are represented not merely as sinners, but as unrepentant sinners, who are quite ready, when occasion offers, to repeat their crime. This dogma is emphasised chiefly for three reasons :—

- (1) To camouflage the sinister aims and ambitions which some of the Allied Powers are at present pursuing.
- (2) To strengthen the public in its resolve "to make Germany pay," and thus at last realise the hopes so long held out to them.
- (3) To exclude from the consciousness of the allied peoples any suspicion of the possibility that other Powers may share the guilt of Germany.

On this question of Germany's guilt we cannot deliver an impartial judgment unless we first make a clean sweep of all the preconceptions and prejudices which we have imbibed from our daily reading of the newspapers: and this is the more difficult because the conviction of Germany's sole responsibility was instilled into us at a time when the passions of war ran high, and in consequence is not easy to eradicate. Moreover, the authors of the Versailles Treaty prefaced their conditions with the same assumption, knowing that without it they could not justify themselves in the eyes of the world. This justification they sought to obtain by asserting simply and unconditionally that the enemy had started the quarrel, and must therefore bear the consequences. Thus we get a general opinion based on no real knowledge or previous investigation of evidence, yet sufficiently strong to provide a sanction for the acts of Governments. The Press, in fact, not only omits the relevant facts, but often misrepresents them; and if it is hard for the public to know the truth about material facts (such as the economic condition of the average German), still harder is it to know anything of their mentality, of the prevailing opinion on fundamental questions, and the convictions which have governed their words and acts. Yet such a knowledge is indispensable for the establishment of a truer and better understanding. If we are anxious to be fair to our late enemies, we must also be willing to exercise our imagination, and try to understand their point of view by putting ourselves in their place. Before we condemn unreservedly their attitude of mind, it would be well to reflect on two or three circumstances which help to illuminate it.

Before the war, the average German citizen grew up in the belief that his country was menaced on all frontiers, and that military preparations on a large scale were necessary in self-defence. That this view was not without foundation could easily be shown. It was shared, among others, by no less a person than our present Prime Minister, at least as regards inland defence. In an interview, reported in the *Daily Chronicle* of 1st January 1914, Mr Lloyd George declared that "the German army is vital, not merely to the existence of the German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation itself, surrounded as Germany is by other nations, each of which possesses armies about as powerful as her own." It was under this conviction that the Germans entered the war, fought it through, and laid down their arms, feeling that if defeated they were not disgraced, and that they had done their duty as citizens. The revulsion of feeling which led to the revolution was due not so much

to belief in the responsibility of their leaders for the war, as to the exasperation of the discovery that the victory which they had been promised, and for which they had suffered untold privations, was a chimera.

At the outbreak of war, the intrigues and machinations which led to the actual explosion were hidden from the ordinary citizen in Germany; but if all the documents had been accessible to him, it is more than doubtful that an impartial study of them would have led him to infer Germany's sole guilt. Here again we may quote Mr Lloyd George, who on 23rd December 1920, at a meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association, is reported to have said that the war "was something into which they (the Governments) glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly: a discussion would no doubt have averted it."

Since the war, the treatment meted out to Germany by the Allied Governments has been exactly of the kind which a victorious power would inflict upon an enemy whom, from the first, she had desired to annihilate. The continuation of the blockade after the Armistice, the crippling terms of the treaty (so hard to reconcile with the promises which induced the Germans to lay down their arms), the harshness with which those terms have been enforced,—all these things have sunk deep into their hearts, and caused them to regard themselves as "more sinned against than sinning." And the hopelessness of their outlook is intensified by the state of physical misery to which the great mass of the people have been reduced, and by the dark uncertainty of their future.

With these facts in view, can we wonder that the mass of the German people, ready as they are to acknowledge the partial guilt of their former rulers, decline to admit that the war was deliberately planned by Germany alone, and wantonly forced upon the unwilling nations? The more men begin to reason on the matter, the more clearly must they see that it is impossible to lay the blame for so great a catastrophe upon any one nation. The attitude of mind to which Germany appears as absolutely black, and the rest of the world as spotlessly white, is so inherently absurd, that its long survival only shows how little the average man troubles himself to reflect.

Germany is accused of having let loose the war on an unsuspecting world. It is true the world (if by this word we mean the peoples of the world) was unsuspecting, but under this term we must include Germany as well as the other nations. Germany may have been foremost in the race of armaments, her war preparations may have been more

scientific, her Government have gone further than any other on the road of tyranny and unscrupulous domination ; but there were other nations equally eager in this business of preparation for the insane conflict. In 1914 all the big Powers were watching each other in distrust and fear. France had passed its Three Years' Conscription Bill ; Russia was intent on Pan-Slavonic supremacy, and was looking to Constantinople ; England, secure in her naval strength, was waiting.

But the general public in this, and to some extent in all the allied countries, concerns itself only with the particular acts which lighted the train and fired the mine, and seldom asks how the mine came to be there at all. They ignore entirely the long series of intrigues and agreements, ambitions and rivalries, which by 1914 had brought Europe into so inflammable a state. For them there is but one simple question, Who started the fight ? And their answer is equally simple and unconsidered. Thus Germany, bearing the sole blame for the outbreak of the struggle, is saddled with the sole responsibility for the consequences. Of any other sort of responsibility the public is simply not aware. Indifferent to international politics as the majority are, they know nothing of those deeper causes which lie in the moral condition of Europe in 1914, or of the deeper responsibility arising from them ; a responsibility shared by all the warring Governments, and not by them alone, but by financiers and monopolists, by pressmen, and politicians—indeed, through this very ignorance and indifference on their part, by the entire peoples of the countries concerned.

It is evident that by thus accepting without reserve the dogma of Germany's sole responsibility, we are placed from the first in a false position towards her. We are led to condone any act of injustice or oppression on the part of her conquerors by the comforting thought that she has brought it upon herself ; while any act on her side which betokens goodwill and readiness to atone for her share in the world-tragedy is interpreted as a mask to conceal her evil motives and designs. And Germany on her part, finding all her acts and gestures thus misjudged, is hindered in the free expression of her changed mentality and genuine desire for better relations. Thus thrown back on herself, she nurses a sullen resentment at the senseless verdict, which if it remains unrevoked must brand her as a criminal for many generations ; and from such feelings of resentment it is but a short step to the desire for revenge, and for the employment of any means for the recovering of her position.

But there is hope that this verdict is not irrevocable. The words of truth spoken already by those who not only know the facts, but wish this knowledge to become common property, have not fallen on deaf ears. Already in various countries, and most strongly among the Germans themselves, the demand for an impartial inquiry has been raised. Whether such a method of eliciting the truth would prove wholly successful is doubtful, so difficult would it be to secure free and unbiassed testimony and the production of all relevant documents. But much would be won by the mere ventilating of the question; and it is inconceivable that the findings of the judges, however inadequate, would fail to bring to light those wider aspects of responsibility which passion has obscured. And with the reversal of the verdict would come the recognition that the decisions of the Peace Conference, which were based upon it, must themselves be reconsidered and revised. Moreover, such an inquiry would impress upon mankind the evils of secret diplomacy, and bring about a better understanding between the peoples, in their political, economical, and social relations. It will then be seen that foreign policy must in future be based upon international co-operation and agreement, in order that the false ambitions of wealth and empire, and a narrowly conceived patriotism, may never again have the power to send millions of the world's workers and thinkers to mutual destruction. Even now the world is troubled by the same ambitions and passions which led to the catastrophe of 1914; and unless we take instant steps to avert it, the storm will burst upon us again. To avert it, however, mechanical devices and political agreements are not enough. We must believe in the goodwill of other peoples, and earnestly desire their co-operation in the work of promoting the well-being of all. Above all, we must strive for a higher and nobler spiritual vision; for the repudiation, final and genuine, of

“ The simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can,”

and the substitution of the belief in justice and equity for the creed of might. A change of heart must come, and with it a spirit of friendliness and toleration in the intercourse of the nations, strong enough to move us to acknowledge our mutual errors, and to go forward in confident companionship. Only thus can be laid the foundations of an enduring peace.

H. C. SHAWCROSS.

PARKSTONE, DORSET.

ODE IN A GERMAN CEMETERY,
WHERE MANY VICTIMS OF THE GREAT WAR
WERE INTERRED.

AMOS N. WILDER.

RANCOUR grows chastened in these groves of death,
And clamorous recrimination hushed ;
 Our pain disarmed by pain,
We can but leave upon these graves the wreath
Our mortal foes by mortal visitation crushed
 Have woven for their slain.

 Still to this day,
Driven by their bitterness, they come to pray,
 And kneeling in the wind-blown grass
 Grope vainly for relief,
 And as I pass
Rise, bearing still their yet unconjured grief.

What did these know of empire's sordid ends
Markets and routes and ancient rivalries,
Balance of power and dark expediencies,
 Reasons of state,
The vain hallucinations of the great ?
 Why should these make amends
 For others' wrongs ?
What guilt for all this ruin here belongs ?
Or if some taint of envy or of hate
 Were theirs, yet even so,
Which is their greater misery—sin or woe ?

Muse on these mute inscriptions, each of which
Stands for a life past divination rich
 In poignant exploitations
 And eager explorations
Of its allotted freehold in the Day ;

Rich in those naïve essays of the heart,
 Forlorn, confiding gestures
 That of this dark enigma make assay,
 And tendril-like adventures
 Whereby we grope and sound and prove
 Whether some circumambient Love
 Greet and reward our motion to aspire.
 Muse on each acted part ;
 Forgotten exultations, rage, and smart,
 Their faith's extinguished fire,
 And little triumphs that none think upon,
 And protests smothered in oblivion.

Muse on this epitaph that meets the eye,
 Strangely familiar in its alien tongue,
 "These for our homes did die",—
 Two brothers loved of nameless folk, who won
 This as earth's final comment at Verdun,
 In that stentorian month whose havoc flung
 Its hundred thousands down to Acheron ;
 In that inordinate reaping
 Of these our fields beneath
 When twilight was congested with the hosts
 Of death's dim, swarming envoys bent upon
 Prodigious inroads down life's fertile coasts,
 Its virgin prairies sweeping
 In far incursions where no scythe had shone ;
 Till earth was cumbered with the oppressive weight
 Of such a garnering underneath the sun,
 Such high-heaped sheaves of death ;
 Till one by one,
 Borne off across the stars in phantom state,
 Death's groaning wains conveyed
 The great ingathering to the realms of shade,
 And throngs unwonted choked the Stygian gate.

. . . . Races of men, co-heirs of earth's duress,
 Children of night, and orphans of the void,
 Ringed 'round with menace and with mystery,
 Condemned at birth to death in loneliness,
 Proscribed and hunted, trampled and destroyed
 By the blind furies of the earth and sea—
 Why still increase the overwhelming odds
 Against us—add this self-inflicted curse—
 That we should hunt each other in the path
 Of cataclysm, stay to vent our wrath

One on the other in the middle-way
Of swift annihilation, tear and slay
Under the onslaught of the universe,
Wage civil war, our seats stormed by the gods !
E'en the wild beasts forgo their lust for blood,
Fleeing in panic through a blazing wood. . . .

Mysterious is the lot of common lives

Lost in the mass,

Anonymous as leaves or blades of grass

In the thick verdure of humanity,

And inexistent to the powers that be ;

Such were these all ;

And so like leaves they fall,

Or one by one,

Or, when some storm of retribution drives

Over the face of mankind at the call

Of surcharged passions,

Unnumbered from their humble holdings wrenched,

Before the blast they run,

Creatures of life's blind impulse and its altering fashions,

To the deep drifts of still oblivion ;

Save where their thought survives

In that sequestered spot where they were known,

In some frail fort of love 'gainst death and time entrenched.

Even their vices were not all their own,

Inevitably sown

In childhood's hospitable tilth

By the thick-flying seed

Of man's continuing legacy of ill,

His cherished heirlooms of disease and filth,

And rank depravities of ancient date,

And unimpaired inheritance of hate,

That generation unto generation still

Contrives to will.

Errors, obscenities and passions breed,

With germs of violence rife,

As in a culture fitted to that end

In human life,

Nor need man to their breeding his impulsion lend.

Then, fallen foe, and friend,

Sleep,

Sleep in repose ;

And you, you suffering mother, cease to weep.

What though but some few months past we were foes,
We fought in nightmare, as in dreams we live :
 Best to forgive.

Aspiring howsoever, you, or I,
The great world weaves its tentacles of ill
Into our hearts, the solidarity
Of mortal evil claims us 'gainst our will,
And with it sinning, with it we must die.

Yet those who in the world-old process caught
Bring thither self-renunciation, aught
Of loftier aim, of loftier ideal,
 Of loftier thought,

And bear the common curse, the shared ordeal
The common retribution, undeserved,
These in all lands, all times, all causes, these
 That law by innocence appease ;

By their sublime attractiveness they win
The world from its fatality of sin,
 And from the common lot

Desiring no exemption,
Their blamelessness with mighty power is fraught
 When joined with pain,
 For so Redemption,
Redemption lifts its mighty cross again !

 So swerved
By love's vast leverage from its ancient grooves
And changeless cycles of eternal wars,

 The planet moves
To grander revolutions among softer stars
And skies unblasted by the beams of Mars,
To placid periods under milder rays,
Pacific seasons, august nights and days.

AMOS NIVEN WILDER.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"A CHINESE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1921, p. 5.)

THE attention of the Editor having been drawn by distinguished Chinese scholars to important reasons for doubting the documentary value of the Chinese book *Hsi yu chi*, translated in part by the eminent missionary, Timothy Richard (the basis of the above article), and to various errors contained in it, the second article on the subject is withheld pending further investigations.

EDITOR.

"KARMA."

I

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1921, p. 20.)

THE article on Karma, written by Dr Farquhar, will have touched every reader by its sincerity and by its tender appreciations of the sorrows and pains of human life. As a Christian priest who for many years has been a believer in the doctrine of karma and a somewhat earnest student of the whole subject, I feel, however, that the article, in omitting certain important considerations, has failed, if I may say so, to present the matter in a proper light. No intelligent Christian person could possibly accept the doctrine as Dr Farquhar has expressed it. We do not believe—in fact, we explicitly deny—that the teaching of karma is "that no single portion of suffering which is due to any soul can be averted." Karma is a law of Nature. We are commanded by the laws of Nature, but we can often disobey them. The law of gravitation does not prevent any reasonably healthy man, should he have the will to do so, from going upstairs. I had an evil desire

in my former incarnation—or in one of my former incarnations—which has its result upon me to-day in an impulse, a tendency, a temptation, to sin. But I am not bound to give way to this impulse. The impulse is the karma, not my action. We can meet our bad karma boldly, by the grace of God, and destroy it; or by yielding to it reluctantly, we can weaken the strength of the new karmic force. We can all assist one another in overcoming bad individual karma. It is one of the most powerful arguments in favour of corporate worship. Moreover, karma does not act by “a single portion.” The good and the bad karma must always be extraordinarily complex. Two men will commit similar sins and the results perhaps be poles apart, the good karma in the one case being much greater than it is in the other. Surely there is room for the work of pity and fellow-feeling when it not only helps a man to bear his lot patiently—and so saves him from creating bad karma afresh—but also directs the kindly influences towards him which will enable him to struggle more successfully against whatever bad karma he has yet to face. There is a curious lack of consideration in the article of anything but individual karma. Much could be said on the subject of family-karma, of the karma of the village or town, of race-karma. Our lives and destinies are mingled with each other, probably to a far greater extent than most of us have ever imagined. Some have seen in the sorrows of Belgium under the German invasion the deliverance of that nation’s soul from a dark karma which for many years has hindered and clogged its true development. I have no space to discuss this part of the subject. But let it be conceived for one moment what is meant by *World Karma*; let it be thought how much of the evil we do affects the atmosphere that men breathe, how all *our* sufferings can never touch this deadening burden of mankind, how mankind was inevitably condemned till One should come who had no previous incarnation at all, but who, entering into the world and life of man, became partaker of that world karma, and took it on Himself as suffering and humiliation. One can only touch here on so tremendous a subject. But self-sacrifice has indeed a place in a karma-ridden world. Not all our pains are merited by individual guiltiness; there will always be the people who bear the pains which are due to the community at large rather than to the individual men and women composing the community, of whom the world is not worthy. And many of us believe that the men who died in the war both wrought to their souls a great deliverance from the accumulated karma of their past lives, and are at this moment a glorious asset in the possession of the soul of the race. And this brings me to the question of responsibility. I confess that I do not quite understand Dr Farquhar when he speaks of the guilt of the makers of the War. “Every person that suffered in the war came into the world doomed inevitably, because of his sin, to endure all that came upon him.” Yes, it had all to be endured some time; and much of it might have been extended over years and mingled with happy enjoyment of good karma. But in its terrible concentration!—that was the crime. The sufferers themselves found deliverance for their souls, but it

was a crime on the part of the others. And we are not to think that they could not have resisted their temptations, as humbler folk have to do. One remembers the old saying, "It must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh." As Origen pointed out long ago, the differences in the quality of human souls are not *essential* differences, but arise from the various exercise of their power of free-will. I have only space to say one thing more. Karma is its name in India; but the doctrine is in the esoteric teaching of all the Masters. It was held by the ancient Christian Church, and condemned along with some excesses in gnostic speculation by the second Council of Constantinople (553). Since then, to have held it was punishable, till the other day. The Albigenses held it, and were destroyed by the Church. Nobody could have asked that question about the man born blind who did not believe in karma. The doctrine is older than the hills. Scientifically, it is stated in the Wisdom of Solomon: "Being good I came into a body undefiled." Morally, it is taught by the Lord Jesus: "Sin no more; lest a worse thing come unto thee." CECIL B. WELLAND.

ALDERLEY RECTORY.

II

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1921, p. 20.)

IN the October issue of this Journal Dr Farquhar sums up an article on Karma with an admission that the doctrine has been of large service to the Asiatic peoples, and that its pressure on the European mind will be distinctly healthy as a counterpoise to materialistic mockings at the moral law and to flabby ideas of divine forgiveness. He admits also its moral seriousness, its attractiveness, its considerable measure of moral truth, but considers that, the more carefully the theory is examined in the light of Christian ethical conceptions, the more unsatisfactory will it be seen to be, and in support of his opinion discusses the doctrine under the following heads:—

Punishment.—A believer in the doctrine of karma would entirely agree that punishment is justifiable only when reformatory, but the criminal is a criminal and is, as the karma theory teaches, paying the due penalty for his crime. Karma is essentially a reformatory agent. It is not clear why the punishment cannot lead to reformation because the crime may have been committed in a former life, though a criminal often pays in the same life. He may, in the former case, not know exactly for what sin he suffers, but he knows full well that he suffers for his own and for nobody else's sin.

One who knows naught of karma is often no more aware of the particular sin for which he suffers than if it had been committed in a former life, and, being ignorant of the sin in the only life he knows, may be inclined to think that he is suffering undeservedly and therefore to rail against his Maker. Not so the believer in karma, who knows that there can be no injustice. The probability of the pain leading to

reformation is therefore in favour of the latter. Punishment to be reformatory must surely be merited.

Pain.—Dr Farquhar asks if it is credible that every piece of suffering is punishment for past sin, as karma teaches, and answers that the modern mind will be disposed to believe that suffering is often stimulative rather than punitive, and suggests that this may explain a good deal of the physical suffering that we see. No believer in karma will dissent from the view that suffering is stimulative if it is accepted in the right spirit. If the sufferer is not conscious of any reason for his pain, he is apt to take it in a spirit that will not stimulate him to a better life, whereas the believer in karma knows that he is suffering the natural and just consequence of his sin, and is therefore more likely than the non-believer to respond to the stimulus. But should we not say that the suffering is corrective rather than punitive? No decent parent or schoolmaster would punish a child excepting with the idea of teaching it a better way, nor would he correct it unless it had infringed the law.

If suffering is regarded merely as stimulative, what are we to think of the suffering of a baby who, born, as too many are, hopelessly diseased, lives for a few months a life of agony, and dies? If there is no question of debt, how can we regard the suffering as stimulative?

Preventable Suffering.—Dr Farquhar says that according to karma there is no such thing. One might as well say that according to the law of gravitation there is no such thing as preventing a fall. Gravity acts always, but it can be counteracted. If a cannon-ball rolls off a table, I can catch it. If a man falls overboard, I can jump in and save him. Of course, the ball may be too heavy and the man's karma too strong, but the ball is an inert mass and the man is not, and his karma may require that he be restored to life. The workings of karma are beyond us, and we have no right to let a man drown. We are told not to judge. How do I know that the very shock of his immersion may not be the necessary stimulus to a better life?

So with medical effort, social reform, etc. A belief in karma would not deter from such efforts, but rather urge us to them, for, as fallible men and women are always making new karma, it is our duty to provide conditions that will tend to purer life. So long as men continue to pile up debts which will have to be paid off in this and future earth-lives they will make no evolutionary progress, and until they are educated to see this they will, according to the teaching of the East, return again and again until the debt is paid to the uttermost farthing.

I do not think with Dr Farquhar that, the more men succeed in doing for the prevention of pain and misery, the less they will be inclined to accept the karma hypothesis, but that, the more men accept the hypothesis, the more will they aim at the prevention of pain and misery. If a man is saved from drowning or from disease or death by medical aid, the more likely is he to mend his ways and so modify or cancel the debt he owes.

The law of karma is not a blind mechanical law like that of gravita-

tion. A sinner who fervently desires to be released from the grasp of his sin will, though he has to pay the debt, certainly not suffer to the same extent as a sinner who has no such desire, who merely dreads the punishment. A sufferer who bears his pain cheerfully, knowing that it comes from a law of a God of love and justice, that he suffers the just consequence, surely does not feel the pang of one who, ignorant of his guilt, feels that he is the victim of injustice. Physical suffering is not the whole of the matter, and spiritual joy and trust may and do go a long way in mitigation of the agony.

Unmerited Suffering.—If we believe in the absolute justice of the Ruler of the Universe, there can be no such thing.

Self-Sacrifice.—This is a difficult point, but is a belief in karma incompatible with a full recognition of the heroism and self-sacrifice of those who did voluntarily and heroically suffer, and who did save us from death or worse? Whether or no they died for a mirage, whether or no their heroism was of no avail inasmuch as their sacrifice was powerless to save their loved ones from the just retribution of their sins, none the less does their act arouse our loving admiration, and in no whit does a belief in karma rob it of its moral splendour.

The self-sacrifice, the self-devotion were as great and noble even if they at the same time paid an outstanding debt of their own. We may rest assured that no such thought entered their minds.

But does the believer in karma regard it as a rigid law against which naught can prevail? A man commits a murder, is not found out, and dies unpunished. He still owes the debt, and according to karma will have to pay in a future earth-life. He may be re-born an innocent child and suffer death by violence, and so pay his debt; but, on the other hand, he may live and devote his life to the welfare of others in love and service, and so cancel his debt.

May not our participation in love, sympathy, and service for those who died to save us bring, in some degree at least, the redemption of our debts, so that we are saved by their sacrifice just as really as if they stood before us and received in their bodies the bullets that would have reached us? If so, their sacrifice was no mirage; they did their part, and it behoves us to do ours if we are to give it full effect. Many a wife, parent, sister entered in spirit into the heroism, the self-devotion of the loved one who died for them as truly as if they stood at his side at the moment, and suffered perhaps more in some cases than those who were cut off in the vigour of their youth—aye, and perhaps still suffer, while those they loved and lost are, we believe, lifted above all pangs and regrets. Their heroism loses none of its splendour though we realise also the heroism of the widow who, with a smile to hide her breaking heart, parted with her only child. Surely her sacrifice covered a multitude of sins.

A believer in karma is not called upon to apply it to the sufferings of the Christ, who came from a higher world to save us from our sin, to lift us out of its grip and domination, but only in so far as we co-operate by giving up ourselves to the service of our fellows and bearing their burdens as He did ours, because we are compelled thereto by overwhelming love and sympathy. We may thus unconsciously

pay our outstanding debt, but that is no reason why we should drag Him down to our level.

Guilt.—In the case of a child born blind, karma teaches that, even though his blindness be the result of his parents' sin, he also is guilty, for otherwise he would be the innocent victim of a gross injustice. Of course, if his parents had not sinned, their child would have been born happy and healthy, and the blind child born to other parents. I greatly doubt if the sting is lessened by a belief in karma. The parents would realise that a blind child was born to them as a result of their sin; it would surely be a mean-spirited parent who could, even for a moment, feel any relief in the knowledge that the child also had sinned.

As for those who caused the late war and its immeasurable suffering and loss, I can only refer to the words of our Lord: "It is impossible but that offences will come; but woe unto him through whom they come."

Divine Forgiveness.—Our Lord most emphatically tells us that our debts will have to be paid to the uttermost farthing. When in the Lord's Prayer we are taught to pray for forgiveness of our sins, it was surely not that we should ask for the remission of the penalty, but that we may be freed from the domination of the sins that most easily beset us, that naught may stand in the way of the prodigal's return. It is reasonable to believe that one who accepted karma would even pray that he may suffer the due penalties in order that nothing may check his upward progress, that he may lay aside every weight (pay every debt) that clogs his progress.

Calamity.—Is it clear that karma argues that the sufferer has been guilty of heinous sin? We are all guilty of innumerable minor sins, and may pay them off in innumerable minor pains or, in our anxiety to clear the debt, in one great calamity. Surely a believer in karma would be as unlikely as a non-believer to say of a sufferer that his calamity was a divine judgment. On the contrary, he would be more inclined to pity him, both as a sufferer and as a sinner. It is not clear, however, why Dr Farquhar should, as would appear, differentiate between a believer in karma and one who "understands the spirit of Christ." I cannot admit that the believer in karma is in any degree behind the non-believer in that respect. I see no reason why a Christian should not accept karma.

Pity.—Why should we not pity one whom we know to be suffering for his sins as much as one whom we believe to be the victim of undeserved suffering? Can we realise the Christ differentiating between them? Surely He would, if so, pity the former as both sufferer and sinner, and in so far as we have His spirit shall we. As for the Hindu widow who repudiated any responsibility for outcaste orphans, there are bigots in all religions. I once heard an Anglican priest declare emphatically from a public platform that to give to Dr Barnardo was to rob God.

Service towards those in Distress.—A belief in karma in no way checks the impulse towards loving service or pity; it would tend rather to increase it. No doctor worthy of the name would remit

his efforts because he knew the sufferer to be the victim of his own sin. It is not the belief or disbelief in karma that makes the difference ; the difference is in the man.

Progress.—"Karma necessarily works most seriously against progress," because "the general tenor of our lives is irrevocably fixed." Karma is not kismet. It does not teach that our fate is irrevocably fixed. We have to pay our debts, but we need not add to the account. A calamity cheerfully and uncomplainingly borne clears off a debt, while one borne rebelliously adds to the indebtedness. Every act of unselfishness, of high aspiration, of loving service given without thought of self relieves the load.

A believer in karma is not like a miser ever poring over his bank account and setting off credit against debit. There is no reason why he should not be as healthy-minded, as disinterested, as given to service, as devout a disciple of the Christ as one who never heard of the doctrine.

Dr Farquhar admits that the doctrine has many valuable features, but concludes that in the light of Christian ethical conceptions it is the more unsatisfactory the more carefully it is examined. As I have tried to point out, I think that he is mistaken, that the doctrine is a valuable one, that a believer therein may be as good a Christian as a non-believer, that instead of hardening the heart, it has the opposite effect, that it is morally elevating, and finally, that it appeals to us as true because no other doctrine or hypothesis so fully satisfies our sense of justice, and our belief that the Universe is ruled by One with whom there is no variableness or shadow of turning. C. H. OZANNE.

BARCOMBE, SUSSEX.

A CORRECTION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1921, p. 786.)

ON pp. 786-789 of the *Hibbert Journal* (July 1921) we find a careful, intelligent, and at many points interesting review of Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes*. But it is amazing to read, on p. 787, that "We are introduced by Dr Spengler to three dominating Kulturs : the Ancient, or Hellenic ; the Indian, or Magic ; the Gothic, or Faustian, or Western." And again : "Indian culture (to which much less study is devoted) deals with the problem of good and evil, God and Devil ; its mathematics are algebraic ; its art is of the unearthly ; its religion, of good and bad spirits." Now, even a casual reader of the *Untergang* must know that the word "Indian" should be "Arabic," or "Early-Christian." It is this "Kultur" and this only to which Spengler constantly applies the epithet "magic." Thus, as early as p. xv of the "Contents," we read : "The late-antique cults as magic Monotheism," and even earlier (p. xi), "Magic and Faustian Christianity" ; and on turning to p. 255 we read of "the *magic* soul of the Arabic Kultur," and on p. 256 of "the movement that transformed the *magic* oriental-arabic Christianity into the *Faustian*

(Christianity) of the occidental church," and "of the magic Christianity of the church-fathers."

It is needless to multiply examples. A rapid glance (of a few minutes) through a friend's copy of *Der Untergang* (my own annotated copy is 900 miles away) detects about thirty such uses of the word "magic" in connection with the Arabic or Early-Christian Kultur, and it is certainly this Arabic Kultur that is second in order, third in importance, of the three great Kulturs treated (the "Indian" is mentioned only incidentally, especially under its degenerate civilised form of Buddhism, never as *magic*); it is "the magic soul of the Arabic Kultur, awaking at the time of Augustus in the region between the Nile and the Euphrates, with its Algebra and Alchemy, etc., etc." (p. 255). In a footnote to p. 267 we read: "The Syrian sun-cults, as well as the Mithras- and Serapis-cult, along with Primitive Christianity (*neben dem Urchristentum*), belong to the early-Arabic religions of the magic type (*magischen Stils*)." Throughout his book Spengler treats Early-Christianity as the one most important initial phase of this "magic Arabic soul." Thus, in his first "Table, of 'Isochronous' Epochs of Spirit," the third great column is headed

" ARABISCHE
SEIT 0,"

and under the title of "Spring: . . . 1. Birth of a Myth *grossen Stils* as expression of a new God-feeling," we find in this third column

" 0—300
URCHRISTENTUM
EVANGELIEN, APOKALYPSE;
LEGENDE."

Coördinated *in the same line* with this "Urchristentum" we find "Mythologie des Veda" and "Olympischer Mythos."

Such facts as the foregoing disclose an attitude of mind in Spengler that seems in the highest degree significant and not excelled in interest by anything in his whole volume—an attitude that we should certainly never suspect from reading the review in the *Hibbert Journal*, where the substitution of "Indian" for "Arabic" and the omission of any reference to Christianity effect a camouflage.

WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH.

COLUMBIA, MISSOURI.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

By THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

WE have to chronicle the publication of two single-volume dictionaries. In *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics* (London: Waverley Book Company) Dr Shailer Mathews and Dr G. B. Smith of Chicago University have edited what is a most serviceable handbook, whose aim is "to define all terms (not strictly biblical) of importance in the field of religion and ethics, and at the same time to discuss with some fullness terms of primary value." There is a place for such a work. Many people desire information of this kind who have no access to the large encyclopædias. The work has been carried out by a large number of contributors, almost entirely American. The articles are often signed, and almost invariably give a succinct, adequate account of their subjects. There are plenty of cross-references; there is a bibliography at the end; and the book is handsomely printed. For readers who cannot afford more than one volume of this kind, the present dictionary is precisely what they want. We congratulate the editors and the publishers upon their enterprise. The other book is *An Encyclopædia of Religions* (Routledge), which really does not rival the former work; it is a handbook to the study of comparative religion, giving exactly the sort and amount of information which an ordinary student wishes to have at easy command. It is a feat to have written a book like this single-handed, but Mr Maurice A. Canney has carried out his task with skill and judgment. The data are often fresh, and the facts are put lucidly. This is a distinct success. The growing desire among the public for light upon matters of religious usage far and near ought to win a widespread welcome for this compact encyclopædia.

Mr Canney has no article on "Resurrection," but Dr Shailer Mathews in his Dictionary writes that "the Christian doctrine of resurrection early shifted from the raising of the shade from the underworld as in the Jewish and doubtless the early Christian belief, to the raising of the particles of flesh from the grave and their re-combination in the original body, which as a partner in the conduct of the spirit was to share in its *post-mortem* fate." The "doubtless" in this sentence would doubtless be denied by Dr J. T. Darragh, who has written an elaborate dogmatic account of *The*

Resurrection of the Flesh (S.P.C.K.) to prove that the orthodox Christian belief involves the survival of the substance or essence of the body even amid the wreck which death makes of its earthly organisation. He quotes largely from the patristic writers to disprove the ordinary assertion that this doctrine was held in a materialistic sense, and is evidently much attracted by the conjecture that God preserves at death the original atom of the body, when its other physical elements disappear.

Both dictionaries have articles on "Sacrifice," as might be expected, the American one being by Dr J. M. Powis Smith, who points out that "whatever theory of sacrifice be adopted, it must be borne in mind that for the early sacrificers themselves the *act* was the important thing, the interpretation of the act was of small importance." Nowadays it is the interpretation which engrosses our minds. What it means is shown well in the noteworthy article on "Sacrifice" which Dr S. A. Cook contributes to the *Journal of Theological Studies* (July, pp. 327-346). In form this is a review of Loisy's *Essai historique sur le Sacrifice*; but in reality, like Lagrange's recent review of the same writer's treatise on the mystery-religions, it is a penetrating study of the theory of sacrifice, one of the distinguished pieces of criticism which occasionally appear in critical literature. One of its many merits is the light thrown upon the "curiously mechanical and intellectualistic conception of religion which mars M. Loisy's learned treatise." We may bracket with this the brief examination of the "Do ut des" element in sacrifice by G. van der Leeuw (*Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1921, pp. 241-253), who traces its effects in mystical religion. The theological aspect is discussed by Professor Lofthouse in a thoughtful Fernley Lecture, *Altar, Cross, and Community* (Epworth Press). He regards sacrifice, when rightly interpreted, as furnishing "the type of the reconciliation" by means of which our moral relations with God and man are realised; Christ's sacrificial death brings us "into living and active harmony" with God's will and mind. The discussion of sacrifice in its ethical significance is excellent. In this connection we have to note an unpretending but informing *Introduction to the Study of Some Living Religions in the East* (Duckworth), by Dr Sydney Cave. The religions are Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Islam, and the faiths of China and Japan. Mr L. Patterson's *Mithraism and Christianity* (Cambridge University Press) is a careful examination of the data collected by Cumont and others, which converges on the conclusion that early Christianity was not indebted to Mithraism for any of its distinctive doctrines or practices. He rightly draws attention to the exclusion of women from active part in the service as a handicap upon Mithraism. "Our inquiry into the doctrines of Mithraism has shown that some belief in 'the Incarnate Word,' Sacrifice, Communion, and the Future Life was held by the votaries of Mithra. But it would be simple paltering with the truth to pretend that Mithraic and Christian teachings on these questions are more or less identical or even very similar." Mr Patterson, among other things, urges that the "miraculous" birth of Mithra is no analogue

to the virgin birth of Jesus; and in the *Church Quarterly Review* (July, pp. 305-324) Mr F. H. Smith studies the Buddhist birth-stories to the same effect. Indeed, it is Buddhism which is attracting special attention at present in comparative religion. Mr Kenneth Saunders, for example, in *The Journal of Religion* (July, pp. 355-361), pleads for a sympathetic approach to it as a faith which inculcates contemplation and the unity of life on a spiritual basis. He thinks the Johannine writings are best adapted for the Buddhistic East: "The more they are studied by Eastern thinkers the more clearly it will be seen that Christianity is not essentially the legalistic and Hebraic religion which it has too often appeared." Mr Yu Yue Tsu, in the same *Journal* (September, pp. 497-512), describes "signs of awakening in Chinese Buddhism, after centuries of quiescent existence." The stirring has been going on for over ten years, since 1910 woke the Buddhists to the ignorance and avarice of their monks. This organising reform has been succeeded by a spiritual regeneration, headed by a saintly monk called T'ai Shu, though as yet it has only affected a fragment of the huge mass of Buddhistic monks and nuns. Mr Tsu is afraid that the pessimistic spirit of Buddhism will always handicap it in meeting the buoyant modern spirit, and that the reforming tendencies are more pathetic than promising.

In the *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* (October, pp. 547-574) Father Pinard closes his survey of the theory of religious experience from Luther to William James. This series of articles is mainly useful to those who resent "le rejet péremptoire de tout dogme défini." The closing pages on Ritschl, Ménégoz, and the pragmatists, for example, do not offer any criticism except what is obvious and familiar. Gaston Rabeau's essay, "Concept et jugement: Etude sur quelques formes du relativisme contemporain," in the *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (July, pp. 325-351), is of a very different character. The writer grapples with the recent argument of M. Brunschvicg, especially, that idealism occupies itself not with metaphysical fixed entities but with the conceptions formed by the human spirit; he sets himself to oppose to this the philosophical implicates of Thomas of Aquinum, viz. that the concept implies a relation to some object, the perception of an objective reality or of an ontological element. The veteran M. E. Ménégoz has issued *Publications diverses sur le fidéisme et son application à l'enseignement traditionnel* (Paris, 1921), a collection of articles upon the liberal Protestant interpretation of Christianity and the Bible, which shows that he is undismayed by the recent attacks upon this method, and alive to the need for a free spirit in discussing religion, a spirit which is free and at the same time profoundly religious. In *Theological Reconstruction: A Plea for Freedom* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson) the Rev. John Edwards reprints an inaugural address to the Presbyterian General Assembly, N.S.W., which is a plea for liberal theology, emancipated from any authority of an external kind, ecclesiastical or biblical. Mr Edwards is quite outspoken. He feels it laid upon him, in the interests of the Gospel, to plead for a recognition of God's spirit outside the letter of the Bible, and for emancipation from the dualism in the idea of God which is

"still a dominant factor in ordinary theology." He adumbrates a new theology in the treatment of the atonement and of the Person of Christ, and declares his mind with a refreshing candour. "We need not be anxious about bringing Christianity up to date; we must get up to Christianity; for the true Christianity is always ahead of date." Or, as he puts it elsewhere, "the doctrines of God and of Christ in the Fourth Gospel are still far ahead of the theology and Christology of the Church." The notes of sincerity and ardour are most attractive in this cry for progress. Probably what Mr Edwards desires is the kind of re-thinking which Dr P. J. Maclagan offers in *The Gospel and Its Working* (Student Christian Movement), four lectures upon the fundamental truths of Christianity which are distinguished by independence and religious candour. Dr Maclagan concentrates upon the Gospel as the revelation of a self-less mind in Jesus, which is the expression of God's love and the ideal of our lives. "If Christianity is true to itself it presents its ideas and makes its varied appeal from the fact of God in Christ as its central standpoint." This is the keynote of his reinterpretation. The philosophical basis, if worked out, would not be far removed from that of Brunschvicg, in his recent *Nature et liberté* (Paris, 1921), in which, for example, applying his dynamical conception of truth in touch with varying conceptions to religion, he writes: "La religion de l'esprit ne contredira pas ce qui est essentiel dans les religions positives; elle prolonge, elle achève, le mouvement de leur vie profonde. *Par la vertu du germe originel qui était déposé dans la pensée de Jésus*, ou par la vertu propre des races dont le développement spirituel s'est accompli à l'intérieur du christianisme, le progrès de la conscience religieuse s'est manifesté dans notre monde occidental, comme l'inquiétude perpétuelle d'une foi qui se replie sur soi pour se scruter, se préciser, se reviser sans fin" (p. 159). The italics are ours.

Some time ago a *Shorter New Testament* was published in America. It is now followed by a *Shorter Old Testament*, edited by Professor C. F. Kent (Hodder & Stoughton, 10s. 6d.). The book is capitably printed, and in a handy form. There are over six hundred pages, the contents being arranged in 384 numbered paragraphs, each with a modern title. Professor Kent and his coadjutors have omitted or abbreviated not only the less edifying parts of the Old Testament, but the duplicate narratives. Naturally, there is very little of Leviticus, only extracts from the first six chapters of Joshua are included, the books of Chronicles are ignored, and parts of Jeremiah are left out, for example. The principle of selection has been the aim of catching the interest of the busy modern reader. No verse-numbering is included, and the translation is new, an admirable attempt "to make it literal rather than literalistic, and to present the thought of the Bible writers so simply that it can be easily understood by all." Dr Loring W. Batten's article on "Some Features of the Religion of Israel" (*Constructive Quarterly*, September) notices "the fact that great good was accomplished in the nation by the priestly religion," which organised the sacrificial element. This is important, just because the dissenters or prophets came to attack not only the

degenerate priests but the entire sacrificial system, as the Reformers did in the sixteenth century. Later, in the post-exilic period, prophets like Joel and Haggai were more in accord with the priests. Finally there arose the "Wisdom" school, theologians or moralists as the case might be. Dr Batten's point is that Hebrew religion was one of "diversity, not of uniformity." Dr Foakes Jackson publishes a fourth and revised edition of his *Biblical History of the Hebrews* (Cambridge: Heffer), which has won a place of its own among educational manuals. Some fresh matter has been added, especially on the period between the Testaments. Rudolf Kittel's *Die Religion des Volkes Israel* (Leipzig) is on the same general lines, but less flexible to criticism; certainly it will not supplant the English volume for English readers. In the department of Old Testament criticism, Dr Melville Scott's *Message of Hosea* (S.P.C.K.) deserves a hearty welcome and careful study. It is an independent, scholarly attempt to throw light upon the meaning of Hosea's prophecies by translation, exposition, and critical rearrangement of the text. Dr Scott gives reasons for his inability to accept the methods and results of Dr Harper, holding that the hopeful passages are too organic to Hosea's mind to be relegated to an interpolator. He offers the interesting conjecture (which is Canon Box's view also, by the way, though Dr Scott is not aware of this) that ch. iii. should follow i. 9. There is a persuasive argument for the authenticity of ch. xiv. as a final appeal, not a prediction, and the burden of the book is that "there is no room for re-writing Hosea at will, as is done in measure by Dr Harper, and without measure by Dr Cheyne." Sometimes this protest seems to carry Dr Scott too far. Thus, xiv. 9 is surely an editorial conclusion. But he has brought forward considerations which tell against any hasty recourse to excisions in dealing with this series of poetical messages, and a critical appendix proves that he is not by any means a prisoner to the Massoretic text. Mr St Clair Tisdall (*Expositor*, November) pleads for a reconsideration of the date of Daniel in view of the linguistic inferences which may be drawn from a study of the Assouan-Elephantiné Aramaic papyri (fifth century B.C.). Mr W. E. Beet (*Expositor*, October) argues that although the ethical standard of "Esther" is not particularly high, and although God's name never occurs in it, the book is designed to suggest that "the most fortuitous occurrences" are "links in a chain of purpose," and that "the Great Unnamed is the ruling factor in human life, though He often works by means not always easy to detect." Dr Jacob Hoschander's paper in the October number of *The Jewish Quarterly Review* (pp. 151-194) on "Esther in the Light of History" offers some acute and ingenious suggestions about the narrative, e.g. that Mordecai at first was not a thorough Jew, indeed that he disapproved of his fanatical co-religionists, and only sided with them, rather imprudently, after Haman struck at their religion. The fact that Mordecai was a Persian, who adhered to Judaism, explains, according to Dr Hoschander, a number of obscure points in the story, e.g. Haman's hesitation about punishing Mordecai for his insolence. Dr Hoschander thinks that the word "Purim" was connected with the term for the Persian festival of

Farwardigan. "The casting of lots on the Persian new-year festival may have been a general custom which Haman also used for determining the fate of the Jews. The latter, by adopting the name of the Persian new year as that of their own day of commemoration, may have intended not only to commemorate the danger they had escaped, but also to disguise the very nature of this festival in order not to offend the Persians." Dr Hoschander's postulate is that the Jews were persecuted for their religious views, not for their nationality, and that Haman's policy was not due to any personal antipathy but to the requirements of the Persian government, which resented the Jewish faith as a disturbance and threat to the stability of the nation.

The problem of "The Secrets of Enoch" has been raised again, this time by Professor N. Schmidt (*Journal of the American Oriental Society*, October, pp. 307-312), in connection with the two recensions of that apocalypse. In opposition to those who, like Dr Charles, regard the shorter recension, B, as an arbitrary abbreviation of the Slavonic A, which is held to represent the original text more faithfully, Professor Schmidt argues that B goes back to a Greek original which in turn was probably "a translation of an Aramaic or Hebrew work, written in Palestine before the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.," whereas A represents a later, expanded version with Hellenistic sympathies. He points out that B only retains one trace of "Hellenistic" thought, viz. the statement about the world being created out of what was invisible or non-existent. But this is held to have been possible for a Palestinian Jew, as "a protest against the notion that the world was created out of previously existing material." B. Motzo concludes his study of the Wisdom of Solomon in the *Rivista trimestrale di Studi Filosofici e Religiosi* (pp. 163-172) by a comparison of its teaching with that of Philo, bringing out the analogies and contrasts. This is not unfamiliar ground, but Signor Motzo does offer a novelty in his note on Wisdom xviii. 14 f., where the all-powerful Word, during the dead night, "leaped from the royal throne, a stern warrior, into the midst of the doomed land" as a deadly emissary of the divine vengeance. We are pointed back to the literary source of this metaphor in the first book of the *Iliad*, when Phœbus Apollo descends in anger from Olympus to strike death into the Greek camp.

Several books have been issued upon the teaching of Jesus, which are meant for an educated popular audience. Two of these are competently done. One is Mr A. H. Lowe's *The Manner of the Master and Studies in His Teaching* (Epworth Press); it presents in a well-arranged sequence the cardinal features of what Jesus taught. The other is on slightly different lines, but written with the same object in view, viz. Mr A. C. Deane's *Rabboni* (Hodder & Stoughton). It draws in slight but graphic outline the contents of the teaching of Jesus, and is distinctly effective.

"We have heard the voice that spake upon the mount,
Unwearied of the generations dead,
And in a watch have been content to count
The loaves, and leave the Word unharvested."

Mr Deane shows us how to make harvest of the records of the Gospels, by sketched the methods and the impression of Jesus as a religious teacher. There is considerable freshness in this work. It stirs the reader's interest and clarifies the mind. Dr D. M. Ross takes a wider range in *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History* (James Clarke). He begins by emphasising the "regnant ideas of Jesus" in the Synoptic Gospels; then he traces the wonderful insight into these principles which was shown by the apostles. But the crucial point now is, were the subsequent developments legitimate? Dr Ross makes loyalty to the ideals of Jesus a test of such developments, and analyses the aberrations in sacramentarianism, which lowers the idea of God's grace; in sacerdotalism, which narrows the access to God; and in orthodoxy, which exaggerates assent to theological doctrines. Dr Ross writes for people inside the Church who are perplexed by modern difficulties. He desires to quicken the power and efficiency of Christians. And he hopes to do so by arguing that "the real unity of the Christian society is not to be found in the framework of an ecclesiastical organisation," but "in the one Christ-inspired life of those who own Jesus as Lord," *i.e.* not simply as a teacher but as "the Redeemer and Leader of humanity." The book is bravely and cordially written by a thoughtful observer. The veteran Dr Lyman Abbott comes to a similar conclusion in *What Christianity Means to Me* (New York: The Macmillan Company). He re-states his view that Christianity as taught by Jesus Christ is reflected fairly in the New Testament, "He finds no satisfaction in scholastic definitions of a triune and little-known God, in the ecclesiastical characterisations of Jesus as Light of Light, Very God of Very God, Begotten and not made, and the like. His interest is in the divine light which Jesus Christ brought into the world." Part of the book is autobiographical, but the larger part is a discussion of what Dr Abbott takes to be the genuine spirit of Jesus as reflected in his sayings.

M. Jules Breitenstein's paper on the parables of Jesus (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, 1921, pp. 97-113) has little that is fresh to those who know Jülicher's treatise; he fails to understand that allegory was common in the rabbinic parables, for example, and that it is too rigid a method to exclude it entirely from what are supposed to be the authentic parables of Jesus. Mr F. J. Badcock (*Journal of Theological Studies*, July, pp. 321-326) argues that "Moses and Elijah talking with" Jesus during the prophetic vision of the transfiguration mean not the Law and the Prophets but Moses and John the Baptist (=Elijah) as the beginning and the end of the old dispensation. Jesus identified John with Elijah as the last figure in the pre-messianic age, but Peter (to whom we owe the report) did not. Another revolutionary hypothesis in the same journal (pp. 367-370) is thrown out by Mr C. H. Mayo, who proposes to make the cock-crowing which startled Peter the *gallicinium* or trumpet-blast blown by the Roman garrison in the adjoining Antonia "at the close of the third night-watch, and the change of guard." Maurice Goguel's article in the *Revue d'Histoire des Religions* (pp. 123-162) on John vii.

contends that the allusion to disciples of Jesus in Judæa is secondary, and that "brothers" probably means "disciples" (as in xx. 17); verses 25-30 are an addition, like verses 37-44 (the latter perhaps added by the evangelist himself); viii. 20a belongs to the source of vii. 1-14, and so on. The point of the intricate textual analysis of vii.-xii. is that the Judæan and Jerusalem mission of Jesus was much more important and lengthy than the synoptic tradition suggests. It is curious that Mr H. J. Flower (*Expositor*, October, pp. 318-320) thinks that John vii. 37-44 has been displaced, and that its original site was after verse 52; also that Professor C. H. Dodd (*Expositor*, October, pp. 273-291) has independently worked out the problem of John vi.-vii. by suggesting that this reflects a parallel to Mark vi. 31 = vii. 37 (viii. 1-21); viii. 22-x. 1, John vii. 1-9 being equivalent to Mark ix. 30, and John vii. 10 identical with Mark x. 1. This solution does not require the radical handling of the Johannine text which M. Goguel employs. In *The Expository Times* (November, pp. 74-78) Mr G. H. C. Macgregor proposes a rearrangement of John vii.-viii. which is more thoroughgoing than has hitherto been suggested. His interesting theory is that viii. 12-20 originally lay between vii. 15-24 and vii. 1-14, that the latter passage was followed by vii. 25-36, and that viii. 21-59 then came, followed by vii. 45-52, 37-44.

In the *Revue Biblique* (July, pp. 321-343) R. P. E. B. Allo writes upon "La synthèse du dogme eucharistique chez Saint Paul," arguing that the tradition about the Lord's Supper which Paul received and transmitted was in every essential the eucharistic dogma at present taught by the Roman Catholic Church. Even the absence of any allusion to a presiding priest does not daunt this theologian. "Mais évidemment ce repas, et spécialement sa partie liturgique, était présidé par quelqu'un de ceux qui dirigeaient l'Eglise" (p. 329), some bishop or presbyter like Stephanus, Fortunatus, or Achaicus. Paul's instructions about the Eucharist are referred to Ananias, who possessed already the doctrine of the mass. With regard to the serious criticism of Paul's epistles, we have to chronicle two books of translation. One is in the series edited by Fathers Lattey and Keating, *St Paul's Epistles to the Churches* (Longmans). It is primarily meant for Roman Catholics, and brief notes accompany the version, which is based, of course, upon an extremely conservative text. Mr W. H. Isaacs allows himself more liberty in *The Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians* (Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press). He makes some sound remarks upon the duties and difficulties of translators, in his preface, aims at "an exact transference of the Apostle's thought from Greek to English," prints his version in splendidly clear type, and adds a number of explanatory notes at the end. Much work has gone to the composition of this book, and it repays close study, even when it fails to command assent, as e.g. on ix. 3 (ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ), where Mr Isaacs observes that "all the translators, even Moffatt, use some ambiguous phrase, as though they were not quite sure of the exact meaning of the word μέρει." I am quite sure it does not mean "even partially," as Mr Isaacs

thinks ; " in this particular instance " seems to me still quite an unambiguous rendering of the Greek.

In the *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses* (pp. 433-480) Loisy prints a long essay on the Didachê and the apostolic fathers. His conclusions about the Didachê will bring small comfort to those who have been trying recently to bring that enigmatic document far down. Loisy serenely examines the contents and puts it in the first century : " La Didachê, abstraction faite de tel passage probablement interpolé, est . . . moins mêlée que les évangiles synoptiques, et dépendant plutôt de leurs sources, qui pourrait être antérieure à la rédaction canonique de Matthieu et de Luc " (p. 442). In the *Revue Biblique* (pp. 344-373) M. Gustave Bardy writes on Cerinthus. This is a learned and educative study, which supplements Professor Peake's article in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. Bardy is no blind acceptor of the statements of Irenæus or Epiphanius ; he regards Cerinthus as a millenarian, a heretical contemporary of the Apostle John, but analyses with keen and drastic force the later ecclesiastical assertions about him and his party.

The cessation of the *Jahresbericht* makes us all the more grateful for individual attempts to chronicle important books and articles in the various departments of theology. In the *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (July, pp. 392-478) there is an excellent survey of recent work upon comparative religion, which notices, by the way, (a) the first treatise on comparative religion published in Czech, a volume by Dr Joseph Hanus of Prague ; (b) an article by P. E. Peiser, which shows that, according to Assyrian law, the connection of Judah and Tamar (Gen. xxxviii.) was not incestuous ; (c) Maurice Brillant's striking monograph on *Les Mystères d'Eleusis* (1920), with its warning for writers like Loisy who hastily trace affinities between the cult and primitive Christianity ; (d) Glotz's proof that the *κάρτοχοι* of the Serapeum at Alexandria were not prototypes of Christian monks ; (e) René Guénon's remarkably sympathetic *Introduction générale à l'étude des doctrines hindoues* (Paris, 1921) ; and (f) the completion of H. Cordier's four volumes on the *Histoire générale de la Chine* (Paris, 1921). In the *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses* (December 1921, pp. 513-558) there is a similar conspectus of works on early Christian literature, which calls attention, among other things, to (a) M. A. Omodeo's *Prolegomeni alla storia dell' età apostolica* (1921), a book identifying the author of the We-source in Acts with Silvanus, who is alleged to be the same as Luke, and denying the influence of the mysteries upon Paul's theology ; (b) to Dr Charles' commentary on the Apocalypse of John, in which Loisy thinks the most important section is that on the language ; (c) to the new edition of Rauschen's *Grundriss der Patrologie* (Freiburg, 1921), ; and (d) to Monceaux's *Saint Optat et les premiers écrivains donatistes* (Paris, 1920), which Prosper Alfaric considers to be " catholic " rather than historical in its verdict on the Donatists. Finally, in *The Harvard Theological Review* (October), Gustav Krüger surveys the literature on Church History for 1914-1920. His outlook is almost entirely confined to German works, and

this robs it of the value which it might have possessed. But, within its limits, it is of real service, especially in calling attention to out-of-the-way researches, like A. Heckel's essay on *Die Kirche von Aegypten* (1918), with its disproof of the legend that Mark founded the Alexandrian Church, and the recent evidence adduced by Sachau and Allgeier that there was a Christian mission in Persis as early as the first century. Krüger calls special attention to the "model investigation" by Holl, four years ago, which "has made it at least highly probable that" the festival of Epiphany "was a Christian substitute for a festival kept in Egypt on the 6th of January in honour of a god Aion, more particularly of his birth from a virgin." The connection of Epiphany with a commemoration of the Cana miracle would be elucidated on this hypothesis, for Holl further brings forward evidence to show that the Egyptian prototype embraced the change of Nile water into wine. Another startling conclusion is urged by Reitzenstein's essay on *Des Athanasius Werk über das Leben des Antoninus* (1914), followed up by later researches, according to which the narrative in the *Vita Antonii* is largely indebted to an earlier life of Pythagoras, and even the ideal sketched by the author is that of a Christian ascetic moulded on a Neopythagorean saint. Krüger regrets that Reitzenstein is too discursive and polemical in these investigations.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS.

The Legends of Smokeover. By L. P. Jacks.—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921.—Pp. 324.

THIS volume sets forth Dr Jacks' thoughts on our present discontents in the form of a parable, which is also a story, told with all his whimsicality of construction and felicity of phrasing. In either capacity it is well worth reading. The story of Arthur Rumbelow, the scientific betting man, who became a multi-millionaire by exploiting the gambling instinct in man, and then combined with William Hooker, the bereaved war-profiteer, and Prof. Ripplemark, V.C., a moral philosopher all but convicted of theft, to run the world by uniting "idealisms, business-like methods, and sportsmanlike principles," to take its management out the hands of "politicians and diners-out," who have none of these things, and so to redeem man from his ignorance, is more ambitious than most of Dr Jacks' earlier efforts. But it is a success, being a fine story, nobly told. It will be appreciated by all who can stomach the ironic vein of humour running through it. As a parable also it is profound. The suggestion that the gambling instinct is, not a mere "vice," but an adaptation to a life which is and remains a gamble, which incessantly demands the taking of risks, and tolerates no truer wisdom than the calculation of probabilities, sees deeper into the nature of things than more pretentious metaphysics, and accords well with the fact that belief in luck is one of the oldest and most persistent of religions.

With Dr Jacks' analysis of the nature of the breakdown with which our civilisation is threatened, I find myself in general and cordial agreement. All States are, as he says, organised for war, and drift into war as by a law of their being. All States are monsters of iniquity in their treatment of each other, and of their own members. All States are, in fact, controlled by gangs of politicians, who are mostly blind, ignorant (especially of economics!), and careless of the future, if only they can think of an expedient to tide them over the week-end. No States have clear aims and intelligent guidance. All blunder along, like "Smokeover"—and our whole civilisation. The machine has got out of hand, and its ever-growing momentum crushes the prostrate millions with a thousand times the efficiency of a Juggernaut car. All this, and more, would seem to be true.

Yet, if it is true, it is not easy to suggest a remedy. For it will be hard to find any that is not tainted and corrupted by the very evils it is intended to subdue. Dr Jacks puts his money (or rather his heroes' money) on education, and looks to the schoolmaster to bring about "a fraternal community among the nations of mankind." But it cannot have escaped his acuteness, that education must be suitably organised so that it can fulfil its lofty functions. Now, there would seem to be only three possibilities. If the educators are left dependent on the parents, they have to submit to their prejudices, and it is known that from the days of Adam and Eve (themselves wholly uneducated) the parents have been one of the major stumbling-blocks in the path of the educator. If they are left uncontrolled, to develop their own professional standards of excellence, which will depart ever further from the interests of their subject, they will desiccate themselves, and desolate their subjects, with incrustations of poisonous pedantry. If put under public control, they will be at the mercy of an education office, no better (if no worse) than any other department of State. Only some skilfully devised and constantly supervised equilibrium of these forces could conceivably save a system of education from corruption.

Meanwhile, there is the universal fact that all actual systems of education have been pressed into the service of the belligerent State, and made to teach "civics" after its own heart. The first step to reform would, therefore, have to be the expulsion from the schools of *all* the textbooks of national history, and the substitution of others, prepared under instructions by, say, the League of Nations. The results might not be much more conducive to historical truth, but might, at least, give international amity a chance.

A further consideration that should mitigate our condemnation of the present management of the world's affairs is that, quite apart from human wickedness and folly, an unsought and uncomprehended crisis has befallen our civilisation, which may easily be fatal. Thanks to improvements in the means of communication, the world has attained to unity, economically and culturally; but politically it is still divided. Consequently, the multitudinous States (national and imperial), whose quarrels and ambitions distract and destroy our lives, have lost their *raison d'être* and moral justification. Also, for many purposes, their jealously guarded independence. They cannot, for example, protect themselves against the world-price of any commodity, or of labour, or of capital. Hence, enslavement or anarchy in one State may produce bankruptcy and revolution (*via* unemployment) in another.

The proper inference from this situation is, of course, some form of world-government. It does not yet exist, but it is needed. It will have, moreover, to be sufficiently elastic at first to work with, and through, the existing political passions and machinery. A few hundred years hence our present troubles may be regarded as the beginnings of the inevitable birth-throes of the World-State. But these may be abortive, and, instead of producing a new order, its mother—our civilisation—may perish miserably in a series of world-wars, each more

hideous and demoralising than its predecessor. It is more likely to do so than not, unless the ship of State is everywhere steered with much more foresight, wisdom, and goodwill than have so far marked its course. To avert a catastrophe a good deal of skill and constructive thought will have to be displayed. Not genius, necessarily; for it is as vain to ask for genius in politics as in other departments of life. Genius does not appear to order. But the various confessions of political men about their conduct of affairs, all somewhat poignantly suggest the conclusion that the right sort of men are either not enabled to rise to power under any existing form of government, or (still worse) that our civilisation has ceased to breed them.

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Symbiosis. By H. Reinheimer.—London: Headley Brothers, 1920.—Pp. 295+xii.

THIS book, which raises many interesting and important issues, is (as the sub-title informs us) a "socio-physiological study of evolution." The term "symbiosis," as used by the author, is defined as "systematic biological co-operation," or partnership, between different species of organisms. The operation of the socio-physiological principles thus implied, as a guiding factor in organic evolution, constitutes "symbiogenesis." The antithesis to symbiosis is parasitism, *i.e.* the preying of one organism on another without service rendered in return. Parasitism is the denial of symbiotic partnership—it is an "immoral" relation antagonising the "moral" or "spiritual" principle of "live and let live."

Symbiotic adaptation is based, for the most part, on cross-feeding, as opposed to in-feeding, and the author illustrates by some striking instances the fact that the latter inevitably leads, in the long run, to the degeneracy of the species concerned. Indeed, the insistence on the paramount importance of type and quantity of nutrition, as a determining factor both in the development of individuals and in the evolution of species, is one of the main themes of the book. The author has come to the conclusion that the general cause of pathological change of form of a species, as well as of disease, in an individual, is ill feeding. Feeding may be at fault either through its excessiveness, or through its failure to conform to the principle of symbiosis. Abstemious, as opposed to excessive, feeding leads to rejuvenescence.

Symbiosis is the source of morality. "Every stage of life," says our author, "possesses its corresponding degree of mind, consciousness, and bio-morality." The bio-immoral, *i.e.* non-symbiotic, species perish from disease in the end. Moreover, psychical progress is earned by "right" (symbiotic) conduct, and the factors that further symbiosis further the evolution of sex (which is one form of symbiosis) and sympathy. This leads to gregariousness and hence to psychic progress. "Thought-processes," we are even told, "would

seem to begin with the plant," and for successful development plants must follow their "symbiotic sense."

The foregoing is a summary of Parts i. and ii. of the book. Part iii. is mainly controversial in character. In chapter i. the author defends his view of pathological degeneracy as being due to lapse of symbiotic relationships, in attacking an opposing theory, that of Dr Larger, who postulates a principle which he calls "contre-evolution," to account for such degeneracy. In chapter ii. the question of nutrition is discussed, with especial reference to the work of Professor Wood-Jones. The latter does not take so strong a view of the "fundamental and universal importance of food as a determining factor in the achievement of evolutionary success" as does our author. In the final chapter the comparatively narrow view of symbiosis adopted by Professor Bernard is criticised, particularly in connection with disease.

Mr Reinheimer supports his main thesis by multiplying instances. Of the merits of his book, judged from the point of view of technical biology, I am not qualified to express an opinion. I must accordingly confine myself to drawing attention to its bearing on philosophical problems. The book evidently bears directly on such current disputes as that between the mechanists and the vitalists. For the issue between mechanism and vitalism turns largely on the doubt as to whether biological categories are ultimately reducible to those of physics and chemistry. If Mr Reinheimer is right in his chief contentions, evidently they are not. Mechanism would therefore go by the board. But equally, our author has no use for the indefinite entelechies or vital principles postulated by the vitalists. His whole argument implies (and, indeed, he explicitly insists in certain passages) that biological phenomena, and especially evolution, cannot be rationally interpreted except by allowing to every stage of life its corresponding degree of mind, apart from which bio-morality, the *sine quâ non* of progressive evolution, is quite meaningless. I, for one, am in hearty agreement with such a view.

Finally, the author's theories are interesting in their bearing on the question of value. For in addition to continuity of mind throughout the whole realm of life, Mr Reinheimer must evidently postulate also continuity of value. For even the lowliest organisms there is a "right" and a "wrong" way of conduct. Yet, though we endow them with some degree of consciousness, we can hardly suppose that such organisms are directly aware of these values as desirable ends to be pursued. This consideration at once raises questions as to the origin and the objectivity of value. With problems of this kind the author does not, of course, attempt to deal, for his work is primarily addressed to biologists. But enough has been said to make it clear that those whose interests are mainly philosophical will also find abundant matter for consideration in the views which Mr Reinheimer has so carefully and lucidly expressed.

C. A. RICHARDSON.

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.

Pluriverse: An Essay in the Philosophy of Pluralism. By Benjamin Paul Blood. With an Introduction by Horace Meyer Kallin, Ph.D. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1920.—Pp. xlv + 263.

READERS of THE HIBBERT JOURNAL may remember that in the issue of July 1910 there appeared an article under the title "A Pluralistic Mystic," by the late Professor William James. This monograph gave intimation that in the quiet city of Amsterdam, N.Y., an original thinker had once more descended upon earth and had already dwelt among men for more than the allotted span. The philosophic speculations of Benjamin Paul Blood and his contributions to the life of thought had found expression up to that time through communications to the local press, in correspondence with Tennyson, Emerson, James, Sir William Ramsay, and other notable persons, and particularly by a pamphlet published in 1874, entitled *The Anæsthetic Revelation*, which recorded the writer's amazing experience in "coming to" after a submergence of consciousness while under the influence of nitrous oxide. His matured thoughts on the Great Enigma are now given to the world in this book *Pluriverse*, the writing of which seems to have occupied the final decade of a life of eighty-six years which came to a close in January 1919.

To readers of a mystic-speculative turn, and whose qualities include a dash of the adventurous, the book offers a feast of succulent material, and is much enriched by an introduction from the pen of Professor Horace Meyer Kallin of Boston, who estimates and "places" Blood's views in their relation to existing systems of philosophy with admirable discretion. "For real excitement," said Henry James, "there are no adventures to equal the intellectual ones"; and when to the love of intellectual adventure there is added a sensitiveness to those mysterious over-tones and under-tones which accompany the words of a genuine artist in language, the fascination is the greater. For not since Carlyle has there appeared a writer in whose work one is so conscious of suggestiveness, of a something over and above what the words seem to convey—of remoter implications that appear to start out from between the syllables. The style, in Blood's case, is indeed the man. It is unique, original, spontaneous; it is an instrument perfectly adapted to its purpose, that of a medium for the expression of daring thought; and the craftsman's mastery of his tool is shown in his marvellous power of illustration by similitudes that are homely and familiar without even bordering upon the trite—as instance "the Adamic surprise of Life" on discovering the simplicity of the problem that has baffled philosophers, "as of finding one's spectacles on one's nose."

The keynote of the book seems to be given in its first page, where the author deplors the hopeless failure of philosophy, the science of explanations, to explain anything; but after which, with an inconsequence which the reader will readily pardon, he proceeds to philosophise on the most recondite aspects of existence. It may be, however, that the charge of incompetence is laid against philosophy merely as a process of ratiocination or as an attempt to discover ultimate truth by the aid of the intellect alone, in which case we need not pause to differ. Philosophy, illumined by vision, has undoubtedly done much, if not to "explain," to give perspective, atmosphere, and relation to the perplexing medley of human experiences. It has concentrated the ineluctable mystery in which things move; and just as a struggling tradesman, exasperated by the

demands of a hundred small creditors, might bless the friend who consolidates his liability into one large sum with ample time for its reduction, so the perplexed speculator may feel toward the philosopher who substitutes a large mystery for a multitude of small ones, who gives unity for diversity, coherence for incoherence, and intellectual self-respect for the humiliating pressure of a thousand unintelligibilities.

If, however, it is admitted that the most strenuous lovers of wisdom have failed to dispel the clouds and darkness that obscure the origin and destiny of what we have been accustomed to call the Universe, it is not easy to follow the chain of reasoning by which Mr Blood denies us the logical right to the concept of Monism or Unity, and emphatically declares that "Pluriverse is the word." The incurable "duplexity" of things which gives the title to the first chapter, seems, on his own showing, to forbid our affirming or denying either proposition to the exclusion of the other. For if we must accept "the old two-face" which the world offers to philosophic contemplation—fate, freedom—mind, matter—creator, creature—subject, object,—there seems nothing contrary to practical wisdom in accepting both concepts, Universe and Pluriverse, and the contradiction along with them. We may indeed reasonably suspect that, despite all argument to the contrary, perfect sanity will find rest and peace of mind only in the concept of a dual unity that will be capable of a universal application—a way of looking at things in which duplexity or the two-face aspect ceases to be abnormal and causes no interruption in the flow of thought.

Passing over the intervening sections, which contain some startlingly original reflections on the physics of astronomy, the relation of the space concept to the freedom of the mind, the mystery of momentum and its apparent infraction of the law which assumes a mechanical equivalence of forces, and the elusive problem of self-relation, we may remark that the chapter headed "Jesus and Free Will," which turns upon the story of the sinful woman and her accusers, suggests an interpretation of Christ's attitude to human responsibility which upsets the ecclesiastical teaching of two millennia. Centring his argument upon the words, "Neither do I condemn thee," Mr Blood seems to assume that Jesus relieves the sin-burdened soul by transferring the responsibility to God and denying that the sinner ever possessed the power fully to will the good. It may be that this is a tenable view of the Master's meaning, and certainly to a world of souls groaning under the weight of responsibility which their fellow-men have loaded upon their shoulders, there can be no joy equal to the assurance that the Maker of all accepts that responsibility and is waiting to relieve us of it. But to assume as a corollary to this that man has no power of choice between good and evil, and that freedom of the will is an illusion, offends our deepest instincts. Here again one suspects a failure on the part of the author to apply his own category of "duplexity." "Go, and sin no more" is a meaningless injunction if it does not convey a sense of responsibility and an assurance of power to will and to choose; and that Jesus did use these words just after his refusal to censure the sinner, affords evidence that to "a sufficient intelligence," as manifested in the Perfect One, the two-sidedness of truth presents no difficulty whatever.

As a practical contribution to epistemology, "The Anæsthetic Revelation," with which the book closes, will probably be regarded as of questionable value. That he to whom the ineffable experience comes unsought "knows" something that transcends expression by human

language, we need not doubt; but to seek thus to lift the veil, even in satisfaction of that desire to look into things which we share with angels and scientific men, will probably defeat its own aim, and that apart from ethical or æsthetic considerations. When, as Emerson reminded us, we go out at night specially to admire the moon, we see nothing but a yellow disc somewhat resembling the end of a Stilton cheese; and only when it shines upon us in the course of a business journey or an errand of mercy does it bring its full message of inspiration and hope; so intimate is the relation between insight and action. But if we may not wisely attempt to take the kingdom of knowledge by violence, such experiences as are here recorded may stimulate in us a sensitiveness to those mysterious uprushes from the subconscious that make the master-light of all our seeing—those unearned increments of knowledge that come to us by the way of intuition. Maeterlinck has given the felicitous title of "The Unknown Guest" to that subliminal self whose presence among us we are only now discovering. To make acquaintance with this guest is perhaps the first and most important step in the science by which we acquire knowledge and understanding. For this guest carries credentials attesting his kinship with the Immensities and Eternities. He is the guest who knows everything and whose memory never fails. He is the great revealer and communicator of knowledge, and may be approached by many paths other than the way of anæsthesia. The only disqualification for confidential relation with this unknown guest consists, not in the possession of logical faculties, but in the blind reliance upon them. Revelations will doubtless always come to those who are ready for them; to one, under normal, to another, under abnormal, circumstances. And who will venture to limit the sundry times and divers manners in which God has spoken and will speak to the children of men?

ALEX. MACKENDRICK.

GLASGOW.

A Critical History of Greek Philosophy. By W. T. Stace.—London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920.—Pp. xii + 386.

A BOOK of this size and scope on Greek Philosophy has for some time been needed. There have been primers on the one hand, and large treatises on the other, but no up-to-date exposition corresponding to Zeller's *Outlines*. Mr Stace's book is based on a series of public lectures given (it is not stated where) in 1919 to a general audience; it is written in a simple and trenchant style, explaining difficult conceptions with admirable clearness, and readable even in the most closely argued passages.

An important statement as to the author's method is found at the end of the preface, where we are told (p. xii) that the description *critical* here means "critical, not of dates, texts, readings, and the like, but of philosophical conceptions." It soon appears, in fact, that we are to be given as a rule dogmatic statements of the theories propounded by the several philosophers, followed by criticisms, always interesting and often valuable, of these theories from the writer's own standpoint. It would be clearly impossible to enter into every vexed

question of interpretation in a book of this size; but it may be questioned whether an historian is wise in suppressing so many of those problems of dates, texts, and readings upon which the valuation of whole systems may depend. This manner of treatment is misleading to the general reader, and seriously limits the value of the book for any student new to the subject. Those who already have their background of knowledge will find here much that is stimulating and corrective.

Mr Stace interprets philosophy strictly as *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*. Hence a good deal that is highly characteristic of Greek philosophy as a whole receives here less than justice. Religion, psychology, and ethics are alike regarded as intruders. The post-Aristotelian systems are briefly dismissed because (p. 341) they centre on "the comparatively petty problems of human life." The author's sympathy is with a strict idealism; he writes *con amore* on the Eleatics (whom he criticises admirably) and on Aristotle, and these are probably the best sections in the book. Pre-Socratic thought in general is well treated; though Heraclitus is inadequately discussed, without any mention of the *λόγος* and its possibilities. The chapter on the Sophists, with present-day applications, is very interesting; Mr Stace does not point out their tendency to subordinate truth to appearance, which culminates in the position of Isocrates, for whom *τὸ δοκεῖν* is the one thing needful. Socrates is on the whole excellently discussed.

Most readers will find the treatment of Plato unsatisfactory. The author mentions to set aside (wisely, in this reviewer's opinion) the view held by Burnet and others that the theory of Ideas is Socratic in origin. He himself postulates (without evidence in support) a chronological grouping of the dialogues which places the *Theætetus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Parmenides* within a "constructive" group following (under Eleatic influence) the early "Socratic" dialogues, and counts among the works of "maturity" the *Symposium*, *Republic*, *Phædo*, and *Phædrus*. This arrangement contradicts the now generally accepted belief in a progress from an "earlier" to a "later" theory of Ideas, and leaves the "hypostasised concept" in all its crudity (and in unexplained neighbourhood to the doctrine of the *Timæus*) as Plato's last word on the problem of Being. Since Mr Stace is not interested in the other aspect of the "earlier" Ideas as ethical and æsthetic standards, he does Plato a double injustice. The Platonic system is expounded under the heads of Dialectic, Physics, and Ethics; but it is admitted (p. 177) that "certain portions of the system, the doctrine of Eros, for example, do not fall very naturally into any of these divisions." The doctrine of Eros must not expect, and does not receive, very much attention in this book. The whole theory of soul and of individual personality, so vital and essential in Plato's system (regarded indeed as the centre of the whole by so complete a Platonist as James Adam), is dismissed with comparative brevity; for it would lead us into mysticism on the one hand and into practical ethics on the other. It is characteristic of the author's outlook that he takes the *Republic* as a political treatise (p. 225 ff.) and ignores the possibility that it is in essence

a plea for the right nurture of the individual soul, the polity within.

In his first chapter Mr Stace describes symbolism (p. 12) as "the mark of an infirm mind." Clearly there is a whole side of Plato's thought with which he has no sympathy; thus he deplures (p. 233) the fact that the dialogues "are both works of art and of philosophy" as exercising "an evil influence" in each direction. Professor Stewart's fine definition, "Platonism is love of the unseen and eternal cherished by one who rejoices in the seen and temporal," strikes a note which is absent from this book. The mysticism of the Neo-Platonists, again, meets with wholesale condemnation. Philosophy "cannot admit anything higher than reason" (p. 377); there is no room here for that "consciousness of the beyond," incompatible with forms of thought and demanding expression in symbols, which Dr Inge describes as an essential part of our human nature. Mr Stace has remained consistent with his own definition of philosophy, and within its scope he has said many wise and bracing things; but he has excluded from his account some of the most important regions in which Greek philosophy, as the term is generally understood, has influenced the world's life and thought.

DOROTHY TARRANT.

BEDFORD COLLEGE, LONDON.

Essentials of Mysticism, and other Essays. By Evelyn Underhill.—
London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1920.

This volume is not a treatise on mysticism but a collection of essays, most of which have appeared in various periodicals during the last eight years. As, however, the title of the first essay is repeated on alternate pages throughout the book, we may regard the discussions, expositions, and illustrations as intended to make clear what are Miss Underhill's own views on mysticism. The discussions comprise, in addition to "The Essentials of Mysticism," "The Mystic and the Corporate Life," "Mysticism and the Doctrine of Atonement," "The Mystic as Creative Artist," "The Education of the Spirit," and "The Place of Will, Intellect, and Feeling in Prayer." The types of mysticism expounded at length are, in addition to Plotinus, three mediæval mystics (two women and the unknown author of *The Mirror of Simple Souls*) and three modern mystics (two women and an excommunicated Roman Catholic poet). These are all treated sympathetically, and for the most part with very evident though not indiscriminate admiration.

The advocacy of mysticism throughout is so pronounced, that the reader's appreciation of the book must depend largely on his own estimate of the merits or demerits of the mystics. If he agrees with the authoress that they are the advance guard of the spiritual hosts of mankind, urging forward the laggards and even making atonement for their shortcomings, he will read the book not only with interest, but also with pleasure. If, on the contrary, he looks upon mysticism as an abnormal type of religion, arising from diseased bodily or mental conditions, or, more charitably, as "the last infirmity of noble minds," he

will naturally feel that this "painful" advocacy is wrong-headed and misapplied.

Candidly, I do not think that Miss Underhill has done very much in these essays to commend mysticism, strictly so called, to the judgments of the unconvinced, or successfully grappled with such common objections as that it violates the historical sense, de-moralises religion, accentuates egoism, makes clear thinking unnecessary and good style impossible.

Possibly the last will be considered the least of its alleged evils. There is, however, sufficient evidence of its existence in the volume before us. A striking example is that of Plotinus, whom the authoress regards as both a great thinker and a great mystic, though she frankly acknowledges his "obscurity" and "the extreme difficulty of his style." Baron von Hügel, the Dean of St Paul's, and Mr Whittaker, among other eminent thinkers, have tried to expound the teaching of Plotinus. But they have all gone wrong somewhere, it would seem. They have all allowed "temperament" to deflect the accuracy of their vision. They might have succeeded in their difficult task if only they could have got rid of those unlucky "temperaments." What is needed is the unbiassed mind, the colourless medium, the pure intuition. If one only had these, Plotinus himself might seem the most crystalline of writers. So Miss Underhill wishes to make the great sacrifice. She will divest herself of temperament, and colour, and style in the interests of sheer reality. To the profane it seems a pity. It may be satisfactory to the adepts. Yet some of us find it hard to shed all our prejudices, and we venture to think that even temperament may be as serviceable as vacuity in providing a pathway to reality. Happily for us, Miss Underhill has not been as successful as she probably hoped to be. There are many traces of "temperament" in this volume, and not least in the chapter on Plotinus. Otherwise we should have found it somewhat dreary reading. Even the mystic may have a temperament; for "the mystical quality" of his views of the universe resides wholly, we are told, in his "temper."

In order to arrive at the essentials of mysticism, the mystic's favourite method of abstraction or ἀπόφασις is adopted. We must disregard all those elements of experience which "are due to the suggestions of tradition, to conscious or unconscious symbolism, to the misinterpretation of emotion, to the invasions of cravings from lower centres, or the disguised fulfilment of an unconscious wish." But who is sufficient for these things? And if anyone is competent to undertake this intricate and drastic piece of analysis, would the residuum be worth very much? The elimination of the first item in the list might alone prove the condemnation of the whole process. No man, not even the mystic, can afford to despise the common inheritance of the race to which he belongs, and begin all over again as though God and he were the only two Beings in the universe. The will of God is to be learned from history as well as from the experience of the individual who tries to run away from it. It is to be inferred from the diversities of experience as well as from its sameness.

In the next chapter to the one just quoted from, these "suggestions of tradition" reappear, but now in a new light. They may have been eliminated by the analyst in order to arrive at the pure essence of mysticism, but the mystic cannot afford to throw them away. "Man needs a convention, a tradition, a limitation if he is not to waste his

creative powers; and this convention the mystics find best and most easily in the forms of the Church to which they belong." They need it to express their experience, and also to test it. So after all, the despised tradition, which is no integral part of the mystical experience, is brought back again to test it. It is the function of the community to judge, and the duty of the mystic to obey. The revelations of the mystic have no independent authority. They must be submitted to the judgment of the common herd.

The residuum which remains after all non-essential elements have been removed is an overwhelming consciousness of God and the individual's soul. These are the two great realities, the two solitary monads; and the mystic's religion is the communion of the alone with the Alone. All attempts to disprove the non-social character of mysticism are futile in face of the mystic's fundamental conception of God and the means of attaining to the knowledge of Him laid down in this book. The highest conception of the Godhead is declared to be "the Silent Desert within which never any difference has lain." Miss Underhill thinks that "the amateur theologians of the present day exaggerate the so-called social side of religion," but all the greatest theologians of the Christian Church, from the Apostle Paul to the present time, have to be put on their side as against the advocates of the abstract conception of the Greek philosophers.

Not only is the mystic's God a Silent Desert, but He is not a Person. "In the highest experiences of the greatest mystics the personal category appears to be transcended." Yet though personality is transcended the "self" remains—God's self and the worshipper's self; and between these two non-personal selves communion, self-giving, and love are possible. But in the next essay we read: "The mystic speaks with God as a person with a Person."

To the non-mystical temperament these apparent contradictions are somewhat puzzling, and there are plenty of them scattered about in these essays. Thus, with the warning about invasions from the lower centres fresh in our minds, we turn to Mechthild's "amorous conversations with her heavenly Bridegroom" and learn how "the utterly loved went in to the utterly lovely, into the secret chamber of pure Divinity":

"Now a blessed silence doth o'er us flow;
Both wills together would have it so;
He is given to her, she is given to Him,"

on which Miss Underhill's comment is: "This is the end of all mysticism." Again, in dealing with the doctrine of atonement, we are told that the theologies which lay peculiar stress on the essential impotence of man "appear to be hopelessly irreconcilable with the mystical view of religion." And yet the Apostle Paul and Augustine are claimed as mystics! One wonders what Augustine would have thought of Miss Underhill's semi-Pelagian type of mysticism. And even the description of the Apostle Paul as "the noblest of souls" will not reconcile the students and admirers of Paulinism to the imperfect interpretation of his theology contained in this book. But then the theologians as opposed to the mystics have not like Julian of Norwich "seen God in a Point," or like Boehme come to "understand the Being of all Beings" by "gazing at a polished pewter dish."

H. H. SCULLARD.

Historic Theories of Atonement, with Comments. By Robert Mackintosh, D.D.—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1920.—Pp. viii+319.

It would be hard to imagine a study of the subject in equal compass with this that should be at once more comprehensive, better informed, more searching in its comments, and more suggestive and well-balanced in its own interpretation of the doctrine. At any rate, none is known to its reviewer comparable to it in all-round excellence, including the prime essentials of moral sanity and religious experience. In it head and heart co-operate in full harmony and on a high level of disciplined insight, as they should in all theology worthy the name, and most of all in that of the central theme alike of Christian piety and thought—when it is conceived in a large and deep way. And whatever this book is not, it is profoundly Christian in feeling and outlook.

Dr Mackintosh grasps firmly the distinction between the fact of Redemption, both in history and in individual experience, and theories of the fact, and observes that "not a few so-called theories of Atonement are evasions or denials of the fact itself." In his Introductory chapter he announces the point of view from which the "historic theories" are to be judged, viz. how far this or that succeeds in doing justice to "the moral necessity of Atonement," alike historically and ideally. Thus on the threshold, as throughout, he shows that he knows how to ask the right kind of questions for the religious consciousness. But, further, he has studied thoroughly the relevant literature up to the time of writing—which, unfortunately, excluded Dr Rashdall's Bampton Lectures,—and on the whole with proper appreciation of the various theories set forth, even when furthest from his own thought and convictions. What is specially valuable is his historical and critically discriminating handling of the Biblical data, both of Old and New Testament, even down to detailed exegesis where needful.

"Old Testament Preparation for the Doctrine" (ch. ii.) leads on to "Christ's Thought of His Own Death" and "The Apostolic Teaching of Atonement." Then come "Greek Church Theories, Exoteric and Esoteric," and "Starting-point and Drift of Western Catholic Doctrine." Here one misses an explicit account of Augustine's view, which our author probably takes too much for known. On the other hand, "Anselm and Satisfaction to the Divine Honour" is very full and valuable; but one misses certain aspects of his great rival's thought in "Abelard and Moral-Influence Theories." Again, while mediæval theories and their favourite categories (*e.g. satisfacere, meritum, acceptatio*, and the tendency to water down the value of terms to *quasi* senses) are fairly fully handled, a fuller account of Thomas Aquinas could be desired. "Historic Protestantism and the Penal Scheme" is a strong chapter, candid and properly critical; but "Grotianism and its Echoes" seems hardly to do full justice to Grotius's own thought. "R. W. Dale and the Fact of the Atonement" is a searching while sympathetic study, as is that on M'Leod Camp-

bell in "Theories of Vicarious Penitence." It and "Redemption by Sample" are both able chapters (though Du Bose has perhaps less than justice done him), and prepare the way for Mackintosh's own constructive effort yet to come. "Some Minor Theories—Bushnell, Fairbairn, Westcott, Ritschl" (whose place under this heading is fairly explained), "Personal Relationships and the Divine Anger" (D. W. Simon and Ritschl are dealt with here), and "Denney and the Problem of Christ's Physical Death" (this latter is the side from which Denney is studied), end the series. The whole is extremely illuminating, and brings out every aspect of the subject with more or less emphasis.

But the chief matter, especially for readers of this Journal, is the author's own theory based on this survey, the light he can cast in the end upon the true meaning of Christ's Passion and Death as the supreme means of Atonement or reconciliation between God and man. This Dr Mackintosh sets forth, quite tentatively in form, in his "Epilogue." He begins with a reminder that all along he has applied to theories the test of "the moral necessity" of the sufferings of Christ. This has been sought in the requirements either of "the glory of God" or of human salvation. Theories of the former or more "objective" type generally "regard the Atonement as making forgiveness 'possible'" in a too limited sense, viz. as removing a preliminary barrier to the execution of God's gracious purpose. Yet inherent provision for its necessary accomplishment must also be included. So it is best to start from the human side of the necessity of Christ's vicarious or sacrificial sufferings, "as the presupposition of the redemption of human character." Here our author's survey has shown the need of adding to the moral-influence theory elements of more "moral necessity" than it possesses on the average, elements of a properly religious order, such as those in St Paul's "mystical" doctrine of the Cross or in the idea of "redemption by sample," when viewed in the light of a mutually inclusive or interpenetrative conception of personality—with the transferability of experience as its corollary. In the quest for these he would advance by noting how Christ's Passion "tells verifiably upon human character and conduct."

First, then, Christ's "suffering righteousness delivers those who trust Him from [the sense of guilt¹ and] the bondage of sin and ensures their conformity to the will of God," and "nothing else could have exercised the same powers." It does this by establishing, in the moral nature of things—including the laws of personality, which may be called "mystic" in the same sense of Biblical mysticism, notably the principle of "faith" in the Pauline sense—"such fellowship with the Christ who suffered" as is the pledge and potency of "the redemption of human character." In this light the fact that "God both requires and provides Atonement" is no longer anomalous. "If" it "is the necessary and inevitable means for rescuing man's character, and if God loves us, then love chooses this means in

¹ I venture to insert this as needful to the experienced fact and as doubtless taken for granted by our author.

spite of its immense cost" (= "ransom," in sense of Mark x. 45). And if it is asked *how* the innocent suffering of Christ, "as the culmination of His fellowship with His human brethren," can achieve this decisive result, he answers that "His death expresses in brief intensity what all His life exhibits." In this supreme act of holy will "it is clear that Christ has reached the utmost point in the way of fidelity to God and of self-sacrificing love for man." "Under conditions of the utmost conceivable significance" He was *faithful unto death* alike to God and to man, in perfect homage to God's will as righteous and also redemptive of man, and perfect sympathy with and hope for man in spite of sin—the deadly nature of which was then present to His consciousness in fullest conceivable degree. [Hence,¹ on the one hand, all the elements of the problem of human redemption, from sin unto a new fellowship with God, met in His soul and were brought into harmony, by trust in God and His unexhausted Good Will for man. On the other hand, this harmony of principles hitherto contrasted, nay, seemingly opposed (righteous anger at sin and love of man while yet a sinner), and of the persons involved in abnormal relations—God and man, alienated each in his own way and sense,—was capable of passing at this quickening point of contact, the Atoning Passion, into other souls, largely subconsciously, through corresponding "trust" in God as revealed in Christ and His twofold attitude of righteous sorrow for human sin and yearning love for sinful man.] The actual effects of *such* suffering by such an one as Christ confirm *a posteriori* the "moral necessity" of the act as the central fact in human moral history. For "the Christian experience is [normally] more humble, more thankful, more hopeful, than any human experience apart from Christ. Life grows a diviner thing" in the faith that "Christ by His death has redeemed us. . . . And it is an axiom of religion that the best is the truest."

Another form of moral necessity, recognised in the past as marking Christ's Atoning self-sacrifice, our author also recognises, viz. that "the glory of God" be fulfilled and revealed therein. But "God is supremely glorified in the fact that man is redeemed." God in His true character, His characteristic divinity, as at once Righteous and Loving (*i.e.* Righteousness and Love "*alive* in God," as the perfect personal will), is glorified in the fulfilment of "His purpose that sin shall not go unpunished [in the sinner's own consciousness], but still more that redemption"—or rather Love as the "victoriously strong principle" that Christ conceived and revealed it to be—"shall triumph." Thus Christ in His death supremely "glorified" God in "carrying through to the end the work," of manifesting the Father's Name or veritable nature, which He "had given Him to do": for it was Christ's filial loyalty, realised in and through Voluntary Suffering, for the ends of the Father's perfected reign in humanity at large, to the extreme point of death, "yea, the death of the Cross," which in principle glorified God. It did so not only in objective fact, by a supreme historic act of obedience (see Heb. v. 8 f., cf. Phil. ii. 8), but

¹ Here the reviewer ventures to try to make explicit the line of thought underlying the author's own statement so far as here expressed.

also in the world-transforming manifestation of that principle of filial obedience as the glory of divine or perfect manhood. Thus in Christ's own humanity at this crisis, above all, the glory of God in humanity at large was fulfilled, not only "in sample" but in pledge and potency, for all who should become united by Faith with Him as members to Head.

"But why," after all, "is God glorified in a *suffering* Christ?" We must not "enforce the analogy of punishment for sin" proper to the sinner, but rather "the analogy of repentance," here conceived as a vicarious one for others' sin—as of a father or elder brother for those with whom he is one in blood, interest, and sympathy. [For to Jesus as the true Christ, the Messianic Head of God's People, the bond of spiritual solidarity between Himself and sinful men, as "all of One" (Heb. ii. 11), was far closer and more real than that of flesh and blood.] Hence, waiving the term "repentance," as partly inapplicable, in favour of vicarious sorrow of soul (before and beneath suffering of body) for human sin, "there is found in Him under His sufferings that right human attribute towards the God of holiness and of salvation which is required by the moral nature of things—an attitude which passes from Him into us; which in Him and even in us pleases God." One may add that Jesus' sufferings, psychological and physical, are in the New Testament regarded as testing His filial attitude and making it more morally real or valuable, through victory over the temptations of human frailty as "flesh" sensitive to the appeal of pleasure and pain (Rom. viii. 3 f., 1 Pet. iv. 1 f.). Hence Christ's Atoning sacrifice and priesthood alike owe their efficacy to the moral intensity of the Saviour's loyalty or holiness, measured by the strain of suffering upon His human will (Heb. v. 6-10, 1 Pet. ii. 20-24). Thus it was through *suffering* in the fullest sense that Christ's negation and judgment of the self-centred attitude, from which sin springs, was psychologically and morally perfected, and equally His loyal and loving attitude to God and man: in a word, both the negative and positive holiness of the Redeemer was objectified for God and man in His Passion, and thereby became the objective basis of the subjective efficacy of its moral influence (in the deepest sense of spiritual change) in those who by faith appropriate Christ and Him crucified, as Paul understood it experimentally and in his mystical vein of thought.

Such "moral necessity," on both the lines indicated, *ad homines* and *ad Deum*—and it only—has as its correlative true "freedom" alike in God and man. "The true freedom of our God is *in* His righteousness and *in* His love. . . . In that true freedom He eternally dwells, and we must come to dwell in it . . . as His *sons*. . . . God may, if He pleases, work miracles in the region of physical law, but redemption by non-moral means would not be redemption at all. Therefore we have been bought—at so great and costly a price"—exactly in the sense of 1 Pet. i. 18 f.

The epilogue ends with a striking and true hint as to the connection of the Atonement with the idea of the Divinity of Christ, over against M'Leod Campbell's view of it as "a development of the Incarnation."

That was not the order of faith in the Apostles ; nor is it for personal faith like theirs to-day. " Christ who does the divinest thing of all, in glorifying God and in redeeming mankind, shows Himself for what He is in what He does." Such a vital type of faith, Dr Mackintosh adds in closing, must in the long run be the nerve of social reform, " the redeeming of social wrongs " being " a plain part of His programme."

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The Historical Evidence for the Virgin Birth. By Vincent Taylor, B.D. (Lond.).—Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1920.—Pp. x+136. Large 8vo.

THIS is not a treatise on the theme in all its aspects. It does not deal with the existence of similar beliefs in many other religions of the time all over Greece and the East. It leaves on one side the rivalry between Christianity and Emperor-worship, containing the tradition that Augustus was born of a divine father. Nor does it examine the nature of miracle, nor touch first-century ideas about divinity. It is purely a critical inquiry into the Christian documents, intended to be severely impartial, and to bring to the general question just as much light as these documents transmit, to be combined with light from other quarters in groping our way to a final conclusion. The author's effort to be fair is manifest and honourable, though, visible through his self-restraint, one reader detects a bias on the orthodox side. It is a solid satisfaction to follow Mr Taylor's deliberate steps, each traced with careful scholarship.

Nevertheless one feels that the author is struggling in his own mind against a negative conclusion. He quotes, of course, the passage in the Fourth Gospel where Jesus is described by Philip as " the son of Joseph," and the one where the Jews at Capernaum ask, " Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know ? " and the three passages in that Gospel where the Jews are allowed to argue that Jesus cannot be the Messiah because he was not born in Bethlehem, or at some unknown place, but was born in Galilee. Here the Evangelist refrains very noticeably from saying that he was, after all, born in Bethlehem. This passage, in fact, throws strong light on the controversial demand for the Bethlehem tradition. Yet Mr Taylor shrinks from granting that these passages show a tacit rejection of the Virgin Birth. He concludes in favour of a tacit acceptance by this evangelist, who, however, is said to have thought it of no importance, and so ignored it. This is an incredible position concerning any writer of that period. Mr Taylor says that the writer of " John " must have known of the Infancy sections in Matthew and Luke in their present form ; but this very large assumption is made without discussion. Mark is confessedly silent about the Birth tradition. But against his knowledge of it stands the passage (vi. 3, 4), where the people at Nazareth exclaim, " Is not

this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James and Joses and Judas and Simon?" and Jesus replied that a prophet had no honour "among his own kin." This last phrase, which ignores any imperfection in kinship, is omitted by Matthew and Luke—a later alteration, possibly, to harmonize with their Infancy stories. In face of this it might have been safe to use a stronger word than "probable" concerning the absence of the tradition from the time of Mark's Gospel.

More significant is the story in Mk. iii. 21, where "his friends (lit. "those near him") went out to lay hold on him, for they said, 'He is beside himself,'" and (iii. 31) his mother and his brethren came and stood without, calling him. But he replied, "Who is my mother or my brethren?" and went on to dwell by contrast on the spiritual relationship. One would suppose that this was fair evidence against his mother's consciousness of any miraculous birth. Even the story that his friends or kinsmen thought him mad was judiciously omitted by Matthew and Luke, probably for a like reason. Yet it causes Mr Taylor to raise a doubt, with nothing in the passage to suggest it, whether Mary shared the view of her sons. Nor does he feel certain that Mark did not all the time know of the doctrine.

Again, in Mk. xii. 35–37 Jesus asks how the Messiah can be David's son and David's Lord. We cannot be very sure of the exact personal allusion here. But it is notable that Jesus was only the son of David through Joseph.

Coming to the heart of the subject in Luke's gospel, we have a completely fair treatment of the passages which point to an ordinary birth. In iii. 22 the words "Thou art my son—in thee I am well pleased" are believed not to be the original form, but in all probability to have been changed from the form in the Western Text: "Thou art my son: this day have I begotten thee"—a passage going only with a non-miraculous theory of birth. The genealogy is accepted as tracing the ancestry through Joseph, and the words "as was supposed" (the son of Joseph) are recognised as likely to be an interpolation, later than the original form of the Gospel. We have also the passage in iv. 22, "Is not this Joseph's son?" taken from Mark. We have the statement in ii. 22 that Joseph and Mary both required purification; we have that, in ii. 33, that both " marvelled " at the prophecy of Simeon, which would have been the sort of utterance actually expected after a miraculous birth; we have, in the discussion with the doctors at Jerusalem at the age of twelve, the statement that "they did not understand the saying" that he was about his Father's business. And, quite definitely, we are told by Luke that "his parents" brought him to Simeon, went to Jerusalem, knew not that he was left behind, and that Mary said, "Thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing." All these markedly significant phrases, it should be remembered, are in the Infancy section, and come neither from Mark nor from Q. This points to the original form even of that section being free from the Virgin Birth statement. Mr Taylor frankly gives up the word "espoused" in ii. 5 as an interpolation, and leaves the text "with Mary his wife."

In the light of these passages let us approach the single verse (i. 34) which implies the Virgin Birth, though it does not state it. The implication is in the fact that Mary's question, "How shall this be, seeing that I know not a man?" is answered by the angel: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee." But if the words ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα οὐ γινώσκω were omitted, the succeeding verse might suitably refer to a spiritual endowment for a child born in wedlock; and as Mary, we are told, was already betrothed, she may easily have accepted it as a promise to be fulfilled when her marriage had taken place.

My principal criticism of Mr Taylor is that he discusses only briefly and, I think, feebly this particular interpolation theory, so much easier than the interpolation by a later hand of two long verses, which he does fully discuss, and rejects, not unreasonably, on textual and linguistic grounds. There are no various readings, and the vocabulary turns out to be markedly like the rest of the section. This argument fails against the insertion of four words. So slight is the liberty which needs to be taken to make this text harmonise with the rest of the New Testament. On these linguistic grounds our author bases his argument that Luke taught the Virgin Birth, but learnt about it later than the time when he wrote his Gospel, and inserted it in a later edition. Through haste or lack of opportunity he did not harmonise the rest of his Gospel with it—truly a far-fetched way of saving the Lucan authorship. It happens that two of the four words, ἐπεὶ and γινώσκω, are linguistically not ordinary Lucan words, and so are more likely to be interpolated. ἐπεὶ Luke never uses elsewhere; he uses ἐπειδὴ. Thus the linguistic argument tells in favour of non-Lucan interpolation. Four words are too few to give scope to much various reading. Besides, it is wholly arbitrary to say that there must be various readings discoverable for every doctrinal interpolation. We do not know how many such there are undiscovered for lack of various readings. And this interpolation must have been very early. Mr Taylor's only other objection to it is that to do the trick in four words is really too clever. Even so, the author only claims Luke's personal (and perhaps private) knowledge of the story at some date after the Gospel was finished, probably also after the Book of Acts (which does not contain it) was written, and not long before his death. But in the final summary in the last chapter this result appears: "St Luke became acquainted with the tradition for the first time, either when he was *in process of writing* his Gospel, or *immediately afterwards*." "Belief in the Virgin Birth existed *in influential Christian communities* (italics all mine) at the time when the Third Gospel was written." "The furthest, therefore, to which we can trace the existence of the Virgin Birth as a *public tradition* is some little time *previous* to the composition of the Third Gospel." In stretching points like this the author exhibits the bias against which he began by struggling. Apart from this, the final chapter on "The Historical Question" is a reasonable and weighty utterance, and worthily concludes an excellent piece of work.

The Virgin Birth is explicitly and clearly stated only in Matt. i.

18-25. This passage and the Genealogy are believed by our author to be part of the original Gospel, on grounds of style and vocabulary. One can only reply that that is so much the worse for the Gospel, for the Infancy narratives in Matthew are so different from and so difficult to reconcile with those of Luke, so intrinsically incredible—miraculous birth, Joseph's dream, Chaldæans' visit, massacre of the innocents, and flight into Egypt,—so clearly selected or produced in order to fulfil misunderstood prophecies, including "A maiden shall conceive," that one would be glad for Matthew's reputation if he could be relieved of them. There is here an admirable discussion of the corrupt text of Matt. i. 16 ff., which Mr Taylor thinks originally ran "Joseph begat Jesus." But he thinks Matthew got over this conflict between the Virgin Birth and the Sonship from David, by the elusive doctrine of a merely "legal" begetting in his Genealogy. In my own view the Infancy section in Matthew is late and historically valueless, but I must not further extend.

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A Short Survey of the Literature of Rabbinical and Mediæval Judaism.

By W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box.—London: S.P.C.K., 1920.—Pp. xii+334.

THE authors of this book are to be congratulated on having done a very useful and timely piece of work. Timely, because of the increased attention which is being given to Jewish literature other than Biblical; and useful, because no other book in English contains in so small a compass the information here presented. The work of J. W. Etheredge in 1852 attempted the same task, and so far as it went was very valuable. But it contained many errors, and its style was execrable. Moreover, it has been long out of print. The present survey far surpasses that of Etheredge, from every point of view; and, though it is not free from errors, is a really valuable introduction to the literature with which it deals. That it is elementary is one of its virtues, since for most readers the Rabbinical literature is entirely unknown. If the writers had been German scholars, they might have packed more information into their book; but at least they offer the reader a book which he can read, and read with pleasure, instead of an encyclopædia for reference. The names of the two authors, long known in familiar partnership, are the guarantee of certain excellences in their work, amongst others a fine courtesy towards the adherents of a religion which is not their own. Such courtesy has not been the usual rule of Christian scholars when writing about post-Biblical Judaism.

The book before us is rightly called a *short* survey, for the literature with which it deals is enormous in quantity, and even an index of titles and authors would need more space than the whole compass of this volume. Wolff's *Bibliotheca*, more than two centuries ago,

needed four thick quarto volumes to contain his survey of the literature, and much of it is mere dictionary work. Wolff is valuable still; but the reader coming fresh to the study of, or acquaintance with, the Rabbinical literature needs such an outline as that which Messrs Oesterley and Box have drawn for him.

The book is divided into four main sections: Part I., a historical survey forming the background against which the various literature and its authors can be shown, then the account of that literature under the specific heads of, Part II., Targum, Midrash, and Talmud; Part III., the Liturgy; Part IV., the Mediæval Literature. It was well done to assign a special section to the Liturgy, because the study of the hymns and prayers of the Synagogue is the best corrective of the common notions as to the sterility and formalism of the religion based on the Torah as interpreted by the Talmud. The authors themselves seem to feel this; at all events the section on the Liturgy gives the impression that it is the devotional literature with which they are most familiar and which they feel to be most congenial. That they should be familiar with all the works, or even all the classes of literature, included in their survey could not be fairly expected. Such a knowledge is impossible for any man. But they have gone to the best authorities within their reach for information where their own knowledge failed them; and they have pointed the reader to those same authorities for the means of forming an independent judgment. More than this they could not do, in a book which is intended to be a survey of Jewish literature. And no reader who has gone through their book need suppose that he knows that literature; he knows what there is to be studied if he chooses to study it, and who were the men most concerned with its literary expression. But the literature itself, and still more the ideas and beliefs of which that literature is the utterance, he does not yet know.

At the same time some help might, we think, have been given to the reader if the authors had more fully explained why the literature which they survey took the particular forms that it presents. The Midrash form is a necessary development for post-Exilic Jewish literature, and is peculiar to that literature. The Talmud itself is only a specialised Midrash,—highly specialised, no doubt, but still of the same stock. A short exposition of the theory of the religion of the Torah would have been very useful in helping the reader to understand the character and aim of the literature, and the right point of view from which to regard it. The authors refer to their book on the *Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* for treatment of many points not dealt with in the present book. Being away from my books at the moment, I cannot say whether the former work gives the fuller explanation which seems to be wanting in the present one. But, in any case, the reader of the smaller book may not have the larger one at hand for reference; and it would have helped him considerably if he had been given the explanation when and where he needed it. A similar remark may be made in regard to the origin of the Synagogue and the Synagogue type of congregational worship. The authors assume that the Synagogue aimed at reproducing the

non-sacrificial elements of the Temple service, and this is by no means certain. How much of non-sacrificial element there was in the pre-Exilic Temple is a question not easy to be answered ; and if there was some amount of such non-sacrificial element in the post-Exilic Temple, it is at least conceivable that this was due to the influence of the Synagogue. This is not the place to argue the question ; but the mention of it shows that the survey of the Jewish literature, which owed far more to the Synagogue than ever it did to the Temple, would have been rendered more adequate by its discussion.

Apart from some minor inaccuracies, the two points just mentioned are the only deficiencies which I have observed in a very excellent book ; and whether these are deficiencies is, after all, a matter of opinion. If a further edition of the book is called for (" may it come soon, and in our days," as the Liturgy says), the authors might correct with advantage a few details. Thus (p. 23) the Palestinian schools did not continue during the whole Amoraic period as represented by the Babylonian schools, but closed a century earlier. Also, it is not true to say that either the Palestinian or the Babylonian Talmud was ever really finished. It is true that Rab Ashi and Rabina brought to an end the process of arranging the *corpus* of the Babylonian Talmud ; but that end was forced by pressure of circumstances, it was not the natural end, as it would have been if they could have dealt fully with the whole Mishnah. As for the Palestinian Talmud, the process of arrangement would seem to have stopped because there was no one left to carry it on. Samuel, the famous colleague of Rab, was never called Rabbi Samuel (p. 22). As a matter of fact, he was never ordained ; but if he had been, he would have been called Rab Samuel. Some further attention to small points like these would improve a book which, even in spite of them, is admirable. In commending it to the student who is beginning his acquaintance with the Rabbinical literature, may I compliment the S.P.C.K. for the spirited enterprise shown in its recent efforts to make that literature more widely known ?

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LONDON.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

STILL AT IT :

THE IMPASSE OF MODERN CHRISTOLOGY.

M. D. PETRE.

WE are still at it, and the problem is no nearer solution—this was the first impression produced on my mind by the deeply interesting papers which appeared in the HIBBERT JOURNAL of January respecting the Cambridge Conference of the Churchman's Union.

The writer of the following pages may be truly regarded as a solitary marooned passenger ; the sole living representative of what has come to be regarded as a lost cause—the cause of Modernism in the Roman Catholic Church. Whether that cause be so entirely lost as most people take for granted is a proposition which I will not wholly admit, though I am not writing this article to prove the contrary. From my queer and uncomfortable little corner in our great Church I often send unspoken greetings, silent sympathy, unnoticed smiles and nods, to friends whom I do not claim as such since to do so would be an unfriendly action. I note, from that same corner, the quiet and matter-of-fact acceptance of ideas and principles that would be shouted down if their correct Modernist signature were affixed to them. But, for the rest, I am prepared to acknowledge that the chief representatives of the cause have either ceased to be such or have ceased to be members of the Church that condemned them, while the cause itself, as a concrete movement, is no more.

These few words of personal explanation are uttered to save what follows from the danger of misunderstanding. If in some ways I appear to regard the Modernist movement in the Roman Catholic Church as a richer and more varied

movement than its counterpart in the English Church, as more forcible, though also more inevitably doomed and desperate, no one will, I think, suspect me of mere prejudiced partiality in the matter, since no one living has more persistently experienced the drawbacks inherent to Roman Catholic membership under such circumstances.

"We are still at it," and *it* is the Christological problem. It is significant to my mind that, whereas Modernism in the Catholic Church attacked a variety of problems according to the subject matter of its action, in the English Church it seems to have concentrated itself on one question alone. As I have pointed out elsewhere, speaking of Catholic Modernists: *some of these men were historians or critics, some were philosophers, some were social reformers, some were mainly apostles.*¹

One of the chief protagonists of the movement, George Tyrrell, was concerned, in the first instance, with the rights, not of the learned, but of the simple, unlearned faithful. In an article, which was to be the keynote of his ulterior development,² he pleaded against the subtle tyranny of over-speculative theology and its sterilising influence on the religious instincts of the ordinary devout mind.

There was a philosophical section of the Modernist School, wherein Monsieur Edouard Le Roy was a prominent teacher, the appeal of which was for a fundamental re-examination of the scientific and philosophical value of dogma.

There was a social section, which endeavoured to bring the democratic movement of society within the sphere of Catholic influence, while attempting, at the same time, to win right of entrance for democratic principles into the Church herself. Prof. Romolo Murri and M. Marc Sangnier were the leading representatives of this Christian democratic movement respectively in Italy and France.

Lastly, there was the historic school of Modernism, of which M. Alfred Loisy was a leading figure; and this school quickly became the most prominent and important.

The main question with which historic Modernism tried to deal was the Christological problem. Other exegetical discussions there were in plenty, but questions such as that of the composition of the Pentateuch, even that of the authorship of the fourth Gospel, soon came to be at least tolerated as problems admitting of scientific examination.

The Christological problem, on the other hand, was at

¹ *Modernism: its Failure and its Fruits.* T. Nelson.

² *Theology and Devotion.* See *Through Scylla and Charybdis.*

the beginning, and has remained ever since, a rock of offence, a source of spiritual disturbance, a seed of doubt.

Any questioning of the traditional doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus Christ, of the truth of His Resurrection, was treated by Catholic authorities, from the first and to the last, as poisonous heresy. M. Loisy wrote his short but celebrated work, *L'Évangile et l'Église*, in which he endeavoured to find place in the Church for a doctrine of the Incarnation that should be immune from the destructive advance of criticism on traditional teaching. He incorporated in this work some of the ideas of Dr Edward Caird, as presented in an article on "Christianity and the historical Christ"; he endeavoured to save the Christ of Catholic worship from the critical results of an historical examination of the Gospels. It was an attempt to separate the domain of faith from the domain of criticism; the Christ of Catholic worship from the Christ of history.

Other attempts were made by Catholic writers in the same direction. Baron F. von Hügel wrote an article "Du Christ Éternel et de nos Christologies Successives" in the *Quinzaine* of 1st June 1904—the "Lettres Romaines," similar in character, appeared in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne* about the same time.

In most of these attempts to stem, on the one side, the destructive force of criticism on faith; to mitigate, on the other side, the intransigent opposition of traditional dogma and belief to the undoubted results of history and science, we find, and it is better to confess the truth, the same tentative character, the same qualities of intellectual shyness (if I may use the term) and subtlety which may be noted in many of the latest contributions to the same question, such as those which were put forward at the Cambridge Conference.

The Roman Catholic Church, through her official exponents, would have none of those Catholic Modernist apologetics; Dr Foakes Jackson, in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* of last January, will have none of the recent ones set forth by Canon Barnes, Dr Rashdall, and others at Cambridge.

In point of fact the Christological controversy, now raging in the English Church, is not very different in character from what it was, say, in 1904–1907 in the Catholic Church; nor has it really advanced any nearer to a satisfactory conclusion. The controversy could be suppressed, once for all, in the one instance; it cannot be suppressed in the other; but the fundamental problem is, I maintain, the same now in the English as it was then in the Roman Church; and it is no nearer its solution because, though a clergyman may

be an historian and a critic in the English Church without being spiritually decapitated, he cannot, all the same, any more than his Catholic *confrère*, allow science and criticism to manipulate a central object of faith without affecting faith itself.

At bottom must we not admit that there has been a considerable element of sophistry in this attempt to admit the critic into the sanctuary while maintaining that things could be much the same afterwards? It has been an elusive task, and those occupied with it have been continually slipping from faith to history, and back again, without clearly recognising the process.

A distinction between the spiritual and eternal and the historic Christ was one of the first attempts to reconcile traditional belief with the latest results of criticism.

Then we began to insist on the uniqueness of the personality of Christ; as of One in Whom God manifested Himself as He has done in no other human personality.

Both these theses are compatible with Christian faith and theology, but they constitute no satisfactory bridge between history and Christian belief, because the historic Christ is as essential to the latter as the spiritual and eternal Christ; and even though His uniqueness were indubitable it is neither adequate nor sufficient.

Nor are these two hypotheses very convincing from the critical standpoint. Let me ask the following two questions:

1. Is there not a great deal of personal tendency and conviction displayed in the various presentments of Christ which the devout critic offers us in place of the one which criticism has put aside? I say this of some of the Catholic efforts as of those now to be witnessed in the English Church. Is not Dr Foakes Jackson justified in describing one such presentment as "slightly patronising"? Is there not a suggestion of interference and personal meddling in the portraits of Christ which have been proposed to us as combining the likeness produced by faith with the likeness produced by criticism?

2. Does it not occur to other minds, as it has often occurred to my own, that, in regard to this theory of uniqueness, taken purely from the critical standpoint, other exalted religious personalities might quite as well be proved unique revealers of God to man if the same amount of consideration and pains and ingenuity were consecrated to the study of their lives and teaching?

In fact, the critic, who is also a Christian apologist, has tried to do too much. He has tried to show that the Christ

of religious faith was untouched by criticism; and in this he was right, though not, I think, for quite the reasons he fancied. But he has also endeavoured to establish a concrete and scientific connection between this Christ of faith and the Christ of the Gospel as sifted and reconstructed by the critic. In this second endeavour he has failed. The spiritual Christ of faith can be one with the traditional historic Christ of the Churches, the Christ of the Gospel of St. John can be one with the Christ of the Synoptics, but only according to the traditional teaching of the Churches, not according to the critical reading of the Gospel as an historic document.

For let us further remember that, once we begin to modify faith in obedience to criticism, we have to take count, not only of what has been ascertained, but of what may, at any future date, be ascertained. So that for the believer it is quite useless to establish a satisfactory refuge from criticism, so far as it has reached, when he knows that it may, even if it do not, eventually reach much further still.

I marvel at the contentment with which the theologian hails some victory of traditional teaching over criticism. A bit of ground lost here or gained there matters so little if faith be truly dependent on the march of historic discovery.

The attitude of one of our former Catholic Modernists has been very significant in this respect. M. Alfred Loisy was foremost in his attempt, as a Christian apologist, to preserve the changelessness of faith from the changing results of science. But he soon perceived the implications of his position. He could accept the Christ of faith as well as the Christ of history so long as he accepted and remained a member of the Church in which that Christ was a central object of worship—when he was denied membership of the Church he found himself left with the Christ of history alone, and in regard to that Christ he became purely a critic and no longer a believer.

I wish the Church had not ejected M. Loisy; I wish M. Loisy had not left the Church; but the present controversy makes me understand his attitude better than ever. He did not attempt to reconcile things irreconcilable; to combine, in one act, criticism and worship.

All the other problems of Modernism were manageable in comparison with this one. The relations of religious authority and rightful liberty, of theology and devotion, of established order and democracy, of physical science and miracle, of dogma and intellectual freedom; all these questions could be asked without risking a kind of spiritual chaos. Those who ventured to ask them might suffer most

grievously at the hands of ecclesiastical authority, but since the very rights and limits of authority were one of the main questions in dispute, there was no inconsistency in maintaining one's belief in the Church in spite of official condemnation.

But the Christological problem was quite another matter ; for herein it was the very central object of worship whose nature was being called in question. It was vain to tell us that the Christ of our faith and adoration was independent of the Christ with whom critics were dealing. We knew quite well, every one of us, that the Christ of faith was also the Jesus Christ of history, and that we were being offered a symbol in place of an historic reality. If the human Christ was not God, as we had been taught to consider Him, then somebody else might, for all we knew, do as well for the historic representation of Divine Incarnation in the human race. Of course the mystery of the Incarnation was a great spiritual fact, far transcending its historic presentation ; still, the historic presentment was essentially connected with the spiritual reality, and we worshipped the human Jesus when we worshipped the Word of God.

For those who entered into this question a practical result was immediately experienced, for this new understanding of the Gospel affected prayer, and prayer is of the essence of religion. We had prayed, not only to God made manifest, in some way, in Jesus Christ, we had prayed to Jesus Christ Himself—the son of a Galilean carpenter—the Hebrew peasant who had been born in a certain place, had walked and talked and eaten and slept ; who had finally died and risen, body and soul, from the tomb.

However beautiful and pious might be the substitute offered us, substitutes they were, and not the same thing.

Hence I will most candidly acknowledge that, on this point, the official rulers of the Catholic Church had all the faithful at their back. In other questions they had not ; but in this one they had.

Supposing, then, that these official teachers had possessed, what they did not possess, a keen appreciation of the intellectual and religious crisis. Supposing they had, as a body, been acquainted, as they were not acquainted, with the problems with which the Modernist was dealing. Supposing they had been detached, as they were not detached, from the burden of precedent and traditional habits of autocratic decision. Supposing their eyes had been open, as they were not open, to what was happening in the world. Supposing their hearts had been responsive, as they were not responsive, to the urgent needs of learned and unlearned, strong and

weak—they might then have acted very differently in their treatment of other Modernist problems—but in their treatment of the Christological problem, though their action might have been other than it was, above all as regards the persons concerned, it is, I think, undeniable that their predicament would have been grave and their choice of action difficult. They would have seen (they did not see it) how fatal it was to strike down any one for speaking the truth; they would also have seen (what they did see) how vital a matter it was to preserve intact, as object of faith and worship, the historic as well as the eternal Christ. Much of the traditional theology in regard to Christ might be modified, and it was, in good part, this theology that was causing trouble to the faithful, learned and unlearned alike; but the prayer and worship of the Church hinged on belief in the Divinity of Jesus Christ of Nazareth; and the ecclesiastical authorities were right in their conviction that nothing could be substituted for that belief, so long as that belief was the very kernel of religious faith and worship. Doctrinal development cannot be carried out in obedience to history and science alone; it must respond to religious needs also.

Now, as I have already remarked, Modernism in the Roman Catholic Church dealt with many other problems than this one, whereas in the English Church the Christological problem was, and is, if not the only Modernist problem, at least almost the only one that matters.

The Catholic Church has answered it by not answering it; it has pursued its way, leaving the problem to perish when it was not the faith of the believer that perished in its place.

The English Church has not tried the policy of not answering, nor of slapping the impudent questioner in the face, but neither has it succeeded in giving an answer, for, in spite of all the learning and all the ingenuity that have been expended in the matter, it does seem as though very little advance had been made to any satisfactory solution.

What is to be our religious attitude to Jesus Christ, in his definitely human as well as his divine character? We are determined not to part with Him—but have we found the true way to keep Him?

I think not, and I think the reason we have failed to do so is that our modern apologists have attempted to separate Christ, as object of worship, from the Church in which He is incorporated; to find a satisfactory basis of Christian worship in our conception of Christ alone, and not of Christ as presented to us by the Church.

Now in truth Christ and the Church are indissolubly connected; Jesus Christ is the central object of worship *in the Church*, and not out of it. In point of fact, the thunders of the Roman Catholic Church were directed not so much against criticism itself as against apologetic criticism, the attempt to co-ordinate the claims of religious worship with those of criticism. This fact, though an argument of perversity, is also significant.

What does it signify? It signifies, for one thing, that the Church instinctively, if not consciously, knew that these claims could not be co-ordinated; that there were elements of her doctrine which could not bear the test of criticism because they were not made to bear that test. Theologians are fond of saying that science can never contradict faith; but if they mean by this that faith is calculated to bear the test of science their very anathemas prove the contrary.

The Church is a medium of Divine Revelation; but this Divine Revelation is unfathomable and inexhaustible, while the mind and heart of man are limited. Every word the Church utters is a word of God, but also a word of man; every object of worship she proposes to us is made by man as well as God.

The word must be uttered. Every religion, the purest as the basest, has its inevitable and essential, its *not* regrettable, element of idolatry. There is the paganism of Christianity as well as the paganism of Greek and Roman mythology—pagans we all are, and pagans we all ought to be within a rightful measure. The idols that are forbidden are those that degrade God to earth; the idols essential to all human religion are those that raise man to God.

I cannot believe that, even in the lowest forms of religion, there is not a dim sense of something higher and holier that lies behind and beyond the hideous objects of direct worship. The scientific investigator of savage religions may not discover this element of savage belief; but I think a missionary who was truly familiar with the savage mind, a Mary Slessor of Calabar, would not fail to find it.

Likewise, in the purest religious conceptions to which man has arrived, there is the corresponding idolatrous element; a spiritually and intellectually graven image if not an image graven in stone.

There is no religious conception which has not this human taint; we make God even in the act of worshipping Him, and a religion is spiritual, not in virtue of its immunity from all pagan elements, but in virtue of the spiritual results engendered by this mixed process. The Christ of the critic

who remains a Christian worshipper—the “Christ Éternel,” the “Mystical Christ”—is an idol in so far as the conception is a creation of the critic’s mind.

The Christian Church, then, is a temple, and of this temple the central object of worship is God made manifest in Jesus Christ. God could reveal Himself in other Churches and in other ways, and there is no answer to the gravest intellectual difficulties that beset us Christians so long as we maintain the old attitude of exclusiveness in regard to other religions. In every religion that speaks to the heart of man there must be some element of Divine Revelation; in the expression of every Divine Revelation there must be some human element. Every Church has to serve out its forms of worship as well as its articles of belief; so long as, in that Church, we find and feel the highest teaching of spiritual reality, we accept her doctrine, her discipline, *her objects of worship*; but we accept nothing with the absolutism of finality, because we know that it is only given us to see through a glass darkly. In faith, as in science, the great principle of relativity must be recognised.

God could reveal Himself in other Churches and in other ways—the God of the Christian Church has revealed Himself in that way and no other.

If, therefore, we would worship in that temple, we must worship according to the ways of that temple. As critics our reading of the Gospel may not be the primitive one of Christian faith; as worshippers we accept the external objects proposed for our adoration. Amongst the worshippers around an altar there are all degrees of spirituality—the same professed object will lead the mystic to the highest union with the spiritual world, while the one beside him has risen but little above the grossest form of paganism. But by all alike the objects of worship are accepted along with the Church in which they are incorporated; and the spiritualising process will be in virtue of religious, rather than scientific, progress.

It is hard to speak on this subject without apparent irreverence; because such statements appear scandalous to those who have not realised how humble should be our estimate of every human Church or creed or worship or belief. But, in reality, there is irreverence, though it be unconscious and unwilling, in private and personal attempts to shape a new form of Christian worship, while there is none in the acceptance of essential human limitations in religious belief and worship.

Pagans we all are, and pagans we must ever remain so
VOL. XX.—No. 3.

long as men are men and not angels. There are human beings who seem to need no religious belief at all, and their need for worship expends itself on the idols of science, or art, or politics, or industry; but for those—and they have ever been the normal representatives of humanity—to whom belief in a spiritual world is essential, a corresponding measure of *religious* idolatry is necessary.

In the Catholic Church, with her richly pagan character, the idolatrous instincts of the human heart have freer play than in the Reformed Churches. The English Church is less pagan, though not in every respect the better for that.

Dr Foakes Jackson says truly that "the Anglo-Catholic party was never so strong as it is to-day," and he adds that "it has recognised the need for the element of wonder necessary to religion." He also points out truly that "Modernist Churchmanship in England fails in two respects—it is too rational and also too unscientific; it will have to choose one side or the other, for the fence on which it is now sitting is giving way." The fence gave way very speedily in the Catholic Church, and exodus or silence were the alternatives.

To conclude, then, I think we have come to the point when, so far as the faith and worship of Christ are concerned, we must take or leave. That religious worship should be independent of criticism is not stranger than that art should have other laws than industry. Without a Church to which He is the Word of God, Jesus Christ would soon cease to be an object of religious adoration. We should not long worship the Christ of the critic, even the devout critic, because such conceptions have no true religious background. Christ lives for us in the Church, and whatever He may be to those outside He is for those within the highest manifestation of the Divinity, God made man.

This He can be to us with no outrage to historic or scientific sincerity so long as Christianity, incorporated in the Christian Church, is for us, the highest religious message.

But what we cannot do is to remain in the temple and change its worship, imperfect as that worship may be. The Church has no right to interfere with the march of human science and truth; but she is justified in crying "Hands off!" to those who would maim her ritual and worship. She has changed, she is changing, but it must ever be by a process from within, a process stimulated, it may be, by science or history, but actually initiated and carried forward by the pressure of religious, and not scientific, needs.

M. D. PETRE.

MODERNIST CHRISTOLOGY AND THE PLAIN MAN.

THE BISHOP OF ONTARIO.

THE Church papers which reached me from England last autumn were so full of correspondence containing attacks on the speakers at the Cambridge Conference and their replies to these attacks, that it seemed advisable, if one wished to obtain a correct idea of the position, to read the actual papers in full, as they are given in the Cambridge Conference number of the *Modern Churchman*. This article is an attempt to set forth certain reflections suggested by a careful and interested perusal of these papers. I regret the banality of the title, but can think of no other describing more exactly the point of view from which these remarks are made. In this democratic country, the fact of being a Bishop is no bar to contact and intercourse with all sorts and conditions of men, and the free discussion of every kind of question. One has in fact rather unusual opportunities of learning what the "plain man" thinks about such matters as God and Christ and religion in general.

The object of the writers of the papers delivered at the Cambridge Conference appears to have been to set forth their beliefs as to the Nature and Person of our Lord, seeking only what seemed to them the truth, quite regardless of consequences. If their conclusions could not be exactly squared with the Catholic Creeds, that was not their concern. Some, if not all of them indeed, would earnestly desire a complete revision of those Creeds, so as to bring them into harmony with Modernist thought. They clearly believe that if their views were accepted, and the Creeds revised along the lines suggested by them, serious intellectual difficulties which are hindering thoughtful people from accepting Christianity would be removed.

The devotion to our Lord displayed in these papers is

both impressive and moving. But while making every allowance for different shades of opinion expressed, and granting that the responsibility for these opinions is individual and not collective, I hope I am not doing the writers an injustice in feeling forced to the conclusion that, speaking generally, their Christ is not the Christ of the Christianity that has up till now been preached to the world, and that, without entering into nice distinctions between Deity and Divinity, He is not God in the full sense in which the Catholic Creeds proclaim Him God. And there is raised in one's mind the question, is it possible for them, logically at any rate, to repudiate, as they do, the conclusions of scholars like Dr Lake and Dr Foakes Jackson? Are not these conclusions the inevitable outcome in the long run of their own position? Even if they as individuals can stay permanently at the point they have reached, can they expect others to do so, who have not the same natural devotion to the Person of our Lord as they possess? No doubt, as they affirm, the fear of consequences ought not to deter anyone from the pursuit of truth. But it is just as well to have a clear idea of what those consequences would be. Their attempt to make Christianity more acceptable by mending it would undoubtedly, if their views were to prevail, have the result of ending belief in it altogether for a large number of people.

For the plain man is very much engaged just now in readjusting his ideas about God. He has no doubt about His existence, but the stern realities of the recent upheaval played havoc with his conventional notions regarding the being and nature of God, and he feels that they need revising. The only way for him to effect this revision successfully is to turn to the New Testament, and to build up anew his conception of God on the basis of the revelation of Him in and through Jesus Christ which he finds therein. But, and this is the crucial point, he starts with a pre-conception. If he accepts this revelation of God in and through Jesus Christ, if he is convinced that the Fatherhood of God and the infinite love of God are the very soul, so to speak, of that revelation, it is because he has made the venture of faith, and believes Jesus Christ Himself to be God incarnate. That is why he trusts His revelation of the nature of God so implicitly. He is often well aware of the difficulties connected with this belief, and the problems it involves. Nor does he hold it simply because the Creeds tell him he must, though they have great weight, no doubt, with him as cumulative evidence. He believes, because it is in his opinion the only satisfactory explanation of the facts. And he feels that if

he can believe that Christ is God in the sense in which the Creeds speak of Him as God, he is, that assumption once made, on firm ground. Whereas if Christ were but man, how can you know that He was even the most perfect of men, or why the type of Manhood displayed in Him should be preferred to any other? or His revelation of the nature of God be trusted as infallible? If it be answered that His authority is proved by the experience of multitudes who have surrendered their lives to Him, the answer is ready. In the first place, these multitudes believed Him to be "Very God of Very God"; and secondly, there have always been many quite untouched by His appeal. He can take his belief about God the Father from Christ because he believes Christ to be God the Son, and consequently that God is telling him about God. Of course, he may be mistaken in this belief. But he thinks his venture of faith is more justified by the facts than any other theory professing to explain them.

For most people, the heart of Christianity is the Cross. To the plain man the sacrifice of the Cross is the signal proof that God must be beyond all else a God of love. He has no cut-and-dried theory about Atonement. But he believes that the victim on the Cross was literally the Son of God, and he reasons somewhat in this fashion: God's love for man was so great that He was prepared to make, and did make, the supreme sacrifice for them, even at the risk that that sacrifice might be made without accomplishing His object of proving His love and winning man for Himself—the risk, in short, that it might be completely thrown away. And for many it has been thrown away. It makes no appeal to them at all. But if God was willing to take that tremendous risk to prove His love, then those who understand the sacrifice of the Cross in this way, whatever other doubts they may feel, can never be anything but completely convinced of the love of God, and that in the light of that love all difficulties and apparent inconsistencies can be faced now, and will be ultimately removed. You can, he believes, face any happening, however overwhelming, if you believe that the unchangeable love of God is behind it. That, baldly stated, is his line of reasoning, which may be crude, but is certainly effective.

Holding these views, the plain man is quite satisfied with the Creeds as we have them, and has no wish for a re-statement of them. He does not altogether like the minatory or damnatory clauses of the (so-called) Athanasian Creed, and would prefer a version of it from which they had been eliminated, but he has no objection to its theological terms and definitions. Being a person of some intelligence, he is

aware that human language and human philosophy have their limitations, but believes the interpretation of the facts to be as accurate as can be expected under the circumstances. The truth they convey would not in any way be made clearer to him if re-stated in modern philosophical terms. With regard to the Nicene Creed, he is quite satisfied with its presentation of the facts. When he recites the words "And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, Begotten of His Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, Begotten, not made, Being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made: Who for us men, and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, And was made man," together with all the further statements about our Lord, he is ignorant no doubt of the theological speculations and conflicts of which they are the outcome, and the technical meaning of such a word as "substance" is very likely unknown to him. On the other hand, while he knows perfectly well that the language and ideas of the Creed must be, in the very nature of things, inadequate to express fully the sublime mysteries which they attempt to set forth, yet he feels that they do set forth in a manner about which there can be no mistake the great fact upon which he has staked his whole faith—namely, that Jesus Christ is very God. Some well-meaning people would like him to be troubled by the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. But he refuses to be troubled. It fits in with his conception of Christ as the Son of God, and he considers that the evidence for it is just about as strong as for any other fact concerning Christ. He is well aware that the Ascension into heaven and the Session at the right hand of God can only be symbolical representations of the truths they are intended to convey, but he does not see how those truths could be more effectively set forth if they were translated into language believed to be more in accordance with modern ideas. In short, it is not the language and the philosophy of the Creeds about which he is concerned, but the ideas and beliefs which they enshrine. He is suspicious of change, because he believes, rightly or wrongly, that it is not really the language or the philosophy which is the real root of the objection, but the beliefs themselves. As he desires that these beliefs should be preserved, he is quite satisfied with the Creeds as they stand.

Again, what is called the miraculous element in the Gospels is not the stumbling-block to the plain man to-day, as it was ten, twenty, or thirty years ago. If he does not exactly "believe for the works' sake," this element does undoubtedly

confirm his conception of Christ as being God as well as Man. He knows the mental attitude of the age when they are said to have occurred towards such things, and allows that some of them would perhaps be described differently nowadays. But he sees no reason to doubt, after making all allowances, that the accounts are in the main true, and that things were wrought by this Person which at any time, and at even the most advanced period of human knowledge, would transcend human knowledge and experience. The contact of the Personality of God incarnate with the conditions of human life would, he believes, be certain to produce extraordinary results, and he feels that if this element were eliminated the Central Figure would not only be much less vivid, but also much less convincing. So far from hindering, it helps his belief.

But if he is convinced that Jesus Christ is very God, he is equally convinced that He is very Man. Profound belief in His Deity does not, as a fact, however theoretically likely it might seem, impair in the slightest degree his sense of fellowship with Christ through His Manhood. He believes that as Man Christ shared all human experiences. He also believes that as God He can meet all human needs. How the union took place of the two natures in one personality is beyond him to attempt to explain; in fact, if the question occurs to him at all, he puts it down as one of those mysteries which are not capable of explanation in terms of human thought; it is the fact and not the explanation which in his opinion matters. He would read a book like Glover's *The Jesus of History* with all the more appreciation, because he had as a background the conviction that the Person about whom he was reading was the Son of God as well as the Son of Man. The Deity of Christ does not for him blur the picture of His Manhood, but rather causes it to stand out in greater perfection.

The fact is that the problem of belief with the plain man is much less an intellectual than a moral and ethical problem. It is true that, as I have said, his conventional beliefs about the being and nature of God received a severe shock from recent events. But once he has recovered and reconstituted his faith in the manner I have described, then his difficulty is to harmonise his life with his belief. By himself, he feels that he could hardly attempt to do so. That is where his belief that Christ is God as well as Man helps him. The example of the life of a man believed to possess immeasurably more of the Divine spirit than any other man might stir his admiration, but would be of little assistance to him in his own

difficulties. But the consciousness that he can have in his life the help of God in the Person of the living Christ, Who knows exactly all his needs, and is vitally interested in him personally, is the greatest help to him. The union of God and Man in Christ seems to make Him the ideal helper in the struggle; as Man He knows the well-nigh insuperable difficulties, as God He gives the power at least to strive, and sometimes to overcome.

The plain man is apt to be very reticent about his religious condition and beliefs, and somewhat inarticulate when he tries to explain them. But I believe that I have represented his ideas and outlook with fair accuracy. And he must count, because of his numbers. There are probably very many more of this type than there are Modernists. If the views of the latter prevail to any extent with regard to the true Deity of Christ, these men will be lost to Christianity, for the very foundation of their faith is that Christ is both Perfect God and Perfect Man.

Modernists claim that they are misunderstood, that they are fearlessly seeking for the truth, and endeavouring to help men to free themselves from the chains of obsolete dogma, and to break down the intellectual barriers which they believe stand between them and the acceptance of Christianity. They are inclined to assign the opposition with which they meet to a reactionary, narrow-minded, and obscurantist orthodoxy. There is probably some measure of truth in what they say; conservatism in religious belief is not only the most natural, but in many, if not in most, cases the easiest mental attitude. But it is not the whole truth. There are many who are neither reactionary nor obscurantist, nor narrow-minded, but who are yet convinced that the very foundation stone of Christianity is the belief in the Godhead of Christ as set forth in the Catholic Creeds. If that belief were to go, the disappearance of Christianity as a world force appears to them to be, humanly speaking, only a question of time. Whatever the outcome of the abandonment of this most central belief might be, and by whatever name it were called, it would not be the Christianity that has for centuries been preached to the world, and has so deeply influenced the world. It may be replied that a similar apprehension has been displayed on various occasions in the past, as when, for instance, *Essays and Reviews* was published, or even, in some quarters at any rate, when *Lux Mundi* appeared, and that time has shown such apprehension to be unwarranted. But on this occasion a belief is at stake which is clearly crucial, and naturally those who have made the venture, and

have based their whole faith and life on the belief that Christ is very God, must contend with all their strength for that belief, and they are convinced that that belief and the Modernist conception of Christ, however lofty that conception may be, given the assumption that Christ is not God in the sense in which the Catholic Creeds proclaim Him to be, cannot exist side by side as alternative expressions of faith. They connote an entirely different idea of what Christianity is. Perhaps the members of the Cambridge Conference would not admit that the following quotation from Dr Foakes Jackson's paper, "Christ and the Creeds," applies to them, but at least the frankness of it must have made them think seriously. Speaking of the failure of so-called Liberal Christianity, he says: "Its weakness appears to me to be that it is unhistorical. . . . However eloquent these teachers may be, however elevated their morality, they are preaching something entirely alien from what was once meant by Christianity. They have lost the historical Christ, and have not regained Him by converting Him into a social reformer, a moral legislator, a revealer of a new conception of God. They are really preaching an entirely new religion, and concealing the fact even from themselves by disguising it in the phraseology of the old, which as employed by them is sometimes without meaning." Coming from one holding the views that Dr Foakes Jackson holds, these words are remarkably significant. The final sentence quoted exactly describes the impression left on one's own mind after a very careful study of the Cambridge papers. Learning, sincerity, fearlessness, devotional fervour—all these valuable things are to be found there in abundance; but their Christ, however beautiful and inspiring a figure, is not the historical Christ of the Church and the Catholic Creeds, the Christ to Whom many simple souls still trust themselves entirely, because they believe Him to be in very truth the Son of God, their Saviour and Redeemer.

Modernist Christology may of course be the true explanation of the facts. And to those who breathe the same intellectual and devotional atmosphere as Modernists do it may be a sufficient and sufficing faith, but to the plain wayfaring man it is no sort of substitute for his belief in Him "Who for us men and our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate also for us." Dr Foakes Jackson says, in the paper from which I have already quoted, that there is a growing conviction that Christianity can be ignored, and that men are less and less troubled by religious doubts, not because they have ceased to doubt, but because they are hardly

interested at all in the religious problem. Whatever amount of truth there may be in this somewhat dogmatic diagnosis of the present state of affairs, there is certainly likely to be, unless one is completely mistaken, though for a very different reason from that given by Dr Foakes Jackson, a very large addition to those who ignore Christianity, if, that is to say, Modernist Christology ousts that of the Catholic Creeds. For if you take away from the plain man his belief in the Godhead of Christ, however much you may try to persuade him that no difference is really made by your re-statement, you take away from him the very foundation of his faith and life, and he will be lost to Christianity. That is why those of us who still venture to hold fast to the Christology of the Creeds may appear somewhat unsympathetic to the Modernists. It is because we believe that, as no doubt, *mutatis mutandis*, do they, the spiritual life or death of thousands of men and women depends upon which teaching prevails.

EDWARD J. BIDWELL.

MODERN CHURCHMEN AND UNITARIANS.

REV. S. H. MELLONE, M.A., D.Sc.,

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DURING the last half-century at least, one of the most striking characteristics of religious life, throughout the English-speaking world, has been a movement which has revealed itself in all the communions commonly accounted orthodox, and has taken concrete form in a general advance of religious thought and a demand for theological reconstruction. This movement has had many simultaneous beginnings. No one denomination, sect, or party, no single group of men, can claim as their own peculiar privilege to have originated it or to guide it. What usually takes place is that a number of tendencies which existed already, unexpressed or only casually uttered, become conscious of themselves and their combined mission. This has happened in so many different religious bodies, and from so many different points of view, that there is an accumulating aggregate of unconcerted statements by individual men or groups of men. Among these, the Conference of Modern Churchmen at Cambridge last August has won the attention which its importance warrants. Among innumerable references in pulpit and press, three papers in the last number of this *Journal* are devoted to different aspects of it; and one of them deals with the relation of the movement to Unitarianism.¹ I gladly take the opportunity which is offered me of making some observations on the argument of this most interesting and significant paper. Part of Mr Major's avowed purpose is to show why the Modern Churchmen

¹ "Modern Churchmen or Unitarians?", *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, January 1922, pp. 208-219, by Rev. Henry D. A. Major, B.D., Principal of Ripon Hall, and Editor of *The Modern Churchman*.

"intend to remain" members of the Church of England: they do so in order to win "intellectual freedom within that Church," and also because they hope to contribute ultimately to the formation of a "reformed and rejuvenated Church of England."¹ It is clear that their personal position in that Church is one of which they themselves in the last resort must be the judges. I shall not touch this question, which in any case could only be raised effectively from within the Church of England itself.

Mr Major's principal purpose is to elucidate the views of Modern Churchmen set forth at the Conference by considering the difference between their position and that of the Unitarians. Such a comparison requires adequate acquaintance with the history and literature of the movement known as Unitarian. The various fragments of information which Mr Major has secured are not sufficient for the use he proceeds to make of them.

It is no matter for surprise that Mr Major should find "some difficulty in being quite sure what Unitarianism is or what it stands for precisely" outside its affirmation of freedom.² "Freedom" as a bond of union must convey some positive meaning; and the all-important question is as to the definition of this meaning. This is the chief source of the difficulty felt by Mr Major. The difficulty does not arise only in reference to Unitarianism. It is not due to some distinctive defect present in that movement and absent from others. I dwell on this, not as an *argumentum ad hominem*, but as throwing light on the actual situation. Take the case of Anglicanism. What does the Church of England stand for? It is obvious that no possible answer to the question could cover or include all the particular varieties of belief which may find individual expression: but is there a great central stream of tendency in religious thought, the content of which may be stated in words, and of which we may say, *this* is what the Church of England stands for? In view of the activities of Anglo-Catholics, Evangelicals, and Modernists—who almost seem to need three different types of liturgical service—the question is not an easy one to answer. To answer it is no part of my purpose, even if I were qualified to do so, which I am not. But a comparison with the movement known as Unitarian must be made. Here we have a strong development of independence and freedom of thought, which occasionally leads to mere eccentricities or vagaries on the part of

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 218.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 209.

individuals or groups, in no sense typical or representative. None the less we affirm that there is in this movement a central main stream of tendency, the content of which can be stated, and of which we may say, *this* is what Unitarianism stands for.

This tendency could be defined by the help of quotations. In that case, the quotations would be drawn from James Drummond's *Studies in Christian Doctrine*, from Martineau's *Seat of Authority in Religion* and from several of the papers republished in his four volumes of *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, and from the published sermons and other papers of John James Tayler, John Hamilton Thom, Theodore Parker, and William Ellery Channing. If the question were dealt with on historical lines, the area of quotation would of course be considerably enlarged. No such method of treatment is possible within the limits of this article. The only alternative is to make an independent summary statement which as far as possible shall be free from the "personal equation."

Mr Major tries to apply the contrast of "traditional" and "modern" to Unitarianism itself, and makes it equivalent to the contrast of "deistic" and "theistic." Others have made the same attempt. So understood, the distinction is chronologically and theologically out of touch with the actual facts. What has happened is that Unitarianism, like Protestantism in general, has been involved in that "second Reformation," as I have ventured to call it, which has so profoundly affected all modern beliefs about the Bible. The difference between the early Unitarians and their orthodox Protestant opponents was not as to the authority of Scripture, but as to what beliefs were warranted by Scripture and what were not.¹ For them the Bible was practically and in effect the only infallible rule of faith and life; and their "anti-trinitarianism" and other apparent negations referred only to doctrines not to be found in the Bible or inconsistent with the character of God as revealed therein. The Bible is still with us: no longer an infallible rule, but a unique instrument of religious instruction and inspiration, with the effective working value naturally belonging to a literature moulded by the powerful religious genius of Hebrew prophets and lawgivers and primitive Christian apostles. The sources of religion, once found in infallible books, must now be sought for in human life itself.

As between Modern Churchmen and Modern Unitarians, Mr Major finds a serious difference in their attitude towards

¹ See Alexander Gordon, *Heresy, its Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights* (Essex Hall Lecture), London, Lindsey Press, 1913.

dogma. Modern Churchmen hold that the task of Christian thinkers consists in "the application of criticism to the ancient dogmas in order to disengage their vital principle, and prepare for this vital principle a new expression,"—in setting free their living principle from the decaying form in which it is enclosed, and preparing for it new forms in harmony with modern culture.¹ The Modern Unitarian, on the other hand, applies to dogma only the solvent power of a destructive criticism. The question then is, does Unitarianism, as a matter of method, theory, and principle, necessarily imply this attitude to the traditional dogmas of the Christian Church? I answer that it does not. It is true that much evidence might be produced apparently in favour of Mr Major's statements; but those who are in touch with the actual facts can see that their significance is other than what he takes it to be. The attitude of mere denial is not usually the expression of a general theory about the history of Christian dogma. Sometimes it may be that; and when it is, it can call one of the greatest living authorities on the subject to support the contention that historic Christian dogmas are a superfluous excrescence on the original idea of Christianity, and where not superfluous, positively mischievous.² The present writer does not share this "pessimistic" view of the history of Christian thought; but the point is, that Unitarianism does not necessarily imply it. The reaction against traditional dogmas in their rigid orthodox form is often a reaction against personal experience of their insufficiency for life and their conflict with conscience, reason, and knowledge; and perhaps more often against experience of personal bigotry and intolerance on the part of orthodox men. I need not dwell on these things. No man knows the full extent of the indifference, infidelity, atheism, which has been directly created and promoted by that narrow-heartedness of the bigot which makes his very sincerity hateful.

As to the historic aspect of the question, we may say with the late Phillips Brooks that "it is not conceivable that any Council, however ecumenically constituted, should so pronounce on truth that its decrees should have any weight with thinking men save what might seem legitimately to belong to the character and wisdom of the persons who composed the Council; personal judgment is on the throne, and will remain there,—personal judgment,

¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 211, 215.

² Harnack, *History of Dogma* (Eng. tr.), *passim*; cp. also Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages on the Christian Church*.

enlightened by all the wisdom, past and present, which it can summon to its aid, but forming finally its own conclusions, and standing by them in the sight of God, whether it stands in a great company or stands alone.”¹ The creeds and dogmas of Christendom were not made through mere perversity, through some bias of original sin in man’s intelligence ; they were made first of all in order to give expression to deep convictions about what we are and why we are sent into this world. We banish the idea of finality in doctrine, if indeed it is not already nearly gone ; and we try to break down the limitations and qualifications by which orthodoxy conceals the real meaning of the truths which most of its dogmas embody. We need to universalise the truths which, even in the imperfect forms (as it seems to us) in which it holds them, give to orthodoxy its strength and power over the human heart.

All this opens up the significance of the question which I have stated. What does Unitarianism stand for ? To handle the question, we must make it more precise. What is distinctive of the movement known by that name ? Even this is not precise enough. We limit the question to Unitarianism as a system or method of belief ; we disregard (for the moment) its denominational or institutional side. Several things might be named as distinctive ; but which of these is the most important, the most central and fundamental ? It may be something held by Unitarians and denied by Christendom at large, or vice versa ; or it may be some great belief or principle of religious faith which is at least professed by Christendom at large, and also held by Unitarians : but by them placed, relatively to other principles and problems of faith, in a position different from that in which most churches place it. This second possibility proves to be the reality. Unitarians take the time-honoured distinction, of the essential and the non-essential, and apply it to the problems of faith so radically and thoroughly as to create a distinctive outlook on religion. The non-essential is not necessarily false : it is not despised or rejected : it is to be understood, valued, used,—for what it is worth : but it is never to be used as the essential is used.

The very essence of the Unitarian gospel, the foundation on which the whole structure is built, the binding force which alone gives it whatever cohesion it possesses, is the Fatherhood of God. The Fatherhood of God : not as an object of lip-service, not as a comfortable generalisation to be

¹ See his essay on “Orthodoxy” in the volume entitled *Essays and Addresses*.

listened to, or a vague theme of merely emotional assent : but as a great Ideal, whose meaning demands realisation alike in personal, social, national, and international life : carrying with it, spiritually and even logically, the Divine Sonship and Brotherhood of Man,—and this, once more, not merely as a Truth to be assented to, but as an Ideal to be realised, a task to be achieved.

In human generation or sonship three things are present : bodily form and feeling ; priority of the parent in time ; and unity and continuity of nature—in a sense the parent exists in the child. This third factor is the essential one ; and it is this, apart from the others, that makes possible the use of the term to express the central thought of vital religion. The sonship of every human soul to God is an eternal fact. It is as eternal as the very being of God, of whose nature man is made. Nothing that can come to pass in time can destroy it. But men may and do incur, and may and do inflict on themselves, prolonged and multitudinous miseries through striving to live a life which is not their true life. Being for ever sons of God, they would live as though they were mere creatures of time. The very sense of sonship is almost lost. And on our human world is laid the weariness of an age-long burden of ignorance, suffering, and sin. The great thing needed for our deliverance is that our divine sonship shall be to us not only a truth to be acknowledged, but a reality to be enjoyed. This is the heart of vital religion. But this contact with God—which for want of a better word I have thus called “ enjoyment ”—though it is necessarily individualised, can be no exclusive possession. It must be continuous, pervasive, purposive. Continuous : it is not to be found in any mere moments of ecstasy. Pervasive : there is no place where God can be left out ; in buying and selling, something in what you give or receive is part of the price of a human soul ; and to neglect that, is to leave God out. Purposive : it must have an object—the moral transformation of the world by means of the transformation of individuals. Whatever else it may be, this is no cheap and easy gospel. None the less we affirm that it is the first among the essential things.

It is a gospel which prompts our rational nature to raise questions, theological, philosophical, even speculative. To these questions some of the greatest minds of our race have devoted earnest thought : and the historic creeds of Christendom offer answers. Neither the questions nor the answers are to be despised or neglected ; but they belong to the non-essentials. They are to be understood, valued, used,—for what they are worth : but never to be used as the

essential thing is used. And to use them to divide and exclude from one another men who are at one in the essential thing, is to sin against the light.

Modern Churchmen affirm that "the Fatherhood of God alone" is not a sufficient basis for the Christian Church. What is meant by "alone"? Unitarians, though they dare to dispense with infallible persons and infallible books, do not attempt to construct "first principles" abstractly or, as it were, *in vacuo*, in detachment from history and experience:

"To insist that Religion shall owe nothing to the past," said Martineau, "or that it shall be the same as if there were no history; to demand that each shall find it for himself *de novo*, as if he were the first man and the only man; to rely, for its truth or its progress, on its perpetual personal reproduction in isolated minds—is to require terms which the nature of man forbids and the Providence of God will disappoint. Transmitted influence from soul to soul, whether among contemporaries or down the course of time, is not only as *natural*, but as *spiritual*, as the direct relation of each worshipper to God. . . . The whole world is held together by like forces of natural reverence, grouping men in ten thousand clusters round centres diviner and more luminous than themselves: and if every family, every tribe, every sect, may have its head and representative, excelling in the essential attributes that constitute the group, what hinders this law from spreading to a larger compass, and giving to *mankind* their highest realisation, superlative in whatever is imitable and binding?"¹

The Fatherhood of God is the essence of the Galilean Gospel. Jesus of Nazareth, so far as our knowledge goes, first made of the Fatherhood of God not merely an idea but a force in life. It is the influence of his personality and teaching that makes the New Testament to-day the richest mine of moral inspiration and insight that has been given to the world.² In confessing the ideals which are central in the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth, we acknowledge his leadership. But the philosophical interpretation of what that leadership implies in reference to his personality—and it is this kind of interpretation which largely occupies the historic creeds of Christendom—this, we affirm, is for religion not primary but secondary. The declaration that "Jesus is God" is rejected

¹ *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. iii. pp. 34, 57.

² Compare Mellone, *The New Testament and Modern Life*, London, Lindsey Press, 1921.

by Unitarians as being historically false and philosophically inconceivable. At the best, it can only be understood in Ritschlian fashion as a "judgment of value": and then it leaves room for interpretations as many and various as are the ways in which the central Figure in the Gospels makes his appeal to the souls of men. I can state the conclusion in Mr Major's own words:—

"There is no single Christology that is so authoritative that it alone must be held in the Christian Church, and which demands that the teacher of any other Christology shall be faced with the alternatives of recantation or deprivation. . . . It is not ecclesiastical authority, but the *consensus fidelium*, the growing consciousness of worshipping, practising, and thinking Christians that must decide which, if any, of the competing Christologies is to become the dominant one in the Church's faith. This is a slow process, and in the best sense of that much misused word it is a *democratic* process."¹

"What think ye of Christ?" The question was never more vital than it is to-day. A typical Unitarian answer is given in the words of Theodore Parker's hymn:—

"O thou great Friend to all the sons of men,
Who once appeared in humblest guise below,
Sin to rebuke, to break the captive's chain,
And call thy brethren forth from want and woe!

We look to thee; thy truth is still the light
Which guides the nations, groping on their way,
Stumbling and falling in disastrous night,
Yet hoping ever for the perfect day.

Yes! thou art still the Life; thou art the Way
The holiest know;—Light, Life, and Way of heaven!
And they who dearest hope, and deepest pray,
Toil by the light, life, way, which thou hast given."

This is a confession of the religious value of Jesus; it is an acknowledgment of his leadership. But a Christology as a formed and fixed theological conception, as it were a *definition* of the personality and power of Jesus, is a conception of another kind. It raises questions of history, psychology, philosophy. It shares the imperfection of all human definitions. It cannot belong to the things which are for religion essential.

¹ *The Modern Churchman*, September 1921, p. 199.

This brings us directly to the doctrine of the Incarnation. The doctrine is referred to here, not in order to discuss it adequately, or to develop the form in which, for example, the present writer would be disposed to defend it :¹ but in order to show that the doctrine from its very nature cannot be classed among the essentials.

Modern Churchmen, says Mr Major, hold the essence of the doctrine of the Incarnation as expressed in the Pauline phrase, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself."

"The Modern Churchman feels that the Unitarian conception of Christ is one which, if adopted by Christians generally, would enormously lower the vitality and saving power of the Church. . . . Whenever and wherever the Christian Church has made little of Jesus Christ, it has failed as a saving power. Whenever and wherever the Christian Church has made much of Him, it has been vital and vigorous."²

These are serious statements, and must be brought to the bar of logic and of fact. Unfortunately, the meaning of the most important words, on which their force depends, is left in doubt. What is the "Unitarian valuation of Christ" which is thus destructive of moral and spiritual energy? What is meant by "making much" of Christ or "making little" of him? What is meant by "saving power"? During the last ten years events have taken place which will not soon be forgotten: and the Church, which for twenty centuries has placed the Pauline phrase or its equivalent in the forefront of her teaching, was no more capable of influencing the course of events than a cork floating on the waves could divert the currents that carry it. The impotence of the Church is an astounding fact in the modern world. Is this because "much" or "little" has been "made" of Christ?

I cannot resist the feeling that in this passage Mr Major has been unconsciously affected by the spirit of some of his own opponents in the Church of England. I appeal to his own words in the introductory article to the Conference number of *The Modern Churchman*. After explaining that there is not a vast gulf between the Divine nature and human nature; that God and man are akin; that God reveals himself to man not through the abnormal but through the normal ("with the eye of faith He is seen . . . supremely in human personality"), the author proceeds:—

¹ The writer may be permitted to refer to a pamphlet of his own, *Athanasius the Modernist*, London, Lindsey Press, 1912.

² HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1922, p. 213.

“ It is these convictions which lead the modernist to believe in a perfectly human and non-miraculous Christ, but yet a Christ no less truly Divine. And the modernist holds that in the light of historical and scientific research this Gospel of the Divine Humanity is not only more credible to the modern mind, but presents a more adequate conception of the Incarnation than does the medieval view.”

The author then dwells concisely on two difficulties. It is urged that if we suppose the difference between God and man to be one of degree and not of kind, we are inevitably led to pantheism. In reply, it is shown that we avoid the evil of pantheism as soon as we recognise the Ideal not merely everywhere but *somewhere*. It is urged, again, that modernism diminishes the religious value of Christ by making him in all things (except sin) too much like other men, and losing his uniqueness. This, substantially, is the “mere man” argument, so familiar to Unitarians. Mr Major’s reply is as follows :—

“ The human being’s defect does not lie in his *essential nature*, but in his weak and perverted will, in his failure to recognise his sonship to God, and, even when he has recognised that sonship, in his failure to live as a son of God should.”

I have made these quotations because in spirit and substance they are closely akin to characteristic utterances of all the leading Unitarian thinkers whom I have named above. Martineau’s attitude is specially noteworthy ; because, while these principles evidently appealed to him and seemed to him to be of real religious importance, they fall into the background in his technical philosophical treatises. None the less he repeatedly dwells on them in letters to friends ; they are many times set forth in the *Seat of Authority*, especially in the great central chapter on “ Natural and Revealed Religion ” ; and in his ninetieth year were repeated once more, in a plea for the extension of the Incarnation idea from *the person of Christ* to the *nature of man*.¹

It may fairly be urged that the very word Incarnation is an awkward Latinism, that no corresponding word is used by the Greek Fathers, and that the religious truths which are involved could be better expressed by avoiding the word

¹ *Life and Letters of James Martineau*, vol. ii. p. 481.

altogether. Martineau, for example, did not often use it.¹ He perceived, of course, that the same thought could be expressed in different ways : thus—

“ I can find no rest in any view of Revelation short of that which pervades the Fourth Gospel . . . that it is an appearance, to beings who have something of the divine Spirit within them, of a yet diviner without them, leading them to the divinest of all, which embraces them both.”²

The “ worship of Jesus,” advocated by Modern Churchmen, is a difficult subject to handle, because “ worship ” may mean various and very different things. Mr Major appears to contemplate liturgical adoration of Christ in public worship, and prayer addressed to him. And where such worship of Jesus is excluded, the Modern Churchman feels “ the chilling influence of a great negation.”³ What is the negation ? It can only be that Jesus is a “ mere man.” But Unitarians believe that if there is no such thing as a “ mere man ”—if the very phrase implies an anti-Christian view of human nature—still it does not in the least follow that worship of Jesus is justifiable. The question is too full of psychological issues to be discussed here. I can only add that the essay by Martineau on “ A Way out of the Trinitarian Controversy,”⁴ to which Mr Major refers in this connection, is almost unique among Martineau’s writings, in that its precise drift is far from clear : and in any case, it is a serious error to suppose that he ever advocated “ Christ-worship.”

This brings us to the remaining fundamental doctrine of theology over which Modern Churchmen find themselves diverging definitely from Unitarianism : that of the Trinity. It is not to my purpose to discuss the various possible meanings which may be put into the Trinitarian formula. I only seek to show that one class of such meanings is entirely consistent with Unitarian theism, and that in any case the whole question, so far from being primary and essential, is not even of secondary importance.

Unitarian theism, taken in its narrowest and most technical sense, implies at least the *unipersonality* of Deity

¹ The passage referred to above occurs in a review of the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour’s *Foundations of Belief*, which was published in *The Nineteenth Century*, April 1895.

² *Life and Letters*, vol. i. p. 131. Martineau adds that this view is everywhere implicated in the folds of the *Logos* doctrine.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 216.

⁴ Reprinted in *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, vol. ii.

as against *tripersonality*. The traditional doctrine of the Trinity attempts to affirm tripersonality. This conception, or attempted conception, is thus characterised by a distinguished modern thinker :—

“ Few things are more disheartening to the philosophical student of religion than the way in which the implications of the doctrine of the Incarnation are evaded in popular theology by dividing the functions of Deity between the Father and the Son, conceived practically as two distinct personalities or centres of consciousness, the Father perpetuating the old monarchical ideal and the incarnation of the Son being limited to a single historic individual. Grosser still, however, is the materialism which has succeeded in transforming the profound doctrine of the Spirit, as the ultimate expression of the unity and communion of God and man, into the notion of another distinct Being, a third centre of consciousness mysteriously united with the other two.” ¹

I quote this passage not because I personally believe it to be conclusive (as I do), but in order to suggest the question whether a doctrine, which really needs to be defended against such a criticism from the side of philosophy, can possibly be regarded as belonging to the essentials of the Christian faith? But this is not all. It may be asked, with some reason, whether the history of Christian doctrine does not show that, in attempting to affirm tripersonality, the Church has wavered between an extension of Arianism with its triad of individuals, and an extension of Sabellianism with its triplicity of functions.² The latter type of interpretation is evidently the more philosophical; and, as a matter of fact, philosophically minded theologians usually gravitate towards it. But it is not a doctrine of three persons, three individualised centres of consciousness, in one God. It is a doctrine of three fundamental orders of self-revelation or self-expression on the part of Deity in relation to the world. The doctrine of the Trinity advocated by Mr Major appears to be of this type :³ though its precise drift will, I think, be clearer when

¹ Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God* (Gifford Lectures), second edition, p. 410.

² Cp. Dr B. H. Streeter, “The Suffering of God,” *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, April 1914 : “So far as the imagination of the Church is concerned, it is really the Arian who has triumphed.”

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 216 (quotation from Ménégoz). For an earlier statement, see a striking sermon by Canon Wilberforce, printed in the *Christian World Pulpit*, 10th June 1896, and quoted in Mellone, *Converging Lines of Religious Thought* (London, Lindsey Press), pp. 108-4.

the Modern Churchmen explain their view of the historic difficulty of Trinitarianism—the relation and distinction between God the Eternal Son and God the Holy Spirit.

None the less a Trinitarianism of the modernised “Sabelian” type may be actually stated as a definition of Unitarian theism. The Father is God as the Source of all being, the Infinite and Eternal on whom all things depend; the Son is Humanity, “begotten of the substance of the Father,” between whom and the Father there is neither a “division of substance” nor a “confusion of persons”; the Spirit is God revealing himself in Humanity as the Inspirer of our higher life. Humanity, including Jesus Christ, is the Word made flesh; and the deepest and inmost in man is the self-utterance of God. This is Unitarian theism: stated indeed, as I purposely have stated it, in terms of some of the conceptions made famous by the Creeds, but true to the type represented by Martineau, by Drummond, and by others whom I have named, each in his way. In our finite nature, personality is found to embrace the deepest differences within the most intense unity: and therefore the very idea of an Infinite Personality must imply an infinite manifoldness and variety of operation, absolutely unified. If then this manifoldness of operation, in relation to the world, takes a threefold form, we get a conception of Deity which may be called trinitarian but is not tripersonal. The Unitarian contention is that while such a formulation of theism may be philosophically sound, it is not essential. Everything of religious importance in it is secured by insistence on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit: in other words, the reality and constancy of immediate divine self-revelation and immediate divine inspiration. One of the great historic failures of Christian theology, I venture to believe, is found here: that theologians, in their eagerness to exalt Christ to the throne of Deity, have been largely blind to the immeasurable religious value and profound philosophical significance of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

What is our immediate conclusion from all this? Here is a doctrine which in its traditional form is liable to “ludicrous, not to say devastating, misunderstandings,” and involves “antiquated and ambiguous definitions” and “seemingly self-contradictory affirmations”: and which, when rationalised, is found to be fully compatible with Unitarian theism, but to have mainly a philosophical or speculative interest. To make such a doctrine into a test by which men who are at one in the essential things shall be divided and excluded from one another, is to sin against the light.

I have not argued that the Modern Churchmen ought to "come out" and join the Unitarian or any other denomination. I have argued that if his position is to be compared with that held by Unitarians, it is desirable to apprehend accurately the main features of the Unitarian movement, as a method and principle of belief: and I have tried to show, so far as it is possible within the present limits, what those main features are.¹

One aspect of the case, however, remains untouched. Mr Major refers to Unitarianism on its "institutional side," and questions whether it will "command the future." The denominational defects of Unitarianism are many and are confessed,—confessed often with a frankness which puzzles those who do not know the movement from the inside. A denomination is not necessarily in a dying or decadent condition because it dares to discuss its difficulties in public. And it does not follow that the religious thought of a denomination is to be tested by the numbers or even by the cohesion of its membership: if that were so, it would seem, by the rules of elementary logic, that the true theology must be that which is distinctive of the Church of Rome. Need it be pointed out that the religious thought of a denomination is scarcely ever the sole cause affecting the cohesion or the extent of its membership? In the case of the movement known as Unitarian, its past history has stamped certain characteristics on its life. Our fathers were forced into exile by exclusion from the larger historic churches of Christendom; and this, together with our subsequent denominational history, has infused a certain habit of mind. It is the habit of independent judgment, of bringing opinions to the bar of a sturdy common-sense, of proving all things and holding fast that which is good. The men trained in these congregations have learnt to think reverently, but to trust their own reason and stand on their own feet. I mention these qualities not in order to dwell on their value, but to point out that these qualities do not easily lend themselves to the creation of that consciousness of common life which instinctively demands corporate union in "a Church." But the question of what Church will "command the future" is a

¹ The position of the Modern Churchmen in the Anglican Church appears to raise an important question (not personal) about the Creeds. The official Creed of a church is surely intended to be a bond of union: otherwise, why maintain it? But if the Creeds are to be interpreted as freely as Modern Churchmen assume they can be, and different competing interpretations of the same Creed are to "grow together until the harvest," surely the *raison d'être* of the Creed is gone.

question which all of us in our wiser moods will let alone. No one need grudge the Anglican, the Presbyterian, the Congregationalist, the Wesleyan, the Baptist, or any other man, any satisfaction to be derived from believing that one day *his* church will embody the world's universal and eternal faith. Once Martineau himself was speaking of this dream : " Happy and complacent belief ! Held, and disappointed, by every sect in turn, with respect to its own creed, yet living and fervent still ! Needful, perhaps, to maintain the zeal of successive generations, yet surely maintaining it on an illusion."

The Hebrew prophet, in a grand world-picture, delineates the disappearance of the great conquerors and kings of earth, one by one, into the world of the dead : and as each one descends, the shades of departed potentates greet him with a wondering question : " Art thou also become weak as we ? Art thou become like unto us ? " There is a world of the dead, where the shades of dead creeds, and theologies, and man-made systems dwell. Into that world all our little schemes of thought will go : the latest and newest, at last, will travel there :

" They are but broken lights of Thee ;
And Thou, O Lord, art more than they."

The consciousness of all this points to the reason why Unitarians, " to a greater extent than larger and less mentally alert bodies of Christians," are " open to the manifold influences of modern science, sociology, and psychology."¹ Their task is not an easy one ; but they believe it is their appointed task. It was defined many years ago by Martineau, with an insight extending far beyond the occasion. In 1838, shortly before the coronation of the young Queen Victoria, he attended a meeting called by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association, and moved the following resolution :— " That this meeting, in professing its attachment to Unitarian Christianity as at once scriptural and rational, and conducive to the true glory of God and well-being of man, and in avowing its veneration for the early British expositors and confessors of this faith, at the same time recognises the essential worth of that principle of free inquiry to which we are indebted for our own form of Christianity, and of that spirit of deep and vital religion which may exist under various forms of theological sentiment, and which gave to our forefathers their implicit faith in truth, their love of God, and

¹ HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1922, p. 210.

their reliance, for the improvement of mankind, on the influences of the gospel.”¹ In this resolution, three main points are emphasised :—

(1) That Unitarian Christianity is scriptural, rational, and conducive to the true glory of God and well-being of man.

(2) That there is something greater than Unitarian Christianity ; and that is the spirit of fearless free inquiry, without which Unitarian Christianity could never have come to be.

(3) That there is something greater even than Unitarian Christianity and free inquiry ; and that is the spirit of deep and vital religion which may exist under many different forms of doctrinal belief.

The union of these three ideals is a hard task to achieve. The first by itself yields the mere protest of an isolated body, the creed of a sect against other sects, the dogmatism of a minority. The second by itself yields a vague and formless freedom with no content of positive meaning. The third by itself yields a religion which ignores the need of coherent thought to give unity to the emotions and guidance to the will. Sundered thus from each other, even these ideals fail. United, they yield the rising vision of another Church, in whose upbuilding Unitarians believe they have their appointed part, though its life will be too vast and rich to be called by any of the names which now are familiar to our ears ; a Church that will not discard the objective help of historic religion, embodied in the supreme personality of Christ, realising in its highest historic form the relation between God and man ; a Church thus wise to gather to herself all the best truth that old times have won, but never seeking to build religion on a dogmatic theological idea, and for ever strong to watch, with forward look, for the light that is still to rise from the unspent deep things of God ; a Church whose one demand of all her children is, that they shall be pure in heart, and whose worship is built on one great motive of thought and action, “ Glory to God alone ! ”

S. H. MELLONE.

¹ See J. Estlin Carpenter, *James Martineau, Theologian and Teacher* (London, Lindsey Press), p. 222.

THE RELIGIOUS TEACHING OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS IN ITS RELATION TO JUDAISM.¹

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

My title is cumbrous: perhaps, too, a little unclear, and apparently a trifle disingenuous, as regards its last two words. What is meant by Judaism? Is it the Judaism of the first half of the first century after Christ, or the Judaism of all the ages, or the Judaism of to-day? Mainly the first; but I leave the matter a little vague on purpose, in order to make such references as I please.

Yet though I want some vagueness for myself, I do not like the vagueness of the average Jew and the average Christian as regards this same term "Judaism." The average Christian tends to give one or other of the following two meanings to the word. For him, Judaism is the religion which, more or less dimly and unconsciously, he constructs for himself out of what he reads in the Gospels and Epistles. It is rather a disagreeable sort of religion, chiefly made up of antitheses and contradictions to the religious teaching of Jesus. Or, Judaism is for him the Jewish religion as, more or less roughly and unconsciously, he weaves it together from what he knows or remembers of the Old Testament. He does not realise that there was a considerable difference between the "Jewish religion" of even B.C. 300 and the Jewish religion of B.C. 30. Still less does he realise that in the Old Testament there are contained not one "Jewish religion," but a dozen "Jewish religions."

On the other hand, the average Jew, half unconsciously, interprets the word "Judaism" to mean the religion which he himself believes in. Judaism is *his* Judaism.

¹ A lecture given to a combined meeting of the Students' Christian Union and the Jewish Students' Union at Manchester on 2nd February 1922.

Hence come misunderstandings. Here is a very blunt and broad one. The Old Testament practically knows nothing of a resurrection, or of a life of joy and retributory unhappiness beyond the grave. The New Testament is full of it. Sometimes, therefore, the doctrine of the resurrection life, with all which follows from it, is regarded as if it were a specifically Christian or New Testament doctrine, whereas it is a doctrine common to the Gospels and to the Judaism of the age.

Again, the average Jew to-day believes in an impartial God; he strongly disbelieves in Hell and in eternal punishment. Hence if the universalism of Paul is alluded to, he says, "Judaism teaches a universalism still more complete." Perhaps *his* Judaism does, but he does not ask, "Did the Judaism of 30 or 50 A.D. teach it?" He contrasts the apparent teaching of Jesus in such a passage as Matt. xxv. 41, 46, and he says, "Judaism abhors and denies such teaching"; and so doubtless *his* Judaism does, but he does not consider that whether the Judaism of 30 A.D. abhorred and denied it is a wholly different question.

Once more—and here my own elastic use of the word "Judaism" comes in pat,—it is improper to make violent contrasts between the religious teaching of the Gospels and that of Judaism (to the discredit of the latter), if it can be shown that, along its own lines and by its own development, Judaism arrived at much the same teaching, or at very similar teaching, even though cast in a different form, and even though we know of no illustrations and evidence of such teaching before the second, third, or even fourth century A.D. It is perfectly legitimate to claim priority for the Gospels; but to make a sharp contrast, as if the very essence of the Gospels consisted in such teachings, and as if the essence of Judaism consisted in their negations or opposites, is unscientific and improper.

May one go to Jesus himself, and find out from him what was the relation of his teaching to the Judaism of his age? Does he not clearly indicate, or at least imply, where his teaching differed, not merely from the practice, but from the doctrines, of the Jews among whom he lived, and also where it agreed with them? This is not an improper course to pursue, but it must be done with caution. For a great prophet, teacher, reformer, may, I fancy, make mistakes in two directions. He may think that there are differences when there are not; he may also think that there are no differences when there are. He may think the first, because, in the heat of conflict and antagonism, he

may exaggerate, or he may imagine that the perversion of a *few* is the only doctrine known to *all*; while, on the other hand, he may regard his own new teaching as the real, true, old, and original doctrine, which has been temporarily obscured by bad and incompetent teachers.

Thus, to take a well-known example, it is not easy to say how far Amos and Hosea were innovators and original; how far they taught doctrines which were entirely new, and had never been taught before. From their books alone one might be at some loss to decide.

Nevertheless, if one reads the Gospels with care and caution, certain results seem to emerge. If one puts aside conflicts and differences of view as to his own person or authority, or as to his own Messianic claims, or as to the powers of healing or forgiveness of sins, the quarrels of Jesus with the Jews of his age, and more especially with the Pharisaic Rabbis, were not about the nature of God, His unity, His justice, His mercy; they were about the Law and its authority, and about the relation of outward ceremonial to morality, of ritual ordinances to spiritual religion. The *whole* difference between his teaching and theirs is not, indeed, comprised in those two little words "the Law"; but all the conflict seems to start from them. It widens out from them, and never leaves them very far.

Apart from this conflict about the Law (and apart from the question of Jesus himself, his powers, his authority, and his claims), an average Rabbinic Jew of, say, 200 A.D. could, I fancy, have read the Synoptic Gospels without *often* saying to himself, "I wholly disagree with this teaching," or, again, saying, "I like this teaching, but I find it very strange." He might have said that a few times, but I do not fancy he would have said it often. Occasionally, I think (if he had been an impartial sort of Jew), he would have said, "This teaching seems to carry us forward; it appears to me to be original."

With these views, it is only consistent that the term "Prophet," as used about Jesus here and there in the Synoptics, should seem to me true and significant. The line of Prophets which began with Amos seems after a long interval (though Jesus wrote nothing) to be resumed again in him. His teaching links on with theirs.

Now, assuredly an essential feature of the Prophetic teaching was the futility of outward religion. "I desire love and not sacrifice." "New moon and Sabbath I cannot endure; fasting and festal gathering my soul hates." Such doctrine was startling enough in the eighth century B.C.,

but it must have been much more startling in the age of Jesus. For the divine Law, the written code of God, universally accepted as such in the first century A.D., but unknown and non-existent in the eighth century B.C., orders and prescribes all these things very earnestly.

Thus the teaching of Jesus as regards the Law, though not entirely clear, or theoretically laid down as a consistent and harmonious whole, nevertheless forms a new departure, and makes a break from the Judaism of his age. Already in his time there were two Laws, one written and one oral: the first universally regarded as perfect, homogeneous, Mosaic, inspired through and through, and absolutely authoritative; the second—the Rabbinic interpretations of, and additions to, the first,—generally regarded as binding, venerable, and holy. Jesus appears to distinguish markedly between the two. He appears to waive aside the second somewhat summarily, and to apply to these Rabbinic fencings and entanglements the dissolvent of common sense and of a certain caustic irony. The written Law he never denies—how could he with the knowledge at his command?—to be Mosaic or inspired; but yet, when he was confronted with actual problems of life which its observance raised, he seems to treat it with considerable freedom. In the marriage question he applies to it the theory, long afterwards revived by Maimonides as regards the sacrificial system, that divorce was a temporary concession made by Moses on account of the hardness of men's hearts. But much more important is his attitude in respect to the laws concerning the Sabbath, forbidden foods, and ritual uncleanness. For the Law does not enjoin divorce: it permits it; but to light a fire and collect sticks upon the Sabbath, or to eat rabbits and hares, is a sin for all, and forbidden to all, while certain things and actions make everybody, under certain conditions, unclean. Now, Jesus does undoubtedly say things and enunciate principles which are in obvious contradiction and opposition to one whole section and theory of the Law—the section and theory of ritual purity and impurity and of disallowed foods: he does not, indeed, fully draw out the consequences of his words and principles, but to do so was only another and easy stage in the process of separation from the Judaism of his age. And he also says things which are in opposition to the whole principle of fixed and immutable ordinances concerning Sabbath observance, though not to the principle of the Sabbath and its rest. He holds the outward to be at best a mere servant of the inward, and when the inward requires it, the outward must yield and be abandoned.

Thus we have no reason to believe that he would have desired to abrogate the yearly fast upon the Day of Atonement, but he clearly held all fasting very cheap. He cared little for fixed rules and hours for prayers. We have no reason to suppose that he was against public worship—synagogue services at fixed hours,—but he did not regard the observance of them as an end in itself. The *opus operatum* in religion was abhorrent to him; he needed it not; he needed no reminder or stimulus for prayer; God was always in his mind.

Thus, in quite other, and much more difficult, circumstances, making his words and actions more revolutionary, Jesus takes up anew the *rôle* of the Prophets, and in his intense insistence upon the inward and the moral in opposition to the outward and the ceremonial, he becomes out of relation to the Judaism of his age.

Not that—let us be clear about this—the Rabbis of the first or of any later century put moral and ceremonial on the same footing. These are the men who made Isaiah lviii. the first prophetic lesson for the Day of Atonement, and the Book of Jonah the second. These are the men who clearly explained that it was not their fasting or their sackcloth which brought forgiveness to the Ninevites, but that they turned from their evil works, and mended their wicked ways. Nevertheless, these Rabbis could not go so far as Jesus. It is only Liberal Judaism of to-day which can go with him the whole distance. For the very men who set these lessons for the Day of Atonement, or said these things about Jonah, would have been horrified if any disciple of theirs, or, indeed, if any Jew, had not observed every detail of Sabbath observance, or had eaten a rabbit or a hare. They could not quote, “I desire love and not sacrifice,” as Jesus does; they could not reject the entanglements of the Oral Law. They could not use in these ritual details the dictates of common sense. The Law was too insistent and too clear. It was too undoubtedly divine in every word and enactment: their minds were too logical and too dependent.

When, however, we turn from the Law and its observance, and from the relation of the outward to the inward, of the ceremonial to the moral, the agreement between Jesus and the Rabbis is much closer, the dissonance is much less marked.

Jesus was a Jew who never dreamed of founding a new religion; he only wanted to reform and purify the religion of his fathers. He was a Jew who had absorbed (and started from) all the best teaching, (and a little of the second best), of the generations which had preceded him. It may well be that his realisation of the divine presence and fatherhood

was more intense and constant than that of any of his contemporaries ; therefore his verbal expression of that realisation may have been more passionate, beautiful, intimate, and far-reaching than theirs. Yet what he said about these and similar matters was not in conflict with their views, nor were theirs in conflict with his. His views were theirs raised to a very high point of purity, depth, and intensity, and theirs were his on a lower level and at less passionate heat.

There are, therefore, many passages in the Gospels which seem to be, and indeed assuredly are, intensely characteristic of the Gospels and of the teaching of Jesus, and which yet are perfectly "Judaic." They are Jewish teaching beautifully and profoundly expressed, perhaps also carried forward, intensified, and rounded off, but perfectly "Jewish" in spirit, and often Jewish in letter.

"Jewish" is not synonymous with Old Testament, though the teaching referred to is not in opposition to the best teaching of the Old Testament. "Jewish" in this context means Rabbinic, but not necessarily "Rabbinic of the first century." The question is rather whether the teaching is in broad agreement and harmony with the general line and tendency of the best Rabbinic teaching as a whole. And the answer must be that the teaching, outside the subject of the Law, *is* in such *general* agreement. Thus, to give a few examples, the teaching about repentance, or secret alms, or the widow's mite, or about forgiving your neighbour, or the beam and the mote, or the goodness of God, is in general harmony with the best Rabbinic doctrine. The passages in question may be the best examples of that doctrine which could be found : some of them may even raise the doctrine a rung or two in the scale of excellence, but the *general* harmony is unquestionable. Nor, I fancy, would absolute impartiality find that superiority, if superiority there be, is always and *invariably* on the side of the Gospels. There are, for instance, finer things about repentance in the Rabbinic literature than are to be found in the Gospels.

But the harmony is not complete. Even excluding the Law, it does not extend to every subject dealt with in the Synoptics. There are differences as well as agreements. These differences partly proceed from the eager, passionate, forthgoing character of the teaching of Jesus. They may be found in his attitude towards sin and sinners ; in a certain bias against riches and in favour of poverty ; in the demand for utter devotion and complete abnegation and self-sacrifice ; in the rejection of the nobility and necessity of a superior

class of learned persons devoting themselves to the study of the Law, and in the substitution of a class of servants of society and of society's outcasts and waifs and strays; in the refusal to oppose force by force, in the attitude towards the enemy; in the conception, and in the demand, of seeking out and redeeming the sinner; in certain objections to the doctrines of merit and reward and of tit for tat, and, perhaps, in some aspects of forgiveness and the cure of sin.

The ethical teaching of the Synoptic Gospels is eager, paradoxical, high strung; the ethical teaching of the Rabbis is pure and good, but, on the whole, more pedestrian, and, in some respects, more suited to ordinary folk and every day. The Rabbis, for example, were anxious to relieve the poor and the suffering, but they did not enunciate an ideal of giving up all one's possessions and all one's time to such relief. Rabbinic ethics are full of delicate feeling; they lay stress on some fragrant virtues which are not mentioned in the Gospels, but they are less clamorous for the entire life, for utter and complete self-denial and self-sacrifice. Jesus is insistent on the utmost; all is to be staked for the Highest, and this Highest is conceived indifferently as the welfare and saving of others, or as the welfare and saving of one's own soul. It turns out to be one or the other, or both.

The morality of the Rabbis implies a small and settled society, which is to continue; it sets before its readers rules and commands which are to be carried out in their entirety. The morality of the Gospel sets forth ideals: the reach is to exceed the grasp; it proclaims principles which can never be attained or realised, or which can only be attained and realised by a very few.

Yet it may be questioned whether the Synoptic Gospels often urge us to do something which the Rabbis would strongly urge us not to do. In some cases they would not urge us to do it, but that is very different from urging us not to do it. Thus, for instance, the love of enemy as enjoined by Jesus is not really in opposition to the best Old Testament and Rabbinic teaching (I here refer to a man's own private "enemy," and not to the enemy of his party, his nation, or his religion). But it screws up that teaching to its highest point and to the *n*th degree, and it makes a principle of it—a principle, moreover, of the broadest and most sweeping kind.

The ethics of the Rabbis tell us what, in average and ordinary life, we ought to do and not to do: the ethics of the Synoptic Gospels set up before us a lofty ideal of service, demanding the whole man and complete self-surrender. "He who would follow after me, let him deny himself, and

take up his cross and follow me." Rabbinic teaching would also demand absolute self-sacrifice and martyrdom, if the necessity arose and the law of God required it; the teaching of Jesus appears to ask for such absolute self-surrender even when the necessity does not arise, of a man's free choice, because it is the Highest, and for the sake of soul and neighbour and Christ.

Thus, too, it is not merely declared that if you *want* to be the foremost and the first, you must be last of all and servant of all, but it is implied that this is the ideal and utterly desirable. To be "worthy" of Jesus one must risk all for the Highest, and all lower duties must be foregone for that Highest. It is noble doctrine, but perilous, for peradventure the quest of the Highest may not be for you, and lower duties may be mistakenly abandoned.

The situation must be remembered. Jesus believed that the end of the old world order was at hand. There was no time for half-measures, and no need to prepare for the morrow. To hoard riches was absurd. Yet besides this motive, we must also recognise the bias against wealth. Mammon is the enemy. Covetousness is the greatest danger for the soul. The Rabbis (unlike many of the Psalmists) had no such bias against wealth. Some of the great Rabbis were poor, but others were rich. The saying, "How difficult for the rich to enter the kingdom of heaven!" is out of relation with the Judaism of the age. The old Prophets said, "Repent," and Ezekiel's office was to warn. Jesus links on to them, but goes further. He comes to save, to seek out, to heal. He acts as God declares that he *will* act in Ezekiel xxxiv. 16. Hence a new attitude towards sinners, and a new bidding. One must go among them, search them out, and try to cure them. One must love them, and awaken their love. Love is to be shown and aroused by compassionate service, by the touch of human sympathy.

There are, indeed, limits to the application. Jesus did not apply his principle of love to his opponents. It may be asked: Could he have done so? Could the principle be applied to the conceited, the proud, the self-righteous; to empty, respectable souls; to formalists; to the hypocritical, the malicious, and the cruel? Perhaps it can only be applied to those conscious of their sin or their sinfulness; who are humble, though wrong-doers; ill at ease, though wicked; whose hearts are not opposed and shut to sympathy and goodness. But I am not sure that the excuse is valid. Even the proud and self-righteous can be softened: to call them vipers is to harden them.

It is, perhaps, the prerogative of genius to employ unusual methods. To forgive may awaken the soul and stir hatred of sin. To show sympathy may turn the heart to the light. Was this what Jesus meant to do in the case of the woman taken in adultery? And were his very presence and his silent tenderness of soul enough to quicken the dormant power of love and the dormant capacity to repent in the harlot at the house of Simon?

Certainly, the active attempt to redeem the sinner by service, sympathy, and love was a new thing. It is not in direct relation with the Judaism of the Rabbis or even of later times, though it is being worked into, and applied by, the Judaism of to-day. It is not, assuredly, in itself un-Jewish, unprophetic. It is, perhaps, illegal, though I do not feel sure about this. To some extent, probably, it went together, and fitted in, with Jesus' criticism of the doctrine of retribution, or of the overstressing of that doctrine: for sin, punishment; for virtue, reward. But however this may be, it is one of the brightest jewels in the Gospels' crown.

The question of forgiveness is a little more complicated. As regards the forgiveness by a man of his neighbour for the wrong which that neighbour has done him, the Rabbinic teaching and Gospel teaching are in accord, though the latter may intensify the former (*cf.* Matt. xviii. 22 with Rabbinic parallels). But the matter does not end there. Jesus appears to arrogate to himself the power of forgiving sins, an office which Judaism assumed to be the exclusive prerogative of God. He is not recorded as forgiving the wrongs done to him (with the exception of the famous words from the cross in Luke xxiii. 34)—indeed, so far from doing that, he vituperates his opponents and calls them vipers and children of Gehenna,—but he *is* recorded to have forgiven sins, and it is possible that he taught that this power is one which all of us, or some of us, can, or should, exercise in our turn. Are we not merely, in the case of wrongs done to ourselves, to forgive in so full and free and loving a fashion that the wrong-doer's heart is touched and he becomes a better man, but, in certain special circumstances, are we to be able, through our love, to exert the power successfully of saying to a sinner, "Your sins are forgiven, and you need sin no more"?

If so, a further question presents itself. Is forgiveness—was forgiveness to Jesus—something more, something more inward, than the remission of penalty?

The Rabbis did not suppose that God would exact punishment for past sin if repentance supervened. If we say to a

man, "Your sin is forgiven," hoping that repentance will ensue, it is a splendid risk. Jesus may have been convinced of his power to effect repentance, and that, unless the cart, as it were, had been put before the horse, the horse would not have moved. Had he said to the woman with stern severity, "Repent, abandon your sin; then only come to me again," she might have continued in her sin. By saying, "You are forgiven," he caused her to repent. It was a noble *husteron proteron*. And forgiveness then means the uplifting power of love to bring about repentance in the soul.

Though the Rabbis did not believe that God would inflict any punishment for sin, however heinous, if repentance supervened, the doctrine of requital and retribution was deeply ingrained in their teaching, as it had also been a prominent feature in the teaching of the Old Testament. Jesus does not deny the doctrine; he admits it as a broad rule; "God will judge every man according to his works," he declares in so many words; yet the doctrine is never pushed to extremes; it is crossed by other doctrines; and it is never applied in a mechanical manner. So much merit, so much reward; so much sin, such kind of external punishment; these would have been statements impossible, or even abhorrent, to him.

For first, as between man and God, there is no question of merit. We deserve nothing, and all we receive is grace. We are God's servants who can claim no reward (Luke xvii. 10). Next, there is no scale, or proportionate, reward from God. The work of an hour may be rewarded with the same broad generosity as the work of a year, and this not because the work of the hour equalled the work of the year. God gives of His love and grace; not by scale. No one has the right to grumble.

Moreover, tit for tat is a bad rule for men. We are to reward good for evil, even as God does. And Jesus notoriously goes much further. We are not to resist the evil-doer. The reason is not wholly clear. Is it for the sake of a principle, or for our own sakes, or for the sake of the evil-doer himself? Is Paul's famous sentence that evil is to be overcome by good the true commentary on, and explanation of, Matthew v. 39?

To these teachings of the Gospels there are some Rabbinic analogies and parallels, though it is fair to say that the *main* Rabbinic teaching is out of relation to them. Yet they are not un-Jewish in the sense that they cannot, so far as they are desirable and true, be adopted and absorbed by Judaism to-day. And I think that (not always with acknowledgment of source) Liberal Judaism has largely absorbed them.

It may have been the vivid and constant sense of God's presence and fatherhood which led Jesus to press the conception of faith more than was habitual in the Judaism of his age. The faith that he demanded was in God, not in himself; faith that God could do everything and anything, and that by the power of such faith man could do much which otherwise would be beyond him. The Rabbis, too, praised faith and demanded trust in God. But, perhaps, the faith which Jesus taught and asked was a more active sort; not merely trust in God's rule of the world and of the individual, and therefore full contentment with your lot, but faith in your capacity and strength as given to you by God; faith in the power of prayer, though always with the conviction that His will might not be your will, till your will was His.

Nevertheless, such confidence in a God-given power is to produce not conceit, but humility. No vice is attacked in Rabbinical literature more frequently than pride. The humility praised in the Gospels is quite in harmony with Rabbinic teaching, though it has a distinctive flavour of its own. Childlikeness and *Anspruchslosigkeit* are peculiar features of the Gospel ideal. There is a sense in which the best of us must be as the tax-collector, who said, "God be merciful to me, a sinner." I do not think that there is anything in this conception which the best Rabbis would not have approved of, though, perhaps, some of them needed a more frequent consciousness of it than on the mere Day of Atonement. "There but for the grace of God go I"; this feeling was, perhaps, a bit wanting in them, and the lack of it may, perhaps, have made itself felt in their relations with sinners and outcasts, or in the want of relations with them, in a turning away of the eyes and a drawing close of the skirts.

On the basis of these brief suggestions, how should we sum up? It is an inaccurate exaggeration to oppose violently the religious teaching of the Synoptic Gospels to that of the Judaism of the first century, or to the Judaism of any succeeding century, and to Liberal Judaism most of all. The saying, "I came not to destroy, but to fulfil," if we substitute Judaism for the Law, and interpret "fulfil" in the sense of supplementing, enlarging, or making rough edges smooth, seems to me correct. In a few cases I would add to these various verbs, "correct," and in still fewer, "oppose." In some cases I would interpret "fulfil" to mean "the change of one example or two into a far-reaching principle." How many of these various "fulfilments" are good fulfilments; or how many have been, or should be, accepted by

Judaism to-day are questions which lie outside my province, though, incidentally, I may have touched upon them here and there. For my province is one of history and fact.

It is the last "fulfilment," turning individual examples into principles, which makes the teaching of the Synoptic Gospels so broadly human. It is another matter, however, whether this teaching is consciously and deliberately "universalistic," and not merely inferentially and implicitly. When the Rabbis taught that God hears all men's prayers at once, and much else of the same kind, their teaching, too, was inferentially "universalistic." It was the same with Jesus. When the Rabbis were not thinking of Israel as opposed to the foreigner (and this happened tolerably often), they spoke quite broadly of men and of God's relations with men. So it was with Jesus, only more frequently and habitually. In his direct teaching on the subject the records show doubt and contradiction: there are pro-heathen and anti-heathen passages, while the pro-Samaritan tendency is only found in Luke. Complete and conscious universalism only goes back to, and derives from, Paul. Yet Jesus possessed the prophetic universalism, though not more, so that here the relation to Judaism is one of agreement and harmony, hardly even, if his teaching be compared with the *biggest* things in Amos and Isaiah, one of enlargement.

Judaism to-day, and more especially Liberal Judaism, is universalistic, and, like Jesus, and perhaps even more trenchantly, we Liberal Jews have "fulfilled," or are "fulfilling," the Law. With all due reverence for, and with all due humility towards, the great teachers and books of the past, we venture to stand above them. The Prophets have enabled us to see further than they themselves could see. We learn from the Talmud; we learn from the Gospel. But we correct, adapt, supplement, expand. We trust that the spirit of the Lord is with us, and with that spirit there is freedom.

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LONDON.

INDIA'S REVOLT AGAINST CHRISTIAN CIVILISATION.

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BRITAIN has governed India now for many years : in some parts for two hundred years ; elsewhere for a hundred years ; and even in the Punjab she has seen three generations pass away, and scarcely anyone who knew native independent rule is now left. During all these years she has directly or through native Princes preserved peace and order throughout the length and breadth of the country—eighteen hundred and three thousand square miles of dense population—and has carried through the best piece of police work on a large scale which has ever been known in the history of the world. The borders of India have never been seriously attacked through all these years, and, except for brief periods and local outbursts of disorder, a dweller or a wayfarer in India, whether Englishman or native of the country, has been safer than in any European country.

Thirty-seven thousand miles of railway have been made ; canals have been constructed to irrigate twenty-seven million acres of what was often desert land ; ten universities have been opened and a network of schools has been spread over the country. Western surgery and medical treatment are now within the reach of all who need them. Immense quantities of private capital, mostly British, have been invested in railways, coal mines, tea gardens, cotton mills, jute mills, woollen mills, and recently even in steel factories. Foreign business houses and banks have been established all over the country ; they have opened the markets of the world to the produce of India, and have enabled her to buy on credit from the ends of the earth.

This is the material prosperity which English rule has brought to India. The face of the country has been changed ;

old fashions in clothes are passing away ; homespun (till Gandhi revived it) has been almost driven out by western mill-made cloth, and European fashions, which always seem so incongruously ugly on Indian men and women, are displacing the beautiful garb of the country ; nearly everyone now eats wheat or rice, not pulse and millet ; pilgrimages have degenerated into picnics. But man cannot live by bread alone, nor can a nation's growth be tested by the amount of steel that it imports, broadcloth that it consumes, or gold that it hoards. The question which calls for a candid answer is whether India shows any spiritual progress also during the years of British rule, and, if she shows little or none, why this is. Necessarily we must look for this progress, if there is any, in the bending of Indian ideals to the ideals of the Christian civilisation of the West, and we ought to find signs that it is no longer true that "East is east and West is west, and never the twain shall meet." For the religion of the State is Christian ; the ethics studied are Christian or utilitarian ; the education is through English literature ; the political theory taught in the colleges of a country which has always been peculiarly aristocratic finds the salvation of the world in western democracy ; the virtues inculcated are those of meat-eaters, which seem, to peoples who are mostly mild vegetarians, to be akin to barbarities.¹

No country has ever been so thoroughly missionised as India. Almost every known sect of Christians in Europe and America has its mission in India, and one may find Roman Catholics, Church of England, American Presbyterians, Baptists, Church of Scotland, Seventh Day Adventists, and the Church of Christ all working within an area of two thousand square miles. The missionaries have preached the Gospel, healed the sick, taught the children, and gone about doing good, but Hindus and Mahomedans alike have rejected them no less decisively than the Jews of Palestine rejected Christ. Few Indians except outcasts have been converted and baptised ; few Indian congregations have established themselves in independent vigour ; they all depend on the constant supervision and nursing of the missionary. It is true that in many parts of India there has been a "mass" movement into Christianity ; but these "masses" are only the outcasts who are neither Hindus nor Mahomedans ; and, whether we rejoice in this

¹ Gibbon somewhere quotes Rousseau : " Il est certain que les grand mangeurs de viande sont en général cruels et féroces plus que les autres hommes. La barbarie anglaise est connue."

movement as a spiritual awakening or tolerate it as a social climb, it cannot indicate the road which Mahomedans and caste-Hindus will take later on. Rather, the thought that they would have to associate on an equality with erstwhile sweepers and leather-workers is one more bar added to the bars of caste which Christianity has failed to burst or even to weaken. Both Hinduism and Islam are stronger than ever, and the reason is that the nascent sentiments of nationality and patriotism find in these two great religions the bond of unity which cannot be found in India in a common language or a common political tradition. All the recent religious revivals in India have been national and political even more than religious, as witness the Arya Samaj, the Panislamic movement, and the tat Khalsa sect of the Sikhs. India may some day become Christian, but the hope will be brighter when England has ceased to rule and the missionaries no longer have national pride as well as caste and the old gods ranged against them.

Nor is it only the dogmas of Christianity which have been rejected. Everyone who has associated much with Indians in India is always conscious in his intercourse that even those Indians who have received a western education continue to look at every question of morality, progress, education, and politics from a point of view which is different from his own. Material values certainly weigh less and spiritual values more with them than with Englishmen. It is inconceivable that any form of utilitarian ethics, any displacement of the will and wrath of God by the-greatest-good-of-the-greatest-number could be accepted by Indians. Birth and even holiness determine a man's social position; wealth hardly at all. Nor do the same spiritual ideals as prevail in Europe appeal to the Indian. For example, the Indian does not in any way recognise the brotherhood of man; he does not believe that every man should have equal opportunities, and he hates equality of status and socialism. India has not yet passed through the revolution which France initiated in 1789. The higher castes still regard the great masses of low-caste or out-caste folk as little better than beasts; and these depressed classes still acquiesce in their dependence and show little sign of throwing off their social degradation.

Then again, in the matter of truth, the Indian remains as Oriental as tradition represents him. Finesse and duplicity are his ideals still, rather than sincerity; and the countenance which conceals the real thoughts is more admired than the mouth which speaks from the fullness of the heart.

All the schools and colleges in India, perhaps because they are strictly secular, have failed during all these years to make any change in the Indians' attitude to truth. Intellectual truth is as little honoured as true conduct. Both Hinduism, with its insistence on regarding fable as at once theology and history, and Islam, which forbids for all time any questioning of the literal truth of every word in the Kuran, are definitely pledged to the denial of any truth which cannot be reconciled with their sacred books. Truth is not found by those who search for her with one eye blindfold.

The influence of the West has almost killed the art craftsmanship of India. There was a real sense and love of beauty in the old weavers of wonderful fabrics, in the embroiderers in gold and silver, in the carvers of wood and the inlayers of marble; but western demand and western models, and perhaps even western teaching, have destroyed their old excellences and have not given them a new western ideal of beauty, but only taught them cheapness and shoddiness.

All this seems to prove that the high road of western progress, which leads to western civilisation, is not the road of progress for India; there is a low road somewhere else which she must find and follow to a different city. But it may be said that the growth of nationalism in India shows the spread of western ideas. "Bande Materam" and "India for the Indians" are undoubtedly shrieked from countless "Nationalist" platforms throughout India; and the official justification of the Montague reforms is that India has taken her first step in the path of nationhood. But in truth Dean Inge is right when he says in one of his essays that perhaps British rule in India has prevented the growth of nationalism. True nationalism must be based on some bond of union, some common tie of affection. The newest form of Western nationalism is based on the bond of race. But there is no such bond binding the peoples of India together: the apparent unity is a common hate of Britain. The only real unity in India is the British Crown and the British centralised government. If the Nationalists' demands were granted and independence given to India, the achievement would mean the immediate disruption of the bond of union and the disappearance of India as a nation. Before real nationalism can be born in India, Britain must leave India. India must split up into homogeneous parts within which there is some unity of race, religion, or tradition, and patriotism can be born. A true spirit of nationalism may some day inspire a gentle Bengal or a Punjab, where the

martial memories of the Sikh Khalsa are still alive, or a Rajput State of hoary antiquity, or the remnants of the great Mahratta kingdoms inspired by memories of Sivaji. "India" is a cold Galatea who will never be stirred into life by the frantic embraces of lawyer Pygmalsions, for "India" is not their handiwork but a phantom from another world, nor are their embraces the life-giving embraces of unselfish love.

So the truth is that little or no spiritual progress has resulted from all our efforts to lead India along the path of western civilisation. The reason is that the spiritual food provided has consisted of strange foreign ideas, and the spirit has become sickly from the unnatural diet and longs for the simpler home fare. It could not be otherwise. To the Hindu the ideal life is one of contemplation—the Englishman lauds action; the Hindu is imaginative—the Englishman is a rationalist; the Hindu is a fatalist—the Englishman thinks himself freer than he is; the Hindu is sublime in his resignation—the Englishman, like Jacob, wrestles even with God.

The unrest is not chiefly political, nor to be cured by a change in the form of government: it was social before it was political, and arose from the constant irritation of exotic ideals at every point of contact with an alien government and society. The great mass of the people even now think, feel, and will just as they did under Moghuls, Mahrattas, or Sikhs, and it is the policeman's eye, not any change of heart, which has modified conduct. The few who have really come under the influence of western culture have read, marked, and learned, but have seldom inwardly digested; they have been like actors uneasy in their fancy dresses, and playing parts into the spirit of which they could not enter. They are types of the hybrid failures which longer western rule would multiply all over the country. We cannot be proud of them; history hereafter will quote them as the finest instances of natures wrenched awry by the incompatible ideals of East and West.

The doubtful argument that most of the people of India, who are aware of their material progress and are incompetent judges of spiritual tendencies, do not wish the departure of the British, does not justify us in risking any longer for the sake of peace the perversion of three hundred millions of souls to a type not intended for them by God.

We have failed to change the heart of India through centuries of peace and friendliness when all classes have gladly listened to our message from the West; we should

still more surely fail in the future, for the people have been taught to hate us as the opponents of their national independence and ideals. There is no longer any hope that England could mould India to her spiritual likeness, as the spirits of Greece and Rome moulded one another under the Roman Empire. If then we are to remain in India as rulers, let us talk no more of the white man's burden nor claim any mission of the higher race to the lower, but frankly admit that we stay there simply for the maintenance of law and order and for the protection of British capital.

We are quite able to govern India and maintain order, but only if we are prepared to reverse the policy of recent years, increase the British army, and insist on sufficient funds from the Indian revenues being appropriated to the maintenance of a strong Executive, the higher ranks of which must be predominantly British. In this way we can stave off anarchy and continue to be, as heretofore, the protectors of the poor who would suffer most from our departure. But it is very doubtful if internal peace is what India needs for her future progress. Owing to the long peace which she has enjoyed, and to the successful operations against the ravages of famine, cholera, and malaria, the population of India has enormously increased during the British period, and is overflowing into the neighbouring parts of Africa and into Australia, to the dismay of these countries. If British rule continues to maintain peace, the limits of population for an agricultural country will soon be reached, and the excess population must either starve or turn to industry and manufacture goods with which to pay for imported food. But experience in Europe may well make England hesitate to force India along a line of progress which will be marked by factory chimneys, great dreary industrial cities, desertion of the countryside, and war between capital and labour.

The alternative is for Britain to leave the peoples of India to work out their own salvation. The whole of India might be divided up into a number of states, each endowed with religious or racial unity and qualified, so far as may be possible, to maintain its independent existence. Even in Utopia, in the Balkans and on the Baltic, new-born states are not always humble and contented, and jealousy and covetousness of the fair lands just over the marches sometimes prevail. The emancipated Indian states are not likely to accept the boundaries prescribed for them, and a period of inter-state warfare will set in. The unnatural security and the comparative freedom from famine and

epidemics which British rule has given would cease. Nature would reassert herself; epidemics and wars would restrict the growth of population: India would continue to be self-supporting in food, and would not be forced into the gloom of industrialism. The wars would not be very deadly, as Hindus are mild and Mahomedans are lazy. Bolshevism or communism could no more thrive in India than it could have appealed to the England of the sixteenth century.

But how about Afghanistan, Japan, and Bolshevik Russia? Will they not invade a defenceless India? Japan belongs to the League of Nations, and, moreover, she probably covets an empty land for colonisation by her surplus population rather than the glory of ruling an overcrowded India. Neither Russia nor Afghanistan belongs to the League, and they would almost certainly invade India. But no moral obligation seems to lie on England to protect from invasion a country which protests that she no longer desires protection.

Only, the trouble is that much English capital is invested in India, and if we leave India either to internal disorder or to external invasion that capital will be lost. The public debt of India is about £300,000,000, of which much more than half is due to English investors. India is liable for the payment of pensions of officers of the civil and military services; and the sum total of British capital invested in India is colossal. It might be argued that British capitalists have put their money into India without any promise that British rule should be continued indefinitely, and that England would be guilty of no breach of faith if now she withdraws. But the amount at stake is too large for airy treatment of this sort. It ought not to be impossible to announce the withdrawal of the British Government from India, say two years ahead, and to devote the last two years of British rule to liquidating India's debt to England and Englishmen. It would be quite easy to raise a great Indian liberty loan of an amount sufficient to pay off the whole of the debt due in England and to provide for all pensions. By the Indian War Loans seventy millions were raised for a cause for which the people cared little; when the loan is the price of liberty, the response will be manifold. During the same period of gradual withdrawal British merchants and investors could, if they wished, sell off their properties to Indians. It is safe to prophesy that there would be no lack of Indian buyers, and at the same time there would be many Englishmen, especially those in Calcutta and Bombay, who would prefer to continue their business and hope for the best under native rule.

Complete abandonment of India could hardly be more disastrous to trade and industry than the present divided Government, which has lost the confidence of the people, and is unable to maintain the security without which commercial enterprise is impossible.

Probably no Government has ever had a more difficult problem to solve than this of the future of India. If it were merely a choice of the two alternatives of staying on in India for the maintenance of law and order or of abandoning her to her own peoples to work out each their own salvation, the problem would be hard enough; but we are already committed to a middle course, which satisfies no one, makes the maintenance of order immensely difficult, and is certainly not intended ever to lead to complete abandonment.

This is not the place in which to consider the theoretical merits of diarchy and the adequacy of the safeguards provided in India's new constitution for securing British control in the more important departments of the Indian Government; but it must be recognised that the hopes of the framers of the constitution have not been realised. They said: "We are justified in calling on the political leaders, in the work of education which they will undertake, to bear carefully in mind the political inexperience of their hearers, and to look for future progress not to fiery agitation, which may have consequences quite beyond their grasp, but to the machinery which we devise for the purpose." The hope that the wolves who were driving the flock demented would join the fold and learn to bleat very like lambs has been blasted. The wolves have preferred to remain outside and avoid the metamorphosis; and even the sheep within the fold do their best to echo the howls of the wolves. The result is that racial antagonism is daily growing more bitter; the Government is boycotted; Englishmen are insulted and calumniated; the removal of the British army is demanded; loyal Indians are subjected to social persecution till they fear to remain loyal. Conciliation and repression are alternated in the vain hope of stemming the agitation. If we could believe that all this is a passing phase characteristic of a period of transition from paternal government to democracy, the programme for leading on India by gradual stages to full responsible government under the British Crown should be persisted in. But, so far as can be seen, this antagonism of East and West must continue and must grow. The achievement of the full measure of self-government in India would still mean a two-headed Government, with the heads looking one to the West and the other to the East. The willing adherence to the

Empire of a vast country, which is bound to it by no ties of race, religion, or—once the British army is gone—of interest, and cannot, like the Dominions, look up to Britain as a mother, is unlikely.

But it is too late now to retrace the steps which have been taken along this course and to go back to a form of government which is able to maintain order. So the alternatives before us are not between abandonment of India and enforcement of order, but between abandonment and the present policy.

For staying on in India there are the arguments of imperial prestige; of the material benefit of India; of the safeguarding of British capital; and of the sadness of relinquishing a splendid adventure in nation-building. For leaving India the supreme argument is that we are not justified any longer in attempting to tell her that our ideas of progress must be hers too. Even our pride forbids us to stay on as policemen and tax-gatherers where once we were social evangelists.

India is not, like Egypt, a stage on the imperial highway which we cannot safely abandon. If only we can leave India with dignity and circumstance, so that all the world can see that the abandonment is voluntary, then the Empire will not suffer. Evacuation of India might even be applauded as spontaneously as was the Irish Treaty. We are not likely ever to be moved from India by force; but a few years more of mutual irritation, boycott, resignations of officials, and lack of new English recruits, may well make our position there intolerable. It has often been said that a refusal of the sweepers of India to carry out their duties as scavengers would compel us to leave. If this were to be the manner of our leaving, then indeed to abandon India would be to abandon also our place in the sun.

W. S. HAMILTON.

SEAFORD.

IS THE WEST CHRISTIAN?

F. S. MARVIN, M.A.

MR EDWYN BEVAN has raised an interesting question in his recent book on *Hellenism and Christianity*, and gives rather a different answer in different chapters. The issue is, What is the nature and extent of the Christianity of the West, of what elements is it composed, and how far is this "Christianity," or something else, the distinguishing and conquering factor in the relations of West and East?

In his Preface Mr Bevan states that "the modern West seems to me still for a large part to require conversion to Christianity." It is "rather the Hellenic, rationalist factor in our civilisation than the Christian, which constitutes, if I may so express it, the Westernness of the West." But in the chapter called "Human Progress" he takes another line. Here he points out that, whereas the ancient Greek never contemplated an indefinite "Progress" in human affairs, the modern world, starting from Christianity, has gradually elevated this doctrine to the highest place in its creed. The ancient writers, such, for instance, as Homer or Hesiod, believed rather in a downward movement; the time of gods and demi-gods was in the past; now an evil age begets a still more evil. Or, as in the Stoic gospel, they contemplated a cyclic process by which the course of human history repeated itself, and after long ages a Golden era began again. Virgil gives us this in his famous Eclogue. Mr Bevan, in perhaps the most suggestive passage in his book, contrasts with this frame of mind the religious spirit which he traces in the three great faiths of the Middle East. Both Jews, Zoroastrians and Christians agreed in placing the goal of human hope and effort in the future. History has unfolded to our eyes an age-long struggle between the forces of Good and Evil in the world. Often the evil side has won a temporary triumph, but in the end the Good will prevail. Here we have a moral idea, an argument from history, and, in part at least, the

germ of the idea of Progress. It is this belief which, according to Mr Bevan, has introduced into the West our modern forward-looking habit. It joins hands later on with the forces of science and produces that passionate creed of Progress which has inspired the West in recent centuries and gives us our present predominance in the world.

Now here, it would seem, we have a reconciling doctrine of the highest interest and importance, which differs widely from the view of Progress put forth recently by Professor Bury. Professor Bury laid stress on the conflict between the hopes and ambitions of science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the older, other-worldly religious ideas which they seemed to undermine. It appeared to the onlookers in those days, and, more or less, to Professor Bury who describes them, that there was no pact possible between the opposing armies, that "Progress" was entirely a scientific and modern gospel, owing nothing to the old. In so far then as we can find a common ground between the two streams as Mr Bevan does, we may do something to allay this ancient feud; more than that, we shall be helping to lessen the anxiety which many feel just now as to the course of Western civilisation. The triumphs and the future progress of science are assured. Link it up with religion, show that they have a kindred root and spirit, and we gain both a reasonable hope and a practicable policy for the future.

The subject is a large one, and rather philosophical than strictly historical. But a short, broad sketch of the historical setting of the drama may serve as an introduction to the deeper consideration which it demands.

We turn first to the "Hellenic, rationalist" spirit which in his Preface Mr Bevan was inclined to identify with the "Westernness of the West." It was of course eternally operative, and has built and is still building our modern thought. But in its original form it flickered out in the third and fourth centuries of our era. That gospel of Stoic resignation of which Marcus Aurelius is the noblest spokesman was its last expression, and it was a gospel without hope. The ancient world and its ideals were crumbling fast around him as a governing faith, and, soon after, the intellectual curiosity which first gave it birth died out also. But meanwhile a new gospel of hope, resting on other premisses, and appealing to other elements in man's nature, was making its way quietly and steadily throughout the West.

It grew up at first as a stranger from the East, alien to the institutions and habits of the world which it was to pervade. It was personal and spiritual, based on the love

of one's fellows, supported by belief in a supreme super-human force, always looking forward and always hopeful. This is of the essence of the Christian faith and most perfectly expressed in the *Paradiso* of Dante. Corrupted by worldly conflicts and ambition in the Middle Ages, it was never extinguished, and at the height of the Catholic period—say in the thirteenth century—it was the distinguishing and best feature of the West in its contrast with the rest of the world. The East had then, in the hands of the Moham-medans, the greater learning, perhaps the higher culture. But the West had a religion of hope, based on love and guaranteed by the historic memory of an Ideal Person. At the Renaissance the doctrine was found inadequate and the formal unity of the Church was broken. But the breach in the continuity of thought was far less than when the Hellenic and rationalist ideal had been obscured in the so-called Dark Ages. The Christian ideal persisted and was purified of many corrupting accretions both in its Catholic and its Protestant forms.

The problem which the Renaissance and the growth of modern science propounded to the open-minded, religious man was not so much one of replacing something which had been destroyed as of making one harmonious and habitable structure of two tabernacles; and this problem is with us still. Alongside of the old Christian traditions and doctrine room had to be found somewhere in the human synthesis, first for all the fruit of pre-Christian thought, and then, more serious task, for the constant stream of new discoveries, penetrating further and further into the nature of things and extending man's dominion over the earth and all that it contains. This new structure necessarily altered the proportions of the old building and destroyed many of its out-lying parts and supposed supports, but it did not affect its essential elements. Love, hope for the future, faith in a Power outside the individual making for good remained, and will remain, the central halls of the mansion.

But though hopeful of ultimate reconciliation and confident of the persistence of good once achieved, we must be careful not to slur over important differences or obliterate the landmarks in the growth of thought. The modern doctrine of Progress comes in, as Professor Bury has shown us, with the development of modern science. But we ought not to put it so late, as Mr Bevan does, as the advent of Darwinism in biology. To connect it with Darwinism suggests rather a misleading note, for Darwinism in the strict sense rests on conflict and the survival of the fittest.

Progress in the modern sense appears when man began to realise the illimitable stretch of science and his consequent power over nature and his own life on earth. This may be dated from the seventeenth century. The profound change in the mediæval view lies in this, that modern science lays the scene of man's progress, the field in which the ideal of love and hope was to be worked out, not in some imaginary other world, but here, amid the relics of his glorious and chequered past, and relies on those powers of which man's own life and the world around him give present and historic evidence. A true doctrine of evolution, as distinct from the Darwinism of a struggle for existence, would lay stress rather on growth by co-operation, the development of the collective human spirit by the wider association of men, and by the contact of the human mind with the realities of nature. By these two forms of association man has risen, and they are both at the moment far more highly developed in the West than elsewhere. They are in essence the two streams of "Westernness" which Mr Bevan distinguishes in his chapter on Progress. It is, as he points out, a composite thing, and the geographer and the racial anthropologist would wish to add still more. But to recognise this is no reason for answering our initial question in the negative. If Christianity means the pursuance of an ideal of love and hope, who would deny that the West is more and not less Christian than it was? Different answers are prompted by the greater or less importance we attach to the various factors which make up the religious attitude, or general mentality, of the West. If we attach the main importance to belief in the orthodox creed as handed down from the Middle Ages, then doubtless we could not say that the West was "Christian" to-day in the old sense. But if, as Mr Bevan himself would probably do, we look rather to the growth of the essential elements of Love, Hope, and Faith, as we defined them above, then surely the West is much more Christian now than ever before. The expansion of science, and still more of the scientific spirit, though it may in certain respects have tended to materialism and selfishness, has enormously strengthened the element of Hope and of confidence in some External Power controlling our lives, however we may phrase it. Nor is the West really more selfish as a whole than it was in the so-called "Ages of Faith." On the contrary, there is far more care for others, more world-consciousness, more collective organisation for the welfare both of the community at large and of the weak and suffering individuals within it.

The supreme problem comes well in view, however, from Mr Bevan's analysis of the two main factors in the progressiveness of the West. We have not yet duly reconciled the old religious element of love and life for the future with the new knowledge and forces which science has put in our hands. Since the rebirth of science, knowledge and the fruits of knowledge have been growing at a pace which far outstrips our growth in social unity and devotion, though that too has not gone back. Hence we need constantly the stimulus of the moralist and philosopher to keep us in mind of the needs of the individual soul and of the claims of the whole society on its more quickly-moving and aggressive members. Would that a modern Dante could paint again the onward march of the human spirit in its greater strength and glory, and, while lashing the flagrant evils of the age, hold out still the old ideal of peace and unity based on love! If such a voice were heard again, it would still find in the eternal "*Divina Commedia*" of the soul an advance, often broken by passion and catastrophe, but continuous, towards a state in which the natural law of Good through Love enlightened by Knowledge was being realised in larger and larger circles. The *De Monarchia* is indeed a clear and moving preamble to the League of Nations, differing only in using the simple political forms of the mediæval ideal as a framework instead of the multitudinous facts of the modern world. The spirit remains as true now as then, still acceptable and still accepted by all men of goodwill. The evolution of the social world and of thought in the six centuries since have added to Dante's problem an immeasurable complexity of new forces and problems; it has not tarnished the brightness of his vision nor lessened our belief in it, whether we call ourselves Christians or not. The wider sweep of our thought still needs the depth and directness of his, for the Law of Progress through Love and submission to the General Good is our gospel still and true for all time. Science has brought distractions to our path, but has added also fresh light for our guidance. The task of the prophet is still to recall us insistently to the ancient and eternal verities, while not disparaging the conquests of the modern spirit nor ignoring man's solid progress in welfare and goodwill.

F. S. MARVIN.

BERKHAMSTED.

LITERATURE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

EMILE CAMMAERTS.

HOWEVER impatient we may grow at the slow development of international friendships, we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that, since the day of the armistice, a series of events have occurred which may give us, at least, a reasonable hope that all nations will realise the material and moral necessity of co-operation. I do not allude only to the practical decisions arrived at by the League of Nations and by the Washington Conference. The movement is not limited to the suppression of material conflicts and of the use of force. It aims also at the gradual suppression of moral conflicts and misunderstandings. We could picture a world in which the horrors of war would be abolished, but in which jealousies and intrigues played such an important part as to gravely compromise the results obtained. International law might be used by certain nations as civil law is often used by certain individuals in order to pursue purely selfish purposes without any consideration for the interests and happiness of their fellow-men. What we are aiming at is a gradual change in the international atmosphere which would bring about, not only the friendly adjustment of rival interests but some manifestations of active and practical friendship. It is not enough that we should not fight each other—we must help each other. In international affairs, as in all other affairs, the Christian principle of charity and goodwill must not merely be negative, it must also be positive. One might even go further and say that, unless it is the second it will never be the first; that unless a certain atmosphere of friendship and co-operation is created between the nations the hope of ending all brutal conflicts will remain illusory. In our eagerness to avoid the return of the terrible ordeal

we have gone through, we are apt to forget the spiritual side of this question and to put our trust merely in the limitation of armaments, compulsory arbitration or other similar measures, hoping that, through their influence, international opinion may gradually be modified. There is a distinct danger in adopting such methods, a danger which has become apparent during the last six months. If we read the papers of the Continent, of this country, and of America, we must realise that great efforts are made to prevent the recurrence of war, but we must realise also that the atmosphere is charged with electricity, and that every week brings a new misunderstanding. We cannot expect British or foreign statesmen to become the leaders of a spiritual revival, but we may even now foresee that, unless such a spiritual revival brings about a change of heart, all their present efforts will become as useless as those of the promoters of the Hague Convention and other similar organisations in pre-war days.

If we consider the problem of international relations as a whole, under its spiritual as well as under its material aspects, we shall, from the outset, meet three formidable obstacles:—the conflict of interests, the want of education, and the difference of national temperaments. Conflicts of interest may be adjusted internationally as they are between private individuals; there may be difficulty in finding the right tribunal; it may, on certain occasions, be more difficult still to get the decision of such a tribunal recognised, but this is, after all, a practical problem dealing with concrete factors, and it ought not to be outside the scope of wise statesmanship to give it as satisfactory a solution as can humanly be expected. Ignorance also can be counteracted. The teaching of history and geography, which is far from satisfactory, if considered from the present international point of view, may be re-organised; our press may improve its information, and, within a reasonable period of time, we may expect that the next generation will grow more interested and less ignorant on the essential problems of international politics with which it will have to deal.

The third obstacle, though generally ignored, is far more difficult to overcome. For the pure internationalist, it does not exist, since everything which is connected with national temperament is considered by him as mere prejudice, and the very principle of nationality may be questioned. But for those who prefer to deal with facts rather than with theories, and whose idealism is not blind to the results of everyday observation, the existence of what is generally called national

temperament is obvious. It may be harmful or it may be beneficent: the quality of its influence cannot affect its existence. People belonging to the same nation have inherited, through the influence of physical surroundings and of that of centuries of common life and tradition, certain characteristics which differentiate them from people belonging to other nations. They may differ in all other ways, through differences of classes, habits, occupation, or individual temperament, but, whatever the importance of the differences which separate them, they are united through a certain turn of mind, a certain mode of feeling, and a certain way of expressing their mind and expressing their feelings which marks them British, French, American, Italian, etc., among a crowd, and which betrays still more their nationality when one enters into closer relations with them.

Such characteristics are so ingrained that they have resisted a century of industrialism and constant intercourse. London is now closer to Paris and New York to London, but the distinctions existing between British, French, and Americans has scarcely altered. They may be gradually attenuated in a distant future, but they constitute, at the present time, a hard fact with which we have to deal, and, since it is in the present time that we are endeavouring to improve international intercourse, it would be childish to shut our eyes to the main feature of the problem.

It is of paramount importance, because, unlike the two obstacles already mentioned, divergence of interests and ignorance, it deals with imponderables and permeates practically all international questions. It shows its influence already in the difference of languages, making international conversations difficult, not only because people do not agree to say the same thing, but because they cannot agree to say the same thing in the same way. All those who, from far or near, have had the opportunity of following diplomatic negotiations are aware of the time and energy wasted on mere technicalities. The turn of a phrase, peculiar to one language, the use of a word which does not possess any equivalent, may delay for weeks and months the conclusion of important treaties.

All the difficulties which underlie a good literary translation derive from the same source. The language of a nation reflects its temperament, and there is nothing which brings us closer to the knowledge of national characteristics than an attentive study of colloquialisms and idioms. I daresay that the English expression "to have a hobby" ought to be translated in French by *enfourcher son dada*.

The two expressions are, nevertheless, separated by a gulf—the gulf of national temperament. For the Briton, full of self-control, shyness, and reserve, the hobby may be the most important thing in his life, far more important, anyway, than what he may be pleased to call his “business.” The self-assertive Frenchman, on the contrary, makes an emphatic distinction between serious and trivial matters. For him *les affaires sont les affaires*, and the *dada* a mere trifle to be laughed at, played with, and thrown aside. One could give such examples by the score; they would show how vain is the attempt to bring nations together by the invention of a common artificial language such as Esperanto. In natural languages we may at least discern the difference of temperament from the difference of expressions and the meaning attached to them. If we all talked Esperanto, we should all say the same thing, meaning, of course, something quite different, and making confusion worse confounded. The curse of Babel was not that people talked different languages, but that, talking different languages, they never made the effort to understand each other and to co-operate in the same undertaking. In the same way, the gift of the Holy Ghost, at Pentecost, not only means that the Apostles were able to talk to all the peoples of the world in their own languages, but that they were able to appeal to a true inspiration which opened the heart of their hearers to their message.

The more we deal with foreign politics, the more we realise that misunderstanding and prejudice are the main causes of trouble. The materialistic view, according to which nations will go on fighting, because there will always be some bone of contention between them, because “one nation will always want to secure some economic advantages which another nation possesses,” is really a short-sighted one. It amounts to saying that no law could ever have been established to protect the weak, and that no social life can be possible. International interests, like individual interests, can be adjusted, if not according to the strict dictates of Divine Justice, at least with some approximation of fairness. The only reason why international difficulties cannot be settled in the same spirit as internal difficulties, is that the nations of the world lack a bond of union, and live, spiritually speaking, in watertight compartments. The most ridiculous prejudices are thus created. Let me quote a trivial example which will show at once the mischief which may be made by this situation when more important problems are dealt with. We have all heard, over here, of the proverbial demonstrativeness of the French, of their exuber-

ance and sentimentalism. The French, on their side, are wont to speak of the cold restraint of the British, of their phlegmatic attitude under the most tragic circumstances, and are inclined to attribute this attitude to a want of feeling. To any one acquainted with both nations it is obviously the reverse which is true. If the French are so demonstrative it is because, being stern realists, they are bound to clothe their opinions in the cloak of an elaborate courtesy, while, if the British are so typically self-controlled, it is because they have naturally a great amount of feeling to control, and cannot afford to let themselves go.

Every popular idea on the same subject might be criticised in the same way. While popular notions are usually sound in their appreciation of human affairs at home, they are nearly always beside the mark when dealing with human nature abroad. They may be right or wrong in the general appreciation expressed, but the point is not whether they are right or wrong but whether this judgment is founded on true or false reasons.

How can we acquire a sound knowledge of other nations' psychology? Personal contact is often advised, but it is not always possible, and, unless practised for years and extended to a great number of people belonging to all classes and professions, may lead to hasty generalisations. A closer study of history and social conditions may certainly prove helpful, but will only give us facts, and what we are trying to find is the light in which we ought to interpret them. No amount of erudition and mere scientific knowledge can provide this spiritual help. The surest method would perhaps be the study of modern classics, that is to say, of the great classics of European civilisation, from the Middle Ages onwards.

A great deal of discussion is still going on, in educational circles, concerning the advisability or non-advisability of curtailing the study of Greek and Latin classics. It is urged, on one side, that more time is required for science and technical knowledge, and that the knowledge of Greek and Latin is of no practical use in modern life. It is urged, on the other side, that there is a distinct danger, especially in secondary education, in further sacrificing literary studies and in limiting the outlook of youth to purely concrete facts and observations. It would be impertinent for an outsider to take sides in the debate, but it might be observed that the study of the classics of modern languages might perhaps be substituted, with advantage, for Greek and Latin studies, with an exception, of course, for those who wish to make a

special study of the latter. With regard to beauty of language and expression, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Pascal, and Goethe are certainly comparable to the greatest writers of antiquity. Their religion, their philosophy are closer to us, the languages in which they express themselves are still spoken around us, and, what is perhaps more important, many of them give us the key to the temperament of the nation they represent.

It may seem a paradox, but it is impossible not to notice that the great authors, whose fame is spread all over the world, and who are read, in the original and in translations, in every country, are precisely those who follow the most exclusive and sometimes the most narrow national tendencies. Dante expresses all the qualities and all the mistakes of the Italian character: its burning enthusiasm, its fierce asceticism, and its passionate spirit of revenge. Molière is more typically French than any other of his countrymen by the blending of wit and tragedy and of refinement and shrewd analysis. Shakespeare and Milton represent the two sides of the English temperament, so genial and buoyant, as long as feelings alone are involved, so stern and uncompromising where ideas are concerned.

The natural objection to any proposal of giving more importance in the school curriculum to modern classics is that they imply the knowledge of several languages. It would be difficult, at the present time, to study them otherwise, owing to the inadequacy of existing translations. The art of translating has been allowed to deteriorate, and while, in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the best authors did not disdain to devote years of their life to this kind of work, our modern writers are far too occupied with their own original production to find time for such patient and scholarly undertakings. There is no greater mistake than to imagine that a translation is of secondary importance and can be written by a secondary writer. As a matter of fact, it requires nearly as much originality and skill to translate a book as to write one, for a good translation not only renders the words of one language into another, but should give an adequate rendering of all images, ideas, and feelings expressed in the original, without the reader being able to notice the effort entailed. The importance of such works cannot be exaggerated. Besides doing real service to the world of letters and to international education, it provides the writer with the best training obtainable, since it obliges him to find an absolutely accurate expression for each particular thought. In the sixteenth century, the French Amyiot owed all his

celebrity as a writer to his translations. In recent times, whenever we come across any good version of a foreign book, we find that it has, almost invariably, been written by some author of note. It is the fashion nowadays, in literary circles, to declare that good translations are impossible, though it has been shown again and again by Schlegel and Tieck, by Leconte de Lisle, by Maeterlinck, and by many others, that the only condition required is to find a great writer willing to undertake the work.

It may be said that there is no such great virtue in the study of foreign literature, and that writers and critics may be brought together without influencing the masses. It may be argued further that, in the Middle Ages, there was far more intellectual intercourse between the nations than there is nowadays. Latin constituted then a natural common language which allowed all cultured men to communicate without the least difficulty. All Europeans belonged to the same Church and shared the same faith. When national literatures developed, almost all important works, whether epics or fabliaux, mystery plays or farces, were promptly translated and developed, so that most works of the period received a French, a Flemish, a German, and an English rendering. A superficial knowledge of Chaucer and of his sources, besides giving us an excellent example of literary translations in the *Romaunt of the Rose*, will provide us with a general view of the European literature of the time. The famous legend of Tristram and Isolt spread from France to England and Germany, and received various treatments in every one of these countries. In the same way, the Flemish satiric poem of *Reinaert* was reproduced during the thirteenth century in France and Germany. Critics still discuss whether the Flemish or the English text of the morality play, *Everyman*, written in the fifteenth century, is the original one. During this whole period authors never worried themselves concerning the originality of their plots. They used material which was common property, and it was only in the treatment of this material that they displayed their originality. There has been no time, in European civilisation, when literature and art were more widely open to foreign influences, and there was perhaps no time when local and national rivalries caused a greater number of violent conflicts.

If any proof were wanted to show that artistic and intellectual intercourse cannot succeed alone in bringing peace to the world, the situation prevailing during the pre-Renaissance period would be a sufficient argument. But war does not mean to-day what it meant during the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries. It is no longer a quarrel between feudal princes, or even an expedition undertaken by the prince to further his own personal interests or his own personal ambition. It no longer involves a limited number of knights or a few thousand mercenaries, most of them of foreign extraction. Through the gradual centralisation of power and through the development of industrialism, it has reached proportions which were never dreamt of in the past. The whole nation is now involved, and the number of casualties and the extent of devastation are out of all proportion with the results of mediæval enterprises. During the Middle Ages war might have been considered almost as a normal phenomenon. It was the natural trade of the aristocracy, and the only justification for its existence. The peasants and traders suffered from it, but neither the people nor the *bourgeoisie* had obtained enough power in the state to make their protests heard and to influence the prince's policy. Besides, there was a glamour attached to individual valour which appealed to the people's imagination; a battle could be visualised as a series of duels, which were sung by poets and described by artists, just as they had been sung and described in the heroic times of Greece. By many of those who waged it, it was considered much in the same light as sport in British universities, and it formed, in the same way, an important item in the young nobles' education.

It would, therefore, be unfair to say that closer intellectual relationship nowadays might not affect international relations because, in a distant past, such intellectual relationships existed throughout Europe simultaneously with periodic outbursts of strife. The movement which we witness to-day towards the creation of world citizenship can in no way be compared with the weak attempts made by the Church to impose, from time to time, a truce in the land. The very conception of world citizenship was foreign to those times. Nationality had scarcely begun to exist, let alone internationalism based on the friendship of nations. Europe, it is true, possessed greater unity from the artistic and intellectual point of view; politically and morally, it was still broken up in thousands of contending units. It would be foolish to argue that closer intellectual relationship might have brought people together at a time when economic and political conditions were adverse to the formation of a larger commonwealth, but now that, for the first time, all nations begin to realise their interdependence from the economic and even from the political points of view, we may well wonder whether

a closer intellectual understanding may not remove some serious difficulties.

We have all heard the argument according to which peace must be re-established by intimate trade relations and travelling facilities. After all the capitals of the world had been brought closer and closer together and the number of travellers had enormously increased, the idea of universal solidarity was expected to make some progress. Events have scarcely confirmed this prophecy. We begin to realise that all the technical improvements, so valuable in times of peace, may also become extremely useful in time of war. Technical civilisation has provided mankind with a mighty instrument which increases its power for good or evil, so that, while liberal philosophers of the last century promised us times when armed conflicts should become impossible, we have seen these armed conflicts become more and more murderous, and extend their ravages over a wider area.

Every student of history must be struck by the unbalanced condition of our present civilisation. Compared with more or less harmonious civilisations, such as those of ancient Greece and mediæval Europe, we are enormously overweighted on the material side. We possess technical equipment compared with which the civilisation of the fifteenth century seems in a state of infancy. But, from the artistic and literary points of view, European nations are perhaps further apart than they were at that time. It is scarcely necessary to pursue the comparison further, in the domains of architecture and decorative arts, for instance. The fact which interests us here is not that mediæval craftsmen might have shown more refinement than our own, but that the craftsmen, painters, and writers of all civilised countries worked with one purpose, dealt with the same subjects, and constantly communicated the results of their labour to each other. Any educated man in England or France, at the present moment, is far less acquainted with art and literature across the Channel than he would have been five hundred years ago. It is true that intellectual production is much larger, and that a selection is difficult to make. What happens, as a matter of fact, is that the selection is made, not according to real value, but according to popularity, and that we are only allowed to know of each other's literature, with a few exceptions, the authors who have catered for popular success.

The same thing is not true of science and applied science. There we have a certain number of important reviews laying before the scientists of all countries the results

achieved. Since the knowledge of at least two foreign languages forms the necessary equipment of any one engaged on research work, the European literature of each subject does not need to be translated to reach its special public. Finally, international congresses bring together doctors, historians, engineers, and all scientists, and tighten the close relationship existing between them.

Such efforts are invaluable, but they can scarcely be expected to bring about a change of heart among the nations of the world. Concrete science is not directly concerned with the expression of feeling which we sum up under the word *temperament*. It does not deal with imponderables and the subtleties of national psychology. In order to obtain certain concrete results, it is, on the contrary, bound to discard vague and often irrational generalities. Whether written in French, in German, or in English, one scientific book reads very like another, and it is only in certain sciences, such as history or art criticism, which lie very close to literature, that a certain difference of outlook may distinguish them.

This close relationship, existing in scientific circles, renders still more conspicuous the lack of artistic and literary cohesion. As a matter of fact, it is precisely in the domain in which constant communication is most required that we find ourselves lying further apart. We may read dozens of French scientific books without in the least increasing our knowledge of the French people, just as we may travel for years throughout Europe without leaving the atmosphere of our cosmopolitan hotels. While it is true to say that an hour spent with Lamartine or de Musset would be extremely fruitful, from an internationalist's point of view, we must admit that difficulties are considerably increased nowadays by the present conditions of modern literature. It has become far more difficult to discover, among the scores of authors who attract public attention, the two or three who give us an insight into the soul of their country. Our various literatures are not only separated, but each of them works on distinct lines, and the grouping of writers in schools, such as the romantic school in France or even the Victorian writers in England, becomes increasingly difficult. We not only lack the opportunities of broader relationship, we lack also the common source of inspiration which constituted a strong bond of union between European writers in the past. If mediæval art and literature acquired such European characteristics, is it not because, to a great extent, it derived its inspiration from the Christian

faith, and if we are driven so far apart nowadays is it not because we have not yet reached the time when a religious revival shall bring us together again? When Louis IX. of France met Brother Giles he did not know a word of Italian, neither did Brother Giles know a word of French. They were satisfied with embracing each other in silence, and, after a short time, "St Louis went his way on his journey and Brother Giles returned to his cell, and, as the other brothers wondered at the unmannerly attitude of Giles, the latter reassured them, saying: Beloved brothers, wonder not at this, for neither could I speak a word to him nor he to me, because, as soon as we embraced each other, the light of wisdom revealed and manifested his heart to me and mine to him, and thus . . . we knew much better what I would have said to him and he would have said to me, than if we had spoken it with the mouth, and with more consolation than if we had gone about to explain with the voice that which we felt in our hearts." In this way did the King of France and the humble Italian monk solve all the difficulties deriving from difference of languages, translations, and international misunderstandings, for the "light of wisdom" shone in their eyes.

Those who have not the privilege of possessing this light, or who can only hope for a faint reflection of it, cannot expect to achieve such results whatever the value attached to their artistic or literary production. Saints do not need words to express themselves, but there are, unhappily, few saints in the world, and, to the great majority of us, words and images remain the only means, however imperfect, through which we may express ourselves and communicate with our fellow men. Keeping within our hearts the memory of those who, with one look, could annihilate all barriers erected between individuals and nations, ought we not to strive, with the material at our disposal, to follow their example as far as our strength permits, and try to make the words of all languages the servants of one spirit?

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THE THREE-FOLD STATE.

PROFESSOR J. S. MACKENZIE.

DR RUDOLF STEINER'S book on the three-fold State (*Die Dreigliederung des sozialen Organismus*) has attracted a good deal of attention in several European countries, and has begun to arouse a certain amount of interest in Great Britain. Dr Steiner gave some account of its main conceptions in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for July 1921. The fundamental principle that is involved in it appears to me to be a sound one, and I think it deserves very serious consideration; though the particular form in which it has been presented may not be such as to appeal very readily to the English-speaking peoples. Perhaps it may be worth while to try to bring out very shortly and simply what its underlying idea is, what would be the practical consequences of its adoption, and how it is related to some other conceptions of the State and to some other proposals for social reconstruction.

Like several other sociological writers, Dr Steiner begins by comparing a human society to a human body; and, up to a certain point, the use that he makes of this comparison is not very unlike the use that has been made of it by several others writers—especially by Plato and by a number of Indian thinkers, of whom Mr Bhagavan Das is at present the most conspicuous. He urges, as most of the others do, that there are three main functions in the social organism, just as there are three main functions in the human body. According to his way of looking at it, the three main functions in the body are (1) the nervous system, having its centre in the brain, (2) the circulatory system, having its centre in the heart, (3) the nutritive system, having its centre in the stomach. Their distinctive aspects might perhaps be briefly and simply characterised as Nerve, Muscle, and Nutriment. The corresponding functions in the social organism are (1) its more spiritual aspects—science,

art, literature, philosophy, religion, education, everything connected with the development and expression of human personality and the realisation of the ultimate values in human life; (2) its more mechanical aspects—the protection of life and property, the defence against aggression from without, the establishment and enforcement of laws, everything connected with justice and with the State (in the narrower sense of that word); (3) its more assimilative aspects—the use and control of natural forces, the practical applications of science, everything connected with the industrial side of life and with the production of instrumental values.

It is at once evident that this way of working out the analogy between the physical and the social organism, though bearing a certain resemblance to the method adopted by Plato in his *Republic*, leads to very different results. It is also very different from the method that is most commonly adopted in India, and that is used there for the defence of the caste system. Let us notice the chief points at which Dr Steiner's use of the analogy diverges from these two ancient methods of applying it.

1. *Difference from Plato's Conception.*—Of the three aspects recognised by Plato and by Dr Steiner, though the bodily parts to which they are referred are the same, only the third can be regarded as having any complete correspondence in the two schemes. What Plato refers to the region of the heart is the element of spirit or passion. The fact that he regarded this aspect of human nature as being essentially allied to the more rational aspect, and properly subject to its control, makes the difference between his theory and that of Dr Steiner less conspicuous than it would otherwise be: nevertheless, there is a fundamental distinction. On both theories, indeed, it is this aspect that is most difficult to understand. Perhaps it is best to think of it as relating essentially to the more purely animal impulses and emotions, such as anger, fear, natural affection, and the like, which in the individual have to be controlled by reason, and in society have to be governed by law. In popular language, these are commonly referred to the heart. How far this is physiologically justified, we need not here attempt to discuss. I may as well confess at once that I do not attach much importance to these attempts to find correspondences between the physical and the social organisms. They are sometimes useful as supplying hints, but it seems futile to pursue them into details. Still, it is well to note the different hints that are supplied to different writers; and, in comparing Plato's views with those of Dr Steiner, we may note an important

divergence with regard to the first of the three aspects, as well as with regard to the second. Plato, by connecting the first aspect purely with the head, tends to give it an exclusively intellectual interpretation; whereas Dr Steiner, by thinking of it in relation to the whole nervous system, is able to give it a much wider application, including everything that can be properly described as spiritual—covering poetry, for instance, as well as philosophy and religion. It is Plato's limitation in this respect that is largely responsible for his failure—in spite of his own artistic temperament—to do full justice to the place of poetry in education and in life. It can hardly be doubted that Dr Steiner has improved upon him in this respect.

Now, if we ask how political theory is affected by these differences, there are several things that it is important to notice. In the first place, Dr Steiner's way of regarding the State tends to lead us to think of it in two distinct ways, a wider and a narrower. In the former sense, it is equivalent to the whole organised community; in the latter, it is confined to the more purely legal aspect of the community. A good deal of confusion has been occasioned in recent times by the fact that different people tend to think of the State in one or other of these different ways. In particular, this fact is largely at the root of the misunderstandings that are apt to arise between German and English ways of speaking about the State. The reverence for the State which is so characteristic of the German attitude is, in the main, due to their identification of the State with the whole national life, or at least with the central power by which the whole of its *Kultur* is sustained. English writers, on the other hand, have been rather apt to think of the State as only that particular aspect of national organisation which is concerned with defence against external enemies, with the protection of the life and property of the citizens, with the enforcement of treaties and contracts, and with the making of laws for the regulation of those activities that can be conveniently controlled from without and for the promotion of the general welfare of individuals in so far as they are clearly incapable of promoting it for themselves. Some would be inclined to cut down its functions a good deal more than this; and, at any rate, most Englishmen believe, or used to believe, that the burden of proof rests decidedly with anyone who seeks to extend the activities of the State. The Greeks also, especially the Athenians, were lovers of freedom, almost as much as they were lovers of art; yet they tended to think of the State in the larger sense of the word, as being the power by which

art and every aspect of the common life was rightly controlled; and Plato compares this control with that which the head, assisted by the active co-operation of the heart, exercises over the bodily organism. Hence he thinks of the rulers as being philosophers as well as kings, and as concerning themselves with every department of social life. The organism is one, and it has a single controlling organ.

Now, it is here that we see the most prominent respect in which Dr Steiner's view diverges from that of Plato. He recognises a real trinity in the State. It is three in one, as well as one in three. The separation of its functions is as real as their essential unity. The philosopher is not to be the king, nor is he to be the captain of industry. It remains, indeed, to be seen whether there are to be any supreme captains. It is not the function of the brain, at any rate, to exercise any direct control over the circulation; and the stomach has to carry on its particular work without the immediate guidance either of the head or of the heart. This, in itself, is obviously a very important difference; but its full consequences will become more apparent when we have noticed the relations of Dr Steiner's theory to that which lies at the foundation of the Indian Caste system.

2. *Difference from the Indian Conception.*—The Indian conception is embodied in the Laws of Manu, and its best exposition in modern times appears to be that which has been given by Mr Bhagavan Das, especially in his two books on *The Science of Social Organisation* and on *Social Reconstruction*. It is his statements that I take here for the purpose of comparison.

His view, like those of Plato and Dr Steiner, is connected with an analysis of the bodily organism; but the analysis is again a somewhat different one. The human body is regarded as falling into four essentially distinct parts—the head, the breast and arms, the lower half of the trunk, and the feet and nether limbs; and, corresponding to these, there are four distinct castes in the social organism—the brahmans, the ksattriyas, the vaisyas, and the shudras. This correspondence is graphically represented in the Hindu mythology by the statement that the brahmans issued from the mouth of Brahma, the ksattriyas from his arms, the vaisyas from his thighs, and the shudras from his feet.

The brahmans, corresponding to the head, are the intellectual and spiritual leaders of the whole society. They are philosophers, but not kings. They may draw up laws, but it is not their business to enforce them. They are priests and teachers, supported by the community, and rewarded

with high honour. The ksattriyas, corresponding to the arms and shoulders (it may be remembered that Ruskin also liked to speak of "head men" and "shoulder men") are the political and military rulers. In the framing of their laws they would generally be assisted and guided by the advice of the brahmanas; but it is their special function to see that the laws are carried out, and to protect the general interests of the whole. Their reward lies in the possession of great power. The vaisyas are the captains of industry. Their reward is their wealth—which, however, they are expected to use for the good of the community. The shudras, finally, have no special function but that of service, which they owe to the other three classes. They are supported with the necessities of life, and their rulers reward them with amusements (the Roman *panem et circenses*).

The general significance of what is here maintained, and the way in which it could be applied to English life, may be gleaned from the following statement (*Social Reconstruction*, p. 62):

"The head priest, presumably the man of highest wisdom, receives the highest *honor*; for instance, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who is the chief 'brahmana' of England, takes precedence of all except the sovereign and his family, in that country. The sovereign, the chief man of action in times of peace, and the generalissimo or military dictator in time of war, has necessarily the greatest *power*, in every country. The *wealthiest* man in every country is always some merchant and not even the king himself. And no one can *enjoy a holiday* so whole-heartedly as the workman. Under the Roman Catholic culture in the Middle Ages, Europe seems to have observed this partition somewhat more clearly, as did India till recently. In ancient India it seems to have worked fully. But the principles underlying this *partition* of the ambitions and corresponding prizes, which is an integral and *essential* part of the rationale of the caste system, have all been thrown away."

He urges further (pp. 69–70) that, if these principles were more fully recognised, a better order of society would speedily be established:

"All the true brahmanas, the scientists, men of letters, priests, legislators, of all faiths and climes, could then co-operate, with lessened exclusiveness and thinned barriers of caste, creed, nation, and race, and increased

good will, in a world-wide educational organisation, for the advancement of sound knowledge and good law, for the benefit of the whole of humanity. So, all the true ksattriyas of all countries and creeds could join in a federalist political organisation for the protection of the good from the evil, and for the preservation of peace and order throughout the whole world. So, all the true vaisyas of all lands and religions could combine in an international economic organisation, for the enhancement of the comforts of life of all the populations of all countries. And so all the shudras could similarly co-operate, under guidance, in an international industrial organisation, for the production of all necessities of life in ample measure, for the use of all the peoples of the earth."

The Indian divisions, however, in actual practice, are much more sharply drawn than those that were suggested by Plato; and, as they appear to have been based originally on racial distinctions, they have not unnaturally come to be treated as hereditary. In other respects, they are not very unlike Plato's divisions. He, indeed, does not explicitly recognise any shudras; but he seems to assume that there would be slaves within his State; and these, at least, would presumably be distinct in race from the free citizens. They would hardly be citizens at all. They would perhaps correspond most nearly to the outcasts in India; but, in practice, I should suppose that they might be classed with the shudras, since Plato's divisions are not rigidly exclusive. It has to be remembered that not only are the Indian classes quite rigid, but there are horizontal divisions as well as vertical ones. Even minute differences of occupation form distinctions almost as exclusive as those between the leading castes. Of course, Mr Bhagavan Das would recommend many reforms in the present system. But, even with very large reforms, it is obvious that a system of this kind would be worlds removed from anything that is contemplated by Dr Steiner, though the primary basis of division is substantially the same, so far as the first three classes are concerned. Dr Steiner has, of course, nothing corresponding to the lowest class; but, in order to see how it is possible to do without such a class, we have now to notice the most fundamental difference between Dr Steiner's conception of the divisions within the State and that which was in the mind either of Plato or of such writers as Mr Bhagavan Das.

In reality, Dr Steiner is not thinking of classes at all.

The three great functions that he has in mind are not to be thought of as belonging to particular sections of the community, any more than they belong to different sections of the human body. The nervous system is not confined to the head, nor the circulating system to the heart, nor the nutritive system to the stomach. The physical organism is a systematic whole, and its leading functions are distributed practically throughout it. The social organism is also a genuine unity, and all its members have their share in each of its leading functions. This is the really essential point in Dr Steiner's conception.

Aristotle pointed out that Plato's ideal State would, after all, be two distinct States. The philosophic rulers and their auxiliaries would be one State, the members of which would differ from one another only in age, ability, and degree of education. The captains of industry and their dependents would be another State, subordinate to the first, the members of which would differ in wealth and in the nature of their occupations. Perhaps the slaves also would eventually form a third State, antagonistic to the other two. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the whole society would long retain its boasted unity.

The Indian communities are much more obviously rent asunder. It is the curse of that great and potentially glorious land that there is hardly any conceivable ground of distinction, territorial, racial, sexual, religious, vocational, or linguistic, which is not turned into an instrument of disruption and strife. Perhaps, indeed, it is wrong to include differences of sex in this list, for the family relationship is certainly a very strong bond; and no doubt there are other bonds as well. But it can hardly be denied that the sources of division are much more numerous than those of unity.

Now, such a society as Dr Steiner conceives would be the very antithesis of this. The divisions that he admits, and which he thinks it important to emphasise, are not divisions between people, but only distinctions between those fundamental functions which may, indeed, be more prominently exercised by some than by others, but in which every human being ought to have some share. Religion, education, science, poetry, music, creative art, belong no doubt to the exclusive realm of the spirit; but it is a realm in which all are admitted as citizens. The defence of the country, of individual life and property, the establishment and enforcement of just laws, are no doubt more the business of some than of others; but, in some degree, they are everyone's concern. So, too, though there are many different forms of

industrial activity, nearly everyone is, in some degree, either a capitalist or a labourer, and certainly everyone is a consumer.

Thus, what Dr Steiner seeks to emphasise is not that the social organism consists of three parts that have to be kept separate, but only that it has three distinct functions that ought to co-operate with one another, but that ought not to interfere with each other's free activity. A community should be as truly three in one as one in three. The State as a political organisation must not interfere unduly with the same State as an economic organisation or as a spiritual unity. But this does not mean that these three modes of organisation are not to exercise incessant vigilance over each other's doings, and, where necessary, to criticise and resist. It is this way of thinking of the whole community as at once one and three that is Dr Steiner's real contribution to social theory ; and it appears to me to be a contribution of the highest value. But, of course, it raises the difficult practical problem as to how it would be possible to maintain both the aspect of unity and the aspect of triplicity. I am not sure that Dr Steiner has provided any quite clear solution of this problem ; and accordingly, in what follows, I do not profess to be expounding the method that he would recommend. I only try to indicate what appears to be a possible way of dealing with the question in the circumstances of one particular community ; and I choose for illustration the community of which I happen to be a citizen. I believe, however, that what can be stated about one community could be applied, with comparatively slight modifications, to almost every community in which there is anything that can be described as a constitutional government.

I may begin by noting that the idea of separate functions, such as those to which Dr Steiner alludes, is not altogether a novelty in this country. Many firm supporters of a national Church, for instance, have strongly urged that its government should be distinct from that which exercises political sovereignty. Similar claims have sometimes been put forward on behalf of education. But it is not always very clear in such cases how the distinct organisations are to work, so as to be at once free and national. Most often, I think, the freedom has to be urged to the detriment of the national unity. Perhaps a better illustration of the attempt to secure co-ordinate authorities within a unified community may be found in some of the recent suggestions of the Guild Socialists. They sometimes suggest the possibility of an association of consumers as having a certain authority more

or less co-ordinate with that of an association of producers ; and, as they use the terms " production " and " consumption " in a very wide sense, it would seem that each of these associations would pretty nearly include the whole community. This way of speaking, however, seems somewhat confusing. It treats all the activities of a community too much as if they were on the economic level. It is doubtful, for instance, whether it conduces to clearness to describe a surgeon as a producer and his patient as a consumer, or to say that a man consumes an oratorio when he listens to it, or consumes the law of divorce when he cannot get on with his wife. Hence I prefer not to enter into considerations of this kind. It seems better to say, with Dr Steiner, that transactions of an economic type, to which the terms " production " and " consumption " are most readily applied, are essentially different in kind from those that are spiritual or personal. For this reason, I pass to what appears to me to be a much more definite and practicable suggestion that has been brought forward by some Socialists of a different type—viz. Mr and Mrs Sidney Webb.

These writers, in their recent book on *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, have set forth a view of the main functions in the life of the community that is to some extent very similar to that which has been indicated by Dr Steiner. They only recognise two main functions, however : what they characterise as the " political " and the " social "—corresponding pretty closely to Dr Steiner's " legal " and " industrial " ; and what they suggest is that there should be two Houses of Parliament, as at present, but that the House of Lords should be abolished, and that another House should be instituted, co-ordinate with the present House of Commons, but dealing exclusively with social problems, leaving those that may properly be described as political to the House that we already have. " What we may call the Political Democracy," they say (p. 111), " dealing with national defence, international relations, and the administration of justice, needs to be set apart from what we may call the Social Democracy, to which is entrusted the national administration of the industries and services by and through which the community lives. The sphere of the one is *Verwaltung*, *autorité régaliennne*, police power ; that of the other is *Wirtschaft*, *gestion*, house-keeping. The co-operative commonwealth of to-morrow must accordingly have, not one national assembly only, but two, each with its own sphere ; not, of course, without mutual relations, to be hereafter discovered, but co-equal and

independent, and neither of them first or last." They add (p. 122) that "they should both be chosen by the same electorate, consisting of the whole body of adult citizens," but suggest that the constituencies should be differently arranged. The second of the two Houses would, among other things, have control of education (p. 120), and thus would include part of the work which Dr Steiner would consider to belong properly to the "spiritual" side. Religion, they apparently consider, should not be controlled by any public body; and so the more purely spiritual side does not call for special consideration.

Another scheme that in some respects approximates even more closely to that of Dr Steiner is one that has been suggested by an American writer, Mr H. H. Powers, in his book called *The American Era*, which seems to me to contain a great deal of practical wisdom. He approaches the subject mainly from the point of view of the importance of having expert advice in dealing with the great problems of national life; and, reflecting on this, with special reference to Great Britain, he is led to a conclusion very different from that which is put forward by Mr and Mrs Webb. He is not led to wish to abolish the House of Lords, but rather to reconstitute it.

His contention is, to put it briefly, that the essential function of an Upper Chamber has always been that of giving expert advice to the ruling power; and he contends that a democratic governing body is no less in need of such advice than an autocratic monarch. The Lower House, according to him, expresses the sovereign will of the people as a whole. The Upper House contains representatives of the great fundamental interests in the community; and these are, at bottom, at least in a modern democratic State, the three that Dr Steiner has recognised. Of course, the manner in which these interests have been represented hitherto has been very inadequate; but the general principle has been to some extent discernible. "The House of Commons," he says (p. 286), "is a body representing the people. The House of Lords was originally a body representing the nobility and clergy. Such in name it still is." But, he proceeds, "the actual House of Lords consists, first, of a few hereditary peers who are statesmen by profession. They are almost invariably men of great ability who have prepared by long study, often by diplomatic or administrative experience, and by previous service in the Commons. . . . But more significant are the men of achievement who are advanced to the Lords in recognition of special attainments in particular

lines of public utility." He illustrates this by such men as Kitchener, Kelvin, Avebury, and Reading, representing War, Science, Finance, and Law. He might have added Bryce, Morley, Haldane, etc., and also a few capitalists who might be taken as representing Industry. "These," he says, "are the men who make the real House of Lords." Of course, there are also the Bishops and others who represent the more spiritual and educational side. No doubt, as he adds, "it would be an exaggeration to say that this transformation of an ancient House of Lords into a house of technical experts representing modern national interests was complete, or that the result was wholly satisfactory." It seems to be most complete on the legal and more purely political side, very one-sided with regard to religion and education, and wholly inadequate industrially. But the direction in which it is tending is apparent enough. And Mr Powers goes on to indicate that in other countries similar tendencies may be discovered.

"The war," he notes, "by its overthrow of the old regime in Germany, cut short what might have been an interesting experiment. The revision of the obsolete constitution of Prussia was under way, and the proposal presented for consideration contained some interesting features. The lower house was to be of the usual popular representative type. The upper house, however, was to contain in addition to the hereditary nobility '36 representatives of agriculture, 36 representatives of commerce and industry, 12 representatives of handicrafts, 16 representatives of the universities, 16 representatives of the Evangelical and Catholic Churches, 36 burgomasters of large towns for the period of their office, 36 owners of hereditary estates, and 36 heads of large industrial and commercial establishments,' besides others that we need not enumerate. . . . We need not consider whether these are wise selections or whether the numbers (the total was nearly or quite 1000) were wisely determined. The important thing is to notice the principle adopted. . . . Men fully cognisant of the needs of all important interests would be present to give expert advice. Not only would every delegate be subject to the opinion of those representing other interests, but all would be subject to the will of the lower house where solidarity would inevitably be much greater. A body of experts as constituted would in practice lose the power of absolute veto as has the

House of Lords. The final decision would rest with the popular body, as it should. But the House of Experts would be immensely influential, and both by its knowledge and by its *esprit de corps* would present a substantial bulwark against the legislative sabotage so constantly perpetrated in the name of government regulation."

The important point in all this is the recognition of the upper chamber as being essentially a body of expert advisers. Unfortunately the tendency has been hitherto to look for such advisers, so far as the industrial sphere is concerned, almost exclusively within the ranks of the capitalists, *entrepreneurs*, and managers. It is clear that in a modern community the advice of representatives of the labouring classes would be no less essential. It is clear also that such suggestions as those that are made by Mr Powers raise once more the difficult question, which has been prominently before us since the days of Socrates and Plato, as to the proper place of experts in the affairs of State. There was an interesting symposium on this subject in the Aristotelian Society a few years ago, which is published in its *Proceedings* for the session 1908-9. The leading part in the discussion was taken by Dr Bosanquet, who was largely occupied in distinguishing different senses in which the work of an expert may be understood. In particular he pointed out that there are "two orders of experts, the ruler and the adviser." With regard to the ruler, he referred to the emphasis that Plato laid on the necessity for expert qualifications in him, but added that "his expertness is to be expertness in the art of life, and his capacity is to lie in adopting and adapting the measures and methods which are instrumental to what makes life worth living." In this connection he notes also that a true citizen "must be an expert in the art of being governed, which cannot really be dissociated from the art of governing." In this sense every good citizen must be something of an expert; and, in particular, expertness of this kind would be, if anything, rather more essential for the active politicians in the lower house than for those in the upper house, whose functions would be more purely advisory. It is more essential, I should suppose, for Mr Lloyd George than it would be for, let us say, Lord Avebury.

But even for purposes of advice there would seem to be different types of expert. There are experts in comparatively small details, and there are experts in large departments of life; and what is to be regarded as large or small depends on the particular purpose in view. The primary difference is

that some experts have to be constantly at hand, whereas others have only to be called in for special occasions. In a great emergency, such as the European War, advice has to be sought in many quarters to which it is not, in ordinary circumstances, necessary to appeal. In such cases, however, what is first of all wanted is someone who would know where that special advice is to be got. But, even among those more general advisers whom it is important to have always at hand, there would seem to be different types. Some are wanted to make calculations, to translate foreign documents, to look up references, and to assist in other matters of detail. These are found among clerks and civil servants. On the information which they provide it is then necessary to form judgments on larger questions of policy falling within particular departments; and it is the experts who are qualified to form such judgments that we are here in search of. It is such experts that it is desirable to have in a second chamber to criticise the proposals that are brought forward in the more popular assembly, to suggest improvements, and even, it may be, to initiate fresh proposals with reference to matters on which they are specially competent to decide. Now, what we seem to have learned from the previous considerations is that the matters on which we seek this expert guidance fall naturally within the three departments to which special attention has been directed by Dr Steiner; and we are now in a position to consider his suggestions in the light of all the hints that have been given by the other writers to whom reference has been made.

The question to which an answer is sought may now be put in this way: Granting that it is true that the great problems of social life fall into the three main departments that have been distinguished by Dr Steiner, how should we seek to organise the instruments of government so as to secure the best advice to enable us to see in what respects those who work within these departments should be guided and controlled and in what respects they should be left alone, and, where guidance or control is wanted, how it can be most effectively provided? The answer would probably have to be given somewhat differently for different communities; and it will, consequently, be best for the present to confine our attention to the circumstances that exist in Great Britain.

In view of what has been already stated, it seems clear to me that the necessary provisions could pretty easily be made in this country by the reform of the House of Lords; and, as Mr Powers points out, it would be thoroughly in

accordance with the traditions of this country to carry it out in that way. As he says, "No matter how much Britain may change the wine in the old bottles, she never changes the labels. It would disturb some people immensely if the labels were changed. They like to change with the times, but all in the restful conviction that things are 'the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.' " Now, the way has already been prepared for turning the House of Lords into an advisory body by removing the power of absolute veto—a power which, it seems certain, will never be restored. Drastic reforms have also been promised. Further, as Mr Powers points out, the House already contains a good deal of what is wanted. It is strong on the legal side, not weak in diplomatic knowledge and in grasp of military and naval affairs, and well in touch with everything that relates to external and internal defences. Thus, on the more purely political side, very little change would be necessary. The Bishops would have to be supplemented by the addition of representatives of other forms of religious organisation and of experts in various types of education (of course, including some women). Perhaps also it ought to have more representatives of literature, science, and the fine arts. With regard to the third division, the additions that would be necessary would be still more considerable, and a good many omissions would also be required. The representation of landed property would have to be considerably reduced; there would have to be a larger number of captains of industry, and some representatives of their chief lieutenants, together probably with some mayors of towns; and a large representation of the main types of labour (including that of the "black-coated" kind) would have to be added. A body thus reformed might be somewhat unwieldy; but it is to be presumed that it would, in general, meet in three separate sections—the spiritual, the political, and the industrial. It would be a single Senate, but for most purposes it would be divided into three separate Councils, to which all important questions falling within their respective provinces would be referred. The other main parts of the British Constitution—the King, the Cabinet, and the House of Commons—need not be interfered with; and I suppose the members of the Upper House would still be called Lords and Ladies (or Dames).

Many questions, no doubt, would have to be raised, with regard to the methods of electing the members of the reformed House of Lords; but it is not likely that they would present much real difficulty. It is clear, I should think, that the elections could not be made, as Mr and Mrs Webb suggest

that the elections to their proposed Social Parliament should be made, by methods similar to those by which the present House of Commons is elected. As Mr Powers remarks, "No popularly elective body can ever be such a body of experts." It would be necessary, in the first instance, to determine how many representatives of each of the main interests concerned should have seats in the reformed House. The Prussian model, to which Mr Powers refers, might be of considerable assistance here : but it can hardly be doubted that this problem would be the most difficult to deal with satisfactorily. Probably a special Commission would have to be appointed to deal with it. Once this was determined, the rest would be comparatively easy. Probably most of the representatives could be appointed by their peers, *i.e.* by those engaged in the same kind of work. In some cases (*e.g.* in choosing representatives of literature and art) it might be better that the appointments should be made by the King—that is to say, by the Prime Minister, acting with the advice of his colleagues. The fact that the Prime Minister would be expected to consult his colleagues, and to explain the grounds of his decision to the King, and probably to defend it to some other people as well, would be a considerable safeguard. We might not always get the best men (no method of election could ensure that), but we might nearly always hope to secure the second or third best of those available. In general, I suppose, the appointments would be made for life, or, at least, if there was an age limit, it would be a pretty advanced one. Of course, the mayors of towns and any similar officials would only have seats during their term of office. Other details would probably not present any serious difficulty. And I should suppose that in other countries methods not very dissimilar could be adopted. Most other countries would have the disadvantage of not being as well accustomed as we are to the adaptation of old institutions to new conditions ; but there might be some compensation for this in the greater readiness that some other countries have to venture upon new experiments. Some of them, indeed, are not altogether disinclined to imitate our own institutions.

What is chiefly important is that the spiritual and industrial sides of social life should be released from the domination of the political state, and enabled to develop freely in accordance with their own essential needs. In this connection, the recent book by Mr Austin Freeman on *Social Decay and Regeneration* may be referred to with great advantage.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

PESTERED BY A "POLTERGEIST."

NIGEL KERR.

[The Editor has made careful inquiries into the circumstances connected with what is narrated below. Whatever the explanation of the facts may be, he has no hesitation in recording his complete confidence in the genuineness of the narrative. Mr Kerr (who is still in the neighbourhood where the events took place) has met all his inquiries with the utmost frankness, has expressed himself desirous of finding a "common-sense" explanation, and has taken great pains to gather additional information at points where it was asked for. This information, wherever it is relevant, will appear in the footnotes.]

TRAVELLING not long ago on the Continent, and being at a loss for something to read, I picked up at a railway bookstall a copy, over a year old, of a well-known London magazine. I turned over the pages somewhat listlessly until my attention was arrested by an article by one of our most widely read living authors (whose name it would not need the services of a Sherlock Holmes to discover) on the subject of "Poltergeists" and "Thought-forms." I was at once deeply interested, and made up my mind that I would put together some notes which I had made at the time when I and my wife had what I still think were rather extraordinary experiences. The result is not very sensational, but the account I give is baldly true, the statement is first hand, and, if it has any merit, it is that it is made entirely on the testimony of two independent witnesses.

A reference to my German dictionary told me that a "Poltergeist" is a "racketing spirit," which did not enlighten me to any great extent. Inquiries, however, among friends more endowed than myself with the gift of tongues, satisfied me that "Poltergeist" is really most expressive in the case I am about to mention. I cannot, however, use the expression "persecuted by Poltergeists," as I had a feeling throughout that I did not matter, and that it was of no importance whether I was within the sphere of influence of the "poltering" spirit or not.

It is necessary, or at least, I believe, customary, in such narratives to mention the mentality, or at least the habit of mind, of the persons chiefly concerned—in this case my wife and myself. My wife is, or at any rate was, a disbeliever in the supernatural, and rather a militant or uncompromising one at that. She has, some years ago, slept peacefully for several nights in a much ghost-ridden chamber, which she chose because "the bed was so beautiful." Physically she is distinctly above the average in courage. As for myself, I have always been a sceptic. Many years ago I more than once craved in vain for spiritual company when in utter and well-nigh intolerable loneliness in strange lands. I have slept (very restlessly and not for choice) in badly "haunted" rooms. Never, however, until last year, have I been disturbed by "racketing" or other spirits, and so I drifted into the attitude of ignorance and indifference, with a so-called open mind, which I take it is that of the person known as the "average man." If I interpret the words rightly, I have always been an unbeliever, my wife a disbeliever.

Last year, after wandering in many lands, I decided to settle down in Italy, on the shores of one of the Italian lakes; this decision took me to the town of Brissarno,¹ which lies at the head of one of Italy's finest lakes, where we put up at a Pension in which we were uncomfortably lodged during our rather lengthy house-hunting.

Whilst making inquiries in the town and its neighbourhood, we came to know two charming elderly Danish ladies, sisters, who were anxious to dispose of all their furniture and household effects, as they had decided, after many years' residence in Italy, to retire to their native land. The elder of the two sisters was evidently greatly distressed at the idea of getting rid of her silver, china, etc., part of which had been in her family for very many years, the rest having been bequeathed to her by a very dear friend who had lived with her and had died in their house some two years previously. To think, however, of transporting all, or even a part, of the property across Europe to Denmark was out of the question, and the poor lady was fain to leave her treasures in what she called our "good hands."

A few weeks later the elder lady fell grievously ill, and after a short illness died under somewhat distressing circumstances. Her end, it was said, was hastened or embittered to some extent by her distress at parting with her beloved belongings.

¹ Fictitious name.—EDITOR.

The other lady was naturally anxious to get away from Brissarno and to go to Denmark as soon as possible. I therefore agreed to take over her house for the remaining month of her lease and until a house which I had bought was vacant. We therefore moved into Villa Wisteria in good spirits at the idea of changing from a none too comfortable Pension to a bright and cheerful modern house. So pleased were we that we were not cast down by having to face the servant question, which resulted in our being servantless and in a *solitude à deux*.

The house was a cheerful and compact little villa, built some eight years previously, and quite up-to-date in every respect.¹ On the ground floor were the kitchen, the drawing-room, and dining-room. A stone staircase led to the first floor, on which were two bedrooms, bathroom, and morning-room, the last having a door leading to one of the bedrooms as well as another opening on the landing. A wooden staircase led to the floor above, which contained three bedrooms. In the hall was a door opening on to a stone staircase, which led to three dark cellars and two basement rooms used for the central heating² arrangements and for washing, ironing, etc.

I was soon to find that the feeling of restfulness for which I had hoped after some three months of uncomfortable hotel and *pension* life was not to be realised. Before we had been many hours in our temporary home I was set a-wondering by the apparent presence of Something or Someone else besides ourselves in the house.

The first evening we were sufficiently tired to look forward to comfortable beds and fragrant linen sheets, comparing these in anticipatory pleasure with our *pension* beds of the past, whose chief point was a persistent tendency to disintegration. We therefore retired to our respective rooms (on the first floor) on the best of terms with ourselves and with the world in general.

Though tired I was not very sleepy and vainly awaited the pleasing moment, known to those who are addicted to reading in bed, when the lines become confused and the meaning of the last paragraph seems to be of extra importance. Although sleep would not come I was lazily comfortable and

¹ Further particulars of the house are as follows: It is detached, separated by eight or ten yards from houses on either side, in one of which the landlord lives. Opposite, at a distance of about eighty yards, is a girls' school. During the time to which the narrative refers this girls' school was closed, owing to an outbreak of influenza.

² The central heating apparatus was not in use when the events to be related took place.

the book was fairly interesting. I turned luxuriously in my bed, and then I heard light but distinct footsteps¹ on the stone stairs leading from the hall. The stair carpets had been removed, and I could hear the footsteps very plainly. I wondered—somewhat lazily at first—who it could be. My wife had retired to her room; the footsteps were not hers, for she has a rather heavy step and quite unlike those to which I listened. At the top of the stairs the footsteps hesitated, and, as if someone were walking in the dark, I heard hands feeling over the panels of the door of my room. Then by the bright light which was flooding my bedroom I heard and saw the handle (not a knob as is used in England, but a white-metal handle, some four or five inches long) of the door moved upwards. A thought, almost of annoyance, passed through my mind that it was a silly and futile proceeding to move the handle *upwards*, as the door could only be opened by pressing the handle *down*. Again I heard a hand or hands passed over the door, and for the second time I heard and saw the movement of the handle. I quietly got out of bed and suddenly threw the door open. The strong light from my room lit up the landing, but I could see no one. I then returned to my bed and book. All was quiet for a time, and then I heard the footsteps again; this time they were descending the wooden stairs² which led from the floor above; they reached the landing and passed across it to the morning-room, where I distinctly heard someone moving about. I remember noticing that there was no noise of the morning-room door having been opened. After watching the handle of the door which led from my room to the morning-room for some time, expecting to see it moved in the same manner as had happened to that of the other door, I left my bed and went to my wife's room, noticing on my way that the morning-room door stood ajar. In answer to my wife's inquiries I gave the excuse of damp sheets and a touch of neuralgia, and passed the rest of the night on the sofa in her room.

I said nothing to my wife about what I had heard.³ Every evening, every day and night I heard footsteps somewhere in the house, except when I was on the top floor or in

¹ Always the sound of *booted* feet. Generally the impression was that the person was wearing light boots, but on one subsequent occasion Mrs Kerr had the impression of heavy boots. She describes them as quite distinct, but as suggesting that the walker was anxious to avoid making more noise than was necessary.

² The difference between the sounds of the footsteps on the wooden and stone stairs respectively was clearly marked.

³ See footnote at end of the article.

the basement. In the daytime they struck me as being more distinct. I would hear them when I sat reading; they would go in front of me, and, less often, follow me when I went up or down the stairs. When sitting in the drawing-room I would hear someone moving about the morning-room immediately overhead, and several times chairs, etc. were unmistakably shifted in the room above. I found it difficult to rest at night; but after a while I became, in a way, more or less accustomed or callous to the movements of the *tertium quid*, and managed on the whole to sleep pretty well behind the two locked doors of my bedroom.

I heard knockings or tappings from time to time, but, after one or two attempts to locate these, I took but little notice of them. Very few, if any, days passed without some kind of "manifestations," which consisted chiefly of the sounds of footsteps or "moving about the house," or shifting furniture¹ in rooms overhead or in the next room. These, for a time, annoyed and irritated me; but after a while they undoubtedly got on my nerves, as, when sitting alone in any room on the ground or first floor, I would nearly always have the feeling that there was someone else in the room. I never experienced this feeling when my wife was present,² neither did I at any time hear any noises inside the room in which I happened to be. It will be sufficient to mention only one or two of the incidents which disturbed my peace, and also, as I afterwards found, that of my wife during our stay at Villa Wisteria.

On the evening of the fifth or sixth day of our residence in the house I had retired to bed and had fallen asleep, but was awakened by the footsteps on the wooden staircase. They came down to the landing outside my room and went down several of the stone stairs. They then stopped and returned to the landing. I then switched on my light and took up a book. In a few moments my wife opened her door and rather petulantly demanded why I was moving about at that hour of the night and thus interfering with her rest. Although I had not stirred, I thought it politic to express penitence and promise to do so no more.

¹ The previous positions of chairs, etc., could not be remembered with sufficient clearness to make sure afterwards whether they had been actually moved.

² Though (see *infra*) he often heard the noises when she did, but in another room. Mr Kerr frankly attributes this "feeling of somebody in the room" to the state of high nervous tension to which he had been wrought. He would continually turn his head, and on one occasion watched a mirror for some time in the hope that he might see the intruder. He saw nothing.—EDITOR.

It was now evident that my wife also heard the noises which disturbed me. Now and again a pause in her conversation, a listening attitude, and a puzzled look had made me feel sure that she also heard what I did, and now I was convinced. I still, however, kept my own counsel. She would sometimes ask me, "Did you hear that?" but my invariable answer was "No." On one occasion, at our evening meal, she asked me to go into the hall and see what was tapping or knocking. I had heard this noise for some little time, but had taken no notice of it. I went out and found that the tapping came from the door (which was ajar) at the top of the basement steps. On approaching the door it was rather disconcertingly pulled to: I promptly locked it and returned to the dining-room. After that the tappings were heard faintly at intervals during the evening.

Some days later I had further proof that my wife was by no means comfortable at Villa Wisteria. I had gone out one afternoon, leaving my wife alone in the house. During my absence two French ladies called in order to obtain some information about the house, which they thought of taking after our departure. My wife took them into the drawing-room and gave them tea, explaining that she was alone in the house, being without a servant and her husband being out. The three ladies talked for some time, and, at one point of the conversation when one of the French ladies was speaking, my wife heard someone at the front door; the inner glass door was opened and leisurely closed, and footsteps were heard in the hall. The lady who was speaking paused and listened, plainly showing that she also heard the noise. Someone then appeared to go to the stairs, to ascend three steps, and to stop where the hatstand stood in the curve of the staircase. The footsteps then continued their way upstairs very slowly and deliberately, and a cough was heard. The steps were heard to cross the landing and then to move about the morning-room, immediately overhead; a heavy chair appeared to be dragged across the room and movements made with it as if someone were settling into it. The French lady who had been speaking asked: "You have then someone staying in the house?" My wife answered "No," and explained that her husband must have come home, having let himself in with his latchkey. She then went into the hall and called me once or twice. Receiving no answer, she concluded that I was not anxious to join the party, as a complete knowledge of the French language is not one of my accomplishments. The ladies resumed their conversation,

and in due time the visitors began to make their adieux. Moving into the hall they lingered there for a while, the French ladies rather volubly discussing the merits of the house and the demerits of the landlord.¹ A door on the first-floor landing was heard to open, or at least to be moved, and also footsteps which were apparently those of someone who was about to come downstairs but who stopped in order to listen. One of the visitors, after a short pause, remarked on the indiscretion of making criticisms on the landlord and his ways, as the person upstairs might be a friend of his. My wife reassured her, saying that her husband, the only other person in the house, was in no way interested in the landlord, even if he understood what was being said. The visitors then left. My wife, never doubting for a moment that I was in the house, hurried upstairs, calling me as she went. She found me in none of the rooms, and, thinking that I, in an unwonted fit of playfulness, was hiding from her, searched for me thoroughly. She found no one. Fear then came upon her; she fled downstairs and locked herself in the kitchen, from which she was released by my arrival about an hour later.²

She met me in the hall and rather excitedly told me that there was someone in the house, begging me to search immediately for the intruder. I at once assented. I locked all the doors on the ground floor, putting the keys in my pocket, and, arming myself with a formidable alpenstock and lighting a lantern in case of the electric light being suddenly turned off, I searched the two upper floors in a very drastic and complete manner. I then examined the ground floor and basement in an equally thorough fashion. Vastly to my wife's disappointment, and to some extent (for I had had but little hope of success) to my own, our quest proved fruitless.

After the above episode I had a rather unreasonable hope that we might be left in peace. I was becoming tired of, and considerably annoyed by, these disturbances, and felt sure that, before long, I should become afraid. One evening, however, I had proof that there was to be no rest for us. I went out with my wife, who went shopping in the town, and, as a natural result, was soon laden with inconvenient parcels. As we happened at one time to be near Villa Wisteria I

¹ The landlord's attitude to my occupation of the house was quite friendly.

² She had the presence of mind to lock the door leading to the basement on her way. She listened intently while she was locked in the kitchen, but heard no sound.

decided to leave the packages there, rejoining my wife a little later. I let myself into the house with my latchkey, and, as it was now dark, felt for the electric-light switch—an operation which was somewhat impeded by the multitude of parcels which I was carrying. As I fumbled for the switch I heard the footsteps on the first-floor landing; they came briskly down the stairs, and the idea seized me that they would arrive at the bottom of the staircase (which was almost alongside the front door) before I could get out of the house. A great desire to run away was what I felt, for I was afraid. I dropped the parcels on the floor, and found myself in the road in quicker time than I should have thought possible.

I was really very glad when our stay in Villa Wisteria was drawing to a close. I, for one, was sick and tired of the house and its happenings, and was looking forward to going to a house of my own.

Our packing was a strenuous task, and kept us, and to a great extent our minds, well employed, so that I at least was not specially disturbed during the last few days which we spent in this horrid little house. On the last evening I went to bed late and very tired by my share of the preparations for moving on the morrow. My wife decided to finish packing her trunks before she retired for the night, so as not to have too much to do in the morning. I had been asleep for what seemed to me to be a short time when I was aroused by the footsteps in the hall: they came, none too softly,¹ I thought, up the stone stairs and reached the landing. I heard one or two steps on the wooden floor of the landing, and then a piercing scream from my wife and the violent slamming of her door. After a pause I heard the steps ascending the wooden stairs, and then all was still. I shouted to my wife, asking if she were all right or if anything was wrong, and she replied that nothing was the matter and she had just finished. I shortly afterwards fell asleep again and was not further disturbed.

I said nothing to my wife until we had settled down the next day in our new house. I questioned her and told her all my own troubles in Villa Wisteria.

From the first day in that bedevilled abode, it appeared, she was oppressed by the feeling that someone else was in the house besides ourselves. She heard every day, evening or night, footsteps and other noises: her experiences were similar to, and in a good many cases identical with, my own. As with me, she was never disturbed on the upper floor; but,

¹ Mrs Kerr, however, describes the steps as "stealthy."

unlike myself, she was much oppressed by the "presence" in the basement, and had several times ascended the stairs leading therefrom backwards, being frightened by the noises below. She often would lock herself in one of the rooms on the ground or first floor on account of "someone moving about the house," and noticed that she was most molested when the house was most cheerful; that is, in the forenoon or middle day, when the sun lit up all the principal rooms. She would not say anything to me for fear of my making fun of her and her "fancies"; but now, in our new house she could tell me all. She told me about the incident of the visit of the French ladies, which I have detailed above, and explained the adventure of the last night. She had finished packing one trunk, which was on the landing; she was kneeling in front of another box, which was half or three-quarters filled, being with her back to the landing, with the box just inside the door, which, of course, stood wide open. She heard, as did I also, the footsteps coming up from the hall; as they came nearer she felt paralysed and unable to move, even to look round; she felt icy cold, and colder still as the steps crossed the landing behind her; then she felt a pressure on the back of her neck. Whatever it was "it did not feel like a hand," but it was very cold, and the pressure was firm but gentle. Her head was slowly but irresistibly pushed downwards until her face was almost within the box which she was packing. With a supreme effort she pushed the box from her inside the room, sprang to her feet, and, with a scream which I had heard, slammed the door and locked it. She saw nothing though the landing was well lit up. On my shouting to her she answered as she did, as she "did not want to make a fuss."

As we compared notes, my wife was surprised to find that I had also suffered from the attentions of the "Poltergeist," and had suffered at the same moment as herself on so many occasions. We were rather impressed by our experiences, and very thankful to find ourselves safely away from the hated footsteps and other worrying noises.

As for Villa Wisteria, I visited it again a couple of days or so after we had left it, in order to make sure that we had left nothing behind. The rooms were bare and empty, and, as I explored them from top to basement, I listened everywhere intently, but heard nothing. The house lay empty for a considerable time, but was eventually taken by two *sposini* (young newly-married people), who, so far as I know, have not been disturbed by any unwelcome

visitors. This I can believe, for they are doubtless fulfilling the destiny of all *sposini*, and are "living happily ever afterwards."¹

NIGEL KERR.

¹ Further inquiry has revealed the following facts :—

The married couple who took the house after Mr Kerr's departure have suffered no disturbance since the date of the narrative.

It will be observed that two deaths had taken place in the house : (1) the death, about two years prior to Mr Kerr's tenancy, of the "friend" (Miss X) who bequeathed the silver, etc. to one of the Danish ladies ; (2) the death of the Danish lady aforesaid a few weeks before Mr Kerr came in.

Mr Kerr has now ascertained that the house was the subject of gossip in the neighbourhood, of which, till the other day, he had heard nothing.

It occurred to the Editor to inquire what precisely were the articles Mrs Kerr was packing into the trunk when she was assailed in the manner described above. Were they part of the personal belongings of Miss X bequeathed by her to the Danish lady and purchased by Mr Kerr on taking over the house ? The answer was in the affirmative. The articles consisted in part of the household linen marked with the initials of Miss X. The room in which the packing took place had been her bedroom.

Mr Kerr expresses regret that neither he nor Mrs Kerr can find less sensational terms to describe what happened on the occasion of the packing. He apologises for such terms as "icy cold," but declares he has done his best to avoid exaggerations.

In response to a natural inquiry as to the cause of the mutual silence of husband and wife during the earlier stages of the occurrences, Mr Kerr has been quite explicit. The explanation obviously turns on the personal characteristics of the parties concerned. The subject belonged to a class which the one treated with contempt and the other with indifference ; each was anxious to avoid the derision of the other or, in the alternative, the raising of an alarm. They were alone in the house together, and had to stay there a month.—EDITOR.

TELEPATHY.

W. R. BOUSFIELD, K.C., F.R.S.

THE subject of telepathy is too important to be disposed of in the casual way in which it is treated by Mr Clodd. It is hardly a branch of the "occult," and it has little connection with spiritualism, although Mr Clodd seems to think that the "high priests of spiritualism" are the chief authorities on the subject. Telepathy between living persons has been made the subject of careful research by those who have no dealings with spiritualism. In fact, spiritualists find it one of their chief difficulties, since they are often in doubt as to whether the telepathic hypothesis in any given case may not demolish the spiritualistic hypothesis. If telepathy exists it is as important and far-reaching a phenomenon for the psychologist as is the law of gravitation for the physicist. There is a scarcity of persons who are sufficiently telepathically sensitive for definite experiment, but there are facts which tend to show that everyone has traces of the faculty. We cannot perceive the action of gravitation between two apples hanging side by side, but the effect of the earth upon either of them is clear. So a telepathic impulse between any two normal persons may be hardly perceptible, but the summation of the effects of a crowd of persons or a nation on single individuals may be considerable.

Let us consider why the materialist is so antipathetic to telepathy and why we cannot accept his *ex cathedra* utterances upon the subject instead of research. To the materialist mind is a function of matter, thought a secretion of the brain, consciousness a side-show of metabolism. One materialist has evolved the brilliant idea that the belief in telepathy is "a derivative of the *flatus* complex." Telepathy is one of a group of ideas which run counter to the materialistic theory, and the materialist rejects the whole group: that there is any mind controlling the evolution of matter, that our thoughts can reach a mind in the unseen, or that inspirations from

such a mind can reach us—such ideas are *anathema* to the materialist. And though his theory is entirely unproved, he rejects with supercilious scorn ideas which run counter to it. This is an attitude of mind which is familiar to psychologists, and is worth examination.

Mr Clodd points out the readiness with which some people generalise from solitary instances and accept theories on insufficient evidence when they have a bias in a particular direction. The observation is very true, and cuts both ways. Psychologists tell us that opinions which are in accord with a person's mental constellations as fixed in his subconscious mind are accepted on very slender evidence, whilst opinions which are in conflict with his mental constellations are rejected summarily, and often no amount of evidence will bring conviction. What Mr Clodd, in common with many eminent scientists, overlooks is that the materialistic complex is generally far more powerful than a spiritualistic complex. It may be established in various ways, and its potency will depend on the particular way in which it is set up. We may examine three ways.

The first is by early education. It is obvious that a person brought up on materialistic theories will acquire a strong materialistic bias. The strength of the complex will not be so great as in the next cases to be considered. It will be comparable in strength to the spiritualistic bias which may result from early education, and one need not further enlarge upon it. A simple educational bias is often amenable to reason and evidence.

The second method arises in the case of a person who in early youth receives the normal ideas of God, of a moral law with moral sanctions, and of a continued existence after death. If such a person comes to live in defiance of such early training, the ideas of moral law and moral responsibility become odious and repellent. He puts them on one side whenever he transgresses the moral law in which he has been educated. Finally, these ideas are repressed, and with them the whole constellation of circumjacent ideas involving the conception of a Divine power. The materialistic complex is set up in its most powerful form and becomes practically inexpugnable.

The third way in which the materialistic complex may be set up is of a quite different kind. The youth may be brought up to believe in the literal inspiration of the Bible. His early religion, instead of being founded on the solid spiritual appeal of the teachings of the Bible, includes in its ambit a belief in the stopping of the sun and moon by Joshua and

the rescue of Jonah by the whale. No distinction is made between miracles which necessarily involve a breach of natural order and miracles which may be regarded as achieved by a higher knowledge of natural laws. He is taught that all alike are of the essence of religion, and that critical examination is equivalent to scepticism. But as soon as a scientific training leads him to the inference that there is no sufficient reason to believe that the order of nature has ever been broken in upon in these marvellous ways, the whole fabric of the religious beliefs in which he has been educated is often shattered. They go by the board. The belief in the whole constellation of ideas, which is for him bound up with the miraculous, is repressed. He is usually unable to readjust his standpoint by regarding some miracles as the working of higher natural laws and some as being distorted in their description by the psychology of the narrators. The spiritual element in the sacred books is rejected along with the miraculous element. The whole constellation of religious ideas is repressed and a strong materialistic complex is set up. And if this generation of the complex is combined with that previously described its potency is irresistible.

When once a person has acquired a powerful materialistic complex no amount of evidence which runs counter to materialistic conceptions will satisfy him. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he subconsciously avoids the consideration of the evidence, or invents ingenious theories which enable him to put it on one side. The "high priests" of materialism would no more experiment with telepathy than they would experiment with perpetual motion. For them the materialistic complex bars out a serious consideration of telepathy just as surely as the laws of thermodynamics bar out the consideration of perpetual motion. A thoroughgoing materialist regards them as equally beyond the pale of inquiry.

It is true that a bias of an opposite character may afflict another set of persons and may cause them to accept evidence with too great readiness. But such a bias is usually much less deeply rooted than that induced by the materialistic complex. It is probably the result of early influences, but is not usually founded, as may be the case with the materialistic complex, on the forcible repression by the subconscious mind of a group of ideas which have become repugnant.

Several cases could be cited of scientists of distinction in their own department whose materialistic complex is clearly indicated by the extreme feebleness of their arguments

when they touch upon the subject of telepathy (though within their own department of science their minds are of the most acute), or by their refusal to trouble about evidence or experiment, being content to appraise the matter as being antimaterialistic and unworthy of further inquiry. They might say with Mr Clodd: "The one and all-sufficing argument which demolishes the telepathic theory is that what is assumed to be due to telepathy is explained by coincidences." The weakness of such an "all-sufficing argument" is clear evidence of an acute materialistic complex. The materialist will reply that there are also men of high scientific reputation who display a similar feebleness when examining evidence of the "occult." It is certainly true that both classes must be on their guard against the subconscious bias. But we find on the one side a spirit of inquiry which leads to the phenomena and the evidence being made the subject of prolonged and critical inquiry, whilst on the other side *a priori* views close the avenue of research.

Most people have not the time to investigate telepathic phenomena for themselves, and have to form their opinions from articles such as that of Mr Clodd and his opponents, preferably from the researches of those who have gone thoroughly into the alleged phenomena. They do not realise that a definite complex, whether materialistic or spiritualistic, disqualifies a researcher from interpreting the experimental facts authoritatively. Yet the ordinary person has to consider the authorities, though one may agree with Mr Clodd that authority alone is insufficient. Says Mr Clodd of those who "believe" in telepathy: "The high priests of spiritualism are cited as authorities from whom there can be no appeal, as if authority had any validity." And then he immediately begins to quote the "high priests" of materialism: "Telepathy is simply a boldly invented word for a supposed phenomenon which has never been demonstrated." Clearly we must weigh our authorities and consider how far they may be disabled by bias. It is all very well to rest satisfied with authority when it comes to reckoning the life period of radium emanations, as to which not one person in a hundred thousand can get direct evidence apart from authority. But in a matter like telepathy it is astonishing that Mr Clodd and some people of even greater eminence should expect us to be satisfied with the assurance that "the one and all-sufficing argument which demolishes the telepathic theory is that what is assumed to be due to telepathy is explained by coincidences." One would like to see Mr Clodd apply this "all-sufficing argument" to the group of experi-

mental facts which are set out later. But in weighing the authorities one has to remember that the materialistic "authority" usually declines experiment, rarely has any first-hand knowledge of the facts, and is swayed by a complex, often of the most powerful kind, which disposes *a priori* of any evidence which runs counter to materialism. The statement of such a one that there is "no evidence" of telepathy must be read in the light of his psychological history.

For the reasons given above the *ex cathedra* utterances of eminent materialists on such a subject as telepathy are valueless, and should not mislead those who are seeking for truth. And it is of some importance to put on record, for the benefit of those who are open-minded, any experiments which may help to elucidate the true character of the phenomenon.

The difficulty which meets one in experimenting with telepathy is that the telepathic faculty, like the musical faculty, is only fully developed in a few exceptional individuals. There are a few people whose fingers, straying over the notes of a piano, bring forth nothing but harmony. They can improvise by the hour. They can listen to a symphony unheard before and sit down and reproduce it. The faculty is inborn. Practice and study may develop it, but it must be inborn. *Nascitur non fit*. The evidence of the existence of such gifted folk is conclusive. But arguments such as those of Mr Clodd would lead us to doubt the evidence. We have to admit that no one has the remotest idea of the *modus operandi* of the musical faculty. Therefore, according to Mr Clodd's argument, it should be non-existent! The brain contains no indication that any part of it is specialised to cause the fingers to give out harmony spontaneously. Therefore, in Mr Clodd's opinion, we must doubt the evidence! The fact that the fingers of the improvisator fall on notes which satisfy our sense of harmony must be attributed to a series of coincidences! The sense of harmony is so far removed from materialism that our materialist might try to dispose of the phenomenon in this way, were it not that the evidence of the facts is conclusive. In truth, such *a priori* arguments as Mr Clodd brings forward are not of the slightest use except to give the materialist an excuse for rejecting evidence *in limine*. He will not take the trouble to examine it in the scientific spirit. He has no desire that a spark should disturb his clod. And even if he is willing to take the risk of this, he finds that unless he is particularly fortunate he cannot get a suitable subject for his experiments.

For the telepathic sensitive is as rare as the born musician, though experiment makes it probable that most people have a trace of the faculty. One of the essential conditions for a telepathic sensitive is the capacity of holding the consciousness blank, like a sheet of clean paper upon which a message may be written. The faculty of producing this receptive condition at will is rare. Even a normal person may have blank moments in which he is temporarily sensitive and receptive. But to produce this state of receptivity at will is beyond the power of all except a few.

The following experiments arose out of a sort of game indulged in from time to time in the family circle, the sensitive subject being a relative, well known as a composer and singer, and having nothing abnormal about him but a highly developed musical faculty. I will call him L. The experiments are some years old, but I dare say L might be induced to repeat them, for the benefit of a really candid and competent observer. The game at first began with the well-known sport of concealing some small object when L was out of the room. Then he came in blindfolded. Someone held his hand without giving any conscious direction to L, and L was able to find the object. This appeared to be a sort of muscle-reading, and in fact I was able to do it myself with some success by observing the unconscious movements of the guiding hand. The game was varied by placing hands on L's shoulders, with the same result. On one occasion L said, "I think I could find the thing without your touching me." We tried this, all sitting still whilst L searched blindfold, and were surprised to find that success ensued. Gradually the thing developed into a particular routine which we practised from time to time. L being out of the room, we fixed on some small object in the room as to which—

- (1) L was to come in and find the object.
- (2) To do some definite act with it.

There was now no need to hide the object to be found, as L did not know what it was; nor was there any need for him to be blindfolded, though he preferred to close his eyes. He always sought the object with one hand over his eyes and the other held out in front of him.

This definite routine was practised until success was almost invariable. Usually the requirement was to take, say, a small ornament or a book or other loose object and to give it to someone or put it into a definite place or receptacle. But it was varied from time to time, though it always involved two steps—finding some object and doing something with it. Thus on one occasion L was to find a gas-tap on a bracket

over his head and then turn out the light. On another occasion he was to pick up an evening newspaper lying on a table and tear off a corner of it. He got the paper at once, and stood hesitating as to what to do with it, but in a few seconds he took the other hand from his eyes and tore off a corner of the paper. Some failures give useful clues. If in settling the object to be dealt with one object was suggested and then we changed over to another, it sometimes happened that the first object was found instead of the one finally fixed on. Again, the requirement of sitting down to the piano and playing or singing a song or tune could not be attained, although L was a musician who required no music score. He would sit at the piano as required and move his hands over the keys, but the air did not come, either when the company thought of the name of the tune or, as it were, hummed the air internally.

Asked as to how the impression as to what he was to do came to him, L replied that he came into the room with his mind a blank and moved to the object under an impulse which he could not define. In fact, he held himself ready to do anything, without any preconceived notions as to what he had to find or do, and then just obeyed the impulse coming from our minds. This suggested to me that with a hypnotised person whose mind was a *tabula rasa* the phenomenon might occur without special telepathic sensitiveness. A Danish hypnotiser (whose name I forget) was at this time giving some private demonstrations. One of these I attended, there being about twenty people there and a readily hypnotisable subject. I asked the hypnotiser to make the experiment for me. There was a table at one end of the long room on which our coats and hats were deposited. To avoid the possibility of the subject hearing, I wrote on a piece of paper that I wanted the subject to go to the table and take a particular bowler hat and put it on his own head. We stood behind the subject, without any contact, and he obeyed literally the unspoken command. I ought to add that I have since asked a friend who has been dealing with shell-shock cases hypnotically to repeat the experiment on one of his patients, but he was not able to get an unspoken command obeyed; but there are many recorded experiments in which this has been done. Whether success depends on some quality of the mind of the hypnotiser or of the subject is doubtful, but here is obviously an easy field for experiment.

The final development of our experiments threw some further light on the matter. L was staying in the Isle of Wight with some dozen members of the family one year at

Christmas-time. We tried a new form of the game, something like the old drawing-room game of "clubs." We were divided into two hostile groups whose requirements were different. Say Group I. desired that L should take a paper-weight and put it into a vase, whilst Group II. desired that he should take a spoon and put it into a coal-scuttle. When L entered the room the tug-of-war began, one side concentrating on the paper-weight and the other on the spoon. Generally one side or the other succeeded completely in getting their requirement fully satisfied. But it sometimes happened that if L followed the desire of one side and took, say, the spoon, the other side would be able to get it put into the vase instead of the coal-scuttle. When one side succeeded completely, one of its members was transferred to the other group. Thus if each original group contained six persons, after the first success the group which succeeded would be reduced to five and the other group augmented to seven. This sometimes went on until the successful group was reduced to two, who could score off the whole ten of the other group. As the same persons usually constituted the successful pair, it is clear that some persons were capable of more forcible "willing" or concentration than others.

As to what may have been the *modus operandi* of the telepathic impulse, the above experiments are inconclusive. Some experimenters have succeeded in conveying visualised impressions, such as pictures of geometrical figures; others have succeeded in passing on words and ideas. In the case of my own experiments, it is not clear that an idea or sequence of words was transmitted, though the cases of turning off the gas-tap or tearing off the corner of a newspaper come very near it. Probably, upon the evidence, both words, ideas, sensations, and motor impulses may be transferred telepathically.

As far as the above experiments are concerned, the particular kind of telepathy demonstrated seems to have been chiefly the transmission of motor impulses. Examining my own series of mental operations in "willing" L to find the object, they would be something as follows:—"Go straight on, now a little to the right, now forward again; now move your hand to the left, now down, now grasp the object." One would not think of the object, but of the way to it. How my ideas of movement could be translated into L's movements is a mystery. But it is no more a mystery than how one's own ideas of a series of movements which one desires to make are translated into the actual movements. One conceives the idea of lifting one's arm, and executes it. There

is all the machinery of brain nerves and muscles ready to execute it, but how one's motor idea impinges on one's own machinery for execution is unknown and likely to remain so. In the same way how one's motor idea can impinge on the motor machinery of another is equally unknown and likely to remain so. But whether the motor impulse impinges direct on the other's motor machinery, or whether it is first converted into an idea conscious or subconscious in the recipient, is a matter which may possibly be resolved by suitable experiments.

Passing to another class of cases in which one may endeavour to transmit an elementary idea as to which successes and failures are subject to definite mathematical probability, one may first consider the case mentioned by Mr Clodd. He tells us that Dr Coover made 10,000 experiments, by selecting a card from a pack and "willing" for fifteen or twenty seconds that it should come into the mind of another individual who was present and "making efforts to receive the telepathic communication." The number of correct answers was what it should have been on the doctrine of chances, so that the telepathic hypothesis was excluded. One's experience of similar experiments would lead one to anticipate such a result. To hold the idea of, say, the three of spades in one's mind for fifteen or twenty seconds, without the intrusion of other ideas, is difficult. One would have expected better results from a quick intensive concentration and an instantaneous response. But the "efforts to receive the telepathic communication" would be fatal. The receptive condition of mind is effortless.

I tried a simpler series of experiments with cards on a chance series of people with better results. I went through the pack of fifty-two cards and asked the subject when I looked at a card to say whether the idea of black or red jumped into his head. I was, of course, thinking of the colour as I looked at the card. The pack was run through quite quickly. I kept a record for some time of the results, and the average was about twenty-nine correct answers to twenty-three wrong ones out of the fifty-two cards. This would indicate that with ordinary persons there was some evidence of a trace of the telepathic faculty. The chance of mere guesses being correct is, of course, even. But I had an opportunity of trying this experiment with a telepathic sensitive (the daughter of a late doorkeeper of the House of Commons) who was accustomed to give demonstrations with a man whose name I forget. I will call him C. They came to my house, where we had a small party of friends

assembled, and had no idea that I wanted anything so simple as this.

I went into the hall with C and a pack of cards, having arranged that when we were looking at a card I knocked on the door outside. The lady inside was at once to say the colour which came into her mind—either black or red. The door was then opened for someone to report to me what she had said. I was surprised to find that the whole series was correctly told, without one error—red, black, black, red, red, red, black, red, and so on. Here, of course, the chance against the correct series being given was too enormous to leave open any hypothesis but that of telepathy. There was no possibility of fraud, whether by signalling or otherwise, and the test was sprung upon C and the lady without any opportunity of collusion.

It is interesting to note that when I myself was the subject the card experiments failed. After I had given a sequence of guesses, say red, red, red, I found my mind arguing that the next must probably be black, and so on. I found it impossible to preserve a purely receptive or passive state of mind, and the results were as often wrong as right. So far as these experiments go, telepathic sensitiveness requires this capacity for preserving a blank mind, purely passive to impressions. Other qualities may be needed, but this passivity seems to be essential to receptivity.

Here, then, for those who say there is "no evidence" of telepathy I put on record these humble experiments. Most of the people who took part in them are available as witnesses. But I don't flatter myself that anyone who is afflicted with the materialistic complex will think it worth while to pursue the subject. For such a one, in the words of Mr Clodd, "The one and all-sufficing argument which demolishes the telepathic theory" will be the theory of coincidences, or perhaps they may super-add the theory of trickery.

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THE RELATION OF CLASS DIVISIONS TO SOCIAL CONDUCT.

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THE aim of the budding science of social psychology is to interpret the social process in terms of the human mind. It is universally recognised that man's history as a living being is but an incident in the wider history of organic life. At some time in the past he branched off from the main stem and developed his peculiarities in circumstances that are but now beginning to be understood. In consequence of this relationship to the rest of the animal world man has certain mental as well as physical characteristics that belong to him alone, or, rather, are more fully developed in him. The characteristics that he gained before he became specialised in his present shape he shares with many other forms of living beings, and these characteristics are found in every normal member of the species. But he has also become possessed of an intellectual side to his mental make-up, and in this respect he differs widely from any other member of the living world. In his intellectual manifestations man also differs widely from individual to individual. When a child is born into the world he brings with him the innate instinctive tendencies that the species acquired in the dim past; and also a mind indefinitely elastic and capable of being moulded into many shapes. From the moment of his birth he is subjected to a thousand and one influences to which his instinctive and his intellectual parts respond according to their several capacities. As the result of this process continued through many generations there has grown up our civilisation, so that a modern child inherits physically the tradition of the species in the form of instincts, and the social tradition of mankind in the form of education, giving

that term the widest possible connotation. His family, teachers, comrades, political party, church, newspaper, and many other agencies are at work influencing him in various ways, witting and unwitting. He possesses the capacity of suggestion, and thus responds to these influences and gradually acquires certain characteristics of thought and behaviour.

If it were a matter of accounting for the fact that these external influences work upon the minds of all of us, the task of apportioning their various contributions to the final result would be difficult enough. But the problem of social psychology is far more complicated than that. Not only has man instinctive and intellectual capacities which respond to the influence of social institutions, but he also has himself produced those institutions in the course of his history. Some of them go back to the times when he was yet undifferentiated from other species, but the great majority belong exclusively to man.

The result of this process is to complicate the problem of determining cause and effect. Consequently, students have not yet reached an agreement as to the fundamental principles upon which the proper method of study shall be based. For instance, in a homely example, are we to look upon the Society of Friends as an organisation that produces in its members a specific mode of behaviour, a definite attitude towards certain forms of social activity such as war, or are we to believe that men with these tendencies come to group themselves spontaneously into that Society? Are the Friends what are termed pacifists because they belong to that Society, or do they belong to the Society because they are pacifists? Again, is the average public schoolboy, with his stereotyped points of view and modes of action, the product of the Public School system, or is the system itself the expression of something else, the class whence comes the boy, and thus is simply carrying on the same form of education to which he has constantly been subjected from birth upwards?

Such examples could be multiplied without coming to any positive decision in all cases. Sometimes it is obvious that the answer must be sought in one, and sometimes in another, direction. But what is most needed is some method of study that will finally lead to the foundation of a real science of social psychology, that will be capable of determining cause and effect, and of predicting the effects of given social institutions on the members of society. How far we are from that desirable state is shown by a glance at

the press in times of social stress. We are faced now with the demand of a large part of the community, consisting mainly of the proletariat—that portion of the community whose sole form of wealth lies in itself,—that some social institutions, such as the mines, railways, and so forth, be made the property of the community. They base their case ultimately upon the contention that this will tend to social peace, to produce the frame of mind best fitted to cause men to work for the good of the community rather than for themselves. On the other hand, the class that controls these social institutions claims that the onward march of civilisation is only assured by an appeal to the selfish part of man's nature, and that if these institutions were made national property it would inevitably follow that stagnation of commerce would set in and ruin would result.

This matter may be looked upon as one of politics. But it is more than that : it is a problem in social psychology. Both sides are predicting what will happen in given social circumstances. Under the institution of the national ownership of the coal mines or the railways one side claims that one sort of social behaviour, the other that another sort of behaviour, will result. Which side is right ? It is impossible in the present state of the study of social psychology to answer that question. The attitude of mind towards it will, in the present circumstances, usually be determined by the past history of the individual, and judgment will be pronounced that is based upon reasons that often have nothing whatever to do with the case, reasons that often will be quite unsuspected by the utterer of the particular opinion.

In such a case as this the determination of cause and effect is not easy. Which side are we to believe in this matter, and why ? We are confronted with a welter of cause and effect that makes the problem of disentanglement seem hopeless. I have chosen this example in order to show the nature of the problem of the determination of some method of distinguishing cause and effect in human institutions. It is evident that certain institutions carry with them a corresponding mode of behaviour, but as to what is the real cause of this behaviour it is not possible to determine at the present time in a way that carries conviction.

The discussion of the rights and wrongs of the claim for nationalisation need not concern us here : these matters are too controversial and shot through with emotional tone to make them safe topics for discussion. Let us remove ourselves away from them and examine dispassionately some social institution with a view to understanding its relation-

ship with the corresponding mode of behaviour : let us take the custom of wearing clothes.

At the present day any ordinary person is appalled if he dreams that he is walking down the street half or wholly naked. Whatever be the cause of such a dream, the sensation shocks his feelings of modesty, and he hastens to cover himself in the orthodox manner. What is the relationship of the feeling of shame to the act of wearing clothes ? Has shame played any part in causing men to adopt clothing : or can it be that it has developed after clothing came in ? What do we mean by shame, and how do we interpret it ? It is certain that a Mohammedan woman has quite different ideas from a Christian woman, for she never goes abroad without a veil that covers the greater part of her face. At the same time she does not hesitate to leave uncovered limbs that Christian women would blush to leave naked. Yet both of these opposing attitudes are the accompaniments of clothing. Again, it is evident that small children have no sense of nakedness. It may be claimed that the reason is that they have not reached puberty, and that modesty comes into play then. But it may be replied that plenty of savages wear no clothes and exhibit no sense of shame at so doing. I think that these facts make it evident that shame must be put on one side as a causative factor in the institution of clothing. It may be suggested that cold caused men to wear clothes ; but here again one can point to people who live naked in inhospitable climates. The peoples of Tierra del Fuego go about with a skin slung over their shoulder, but wear no real clothing. In this they constitute a great contrast to the Eskimo of Greenland, who are well clad in skins. If cold makes the Eskimo wear these clothes, why does it not produce the same effect in Tierra del Fuego ? Here again it looks as if the feeling displayed when clothing is removed did not act as a causative factor in producing the institution. We should feel cold and probably die if we were to be exposed on a December day : we should certainly make strenuous efforts to get our clothes on again. But it would seem that such considerations do not prevent Siberian natives from allowing their children to play stark naked in the snow in mid-winter.

Even in a case apparently so simple as that of clothing, it seems impossible to determine from the institution itself and its psychological accompaniments what really brought that institution into existence. How is this matter to be settled ? We can approach the matter by remembering that some peoples go about stark naked. So do animals. Presumably,

then, there was a time in the history of human society when dress first came into being. What manner of dress was this? It is not easy to say with certainty; but the balance of evidence goes to show that the earliest form of dress consisted of a belt of cowrie shells worn by women round their waists in order to promote fertility.¹ For certain reasons the cowrie shell became looked upon as a fertilising agent, and was used to procure larger families. The evidence is too intricate to put forward here, but, to my mind at least, it would seem that this suggestion, which we owe to Professor Elliot Smith, is very near the mark. In any case, it is certain that much early clothing was worn with this aim of promoting fertility, and for other magical reasons connected with the propagation of the race, as well as for ornament.

If we take this solution of Dr Elliot Smith's as a working hypothesis, it would seem that the institution of clothing was begun with one aim, but has altered its import. Round itself it has gathered modes of feeling hitherto dormant or non-existent. The enumeration of the total psychological effects in modern society of dress in all its bearings would be a difficult task, so manifold and subtle are they. In the first place, accustomed as we are to wearing clothes, we experience discomfort if we take them off, except in very hot weather: we should experience shame if this were done in public, certainly in the presence of the opposite sex. Fine feathers make fine birds; so if we wish to create a good impression we put on our best clothes. Soldiers and others dress up in uniforms, and thereby acquire status. Think of the prestige in France of any sort of uniform. Think of the degradation of clothes marked with a broad arrow. In these and many other ways does clothing influence the behaviour of men in society.

The examination of this one institution enables us to advance one step towards the foundation of a method of inquiry in social psychology. We have seen that the forms of behaviour associated with an institution may have nothing whatever to do with the causation of the institution, but are themselves caused by it. We find again that an institution can come into existence for one reason, and that it may persist for other reasons. Thus clothing, which certainly was, in the earlier stages of human development, a form of magical contrivance, as well as an ornament, has dropped its magical nature in advanced civilisations and become purely ornamental as well as protective.

¹ See G. Elliot Smith, *The Evolution of the Dragon*, Manchester, 1919, for an account of this topic, pp. 153 *et seq.*

The disappearance of the magical aspect of clothing is important. We can take the use of magical charms for the promotion of fertility as a social institution which came into being owing to certain causes into which we need not inquire. But it has entirely disappeared in our own society, at least among its more educated members. So it would seem that a social institution does not necessarily persist. Plenty of examples could be quoted of institutions that have entirely disappeared. This is an important fact, for it shows that not only is the origin of a social institution a matter of importance, but so also is its persistence. An institution persists because certain forces cause it to persist, and these forces must be discovered. The institution of clothing has created certain needs that apparently originally did not exist. These created needs, and not the original causes, keep the institution in existence. The institution has created its own environment and thrives in it.

Translating this into general terms, it follows that there are three aspects under which a social institution must be studied. It has a beginning, and certain causes brought it into being. Then certain causes tend to its persistence, these causes not necessarily being those that gave rise to it. The institution, once in existence, itself produces effects upon the behaviour of those who come under its influence. This threefold aspect of human institutions must never be left out of mind when any problem of human behaviour in society is being examined. It is now evident how apparently complicated are the problems of the nationalisation of mines and railways. In order to understand them properly we should have to institute wide historical investigations into the origins of the various institutions involved, and work out the complicated interactions of institution and behaviour that proceed from them. These problems are difficult, but that should not make us despair of their solution. For it is possible that we are looking at them from the wrong point of view, and that a proper orientation would soon cause vast masses of facts to wheel into line. Complexity is often read into phenomena by the observer: it is not always there in reality.

The main problem of social psychology is, therefore, primarily historical. We must, as Rivers puts it, "ascertain what happens and what has happened" in society, leaving till later the more difficult task of trying to find out "why it happened and has happened."¹

The usual frame of mind in which social psychology is

¹ "Sociology and Psychology," *Sociological Review*, 1916.

approached is that in which the inquirer argues that "social events follow a certain course because our knowledge of the human mind shows that they must follow this course."¹ But that is exactly what we want to know. What is "Human Nature"? what knowledge have we of the human mind acting in society? To argue in this way is to beg the whole question. For, as Rivers says, "How can you explain the workings of the human mind without a knowledge of the social settings which have played so great a part in determining the sentiments and opinions of mankind?" (*loc. cit.*). If we are to make progress, we shall have to give up the practice of making up a scheme of development in our minds and then setting out to seek facts to support it. Nothing is easier or more fatal, and the chaotic state of the study is primarily due to that procedure. Almost everyone who talks of human society thinks he is competent in the matter, and especially competent to frame a scheme of what happened in primitive society. It is impossible to pick up a work on sociology without coming across instances of utterly uncritical use of facts, drawn from the less developed forms of human society, in support of some *a priori* theory or other. Until it is realised that the study of early man needs as much precision as that of any other form of human society, there is no hope for advance in social psychology and the great number of studies that depend on it.

Can we claim to have made any progress at all in social psychology? Can we answer the very first question of all: Why did men come to live in societies as we find him so doing in all parts of the earth? This problem has been obscured during the past fifty years or so by the misapplication of certain biological theories, especially those of Darwin and Herbert Spencer. One result of this has been to cause men to seek relationships between human and animal society, and to explain both on similar lines. One form of this method of reasoning is that of claiming that man is endowed with an innate tendency to live in societies, that he has a gregarious instinct such as that which has supposed to lead sheep and other animals to live in groups. He is supposed to have acquired this form of instinct in the course of his racial experience, and this gregarious tendency has been the root cause of the growth of human society. Of late years much has been written on this topic. One especially prominent work is that of Dr Trotter on *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, a work which is having great influence upon modern sociological thought. Dr Trotter's main posi-

¹ *Loc. cit.*

tion is defined in this way: "The question is as to whether man is to be regarded as gregarious in the full sense of the word, whether, that is to say, the social habit may be expected to furnish him with a mass of instinctive impulses as mysteriously potent as the impulses of self-preservation, nutrition, and sex" (p. 20). He says that "from a biological standpoint the probability of gregariousness being a primitive and fundamental quality in man seems to be considerable," and he bases an elaborate argument upon the assumption that "gregariousness may be regarded as a fundamental quality of man" (pp. 22-23).

Dr Trotter bases his conclusion that gregariousness has played a dynamic part in the production of human society upon two main lines of reasoning. He makes great play with the various kinds of herd instinct that he postulates in animal life. He speaks of the aggressive type, specified by the wolf pack; then the protective type, characterised by sheep; and the socialised type as shown in societies of bees (p. 172, *inter alia*). According to him, a "very striking piece of general evidence of the significance of gregariousness . . . is the remarkable coincidence of its occurrence with that of exceptional grades of intelligence or the possibility of very complex reactions to environment" (p. 20). It is interesting to find sheep so described, and the higher anthropoid apes presumably put below them in this characteristic. Dr Trotter tells us that human society is of the bee type, that it is socialised (p. 172), although the Germans—I presume he means the Prussians—are of the wolf type (p. 186). Does Dr Trotter mean that all wolves go about in packs? If so, how does he account for the timber wolf of North America that does not do so? How is he going to prove that hunting in packs is really instinctive and not a habit that the wolves in certain countries have learned? Gregariousness is not a common feature of the dog tribe, and it is certainly begging the question to claim that the pack habit is instinctive. Even were the pack habit instinctive, it is difficult to see what this has to do with human society. For Dr Trotter tells us that we have followed the bees. That being the case, one would like to know what sort of connection he proposes to establish between us and the bees. I confess to a great ignorance of natural history, but have always been under the impression that bees were insects and had a definite life-history of their own. In that case, if bees evolved their instinctive traits in the course of time, there should be other links showing the relationship of this ancestry of theirs to our own more remote ancestry. Otherwise I

fail to see on what Dr Trotter bases his contention, and must plead complete scepticism with regard to this part of his theory.

Surely it is high time to protest against this form of analogy? The Darwinian position is being seriously undermined on the biological side. It has never been established in the realm of human society, and any applications that have been made have simply been of the nature of the selection of facts to support some hypothesis founded upon this misapplied theory, which in itself may well not be true. Man is differentiated from the animals by his mind, which excels theirs on the intellectual side. Why, therefore, have recourse to vague analogies to explain something that does not really exist as the common property of man and the rest of the animal world? Such a mode of reasoning proves nothing, and the sooner it is abandoned the better for us all. If one wishes to compare the animal world with human society, why not begin where the analogies are closest—with the apes? I suppose it is true that the higher anthropoid apes are not our direct ancestors, but they approximate more than the rest of the animal world to human beings, and they certainly are not gregarious, for they live in family groups. If one wished to pursue the analogy, one would expect to find that human society was first of all founded upon family groups. But Dr Trotter says No. He says: "One of the most familiar attitudes was that which regarded the social instinct as a late development. The family was looked upon as the primitive unit; from it developed the tribe, and by the spread of family feeling to the tribe the social instinct arose. It is interesting that the psychological attack upon this position has been anticipated by sociologists and anthropologists, and that it is already being recognised that an undifferentiated horde rather than the family must be regarded as the primitive basis of human society" (p. 21).

The basis of generalisation should be an examination of the known facts. We cannot tell for certain whether any particular community is what may be termed primitive. We can, however, examine those that exhibit the lowest form of civilisation—those people that do not produce their food in any way, but simply seek it where they may find it. These peoples, wherever we find them—in India, Ceylon, Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Borneo, New Guinea, Philippines, North America, and elsewhere,—uniformly, where their culture is least touched by outside influences, display a form of society founded on the family. They wander about in groups of relatives, usually led by the eldest male, who

exercises a nominal control. The evidence for all these tribes has been published.¹ It is therefore hard to see how Dr Trotter can claim that anthropologists are recognising that the earliest form of human society was the horde. What he really means, consciously or unconsciously, is that certain theories at present widely held are founded upon the supposition that the horde was the earliest form of human society, although no one has ever heard of the actual existence of such a thing. It stands beyond doubt that the more primitive peoples of whom we know base their society upon the family group. So, whatever theory may be held with regard to the origin of human society, it is evident that, in these cases, the family sentiments are enough to explain the social organisation, and that there is no warrant to call in an instinctive tendency to go in groups. It is therefore probable that man does not possess an instinct of gregariousness akin to that of self-preservation, or of sex, or of nutrition, for he does not always seek the society of his fellows other than members of his family. Those who wish to found their theory of society upon the existence, in the dim past, of hordes, will have to establish the existence of such hordes before they can lay any claim whatever to an instinct of gregariousness.

The postulate of an instinctive tendency to gregariousness is an excellent example of the absence of any method in the study of social psychology. It is certain that man takes pleasure in, and seeks the company of, his fellows; but that constitutes no argument whatever as to the origin of human society, any more than the feeling of shame at nakedness serves to explain the origin of clothing. It is fashionable to speak to-day of the tendency of human beings to group themselves in large communities as the result of this gregarious tendency. But it is difficult to make out a strong case, for many other factors tell, chiefly the economic factor. All that we can say in regard to human society is that man likes the company of his fellows, and that he lives in societies. But we are still as far as ever from the beginnings of society as we know it. We have found that the earliest known form of society was, judging from the facts, the family group, for the constitution of the family sentiments is sufficient explanation of the facts.

It is evident from what has gone before that the psychological accompaniments of any social institution are not necessarily an index of the real nature of that institution.

¹ Perry, HIBBERT JOURNAL, Oct. 1917: "The Peaceable Habits of Primitive Communities."

They may be, and often are, the actual products of the institution itself, its mode of influencing the members of that society. For that reason it is always preferable to begin the study of social psychology in any of its aspects with the actual institutions themselves, and to leave the psychological interpretations till later. The problem now before us is that of accounting for the beginnings of organised society as we know it around us. We have seen that the evidence available goes to show that the earliest form of human society was founded simply on that of the family. In this respect there is no difference between man and the higher anthropoid apes, and many other branches of the animal world. I shall assume for the purposes of this paper that this was really the earliest form of human society, and base my assumption upon the known facts. If the earliest form of human society be of this extremely simple type, it should be possible to gain some information of the behaviour of human beings when living outside of the influences of social institutions other than that of the family. We need in social psychology some absolute standard of comparison. In arguments upon the significance of social institutions appeal is constantly made to "human nature," as if that was something which we all understood. And by human nature usually something undesirable is meant. If it were possible to point to any standard of comparison, reasoning in social psychology would be simplified. So therefore we will pursue still further this matter of inquiring why men came to live in societies.

In commenting upon a collection of descriptions of these food-gathering peoples that I published a few years ago, I stated that the accounts given by investigators of these various tribes were so similar that the description of the Veddas of Ceylon could be substituted for that of the Punan of Borneo, or the Déné of the Mackenzie basin in Canada, or for any other of these tribes, without needing any alteration. The number of tribes so described was considerable, and all of whose existence I am aware were included in the account. Since they are so similar in culture it would seem that they could constitute the standard of comparison that we need in our study.

In my opinion these descriptions constitute some of the most important material upon which the social psychologist can work, and only when its significance has been properly appreciated will it be possible to make any real progress towards a science. The importance of this evidence lies in the fact that it shows us what is the behaviour of human beings when freed from the influences of social

institutions other than that of the family. Inside the family group of these food-gatherers the mode of behaviour is such as we look upon as the highest that can be desired. There is complete harmony, absence of violence or cruelty, complete communism, and mutual help. The form of marriage is monogamous, and the tie is for life. Authority does not exist, and decisions are taken by mutual consent. That is to say, under the family organisation a definite type of behaviour is exhibited that is so uniform everywhere that it can be associated with that organisation. If that conclusion be accepted, it follows that any deviations from this standard type of behaviour are to be ascribed to the influences of social institutions. For, seeing that these deviations do not form part of the behaviour of the food-gatherers, they could not have given rise to the institutions, and therefore must be a product of them.

We have no reason to believe in an inevitable tendency in human society to form any particular form of social organisation beyond that of the family, which is an institution shared with other species. For certain societies that have a more advanced and complicated culture than that of the food-gatherers have a social organisation roughly of the same nature. These peoples possess agriculture, and thus are able to expand more than the hunters, who require much ground for their living. Certain agricultural communities really consist only of large family groups living closer together than the hunters, for the simple reason that they are able to do so by reason of their agriculture, and not necessarily on account of any instinctive desire. China is an example. The Chinese claim descent from an original hundred families who settled in the basin of the Hoang-Ho. "The empire . . . probably was in ancient times an agglomeration of tribes, each enjoying patriarchal self-government constituted of the elders, every one of whom must be a paterfamilias : and over all these tribes the sceptre is to be wielded by a supreme government, which simply maintains peace and order among them, without, however, interfering in their internal affairs." "This clan life has always been regarded as the chief corner-stone of its social organisation, and has existed since the dawn of Chinese history."¹ Chinese villages usually consist of groups of relatives, and the life of each member of the large family group is closely bound up with that group and bears little relationship to that of other groups. The history of the Chinese people can be regarded as a gradual expansion of small groups, which, by reason of their

¹ J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, i. 541, 833.

intensive agricultural system, are able to live closely together. But essentially the social structure is the same as that of the hunters. The Chinese in their history have not evolved any class system, and their ruling class, which was imposed upon them from the outside, has disappeared. I have no time to go into the matter now, but should like to remark that the Chinese approximate in behaviour more to the type of the hunters than they do to peoples with more complicated social structures. For instance, they are, as a race, peaceful, and seem to possess a higher moral standard than is usual among other civilised peoples. Their social organisation is simply that of the juxtaposition of family groups with certain complications due to historical circumstances, such as the former existence of a ruling class and the influence of other peoples.

The problem of the development of society is that of determining how, where, and why, certain family groups came to live in relationships other than those of juxtaposition and more or less complete independence. When two family groups come to assume a relationship to one another, say of dominance on the part of one and submission on the part of another, then it is obvious that new types of behaviour are certain to be produced in both groups. These two groups would constitute a rudimentary community of the type with which we are accustomed in modern society. This is in its baldest form one of the fundamental problems of human society, namely, the origin and significance of the class-system. The problem is that of understanding how it ever came to pass that one family group assumed a position of superiority over others. It is easy to say that the more highly organised family group, or that with the more energetic members, came to assume this position. But that form of reasoning makes the same mistake as was made by the Darwinians. They are taking for granted the very thing that needs explanation. If you will explain how it comes about that one group is more energetic than, or superior in any way to, the other, then the rest will be granted. But you have first of all to prove your statement.

It is usual to take for granted the existence of the class-system in all parts of the earth, to look upon it as a normal and inevitable consequence of social life. But the evidence just put forward shows that this assumption is dangerous in the extreme, and is only made by ignoring certain groups of facts. The Chinese have not developed the class-system, nor have the food-gathering peoples, and there seems to be no

reason why they ever should go through this great transformation without outside influence. It is this very act of taking for granted processes that urgently need explanation that has brought ethnology and social psychology to its present pass. Far from the evolution of social classes, the superposition of one family group upon others being a normal inevitable occurrence in all communities, evidence is rapidly accumulating to show that this event only took place once in the history of man, and that the existence of the system in any country has been the direct result of a process of growth of the original group and its domination of other groups of families in all parts of the earth. This may sound sheer nonsense. But it must be remembered that the population of the earth in the food-gathering days must have been sparse, and that great communities such as the Chinese have come from small beginnings. If the original dominating group took with it in its natural expansion the craft of agriculture, then the great development of population on the earth is readily accounted for. The battle over this position has yet to be fought, but I feel convinced that the day is not far distant when it will be seen to provide the only rational explanation of the facts. The acceptance of this point of view means that we are to look upon European civilisation with its class organisation as the product of a process of superposition of groups, and not of the segregation of groups within definite communities. This point of view makes the task of the social psychologist much simpler. If we wish to look upon the States of Europe as distinct entities, we shall be utterly balked for a real definition. If we look upon them as organisms with histories of their own, with definite personalities such as are possessed by human beings, then the complexity of the study is enormous. For it is well known that hardly one of the European States has existed in its present form for more than a few centuries. The map of Europe has constantly been changing, and much study is needed to understand its kaleidoscopic vicissitudes. When we try to think of these States as entities, the imagination is baffled. What do we mean by France? Do we mean the Government, the predominant political party? In speaking of Germany do we mean Prussia, Saxony, or Bavaria; do we mean the military aristocracy; do we mean the social democratic party? What do we mean? As a matter of fact, when we speak of Germany, we usually have not the slightest idea of what we really do mean, but are forming some vague shape in our minds that we endow with a sort of personality, to the utter confusion of our reasoning. But if

we look at European history, there is one constant feature that is ever present while the map is undergoing the most violent changes. We always have the class-system, and it does not need much knowledge to show that this system can in no part of the continent and at no time be watched in its beginnings. The further back in history we go the more definite it is, and as we approach prehistoric times it eludes our search for its beginnings. It is well known that in our own country, for example, the class-system originally was due to a process of superimposition from without, and this is a commonplace in the study of the class-system.¹ If we adopt this point of view and look upon European history for the moment as a great process of superposition of family groups on others, then the problems of class-states disappear. The various class-states at any time are simply the expression of the existence of that process, the forms which the process takes upon itself at any moment. The sole reality is the process itself, whose origins we cannot seize in Europe, or among the early hunters who still persist on the earth. From this point of view the relationships of States are not due to any inherent qualities of these States, but to the larger process at work. So, before trying to study the various peculiar characteristics of the great States of Europe, it would be well to confine attention to the much more fundamental process that gave rise to them, that of the superposition of families, and the effects that this process has had upon human behaviour. There is plenty of material on which to found this study. We know of communities with classes superposed on one another, and of others with only one class, and can institute comparisons between them. Moreover, we can compare in those States with superposed classes, the behaviour of the two classes and their respective contributions to the life of the community. It is interesting to note that one student at least has already made a move in this direction. Dr Trotter, in his work on the Herd Instinct, discusses this division of the community as we find it in western civilisation. He states that society is divided into two strata, and he couples on to these two classes definite types of behaviour. He calls the type of mind of one class normal or resistive. It is, in fact, the conservative mind in its pure form. Those possessing it are indifferent to certain facts; they definitely repress them; they also tend to rationalise others. Dr Trotter says: "The solutions by indifference and by rationalisation or by a mixture of these two processes are characteristic of the great class of normal, sensible, reliable

¹ Cf., for example, H. M. Chadwick, *The Origin of the English Nation*.

middle age, with its definite views, its resiliency in the depressing influence of facts, and its gift for forming the backbone of the State. In them herd suggestion shows its capacity to triumph over experience, to delay the evolution of altruism, and to obscure the existence and falsify the results of the contest between personal and social desires" (pp. 53-54). He goes on to say that "among the first-class Powers to-day the mentally stable are still the directing class, and their characteristic tone is discernible in national attitude towards experience, in national ideals and religions, and in national morality" (p. 55).

Outside this power-holding, directing, normal, mentally stable class, he states that there is another characterised by mental instability. "It is produced by the mental conflict forced upon man by his sensitiveness to herd suggestion on the one hand and experience on the other" (p. 58). He says further that "the most prominent characteristic in which the mentally unstable contrast with the 'normal' is what we may call 'motive.' They tend to be weak in energy, and especially in persistence of energy. Such weakness may translate itself into a vague scepticism as to the value of things in general, or into a definite defect of what is popularly called will-power, or into many other forms, for it is always the result of the thwarting of the primary impulses to action resident in herd suggestion by the influence of an experience which cannot be disregarded. Such minds cannot be stimulated for long by objects adequate to normal ambition; they are apt to be sceptical in such matters as patriotism, religion, politics, social success, but the scepticism is incomplete, so that they are readily won to new causes, new religions, new quacks, and as readily fall away therefrom. . . . Thus we see society cleft by the instinctive qualities of its members into two great classes, each to a great extent possessing what the other lacks, and each falling below the possibilities of human personality" (p. 59).

Dr Trotter has presented us with a psychological problem of first-class importance. Has this division into social classes the effect of producing a definite type of mind or not? Dr Trotter evidently looks to the institution as the causal agent. "It is probable," he says, "that the perpetuation of a given type in a given herd is not chiefly a matter of heredity in the individual. The individual is gregarious by inheritance; the type according to which his gregarious reactions are manifested is not inherited, but will depend upon the form current in the herd to which he belongs, and handed down in it from generation to generation" (p. 197). Reasoning from

the behaviour of the standard type, this certainly would seem to be the case. If this be so, it is evident that the mode of behaviour exhibited by the members of classes is a by-product of the class itself, for which the class-system must be held responsible.

The moral of this discussion is that in social psychology "things are seldom what they seem." Cause and effect in human social behaviour are so confused that only a strict method will ever enable us to disentangle them with any success. It is evident that the science of social psychology has yet to be born, but that it is now going through its process of birth under the influence of the new currents that are flowing so strongly in the stream of individual psychology. It would seem that we have not yet succeeded in explaining even the most elementary and fundamental facts connected with our present-day society, and that the study of European society is not going to take us far, if any distance at all, on our journey. It is possible that the original significance of the class-system was vastly different from that which it possesses at present. It came into existence for certain definite reasons, yet to be formulated; it persisted for other reasons which can be guessed at, but not strictly enumerated; and it has had tremendous effects upon the behaviour both of the superposed groups as well as on those over whom they dominate. In the simple societies, with their juxtaposed family groups, we find a type of behaviour which apparently can be taken for the standard behaviour. What we are called upon to explain is the mode of beginning of the society with superposed groups, and to work out its psychological history. For that purpose it is obviously necessary first of all to institute an inquiry into the historical process; to discover, if possible, the beginnings of the system; to see where, how, and why the first superposition took place. That done, we shall be on our way to the solution of many important problems of social psychology.

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THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SUFISM.

SIRDAR IKBAL ALI SHAH.

“He that is purified by love is pure ; and he that is absorbed in the Beloved and hath abandoned all else is a Sufi.”

OF the many mystical doctrines to which our mother the East has given birth, none is more beautiful in its appeal than the way of the Sufi, nor does any point to a goal of such exalted spiritual ambition. He who is versed in its tenets and practice has outsoared the shadow of doubt and the possibility of error. He is face to face with the Divine. Many esoteric systems lay claim to such a consummation, but none with more justice than Sufism ; for the disciplinary and preparatory measures it entails are of a kind to induce in the devotee a perfect confidence that the ultimate goal to which he aspires will be triumphantly achieved.

Sufism dates from the latter part of the eleventh century, and was founded by a branch of that sect of Islam known as Ismaelites, headed by one Hassan Sabah, who, driven from Cairo by the persecution of the orthodox, spread a modified form of the Ismaelite doctrine throughout Syria and Persia. He was, indeed, a member of the great and mystical Western Lodge of the Ismaelites at Cairo, the early history of which is one of romantic and absorbing interest. It comprised both men and women, who met in separate assemblies, and it was presided over by a Dai al Doat, or chief missionary, who was usually a person of importance in the State. The assemblies, called Societies of Wisdom, were held twice a week, and at these gatherings all the members were clad in robes of spotless white. This organisation was under the especial patronage of the Caliph, to whom the lectures read within its walls were invariably submitted ; and it was in the reign of the Caliph Haken-bi-emr-illah that steps were first taken to enlarge its scope and institute what might be

called a forward movement for the dissemination of its peculiar principles.

So that it should not lack suitable surroundings, the Caliph erected a stately edifice known as the Dar al hikmet, or "House of Wisdom." Within its walls a magnificent library was installed, and writing materials and mathematical instruments were supplied for the use of all. Professors of law, mathematics, rhetoric, and medicine were appointed to instruct the faithful in the sciences. The annual income assigned to this establishment by the munificence of the Caliph was two hundred and seventy thousand ducats, or about £126,000. A regular course of instruction in mystic lore was given to the devotees, and nine degrees had perforce to be passed before they were regarded as masters of the mysterious knowledge gained within the classic walls of the House of Wisdom. It was the seventh of these stages in which the doctrines of Sufism were more particularly taught.

But Hassan, a man of great natural force and enlightenment, the friend of Nizam-al-Mulk and Omar Khayyam, saw clearly that the plan of the society of Cairo was in some respects defective. His novel views did not, however, meet with the approval of the other leaders, so he retired to Persia, where he remodelled the course of instruction, reducing the number of initiatory degrees to seven, and instituting a much more rigorous system of discipline. Around the figure of Hassan cluster many legends and traditions, most of which have been highly coloured by the passage of time. But that he was the founder of Sufism as we know it to-day is certain.

Having briefly outlined the early history of Sufism, we must now seek for some general definition of its doctrines, such as will make clear to us its purpose and significance—the message it holds for the mystic and for humanity in general. It exhibits a close connection with the Neo-Platonism of Alexandria, with which it certainly had affinities, in that it regards man as a spark of the divine essence, a "broken light" from the great Sun of our being, the most central and excellent radiance from which all things emanate. The soul of man is regarded as being in exile from its Creator, who is not only the author of its being, but also its spiritual home. The human body is the cage or prison-house of the soul, and life on earth is regarded as banishment from God. Ere this ostracism from the Divine took place, full communion with the Creator was enjoyed. Each soul has formerly seen the face of Truth in its most real aspect, for what we regard

as truth in the earth-sphere is but the shadow of that which shines above, perfect, immaculate—a mere reminiscence of the glories of a heavenly existence. To regain this lost felicity is the task of the Sufi, who, by a long process of mental and moral training, restores the soul from its exile, and leads it onward from stage to stage, until at last it reaches the goal of perfect knowledge, Truth and Peace—reunion with the Divine.

As an example of the Sufi doctrine of the immanence of God in creation, an ancient manuscript tells us how the Creation proceeds directly from God.

“The Creation,” it says, “derives its existence from the splendour of God; and as at dawn the sun illuminates the earth, and the absence of its light is darkness, in the like manner all would be non-existent if there were no celestial radiance of the Creator diffused in the universe. As the light of the sun bears a relation to the temporal or the perceptible side of life, so does the splendour of God to the celestial or occult phase of existence.”

And what words could be more eloquently illustrative of the belief that the present life is the banishment of the soul from God, than those of a great Asian Sufi, who on his death-bed wrote the following lines :—

“Tell my friends when bewailing that they disbelieve and discredit the Truth.

You will find my mould lying, but know it is not I.

I roam far, far away, in the Sphere of Immortality.

This was once my house, my covering, but not my home.

It was the cage : the bird has flown.

It was the shell : the pearl has gone.

I leave you toiling and straight. I see you struggling as I journey on.

Grieve not if one is missing from amongst you.

Friends, let the house perish, let the shell decay.

Break the cage, destroy the garment, I am far away.

Call this not my death. It is the life of life, for which I wearied and longed.”

There are now four stages through which the Initiate must pass on his way to perfection and reunion with the Divine Essence ; four veils that must be lifted ere his vision is purged from the grimness of the earth-sphere and he is granted the final wonder and bliss of coming face to face with Truth Eternal.

The first of these stages is known as *Hasāt*, or Humanity. The essential of proper observance in this phase, and the mere approach or avenue to the temple of Sufism, is the faithful observance of the tenets of Islam, its laws and ceremonies. This preliminary course is regarded as a necessary discipline

for the weaker brethren, and as a wholesome restraint upon those who may be constitutionally unfitted to attain the heights of divine contemplation. Latitude in matters of doctrine in the earlier stages frequently leads to evils which cease to trouble more powerful intellects and devouter souls as they gain the higher levels of contemplation, so that in a later phase the trammels of ritual observance and symbolic recognition can be cast aside and aspiration remain unfettered.

The second stage is called Tarequt, or the manner of attaining what is known as Jubroot or Potentiality or Capacity. Here the neophyte dispenses with his guide and becomes a Sufi. It is frequently asserted that in this stage the pilgrim may, if he choose, lay aside all the external forms of religion, its rites and observances, and exchange mere worship for the delights of contemplation. But more than one of the masters contest this view, and refuse to recognise the freedom of the novice from religious forms, no matter to what degree of advancement he may have attained. There remains, however, a certain school, the members of which, though admitting that purity can be acquired in the first instance through the constant practice of orthodox austerities alone, so it cannot permanently be retained unless mere forms be transcended and outgrown.

The third stage, Araff, signifies that a condition of assured knowledge or inspiration has been reached, which occultists might call a condition of adeptship or Buddhists Arahatship. The eyes of the pilgrim have become opened; he has gained possession of supernatural and occult knowledge, and is the equal of angels. Edgar Allan Poe alludes in one of his most wonderful poems, "Al Aaraaf," to a mystical star, which he calls by this name, and which he speaks of as a plane higher than this world and not nearly so material.

"Oh! nothing earthly, save the ray
 (Thrown back from flowers) of Beauty's eye,
 As in these gardens where the day
 Springs from the gems of Circassy.

Adorn you, world, afar, afar,
 The wandering star."

Lastly—but this is remote and to be gained by the exalted in purity and holiness alone—is the stage of Hagequt, or Truth, perfect and supreme, for the union of the soul with Divinity is now complete. It is to be won only by long-continued meditation, constant prayer, and complete severance from all things gross and earthly, for the man must

be annihilated ere the saint can exist. The fire, Qulb or steps of Heart (Dill), Breath (Nufus), The Rest of Soul (Sar), Head (Ikhfa), and Crown and the Head (Khafi) have been climbed, and he who was a scholar is now qualified to become a master.

In order that this condition or state of exalted holiness may best be brought about, the life of the hermit is frequently resorted to, and many, to attain it, retire into the gloomy solitude of the jungle or seek the quiet of desert fastnesses, or dwell in caves situated in the heart of almost inaccessible mountains. This devotion and singleness of purpose is, indeed, characteristic of Sufism. But such a life, spent in prayer and meditation, conduces to the acquisition of wisdom as well as moral exaltation, and many of the most renowned Sufis have been men of the highest erudition. Scholarship is regarded as predisposing a man for the life of the Sufi. The philosophic temperament and the power of penetrating into the mysteries of the Divine Nature are often found in one and the same person. A tendency towards studious things raises a man above the level of the vulgar herd and prompts him to seek the higher excellences of holiness. It has been so in all times and in all faiths. Are not the ascetics of all religions habitually studious? and whence, it may be asked, has so much light been thrown on things spiritual as from the cave of the mystic, or the desert abode of the Sufi?

The poet especially is looked upon as the type of man who may best develop into a Sufi of great sanctity. Poetry is, indeed, of the very essence of Sufism. The genius of the poet is akin to religious inspiration. The long flights by which he penetrates to the highest realms of the imagination are of the same nature as those by which the mystic reaches the gates of the Palace of Life and Wisdom. In the throes of his rapture, the poet transports himself into the heavenly empyrean, his wings bear him into that rare atmosphere where he can see face to face with the Divine Cause and Origin of all.

Sufism has a poetry all its own—a poetry perhaps more soulful and higher in ecstatic expression than that of any other religious caste in the world. Again, the language of poetry—its metaphor, its swift and pulsing rhythm—is more akin to the speech of the mystic than the grosser language of the sons of earth. It is not restrained by convention or the fetters of idiom. It soars supreme above the faltering, stammering necessities of the earth-speech. Hence in Central Asia, the true home of modern Sufism, as elsewhere, we find Sufi devotion chiefly expressed through the cadences

of poetry. Nor do the services of poetry to Sufi mysticism end with its provision of a more fitting medium of expression, for in Sufi verse the constant repetition of mystical allusion and religious allegory serves to conceal from the profane the hidden meaning of the cult—those deep and awful truths which it is not well that the vulgar should know, and which, at all costs, must be guarded by the adept from profanation.

That the inner significance of Sufi mysticism may be the more closely shut off from possible profanation, the language of eroticism and excess is frequently employed in its strophes to conceal hidden meanings. This has, perhaps naturally, resulted in a charge of luxury being brought against the Sufi literature as a whole. Nothing could be further from the truth. Scandalised by the interpretation placed upon the sacred writings by the ignorant, the Great Moghal Aurungzab, himself a Sufi of exalted degree and a moralist of the strictest tendencies, decreed that the poems of Hafiz and Jami should be perused only by those persons who were sufficiently advanced in spiritual understanding to appreciate the works of these poets at their proper worth. The great mass of people in India had misunderstood the metaphors and figures of the Persian singers, and their songs, he learned, were even regarded as provocative of immorality. Let it be admitted, too, that even Eastern mystics of lower rank have misinterpreted the metaphorical expressions in which these poems abound. Speaking generally, it is the dark riddle of human life which the Sufi poet veils beneath the metaphor of physical love and the agony of parted lovers. By such means he symbolises the banishment of the human soul from its Eternal Lover. The pain of earthly parting is merely a synonym for the deep anguish of the spirit estranged from its Creator. The wine-cup, again, and the language of debauch hide metaphors which signify the rapture of the soul which is drunken with the love of God.

We must here accentuate, lay stress upon, the great central doctrine of Sufism that the human soul is one in essence with the Divine. The difference is one of degree and not of kind. However much men may differ from Divinity, they are, after all, particles of the Divine Being, broken lights of God, as Tennyson so beautifully says, and will ultimately be re-absorbed in the Great Cause which projected them into the darksome regions of the earth-plane. God is universal. He interpenetrates all matter, all substance. Perfect in His truth, goodness, and beauty, they who love Him alone know the real fullness of love. Mere physical love is an illusion, a seeming, a snare to the feet and an enemy in the path.

The great mirror in which the Divine splendour reflects itself is nature. From the beginning of things, ay, from the first, it has been the task of the Supreme Goodness to diffuse happiness among those fitted to receive it. Thousands ignore it, mistaking the pomps and pleasures of earth for joy, rejecting the greater bliss to their hands.

In many faiths we hear of a covenant betwixt God and man. This is also the Sufi creed. That covenant has been broken by the sin of the creature against his Creator. Only when man once more finds reunion with God shall he be restored to his ancient privileges of full and unalloyed fellowship with the Divine. This alone is true happiness. The pursuit of the material is a vain thing. As Longfellow says :

“ Things are not what they seem.”

Nature, the earth, that which we see, feel, and hear, are but the subjective visions of God, suggested to our minds by the great Artist. Mind or Spirit alone is immanent. The fleeting phantoms thrown by the phantasmagoria of matter we must beware of. We must attach ourselves to none of their manifestations. God alone is the one real existence, the only great Reality. He exists in us and we in Him. The visions He grants us, the pictures He casts upon the screen of our imaginations, we may use as a means of approach to the Eternal Beauty, to the consideration of the Divine. They are what Wordsworth calls “ Intimations of Immortality.” As a great Frenchman once said, we weep when we listen to beautiful music, our eyes fill with tears on looking at a great picture or noble statue. A wonderful prospect in nature affects us in like manner. Wherefore ? We weep because we feel that these things are but shadows of the real, the imperishable beauty which we have lost, and which we will not regain until we are once more made one with God. That Frenchman would have found in Sufism the complement, the ideal, of his philosophy. The microcosmos, or small world, said the great Paracelsus, one of the most learned Europeans of the sixteenth century, who had travelled widely in the East, was but the reflection of the macrocosmos or great world above—the spiritual world, which mirrored itself in the plane below. To him the illusory and phantasmal nature of the sphere in which we dwell was very plain. Indeed, no European mystic of old could possibly have found anything at which he could have demurred in the tenets of Sufism. In my opinion, Western as well as Oriental mysticism is heavily indebted to the Sufi philosophy, and those who believe in one must naturally believe in both.

It requires a mind of the first rank to recognise the great scheme of God at first sight. Few minds succeed in doing so. With most persons, long experience is needed ere they appreciate the marvellous arch-plan of the Almighty. To a mind naturally pure and angelic this wondrous cosmic symphony is apparent from the first. It was so to Mohammed, to Boehme, to Swedenborg, to Blake. What is man, after all, but the cloak of the soul? When we say that a man is "naturally bad," we allude to the state of his inherited mind, not to his soul. The garment may be ragged, dross may cover the gold, but it is there all the same. Our bodies are of the earth and such as our fathers leave us. Our souls are of God. O man! is there aught that, possessing the friendship of God, thou canst not compass? Doth not thy soul strain to Him as the mountains strain unto the sun and the waters of the sea unto the moon? Verily thou dost move forth in the light of His strength, in the unquenchable brilliance of His boundless majesty, as a great star, lit by the beams of a still greater sun, launches forth into the million-lamped avenues of the night. As a ship is moved by the bright waves of the morning, so art thou urged by the breath of His spirit. Verily thou art of God as a child is of its father. What then hast thou to fear, O son of such a Father?

With such a hope before us—before every one of us, if we accept it—we must turn our souls from vanity, from all that is not of God, striving to approximate to His perfection and discover the secret of our kinship with Him, until at last we reach the happy consummation of union with the Divine. The Sufi doctrine tells us that at the moment of the creation of each creature a divine voice was heard asking the question, "Art thou not with God? Art thou not bound by solemn covenant with thy Creator?" and each created spirit replied "Yes," as it stood in the presence of the Almighty Himself. Hence it is that the mystic words, Alasto, "Art thou not," and Bala, "Yes," occur so frequently in Sufi poetry. For example, Romi began his celebrated Musnawi, which I have ventured to render into English verse, as follows:—

THE FLUTE.

" Oh ! hear the flute's sad tale again :
Of Separation I complain ;
E'er since it was my fate to be
Thus cut off from my parent tree,
Sweet moan I've made with pensive sigh,
While men and women join my cry.

Man's life is like this hollow rod ;
 One end is in the lips of God,
 And from the other sweet notes fall
 That to the mind the spirit call,
 And join us with the All in All."

A regular vocabulary of the terms employed by the Sufis in their mystical poetry exists. Wine, for example, signifies devotion ; sleep, meditation on the divine perfection ; perfume, the hope of the divine afflatus. Zephyrs signify the gift of godly grace, and kisses the transports of devotion and piety. But the terms of significance are often inverted, in order that they may not be comprehended by the profane. Thus idolaters, freethinkers, and revellers are the terms employed to indicate those whose faith is of the purest description. The idol they adore is the Creator Himself ; the tavern is the place of prayer ; and the wine drunk therein is the holy beverage of love, with which they become inebriated. The keeper of the tavern is the hierophant, or spiritual leader. The term beauty is used to denote the perfection of God, and love-locks and tresses the infinitude of His glory. Down on the cheeks is symbolic of the multitudinous spirits which serve Him. Inebriation and dalliance typify that abstraction of soul which shows contempt of mundane affairs.

The following extract from Sufi poetry will serve to illustrate the use of many of these mystical terms. At first sight it would appear to be inspired by the spirit of amorous and bacchanalian frenzy, but when translated into its true terms it reveals itself as of the veritable essence of mysticism.

" Yesterday, half inebriated, I passed by the quarter where the wine-sellers dwell,
 To seek out the daughter of an Infidel, who is a vendor of wine.
 At the end of the street, a damsel, with a fairy's cheek, advanced before me,
 Who, pagan-like, wore her tresses dishevelled over her shoulders like the sacerdotal thread.

I said, ' O thou, to the arch of whose eyebrows the new moon is a shame !

What quarter is this, and where is thy place of abode ? '

' Cast,' she replied, ' thy rosary on the ground, and lay the thread of paganism thy shoulder upon ;

Cast stones at the glass of piety ; and from an o'erflowing goblet quaff the wine.

After that draw near me, that I may whisper one word in thine ear ;
 For thou wilt accomplish thy journey, if thou hearken to my words.'

Abandoning my heart altogether, and in ecstasy rapt, I followed her,
Till I came to a place where, alike, reason and religion forsook me.
At a distance, I beheld a Company, all inebriated and beside themselves,
Who came all frenzied, and boiling with ardour from wine of love ;
Without lutes, cymbals, or viols ; yet all full of mirth and melody—
Without wine, or goblet, or flask ; yet all drinking unceasingly.

When the thread of restraint slipped away from my hand,
I desired to ask her one question, but she said unto me ' Silence.
This is no square temple whose gate thou canst precipitately attain ;
This is no mosque which thou canst reach with tumult, but without
knowledge.

This is the banquet-house of Infidels, and all within are intoxicated ;
All, from eternity's dawn to the day of doom, in astonishment lost !
'Depart, then, from the cloister and towards the tavern bend thy steps.
Cast away the cloak of the Darwaish, and don thou the libertine's robe.'
I obeyed : and if thou desire with me the same hue and colour to acquire,
Imitate me, and both this and the next world sell for a drop of pure wine."

One of the most celebrated exponents of the Sufi doctrine is Jami, the author of the *Lala* and *Majnoo*. His name is venerated throughout Central Asia as one of the champions of the faith. In his belief, when the Creator pours the effulgence of His Holy Spirit upon the creature, such a one becomes himself divine. So closely, indeed, is he identified with the great Source of all good, that he finds the power has been conferred upon him of sharing the regulation and direction of other beings. With the created beings whom he governs he is connected by a powerful bond of sympathy, so strong, indeed, that in a mystical sense they are spoken of as his limbs, as parts of his body ; nor can they suffer and endure anything that he must not endure and suffer as well, through a process of psychical sympathy.

One of the many mistaken objections to this portion of Sufi belief is that it implies that saintship is almost one and the same thing with deification. This is not so. At the basis of Sufi philosophy will be found the fundamental axiom that no mortal can be as a god. The union of the creature with God is not an apotheosis of man, but a return of a portion of the Divine Spirit to its original fount and nucleus. The result of the union of man and God is annihilation of the merely human part of man and the withdrawal of his spiritual part to that place whence it emanated. On the annihilation of self, man realises that his own real and imperishable ego is one with the essence of God. In this union, so great is the influence of the Eternal Spirit that man's human judgment—that which we might describe as his logical faculty, his understanding—is entirely quenched and destroyed by it ; " even as error passeth away on the appearance of truth,"

in like manner his ability to discriminate between the perishable and the imperishable is rendered negligible. This feeling of oneness with deity it was which urged the sage Mansur to ejaculate in a fit of ecstasy, "I am Truth"; meaning thereby, "I am God." But in the eyes of the orthodox this statement appeared as blasphemous, and in making it Mansur forfeited his life—so little are those who grope in the purlieus and courts of the outer temple able to appreciate the wisdom and the speech of those who dwell in the inner sanctuaries.

The origin of evil—the question of dualism—has been the cause of much learned contention among erudite Sufis. Many have argued that evil cannot exist in face of the fact that God is wholly good and all things are from Him. One Sufi poet has said :

"The writer of our destiny is a fair and truthful writer,
And never did He write that which is evil."

Evil is, therefore, a thing entirely human, due to the frailty of man, to the perversion of the human will and the circumstances by which humanity is surrounded—the material environment which man believes to be real, and which serves to distort his vision. It has no part in the being of God. It follows that all the so-called spiritual powers of evil, those principalities of the air and demons of the abyss, the existence of which so many religious philosophies admit, and even expressly urge, are nothing but the figments of the human mind, misled by the phantasmagoria, the unrealities, by which man is surrounded.

Underlying the gorgeous imagery and lofty mysticism of Sufi poetry, then, whether it be that of Persia or of the Middle East, there dwells a deep significance of hidden instruction, which he who seeks may find—shall find, if he be eager enough, ardent enough. In vain we search elsewhere for a system so satisfying to the soul, so full—when all is understood—of the higher, the more spiritual reasoning. We will not find it in the teachings of ancient Athens, in the wonderful philosophy of old Egypt, or in that child of both, the Neo-Platonism of Alexandria. To these systems Sufism undoubtedly owes much, as we have seen. But it has refined upon them, has excogitated for itself a manner of thought beside which they seem almost elementary, and a symbolism and mystic teaching of much greater scope and loftiness. As I have indicated, there can be little doubt that it powerfully affected European mysticism, especially through Paracelsus and Boehme. It is, indeed, the true

allegory of the inner life—its erotic imagery, its glorification of the grape, are but veils which seek to hide the great truths of existence, as the language of alchemy sought to preserve its discoveries from the vulgar. Sufi poetry speaks of a love which is not carnal, and of an inebriation produced by no material vine. These are the ecstasies and transports of divine affection. If it be mysterious, shall the bread of life be given to fools, shall pearls be cast before swine? No! Let the wise seek till they find. That is the last word of all mysticism, Oriental and Occidental—meditation is the one true way to exaltation.

IKBAL ALI SHAH.

LONDON.

THE RELATIVITY OF DEATH.

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JUST as some great preacher of repentance may strip emperor and king of their purple state, and display, beneath it all, the trembling heart of mere mortality, so Dr Einstein has drawn aside the ermine of absolutism from such monarchs as Space and Time, and shown us their common relativity. But what of that other monarch whom Raleigh addressed as "Eloquent, Just, and Mighty"? Is the hand of science suddenly become reverent, or smitten with paralysis, that it lays no hold upon the insignia of death, dares not discover him and tell us whether, here also, absolutism is more than mantle deep?

So far we have no scientific theory of human survival. Sir Oliver Lodge speculates and Maeterlinck suggests, but no theory can be considered scientific that does not harmonise with that chief of scientific suppositions—the continuity of Nature. Science cannot disprove and has no right to deny such "soul" as Plato speaks of or such "spirit" as Sir Oliver sees, but it cannot deal with either apart from living continuity. Science can recognise personality in man with all its high specialisation of animal individuality, and can reason about it just so long as bodily conditions are such as to lend to that personality the power of manifesting itself. For the purpose of scientific cognition such personality ends when it is no longer sustained by the vital energies of the body. But could it be shown that there is an organic instrument for supporting the personality, or self, and for lending to it the vital energies of which the physical change of death would deprive it, the attitude of science would immediately change.

Leaving aside all philosophy of souls and spirits and theism, there is, then, however unlikely or difficult, a possible

condition for a scientific, as apart from a religious, belief in the relativity of death.

At present the scientific view of racial immortality and its reputed handmaiden, private death, has advanced little beyond the position of Weismann, who asserted that the swarming life of our ponds and ditches may possess a natural immortality, but that Nature, in order to pave her ascent in the architecture of highly specialised individuality, invented private death. Death, therefore, must be more indispensable the higher we rise in the scale of life, and personality would be more irrecoverable and farther off from any natural immortality than any other type of individuality.

But "*les extrêmes se touchent*," and what if this specialised and differentiated life should seek resynthesis with the immortal typical life? Psychical research seems able to show that personality can project itself and unite into a group existence. The uniting, or at least communing, of distinct and distant persons, that curious, puzzling, and rather fearful action of what we may call the fibre of one personality upon another, which is known, or unknown, as telepathy, is full of suggestion. For the full working of telepathy some kind of group seems essential. Spiritistic phenomena occur only when grouping takes place. Telepathic movements from the living would seem to be the unseen hands that work this new enthralling Punch-and-Judy show, in which, if we see no startling poetic justice, we see signs of a hitherto undemonstrated power—the power of human personalities to unite with one another.

Telepathy, "spirits," ghosts, spectres, apparitions, and clairvoyant power all presuppose this grouping movement, and indicate that the power to extrude itself is characteristic of human nature, and therefore has a creative purpose in Nature's scheme. And if personality is recognised by Nature or the universe, it cannot be that "mere pool" which reflects the heavens for a moment and then "dries up."

And if personality be a recognised citizen of the universe, it can, in the long run, count upon all the resources of the universe to fulfil itself with all its group-forming tendencies. This being so, may not those emotions, sentiments, beliefs, and rites fostered by various religions be the counterpart or parallel, scientifically, of such phenomena of racial life as bird song, bird play, the ceremonies of courtship and marriage, and our own sex passion and domestic affection? Are they not the outcome of an upheaval of the fibre of personality, and definitely and effectively purposive, working towards the eventual persistence of man in a group status?

Perhaps the greatest gap in the study and comparison of religions has been caused by the failure to see that the persisting phenomena of a psychological order which all religions exhibit must indicate a true upheaval in the fibre of the single life, which would project itself into new relationships, new groupings, for the discounting of bodily death.

Religions cannot be scientifically accounted for on the supposition that they live by taking in the washing of ethics and sociology. The law of causation demands a specific energy behind this persistent and characteristic display. Nature is clear, definitive, synthetic, and invincible. If she allowed private death she did it with the definite aim of carrying her highly specialised individualities or personalities further on their road of development—to bring them round the circle and bestow upon her highest that which they seemed to surrender in their long upward climb through typical immortality.

Nature is certainly grand enough and wide enough to take all the steps which might lead to such a consummation. If she can set up domestic affection to safeguard the racial impulse, she can set up the domestic world affection which we call religion, and which alone can dispose the race group to provide the hospitality of a corporate body and soul for recovered single lives.

In using the term Nature no pantheistic interpretation is implied and no theistic one denied. The term simply covers a convenient personalisation of the cosmic energy observed at work, without dogmatising as to the source of that energy. The point to be made is that the energy which works through the domestic affections for the preservation of the race, an energy which is generally spoken of as Nature, seems also to work through religious world affection for the projecting of that laboriously built-up and specialised individual life within the human type over the gulf of personal or private death. For the purposes of racial immortality she promotes a selfishness *à deux*, which works to an unselfish end, the reproduction of the species. For the purpose of individual immortality she fosters the pure, unselfish projecting of the private life into that of the community, so that the selfless private self may exist after the death of the body. In this effective socialising of the single life that it may survive we see the scientific translation of St John the Evangelist's intuitive saying: "We know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren."

The modern world is agreed that there can be no immortalisation apart from socialisation; yet it lives in a

dangerous delusion, because it thinks that such a socialisation can be brought about merely by altruistic principles and endeavour without a real creative process. The world might as well think to perpetuate the race through a merely platonic affection.

Just as friendship, though increasing the value of human beings to one another, is powerless to reproduce them, so a religion of ethics, while lending beauty to life, is powerless to immortalise it. In love and in religion the continuity of life must be effected by real creative acts. Founders of religion have realised this more or less consciously.

For example, take one of the purest embodiments of the religious impulse, the mortuary cult of Osiris. There was in this cult a very definite apprehension of the relativity of death. Compare it with the faith of the Pharaohs of the Fourth Dynasty. The Pharaohs seem to have anticipated Maeterlinck's idea that the departed survive in the breast of living mankind if we, in remembrance, halve our lives with them, so that their life continues as part of our life. It was apparently on this supposition that the Pharaohs set about building the Pyramids, that they might hypnotise the world's memory. They set up their cults, also, to add the more vital soul-remembrance or soul-cultivation. Maeterlinck and the Pharaohs may have observed rightly in attributing to humanity enough superfluous energy to supply a delicate life-stream to any departed one who should, in dying, change the pivot of his existence, casting his conscious life out of his perishing body into the consciousness of living mankind.

But humanity, ordinarily speaking, is not organised to sustain soul-memory, or to bestow itself sacrificially on the departed. Pyramids, tombs of a Hadrian or a Metellus, Albert Memorial or a Sièges Allée, may cumber the earth, but they do not sit down in the heart of man. Only one who had gained the persistent, unanimous favour of a community might hope to be so identified with that community as to enjoy some kind of survival within it. The devotees of Osiris saw this and worked for survival through the community, and in so doing achieved something of classic beauty. Their saviour-god Osiris was fitted to perform the functions which human religious need demands of a god. He could become an organ of immortality because he was the Deus Soter, the type as well as the personality. As Dr Breasted says, Osiris was the "good king," the sum of all that Egypt treasured, the "collective soul," the "visualised desire" of his worshippers.

The Egyptian was filled during life with this god-consciousness, with this Osiris, organ and bond of soul-unanimity of his community. At death, if the Egyptian stood the judgment, the test of his moral conformity with the community, his psychological continuity was conserved in the saviour-consciousness of the Egyptian people. The departed one is treasured for ever because Osiris is treasured. Osiris represented a great evolutionary advance on the Pyramids in the process which has been spoken of as Nature's device for lending some sort of persistence to personality. The personality is one with the saviour-god, and is therefore alive in the bosom of this natural, catholic church of the devotees of Osiris.

This saviour-consciousness, this self-identification with a mortuary or mystery god, would even from the materialist point of view supply a possible psychological bridge from an individual to a corporate status. What of biological continuity?

To this, too, the Osirian cult supplies an answer, and does so with a classic completeness. For its devotees kept up a sacrificial transfer of energy from the devotee to the saviour-god. Just as vital energy in the human being keeps him from fainting and unconsciousness, so the vital energy of the devotee kept Osiris in existence. The god was, in a true biological sense, born anew of, nursed and sustained by, those who adored and cultivated his memory. Here again Nature led the way to a forestalling of the idea of a catholic church. All that millionfold supply of living energies, the synthesised body of the god, was also the mystic wheat, the food of such as met in the body of Osiris. By identification with the god through sacrificial adoration, the living man stored up his personality, or sent out suckers, so to speak, by which the life of his personality could continue when the stem, the body, died down.

This Osirian cult showed its vitality by persisting for thirty centuries; its last stronghold in the island of Philæ yielded to force in the days of Justinian.

As the religion of Osiris affords such a clear, scientific conception of a possible communal "re-birth" of the human, individual self, in conformity with natural law, so its failure also affords instructive illustration, and helps us to see what a redeemed, simplified, humanised religion ought to be. Not that mankind to-day has any interest in surviving in an Osiris, or in any freak existence such as Spiritualists seem to offer, or even in the too highly specialised and conventionalised rendering of a Christian Saviour. But mankind

has a direct and immediate interest in a correct scientific delineation of religion and of its organic processes and functional purpose. Such an understanding of religion would tend to unite the world in all the supreme affairs of humanity. It would be far more effectual than any League of Nations.

For if utilitarian mankind thinks in its heart that all the departed "should go hang themselves," and chafes at the thought of memory of the dead interfering with living interests, it should remember that the weight of the presence of the departed may be as the sword of Brennus in the scales, and in our day would overbalance the scale in favour of an effective salvage of civilisation.

The old Roman knew, as the Japanese teach to-day, that religion is *pietas*, a disposal of our earthly life so that those who went before us can be cherished with us and their good and ours can accumulate together to the winning of final victory.

For whether or not we desire life after death for ourselves, we must desire the restoration of hope in the world's progress; and what could restore hope of a Messianic joy better than a realisation that the group sentiment, the group affection, which is called religion, is as surely indicative of an urge towards regeneration as the domestic affections are indicative of an urge towards reproduction? The history of religions shows that they are not developments of an idea but expressions of forms of vital energy, moving, in a sense prophetically, towards some completion. And as from the floundering "dragons of the prime" we can foretell the swallow and the falcon, so from a religion like that of Osiris we can foretell the coming of a fully vertebrate religion, a divine remembrance club of the World's Best, an incitement to make our civilisation a place of repose for their presence, so that they, through us, may conquer for the final collective good.

RICHARD DE BARY.

HORTON, WIMBORNE.

THE TASK OF THE CHURCHES IN ADULT EDUCATION.

BASIL A. YEAXLEE.

IT boots little to be a Fellow of the Statistical Society if you are not also something of a philosopher. The face value of facts is often so extraordinarily different from the human significance of the forces they represent. Thus a cynically minded disbeliever in democracy may smile, when he hears it pointed out that though there are some eight million organised trade unionists in this country, the university tutorial class membership for 1919-20 was only 5528.¹ Not all these could be described as belonging to the working classes. Yet the tutorial class movement is the practical expression of the alliance between Labour and the universities. Wherefore the superficial interpreter of statistics sets down the demand for adult education on the part of the industrial and agricultural masses as at best the fad of a few. Probably he accounts it mere camouflage. But when Mr Fisher the other day drew attention to figures like these, it was only in order to emphasise the importance of other educational activities among adults. At these we will glance in a moment. It is intended at this point to use the figures already quoted as a flail for quite other backs. These men and women have in every individual case set themselves to a three years' course of serious study under a highly qualified tutor of university standing, and with the aim of reaching in the end something like university honours standard in the subjects they have chosen. They have no examination or diploma in view. Their work is undertaken and carried through simply that they may be the better equipped in mind and spirit to live their ordinary lives and to serve the community. *Can the Churches produce any comparable number of men and*

¹ The numbers for the current year are over 7000, thus exceeding the number of undergraduates at Oxford.

women who are submitting themselves to as strenuous and prolonged an intellectual discipline for the sake of Christian life and service? It is true that many of these members of tutorial classes belong to the Churches. But even if the Churches can honestly claim the credit of inspiring them to this quest (which may be doubted), they certainly have done little to provide them with facilities for the pursuit of it.

This article is not written to castigate the Churches, but rather to awaken them. It is intended to raise a matter of most pressing urgency, not only from their own point of view, but from that of general well-being and progress. Great advance has been made in the application of psychology and teaching-method to the practical work of our Sunday-schools. Children and adolescents are, on the whole, wisely handled and well provided for—though it is to be hoped that, having started on the proper track, we shall never reach a point at which we shall be content to stop. But it may be said without fear of exaggeration that the necessity of adult education as a part of its ordinary business has not so much as occurred to the average Church. The increased care given to the training of our little folk and our young people renders the tragedy all the more acute if we proceed to neglect them completely as soon as they come to maturity.

The extent of the movement outside of the Churches has hardly yet been realised by those inside them, who are busy with the all too trivial round and the unhappily common task of more or less futile meetings, small philanthropies, and dying conventionalities, in many congregations. Let such consider the vitality, however narrow and class-conscious, of the Plebs League, with its "gospel" of materialistic Marxism. On the other hand, let us look at the amazing growth in the educational activities of the Co-operative Societies, now returning from a period of bondage to the business aspect of the co-operative principle into the pristine liberty of spirit that belonged to the early co-operators. The tutorial classes are perhaps the apex of working-class educational effort (apart from short terms of whole-time study), but the base broadens out rapidly as you come to one-year classes, study-circles, and lecture courses. Women's institutes were a war-time innovation in England, but now they number over 2000. Working men's clubs are giving a new place to classes and lectures. A special Trade Union Committee has just issued a remarkable report on Adult Education, which adds to the reader's conviction that, while Labour has learned to use education for its own special

purposes, it is only a small section that puts propaganda above the passion for finer personality and a nobler social order.

As to the Adult Schools, with their Sunday or week-day Bible lesson and "first half-hour," their summer schools for women, their week-end schools for men, and their winter residential schools for working girls, they are entering upon a new era of their influence throughout working-class England. The new Educational Settlements which are springing up in our great centres of population are becoming the home of all these varied activities. One such Settlement reports 10,398 attendances at classes and lectures during the 1919-1920 sessions. Finally, one by one, residential colleges for working people are being set up, and to Fircroft for men now answers the Residential College for Working Women at Beckenham.

A catalogue is the dullest of all dull printed matter—except, perhaps, a time-expired railway guide. But it has its uses, and the reader will of course not rest content with the above brief indication of what the Adult Education movement is doing to-day. He may find the tale in full elsewhere. But the synopsis will serve to suggest, by contrast, the disappointing meagreness of the story that the Churches have to tell. To the writer, as doubtless to others, this has been brought home with painful sharpness in two ways. The first is when one has found it necessary to insist almost to the point of sheer dogmatism, in the course of inquiries into adult education, that the work of the Churches is not negligible. The second is still more disillusioning in its effects, for it lies in the discovery, when one is challenged to produce evidence in support of one's assertions, that the obtainable facts are extremely few. This may be in part because the various denominational headquarters are not good at assembling information. But one is gradually driven to believe that it is more because the facts are not there to be tabulated. A few experiments have been made, and illustrative instances show that a considerable amount of work is being done in a diffused fashion. But it remains clear that a much more concentrated effort is required. A policy and a programme must be shaped. If the Church is to fulfil her function, and certainly if she is to regain her place in the thought and life of the people, she must teach as well as preach. The fellowship that she offers must be both intellectual and spiritual.

The ministry was perhaps never better equipped with knowledge than it is to-day. Probably our clergy and ministers are more eager to share their treasure with their people than at any previous time, and to spread the spiritual

impulse that forms an integral part of all true education for life. But our best preachers will tell us that sermons are no true medium for systematic education. The sermon must be based upon wide study and frank thinking: the class must possess the quality of inspiration. But the two are distinct in purpose and method. What most ministers have not yet fully appreciated is, that in adult education the business of the teacher is not to pour out facts and opinions, *ex cathedra*, upon the heads of his devoted pupils. It is to lead a little band of brothers in quest of truth, to stimulate them towards the search for facts and the formation of opinions on their own account.

It is said that people are not interested—that young people in particular will not respond, being set upon the pursuit of pleasure, in the leisure left them by business or by their necessary attendance at technical and vocational classes. It is certainly the experience of working-class educational bodies that their students come when they have more or less “settled down” in life, and are facing serious problems. But as the Trade Union Committee points out, this is largely due to the fact that most of them hitherto have had no guidance or stimulus after leaving the elementary school at thirteen or fourteen years of age. The Fisher Act provides for the filling of that gap. If the Churches have done their work with adolescents at all well, they have at least bridged the gap for those young people of whom they have had the care. The statements made at the beginning of this article show that mature working-people do respond to educational facilities *if these are related to life*, and if they respect the freedom and provide for the social instinct of the student. The writer’s impression is that the pessimism of many padres about the inclinations of young people rests upon an experience of middle-class young people, who, with a better school training, are often the victims of a worse social tradition than that of poorer folk. As to the older men and women, it may be that their interest is real and deep, but that the wrong methods of appealing to it have been adopted, or the right ones not discovered.

There should be no thought of rivalry between the educational activities of the Church among adults and those of such bodies as have been mentioned above. Indeed, as we shall see later, there is much scope for co-operation. It is certainly not suggested that there should be any turning of this ripe field into the scene of a pitched battle like that which arose over the education of children in the last generation. There is no place for propaganda and counter-propa-

ganda. The business of the Church is to take her part in the national scheme of education which the Education Act of 1918 and the various Board of Education publications in connection with it have challenged us to work out. No scheme of education for adults could be complete, in the university sense, without the study of many subjects with which the Churches are supremely concerned. No Church that desires the perfect development of men and women in a true community can stand aside from this common task. It has much to give and much to receive.

To write as though nothing at all had been done by the Churches would be at once unfair and unintelligent. The importance of some experiments already in progress is far greater than can be measured by their extent. The Church Tutorial Classes are now an established fact, thanks to the persistent enthusiasm of Mr Mansbridge, Bishop Gore, and the Bishop of Manchester. They are modelled on the ordinary tutorial classes, but are organised by the diocese, the archdeaconry, or the parish, and deal with such subjects as "The Development of the Idea of God in the Old Testament" and "Christian Ethics." Since the first class was started in Lee (South London), during 1917, some score or so have been organised. Though only two or three have attained to the full status of three-year tutorial classes, the others having taken the form of "one-year," or preparatory, classes, the success thus far attained augurs well for future developments. One difficulty is that of securing suitable tutors, and of course under existing regulations there are no grants in aid from the Government or Local Education Authority as there are for ordinary university tutorial classes and W.E.A. classes in "non-religious" subjects.

It is always easier to tabulate results in the earlier stages of a movement than it is when things begin to go of their own momentum. The study-circle, originally promoted twenty years ago by the various Missionary Societies, has now become a feature of the modern Church programme, and deals with social and Biblical as well as "missionary" subjects. Its value has been in the combination of informality with seriousness of work and systematic effort over a brief period. It has introduced sound educational method among the younger people of the Churches, and a generation of older people has now arisen that, having passed through the study-circle phase, asks for something still more sustained and thorough.

These groups for study have led naturally to summer schools, which, however, as a rule, have not done much more

than provide a week's course of lectures, together with a certain amount of instruction in study-circle method, and perhaps demonstration of it. How valuable ten days of lectures and discussion can prove is best illustrated by the annual Interdenominational Conference of Social Service Unions. Also the local schools for the training of study-circle leaders, conducted by experts for short but strenuous terms, must not be overlooked.

One or two churches have worked out a full scheme of consecutive study, in lectures, circles, and classes on the tutorial plan, for their members, first of all preparing a number of leaders for the various sections of the work. It is as yet too early to estimate the value of these. In other cases various churches in a district have combined to organise a course of lectures in Biblical or apologetic subjects, and in one or two instances arrangements have been made with a university for a course of extension lectures on psychology, or some other subject specially suited to the needs of teachers and lay preachers. Theological summer schools for ministers were once or twice carried through with considerable success at Mansfield College, Oxford, and recently one has been held for ministers in the Eastern Counties. In the diocese of Winchester short courses for clergy have been arranged. Doubtless other provision of a similar sort has been made for clergy and ministers. But perhaps this should come under the category of "technical or vocational education"!

In the sphere of correspondence tuition, which may have very real value if rightly handled, there have been courses in Greek Testament for Sunday-school teachers, and the Church of England has an admirable institution in its Society for Sacred Study, as also in the Central Church Reading Union.

Lest it should seem that I am degenerating to the rôle of catalogue-maker again, I hasten to say that these efforts are specified because the available data are too scanty to make generalisation either safe or significant. References to these definite activities preserve us from mere sketchiness, and, even if fuller details are not available, we still gain clear proof that the prospects are far from hopeless, given a more determined and better co-ordinated attack upon our problem.

Let us then turn to the more constructive aspects of the subject. What is the main task of the Church in this matter of adult education? What should be her policy and programme? How far are her own resources adequate, and what help may she hope to receive from outside her

borders? Above all, what is the sufficient motive for all this effort?

The distinctive contribution of the Churches to the development of adult education is obviously, in the first instance, that of providing facilities for the study of such subjects as Biblical Literature and Criticism, Theology, Christian Ethics, the Christian Basis in Politics (National and International), Christianity and the Social Order, Church History, Christian Missions (in the broadest and most comprehensive sense), Comparative Religions, the Philosophy of Religion, and the Psychology of Christian Experience. Frequently your Red Socialist knows his Marx far better than your average Christian knows his Bible. Industrial History has been a favourite subject in university tutorial classes: few members of our Churches could trace the story of the Evangelical revival of the eighteenth century, with all its issues in social progress, as clearly and fully as many a man outside could describe the origin and growth of trade unions. Psycho-analysis, and the new Psychology generally, has proved to possess a strange fascination for the man in the street, and even more so for teachers and the *intelligentsia* of the middle classes: since James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* arrested the attention of the reading public, there has been no strong effort to get even the people inside the Churches to investigate facts, and make deductions from the facts, about conversion, the work of the Holy Spirit, and similar vital psychological questions. It is to be hoped that Dr Hadfield's forthcoming Dale Lectures on *Christianity and Ethics* will stimulate a fresh start in this direction. Yet the spirit of inquiry is undoubtedly there. People are willing to take some trouble in order to arrive at the truth concerning these things. Indifference or *soi-disant* antagonism on the one hand, and controversy of a destructive kind on the other, will continue so long as ordinary men and women are not enabled to come to close quarters with the problems involved, helped to undertake some serious and continuous reading, and stimulated by well-guided discussion to do their own thinking. Historically there is no real gulf between the "sacred" and the "secular" forces that have shaped the destinies of men and women. The process of interaction has been perpetual. Yet the widespread study of at least half those forces has not been encouraged adequately or aided definitely by the provision of means by which men and women of all types and capacities could undertake it. Really it matters as much to the progress of adult education outside the Churches, and to the proper

study of subjects which seem to belong to "secular" movements, that this condition of things should be remedied, as it does to the well-being and progress of the Churches themselves.

Much may be done in co-operation with other agencies. Some of these are willing to come within the corporate life of a local church or group of churches and function as a part of that life itself, though they demand due respect for their freedom of spirit and method. University Extension Committees and Local Education Authorities have expressed their willingness to arrange lectures and classes for groups organised by churches: London, Bradford, Sunderland, Middlesex, and many other areas could be cited as giving practical proof of the mutual value of such co-operation. Many Adult Schools meet on church premises and play a large part in the life of the Church, though by constitution they are independent in government, non-sectarian and non-political in character. The League of Nations Union is a striking example of a propagandist body which is yet concerned to stimulate real educational effort in the fields related to its propaganda, and to help Churches desiring assistance in very practical ways. But the Churches must learn the true and full meaning of co-operation, which involves sending people away from your own premises, encouraging them to join organisations that neither are nor can be definitely connected with the ecclesiastical, first that they may strengthen the activities into which they go, and then that they may reinforce the work of the Church itself. Thus the Workers' Educational Association in a given place might or might not be willing to form a tutorial or one-year class in Economics, History, Literature, the Theory of Politics, Biology, or what not, in special connection with a Church. But why should the Church not regard it as in every way healthier and better that it should send its members to a class established in the ordinary way and upon a perfectly general basis by the W.E.A.?

A special field of co-operation is offered by Settlements in general, and particularly by the newer type of Settlements known as Educational, because they are primarily centres of adult education in all its forms rather than little colonies of social workers. The Folkhouse at Bristol, for example, sprang from the willingness of Tyndale Church to utilise its fine mission premises on College Green for the purpose, forming a Joint Committee with the Bristol Adult School Union, and gaining the co-operation of the University, the Local Education Authority, and several of the voluntary educational organisations and societies. These Settlements

(as at Beechcroft, Birkenhead ; St Mary's, York ; Bensham, Gateshead ; or Letchworth, to name only a few), while not sectarian in any sense, are founded upon a spiritual basis. They afford common ground where the Churches can do together a great deal of their educational work and meet with other bodies with which they might otherwise find few points of contact.

On the side of organisation the Churches can and should render great service to the Adult Education movement. There are some millions of people in the country whom they can reach as no other organisation can. Whether these folk are recruited by the Churches for classes carried through by outside agencies, or whether they are banded together within the Church itself for definite study, it will be largely the business of the Church to stimulate in them the desire, and to see, not only that a complete range of facilities is within their reach, but that they know what those facilities are.

Independently, or in co-operation with non-ecclesiastical bodies, there ought to be provided popular lecture series on really thought-provoking subjects, short lecture courses, study groups, lecture schools, one-year classes, three-year tutorial classes, adult schools, week-end schools, summer schools, and correspondence courses, while the Churches should also make common cause with the public libraries.

To turn aside for a moment to the subject of books, the librarian of to-day is eager to discover and meet the needs of the locality, especially where these outreach the novel and the gossipy biography. But how many padres help the librarian to choose the best recent theological and missionary books for his shelves, and then see that their people know about them and borrow them ? The Central Library for Students in Tavistock Square exists to procure and lend to individuals or to groups serious books that cost more than five or six shillings, and sends these out at the mere cost to the borrower of carriage both ways. Yet how much use is made of it by the Churches ?

The supply of suitable tutors is always a matter of considerable difficulty in adult education. It is far from being the case that the good preacher is also a good teacher. But many clergy and ministers would find a real vocation in work with a class. Sound knowledge, absence of dogmatism, eagerness to see all sides and to consider all relevant facts, acquaintance and sympathy with the point of view and special interests of the students, and, above all, an ability to create discussion and to develop the originality of the members of the class, are the characteristics of the true

teacher of adults. One of the best known and most brilliant tutors in the University Tutorial Class movement once went to his committee and said that it was imperative that he should be removed from one of his classes. The committee knew that the class was deeply attached to him, and feared the consequences if he were taken away. "Yes, but," he protested, "they've come to believe all I say because I say it, and I can teach them no more." There is food for thought in that remark, and parsons who are anxious to do educational work among adults are advised to ponder it.

As the universities have done, the theological colleges should hear and respond to a great appeal in this business. Professors and lecturers have already in many instances shown their enthusiasm and capacity for this kind of extra-mural effort. College committees might set them more free for it, and should certainly have this claim in view when making appointments, particularly to junior staff posts. Such activities help those who are responsible for the training of ministers to keep in contact with the people whom their pupils are to shepherd. If college staffs in this way were enabled to know more fully what is going on in the mind of the average business or working man, they might not feel it necessary to alter the main lines of their college curriculum, but they would certainly teach from a different angle, lay the emphasis differently, and perhaps would change their methods.

Then surely there is a considerable place for theological students in this movement, and they themselves might derive much benefit from participating in it. Many men in their third year, if not in their second, would be well qualified to take a one-year class. If each really suitable man were given one such class in the session it would occupy no more of his time than he now gives to desultory preaching. He would gain a deeper insight into some of the problems that he will have to face when he himself is ordained, and would get an experience of men and women that would help greatly to prepare him for his ministry later on. Academically he would be kept hard at work on consecutive study of the subject in which he is specialising. He would learn from his class that after all he is only a man with a little better start than the rest, and might be delivered from one of the most common, and often most destructive, perils of the young professional man—swelled head. Similarly, from among the outgoing men one here and there might be selected and given a fellowship, tenable, say, for three years, with the duty of taking three or four tutorial classes each

session, or a couple of tutorial classes and other forms of lecturing or teaching work among the Churches. Naturally, part of their time would be devoted to research. Possibly the teaching work might be arranged as a half-time task, the remainder of a man's time being utilised for some other form of service. One wise principal of a theological college used to see to it that his men, during their ordinary course, joined adult schools and took their part there. The writer has lately heard that Manchester College, Oxford, and another theological college in the south are quite definitely considering some such plan for their students as the one just suggested.

We make far too little use of our lay men and women in the Churches. There are many in business or professional life who have taken ordinary university courses, or are by nature and habit students, and whose knowledge of men, broad outlook, and human sympathies would make them excellent teachers. They "have no use" for many of the trifling little jobs which often appear to be all that we offer them, and they will make no time for these. They will make sacrifices for a task that is worth while, and will give of their best.

There is, of course, a financial aspect to all this. Much can, and will, be done "for love." But the demands on the time of men and women involved in any big and thorough educational effort on the part of the Churches will mean that those men and women must be given, in whole or in part, the means of subsistence. Grants-in-aid may be forthcoming from official sources for certain of the more systematic types of high-grade work. But it is questionable whether this would be possible in the case of some of the subjects of central importance from the Church point of view. It does indeed need to be demonstrated that you can teach Biblical subjects, and many others among those mentioned above, as impartially as you can teach economics or industrial history. A Christian motive and Christian conviction do not imply bias or unscientific method: on the contrary, they should ensure the very reverse, and result in loyalty to truth above all things. But freedom is essential, and no crippling limitations can be admitted for the sake of obtaining a money grant. Moreover, there is a great deal of introductory and experimental work to be done for which it would be unreasonable to expect such aid. Probably it would be found that students would be ready to pay for real facilities at a much higher rate than is at present supposed. For the rest, the Church must budget for this as for any other part of her work—certainly as definitely as she does for the upkeep of

cathedrals and bishops, or the fine buildings and star preachers of the Free Churches in great cities.

And the motive? Jesus, both in practice and in His final commission to His followers, put preaching, teaching, and healing on the same level. He set out to make complete manhood and womanhood possible all over the world and in every age. The Kingdom that He proclaimed is founded upon truth—ethical, economic, æsthetic, historic, scientific, political and international, as well as theological and experimental. The Church cannot be loyal to Him unless she does this thing. His reign in the lives of men must tarry while they are slaves—for the truth is to make them free. To the attainment of truth, as His respect for personality has once for all revealed, the contribution of every man's mind and will is necessary. It was in the power of His victory, by way of the cross, over sin and death that He said to those whose lives He had changed, and into whose hands He gave the whole future of His continuing work, "Go and make learners of all the nations."

BASIL A. YEAXLEE.

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THE CHURCH AT THE CROSSROADS.

MRS M. A. ST CLAIR STOBART.

A FEW years ago, only the bravest members of the laity would have dared—and only then in whispers—to have asserted that the churches are a failure. To-day the clergy themselves are proclaiming their failure to fill their churches, or to reach the souls of those who come—either out of curiosity to hear a popular preacher, or from a lingering tradition that churchgoing is an outward and visible sign of moral and social respectability. The time has therefore come when members of the laity may presumably speak aloud, in the hope that a cherished institution of religious life may yet be salvaged. But, it may be asked, why be anxious for the fate of institutional religion? If it is dying a natural death, that probably means that it has already served its purpose. Religion is, after all, an affair of the individual soul, and can safely be left to individuals. The chief value of religion has been in its inculcation of morality. Its value has been social, and to-day the moral code, founded on the commandments of Moses, is safely in the hands of the police. So why not leave the churches to die a natural death?

But such argument leaves out of account the fact that the importance of religion as a factor in evolution, and the responsibility of the churches as the exponents of religion, have been enhanced a hundredfold by the birth of the League of Nations. For even in its present anæmic condition the existence of the League, whose object is to prevent war, is a sign that the conscience of mankind has outgrown the usages of war, that man is discovering that war is probably after all not preordained as a permanent factor in his evolution, that, in short, *the Age of War is passing*. And a consideration of the significance—the revolutionary significance—of this simple phrase reveals, as we shall try to show, the tragedy that is upon us, if the churches should fail us at this juncture.

Now, it would be absurd to suppose that a force wielding the colossal power that war has wielded, from the earliest days till now, could glide gently out of the lives of men, without producing far-reaching effects. For the power of war in the past has been overwhelming, not only in its direct and more or less transitory effects—effects such as those which have been painfully brought home to this generation, but which will to a large extent be forgotten by future generations—the power of war has been stupendous also in the influence it has had in moulding the everyday laws and social habits which form the framework of society, and control our lives in time of peace.

We all realise that the history of the rise and fall of nations is, in its outer aspect, the history of wars; but we do not always remember that the whole fabric of our social life, in its internal as well as in its external aspects, has, in the past, been framed in accordance with the exigencies of war, in deference to the supposed inevitability of war. The institution of kingship, parliaments, the feudal system, from which our land laws and our ideas of property are derived, class distinctions, the social inequality of the sexes, with all that this involves, together with innumerable other legal and social phenomena, all owe their origin directly, or indirectly, to conditions of life determined by the requirements of war. And much discontent in our social life to-day is due to a subconscious recognition that many of our laws and customs have outlived the conditions, the war conditions, in which they had their origin, the conditions in which alone their justification could be found, and that in many cases in which rights and duties, originally military duties, were concurrent, to-day the rights persist, but the duties have been abrogated. And it is reasonable to assume that if, to-day, whilst the actualities of war are still vivid in our memory, we are resenting anomalies due to the prevalence of war in former days, we shall be still more resentful when the complete passing of war shall cause further and innumerable anomalies to be manifest. And so the passing of war, as a social habit, will disturb, as it has already begun to disturb, the whole moral and social equilibrium of mankind; it will cause a revaluation of our social forces; it will revolutionise ideals: the passing of war will, in short, bring civilisation and all the forces which make for civilisation—and amongst these must surely be included the churches—to the crossroads of their fate.

But wherein lies the special responsibility of the churches? Why may we not assume, as before suggested, that the rôle

of the Church is played out, and that, if there is to be a new régime, a régime in which war and all its influences will be exterminated, this can very well be initiated without the influence and the interference of the churches? Where lies our justification for the assertion that the importance of religion, and the responsibility of the churches as the exponents of religion, are enhanced a hundredfold by the birth of the League of Nations? Let us briefly consider the position.

No one will dispute that the world to-day is indulging in an orgy of egoism. All classes are egoistic—the capitalist, the commercial, the political, the working class; the churches also cannot be exonerated from the charge. Profiteering, strikes, lock-outs, all are evidence of the fact that everyone is out to get what he can for himself, without thought of others. Bolshevism, which sacrifices for one section of society every other section, Sinn Féinism, which means literally “Ourselves alone,” are modern epitomes of egoism run riot.

Yet no one seems conscious of wrongdoing, and for this reason. We have all been brought up to believe that life is one big struggle for survival; that nature has so arranged it, that in the struggle the fittest will survive, and pass on their qualities of fitness to their descendants: that we need therefore have no scruples in ousting and eliminating those who in the struggle are weaker than ourselves, as this is nature’s way of securing progress, the survival of the fittest, the evolution of the race. Darwin’s catch-phrase, “survival of the fittest,” has been seized upon by the world at large, and applied indiscriminately to every phase of life. Leaders of all classes, philosophical, commercial, as well as military, have seized greedily upon the idea of survival of the fittest, as scientific excuse for conduct of the most aggressively egoistical kind. And, as physical force was the most valuable weapon in the struggle for survival, war in all its aspects, social and industrial, as well as military, came to be regarded as the natural and legitimate means of settling differences and of adjusting inequalities. War, in short, secured the survival of the fittest. The Germans, with characteristic thoroughness, carried this doctrine of survival of the fittest to its logical extreme. Every German man, woman, and child was taught that it was the evolutionary duty of the German people to prove their extreme fitness for survival by crushing other nations who contested their supremacy. This was a law of nature, which it were blasphemy to God, and to the all-highest man, to disregard. Licensed egoism became, indeed, the guiding principle of life.

Now, though Darwinian principles may have been appli-

cable to the physical evolution of the individual during what has been called the jungle stage of life, they are not applicable to the evolution of society—of people living together in communities—a subject to which Darwin had not given his attention. The principle of licensed egoism is, indeed, the result of undigested Darwinism. And this application to the evolution of society, of principles applicable only to the evolution of the individual, is probably one of the most disastrous blunders the world has ever made. Had Darwin lived to see this misapplication of his theory, he would probably have been the first to wish to counteract it.

For the laws controlling the evolution of society are indeed the exact reverse of those responsible for the evolution of the individual. In the jungle stage of life, the keynote of success is satisfaction, egoism, and the most valuable qualities are physical. When there is no social law, and everyone has to fight literally for his existence, physical force decides survival, and the physically weaker perish. In short, egoism and physical force are essentials of survival. But in social life the keynote of success is self-sacrifice, altruism, and the most valuable qualities are spiritual ideals and moral obligations—the obligations of one individual to another, of one class to another, of one nation to another. If the rich, for instance, are not willing to sacrifice some of the riches they have secured in the struggle for survival, in other words to be taxed, and heavily taxed, for the benefit of those who have been less successful in the struggle: if the workers are not willing to make some concessions in the way of liberty, time, and energy, for the benefit of the community: if employers whittle wages down to the lowest living wage, and if the workers, in revenge, give the scantiest minimum of labour: if all fight together to exhaustion, on every possible occasion, by strikes and lock-outs—the result is social ruin, society cannot hold together; for trade and prosperity no longer tamely follow the flag, they follow peace. In short, not egoism and the physical forces, but altruism and the moral and spiritual forces, are the essentials of social survival.

And until we have realised this fact, and until we act as though we had realised it, we are not truly social beings, we are not truly members of society, we are animals, and have no right to talk of being civilised at all. For I take it that to be civilised means to have learnt something of the art of living together as members of a complex social community, and this is only possible when we have definitely discarded the egoistic principles of jungle life, and substituted for these the altruistic principles of social life.

All very well, it may be said ; but what power is there that can compel us, as a class, as a nation, to the virtues of self-sacrifice essential to social progress ? Now, the only two powers that have ever succeeded in inspiring men to acts of self-sacrifice and devotion, are war and religion. But the League of Nations is testimony to the fact that the Age of War is passing. And no wonder, for with the passing of the usefulness of physical force, as a factor in evolution, passes also the usefulness of war, as discriminator of the fittest.

But in rejoicing, as all sane people must rejoice, at the passing of the scourge of war, we must remember that, though war has fostered the grossest egoisms of those who sought conquest for the sake of gains, it has also appealed to the purest altruisms of those who felt the moral value of self-sacrifice for an Ideal. For, base and degrading as are the accompaniments of war, the cause of war has succeeded, beyond all other causes, in unifying the diverse sentiments of men to a common Ideal, to a common purpose. War has stood at one and the same time for two opposing principles. Its appeal has thus been universal. War has swept men off their feet into torrents of spiritual ecstasy and exaltation. War has conformed equally to the doctrine of egoism as a duty in evolution, and to the doctrine of altruism as a condition of salvation. War has contravened the Scriptures, for it has served both God and Mammon.

And in so far as war has served God, by its power of crystallising the vague and abstract ideals of men to a definite and a common purpose, and by its inspiration to the virtues of collective sacrifice essential to social progress, war has been one of the mainstays of civilisation ; and if this mainstay is withdrawn, civilisation must inevitably collapse, *unless the function of that mainstay is taken over by some other power.*

Now, there is only one other power that has ever succeeded in inspiring men collectively to self-sacrifice and to altruism—the power of religion, the noblest ideal that ever unified the sentiments of men. But the trouble with religion has been that it has hitherto lacked the glory of war. And if religion is to take the place of war, as a stimulus to the virtues of self-sacrifice, collective sacrifice, essential to social progress, religion must be endowed with the qualities that have made war glorious for man.

But what is glory, and wherein has lain the glory of war ? Surely the essence of glory is—when shorn of its external bedizenments—self-sacrifice. The glory of war has consisted not in its bloodiness and in its horrors, but in its power of

evoking sacrifice, the sacrifice even of life itself. But is not self-sacrifice the essence also of religion? Is it not clear, therefore, that religion must take the place of war, as an inspiration to the virtues of self-sacrifice, to that universal altruism, essential not only to social progress, but to the continued existence of the human race. But the sacrifices demanded by the churches have not hitherto been sacrifices for the common good. The churches have not inspired men to collective acts of altruism. The appeal of the churches to-day is local, individual, and ecclesiastical; it has not a national, still less has it a human, basis. The churches to-day have no grip upon the human heart. They have failed at the greatest crisis in the history of the world, as they themselves now recognise. But the fault is not inherent in the religion which they have sought to teach; the failing lies in the manner of presentation. For religion is not dogma, it is not tradition, it is not ritual. Religion is an instinct for the preservation of the life spiritual, and the task of the leaders of religion is, not to overlay this instinct with material beliefs proper to the material plane, but to guide it to function on its own spiritual plane.

And the churches have failed because, though the world has passed the crudely materialistic stage, and has advanced to a consciousness of the reality of the spirit life, and has moreover, now, an intellectual foundation capable of supporting the spiritual superstructure, they still insist upon a crude materialism in doctrines, rituals, and foundational beliefs, and still consider it dangerous to admit their congregations to the reality of the spirit life, to the true communion of saints, which remains a dead letter of a lifeless creed. The churches thus, by forbidding all personal experience of the reality of the spirit life, arbitrarily divide into two compartments the life of the spirit, which they say belongs to a future life, and the life of the body, which belongs to this life; and religion, instead of being an aid to spiritual knowledge and to the development of the spirit life on earth, becomes a barren conformity to creeds and rituals, which have no bearing on practical life: they savour neither of earth nor heaven.

But if religion is ever to be anything more than a convention, a social habit, if it is to be a dynamic force, it must be presented to the world under its own spiritual banner, as a force that is neither material, nor intellectual, nor a mixture of history, metaphysics, and fairy tales, but as a spiritual force. The churches must have the courage to lift religion once for all from the material on to the spiritual plane. Man-

kind is only stirred to greatness by great emotions. These are spiritual. Even the German aggressors in 1914 were not foolish enough to attempt to lure their people to the frenzy of war by the vulgar bait of material conquest. The mind of the German people had been scientifically saturated with ideas of an abstract super-patriotism, which carried even the learned professors of philosophy off their feet. The German nation, said the leaders of German political thought, was a super-nation, and it was the evolutionary duty of the German super-man to spread his super-culture across the globe. This was the mission, the spiritual mission, of the race. And in our country, it was certainly not for material motives, for hopes of material gain, that men and women, great and humble, rich and poor, flocked in their thousands to lay down their lives. It was for a spiritual abstraction, for an Ideal, for the Idea, whether true or not, that this was a war to abolish militarism, to do away with Prussian tyranny and political opportunism: a war to make the world safe for democracy, a war to make a better and a nobler world. And the world will suffer incalculable spiritual loss if, when the Age of War is past, there should be no influence on a national scale, to sublimate for us great spiritual ideals, and stir us to make sacrifices for the common good. If it has been desirable to make sacrifices in the cause of war—which is generally a bad cause—how much better would it be to make sacrifices in the cause of religion—which is a good cause! And if the churches are to reach the hearts of men, and stir them to great deeds for the service of humanity, for the service of God—for causes nobler than any that war has ever championed—they must build, not as now, on a foundation of decaying traditions, with a top-dressing of metaphysics, but *upon the spiritual nature of mankind*. They must risk all upon the reality of spirit. They must lead men boldly into the no-man's land of the spirit life, and leave the old semi-material, semi-ecclesiastical religion behind them in the trenches.

The summation of our argument then is, that if the League of Nations is, as we believe, a token that the Age of War is passing, and if with the passing of the evil influences of war there will pass also certain influences for good, then the churches, as trustees of religion, are to-day responsible for the salvation of mankind. For upon them in future will rest the responsibility of inculcating self-sacrifice and altruism as the guiding principle of life: upon them alone will rest the responsibility of offering to men, individually and collectively, occasional visions of the transcendental self—of

that self which can, when stirred by true emotion, transcend suffering, discomfort, pain, and death, and realise, in purest joy, the unreality of the body, and the reality of the spirit life.

If, then, the churches should fail us now, if they should refuse to revalue their ecclesiastical stock, refuse to scrap misfits and to adapt themselves to the spiritual requirements of this age, if they should fail to rise to the urgency of the present crisis, the multitude, deprived of its main incentive to the cardinal virtue of collective altruism, will sink.

For altruism can no longer be left to a handful of individual Christians. Altruism must be organised for the multitude, as egoism has been organised. But whereas the majority need not much persuasion to walk along the broad highway of egoism, the path of altruism is beset with thorns; and if religion is to grip men's hearts and souls in the future, as war has gripped them in the past, and bring men of diverse sentiments to the common denomination of enthusiasm for an Ideal, the churches must abandon their autocratic insistence that religion is a special revelation, to a special people, at a special time, and to a special sex—for in religion there is neither time nor sex—and they must learn to discover for religion, as the militarists have invariably discovered for war, a universal and a spiritual basis of appeal.

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DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

" OCCULTISM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1922, p. 251.)

IN his article on "Occultism" in the January 1922 number Mr Edward Clodd, having discussed the phenomena of telepathy and water-finding by a rod, classifies them with many others, such as "medium-trainers, faith healers, soul weighers, spirit photographers . . . *et hoc genus omne.*" He condemns or rather derides them all as being superstitious delusions, and he quotes many writers in support of his opinions. But he does not mention the result of his own personal experiments or observations made in order to discover the causes of these phenomena.

When we hear of or see a phenomenon, the cause of which is not known by us, the scientific method of investigating the unknown cause is by experiments made by ourselves. I only claim to be a lover and a student of nature; yet, when walking on a mountain side I notice the behaviour of flocks of sheep and the flight of birds, I can only explain what I see by the supposition that, within a certain distance of one another, their minds do communicate with one another instantaneously.

When one sheep at the edge of a flock sees my small dog, they all simultaneously take to flight, although, owing to the height of the gorse and heather, only one sheep saw the dog.

It is wonderful to observe the flight of large flocks of plover or starlings. At one moment all their wings are turned edgewise to us, the next moment we see the spread of all their wings turned towards us. All their minds work or think together with absolute precision, and reveal the fact that telepathy does exist in groups. The same explanation may be given of a sudden panic, which in an instant can affect a huge crowd of people. They act on an impulse of thought common to all.

As regards water-finding by a rod, I deny that it may be classified with Mr Clodd's list of superstitious delusions, as it is a very practical and useful fact or phenomenon. Before selecting a building site for a house in the country, it is essential to know that an unfailing supply of pure water will be within reach of the suction pipe of a force pump. I knew nothing about water-finding until one day when I was acting on a commission of delapidations at a vacant rectory. There was a small well with an outlet in the floor of the kitchen, and the architect wanted to know whether the water came from a pure source. No one could give him any information. Saying that he must find it out, he went outside and cut a forked rod from a snow-berry bush, and sharpened its projecting point. Then, holding the bent forks in both hands so that the point projected horizontally before him, he walked across a bank of earth which sloped towards the kitchen. At one place the rod curled upwards and hit his chest, and in doing so it broke itself outside his hands. I was astonished, and he said, "Now, if you touch me you will destroy my power."

We cut a new rod, and when we passed over the spot with my hand lightly touching his arm, the rod made no movement. I took the rod into my hands, and, when passing over the spot, it twisted itself so that it pointed downwards, as if it were made of steel, and a magnet in the ground was pulling its point towards it, no matter how tightly I held the forked branches of the rod. The architect said, "I should have told you that with most water-finders the rod points downwards." The ground was then dug, and a small stream of water was found running rapidly in a confined channel towards the house.

The fact that our rods pointed in opposite directions suggested to me that the force, whatever it was, might be akin to the positive and negative poles of electricity, so I investigated in order to discover if such were a fact. With the co-operation of a friend I found that his rod acted when he stood over a water supply pipe which was under the floor of his large hall, but when I insulated him by getting him to stand on a slab of glass in the same place his rod became inert.

On another day I connected a large loop of wire with a four-volt battery and laid it on a carpeted floor. No motion took place when I held the rod over the wire, but when I stood on the wire, the rod twisted downwards as it did over the hidden water at the rectory. Another man was there whose rod made no movement when he stood on the four-volt wire; but when we went to the motor workshop, I charged the wire from the dynamo with twenty-five volts, and then when he stood on it his rod twisted downwards notwithstanding his effort to prevent movement by holding it tightly with both hands.

Then I investigated the cause of the opposite movements of the architect's rod and mine. I put the point of the rod on one pole of the dynamo until my arms tingled. When I removed it, it pointed to the floor of the room; but when I put it on the opposite pole and removed it, it pointed upwards and hit my chest. I concluded that the power of the dowser depends on his conductivity of electricity. In order to test this conclusion, at a garden party I placed a lady

over a pipe which was under a walk and which supplied a fountain at the bottom of the garden. When I turned the water on, her rod moved; when I turned it off, the rod became inert. I then asked the visitors one by one to touch her arm. When some touched her, her power was destroyed; but when others touched her, it was increased. The conductivity of each visitor was thus revealed.

As the rod never moves when held over still water, nor over an open stream, I conclude that the cause which moves the rod is the force generated by the friction of the water running in a confined channel which passes through the feet of the dowser, and escapes through the sharp-pointed end of the rod in an upward or downward direction.

Mr Clodd's explanation of the phenomenon is different. Having quoted many books, he says, "So the question is narrowed to the psychology of the dowser. Excluding suggestions of trickery, is he in the possession of a special psychical faculty, or is he the victim of a delusion? The answer, unlike the water sought after, lies on the surface. The movement of the dowsing-twigg is not due to any occult property which emanates from the thing hidden. It is explained by the muscular fatigue resulting from the effort of keeping the hands and fingers in one position. The strained hands seek relief, and as they move the forked twig moves with them mechanically. While the cooler-headed can control this muscular relaxation, those who are mentally absorbed in the strange procedure find their tired hands (tired, though they are unconscious of it) suddenly turning, and the twig flies upwards in a way which they can neither explain nor control."

Every sentence of this explanation is contrary to the facts which I have verified by experimental research.

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SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

SINCE I last wrote, European philosophy has suffered two severe and irreparable losses. The death of Sir Henry Jones on 4th February removes from our midst a striking and unique personality, a man who infused into philosophical thought something of the earnestness and enthusiasm of Fichte. The story has often been told—he himself was proud to tell it—of his progress from the shoemaker's bench, first to the chair of Philosophy and Political Science at Bangor in 1884, then in 1891 to that of Logic and Metaphysics at St Andrews, and finally in 1894, as successor to his own teacher Edward Caird, to that of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow. A great teacher Henry Jones most undoubtedly was, a teacher who possessed the rare gift of being able to make his subject attractive without becoming superficial. But to represent him, as some writers have done, as a mere popular expounder of Hegelian idealism is a gross injustice. He was, on the contrary, a subtle and penetrative thinker, and he had a keen theoretical interest in the investigation of scientific and philosophical problems. His book on *The Philosophy of Lotze*, published in 1895 (not in 1894, as erroneously stated in several notices), is not an exposition of Lotze's mode of thinking, but an acute and searching criticism of his theory of knowledge, and could only have been intelligible to readers who were already acquainted with Lotze's writings. To the pages of *Mind* Henry Jones contributed articles that were full of penetrating and suggestive reflexion, and he seldom handled a theme without having some new light to cast upon it. He was, it is true, a disciple of Hegel, but a disciple who perhaps more than any other was breaking away from the orthodox paths and leading his pupils to a critical realism. He had a rooted objection to subjectivism in all its forms, and would not tolerate what he believed to be a woeful perversion of Hegel's teaching, such a representation of it as finds expression in the writings of Croce and Gentile. With the aims and purposes of the HIBBERT JOURNAL he was from its commencement in fullest sympathy. To our first number he contributed a carefully reasoned critique of Royce's Gifford Lectures, and some of his most poignant articles have appeared in these pages. We lose in him

a powerful supporter of the principles for which we stand, and a personal friend whose memory we shall warmly cherish. M. Émile Boutroux, who died on 21st November, was likewise a great teacher and a man who by his personal charm exerted a wide-spread influence in philosophic circles. He had not, it must be confessed, either the critical acumen or the speculative ability of Sir Henry Jones, but he did a considerable amount of useful philosophical work, and all his chief books have been translated into English. His most important volume was his first one, that published in 1879 and entitled *De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature*. Since its republication in 1895 it has gone through a large number of editions, and is now recognised as containing that which provided the point of departure for the speculation of Bergson and Le Roy. Professor Boutroux was Gifford Lecturer in Glasgow in 1904 and 1905. His lectures there on *La Nature et l'Esprit* have never been published; but a portion of the material of them is evidently embodied in the book on *Science et Religion dans la philosophie contemporaine* which appeared in French in 1908, and in English in 1909. For some thirty years Boutroux occupied one of the philosophical chairs in the University of Paris, and his appointment in 1902 to the Directorship of the Fondation Thiers brought him into close contact with a large number of younger men who were engaged in original research of a philosophical kind. In 1919 he suffered a heavy blow by the death of his wife, a sister of Henri Poincaré, but he retained to the end his wonderful vivacity and his interest in philosophical questions and social affairs. He visited England in 1914 to deliver the Hertz lecture at the British Academy, on "Certitude and Truth." This lecture was reprinted in 1916 with a number of other essays in a volume entitled *Philosophy and War*—a volume in which there is no bitterness, but in which the hope is expressed that the Germany which was respected and admired by the whole world, the Germany of Leibniz and Goethe, may yet some day be reborn.

Sir Henry Jones had intended to follow up his treatment of Lotze's doctrine of Thought in another volume dealing with Lotze's metaphysical theories, but unfortunately that intention was never fulfilled. To some extent the need of such an examination has been met by the Rev. E. E. Thomas in his critical exposition of *Lotze's Theory of Reality* (London: Longmans, 1921). Mr Thomas discusses in detail Lotze's conception of the world as a systematic unity of things, and of the deeper unity which was taken to underlie the former. He also considers Lotze's view of the human soul (without referring, however, either to the *Medicinische Psychologie* or to the important psychological papers contained in the *Kleine Schriften*), and he concludes with a chapter on moral values as determining the nature of reality. The author's criticism is, I think, on the whole judicious and well directed. He argues, for example, that the theory of the singleness of meaning of the world does not enable Lotze to solve the problem as to how the activity of things centres in a whole which includes them all within itself. For the question at once arises, How do changes originate in the world at all? Does the world as a whole

initiate activity in certain parts of itself in order that its unity of purpose may be destroyed for the moment, and in the next moment be restored again? What could the world, however, gain by such a process? If the world has a singleness of meaning, or of purpose, and if this meaning rests in the world itself as a whole, and can only be destroyed and restored again by the activity of the world itself, then all reason for movement and change is removed; the world might keep its singleness of meaning or of purpose in eternal immobility, for it gains nothing by change. If, on the other hand, change is initiated in parts of the world, independently of the world as a whole, and if the world has to react upon these changes in order to restore singleness of meaning in itself, then the activity of individual things can claim an independence of the activity of the whole, and singleness of activity is destroyed despite unity of meaning, seeing that we now have activity initiated in things and activity initiated in the whole, both facing one another. In short, Lotze does not succeed in showing how the whole has given reality to the parts, or to single objects. In the latter part of the work Mr Thomas has some suggestive things to say about value judgments and their relation to reality. Through the medium of value judgments, Lotze sought to see a thing fulfilling the law of its being; and, in order to conceive of value as objectively realised in things, he looked upon the law of a thing's behaviour as the principle of its reality. But when he came to determine what value is, he was constrained to describe it as a state of blessedness subsisting in a community of spirits. And thus, in the end, he was left with the old antagonism between a realm of nature and a realm of spirit—an antagonism which he was never able to heal. Mr Thomas has written a book that will certainly be useful to students of Lotze. But it is a pity he did not read over the proof-sheets more carefully; there are numerous errors in spelling and construction that ought to have been corrected.

Two interesting volumes of essays call for notice. Professor J. B. Baillie's *Studies in Human Nature* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1921) are not intended to support any of the familiarly accepted theories, whether of idealism or realism. On the one hand, the idealistic elaboration of a theory of a completed and perfect universe, "all inclusive and harmonious," leaves, he thinks, too little for the creative spirit of man to do; while, on the other hand, a realistic exposition of the world in a way which treats human suffering and human ends as derivative or secondary leaves for man nothing worth doing. The defects of such one-sided theories will best be avoided by following the path of what Sidgwick used to call critical common sense, and by holding to the natural solidarity of human experience to which it clings. Professor Baillie's main object would appear to be to determine the function of thought or intellect in human life, and its relation to other mental activities. He insists that the complex individuality of man is the best clue to the nature of reality, and not intellectual activity alone. Thought, he urges, is in fact always affected and influenced by other factors of our mental life—the striving attitude, the emotional attitude we take up to the object considered, etc. If

the philosopher would have nature and human life expressed in terms of reason, consistent and complete, then the recent appalling calamity in our history is sufficient to convince us that in the cosmic ordering of human life the Spirit of the World must have something else to do than to be reasonable as we count reasonableness. Possibly not reasonableness but dramatic completeness may be the chief unifying quality of man's life. "Human life is not a scientific enterprise, nor the universe a mere riddle for philosophers." Not even physical nature offers up its whole secret to the human intellect. No one who has seen a summer sunrise transform the rocks and hills will ever imagine that the full significance of the scene is reserved for the textbooks of the geologist or the cosmology of the philosopher. Knowledge is but one channel of satisfaction for the mind. The state of emotion likewise, for example, contributes to our consciousness of the real. Where there is emotion, conscious kinship stands revealed, and thus in this experience we have not merely a state of the individual's life but a characteristic of the real world. The chief difficulty I feel in Professor Baillie's argument is that, though he maintains intellectual activity involves emotion and effort, he seems perpetually to lose sight of the fact that emotion and effort involve intellectual activity. Art and religion are surely not outcomes of emotion devoid of thought. Professor Josiah Royce's *Fugitive Essays*, edited, with an introduction, by Dr J. Loewenberg (Harvard University Press, 1920), contain much that one is glad to have rescued from oblivion, especially the papers on "Schiller's Ethical Studies," "The Practical Significance of Pessimism," "Pessimism and Modern Thought," "George Eliot as a Religious Teacher," and "The Problem of Paracelsus." With the exception of the last three in the book, all the essays here collected are the early fruits of Royce's literary activity; and, as there will probably be no biography written of the author, it is hoped that his early essays may contribute to an understanding of his personality. As the editor says, there are present in them the earnestness, the sincerity, the humility and the reverence, so characteristic of all his thinking and writing.

The translation by Mr H. L. Brose of Professor Hermann Weyl's great work on *Space-Time-Matter* (London: Methuen, 1922) places within the reach of English readers the most systematic presentation of the scientific theory of relativity that has yet been written. The treatment of the Tensor Calculus, by means of which the author thinks it is alone possible to express adequately the physical knowledge under discussion, occupies a relatively large amount of space. The book consists of four chapters, the first dealing with Euclidean space, the second with Riemann's geometry, the third with the special theory of relativity, and the fourth with the general theory. In the last chapter the author propounds a new theory of his own, which represents an attempt to derive from what he calls world-geometry not only gravitational but also electro-magnetic phenomena. Attention should be drawn to the able and lucid article by Mr J. E. Turner (*Mind*, January 1922) on "Scientific Relativity." Mr Turner shows conclusively what has more than once been contended in these pages,

that the scientific theory has no bearing whatsoever on the philosophic problem of the relation between mind and reality. It is not the "mind of the observer" that is directly concerned by either the special or general form of the theory; it is merely his velocity, or rather the velocity (or its equivalent) of his reference-system. The writer emphasises the significance of the limiting case of observers in one reference-system who obtain, therefore, *identical* results. In the first place, this identity, he points out, proves quite definitely that those discordances in the content of our experience, from which so many sweeping philosophic conclusions have recently been drawn, are due to nothing except either (a) differences in the velocities, not of the observers, *as conscious observers*, but of their physical systems of reference, or (b) certain conditions (again physical) whose nature, though as yet far from being understood, nevertheless presents aspects which have abstract mathematical equivalents. Such discordances can, then, only have a bearing on the problem of the *nature* of knowledge, or of experience, or of reality, if we are prepared to base our epistemology on the rate at which we happen to be moving, or on gravitational potentials. And, in the second place, the identity in question constitutes what all scientists accept as "absolute"—namely the invariable *Eigenraumzeit* of observers with identical velocity. Mr Turner might, in fact, have gone further. Those who maintain it to be an outcome of mathematical relativity to introduce subjectivism into physical science have grossly misunderstood the theory itself. They suppose that each observer must have one and only one system of reference and that no two observers can have an identical system of reference. But what the theory of relativity implies is just the opposite—namely, that each observer may have several systems of reference, and several observers may have an identical system of reference. Mention should also be made of a thoughtful article by Professor A. L. Hammond on "Appearance and Reality in the Theory of Relativity" (*Phil. R.*, November 1921). "Whether there is absolute space, time or motion, I am sure," writes Professor Hammond, "I do not certainly know; but I do know that if there be, still measurement of them would be as relative as Einstein demonstrates." Some of our readers will like to be informed of the excellent account of the Quantum theory by Fritz Reiche: *Die Quantentheorie, ihr Ursprung und ihre Entwicklung* (Berlin: Springer, 1921), an English translation of which is already announced by Messrs Methuen.

In an article on "The External World" (*Mind*, October 1921), Professor C. D. Broad discusses the work which has been done during the last few years on the problem of the relation between a physical object and what are called its sensible appearances. He confines himself, however, to work which has proceeded on certain lines—from the assumption, namely, that whenever we judge that something *appears* to us to have the quality *q* there must be an object with which we are acquainted which *really does have* the quality *q*, this object being the sensum. First of all, he examines the arguments to prove that *sensa* are mental, in the sense of being presentations, and finds that, though plausible, those arguments are inconclusive. Then he passes

to the question of how *sensa* are related to physical objects. According to the view he is concerned with, physical objects are conditions of our *sensa*. But we have to ask, What exactly is meant by this phrase "conditions"? In the first place, what is it that processes in physical objects and in our own bodies condition? Do they produce the *sensa*? Or do they cause us to become aware of *sensa* that already exist? Or do they both produce and make us aware of them? The difficulties which Professor Broad discerns in each of these three alternatives, those which he calls the creative theory, the selective theory, and the mixed theory respectively, only strengthens, I think, the doubt one feels as to the legitimacy of the assumption that lies at the basis of them all. In the same number of *Mind*, Professor Alexander replies to Professor Broad's critique of his Gifford Lectures on *Space, Time, and Deity*. "The one thing," he says, "which disappointed me in Mr Broad's articles was that he does not appear to realise that for me the doctrine of the categories, taken along with the notion of Space-Time, is central; and this failure of insight affects his criticism of me when he discusses my account of Space-Time." What he has tried, he tells us, to do is, assuming Space-Time to be the foundation of the universe, to point out what the experienced features of Space-Time are which are the categories. Professor R. Wood Sellars is likewise concerned with our knowledge of the external world in his article "Concerning 'Transcendence' and 'Bifurcation'" (*Mind*, January 1922). He contends that a physical thing is an object only in the sense that it is made an object by the percipient organism. That is what "object" in this case means. By its very nature and situation it is outside the individual's experience-complex, though not outside the reach of knowledge as a claim or reference. The "object" of intuition, on the other hand, the datum, the appearance, is within experience. There is, therefore, no contradiction in the thought of a transcendent object. Perception is the natural identification of object of intuition and object of response, or the assignment of the one object to the other. The existent which is selected as the object of reference has its own determinate nature. It is a patterned or ordered stuff. And in the cognitive idea (the object of intuition) there is a reproduced identity of pattern or order in the dimensions of space and time. Thus there is an identity between cognitive idea and object, an identity of understood pattern with the pattern of the physical existent. The mistake to be avoided is to think of *something* as passing back and forth between mind and thing. In the January number of *Mind*, there is the first part of an account of "The Philosophical Researches of Meinong" by the present writer. I deal in detail with Meinong's early *Hume-Studien*, in which he was concerned with the nature of abstraction and of relation, and I show how he gradually came to recognise the distinction between the "content" (*Inhalt*) of an act of apprehension and the "object" (*Gegenstand*) of that act, as also how he gradually freed himself from the assumption that relations must be regarded as products of mental activity. In the latter part of the article, I trace the way by which Meinong attained to the elaboration of what he called *Gegenstands-*

theorie. Mr Louis A. Reid, in an article on "Correspondence and Coherence" (*Phil. R.*, January 1922), tries to exhibit certain flaws both in the correspondence and in the coherence views of truth, and to suggest a view of the nature of judgment by means of which some at least of these flaws may be avoided. Thought in judgment cannot, he contends, be disentangled from that existence of which it is the thought. It is only by artificially attempting to disentangle the object from thought and regarding thought apart, as mere psychical existence like feeling, that we raise difficulties about judgment. Thoughts, ideas, are just different in nature from feelings because they do refer, do go out beyond themselves, as mental, to reality beyond the knowing mind.

We are glad to see a translation of Professor Giovanni Gentile's *Teoria generale dello Spirito come Atto puro*, the third edition of which appeared in 1920. The translation is entitled *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, and is made by Professor H. W. Carr (London: Macmillan, 1922). I doubt whether *il pensiero pensato* and *il pensiero pensante* (iv. 7) become intelligible in English when rendered *thought thought* and *thought thinking*. What Gentile means is the distinction between a content thought about and the process of thinking. There are several errors in the translation. One unfortunate instance is on p. 29, where Gentile is made to say that Spinoza "opposed *idea* and *res*, *mens*, and *corpus*, but he was not therefore able to think that *ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum*." What Gentile actually does say is that Spinoza "was not thereby precluded from thinking" that which, as a matter of fact, he asserts. A translation has also appeared by Louis Simon of Professor Richard Semon's important work *The Mneme* (London: G. Allen & Co., 1921). I trust it will be followed by a translation of Semon's perhaps more important work *Die mnemischen Empfindungen*, which was published in 1909.

The final volume (vol. xii.) of Hasting's *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921) contains several contributions of philosophical value, especially Professor A. E. Taylor's very suggestive treatment of "Theism," Professor Broad's acute article on "Time," particularly useful just now, and Professor John Laird's discussion of the nature of "Will." Professor Taylor writes: "Prayer and adoration need no more justification than the questioning attitude towards things which leads to science, or the impulse to make things of beauty which leads to art, or the desire to do right which leads to morality. It is not for nothing that man, as the Greeks said, is the only animal who has a god. If we look at the matter from this point of view, we may fairly say that the Stoic appeal to the *consensus gentium*, though no formal demonstration, still contains a thought which goes to the very root of things."

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REVIEWS.

Painted Windows : A Study in Religious Personality. By A Gentleman with a Duster.—London : Mills & Boon, 1921.

MY first impulse after reading this remarkable book, at once so flattering to egoism, so humbling to pride, so rousing to thought, and so agreeable to the literary sense, was one of thankfulness that a God exists who knows us as we really are. Perhaps my fellow-subjects—a word doubly appropriate, since the Gentleman not only uses us as themes for exposition, but handles us rather autocratically—will join me in this act of praise ; though one of them has recently stated, in a letter I have seen in print, that he finds it difficult to join in religious exercises with heretics of my colour. At all events I like to think that others of the Twelve besides myself have laid this book down with the words “thank God” on their lips, and for the same reason that prompted them in me.

In what he has to say about myself the Gentleman with a Duster has attributed to me good qualities which, most emphatically, I do not possess. On the other side, whether through charity or blindness I know not, he has overlooked—but as to *what* he has overlooked the less said the better. Perhaps my testimony on these points is not conclusive ; nevertheless, I feel constrained to give it. I do not claim to know everything about myself ; but I know more than the Gentleman does, and I say he is wrong. And if he is wrong with me, who am the least of painted windows, is he likely to be right about the others—about great East Windows, in which everything is represented from Genesis to Revelation ? But God *knows* ; and who among the Twelve but would rather be condemned by God for being what he is than praised by any Gentleman on earth for being what he is not ? Indeed, the Gentleman has given us a new argument for the existence of God. No, not a new argument, but a new application of one of the oldest known to the suffering spirits of men : see the Book of Job. Without a God to revise these judgments, to redust these dustings, the Universe would be intolerable. For God also wields a Duster, which winnows the chaff from the wheat, that it may be burned up with unquenchable fire.

But though individual portraits may be out of drawing, or at least seem so to the persons portrayed, it can hardly be questioned that the group, taken as a whole, is a faithful picture of actual conditions. It is the picture of a theological *sauve qui peut*, in which each person appears to be going somewhere, the totality nowhere. In that sense the Gentleman has faithfully reproduced the impression which the religious leadership of the day makes on those who stand outside the sphere of its influence, and to a less extent on those who stand within. To the religious leaders themselves he has given a salutary reminder that the public is not taking them at their official valuation, as it stands in the Church or Chapel Directories, and is by no means ready to swallow everything that is presented on a Rabbinical spoon. On every page of this book we encounter the vigorous reactions of a critical laity, bold to retaliate when assaulted by D.D.'s of any denomination, and able to give as good as it gets, if not better. There was a time when laymen were almost at the mercy of clerics in the matter of religious belief. The layman had to take what he was offered by his parson, or go hungry in the alternative. That time is long past, and it looks as if the tables were turned. The higher authority pitches its claims nowadays, the more criticism it provokes, and neither the triple crown nor the Bishop's mitre can save its wearer from becoming at any moment a *corpus vile* for psychological dissection and being publicly turned inside out. How authority can maintain itself under these conditions is a problem for those to solve whom it concerns. Meanwhile, control of the religious situation has clearly passed out of clerical hands, though not many clergymen and only the wisest of Bishops seem to have noticed the fact. It is lost, and little hope there is that it will be recovered by rebuilding the ancient ramparts, valid against the artillery they were designed to resist, but vulnerable at all points to the modern Duster, and likely, when they fall, to entomb their defenders in a deeper Dust. The effect, for example, of teaching Noah's Ark under clerical sanction is no longer, as once it would have been, to increase believers in Noah's Ark, but to increase disbelievers, and therewith to discredit the clerical sanction in matters of greater importance. This transforms the whole problem of religious leadership. What avails it for the Church to produce leaders unless the World provides them, when produced, with followers? Who is to lead in an age when Gentlemen respond to the leaders by giving them a dusting? Obviously the centre of the problem has shifted. Neither the Gentleman with a Duster, nor the lay reaction which he represents, is easy to lead, and I prophesy trouble to anyone who tries to lead either him or it. Had he been born in the Dark Ages, and were he a man of less mettle, any one of the Twelve might, on pains taken, have secured him as a follower. But he was not born in the Dark Ages; and there lies the trouble. Indeed, I cannot help thinking that the great kindness with which he treats me in this book is due to the fact that I have never tried to lead him, never given him the faintest hint, either by wearing lawn sleeves like his Bishops, or by claiming apostolic succession like Dr Orchard, or by raising a flag like Mr Bramwell

Booth, that I wished him to follow me. Had I done so he would have applied his Duster upon me to a very different tune. I find him a tough subject, and behind him, backing him up and applauding him, I see millions of subjects as tough as himself, or tougher. Nor can I construct the kind of religious leader the Gentleman would consent to follow. I have taken Dean Inge, and Bishop Henson, and Father Knox, and others of my fellow-victims, and tried to modify each in turn so as to fit the Gentleman's exact requirements in the way of leadership, touching them up, so to speak, by the hints he himself has given for their improvement. I am convinced he would follow none of them, not even when doctored according to his own prescription. Whom then, does he follow? He must follow somebody. All Gentlemen do, whether they wield the Duster or submit to the Dusting.

To me it is a new experience to find myself joined in one group with so many personalities important to the religious world. It is not often that an outsider can refer to himself and an Archbishop, not to speak of several Bishops, as "we"—and that with a certain feeling of *camaraderie*, due to the Gentleman's free way of handling us. History will not forget that we Twelve all stood up in a row for the Gentleman with a Duster, which he sometimes exchanges for a gun, to shoot at us. I do not know whether the Eleven (which, by the way, involves *me* in an uncomfortable designation) will thank the Gentleman for making this kind of contribution to the Union of the Churches. But made it unquestionably he has. Beneath the differences that divide us he has discovered a link or common element—the presence, namely, in each of us of something which needs a thorough cleaning-up. The Bishop of Manchester may object as he will to joining Unitarians in acts of prayer and worship; but neither he nor the Unitarian can prevent himself being wiped down with the same Duster which has just been applied to the other. It is a notable sign of the times. In this book the Duster becomes a bond of union between Christians who think themselves compromised before God by worshipping Him in each other's company; and differences, which seem of immense importance to institutions whose vested interests depend on their being maintained, become things at which wise men can smile. We are companions in misfortune, shipwrecked mariners all afloat on the same raft. Or, changing the figure once more, may we not say that Painted Images which, in their undusted condition, seemed to frown at one another across the gloom of emptying churches, alter their expression under the sprightly application of the Duster and begin to exchange friendly nods? On this ground alone I am disposed to think that the Gentleman merits Mr Chesterton's description of him as a great public servant. I look upon him as a brilliant host who has given us Twelve a party, introducing every man to his neighbour, and putting us on the best of terms with one another, if not always with him; and that, too, in an age when but for his kindly intervention some of us would have remained strangers for ever. How pleasant a thing it would be if the Twelve, on the strength of

this introduction, were to form a Club or Symposium, and dine together once a month !

These things, no doubt, would be more appropriately said by one whose theology was more respectable than mine. Certainly it is not for me to say that the mutual acquaintance thus brought into being by an ingenious hand will be kept up. Experience has taught me not to force the pace at this point.

As to my theology, I have to confess that I recognise as much of it in the concluding chapter, where the Gentleman gives us his own, as I do in the chapter he devotes to me. In dealing with what I think about these things he has had but scanty data to build upon; for in late years I have fallen into the habit of talking about my theology in public not as much as I can but as little as I need. I cannot persuade myself that the universe exists for the purpose of providing theologians with problems, or preachers with subjects for sermons. There are indeed falser views of the universe than this, but none which shows less reverence for its majestic secrets. God and Christ have been too much talked about. They have been made into "copy," and cheapened. I have had somewhat exceptional opportunities of observing that there are no topics of human thought about which so many foolish things are said, or even believed, and none upon which it is more difficult to speak wisely ; and so I have learnt to be cautious in tampering with the tremendous mystery on the edge of which I know myself to be living. In a sense I could be content to leave it alone, though, unlike the Agnostic, I perceive that it never leaves me alone for an instant, never ceases its play on the manifold keyboards of life, senses, intellect, imagination, and heart, evoking thereby the mystery named consciousness, so that deep answers unto deep, and the two make music together; the essence of the matter being that wherever there is a soul in darkness, obstruction, or misery, there, also, is a power that can enlighten, liberate, and help. So far as I can observe, this power is indifferent to the names by which it is called (the chief point of our disputes) ; it does not even ask to be spelt with a capital P ; its action seems unconditioned by that or any such trifle, often proving itself mightiest to save in men who give it no name at all. How we paint the "windows" matters but little. The light shines clearest through the windows that are not painted at all. And these are to be found in every human soul.

Still, when all has been said, I am not quite clear as to what the Gentleman means by calling us "Painted Windows." I am not even clear whether he intends that term to apply to *us* or to *his book*. Is he painting us himself ? In that case he should call himself the Gentleman with the Brush. Or is he merely rubbing off the dust from paintings done by other hands ? The motto from Lowell, on his title-page, supports the latter hypothesis. There we are plainly in a house of stained-glass windows, already finished and in position. Yet, even so, things are not quite on all-fours. For the motto speaks of the "*painted images of saints and martyrs*." Now, there is not a martyr in the lot of us ; while, as to the saints, the nearest

approach to the picture of one is that given of Miss Maude Royden, though even here the approximation is not sufficiently close to offend anybody. So the point must remain obscure as to precisely what kind of a fellowship the Gentleman's Duster has established among us—the fellowship of men whom he has created anew, or the fellowship of men whom he has only cleaned up. But a fellowship of some sort most unquestionably there is. And for that, I say again—thank God! The cause of religious unity would advance if we could manage, all Twelve, to say it together. L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion. By Baron Friedrich von Hügel.—London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1921.—Pp. xviii + 308.

BARON VON HÜGEL's new volume on the great subject in which he has so long shown himself a master is a particularly difficult work to review. Like other books by the same author, it has a subtly intimate and self-revealing character, and the personality revealed has a quiet charm, a fragrance redolent at once of deep thought, intense earnestness, simple humility, high courtesy, and genuine humour before which "criticism" seems indecently out of place. For my own part, I find the author's significant sayings about the Christian life pregnant with matter most provocative of long and grave meditation, but, as for criticism, I had almost as lief undertake to "criticise" the *Imitatio*. Not all works which profess to deal with the "philosophy of religion" conduce to "growth in grace." Many of them tend to diminish what grace their reader has, sometimes by the superficiality of their philosophy, sometimes by the want of "intensity" in their "religion," or again by an unpleasant tone of apologetic bellicosity. The readers of *Eternal Life* will hardly need to be told that a book by Baron von Hügel exhibits none of these unpleasant features. There is no superficialising of religion, no cutting down of the Christian life to make it fit the framework of a hastily run-up metaphysical scheme, and no blinking of the tremendous difficulties which beset our thought when we try to do full justice to the whole rich and complex message and claim of Christ and the Church. The result is a work which no one who takes Christianity seriously can afford to ignore, and which, in the unpretentious guise of a collection of detached addresses and essays, has more to teach than a whole library of systematic treatises of the average type. Perhaps the author has already provided the best "review" of his own work in the *Preface*, where he puts together the main points of the doctrine which pervades his book. At any rate, it is hard for anyone who feels so completely in sympathy with the tone of these papers as the writer of the present notice to attempt an appreciation which would add much to, or differ much in standpoint from, the author's own account of them. This must be my apology for confining myself to the lesser task of indicating

the respects in which Baron von Hügel's presentation of the case for Christianity strikes me as peculiarly wholesome for these times.

The essays themselves fall naturally into the three groups indicated in the table of contents. The first three deal with problems not specific to Christianity, but raised by any serious theism; the next three with certain fundamental issues connected with the teaching of Jesus, and requiring to be faced by any religious body which is Christian in the general sense of making Jesus the centre of the devotional life and his teaching fundamental for our thought about God; the last four with matters that have to do with "institutional religion" and the attitude of "Catholicism" in particular, as contrasted with "sectarianism" or "individualism." It hardly needs to be said that in all three sections the tone is at once that of a firm and earnest believer in the one Catholic Church, and indeed in the one Church under the guidance of the Apostolic See, as the only medium in which the highest type of religion can fully flourish, and of a Christian in charity with all mankind and a ripe scholar, anxious to recognise and even to insist on the real value for the soul of the forms of religion which are regarded as lower than the highest, even down to the poorest of them, and the varieties of Christianity, such as intense sectarianism and individualistic quietism, which are commonly conjoined with unreasonable or even bitter animus against everything that savours of Catholicism and institutionalism. In the essays of the first group there are two thoughts specially stressed which seem to me to be especially timely. The first, which recurs also repeatedly throughout the whole volume, is that God, the object of religious faith and adoration, the abiding and perfect reality, is all through the history of humanity primarily not something *inferred* but something *given* in direct contact and apprehension. Not only have men, as St Paul said, always been feeling after God, "if haply they might find him"; more than that, the feeling hands have never been left merely empty. They have always closed on something real, and it is just this overwhelming sense of the reality *touched*—a sense as genuine as that of physical contact with rock or tree—which makes it impossible that religion should ever be sublimated away into a metaphysical speculation. This seems to me a position no less timely than true. It is the sound kernel in the old theory, so often presented in fantastical forms, that revelation—the outward movement of God disclosing himself to his creatures—is essential to all religion, and that the "original revelation" lies behind all the world's creeds. It is one of the advantages of the present philosophical recoil from mere "idealism" that it enables us to do justice to this conviction. Most of those who are most eager to advertise themselves as "new realists" seem to have little, if any, belief in the reality of God, but their own main philosophical tenet should point onward to a theistic conclusion. The fault of the thoroughgoing "idealists" in cosmology, as would now, perhaps, be generally agreed, is that they insist on making the external word a "construction," a "projection" outwards of purely subjective experiences, a thing of inference and hypothesis. What some of us, who were

brought up in this tradition, have had to learn with a certain reluctance, is that the bodily world is a thing given from the first, not a thing made or inferred from what is not itself. But it is equally certain that no account of the "religious consciousness" will be more than a ludicrous caricature of the facts unless it emphasises the point that from the first God, the perfect and abiding reality, on which our fleeting and mutable being depends, who at once supports it and contrasts with it, is given as objective too, and that the piquancy and tension of the religious life depends precisely on this givenness. Of course neither the bodily world nor God is originally given at first in any definiteness. The former, as James tells us, is to the baby a "buzzing, blooming confusion"; but the confusion is none the less given as a genuine reality of which our later experience and knowledge is an articulation. And so it is too with the *ens realissimum*. A second valuable thought is the thought dwelt on specially in the first essay, that on "Responsibility in Religious Belief," illustrated powerfully in the second, that on "Religion and Illusion," and "Religion and Reality," by a searching examination of Feuerbach, and recurrent in the fourth paper, "Preliminaries to Religious Belief." I would specially advise all readers to ponder and ponder again this last writing, a letter of wise and tender counsel to a mother shaken in theistic belief by the suffering and death of her infant daughter. It cannot too often be insisted on, in these days of cheap and easy acceptance or rejection of beliefs of every sort, that we really are responsible for our faith, for what we believe, as well as for what we do. "It is our sins," after all, as T. H. Green said, which "keep us from God"; and it is precisely the want of docility, the lack of the humility which is ready to learn the lessons of life from every quarter and holds all the doors of the mind open, which keeps us from truth about God, precisely as it also keeps us from truth about his creatures. It is to be hoped also that, for those who will ponder the pages of this letter with the teachable mind, its writer will once for all have slain the two dangerous illusions that Christianity, because it is true, has somehow "explained" the presence of evil in the world; or, on the other hand, that because it has not explained the presence of evil, it is not true. As Baron von Hügel says, Christianity has not "explained" evil; it has done something better. It has taught countless souls to face it at its worst, to overcome it, and make it the occasion for the development of more abounding good which, but for that occasion, would never have been.

In the second division of the book the main pervading thought is that the fundamental contrast in the Christian conception of the world is not that of good with evil or of redemption with sin, but that of supernatural or eternal good with merely natural or temporal good. This seems to me fundamentally true. The work of Christ becomes a stunted thing when one declines from regarding it, with St Thomas, as the raising of nature to supernature, and thinks of it merely, in the fashion of the Puritan, as the redemption of men from sin. That opens the way both to the unfortunate over-moralising

of our interpretation of the world which turns the Christian into the "unco' guid," and to the despising of science and art as "secular" affairs. The saner conception is that God's work in and for man is the "supernaturalising" of nature by grace, which means the development of devotion to the great "ideals," those of the man who is prepared to live and die for science and art or for a "cause," no less than those which are specific to the great saint. There is nothing better in Baron von Hügel's book than the width of vision with which he insists on the necessity for the complete life that nature and "supernature" should be integrated in it, and on the delicacy of the problems which the adjustment raises as the great reason why it is so "hard" to be true to the whole Christian ideal. (Incidentally this leads to a touching defence, and I think a triumphant one, of the Church's wisdom in discriminating between those who have the special vocation to follow the "counsels of perfection" and the average run of humanity, as against those who would simplify the problem by having just one level for all.) In the first of the three essays contained in this division we have a really profound study of the significance of the apocalyptic element in the teaching of our Lord. It is to the writer's credit that he will not make things easy for himself by the tempting method of making either the whole teaching or none of it apocalyptic. He takes the evidence of the Gospels fairly as it stands, pointing as it does to a steady increase in the prominence of apocalyptic elements as our Lord's career on earth draws to its end. Then comes the real issue. It is indispensable to Christianity that its Master should be the unique Son of God, the full and final revelation of the mind of God, so far as it can be disclosed to us. Yet Jesus unmistakably foretold his own imminent return as the Judge, and the event was otherwise; and precisely because it was otherwise the conception of the Catholic Church is already in the apostolic age substituted for that of the kingdom preached by Jesus. What are we to say, then, as Christians, of his inerrancy? Baron von Hügel grapples with the difficulty, and, in my opinion, with success; but perhaps what is even more admirable than his solution is the candour which leads him to insist on stating the problem as frankly as he had already stated the difficulty about the helplessness of Christianity to "account for" evil. Students of philosophy will perhaps find the essay on "The Specific Genius of Christianity," dealing with the work of Troeltsch, and containing a masterly restatement of St Thomas's conception of the task of Christianity, the most attractive part of the whole book; but a wider popular interest attaches to the last of these three essays, which deals with the conceptions of heaven and hell. In principle, I take it, any serious thinker must agree with the author that the "revolt against hell," which takes the form of asserting that somehow everything will come right with everyone, is profoundly unethical, and that we cannot afford to ignore our Lord's insistence on the abidingness of the consequences of choice. I am not sure, however, whether this conviction, which the author regards as what is essentially *de fide* in the belief in hell, can only be maintained in the special form he gives to

it. I suspect that most of those who have regarded the ultimate doom of the impenitent and incorrigible as absolute destruction have been quite serious in regarding themselves as insisting on "abidingness" of results, and I am not sure that the conviction is inconsistent even with some forms of a belief in the ultimate conversion of all souls. For it would at least be true that the soul converted to good at the long last would never be what it might have been if its resistance had not been so obstinate and so prolonged. And Baron von Hügel's own solution of the problem suggests a question. He holds, apparently, that since the vast majority of human beings die in infancy and unbaptised, without being actually spiritually awakened, their future must be an existence in "limbo," where they enjoy "natural" good to the full and do not miss that other good of which they know nothing; the majority of the "supernaturally awakened," again, go at death to purgatory, and so, I presume, ultimately to paradise. His hell is thus for the few, and it might perhaps be asked whether this view is more obviously in accord with the utterances he quotes from the Gospels than some others which he rejects. But whatever we may think on that matter, it is a true service to protest emphatically against a kind of universalism which is as morally frivolous as it is fashionable.

I have spoken at such length already that I am unable to do anything like justice to the essays in which Baron von Hügel rightly defends the ideal of an all-inclusive Church and dwells, as against the spurious spiritualism which forgets the body and the subtle influence of body and bodily surroundings on the mind, on the value of institutional religion, sacraments, and cultus as true channels of divine grace. I can only remark that it is well to revive the thought of Cardinal de Lugo that sectaries, pagans, and others who achieve salvation outside the (visible) Church, do so not in spite of their fellowship with followers of their own religion, but in virtue of the way in which they have appropriated that in their own religion and worship which is really true and divine, and that it is a true insight of the same kind which reminds us that but for the community and its tradition, which is always there in the background, the great individualists would not themselves have existed. As the author says, George Fox may insist that all revelation comes direct without mediation from God to the individual soul of whom God is the "inner light." But behind George Fox's doctrine of the "inner light" stands the Gospel of St John, the most "institutional" and "sacramentarian" writing of the New Testament.

May I express my regret that in more than one respect, especially in the flimsiness of the binding, the outward form the publishers have bestowed on this admirable work is not worthy of it?

A. E. TAYLOR.

The Mysteries and Christianity. By the Rev. John Glasse, M.A., D.D., Minister-emeritus, Old Greyfriars, Edinburgh. Oliver & Boyd, 1921.—Pp. 296.

THE story of the origins of Christianity, like the story of what happens when we perceive any object, is the story of a land possession of which is passionately sought. And very naturally. For in it is involved the whole praxis of our higher life. In some sense all that we have come to hold dear through the Christian era runs back to the answer we give, one by one, to the question, "What think ye of Christ?" Was he a miraculous Being who established a miraculous system by which his religion should be insinuated into the hearts of men? Or was he an exceptionally gifted hero of religion, supreme indeed among religious leaders, but not in any real sense unique? Again, was the system he established—supposing he did establish one—a closed compartment to which few (if any) external forces could gain entrance? Or was it, on the other hand, the product of historical forces, and in its turn the organ of transmission for what both brought it into the world and modified it continuously during its growth and maturity? To questions such as these no unanimous reply is yet possible.

The late Dr Glasse has attempted in the volume before us to indicate the sort of answer we should give. He was under no illusions about the adequacy of current Christianity to explain itself. "One is apt to forget," he writes, "that Liberal Protestantism is an anachronism as a representation of early Christianity. Jesus was not a cultured clergyman with modernist ideas. He belonged to His time, and to the spiritual ancestry of the Hebrew prophets. His Church was founded on their teaching, and while it was essentially ethical it was also distinctly apocalyptic" (p. 160). If Dr Glasse means by the last sentence that Jesus organised the Church which bears his name in history, and also that he himself shared the apocalyptic views of his age, he is mistaken in both these judgments. What is becoming gradually clearer, as criticism rolls away the mists of tradition, is that the Church grew and was not made, and that Jesus is far more truly described in Lord Morley's phrase as "the sublime mystic of the Galilean hills" than as an apocalyptic herald. This latter rôle was played by John the Baptist, and this is why Jesus placed him outside the kingdom which was within.

When, then, Dr Glasse proceeds to identify the aims and beliefs of Jesus with those of his Galilean followers, such as Simon the Zealot, he forgets what the earliest tradition did not forget, viz. that Peter was called a Satan by Jesus because he attributed to his Master his own Messianic views, and that when the disciples found at the arrest of Jesus that their Messianic hopes were vain they all forsook him and fled. We should do better to stick to Matthew Arnold's formula: "Jesus infinitely above the heads of his reporters."

But, on the other hand, Dr Glasse is right in seeing, with most enlightened critics, that the main lines of the development of the

beliefs and practices of the Catholic Church were laid down, or at least were unconsciously determined, by St Paul. Through him and the Hellenistic circles, of which in the Church he was the most distinguished representative, a little rift opened between the Jerusalem Church and the Churches of the Dispersion which grew into a yawning gulf in which the former was in the end plunged and lost. Hence the sacramentarian form of Christianity runs back not to Jerusalem for its ancestry, but to Antioch—to Paul and not to Peter. It may no doubt justify itself on other grounds, but it cannot claim the august authority of Jesus. On the other hand, the pure Evangelical faith is in no better case. It too can appeal to Paul, but hardly to Jesus. But both, when they shed their formal beliefs, and present their best and permanent treasures of love, worship, devotion, and humanity, are in the direct line of descent from Jesus.

In one respect Dr Glasse's work is distinctly disappointing. He devotes 127 pages to a description of the mysteries of Eleusis, of Cybele, Isis, and Mithra, and another 100 pages to a delineation of Durkheim's theories of primitive religions, but he nowhere attempts to show in any detail where and how any of these reappear in Christianity. Indeed, he would have done better had he placed the section on primitive religions at the beginning of his book, and before the section on the Mysteries, and then attempted to show how the two had reappeared in fundamental Christianity. Even had he essayed to do this he would have left half told the full story. Was it not an Oxford Head who once declared historical Christianity to be "a pagan myth with a Stoic ethic"? The influence of the Mysteries has indeed been widely discussed, but the influence of the Stoic philosophy has not yet found its *sacer vates*.

In any case, Dr Glasse's disquisitions will help to swell the volume of belief that current Paganism profoundly modified the Jewish strain which was inevitable to a religion whose earliest exponents were Jews brought up on the Law and the Prophets. Perhaps we ought to add that so profound was the nature of the God-man, and so wide his aims, that the truths he taught are yet but seen as in a glass darkly. Perhaps the best wine has been kept to the last, and the end is not yet.

W. F. GEIKIE-COBB.

LONDON.

Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality. By Lewis Richard Farnell. (Gifford Lectures for 1920).—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921.

It is hardly too much to say that the above work is the most important in English, within the sphere of Greek religion, since the completion of the same author's *Cults of the Greek States* in 1909. Indeed, for any who like the present reviewer value sound learning and a wise suspension of judgment on doubtful points above any ingenuity of theory, however attractive at first sight, its only serious competitors are the other works by the same author which have appeared in

the interval. It deals with a subject which, by reason of the obscurity and imperfection of much of the material and the inadequacy of our knowledge of several important periods of Greek history, must necessarily give much scope for conjecture and for intelligent differences of opinion. Again and again we have a group of facts susceptible of several different explanations; and to choose between these, or if need be to reject them all as unlikely, is a task which calls for a combination of profound scholarship and inborn good sense not often to be found.

Since the great, if one-sided, work of Rohde called attention to certain aspects of the religion of ancient Greece, numerous scholars, British and foreign, have either in special treatises or incidentally in works of a wider scope applied a variety of hypotheses to the elucidation of those cults which do not come within the range of the ordinary "Olympian" worship. Frazer's enormous learning has shown what could be done by applying the known and supposed facts about the cult of vegetation-deities to the phenomena in question; Eitrem from one point of view, Ridgeway from another, have given us a rehabilitation of the Spencerian deduction of all or most forms of worship from funeral rites or reverence for the dead; Miss Harrison's later work has drawn upon the fruitful ideas of Dürckheim and his collaborators; and there are still not wanting books, often learned and ingenious enough, whose authors appear to suppose either that totemism will explain everything, even for countries which have never been shown to possess it, or that, as Macrobius and certain of his authorities thought, well-nigh all deities may be reduced to the sun. We have had the heroes of Greek cult resolved into faded gods, totemic or sacred animals, *Sondergötter*, and other interesting things, or explained away as mere excrescences of misunderstood ritual; and, on the other hand, we find here and there some stout champion of their historicity who, like M. P. Foucart, proclaims them and all their doings perfectly credible, with a little allowance here and there for pardonable exaggeration.

It is strange that amid all this confusion of ideas so few have been found to emphasise, what Dr Farnell justly lays great stress upon, the fact that we are dealing, not with one problem, but with many; that the content of the word *ἥρωες* in its classical usage is really very complex; and that it is, at least, *a priori* highly unlikely that any one explanation ever could be found for all that it covers, or even for the majority of the ideas and usages involved.

With a thoroughness which is popularly supposed to be peculiarly German, the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford has collected every passage he could find in ancient literature and in inscriptions bearing upon the subject, and has also paid due attention to the material, important enough but often perilously uncertain of interpretation, furnished by coins and other works of art. Post-war conditions, as he explains in his preface, have prevented him from presenting the results of his search in full; but a reference is given to every passage of any importance, in a list occupying twenty-four closely printed pages, and many passages are discussed at length in the text.

Examining his material, Dr Farnell distinguishes no fewer than seven "types or classes of heroes and heroines: (a) the hieratic type . . . whose name or legend suggests a cult-origin; (b) sacral heroes or heroines associated with a particular divinity, as apostles, priests, or companions; (c) heroes who are also gods, but with a secular legend, such as Herakles . . .; (d) culture and functional heroes . . .; (e) epic heroes of entirely human legend; (f) geographical, genealogical, and eponymous heroes and heroines, transparent fictions for the most part, such as Messene and Lakedaimon; (g) historic and real personages" (p. 29). He admits that "the categories may sometimes overlap," and it is obvious that some of them, especially (a) and (c), cannot be distinguished at a glance from each other, but require for their final assignment the trained eye of the expert. Yet it is hard to see how any less complicated classification could be made to fit the complicated facts; and in scholarship, as in art and music, there must come sooner or later a point at which the instinct of the expert is the only available criterion.

The categories being so varied, it follows that the explanations of different cults vary widely. Thus Ikarios is most probably a priest-king of the most orthodox Frazerian type; Charila, again a Frazerian figure, doubling the rôles of the fresh spring-daimon and its worn-out autumnal counterpart; Herakles is a man, whether originally real or imaginary, Asklepios very likely another such; Aineias, on the other hand, dwindles to a mere eponym; Ariadne and Aristaos are genuine faded deities; while Dexion is simply what the Greeks of later times, or some of them, believed him to be, namely, the poet Sophokles.

With all this the reviewer is in general agreement. It is inevitable that a detail here and there should appear doubtful; thus the chapter on *Sondergötter*, while rightly rejecting Usener's attempt to evolve the high gods from these shadowy figures, perhaps hardly gives them enough importance, or realises sufficiently that the absence of any very early evidence for their existence is natural enough in the case of spirits, belief in whom originates in no very advanced section of the population.

This brings us to one of the few salient weaknesses of the book. Ready as he is to admit many convergent causes in the formation of the cults, Dr Farnell does not dwell enough upon—though he does mention—the circumstance that the Greeks of every period of which we know anything were a mixed people (on the very simplest possible hypothesis, a blend of Nordic invaders, Minoan-Mycenæan immigrants from Crete, and aboriginal *homo Mediterraneus*, and far more likely including several other strains), and that even if they had been ethnologically simple, the same race in the same generation is capable of producing all degrees of mentality from idiot to genius. Thus, while on one page (12) admitting that Homer is a doubtful witness for the feelings of the average Achaian of his day, on another (6) he sees no evidence of a cult of the dead (as opposed to tendance; the differentiation is fully made out in chap. xi., and is one too often neglected) in the elaborate funeral rites of Patroklos. Granted that they do

not imply that Achilles worshipped him; is not the fact that he conceives himself as able to form ties of "loving communion" with his dead friend good presumptive evidence that to his vassals that friend was still alive, and still to be "revered even as a god," to use Homer's own recurring phrase of the attitude of the commonalty towards the living chieftain? Elsewhere (p. 83, cf. 94), we are told that "the Hellenic perception of divinity had become clear and precise at a very early period." So doubtless it had for the more elevated minds; does it follow that the rank and file were not capable of animistic or pre-animistic notions? Elsewhere Dr Farnell remarks that it is "singular that the superstition" (concerning the divine properties of twins) "seems to have survived and perhaps increased in strength in the later historic period." Why singular, when that period saw the emergence to greater prominence, political and other, of the lower elements of the population, who thus became more articulate? It would be hard to find, in the aristocratic literature of the eighteenth century, any example of the formation of a folk-tale of the type of those current in classical and mediæval times concerning the Emperor Nero, or the emergence of a new system of divination; but to-day our popular prints give us details of the formation of the Kitchener legend (which is simply the death of Robin Hood with a German spy in the place of the treacherous nun) and of the existence of a belief, apparently unshakable by any argument, that the results of a coming horse-race may be foretold by studying the letters in the title of a widely read newspaper.

Against this defect we may set many instances of the clear perception which guides the author through mazes of tradition which have misled scholars of repute. Thus (p. 311) he sees clearly that the folk-tales about Peleus show him to be conceived of as mortal, not divine. It might be added in this context that none but a mortal could possibly be the hero of the sort of story in which Peleus appears with Cheiron acting "the part of a guardian-fairy." The whole point of the narrative is that someone with no magic powers of his own—Peleus, Jason, or one of the nameless heroes or heroines of Grimm—acquires, generally by his courtesy, the favour and help of a superior being. A fairy or a god would need no such help. The emphasis which is rightly laid, in chap. xi., on the importance of the influence of epic poetry, suggests the parallel of the effect of the Serbian *guslar*-songs, which among other things have had the curious result of transforming the worthless Prince Marko into a mighty hero. These points may be instanced as examples of the many places in which a further search into the parallel phenomena of other nations strengthens Dr Farnell's case.

To avoid too much discussion of technical detail in a journal not primarily devoted to Greek antiquities, I mention only one of the many passages in which the author discusses a difficult piece of evidence with a thoroughness which upsets an attractive but baseless theory.

According to tradition, Aias, son of Oileus, or Aias Ilios (his father is probably but an off-shoot of himself), after the taking of Ilion—whether he was named for the city he helped to take or the city

popularly called after its sacker does not matter,—outraged all Greek feeling by violating the priestess Cassandra in the very temple of Athena. In penance for this, the Lokrians, his people, sent yearly two maidens of high rank to be slaves in Athena's temple if they escaped being killed on the way there by the Trojans,—i.e. the inhabitants of the Greek city which was founded on the site of Priam's town. This custom continued for 1000 years.

Not long ago an inscription was discovered giving the terms of an agreement between the other Lokrians and the Aianteioi, obviously the clan of Aias, according to which the former granted the latter and their town of Naryka a number of privileges; while the Aianteioi ἀνεδέξαντο τὰς κόρας, whatever that may mean. Dr Leaf, in an able and persuasive article (*Annals of the British School at Athens*, xxi. p. 148), took it to mean "received the maidens," i.e. undertook to provide for the last ones ever sent, on their return from their term of service at Troy. He held that the rest of the inscription had reference to the taking off of the curse from the Aianteioi, now that the long penance had expiated their ancestor's guilt, and that we could thus roughly date the cessation of this extraordinary practice by the date of the inscription (about 275-240 B.C.).

Here Dr Farnell points out (p. 296, n. a) that "the slight service that Dr Leaf supposes them [the Aianteioi] to be bound to render does not explain the extraordinary privileges which the rest of the Lokrians were willing to give. Dr Leaf's criticism ignores these and looks only at the social disabilities removed." A study of the text of the inscription¹ shows him to be right. It is true that many of the privileges granted the Aianteioi are negative: they are *not* to be excluded from sacrifices and social intercourse; they are *not* to be subject to certain fines ([εἶμην] . . . ἀποσίους, 1. 2); they are *not* obliged to live in any particular place, and so forth. This might well be the mere removal of a tabu; but alongside of these negations come a number of positive privileges. The Aianteioi are freed from tribute and other burdens; they are especially protected by the magistrates; their local shrine is to become a centre of the worship of all Lokris. Finally,—another negative privilege, but a significant one,—they are no longer required to give their sons as hostages for the maidens; i.e. presumably to be put to death if the girls failed to reach the temple of Athena at Ilion in safety. The disputed words then must mean that the Aianteioi took over the task of providing the maiden-tribute from among their own number; with the consequence that as the State had no longer to bear their guilt, it no longer exacted retribution from them nor regarded them as unclean, but rewarded them as public benefactors. The tribute then went on being paid for generations more; for Plutarch (*De sera num. vind.*, 12, p. 557 D), writing perhaps about A.D. 100 (he died before 117), says that it is not long since it ceased. "Not long" before 100 A.D. is at earliest somewhere in the first century; 1000 years from that takes us back to the tenth

¹ Published in *Jahreshefte des oest. arch. Inst.*, xiv. My own too hasty approval of Dr Leaf's view (*Year's Work in Class. Studies*, 1920, p. 53) was given before I had had opportunity to examine this rather inaccessible document.

century B.C., the probable date of Hissarlik VII., the Greek city which succeeded Priam's. A more remarkable instance of the strength, persistency, and influence of Greek religious tradition could hardly be imagined. That a historical fact, more or less distorted, should be long remembered is common; but the recollection, apparently fairly exact, of the date passes all likelihood for mere folk-memory and compels us to assume something like written annals, not indeed of the Homeric siege, but in all probability of the age in which Homer himself wrote.¹

The book is, of course, written by a specialist and to some extent for specialists; but it is one which every intelligent student of the religious thought of mankind ought to read, even if, like Bentley's English reader, he knows not one word of Greek.

In conclusion, it must be said that the reputation of the Clarendon Press for excellence of printing will not be increased by this book. The reviewer has noted about a score of misprints, varying from the misplacement of Greek accents and the omission of the sign of Umlaut in the name of Kühn to rather annoying mutilations of names and the like—Dr Nilsson, for example, appearing as Nillson. But the author is to be congratulated in letting the many Greek names stand as the Greeks wrote them, without disguising them under Latin forms.

H. J. ROSE.

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Theism in Medieval India. By J. Estlin Carpenter, D.Litt.—
London: Williams & Norgate, 1921.

It would be difficult to find a work more opportune and more stimulating than this expansion of the Hibbert Lectures delivered by Dr Carpenter in 1919. We were already prepared for a reliable and profound study of Indian religion; but we cannot too highly appreciate the immense amount of labour which has produced this very comprehensive and detailed volume. The industry and scholarship of Indian and European experts of the last thirty years have rendered great stores of material accessible, and without these, as Dr Carpenter would be the first to admit, this book could not have been written. None the less, we have to express our gratitude to him for working them over, and for providing us with a complete and convenient volume which gives us a deeper insight into the nature of Indian religion than had previously been possible. His aim has been to furnish a general view of the various phases of Theism from the seventh to the sixteenth century. This demands attention both to the earlier literature and tendencies, and also to the subsequent developments. To estimate these centuries aright one must understand those that precede and follow; even as we gain new and sounder conceptions of the Bible and of Christianity from a study of both in the light of that impressive

¹ The unity of Homer is one of Dr Farnell's characteristically sane views.

background upon which the crucial centuries of Palestinian history can now be placed. So, here, the reader is introduced to that extensive field of which Medieval Theism is only a part, though, of course, an extremely significant part; and, in thus gaining a broader knowledge of the essential features of Indian religion, he can understand the course of past development, and is better able to prepare for the future. For this and other reasons Dr Carpenter's volume is a welcome and valuable contribution to some acute problems of to-day, both in India and at home.

Dr Carpenter has taken as his point of departure the account of the journey of the Chinese Buddhist Yuan Chwang to Nalanda in the seventh century A.D. The important part played in the history of Indian Theism by Buddhism has not, he points out, been very clearly recognised, and the religious conditions of Yuan Chwang's day provide a clear landmark for the discussion of early developments. Starting with the rise of Theistic Buddhism—in itself an extremely significant portent—he discusses the earlier steps, and, proceeding to a careful treatment of the Mahabharata and other popular sources, considers at some length the current religious and philosophical tendencies. A treatment of the great trio Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva includes an account of the Bhagavadgita, one of the various "Bibles" or "Testaments" of India; and the theological and philosophical aspects of the sectarian religions are very fully handled. The concluding chapter on Hinduism and Islam discusses the striking movements due to Mohammedan royal and other reformers, and leads to some careful reflections upon the present situation.

A work of this scope and fullness hardly lends itself to review: it covers so large a field that few readers or reviewers possess the necessary knowledge of Indian languages and conditions. It must suffice to stress the fact that readers interested alike in the science of religion and in Indian problems will find herein much that is of exceptional value. Dr Carpenter's subject at once recalls Dr Nicol Macnicol's *Indian Theism* (reviewed in these pages, April 1916, pp. 662 *seqq.*): that writer's Psalms of the Maratha saints is itself a striking little contribution to one phase of medieval theism. The two works differ somewhat in their method and treatment. Dr Carpenter's wide acquaintance with the world's religions and philosophies has made his volume an admirable example of the value of the comparative study of religions; and, as was to be expected from the author of the handy book on *Comparative Religion*, in the Home University Series, he takes throughout a very just attitude where questions arise of borrowing or of influence. An appendix on Christianity in India summarises the main facts as regards Christian influence; and it may be worth adding that further details and references may be found in the Introduction to the Catalogue of Syriac MSS. preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge, which contains a number of typical MSS. from South India.

Dr Carpenter does not, of course, ignore the possibility of direct influence (pp. 91, 119), especially in the stories of Krishna (p. 249) and Madhva (p. 409); but allowance has to be made for the funda-

mental similarity among all religions at similar stages of growth, the inevitable rise of some natural problems, and the native treatment of particular problems which may indeed have been suggested by foreigners. Where there are beliefs in God, and in the relations between God and man, similar problems arise and must be worked out; and when there are Saviour-Gods, or men come to be regarded as gods, the various Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian controversies on human and divine personality well illustrate and supplement each other in most unexpected ways. Again, when Chaitanya (died 1534) declares that Krishna's name alone washes away all sins (p. 445), the question of extraneous influence soon becomes less significant than the speaker's sincerity, the pragmatic value of this and similar convictions, and the relatively secondary importance of the problem of the "historic" Krishna. Indian religion, as no other, presents to the student of religions the profoundest problems; and they are so intimately connected with those of the Western world, that one can only hope that those students who are interested in Western theological differences will enter the Indian field in order to obtain a juster and deeper comprehension of their nature. India is of unique value by reason of its very lengthy and continued religious development. It illustrates the vicissitudes of gods, the interrelations of religion and of philosophy, of conceptions of personal powers and impersonal processes, and of lower and higher planes of thought; we witness the growth and decline of concepts and beliefs, the history of reforms and experiments, and we see something of the nature of "reactionary" and "progressive" tendencies. In view both of our relations with India and the gathering religious controversies at home, the thoughtful reader who would equip himself for the future will find Dr Carpenter's fine work invaluable.

The book, owing to its fullness, is not an easy one to grasp as a whole: the "lectures" are naturally simpler than the "expansions." But there are a number of fundamental ideas which, when understood, considerably simplify the task of tracing the increasing complexity of religious belief and speculation. At the head must be placed the conviction summed up in the words "That art Thou" (*Tat tvam asi*)—the union of the ultimate reality of man with that of the universe. The idea underlies Indian life and thought, and is very differently expressed and developed according to the individual's temperament, knowledge, and the current stage of thought. The passage from ordinary experience to this unique state of consciousness, and from the world of space and time to the consciousness of some ultimate reality, demanded an explanation, and this gave rise to the rudiments of psychology, theology, and science. On the one hand, man tried to reproduce the unique state which seemed to give him ultimate truth and reality; on the other, the effort was made to reinterpret and explain the experience and all its implications. No less fundamental are the ideas of "order," "law" or "cause," in their most general and undifferentiated aspects. But while Dr Carpenter carefully explains *Dharma* (*Dhamma*), we miss its forerunner, the remarkable idea of *Rita*. This is to be regretted, because we have here the earliest

known form of conceptions of natural causation, and of order (cosmic, ritual, social and moral), which hold so prominent a place in Indian reflection upon man and his fate. Moreover, *Rita* was once bound up with the profoundly ethical god Varuna; an early combination of a natural order *plus* an ethical and moral god. The fact that this god came to hold a secondary place is of very great importance, both for the freer development of ideas of order, and also for the history of the problem of the relation between a moral god and an apparently hostile world.¹

Passing over a third fundamental idea, that of incarnations, Avatars or descents, we may draw attention to the early recognition of the inevitability of lower and higher types of religious life and thought. The unavoidable mental changes in the course of the individual's life, and the no less unavoidable mental differences among the men of every ordinary social group, are perhaps recognised more frankly in the East than in the West. We may not agree with the Eastern treatment of the difficulties that arise, but among the many things that the West can learn from the East is this necessity of facing some of the elementary facts of mental development. We have no space to quote Dr Carpenter's concluding paragraphs upon India and Great Britain; they are a warning that we must endeavour to understand the nature of the permanent elements of Indian religion. India is at a stage where she must be understood: and men who are understood can be governed justly. The West is rather too ready to read the East through some specifically Christian or Western spectacles; and in so doing, it neither does sufficient justice to Eastern thought nor understands it critically and sympathetically. One cannot but feel that the comparative study of religions—as illustrated especially in this book—is destined to play a prominent part in helping the different divisions of mankind to understand one another in their relation to the ultimate realities; and because this will involve a relinquishing of certain prejudices and presuppositions, and reshaping of ideas, and the establishment of new foundations, there is need of a *science* of religion to lift the discussion of the delicate and grave questions above the level of sectarian controversies whether in the East or in the West. One is the more grateful, therefore, that Dr Carpenter's volume is measured and objective, and an example of the scientific, albeit perfectly sympathetic, method of treating the beliefs of seekers after the Living God who are no less sincere and no less frail than ourselves. STANLEY A. COOK.

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¹ In "Cosmic Law in Ancient Thought" (*The British Academy*, vol. viii., 1917) Professor Rhys-Davids recognised behind animism one single underlying principle which he called "Normalism," i.e. the belief in a certain rule, order, or law. All his arguments are not of equal value, but he undoubtedly points the way to a most fruitful method of treating the history of religious and non-religious thought.

The Psychology of Society. By Morris Ginsberg, M.A.—London : Methuen & Co., 1921.—Pp. xvi+174.

MR GINSBERG'S book is above all a very much needed attack upon hypostatisation in psychology. In a great deal of recent psychology there has been a tendency to treat certain terms as though they stood for self-existent entities. Mr Ginsberg insists upon the uselessness of trying to interpret social life in this way. Instincts, imitation, suggestion, the self-regarding sentiment, the group mind, and many other *idola theatri* he considers in turn, and shows that each is a term covering so wide a range of facts that it has little or no explanatory value for the social psychologist.

The book may be divided into three parts. The first three chapters are concerned with the rôle of instinct, reason, and will in the life of the individual. In these chapters Mr Ginsberg sets out very clearly the theories underlying intellectualist and anti-intellectualist views. He regards the opposition as due to "a mischievous and misleading separation of the empirical from the rational," and enters a strong plea for the recognition of the rôle of reason in the life of the individual and of society. There is probably no other book in which the arguments for and against the instinct theory, as it is usually interpreted, are so clearly presented. Mr Ginsberg protests even more forcibly than does Woodworth against M'Dougall's view of social feeling as derived from tender emotion and the parental instinct (p. 15). His arguments in this connection might very justly be brought against a great deal that has been written recently on the subject of "sublimation" and of "drives." Again, in general agreement with Woodworth, Mr Ginsberg holds that there can be devotion to ends on account of their value apart from any connection with primitive "drives."

The second section of the book consists of a critical review of the reasons which have been put forward to support the theories of a general mind and a general will. Mr Ginsberg's view is that, "though individuals are nothing apart from society . . . yet society is nothing but individuals in relation." He considers in some detail the views of Durkheim, M'Dougall, Barth, and Bosanquet. His careful analysis of what is implied in the different theories and of the empirical facts upon which they rest is a valuable contribution to psychology. His main contention against all views which imply psychological unities transcending the individual mind is that they ignore the distinction between content and process. While there may be community of content there cannot be community of process. The argument is developed most fully in the consideration of Bosanquet's theory of a general will. The reader whose main interest is psychological will probably feel that at this point Mr Ginsberg steps outside the field of psychology altogether. To recognise the distinction between process and content is important for psychology, but to draw this distinction alone is not sufficient to show what Mr Ginsberg considers to be the erroneousness of Bosanquet's view of a general will. The force of Mr Ginsberg's argument rests on making three further assumptions,

namely, that (1) there can be no interdependence of individual processes such as would justify the term general will; (2) that the only kind of unity which would justify such a term as general will is the existential identity of one particular will with another, or with the will of society (p. 87); (3) that it is not legitimate to regard contents or essences as themselves existents (p. 85). These assumptions rest on epistemological and metaphysical grounds which lie outside the science of psychology as such.

Mr Ginsberg says: "It is to be regretted that the problem of the nature of social unity has not yet been approached more empirically or inductively" (p. 56). There seems no doubt that the last five chapters in which he makes this approach are a real contribution to the psychology of social unity. He treats of racial and national characteristics, tradition, community, association, institutions, the crowd, public opinion, organisation and democracy. In discussing the psychological factors which influence social institutions he is consistent with his earlier analysis; he shows how instinct and reason are involved throughout even though at present social behaviour has scarcely risen above the level of trial and error. In his treatment of the problem of collective deliberation he inclines to agree with Graham Wallas in his scepticism of the effectiveness of present institutions. He considers that their futility arises from the neglect of psychological principles, and that it can be remedied by having regard to these.

Mr Ginsberg says that his book owes much to the teaching of Professor Dawes Hicks. Those who are familiar with Professor Hicks' method of approach to philosophical problems will be glad to see his method so ably applied in a field of inquiry in which clear-sighted analysis and criticism of existing concepts are especially needed. Both as an exposition of theories and as an incentive to critical thought Mr Ginsberg's book should be most valuable to the student of social psychology.

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Education and World Citizenship: An Essay towards a Science of Education. By James Clerk Maxwell Garnett, C.B.E., M.A.—Cambridge: University Press, 1921.—Pp. x+515.

WITH good reason Dominie Sampson would have exclaimed "Prodigious!" if he could have seen this book. Not only does it consist of 525 royal octavo pages, but the extent of outlook is enormous, its index contains a galaxy of names of authors on education quoted such as can rarely have been surpassed in number in any educational work, and there is an aliveness of interest and thought which strikes confidence in the reader as to the experience and wisdom of the writer. It is emphatically a big book in size and a big book in its significance. It is as if we had been going through an age of mono-

graphs, and the time had arrived for a summary of things as they are educationally. For, although the book is a big volume, it is in many ways a summary of educational thought. It is, after all, representative rather than comprehensive. Indeed, it is difficult now for any one man to write a book on the whole of the implications in the concept of education. It has become too great a subject for one man to compass within his own universe of thought, and then to convey clearly and convincingly to others its whole significance. This book is prodigious in its subject-matter and in its significance. The consequence is that a thoroughgoing review and criticism would have to be also prodigious. For, in virtue of its summarising nature, the volume is often allusive; and the trouble in allusive books is that at various points they mean so much more in emphasis to one reader than they do to others. Many readers, therefore, will be drawn to Mr Maxwell Garnett's book for the treatment of this subject or that subject. Few readers will have a sufficiently wide background of experience, knowledge, and thought to follow with complete acquiescence the whole work, for, without meaning it, it is, perhaps necessarily, at points challenging, though with the appearance of sweet reasonableness. The divisions of the volume include Book I., an introduction dealing with the aims of education in the past, and "the present position." Book II., the aim of education. Book III., a system of education. It is excellent, indeed, to find such emphasis laid on the aims of education, and if we were asked for the outstanding merit of Mr Maxwell Garnett's work, we should unhesitatingly say it is his insistence on the *inner aims* of education. This attitude, on the part of a man of the wide experience and practical atmosphere of work of the author, together with a consistent devotion to the claims of applied science and technological education, is of the utmost value. It means, if we may venture to interpret it, that the old "utilitarianism" of English thought, to use a term much in vogue to-day, is being "sublimated" into a reconciliation with the most strictly human aspects of educational thought, taken at its best. Education, as a subject, inevitably has its social, industrial, commercial, and its religious aspects and relations, but in its own territory it is, as Plato long ago said, an "art"; and within its own province its aims are paramount, and the sooner we recognise the dominance of that "art," as Mr Garnett would have us do, the better. Education, as such, with its own aims, must be the leader of the country, not the hander-over of goods across the counter on order and at request of other sectional interests, however enticing. We are conscious, therefore, of the high service of Mr Garnett in insisting on the "aims" of education. He has done this part of his work *de plein cœur*, and it will command the respect of all the best of the community. It is, once more, "prodigious" in scale. As the logician would say, it is wonderfully thorough in its intension—in its insight into the analysis of the contents of the term education; whilst it is no less alert as to the extension of the term—it is world-wide in its claim for the best education for everyone. It is no longer a question of a political standard, of the greatest good of the greatest number. Mr Garnett realises

that any true final educational aim is non-sectional and cannot be confined to bits or "interests" of a portion of the community. In a true sense it altogether transcends any single community, even a nation. It really means the greatest physical and mental good of every individual in the world, so far as combined external agencies can help the individual to realise himself. Education is humanism *in excelsis*.

The enormous width of subject-matter, once more, lends such a volume open to criticism at a score of points. Take, for instance, Mr Garnett's treatment of the aims of education in the past. The study of the history of education is not quite so simple as he thinks. If it were, consistent recourse to it ought to bring us much nearer perfection, politically and educationally, than it does. This historical side Mr Garnett disposes of in seven pages. Thus it is easy to identify the teaching of the classics with the theory of formal training, and to say that this has become a "dogma" and is discredited. But the real historical strength of the theory of classical training in the seventeenth century was the Puritan absorption in a knowledge of the Scriptures, a most specific mode of instructional training for which Latin, Greek, and Hebrew were the "holy" languages, because they form the basis for that knowledge of most worth, or, if you like, of most "use." The reason we do not see this, is because the Scriptures themselves have ceased to be the specific cynosure which attracted our ancestors, and which do not similarly attract us. Hence it may be that we shall presently find that even theological training has no use for either Greek or Hebrew. The historic aspects of formal and specific training are very interesting, but not disposed of quite so readily as would appear. If Mr Garnett turned his attention to the formal training of the will, he would, possibly, find that the study of history would furnish multitudinous examples for consideration. The fact is that the discussion of this question of formal and specific training is taken to apply to the subjects of the curriculum, and the reason apparently why Mr Garnett wishes to introduce it is to strengthen what seems to be his fundamental position of education through instruction. For apparently Mr Garnett is a strong neo-Herbartian, and believes in the inner values of "subjects of knowledge." The doctrine that character is built up on the subject-matter of instruction is extremely attractive, because it is extremely optimistic. It makes the school-master, as Erasmus would say, "a king." Mr Garnett, however, recognises that for the individual—and all education, he would admit, is eventually individual—*self-realisation* is the only reasonable aim, but its vagueness is so palpable that it must somehow be defined in a statement of its limits and safeguarded in its application to the claims of society. Perhaps no point in all Mr Garnett's discourse is better worked out than his doctrine of transformation of Herbart's "many-sided interest" into the new statement of a "single wide interest." For Mr Garnett sees clearly that from the point of view of the community it is highly desirable—most people would say essential—that different interests must be cultivated by different individuals; and these, he suggests, must be built up by the educator, or at any rate the educand must be protected from a cramping en-

vironment. The problem becomes, from the educative point of view : How can the pupil be enabled to become concentrative in purpose and at the same time wide-minded in his interests ? From the point of view of instruction, Mr Garnett's answer is : By adopting a central subject of study, and becoming interested in cognate, supplementary, complementary subjects along with it.

Into the remarkably rich and fertile fields of consideration which Mr Garnett turns over, ploughs, and in which he sets seeds and shows prospects of harvests, we cannot follow. We have done all we can in taking as keynote the word "prodigious." From a complete identification of education with life Mr Garnett abstains, for we have met in his pages with no systematic treatment of the other educational influences of the environment such as the family, the Church, the press, and the spiritual developments of friendships, and the larger spirit of the age. Yet we feel that Mr Garnett would be the first to admit that institutional instruction is only a small portion of the educational environment. Nevertheless, the obvious self-limitation and emphasis on the instructional side of education gives a certain mechanical impression, often, it must be allowed, of the dynamic kind, and yet sometimes unconvincing, through a certain omission of factors which should come into the practical problem. We are always thrown back upon the fact that the real problem of education is : personality meeting personality on a common plane, action and reaction being equal, and the common result being stimulation of thought and feeling on a wider and more interpretative and sympathetic plane. All questions of subjects, time-table, discipline, organisation, administration are subsidiary, or rather intermediary. It is no use hiding the fact that the educational process, if not formal, is at least formative, and all the objective and visible apparatus and material, specific as they are (curriculum included), are, after all, only instrumental. It has been remarked by one of the most cultured men of our generation : "I think the most valuable positive result of my own education was due at least as much to its defects as to its merits." It is for this reason we must beware against too much insistence on the formal study of the child-mind in the abstract on the one hand, and too much belief in mechanical procedure and curricula on the other. Educators are not omniscient, and possibly they will be less so the more they develop "a science of education." Every child is a personality. *The primary and the final need of dealing with him* is not "science" in the abstract, but the sort of science and sciences *which help to develop the clearness, the richness, the sympathy in the personality of the teacher*, and bring his life into a readier wisdom, a riper judgment, into an atmosphere of human insight. We do not think that the present need of education is so much for another "science." Mr Garnett, we have seen, proceeds far beyond the collection and arrangements of facts, characteristic of a "science," by his excellent demand for the study of aims. It is clearly a *philosophy* of education he means, not another "science." And it is a philosophy he helps us towards, happily, whether we agree with him or not.

As to the contents of Mr Garnett's "system of education," we rejoice in its helpful broad-mindedness. In this short review we cannot do more than refer to two problems, but the treatment of these questions will serve to indicate the fine spirit of approach that Mr Garnett brings to bear on the study of education. We will choose the question of the position of classics in education, and the problem of the vital place which religion occupies in a sound system of education.

Mr Garnett retains classics and ancient history as one of his three "single-wide-interest" subject-groups of instruction in an educational curriculum (the other two are (a) modern language and literature studies, still including Latin and, if possible, Greek, as subsidiary subjects; (b) natural science and mathematics, and again still including Latin and Greek as subsidiary subjects) in his curricula for secondary schools. The reasons for this remarkable retention of classics (for we recall the fact that Mr Garnett's experience of teaching has been largely in scientific technology) are that the higher study of classics will always be necessary *to keep the thought of our time in touch with the best of the thought of ancient Greece and Rome*; and, secondly, the "perfection of method that enables form-masters to secure far more concentrated attention from their classical forms than the various specialist masters, who are responsible for modern studies, can generally obtain from their subjects." And, again, with his ideal of a "single-wide-interest" group of studies, Mr Garnett maintains that classical subjects are "by tradition more closely welded together, and are thus more effective in developing a single wide interest," than modern subjects of the curricula ordinarily are; though this contrast may, of course, be modified in time.

With regard to the place of religion in education, Mr Garnett sends forth no doubtful voice. With remarkable independence from even his own statement of aim to proceed a step further towards a "science" of education, Mr Garnett insists on the place of religion in the building up of "character in the perfect commonwealth." He speaks of the need of the individual to be distinguished by a philosophy of life with "everything focussed in a supreme and dominant purpose." This purpose transforms a philosophy into a religion. On the point of the need of the religious purpose for the progress of the community, he quotes illustratively from Mr Frederic Harrison:

"All our mighty achievements are being hampered and often neutralised, all our difficulties are being doubled, and all our moral and social diseases are being aggravated by this supreme and dominant fact—that we have suffered our religion to slide from us, and that in effect our age has no abiding faith in any religion at all. The urgent task of our time is to recover a religious faith as a basis of life both personal and social."

Mr Garnett accepts this position—that both for the development of the character of the individual and for social progress, as things stand to-day, religion, the Christian religion, is educatively desirable, as desirable specifically as any other specific subject of knowledge and thought is desirable. The world of experience is interpreted

by each person in what Mr Garnett calls a "personal endarchy," *i.e.* the elements are arranged in the order of importance according to "the depth of the corresponding neurogram-elements in our respective nervous systems." But the impersonal endarchy of science is, in the words of Professor Whitehead, "the neat, trim, tidy, exact world which is the goal of scientific thought." Where, then, does religion come in? "The Christian account of the universe," says Mr Garnett, "completes the discovered part of the endarchy of science with a hypothesis concerning the hitherto undiscovered central essences; and it does so in a manner that enables the corresponding neurography to fulfil the conditions that have to be satisfied by the neurography of the typical citizen of a maximally efficient and progressive community." The Christian philosophy is concerned with the Kingdom of God. Its significance is that: "the endarchy of science is therein completed as regards its undiscovered portion by the Christian hypotheses concerning its undiscovered central essences." The faith that is educative is that which is a preliminary condition to *action* on a hypothesis. Christianity, educationally, then offers the hypothesis concerning "the undiscovered part of the endarchy of science—with a view to its verification." We must, however, "distinguish the foundations of Christianity from its gargoyles." In a word, in a world which we find partially intelligible, we must complete in thought and action for ourselves a universe which, similarly, is intelligible, but which is also a complete universal endarchy. And intellectually and educationally, we must learn to live in it. But enough has now been said to show that Mr Garnett's book is one to be counted with by educationists of all types.

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A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job, together with a New Translation. By the late Samuel Rolles Driver, D.D., and George Buchanan Gray, D.Litt.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921.—Pp. lxxviii+376+360.

THE problem of the Book of Job will always appeal to the serious student, and even the ordinary reader never fails to be impressed with its pathos and its poetry, sadly disguised though the poetry is in the Authorised Version: the Revised Version is better, but by no means perfect. The literature dealing with "Job" is of vast extent, ranging from the *Morals* of Gregory the Great to J. A. Froude's striking essay in his *Short Studies*, to say nothing of its place in all Commentaries on the Bible. The latest addition lies before us in this volume of the International Critical Commentaries just published.

The present book differs in several important respects from others of the series, and the differences are an undoubted improvement.

For example, a continuous new translation is provided, showing as nearly as can be done in English the versification of the original; with this are combined the Exegetical Notes; the Philological Notes are given separately in the second half of the book, the pagination beginning again with page 1. Two Indices also are given, the one English, the other Hebrew. These improvements make the book far more useful both to the scholar and the general reader than, for example, that on Deuteronomy, in the same series, could ever be.

Dr Driver's share in the work, the last work he did, consists of the Philological Notes almost in their entirety, a considerable portion of the translation, and the Exegetical Notes on chapters iii. 2-ix. 10 and xl. 15-xli. 30. The rest, including the whole Introduction, is the work of Dr Gray.

The Introduction, as was only to be expected, is as full and complete as possible, and covers every point that can be discussed in connection with "Job": the title of the book and its place in the Canon, its subject and main divisions, its literary form, origin and history, purpose and method, age, text, and rhythms. With the latter subject Dr Gray is peculiarly fitted to deal, as he has made a special study of *The Forms of Hebrew Poetry*, his book, with that title, having been reviewed by us in this Journal when it came out. The prevailing rhythm in Job, as in the larger part of Hebrew poetry, is 3-3, *i.e.* it consists of two *stichoi* or sentences with three stressed syllables in each; but there are occasional examples of other forms, such as 4:2 or 2:4 or 2:2:2; this latter finds its place in impassioned utterance, as in ix. 21, if the text is correct, "I am perfect; I care not for myself; I refuse my life"; or (xvii. 1) "My spirit is broken; my days are extinct; the grave is ready for me." By paying attention to the rhythm, many a useful emendation of the text is rendered possible.

The book consists of Prologue, dramatic Dialogue, and Epilogue: the first and last in prose, the rest in poetry. Many writers have argued from this that the Prologue and Epilogue are not from the same hand as the Dialogue, but the differences of style are only such as naturally distinguish prose from poetry, and are not sufficient to suggest difference of authorship. As regards the origin of the book, it is probable that the author made use of a tale that had been handed down traditionally, or perhaps embodied in a *Volksbuch*, of a wealthy Sheikh who was noted for his piety and yet had unaccountably lost his wealth, his children, and his health by a series of misfortunes, and made it the foundation of his moralising on the vicissitudes that attend even the best of men. A curious parallel has been recently discovered in Babylonian literature, but it deals with the fortunes of a king, and Dr Gray sees no grounds for assuming that the author of Job was acquainted with it. A comparison has sometimes been drawn between the dialogue of Job and that of Plato, and when it was thought that Job dated from the patriarchal age, the suggestion was made that possibly Plato might have borrowed from the Hebrew poet; of late, now that a fifth-century date is assigned to the book, it has been suggested that possibly the author of Job borrowed from

Plato; but the latter suggestion is no more probable than the former.¹

The scene of the poem, for such it must be called having regard to the bulk of its contents, is laid in the patriarchal age, in a country to the east of Canaan, abounding in large farms, not far from towns, and with the desert at no great distance. The author shows himself acquainted with Egypt, and with the other great empire of Babylon; he is fond of nature and a country life, but he is also a student of books. The Dialogue portion is not complete, or has been mutilated; this is shown by the fact that the third cycle of speeches is imperfect, viz. the first and second cycles each contain a speech by each of the three friends, followed in each case by a speech of Job; in the third cycle there is a speech of Eliphaz followed by Job, then a very short speech of Bildad followed by a very long one of Job, and none by Zophar—unless chapter xxvii., which contains much that is inappropriate to Job, really consists of a mutilated speech of Zophar. Chapter xxviii., a quiet discourse on Wisdom, is an interpolation; so also are the speeches of Elihu, for no mention of this very opinionative, though professedly modest, young man is made before or after, and the book is complete without them; they add nothing to what has already been said, and do not further the solution of the problem.

What is the problem that the author of Job set out to face? Here we cannot do better than quote Dr Gray, and invite the reader, for further information, to consult the book for himself. "It would, no doubt," says Dr Gray, "be as inadequate a description of Job as, for example, of *Paradise Lost*, to call it merely a didactic poem; it would be even further from the truth to regard it as a purely objective dramatic poem in which the author maintains an interested but quite impartial attitude towards the various characters which are introduced and the various points of view which are expressed by them. On the other hand, the author obviously ranges himself with Yahweh in approving Job as against his friends; as passionately as Job he rejects the interpretation of life maintained by the friends, and as decisively as Yahweh the estimate of human character that is offered by the Satan." The writer's purpose is akin to that of Milton, though never so directly formulated, nor coextensive with it, and the differences of opinion as to the purpose of the book have been due to seeking from the author more than he was able or intended to offer. He had no clear-cut theology, like Milton's, but through pain and suffering he had discovered in his own experience that

¹ In this connection it is to be observed that there are differences between the Prologue and Epilogue on the one hand, and the Dialogue on the other, in respect of the terms employed for the Divine Name. The Prologue and Epilogue, like JE, show a marked preference for Yahweh; the Dialogue, like P, uses El, Eloah, Elohim, and Shaddai. If this does not point to difference of authorship—and there is nothing in the style to support this—it goes to show at least that the author had thoroughly assimilated the story as found in the *Volksbuch*. Again, there is a difference in the use of the two forms of the first personal pronoun: in the Prologue אֲנִי is used exclusively; in the Dialogue אֲנִי is used fifteen times to אֲנִי eleven times; Elihu uses the first nine times, the second twice; and it may be noted that in *Deut.* אֲנִי is used fifty-four times to אֲנִי twice.

God did not abandon the sufferer; and more, that suffering and loss need not detach him from God, that it is possible to serve and love God not for the outward things He gives, but for what He is in Himself. "The book aims not at solving the entire problem of suffering, but at vindicating God and the latent worth of human nature against certain conclusions drawn from a partial observation of life." Thus Dr Gray develops some fresh thoughts which place the problem in a new light, and explains how it is that Yahweh in his speech(es) is able to uphold Job's *rightness* in spite of all his, at times, wild outpourings; against his friends Job throughout maintains his integrity, and Yahweh supports him.

Job has been compared with Greek Tragedy, but there is this difference: whereas Æschylus, for example, shows a deep sense of the overpowering mastery of Até, or Fate, the Hebrew poet, like the prophets of Israel, has an abiding sense of the overshadowing presence and power of a personal and, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, all-loving God. This is the gift of Israel to the world.

When we come to examine the translation there are some crucial passages to which we at once turn, and in these, and many another to which we have no space to refer, we find fresh light thrown or fresh beauty added to the text. For example, chap. ix., Job's first expression of the power and majesty of God, particularly vv. 9-14, "Who made the Bear (and) Orion, and the Pleiades, and the chambers of the south," for which latter phrase F. Perles has suggested "the (stars) surrounding the south," with great plausibility; and in v. 18 "the proud helpers" of AV become "the helpers of Rahab," and the note brings out well the true mythological bearing of the phrase (*cf.* my paper on "Mythology in the Psalms," in *The Interpreter* for 1918, vol. xiv. pp. 311 *seq.*). In chap. xiv. the utter hopelessness of Job's outlook in respect of any future life or personal survival after death, which was the standpoint of his age, is brought out more definitely than in the AV, a hopelessness which the well-known passage in chap. xix. really does nothing to dispel. For what does Job say there, according to the new translation, based on the best reading possible of a text manifestly corrupt? "But I know that my vindicator liveth, and that hereafter he will stand up upon the dust. And . . . And away from my flesh I shall behold God. Whom I shall behold (to be) on my side, and mine eyes shall see to be unestranged." The notes on this passage should be studied, but the result is that all Job longs for is that God should vindicate his rightness, whether after death (away from my flesh) or in life (from my flesh), whichever the Hebrew may be taken to imply.¹ The preceding verse (24) may be taken in two ways: either he wishes that his words

¹ That the author had no thought of a personal future life—except in so far as the spirit in Sheól partakes of the future of the body laid in the grave, (xiv. 22); *cf.* the Egyptian belief in the Ka, which dwells in the tomb with the (mummified) body, to which they added the Ba, or bird-soul, which flies away, like a bird, to the realm of Osiris—is proved by the fact that he represents Yahweh as fulfilling Job's wish here in this life; Job *has* the Vision of the Almighty he longed for, and so exclaims: "By the hearing of the ear I had heard of thee; but now mine eye hath seen thee" (xlii. 5).

may not only be written in a book, but that they may be engraved with an iron stylus in the rock, and then, for greater clearness and lastingness, the letters may be filled in with lead; or that, as the text may be rendered,

“That with an iron stylus on lead,
Or for ever in the rock they were graven.”

In this case three materials are referred to: a written scroll, or, what is more enduring, lead(en tablets), or, what is more enduring still, the rock. To the references as to the use of leaden tablets in antiquity may be added the fact of the discovery within recent years of such leaden tablets in the Roman baths at Bath, some containing curses, one the letter of a Christian, Vinisius, to a lady, Nigra, in the fourth century A.D., and fifteen uninscribed at all. Such tablets were dropped in as offerings to the spirit or presiding genius of the spring, and probably Nigra was not above yielding to the prevailing superstition, though a Christian. In v. 14 of this same chapter, by paying attention to the rhythm and the parallelism of the original, we arrive at a greatly improved reading:

“My kinsmen and my familiar friends have failed,
They that sojourn in my house have forgotten me;
And my maids count me as a stranger,
I am become an alien in their sight.”

And perhaps the fourth of these lines has suffered transposition and originally was the parallel to the first.

The author of Job was a true poet, and the best of his poetry appears in the speeches of Job himself and in those of Yahweh. What is there more magnificent in any literature than the nature studies in Yahweh's addresses to Job; and what is more beautiful, for instance, than Job's illustrations of the speed with which his brief life is hurrying to its goal, those in ix. 25, 26? “My days are swifter than a post. . . . They shoot along like skiffs of reed, like an eagle that swoopeth on its prey”; *i.e.* the solitary runner making all haste to deliver his message (cp. 2 Sam. xviii. 22–24), the fragile craft of reeds that skims so swiftly over the surface of the Nile—an indication, among others, of the poet's acquaintance with Egypt, and the griffon or vulture swooping on its prey. It reminds us of our own poet's:

“The more we live more brief appear
Our life's succeeding stages,
A day to childhood seems a year,
And years like passing ages;
Heaven gives our years of fading strength
Indemnifying fleetness,
And those of youth a seeming length
Proportioned to their sweetness.”

The Philological Notes will be found invaluable by the student of Hebrew; they are marked by all Dr Driver's well-known care and exactitude, and render the use of a dictionary almost unnecessary. It is impossible here to deal with them in detail.

As was hinted above, this edition of the Book of Job fully maintains the high level of the great series to which it belongs, and it surpasses some others of the series in that it can be read with equal delight by the serious student and by the simple reader who wishes to gain a wider understanding of this wonderful product of Hebrew wisdom. We should advise the latter to read the new translation first, and thus to gather a fuller insight into its rendering of the "still, sad music of humanity," and then to pass on to the Exegetical Notes; the Philological Notes he can leave alone: they are for the Hebrew scholar.

Dr Gray has done his work with an excellence and a thoroughness which leave nothing to be desired; and thus the final labours of Dr Driver find a pious and satisfactory conclusion.

H. J. D. ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM, NORFOLK.

The Ila-Speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia. By Rev. Edwin W. Smith and Captain Andrew Murray Dale. 2 vols.—London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920.—Pp. xxiv+423, xiv+433.

In Unknown China. By S. Pollard.—London: Seeley, Service & Co., Ltd., 1921.—Pp. 324.

THE materials for anthropological and ethnographical study have received valuable additions in these volumes. Only recently it was possible to say that "an enormous mass of material, quite in the raw, awaits reduction to order on the part of anthropological theorists, as yet a small and ill-equipped body of enthusiasts." The reproach levelled against the anthropologists is in process of being removed, while the contributions of materials for their investigation become increasingly available.

A glance at the footnotes of Sir J. G. Frazer's *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament* will reveal the conspicuous work done in this department of research by missionaries. Both these books carry on the tradition. *The Ila-Speaking Peoples* will take rank with standard works on ethnography. Mr Pollard's book, the subtitle of which is "A record of the observations, adventures, and experiences of a pioneer of civilisation during a prolonged sojourn amongst the wild and unknown Nosu tribe of Western China," does not pretend to be a serious study in anthropology. The contributions to science crop out here and there; often they are almost submerged by incidents as sensational as those of Sir Rider Haggard's romances. The other book is intended, however, to be "a serious contribution to African ethnography." The facts have been carefully observed; other information has been gathered from reliable sources; and all this has been sifted, collated, and classified. Yet the results of this scientific investigation are presented in so interesting a manner that the reader is fascinated as he proceeds. A good literary style and clear statement of essential things are everywhere in evidence.

Mr Smith, who is now serving the British and Foreign Bible Society as director of their work in the Latin countries of Europe, was for thirteen years a missionary in Rhodesia under the auspices of the Primitive

Methodist Church. He reduced the Ila speech to writing, and is mainly responsible for its present orthography. His *Handbook of the Ila Language* was published by the Oxford University Press in 1907. He has also done much translation work, including many of the New Testament books. Captain Dale was a magistrate in the British South Africa Company's administration. Missionary and magistrate gave themselves to the study of the language and the customs of an almost unknown people, primarily for the purpose of performing their immediate tasks to the best advantage. The publication of the results of their observation and study was delayed by the war. Captain Dale was invalided home, but died before any part of the book was in print.

The combination of missionary and magistrate may arouse suspicion in some quarters. No attempt, however, has been made by either to use any privilege of position for the purpose of playing the autocrat, or peering offensively into the secrets of the African. They have regarded the Ba-ila as fellow human beings, and the account given of their methods, as well as the nature of the information they have gathered, attest their patient, painstaking, sympathetic attitude.

The Ba-ila "belong to the Bantu subdivision of the African negroes, and their ancestors in remote times must have come down from the southern Sudan." They are usually known as the *Mashukulumbwe*. They inhabit the country formed by the watershed of the Kafue river, north of the Batoka plateau. Their history is vague—a record of intertribal strife, varied by raids from other tribes and from slave-hunters. Their first contact with Europeans cannot be determined. Livingstone passed just outside their territory. The people have been variously described. Colonel St Hill Gibbons describes them as "quite the most hopeless savages it is possible to conceive." Mr F. C. Selous says "they are a fine sturdy-looking race of men; very many of them have rather aquiline features, and are at the same time lighter in colour than their fellows, and it appears to me that amongst them there is a strong admixture of some other blood than the negro—perhaps Arab or some other North African race." The writers of this book, who know the people better than either soldier or hunter, speak of them as possessed of fine physique, but kept down in numbers "by the astonishing promiscuity of their sexual relations and the extreme earliness of age at which these relations commence." "It is no exaggeration to state that from the age of seven or eight a girl, married or otherwise, counts her lovers, who are constantly changing, not singly but by the score." "Sex is the most pervasive element of their life." Chasteness is not known in girls over ten years of age. Probably seventy per cent. of the children die in infancy. Women are more numerous than men in the proportion of three to two.

Detailed information is given concerning the physical characteristics of the people, their dress and decorations. A singular feature of the latter is the *isusu*, a tall coiffure, about three feet ten inches long, worn by the young men for about three months after the field work is finished. Its preparation is a painful process. Its probable use is for keeping each other in constant sight when hunting or fighting in the thick cane-brakes or reeds. Domestic life and work, warfare, handicraft, and leechcraft are described. The medicine-man has a place in the life of the Ba-ila that it is not easy to explain. He has medicine for all needs. Sympathetic magic has something to do with his ascendancy; trickery plays its part also; yet there is something else—the personal element that eludes analysis.

"Dynamism" is a term used by Mr Smith when he comes to the religion of the people. This is not a term used merely to cover a theory. Its use is necessary for describing the facts. One of the duties of the medicine-man is to instruct the people in reference to the taboos.

The social organisation is peculiar. There has been no development into national life as with the Baganda. Children take the clan of their mother, and, although they are the property of their father, he has less power over them than their maternal uncles. It is difficult to gain knowledge concerning the clans, or to discover the meaning of animals, plants, or things as totems. "The Ba-ila . . . believe in transmigration; but there seems to be little or no connection between their totemism and their conception of metempsychosis." Reincarnation is never in their thought achieved apart from the ordinary processes of nature. There is no marriage between members of the same clan. Beyond the clan is the community, of which there are several, ranging from that of Kasenga with about three thousand people to those of one hundred or less. The chief is not selected because of birth. In theory any person may be chosen. "A man's character, primarily, and his wealth, secondarily, are regarded in the selection." The choice of his successor by the reigning chief grows in favour.

The religion of the Ba-ila is most interestingly treated. There is evidence of a conscientious and successful endeavour to capture the secret of this African people. And a wonderful secret it is. They live in contact with the marvellous. Witchcraft gains credence; ghosts hover everywhere waiting to be reincarnated as living beings; every living person has a guardian spirit. There are gods innumerable. Every person and each family have their divinities. There is the arch-demigod Bulongo. "He is the *muzhimo* of the whole country; there is no community that does not pray to him." Bulongo is amiable even to the whites, who are regarded as "unfortunates, wasters." And then there is Leza, the supreme Being, who is sought on occasions of special need. The idea of him is not ethical, and no sense of sin finds expression in their prayers to him. Leza has many names, but these are not evidence of polytheism—this only illustrates the fact that all names are necessary to describe deity.

Mr Smith uses, as I have said, the term "dynamism" to describe the religion of the Ba-ila. He discards the words "magic," "magical," "fetichism," as these "convey the sense of something inferior, illicit, bad." But the Ba-ila believe in the existence of higher powers, and are quite sure that they have intercourse with them. The world he lives in is full of mystery, certain persons and things are *tonda* (taboo), and there are means known to the initiated by which baneful influences may be averted and beneficial results attained. Traffic with hidden powers for destructive purposes is regarded with horror. To them death does not belong to the original constitution of things. And they believe firmly in the survival of personality. The ghosts of the departed hover about waiting to be born again. The myth of the perverted message appears in their folk-lore as explaining the cause of death. Their ideas are vague, illogical, and the difference between the personal and the impersonal is worn thin. "Whether or not there has been a historical development of belief, there is certainly what to our minds is a logical development in their ideas, a development from the impersonal to the personal, from charm to prayer, from *musamo* (medicine) to *mizhimo* (divinities), from *mizhimo* to Leza. In other words, we can distinguish traces of development from dynamism to something approaching monotheism."

Mr Pollard, who spent many years as a Bible Christian missionary in China, records some of the customs of an aboriginal people strangely different from the Ba-ila. Incidentally he imparts much information about the Chinese, but the chief part of his book deals with the Nosu tribe, who inhabit a tract of hilly country in the far west of China, to the north of the Yangtse river, two thousand five hundred miles from the ocean, well on towards mysterious Tibet. These hillmen pay tribute to the Chinese Government at Peking, but in their raids across the river they gather more than they give, unless they are bought off by the officials by the payment of large bribes. The origin of this people is lost in myth. They regard the Tibetans as a sort of "poor relations," although the differences between them are many. The Nosu have no temples, priests, or idols; while polyandry is unknown among them. The Chinese are scorned as effeminate. Nosuland is "the surprise land of West China, whose inhabitants are practically independent, where there are no Buddhist temples, no debasing Temples of Hades casting a gloom over the thought of all the people, no women with deformed feet, no infanticide of unwanted baby girls, no overpowering mandarins with their retinue of unscrupulous squeezing underlings." It is the bogey-land of the Chinese because it is so little known and therefore mysterious.

Women have much more liberty than in the Empire. Chivalry is not rare. The rule of the clan chiefs, who represent the old feudal system of government (their name is "Earth Eyes"), involves "intrigue, lawlessness, gross immorality, robbery, rape, murder, and much else that is horrible to contemplate and still more horrible to come into close contact with." The blood feud obtains, but this ends if a house is burned down. Trial by ordeal is also practised, and slave deputies are chosen to represent both accuser and accused. Spiritualism is all-powerful. The wizards, as among the Ba-ila, are sometimes impostors, yet there are cases in which they exercise a power that it is not easy to explain.

Although the people generally are illiterate, they have a written language and a literature. Their ideographs differ from the Chinese. Their writing is vertical, but unlike the Chinese it begins at the left of the page. The wizards are the custodians of the literature, which deals with disease and demon possession. One book, however, has for its subject the origin of things, and has affinities with other creation myths. The serpent appears as the go-between by whose means the only survivor from the Flood obtained a wife. Students of history and philology, and perhaps religion, may discover many hidden secrets in this unexplored field.

There is a strange insensibility on the part of these hillmen to the appeal of religion. Mr Pollard presented a Nosu graduate with a Bible. "He returned it later on, saying that he could write a better book than that, and asking me to give him a modern pistol instead." Yet Mr Pollard is persuaded that a community of interest links East and West. "One often smiles as he reads a lot of rubbish about the impassable gulf between East and West. The gulf does not exist. The saying of the Chinese sage that there exists 'one principle throughout all the peoples in the world' is far nearer the truth than the crude placing of the East and West in absolutely different compartments. Those who go down deep enough know that East and West are one."

J. C. MANTRIPP.

Henry Edward Manning: His Life and Labours. By Shane Leslie.
London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd, 1920.

MR SHANE LESLIE'S *Life of Cardinal Manning* is a brilliant chapter in ecclesiastical politics. As a study of character it has also real psychological value, but it suffers from the fact that it is a premeditated counterblast to Purcell's biography, and also from a vein of perversity which at times takes the form of anti-Protestant bias in the writer. For the latter reason it is hardly likely to turn suspicion and dislike into sympathy and understanding in those non-Catholic circles for which Mr Leslie has such a slight esteem. It is not necessary to claim solitary greatness for the central figure of his picture in order to pay it due homage. He has yielded too easily to the temptation to regard Manning's loneliness as an incontestable proof of his superiority. The Cardinal strikes us as a singularly friendless man. His associates in work and his spiritual dependents were a large company, but he had no gift for the fine equalities of friendship. The companions of his youth like Wilberforce and Gladstone dropped away and others did not come to take their place. He could never tolerate only to be *primus inter pares*. His candid admirers admit that there was in him a vein of jealousy which kept a watchful eye upon all competitors to influence or fame. We need search no further for his grievous misunderstanding with Newman. Mr Leslie softens the harsher features of this antagonism, and robs the biting rhetoric of Mr Strachey in his *Eminent Victorians* of some of its sting; but the fact remains that Manning found the subtle and pervasive influence of Newman upon the educated English mind uncongenial. There was in it something at once penetrating and incalculable which he could not subordinate to his own schemes, and instead of provoking him to generous admiration it aroused suspicion and dislike.

A *Life of Manning* must be in a large measure a study of ecclesiastical ambition. His was a type of character more attractive to the Latin than to the English mind. We have little taste for ecclesiastical politics, and view with suspicion, perhaps for adequate historical reasons, the diplomatic methods and the art of spiritual finesse which they involve. The Roman Catholic Church has profited largely by the Romantic movement. Through its ritual, its tradition of saintliness, and its mystical theology its influence upon the religious life of modern England has been profound; but on the side of sovereignty it remains foreign and remote. But this was the side where Manning, as the protagonist of the temporal power of the Papacy, revealed his special gifts. He had the ambition which is the goad of political success, and complete confidence in the rightness of his own judgments. He believed in the value of autocracy, and the fact that his autocrat ruled in the empire of the spirit banished all doubts about his wisdom or justice. Ollivier has drawn a picture of him at the Vatican Council: "The love of domination is about him, and when his thin lips smile, it seems to be out of pure condescension. He is certainly pious and sincere, wrapped in God, but he is not the emaciated monk he looks. Under his seraphic beatitude he retains a

wheeling and energetic policy." At a later date his nephew, Father Anderdon, in a bold letter which closed personal intercourse between them, wrote as follows: "Has your Eminence sufficiently considered it as the great misfortune of your life that you have never practically had a superior? that you have always been in the way of making your own views and opinions, and so stereotyping them as being your own? Is not à Kempis right in saying, '*Nemo secure præest nisi qui liberter subest*'? Has your Eminence ever really been in that condition, *subesse*? I do not mean to external ecclesiastical subordination, but to submission of the will and judgment to another?" No doubt these questions might be regarded justly as impertinent, and they are not free from the unkindness of personal disagreements, but their exposure is complete of the besetting weakness of ecclesiastical ambition.

Mr Leslie does little to soften these characteristics of Manning's dominating personality. The political shrewdness which obtained such a striking success at the Vatican Council, combined with his deep Christian compassion for the suffering and oppressed, made him the champion of Labour and the friend of Ireland long before either cause had become respectable. "I claim for Labour," he said in 1874, "and the skill which is always acquired by Labour, the rights of Capital. It is Capital in its truest sense." As long ago as 1865 he wrote: "I am convinced that we hold Ireland by force, not only against the will of the majority, but in violation of all rights, natural and supernatural—that is, of political justice and of religious conscience. Moreover, that our bayonets there are as truly foreign bayonets as the French in Rome." Later, while he remained a moderate Home Ruler, his attitude on this question was determined largely by religious considerations. In a letter to the Pope in 1885 he expresses the fear that the separation of Ireland and the concession of a Parliament "might be the cause of infinite evil to the Irish Catholics and to the Catholic Church in the Empire." He was averse to the transference of forty or fifty Catholic members from the highest Protestant legislative assembly of the world to a Parliament in Dublin on the ground that their presence and vigilance were "necessary for the defence of the Faith and of the Pontiff."

It is the misfortune of those who live much in the public eye that the interior life of faith and affection often receives far less than its due from the observer or the critic. In the case of Manning there was evidently a veil of reserve. The secrets of the spirit were guarded carefully. He had the Englishman's silent pride on matters of personal religion, and the revealing glimpses in these pages into the sorrows and triumphs of a struggling soul are all too few. A most precious document has been given to the world by Baron von Hügel in a letter which appeared in the Literary Supplement of the *Times* on 24th March, after the publication of Mr Shane Leslie's biography, and we hope we may be forgiven if we transcribe it here. A week after Cardinal Manning's death on 14th January 1892, the future Cardinal Vaughan gave Baron von Hügel the following account of his last moments:—

" You know what we all thought about the Cardinal and Mrs Manning. Well, this is what happened shortly before his death. I was by his bedside ; he looked around to see that we were alone ; he fumbled under his pillow for something ; he drew out a battered little pocket-book full of a woman's handwriting. He said : ' For years you have been as a son to me, Herbert : I know not to whom else to leave this—I leave it to you. Into this book my dearest wife wrote her prayers and meditations. Not a day has passed, since her death, on which I have not prayed and meditated from this book. All the good I may have done, all the good I may have been, I owe to her. Take precious care of it.' He ceased speaking, and soon afterwards unconsciousness came on."

This glimpse into the far-off happiness of his home at Lamington reveals more of the real man than the hour of his triumph when Papal Infallibility was decreed at Rome. We hope that Mr Leslie will insert it in a second edition of his book.

WM. HAMILTON DRUMMOND.

LEWES.

Medieval Europe. By Prof. Lynn Thorndike, Ph.D.—
London : Harrap, 1921.

PROFESSOR THORNDIKE has well performed the task which he set before himself. To bring all European history for nineteen centuries into the compass of 600 pages needed strict compression ; a book of this kind is necessarily a manual ; but Professor Thorndike has avoided the dryness of the typical manual. It is evident that, as he claims in his preface, " some passages in this book are the result of my own study of the sources, and will not be found covered in any other work of this nature." It was inevitable that he should be dependent in many cases on second-hand and even on obsolescent information ; but we have noted few instances of this kind affecting conclusions of any importance. If it is true that nobody can understand the Middle Ages without first-hand study of a few medieval books, it is perhaps equally true that we cannot really understand them without the help of some book of general outlines ; and, for that purpose, we have met with no better volume than this. The price is very reasonable ; and the thirty-three illustrations are of real assistance to the reader, who certainly gets his money's worth.

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CONTENTS OF NUMBER 80

ARTICLES—

PAGE

Natural Piety. By Professor S. ALEXANDER, F.B.A.	609
What do we Mean by the Holy Spirit? By the Rev. GEORGE JACKSON, D.D.	622
Rome and the Anglicans. By BERNARD HOLLAND, C.B.	632
Church and State in Conflict. By ROMOLO MURRI	643
The Supernatural under Domestication. By the Rev. T. J. HARDY	657
The Ethical Movement and the Natural Man. By J. A. HOBSON	667
Faith and its Expression in the Arts. By G. P. BAKER	680
The Last Chapter of St John's Gospel as interpreted by Early Christian Art. By ARTHUR GRAY	690
Is Determinism Rational? By H. V. KNOX	701
The Confessions and Hopes of an ex-Inspector of Schools. By EDMOND G. A. HOLMES	721
The Wisdom of Educational Experiment. By NORMAN MAC MUNN	740
Moral Responsibility and the New Psychology. By Professor JOHN LAIRD	748
Self-Suggestion and Religion. By Rev. the Hon. EDWARD LYTTLETON, D.D.	760
The Self and "the Unconscious." By LEONARD HODGSON	768

DISCUSSIONS—

"India's Revolt against Christian Civilisation." By W. S. URQUHART	775
"Modernists and Unitarians." By C. C. OSLER	778

(Continued on p. vi.)

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CONTENTS OF NUMBER 80—*Continued*

	PAGE
SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE. By the Rev. Professor JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.Litt.	780
 REVIEWS—	
BERNARD BOSANQUET, <i>The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy.</i> By Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé	787
L. T. HOBHOUSE, <i>The Elements of Social Justice.</i> By Morris Ginsberg, M.A.	793
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, <i>A History of Indian Philosophy</i> , vol. i. By Dr F. W. Thomas	796
R. W. LIVINGSTONE, Ed., <i>The Legacy of Greece.</i> By Rev. James Evans, M.A.	800
WALTER J. EVANS, <i>Allitteratio Latina; or, Alliteration in Latin Verse reduced to Rule.</i> By Professor H. J. Rose	802
JAMES MOFFATT, <i>The Approach to the New Testament.</i> By Rev. J. C. Mantripp	803
J. GRESHAM MACHEN, <i>The Origin of Paul's Religion.</i> By Rev. Professor J. Moffatt	805
DITLEF NIELSEN, <i>Die dreieinige Gott in religionshistorischer Beleuchtung.</i> By Dr Stanley A. Cook	808
FATHER CUTHBERT, <i>St Francis of Assisi.</i> By Dr G. G. Coulton	812
YANKO LAVRIN, <i>Ibsen and his Creation: A Psycho-Critical Study.</i> By William Johnson	815

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609

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

NATURAL PIETY.¹

PROFESSOR S. ALEXANDER, F.B.A.

I do not mean by natural piety exactly what Wordsworth meant by it—the reverent joy in nature, by which he wished that his days might be bound to each other—though there is enough connection with his interpretation to justify me in using his phrase. The natural piety I am going to speak of is that of the scientific investigator, by which he accepts with loyalty the mysteries which he cannot explain in nature and has no right to try to explain. I may describe it as the habit of knowing when to stop in asking questions of nature. The limits to the right of asking questions are drawn differently for different purposes. They are not the same in science as in ordinary intercourse between men in conversation. I may recall an incident in the life of Dr Johnson. I was once present, says Boswell, when a gentleman (perhaps it was Boswell himself) asked so many (questions), as “What did you do, sir?” “What did you say, sir?” that at last he grew enraged, and said, “I will not be put to the *question*. Don’t you consider, sir, that these are not the manners of a gentleman? I will not be baited with *what* and *why*. What is this? What is that? Why is a cow’s tail long? Why is a fox’s tail bushy?” Boswell adds that the gentleman, who was a good deal out of countenance, said, “Why, sir, you are so good, that I venture to trouble you.” JOHNSON.—“Sir, my being so *good* is no reason why you should be so *ill*.” The questions which Johnson regarded as typically offensive in conversation about the cow’s and the fox’s tail might quite legitimately be asked in science, and I fancy answered by a naturalist without any particular difficulty. There is a mental disease known as the questioning or metaphysical

¹ Sir Samuel Hall Oration (University of Manchester), March 1922.

mania, which cannot accept anything, even the most trivial, without demanding explanation. Why do I stand here where I stand ? Why is a glass a glass, a chair a chair ? How is it that men are only of the size they are ? Why not as big as houses ? etc. (I quote from William James). Now the very life of knowledge depends on asking questions. Is it not called inquiry ? And its limits are not drawn by considerations of politeness or by shrinking from insanity. But it does recognise that, however far it may push its explanations, the world presents characters which must be accepted reverently as beyond explanation, though they do not pass understanding. And I call this habit of acceptance of nature by the name of natural piety, because simple-minded religion is accustomed to speak of events for which it can find no reason as the will of God.

I will illustrate my meaning from human matters, before passing on to the proper subject of nature. Familiar with the style of Shakespeare, we might with sufficient knowledge of his antecedents, his physiological inheritance, the influences upon him of the company in which he lived, the common speech of the time, and its literature, persuade ourselves that we can understand how he came to write as he did. But the distinctive flavour of it we could not with any amount of knowledge predict, as possibly we might predict with a style such as that of R. L. Stevenson, which carries with it the traces of its origin ; we can but acknowledge it as a new creation and confine ourselves to inquiring into its conditions. The same thing may perhaps be said of the style of Plato, or of Pascal. The French Revolution introduced into political and social life a conception which, however hard to define, was new and gave a new direction to the political thought of Europe, inspiring even those who in the end overthrew the revolutionary régime. That a change was about to occur could have been foreseen by those who considered the evils of the aristocratic polity of France and the direction of the thinking of political writers. But that the change would be the new idea of democracy could not have been foretold. A new feeling had arisen in men's minds of the claims of the common man. Even at the present moment, when the sanguine hopes which were entertained of a regenerated world which was to arise from the war seem to be swept away by the recrudescence of evil passions of domination, or terror, or selfishness, it can hardly be doubted that the world has suffered a political change, which we are too near the event to describe, which owes something to the ideals of the conquered as well as of the conquerors, a new flavour of political

life, of which we can understand the conditions but can only feel the presence. We can tell how it has come about, but we do not explain why it should be what it is, and we hardly as yet realise what it is. Compare the teaching of Jesus with what we know of the Judaism of the first century of our era. If our authorities are to be trusted the difference appears to be far smaller than accounts for the immense consequences of the new teaching. That there was novelty, a new conception introduced into morality and the relations between man and God, it would be impossible to deny, and it provided the material when the organisation of Christianity by Paul came about. A religion had come into existence, not put forward by its founder as more than a reform of Judaism, and yet possessing a flavour of its own which was the mark of its originality. What may seem a mere difference of emphasis, a brighter flame of passion (I believe I am taking these phrases from Mr Montefiore)—all these things, for which the historian can note the antecedents, were fused and welded into a new and distinctive idea. All great historical transformations might be used to supply further examples—the marvel which was born when men of Dorian birth adopted the civilisation and the arts of Egypt and Phœnicia; the limited idea of constitutional liberty for which the Great Rebellion in our own country was fought; the Reformation itself; and a hundred such great changes, of which once more we can understand with sufficient knowledge how they came to be, but not how they should have taken the particular colouring or flavour which actually they possessed.

In these critical changes, further, there is a constant feature. The new creation inherits the ancient ways out of which it grows, but it simplifies the old complexity. There was a chaos of conflicting forces; men's minds were groping confusedly in a tangle of divergent and intercrossing interests; there was a vast unrest; the old habits were lingering on though they had lost their convincingness and bred dissatisfaction; experiment after experiment upon the traditional lines had failed; yet the newer thoughts that were abroad had reached as yet no more than the condition of subterranean and indistinct rebellion. Suddenly, at the bidding of some great single mind, or oftener perhaps some conspiracy of many minds, stirred to their depths with obscure foreboding of the future birth of time, and finely if still vaguely touched to the fine issues, a light has arisen; the discordant elements fall into their places, and the complexity gives way to simplicity. The synthesis is no mere reconciliation; it is creative. So the historians have traced for us the

birth of democratic freedom out of the turmoil of the eighteenth century, when once its complacence had broken down ; or the preparation of the world to receive the Gentile gospel, when the dull universalising régime of the Roman Empire was fired with the deeper thinking of the Palestinian prophet. So, too, we may feel to-day that our minds are moving this way and that in a sheer confusion of old with new ; the complexity and disorganisation of the world is more patent than its unification ; and yet we doubt not, or at least we hope, that we have not passed through the ordeal in vain, and that some time and somehow the tangled skein of our present condition will be unravelled, and our conflicting ways may be found convergent towards a simpler and clearer ideal of national and international life. Hence it is, because the creative simplicity is conditioned by so immense a confusion and welter of interests, that it is sometimes more plainly revealed away from the place of its more immediate origin ; that the smaller peoples may exhibit more definitely the principle for which larger and better organised nations have striven.

Nor is it only in political and industrial affairs that the creative simplicity emerges from the chaos of complexity. The same feature is even more palpable in science and all pursuit of knowledge. Simple and illuminating discoveries presuppose an immense labour, conducted upon older lines, of material which remains, till the new creation, inco-ordinated and blind. The new thought or theory reduces the old material to order, while it emancipates us from its confusion. The physical science of to-day uses a language singularly unlike that of the nineteenth century, which it half seems to forget ; considered more closely, it is at once the continuance of that work and the discovery of a new and simpler world. Other sciences may not have reached this fulfilment so soon. In history I am told the vast accumulation of detailed investigations awaits as yet the constructive thought which is to give it coherence and simplicity. Philosophy exhibits at the moment all the signs of approaching creation, but is for the time a chaos of discordant doctrines, all of them containing their measure of truth, testifying the awakening of philosophy from its complacent dream, but none as yet completely binding experience into its desired unity. The extreme forms of idealism and realism, the traditional idealism and the antagonist ideas inspired by the revolt against intellect taken alone, or rather by the passion for seeing in the world the fulfilment of man's practical or æsthetic or religious ends ; Bradley and Bergson, Croce and William James with his later

followers, James Ward and Bertrand Russell; the "discovery" of Time and the invasion of our ideas by the march of relativity, with its meaning and issues as yet half understood and certainly undecided; the breaking down of the older literary conception of philosophy and its return to its ancient unity and kinship with science, physical and biological; here is a picture of a world distraught by its own complex and abundant vitality. Yet the philosophic believer in philosophy never doubts the imminent birth of a more satisfying thought for which these labours have supplied the favouring marriage of unlikes feeling out towards their blending, and which once attained will set the mind free, as the older idealism has done for a century, to explore with a new guiding thread the vast provinces of special philosophical inquiry.

These features which have been traced in human affairs; new creations which lend an unexplained and strange flavour to existing institutions and remodel them; external habits and ways of life retained but their inward meaning transformed; immense complexities of elements, hitherto chaotic, now gathering themselves together and as it were flowering into some undreamed simplicity; these features are found in the nature of which man is but the latest stage. Nature is "stratified," and if we apply to it our customary conceptions of growth and development, we can regard it as a geological formation with a history. But the comparison is still inadequate; for new geological strata are but fresh deposits laid down upon the subjacent ones, not drawing from them their new life. Nature is rather a history of organic growth of species, in which the new type of organism is the outgrowth of the older type, and continues the earlier life into a form at once more complex and more highly simplified. As there is in the animal-world or the plant-world a hierarchy of forms, so in nature there is a hierarchy of qualities which are characteristics of various levels of development. There are, if I may borrow a metaphor used by Mr Sellars of Michigan in his recent book,¹ "critical points" in the unfolding of Nature when she gathers up her old resources for a new experiment and breeds a new quality of existence. The earliest of these qualities of being which is familiar to us is that of physical matter, whatever we are to suppose it is that materiality consists in. Other well-marked levels are those of chemical structure and behaviour, and life, which is the quality of things which behave physiologically.

I am not concerned to offer a complete enumeration of

¹ *Evolutionary Naturalism*, R. W. Sellars, Open Court, Chicago, 1922.

these levels of existence with their distinguishing qualities. The three qualities mentioned are but a selection. Every attempt at completeness raises questions of difficulty. Certain, however, it is now that mere physical materiality is a highly developed stage, late in the history of the world: that there are forms of submaterial being, and the line between the submaterial and the material is not for me to draw. Neither is it for me to say whether electrons are the lowest existences in the scale. Again, beyond life, some have maintained that mind is itself a new quality which arises out of life, while others treat consciousness merely as a function of all life, and for them consciousness and life are one, and accordingly all the knowing on which we pride ourselves so much is in the end only a special form of vital behaviour. There is another debatable question. To me, colours and sounds and tastes and all the sensible characters of material things appear to be resident in things themselves; and coloured existence to be a critical point in nature. When a physical body is such that the light which it sends out to our eyes has a determinate wave-length, that body is red. To others, and they are the majority, the colour depends upon the possession by the percipient of eyes. These questions I need not raise in this place because they take us away from the central theme into historic problems which have occupied physics and philosophy from the days of Galileo and before. There is still another matter I leave open. Life is without doubt such a critical point in nature. Are the various gradations of life, first of all the difference of plants and animals as a whole, and next the marked differences of kinds among animals and plants themselves, to be regarded likewise? The differences which part a humble *amœba* or hydra from the monkey, or even from the lizard or crab, are vast. Are they critical differences? All I need answer is that if they are not, at least the outgrowth of the higher from the lower forms of life helps us mightily to understand the outgrowth at the critical point of the higher level of quality from the lower. Further, if it is right to treat colours as real qualities, not dependent for existence on the physiological organs; which are but instruments in that case for apprehending, not for creating them; if this is so, the different kinds of colours—red, green, and the rest—are comparable to the species of animals or plants, and if they do not mark a change of level they mark differences upon that level. All these matters of debate I leave aside, in order to insist on the vital feature of Nature that she does exhibit critical changes of quality, which mark new syntheses, that we can but note.

We may and must observe with care out of what previous conditions these new creations arise. We cannot tell why they should assume these qualities. We can but accept them as we find them, and this acceptance is natural piety.

These bodies with new qualities, these "creative syntheses," which arise at critical points from a lower level of existence, are therefore no mere mechanical resultants of their lower conditions. If they were they would have merely the quality of their antecedents or components, as the component pulls upon a body along the sides of a parallelogram are equivalent to a resultant pull along the diagonal. Even the chemical combination of sodium and sulphuric acid, though it leads to something new and its process is not purely mechanical, does but issue in a new chemical body, just as the pairing of two living beings may lead to a new variety, but still a variety of living being. They are, therefore, after the usage of the late George Henry Lewes, described as emergents by Mr Lloyd Morgan, with whom I have for many years shared this conception of things, which he has expounded with a simplicity and lucidity beyond my powers in a chapter of his book, *Instinct and Experience*, and with particular force in the address with which he inaugurated the independent section of Psychology at the recent meeting of the British Association at Edinburgh (1921).

Without attempting to take in the whole field of nature, I will confine myself here to life, considered as an emergent from the realm of physico-chemical bodies. A living body is, according to this conception, a physico-chemical body of a certain degree and kind of complexity, whose actions may severally be viewed as physical or chemical, but taken in their integration, or entirety (to borrow a word of Lord Haldane's), have the quality of life. Life is therefore resolvable without remainder into physico-chemical processes; but it cannot be treated as *merely* physico-chemical. Certain of its functions may be referred to physical or chemical laws, but it is not these separable processes which constitute life. Life exists only when we have that particular collocation of such physico-chemical actions which we know as living. It is the special co-ordination which conditions the appearance or creation of the new quality of life. We might therefore be disposed to describe the living body indifferently as being a physico-chemical body which is *also* vital, or as being vital and *also* physico-chemical. In reality only the second designation is satisfactory. The first would imply that a certain grouping of such processes remains no more than physical and chemical, that life is not something new but

a name for this integration, whereas it is a new quality conditioned by and equivalent to the particular complexity of integration. Given life, we can hope to resolve it into its physico-chemical equivalent. We can even hope to reproduce partially or wholly by artificial means the existence of life. It is well known, for instance, that certain foams or emulsions of oil have exhibited streaming movements like those of living protoplasm. But life has been already attained, and it is our clue to the invention of the necessary machinery. Given merely physical and chemical processes, we can only generate life when we have hit upon the requisite form of integration. Thus life is *also* physico-chemical, because in its separable activities it is comparable with other physico-chemical processes. But it is not *merely* physico-chemical, because merely physico-chemical processes are not alive, and they do not give us life until the requisite complexity of integration is attained. So important is it to remember that besides elements there is the form of their combination, and that the form is as much a reality as the elements and gives them their significance; that it is not the patches of colour alone which make the picture, but their selection and arrangement which make the separate patches contribute to the expressiveness of the picture; that a melody is not merely the notes by which it is conveyed, but the choice and order which the musician has introduced into them; that in the choice and combination of the parts the whole receives a meaning which does not belong to the several components; and that while a combination of sounds is still a sound, and the blending of male and female elements in a human being is still human, there is still room at critical points for the combination to carry us into a new quality of being. Even where there is no such new quality of being, the change that is due to form may shadow forth these greater and more creative changes; as when, to revert to former illustrations, the choice of words generates the indescribable flavour of style, or, in music, to quote the often quoted words:—

“Consider it well: each tone in our scale in itself is nought;
It is everywhere in the world—loud, soft, and all is said:
Give it to me to use! I mix it with two in my thought
And, there! ye have heard and seen: consider and bow the head!”

That attitude is an illustration of what I am calling natural piety.

It is here that we are brought face to face with the long-drawn dispute between the so-called mechanistic explanation

of life and vitalism. The latest contribution to the controversy is to be found in the highly interesting work on "the mechanism of life,"¹ by Mr Johnstone, the professor of Oceanography at Liverpool. I do not mention his work in order to discuss his own explanation of life. He distinguishes the vital and the material mechanism in this way. All material mechanisms expend a part of the energy supplied to them not in doing work but in the form of heat which is no longer available for work; in the technical phrase they increase the sum of entropy or unavailable energy, and they represent a progression towards the condition of general dissipation of available energy. Living machines, on the contrary, delay or reverse the accumulation of entropy. It is beyond my competence to inquire into the correctness of this view. Rather I wish to direct your attention to the point that there is upon this doctrine such a "mechanism" of life; because it suggests that the sharp distinction of the mechanical from the vital is unfounded, and that life may be a mechanism and yet have, as I have said, a new quality (though this view I am not attributing to Mr Johnstone himself), and that while there is no new entity life, there is a new quality life, with which certain combinations of matter may be endowed. Vitalism supposed that there was an actual vital force, non-physical, which interfered with and directed the physical behaviour of the organism, and it has been reintroduced in our day by Mr Hans Driesch under the guise of a presiding psychoid or entelechy, as he names it, a distinguishable principle, not resolvable into chemical or physical action. In this controversy a middle position is occupied by Mr J. S. Haldane, who has called attention to a number of delicate adjustments performed by the organism which cannot be accounted for, he thinks, by the separate chemical processes of the body. Thus the respiratory actions under the guidance of the nervous centre are so delicate that they preserve the pressure of carbonic acid in the air in the lungs and therefore in the blood-vessels, and restore it to the normal when the amount of it has been disturbed even in the slightest degree, as by taking deeper breath and so diluting the carbonic acid. The arterial blood has, as he otherwise puts it, a normal faint alkalinity, and if this is disturbed, however slightly, by defect of carbonic acid, the pressure is restored. In the same way the blood has a normal salinity, which is kept constant in the face of the slightest changes by delicate reactions on the part of the kidneys. Mr Haldane takes this delicacy

¹ *The Mechanism of Life*, London (Arnold), 1921. (Cp. W. M'Dougall, *Body and Mind*, p. 245.)

of adjustment to mean that physiological action can only be understood by including in any function the organisation of the whole creature. Here we might seem to have a matter upon which only a physiologist has the right to speak. Still, a mere philosopher may be allowed to consider the wider issue raised. If this concept of organisation means only that vital action implies and is not rightly described without it, a philosopher must declare Mr Haldane right. If he means that vital action precludes the resolution of life without remainder into chemical and physical action, he is open to the charge that, in his zeal for this new fact of life, he is forgetting that the whole make-up of the organism is itself, as Mr Lloyd Morgan has pointed out, a factor in the chemical and physical processes in question. The moral which I draw from his work is not his own, but precisely the statement made at the beginning, that that organisation which is alive is not merely physico-chemical, though completely resolvable into such terms, but has the new quality of life. No appeal is needed, so far as I can see, to a vital force or even an *élan vital*. It is enough to note the emergence of the quality, and try to describe what is involved in its conditions. That task will be, I imagine, difficult enough, and Mr Johnstone's own account¹ may be valued as an attempt towards performing it.

The emergence of life with this new collocation of conditions implies that life is continuous with chemical, physical, and mechanical action. To be more explicit, the living body is also physical and chemical. It surrenders no claim to be considered a part of the physical world. But the new quality of life which it possesses is neither chemical nor mechanical, but something new. Thus the parts of the living body have colour but life is not coloured, and they are material but life itself is not material, but only the body which is alive is material. The lower conditions out of whose collocations life emerges supply a body as it were to a new soul. The specific characters which they possess are not continued into the new soul. The continuity which exists between life and the material does not mean that the material is carried over into life. There would not in that case be continuity between the living body as a new emergent and its predecessors; the living body would be nothing more than an elaborate material mechanism, which would illustrate material action, but could not claim a position of privilege. The characters which *are* continued from the lower level into life are not the specific qualities of the lower level; they are rather those characters which all existence shares in common, such as existence in

¹ *The Mechanism of Life*, c. xi.

time and space, intensity, capacity of affecting other existences, all which belong to life as much as to matter.

From this it will be clear that when we draw a sharp contrast between life and mechanism, as too often we do, we are guilty of exaggeration if not of confusion.¹ It is more to the purpose to indicate their differences after we have assured ourselves of a fundamental continuity or resemblance. What is salient in mechanical bodies is their general uniformity of response, the routine character of their behaviour. What is salient in life is its capacity of fine adjustment to varying conditions, a capacity such as no merely material body possesses, not even any machine made as yet by human design. This capacity of variation in its response may seem even to amount in certain cases to an originality which has led some to credit life with genuine freedom from determination by previous conditions, with indetermination, such as is supposed to appear in human beings as free will—not in the ordinary sense in which we are undoubtedly free, as directing ourselves consciously to foreseen ends, but in the sense of making new departures without determining reasons. How, then, we may ask, if life is resolvable without remainder into mechanical, physical, and chemical elements, can a living body be other than the automaton which Descartes declared it to be? (Descartes, observe in passing, would, if I am right, have been justified, if he had only realised that an automaton of sufficient complexity would cease to be a mere automaton.) Now these questions are put because of confusing the determinate with the purely mechanical. All behaviour, it is safe to assert, is determinate, and its fine capacity of variation and spontaneity are determined by its delicately complex organisation. But not all determinate action is therefore mechanical. The mechanical is simple and its responses broadly constant; the vital is highly complex and its responses, though definite, may vary according to circumstances; and that is all. If one thing is appearing more clearly than another from recent science, it is that material action is not so much that from which vital action diverges, as a first approximation towards vital action. The idea of life tends in our day to be extended downwards towards more primitive kinds of existence. Not that material existence is to be regarded as a form of life, but that it exhibits features which correspond to life; so that the transition from matter to life is no longer the passage to something absolutely heterogeneous but the manifestation of a single

¹ Compare on this subject chapters vi., vii. of Mr R. F. A. Hoernlé's *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, New York and London, 1920.

principle operating under conditions of various complexity, and generating emergents with distinctive qualities, and yet retaining them all in one linked progression of affinity.

We are to combine in our thoughts this fundamental unity with the recognition of emergent qualities which can only be accepted but cannot be accounted for. One difficulty in the way of effecting this combination in our thought is the idea that if the world is a determinate growth, each new creation determined by its predecessors on a lower level, the history of the world must be capable of prediction, according to the famous assertion of Laplace. But this conclusion does not follow. Laplace's calculator might foresee that at a certain point a certain complexity might arise, whose actions were capable of measurement and would be those of living things. He could never affirm that this form of action would have the quality of life, unless he lived to see. He might predict ethereal waves but could not predict them to be light; still less that a material body would be material or when touched by light would be red, or even merely look red to a living body with eyes. All known forms of action could be predicted in their measurable characters, but never in their emergent ones. Not even God, if we suppose a God presiding over the birth of the world, in accordance with the conception of the crudest theism, could predict what these emergent qualities would be; he could only accept them like ourselves when the world he made had originated them.

I have chosen as illustrating the attitude of natural piety our acceptance of the emergence of these qualities. They remain for ever a mysterious fact. But they are after all only a part of the mystery which encompasses us and which we have no right to ask to penetrate. They are themselves related to simpler conditions, which it is the object of science to discover. Some persons have even supposed, following the precedent of the early Greek philosophers, and in particular of the chief Pythagorean speaker in Plato's great dialogue, the *Timæus*, that all these features in the world are but specifications of some ultimate stuff of which the world is made. If this were true, it might be repugnant to the feelings of some, but natural piety would accept it, as it accepts the law of gravitation, or the law of the progression in the forms of life according to evolution, whatever the law of evolution may turn out to be; or as it would accept, if we are compelled to think so, that the four-dimensional space-time in which we live is bent in the neighbourhood of matter. All science attempts to connect the variegated

phenomena of the world by expressing them in terms of measurable motions. It seems to take the colour and richness from the world of secondary sensible qualities and expresses them in terms of primary qualities which in the end are terms of space and time. It does not, nor does it pretend to remove, the mystery of these qualities, and in all its explanations it does but bring us in face of other mysteries which we must needs accept.

We are thus for ever in presence of miracles ; and as old Nathan said, the greatest of all miracles is that the genuine miracles should be so familiar. And here I interpolate a remark, not altogether irrelevant to my subject, upon the uses of great men. The emergence of qualities is the familiar miracle, but great men, and in particular great men of science, are for ever enlarging our mysteries, simplifying them and extending their scope, as when they record the law of attraction, or the idea which lies at the basis of the notion of relativity. And thus with their fresher insight they keep for us our sense of piety to nature alive. Compared with other men they are like the springs of a river. Perhaps some of you may have shared with me the exquisite experience of seeing the springs of the Aberdeenshire Dee below the top of Ben Macdhui in the Grampians. There the clear water bubbles to the surface through mosses pink and yellow and green with all the varying shades of green ; and as it gathers to the edge it falls in tiny trickles which unite with one another into rills, and these with like rills from other portions of the plateau, until in the end they combine to form the river which you see at the foot, already a considerable stream. The stream is discoloured in its course by the soil through which it flows or the products of human labour, and is put to the service of man before it reaches the sea. And as its springs are fed by the sea into which it falls, whose vapours are drawn up and fall in rain, so that a continuous life is maintained between the ocean and the fresh waters on the heights, so it is that the thoughts of great men keep up for general mankind our communion with the circumambient mystery.

The mystery of facts, whether these facts are the individual facts of experience or the larger universal facts which are scientific laws, or such facts, more comprehensive still, as may be discovered by a prudent and scientific philosophy, is the last word of knowledge. The reverent temper which accepts them is the mood of natural piety.

S. ALEXANDER.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY THE HOLY SPIRIT ?

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THE "Holy Spirit"—not the "Holy Ghost." Would it not be as well if this now quite meaningless word were allowed to drop out of our religious vocabulary ? There is, of course, only one word—*πνεῦμα*—in the Greek Testament, and it is quite adequately rendered by our English word "Spirit." Why our Revisers of 1881 left "Ghost" in our version it is difficult to understand. As Dr Agar Beet long ago pointed out,¹ it cannot be used at all without the adjective "Holy"—we cannot speak of "the Ghost of God"; nor even with it if a genitive follows—we must say, "the Holy Spirit of God," "the Holy Spirit of promise," and so on. We have nothing to lose, therefore, and much to gain, by following the example of the American Revisers, and using only the sufficient and intelligible term, the "Holy Spirit."

I.

And what do we mean by the Holy Spirit ? "Nothing is easier," says Newman, "than to use the word God and mean nothing by it." And the saying is true of the Holy Spirit. Little groups within the Christian Church have fastened on a few familiar New Testament phrases—the *baptism of the Spirit*, *led by the Spirit*, *filled with the Spirit*, and so forth—and have made them into something like the watch-words and badges of a party. But when we ask what religious experience, what spiritual reality of any kind, lies behind the words that are so freely bandied about, we are often at a loss to answer. There is perhaps no subject

¹ *Expositor*, 2nd series, vol. ii. p. 108.

concerning which good people have so chloroformed their minds with words as this. And if we turn to text-books of theology, their language is often equally unsatisfying. One has the feeling—I speak for myself at least—that the writers are toying with words, that they are making distinctions which are meaningless because they represent no reality that our minds can apprehend. It may be true that, as the Athanasian Creed has it, “the Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son: neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.” All I can say is that I can find nothing either in Scripture or in experience to tell me what the words mean. And so it has come to pass that between the jargon of the “Holiness Convention” on the one hand, and the elaborate mystifications of the theologian on the other, the average man in our Churches has wellnigh ceased to think or care about the subject at all. “Daddy,” said a little girl of my acquaintance, “I can understand what you mean by the Father and the Son, but I haven’t any use for the Holy Ghost.” And there, in the refreshing frankness of a little child’s speech, the thoughts of many hearts are revealed. I confess frankly that, in the earlier years of my ministry, few incidents in the New Testament perplexed me more than the story of Pentecost; on no day in the year did I find it so hard to preach as on Whitsunday. Of course, one could repeat the accepted commonplaces, but there was nothing vital in them, they rang hollow and unreal; and so, for the most part, I did what so many do—I took refuge in silence, and passed by on the other side. I think now that I know what to say when Whitsuntide comes round; the story of Pentecost is no longer a stone of stumbling.

II.

Let us return to our question: What do we mean by the Holy Spirit? And when we open the New Testament at once we are impressed with the fact that, numerous as are the references to the Spirit—St Paul alone, it is said, has no less than a hundred and twenty—there is nothing that suggests a fixed and definite doctrine in the minds of the writers. What it reveals to us, as Dr Newton Clarke says, is “not so much a doctrine as a consciousness.” In other words, we are here at the stage of experience rather than of definition. Definition came later, and sometimes, unhappily, we have allowed definitions, framed with the help of intellectual conceptions that are no longer ours, to come between us and the experience they were meant to convey.

But in the New Testament experience has not, as yet, crystallised. The language is everywhere fluid and mobile. The very variety of terms under which the Divine Spirit is referred to—the *Spirit of God*, the *Spirit of Jesus*, the *Holy Spirit*, and the *Spirit* simply—is typical of the fluidity both of thought and expression which characterises the New Testament writers throughout. What is essentially the same spiritual experience is described, sometimes in one way, sometimes in another, so that it is quite impossible to reduce their words to the harmony of a logical and self-consistent whole. Were the framers of the Apostles' Creed, one wonders, themselves dimly conscious of this when they left its third article—"I believe in the Holy Ghost"—without any additional and elucidatory clauses such as follow and expound the first and second articles ? ¹

In thinking about the matter for ourselves it is best to begin where in all our thoughts about the Divine Being it is always best to begin : it is best to begin with Jesus. He is *the image*, the portrait, of *the invisible God*. Therefore, to know God we must look at Jesus ; we must interpret the unseen and unknown God in terms of the seen and known Christ. He that hath seen Him hath seen the Father. And in the same way we understand what is meant by the Holy Spirit only when we look at Christ. To leave Him for subtle speculations concerning the Divine nature—"the metaphysics of the Trinity"—is but to beguile ourselves with an illusion of knowledge which has no religious value.

Is not this the way of approach that seems to be suggested by the order in which the phrases stand in the familiar word of benediction : *the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ—the love of God—the communion of the Holy Spirit* ? When we stop to think of it, that is not the order we should have expected. Is it not rather this : first, the love of God and then the grace of Christ and the communion of the Spirit ? In the baptismal formula the words are, *Baptizing them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit* : Father, Son, Holy Spirit—there is what one may call the natural, the theological order. Why, then, does the apostle depart from it in his word of benediction ? Because while the other is, as I have said, the natural, theological order, this is the order of experience. The first great word in the Christian vocabulary is not God, it is Christ. Whatever

¹ See Denney's *Jesus and the Gospel*, p. 401. Cp. also the language of the *Te Deum*, in which the reference to the Holy Spirit reads almost like a parenthesis slipped in among the multiplied clauses in praise of the Father and the Son : "Also the Holy Ghost, the Comforter."

knowledge of God we have, whether as Father or as Holy Spirit, whatever experience of His love or fellowship, is ours only through the grace of Christ. In Him are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden, and except by Him no man cometh to the knowledge either of the Father or of the Spirit. It would seem, therefore, that we shall best give intelligibility and reality to our thinking and best serve the interests of our personal religious life, if we make no attempt to distinguish between the Holy Spirit and the living Christ, and learn to think of "the presence of the Spirit" as but another way of indicating the spiritual presence of Christ. And when we turn to the writers of the New Testament we find that though neither this nor any other way of speaking of the Holy Spirit is constant, it is one quite commonly adopted by them. The point is of such capital importance that it may be well to illustrate it in some little detail. For convenience' sake we may arrange the relevant passages in four small groups.

1. Let us take first the farewell discourses of Jesus as they are reported in the fourteenth and following chapters of the Fourth Gospel. How much of these chapters is due to Jesus Himself, and how much to the mind of His reporter, we need not now pause to inquire. For our present purpose it makes no difference what view we take. Indeed, since at the moment it is not so much the mind of Jesus as the mind of the first Christians we are seeking to understand and to interpret, these chapters are the more pertinent the more they are coloured by the mind of the Evangelist himself. Now throughout them, as has so often been pointed out, no attempt is made to distinguish between the coming of the Holy Spirit, the promised Comforter, and Christ's own coming to abide with and in His disciples. *I will pray the Father, Christ says, and He shall give you another Comforter, that He may be with you for ever, even the Spirit of truth. . . . The Comforter, even the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name, He shall teach you all things* (xiv. 16, 26). But immediately He adds, *I will not leave you desolate : I come unto you. . . . A little while, and ye behold Me no more ; and again a little while, and ye shall see Me. . . . Now ye have sorrow ; but I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice* (xiv. 18 ; xvi. 16, 22). Similarly Christ says, speaking of the Spirit, *He abideth with you, and shall be in you* (xiv. 17) ; and then again He says of Himself, *Abide in Me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine ; so neither can ye, except ye abide in Me* (xv. 4). Indeed, we have in these chapters all the three forms : *I will come*

—*He will come*—*We will come*; and, apparently, all mean substantially the same thing.

2. We turn next to the great word of promise with which our First Gospel closes: *Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world*. Again, and for the reason already given, I pass over the question raised by modern criticism. Whether this was a word actually spoken by Jesus, or, as some think, a word put into His lips by men who had had experience of the truth of it, for our present purpose—or, indeed, for any purpose—matters but little. Either way it witnesses to the certainty of the first disciples that their Lord was still with them. When, then, we turn to the subsequent history, how does this consciousness declare itself? Sometimes in this way: *They went forth, and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word by the signs that followed* (Mark xvi. 20); and sometimes in this: *It seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us*; or in this: *We are witnesses of these things; and so is the Holy Spirit, whom God hath given to them that obey Him* (Acts xv. 28; v. 32). In one place we read: *They went through the region of Phrygia and Galatia, having been forbidden of the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia*; and then, again, in the very next verse, this: *And when they were come over against Mysia, they assayed to go into Bithynia; and the Spirit of Jesus suffered them not* (Acts xvi. 6, 7). Does not language like this say plainly that whatever nice distinctions the theology of a later day might draw, in the experience of the first disciples the presence of the Spirit had no other meaning than the presence of the living Christ Himself?

3. There is a similar identification in the Letters to the Seven Churches in the Book of the Revelation. Each letter begins with a formula in description of Christ. The formulas vary, but one may be quoted as typical of the rest: *These things saith the Son of God, who hath His eyes like a flame of fire, and His feet are like unto burnished brass* (ii. 18). And each letter closes with the exhortation: *He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith to the churches* (ii. 7, etc.).

4. Most significant of all, perhaps, is the language in which St Paul describes the new life which was both his and theirs to whom his words were written. *Know ye not, he writes to the Corinthians, that ye are a temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?* And again to the same people he says, *Know ye not that Jesus Christ is in you?* (1 Cor. iii. 16; 2 Cor. xiii. 5). *I live, he says, and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me*; yet a little later in the same letter he makes it clear that to be Christ's and to *live by the*

Spirit are but two ways of saying the same thing (Gal. ii. 20 ; v. 24, 25). Still more striking is the quick interchange of phrase in the following passage : *Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. But if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. And if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin ; but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you, He that raised up Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies through His Spirit that dwelleth in you* (Rom. viii. 9–11). Here not only is the Spirit spoken of both as *the Spirit of God* and *the Spirit of Christ*, but the Christian life itself is indistinguishably the life of the indwelling Christ and the life of the indwelling Spirit ; and to speak of these as though they were rival or parallel experiences is surely to make distinction where no distinction exists.¹ After this it does not surprise us to find the Apostle saying explicitly, *the Lord is the Spirit* (2 Cor. iii. 17) ; and to try sharply to distinguish between them is only to lose ourselves in that unreality which has been the bane of so much of man's thinking about God.

It is not, of course, suggested that all the Apostle's language concerning the Holy Spirit, and still less all that is said elsewhere in the New Testament, can be brought within this formula of identification. If there are many passages, like those which have been quoted, in which no distinction is discoverable between the Holy Spirit and the living Christ, there are others in which with equal clearness a distinction is made. Elsewhere, as was indeed to be expected, the writer appears to be moving on the lower plane of Old Testament conceptions of the Spirit. So that, as has already been pointed out, it seems impossible to find any formula into which we can fit all our New Testament records of the manifold and varied activities of the Divine Spirit. Nevertheless it is, I believe, by the way of practical identification that we shall most adequately interpret the experience of Christian men whether in the first days or in our own, and that we shall best deliver ourselves from that web of unreal words which vulgar and learned alike have in the past so often woven about our feet.

In this way, I say, we can best interpret the experience of men to-day. Let me give one illustration. There is perhaps no more familiar incident in modern Christian biography than that related of R. W. Dale of Birmingham. He was writing an Easter sermon, and when half-way through, the

¹ Mackintosh's *Person of Christ*, p. 58.

thought of the risen Lord broke in upon him as it had never done before. "‘Christ is alive,’ I said to myself; ‘alive!’ and then I paused; ‘alive!’ and then I paused again; ‘alive! Can that really be true? living as I myself am?’ I got up and walked about repeating, ‘Christ is living!’ ‘Christ is living!’ At first it seemed strange and hardly true, but at last it came upon me as a burst of sudden glory; yes, Christ is living. It was to me a new discovery. I thought that all along I had believed it; but not until that moment did I feel sure about it. I then said, ‘My people shall know it; I shall preach about it again and again until they believe it as I do now.’” No reference is made, it will be noted, in the record of this remarkable experience to the Holy Spirit. Yet was not this, in a very real sense, Dale’s Pentecost? Was not that swift uprush into consciousness of the truth, “Christ is living! Christ is living!” *essentially* one with the experience of the disciples in the upper room in Jerusalem? One of Dale’s unfulfilled ambitions, his son tells us, was the writing of a book on the Holy Spirit. If he had lived to write it, could he himself have drawn any real distinction between what the New Testament calls *receiving the Holy Spirit*, and that unforgettable Eastertide experience of his own?

And, apparently, it is in this direction that Christian thought is now steadily moving. Thus, in one of the *Later Letters* of Dr Marcus Dods, he writes to a correspondent, “I am interested in your discovery of the exalted Christ, and there is much to talk over in that direction. I doubt if we can make much of a personal Spirit interposed between Christ and us.” “The life in the Spirit,” says Dr Garvie, “is indistinguishable from the fellowship with the living Christ. . . . Christian experience does not and cannot distinguish between Christ and the Spirit as Christian doctrine has tried to do.”¹ Dr Denney, in the *Cunningham Lectures* published after his death, is equally explicit: “To be a believer in Christ and to have the Spirit are identically the same. . . . The doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as an element in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity, goes far beyond this, and far beyond anything which the New Testament defines.” But, he continues, “we can think of no presence of the Spirit except the spiritual presence of Christ Himself.”

But, it may be asked, what then becomes of our Trinitarian theology? Is not this identification of the Son and the Spirit a move in the direction of the old Sabellian heresy?

¹ *The Christian Certainty and the Modern Perplexity*, p. 179. See also Mackintosh’s *Person of Christ*, p. 374.

To which perhaps it might be replied that, as Canon Streeter says, "popular Christianity is Tritheism with reservations," and that if one had to choose he might with good reason prefer the way of the ancient Sabellian to that of the modern Tritheist. But I am not a theologian, and it is not with the high mysteries of Trinitarian doctrine that I am here concerned. I am only attempting the much humbler task of seeking to interpret, in terms level with our own experience, what lies behind the non-theological language of the writers of the New Testament, and I believe we shall best understand it when in all that they tell us concerning the Holy Spirit's activities, guiding, teaching, inspiring men, we learn to read their own vivid, unbroken consciousness of their Lord's presence with them. Then what has often seemed but as airy, unsubstantial cloud-rack will turn to solid ground beneath our feet where men to-day may walk in joyous strength and freedom.

III.

This, then, I take it, is the truth which the Church's doctrine of the Holy Spirit is meant to declare and to safeguard—that He who was "born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried," is still with us. When we gather for Christian worship it is not as those who come to strew with flowers the tomb of a dead Master; we rejoice in the presence of a living Lord. Here, it has been rightly said, in the one conviction that Jesus is at this moment conscious and supreme, is the true differentia of the Christian faith. When Festus, the Roman governor, in his report to Agrippa concerning a strange prisoner who had been left on his hands, spoke of *one Jesus, who was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive*, all unconsciously he put his finger on the great central issue of the centuries between faith and unbelief. Jesus had been put to death by the Jews; if, as Festus supposed, that death had been the end of Him, then the tomb in Joseph's garden was not only the tomb of His body, it was the tomb of His religion. But always, with St Paul, the Church has affirmed that He is alive. It is said that once Luther was found, at a moment of peril and fear, sitting in an abstracted mood, tracing on the table with his finger the words "Vivit! Vivit!" "He lives! He lives!"

"Loud mockers in the roaring street
 Say Christ is crucified again,
 Twice pierced His gospel-bearing feet,
 Twice broken His great heart in vain. . . .
So in the street I hear men say:
Yet Christ is with me all the day."

It was in that faith, or rather, out of that consciousness, that the New Testament was written. The whole book throbs with the glory and the wonder of it. Without it it could never have been written at all. Some one has remarked very truly on the entire absence from the New Testament of any *In Memoriam* strain :

“Thou and I have shaken hands,
Till growing winters lay me low ;
My paths are in the fields I know,
And thine in undiscover'd lands.

I wage not any feud with Death
For changes wrought on form and face ;
.

For this alone on Death I wreak
The wrath that garners in my heart ;
He put our lives so far apart
We cannot hear each other speak.”

Now there is nothing in the least like that in the New Testament feeling about Christ. “No apostle, no New Testament writer,” says Dr Denney, “ever *remembered* Christ.” The saying is half paradox and all truth—all truth at least in this sense, that they never thought of Him as belonging to the past. He was never simply a gracious and pathetic tradition. They never mourned for Him as for a friend they had lost ; for indeed they had not lost Him ; He was with them in a new and spiritual fellowship which nought on earth could break. This was the truth which first fully broke upon them at Pentecost, to remain with them through all the years, “the fountain light of all their day, the master light of all their seeing.”

Together with that great central experience went two others, inseparable from it and finding their explanation in it. One is the strange, rich, contagious gladness in which all our records of the first believers are enwrapped. *It came to pass, while Jesus blessed them, He parted from them, and was carried up into heaven. And they worshipped Him, and returned to Jerusalem with great joy : and were continually in the temple, blessing God.* Before, when He had spoken of going from them, sorrow had filled their hearts, but now their sorrow is turned into joy. After Pentecost the bells are always ringing ; go where we will in these early years we are never away from their sound. *The disciples were filled with joy and with the Holy Spirit : this is the token in every epistle.*

But there was something more and greater than this. As autumn follows spring and summer, so from this rich

blossoming-time, this warm, quick life of the emotions, sprang in due season the richer fruitage of the moral life. It is here we see most clearly the distinction between the Old and the New Testament's conception of the Spirit. In the Old Testament the Spirit denotes God at work, God putting forth power, but it is only occasionally moral power. It is significant that only twice in the whole of the Old Testament is the Spirit spoken of as the "Holy Spirit." In the New Testament, on the other hand, the moral element dominates every other; the work of the Spirit is specifically toward moral ends, and the making of good men. *The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance*: it is in a saying like this that the real interest of the writers of the New Testament discovers itself. They do not speculate about the nature of the Divine Spirit; they are concerned with the work, the power, the fruit, of the Spirit. All that claims to be spiritual must be ethically judged, and since, as we have seen, the presence of the Spirit is none other than the spiritual presence of Christ Himself, it is His words and life that must be the standard of judgment.

There are amongst us religious communities that have laid special emphasis on what is called "the witness of the Spirit." And in so doing they have done well, for the phrase stands for a real and great fact of Christian consciousness. But we need not only a "witness" that will convince and satisfy ourselves; we need a "witness" that will convince and satisfy others, and for them the works of the Spirit are the witness of the Spirit. *Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be My disciples.* So, too, and so only shall we win others to discipleship to the same Lord.

GEORGE JACKSON.

MANCHESTER.

ROME AND THE ANGLICANS.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
A ROMAN CATHOLIC LAYMAN.

BERNARD HOLLAND, C.B.

FROM time to time suggestions are made here in England that, if Rome would make certain concessions, "corporate reunion" could and would take place between the Church centred at Rome and that centred, in a certain sense, at Canterbury. There is, some day, to be formal negotiation and treaty with Rome. If the Roman concessions prove sufficient, the Anglican Church is to accept the honorary primacy of the Roman Pontiff. Then there would be sacramental inter-communion, and meeting in common council. Anglicans who desire to return now, as individuals, to communion with Rome are advised to wait until this blessed day, or to die where they are in its expectation. They are taught by men, who themselves are often sadly resisting their own real conviction, that to return as individuals to the central fold is spiritually unpatriotic, and likely to defer the day when the Anglican Church will move as a body. "Remain where you were born," they are told; "if it is a sacrifice to do so, it is a meritorious sacrifice; possess your hearts in patience, turn away your minds from the Roman controversy, and go on spreading Catholic doctrine and practice among the still unconverted Protestants who form the great majority of this nation. If as individuals you join Rome you will lose influence, because the English, who will trust you, are suspicious of the 'Romans.'" Thus they are bidden, in the name of the common weal, to fight against the mysterious attraction emanating from, or through, the Roman centre. They are not to take the action suggested to them by their own convictions, desire, or conscience. They are to resist the call from a motive of expediency—let that be well understood. Gladstone once said that the

impulse to join the Church of Rome had never seemed to him other than a temptation from the Source of Evil : that is not the feeling now. The older High Church party to which he belonged took a line very different from that of their successors. They honestly held that the Church of Rome was guilty of most serious doctrinal errors and practices, and that until these were all remedied there could be no hope of reconciliation with the purified Church of England. "Speak gently of our Sister's fall," said the pious and kind-hearted Keble in the "thirties." Anglican thought has travelled far since that was written ! It is of the fall of their own Church in the preceding centuries that they speak now, and often by no means "gently." According to the modern "advanced" party, the doctrine, cult, and practice of the Roman Church is deemed to be a model of that which is sound, true, and catholic. It is adopted or imitated by them as exactly as possible in frank defiance of the Book of Common Prayer and the Thirty-nine Articles. The test of Catholicism is no longer now what they can discover in the first few centuries, but what is the existing practice of the Roman Catholic world.

To men like these the only dividing question remaining is the claim of the Apostolic See of Rome to real authority, jurisdiction, and final voice in questions of faith and morals. If the Pope would abandon, or essentially modify, this most ancient and abiding claim, they would admit his primacy in the kind of sense in which the Archbishop of Canterbury holds primacy in the Anglican Church. This, of course, means, though advanced Anglicans usually avoid saying so, that the decision of the Vatican Council of 1870, stating a divine right claimed from the earliest times, is to be rescinded or ignored, or deemed not binding, or, better still, to be explained away by means of one of those convenient "formulas," so dear to the English mind, used to make diametrically opposite principles appear to be the same principle. This, to Catholics, is an utter impossibility, for the decrees of the Vatican Council are, to us, as binding in their plain sense and terms as those of the Nicene. Advanced Anglicans admit that Rome is in the right upon nine questions out of ten at issue when the schism took place in the sixteenth century, but in the wrong upon this one question of its own authority and commission. There is every shade of difference among them as to how far Rome is in the wrong on this, as to what concessions Anglicans could make. But, to some extent or other, Rome is required to recede from its all-essential position upon this vital

matter as a condition of reconciliation with the English national or racial Church, which, however, only includes a part of the English nation and race. Is it conceivable that Rome should ever make any surrender whatever of that which binds together a world-wide community drawn from all nations and races? Why then should virtually convinced individuals waste their brief lives in waiting for this impossible event? If they feel a strong heart-call to enter the super-national society which has Rome for its visible centre, and if their reason does not tell them that this attraction acts upon their lower nature and is towards something evil in itself, they should obey the call, as coming from God, and not destroy their will power by excuses and delays. If they feel no call or attraction, let them stay where they are. One cannot accept an invitation not given. It certainly is a loyal and patriotic feeling that keeps many in that national Church which, with the mass of the clergy and laity, under the guidance and power of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, broke away from the centre of Catholic unity. Let them ask themselves whether it is not loyalty and patriotism working in the wrong sphere of things. It is like the patriotism which, in the late war, refused to listen to Mozart or Beethoven—a true and good feeling gone astray, down the wrong road.

The Anglican line of argument implies and takes for granted that the claim of the See of Rome is one of a political nature, not an unchangeable dogma of the Catholic Church, but a claim of human right, which could, in course of time, be not insisted upon and gradually abandoned. But no; the definition made at the Vatican Council is an irreformable dogma as much as all other defined dogmas of the religion. Compare its origin and evolution with those of the dogma that in the Sacrament the substance or essence of the bread and wine (the "thing in itself") becomes changed into the essential flesh and blood of Christ. In each case the seed, as it were, was a few words stated by the Evangelists to have been spoken by our Lord—words to which pure reason, apart from tradition and authority, can attach, and has attached, honestly, quite different and opposite meanings. Each doctrine grew gradually, through increasing definiteness of statement, to the final definition made by the Catholic Church in Council. In both cases conflicting understandings of the meanings of the original words were long in the field. In both the full doctrine of the Church was evolved from the practice of the Church—in other words, from the general instinct of the Church, or, in

other words still, by the subconscious reason of the Church—long before the doctrine was finally formulated by the authority of the Church. Exactly the same process took place at an earlier date with regard to other fundamental doctrines—those of the nature of the Trinity and the nature of Christ. The Catholic Church would not recede from definitions of these doctrines once made, and by that refusal lost for a time half the Christian world.

It seems impious to some when the doctrine defined at the Vatican Council is placed upon the same basis as that defined at Nicea and Chalcedon. But, if the Petrine doctrine does not deal with so supreme a theme, yet it is of immense importance as the incarnation, so to speak, of the article of the Catholic Church in the Creed. And, as St Augustine argued a thousand times, the real, visible, organic Catholic Church is the foundation upon which rests the Christian faith. As Bellarmine says: "*Etenim de quâ re agitur, cum de primatu Pontificis agitur. Brevisime dicam, de summâ rei Christianæ. Id enim quæritur, debeatne Ecclesia diutius consistere, an vero dissolvi et concidere?*" That is the question, whether the visible, super-national, united, and organic Catholic Church, consisting of men of all races and languages, shall stand, or whether it shall be dissolved. Those who accept the doctrine of Nicea and Chalcedon, but who refuse the doctrine of Transubstantiation, have to show why they accept one doctrine and refuse to accept another evolved by the same process. Those who, like so many Anglicans now, virtually accept the doctrine of Transubstantiation have to show why they refuse to accept the Petrine doctrine evolved by exactly the same process. The position of men who reject all these doctrines is intelligible and sound, as a line of battle; this argument is not addressed to them. Not so the position of men who accept some and reject others, and never can show their discriminating reason. There is no real standing ground between acceptance of all and rejection of all. This argument was used by Newman with great lucidity and force in his essay on Development; but it had been used centuries before that, and indeed must have occurred to every real and logical thinker. The main divisions of human nature are always the same. In the fourth and fifth centuries there were the Catholics of the visible, united, and organic Church; there were the Donatists, a separated national Church in Africa; there were the Arians of various shades, from those who were almost Catholics to those who were almost pagans, corresponding with the Protestants of various shades in modern times;

there were Manicheans and other Gnostics, calling themselves Christians, who soared in lofty flights far above scriptures, tradition, authority, and there were the non-Christian philosophers, also of many schools. "What compelled me," asked St Augustine, speaking of the Manicheans, "for almost nine years (despising the religion which had been implanted in me as a boy by my parents) to follow those men and diligently hear them, unless that they said that we Catholics were frightened by superstition, and that we commanded faith before reason, but that *they* pressed no one to faith unless the truth had first been discussed and unravelled?"

Unlike the Manichean, the Arian reasonings were those of prosaic common sense and literal interpretation of the Scriptures. Their great objection to the word "*homooousios*" (a word which Luther, arguing himself backward into old heresies, over a thousand years later, said that his "soul abhorred") was that it was not found in the Scriptures and had not been used by the earliest Christian writers. The Catholics denied not this, but said that the word was a convenient summary of many expressions to be found in the New Testament, especially in the writings of St John, and also in the prophetic writings, and that it had in fact been used over a hundred years before the Council of Nicea by one or two leading authorities. But the real driving force was not this kind of learned argument, but the Catholic heart and devotion. As even Gibbon says: "The opinions of Arianism might satisfy a cold and speculative mind, but the doctrine of the Nicene Creed, most powerfully recommended by the merits of faith and devotion, was much better adapted to become popular and successful in a believing age." In other words, the subconscious soul of the Church carried the day against Arian intellectualism. The bishops of the Nicene and later Councils were mostly pastoral and simple-minded men, in touch with the instinctive faith of the Christian people. Leaders of heresies have usually been bred as monks or scholars, out of this touch. Cranmer, for instance, was a typical learned Cambridge don, raised for a special purpose by a royal egoist to the first See in England. Those bishops, assembled from a far wider world than those at Nicea or any later Council, who passed the Vatican decree of 1870, were, for the most part, not the most learned, but were those of a simpler kind, in close touch with the instinctive feeling of the Catholic Church as a world-wide whole. Men of vast learning, whose lives had been spent in their libraries, were against it—an Acton, a Dollinger.

The Catholic Church has always had in its service great intellects, men who accepted by faith the foundations or axioms, and reasoned from them; and has always been opposed by those more pure intellectualists who admitted no foundation of belief and required proof of all the axioms. The claim of Jesus to be the Messiah and Son of God was opposed by the Jewish intellectuals of the age. "None of the scribes and Pharisees have believed": none, that is, of those deeply learned in the Scriptures. St Paul's preaching seemed foolishness to the Greek rationalists. With rare exceptions the intellectual aristocracy of the Roman world never became Christian; long after the conversion of Constantine it was deemed an unusual and remarkable event if one of this intellectual and social aristocracy became a Christian. It was spoken of much as a similar conversion to the Catholic Church is now spoken of in England. St Augustine's account, in the *Confessions*, of the conversion of Victorinus shows this. This old aristocracy died out in the barbarian invasions; it was never converted as a whole. Inside the Church a rationalist party was in constant opposition to the evolution or unfolding of Christian doctrine. So it has been from the beginning down to the day of the Vatican Council. The Catholic Church is led by profound instinct, subconscious action. The Church uses the reasoning faculty in support of its faith, not as a master, but as a servant of its faith. In all things a man has to choose whether he will be master or slave of his own intellect. A pure intellectual seems like a man who has no full control over his arms or legs or tongue. A man who cannot choose or act because of his doubts is like a paralytic. A man who accepts, like St Peter in the Gospel, the claim of Christ to be the Son of God, abandons the merely probable or reasonable view at the outset. It was not Peter or John, but the learned Pharisees, who took the reasonable or common-sense and probable view. The claim of Jesus was not, at first sight, reconcilable with the prophecies or the probabilities. The same thing is true of the doctrine of the Mass. The common-sense and probable and rational view is not that taken by Rome, but that taken by Geneva. This is indubitable, whatever diverse conclusions as to the truth of the religion may be drawn from it by diverse minds. Devotion leads to the intellectual Creed, not, in the first instance, the Creed to devotion. Those who supported at Nicea the full doctrine of the divinity of Christ appealed not only to the Scriptures, but, and much more, to the tradition and to the then existing, and long-before existing, cult. Christ was, in fact, wor-

shipped, with the kind of worship due to God alone. If Christ were not one with God, this would, Catholics said, be idolatry, like that of the pagans. But this they felt not to be conceivable or possible in a divinely guided Catholicity. Thus the consubstantial doctrine explained the adoration which the Christian heart had from the beginning given to Christ. So, at a later time, the intellectual doctrine of Transubstantiation, or, in Saxon, change of underlying being, was formulated to justify and explain the adoration felt by the Catholic heart for Christ in the Sacrament. If Christ were not fully in the Sacrament the adoration would be, as the Protestants said, idolatry. The reasoning mind gives form and body in the seed sown by the procreative power (*Verbi sparso semine*) as the hand and skill of the artist gives form and body to the ideas existing, or arising, in his imagination. All this is equally true of the third great Catholic development, the doctrine regarding the Church centred in the Apostolic See. The definitions finally made arose by the same process. They are reasoned, but their first foundation or origin is not pure reason, but faith. This Petrine doctrine must be accepted or refused—everyone is free to choose—but those who refuse it imperil other beliefs which they may think that they possess. How can you reject one doctrine and yet accept others whose origin and development are the same?

Can a man led purely by his reasoning faculty be, really and honestly, anything but a sceptic and agnostic? Will he ever arrive anywhere? One who belongs to the Catholic Church knows that, as an individual, he knows nothing, and in that sense is an agnostic; but as an unit in the Catholic Church he accepts and believes that which the Church as a whole accepts and believes. The life of the Church is in him, as the life of the river is in a drop borne on by the stream. And he must, by choice and will, accept all that the Church formally and finally accepts and believes. A drop cannot be in the stream for some purposes and not for others. "*Amatis autem cum illâ si estis in illâ,*" says Augustine. And you believe also with her if you are in her. This is strange but true.

Anglicans—those, that is, who accept all else, but with varying shades of refusal refuse to accept the Petrine doctrine—are thus separated, not on a question of discipline or expediency, as to which concession might be made, such as a liturgic form, but by a vital and essential doctrine inseparably interwoven with all the other doctrine of the Church. It must be accepted all in all, or not at all. Dr

Gore, late Bishop of Oxford, their strongest leader, said, in a speech made in 1916 :—

“ With the most passionate desire to promote the realisation of the Catholic idea, I confess that, as I look round, I see little chance in the direction of the Roman Communion. The more I study it, the more I see that everything which is distinctively Roman Catholic is bound together by an extraordinary coherence of tendency and spirit, which receives its chief embodiment in the Papal autocracy.”

“ Autocracy ” is not the true word to express the fact. Every Pope is limited by the whole body of previous custom and decision, as a judge is limited by the whole body of existing law. But Dr Gore continues, and his words deserve close attention :—

“ Nothing is more idle or futile than to take this or that distinctively Roman feature and say, ‘ Let us assimilate it,’ because it all has this extraordinary quality of coherence which is particularly expressed in the institution of the Papacy.”

In something the same sense a very different man, Martin Luther, said : “ The Mass is the rock upon which the Papacy is built,” and therefore tried to destroy the Catholic doctrine of the Mass and to substitute one peculiar to himself. But does it not occur to Dr Gore that this “ extraordinary quality of coherence ” is in itself evidence of true and divinely given life ? It is not more extraordinary than, or rather it is as wonderful as, the unity of an ancient oak sprung from a single acorn. Where is that coherence in his own communion ? Dr Gore seeks passionately the “ realisation of the Catholic idea,” the union of men of all nations in one religious society. How can so honest a thinker be so blind to that which is most clear ? He does not see, or refuses to admit, that this union is, and always from the beginning has been, realised, although *all* men of all nations, or even all who profess and call themselves Christians, never have been so united. The complete realisation can, as we believe, only come to pass through the gradual expansion of the central realisation, through the work of the existing realising energy. The Chair of St Peter always has been, is, and, we believe, must be, the nucleus of the realisation, or the rock on which is built the Catholic Church. In asserting this, one does not disguise imperfections. St Augustine says that St Peter was the type of the Church *in viâ*, as St John, who was to wait

"till I come," might be that of the Church *in patriâ*. The small section of the Catholic Church here in this life can never be perfect. Like St Peter, the Church, having a body as well as a soul, is subject to moral weaknesses, is never perfect, and has sometimes very badly fallen. We ought to look at the Protestant rebellion as a bitter but salutary medicine for a debased state of things which could produce a succession of such Popes as Innocent VIII., Alexander VI., Julius II., Leo X., and Clement VII., and many of their cardinals and bishops—men so full, in various ways, of worldly aims and vices. The fifteenth century, though it produced saints also, was, perhaps, in its high places, the wickedest of all the Christian centuries. Yet the faith of the Church, in the worst times, has never been tainted, and the majestic evolution has continued. From the beginning, as we know from St Paul's letters, the Church had divisions as to doctrines and lapses in morals, and if we survey its whole course we see these things ever recurring on a larger scale. The Church, *in viâ*, has had a troubled voyage across all kinds of obstacles. Yet through fogs and storms, between rocks and shoals, the ship has conveyed the deposit of faith, and will, we trust, in the future find calmer and wider seas.

Henry VIII. intended to divorce the Church in England from the rest of the Catholic Church centred at Rome, and yet to retain all the essential Catholic doctrine and practice and cult. This king, in his own strange way, was the first "Anglo-Catholic," and by force of terror carried out his will while he lived. The great German historian Ranke, whose mind was conspicuously judicial and fair, says in his *History of England* :—

"The question arises, whether it was possible permanently to hold to Henry's standpoint, to his rejection of papal influence and to his maintenance of Catholic doctrines as they then were. I venture to say it was impossible; the idea involves an historical contradiction. For the doctrine too had been moulded into shape under the influence of the supreme head of the hierarchy while ascending to the height of power; they were both the product of the same times, events, tendencies; they could not be severed from each other."

This is, like Dr Gore's, a non-Catholic way of stating the truth that doctrines evolved by the same time-process cannot be divided. We ourselves attribute this indivisibility to the divine, mystical life of the one and real Catholic Church.

Here, in England, during the last hundred years, the historical process has been reversed. The Catholic doctrines repudiated under Edward VI. and Elizabeth have one by one recovered the adhesion of increasingly numerous Anglican Churchmen. Just as Henry VIII. could not stay the process of disintegration at the point of the breach with Rome, so the converse process of reintegration will not stay short of the return to communion with Rome of all those who accept the rest of the Catholic doctrine. The dividing wall which surrounds the Church of England is still solid-seeming, but it is undermined, and may some day fall with surprising suddenness, like the walls of Jericho at the sound of the trumpet.

There is no better proof of the change which has already taken place than a comparison of the present times with those of the "Test Act." For one hundred and fifty years, from 1679 to 1829, every English and Irish bishop of those Protestant and reformed Churches, before taking his seat in Parliament, made, like all other members of the two Houses, a solemn declaration of his disbelief in the doctrines held by Rome of Transubstantiation, the Invocation of the Virgin and Saints, and the Sacrifice of the Mass, and apparently in every case without hesitation or reluctance. In 1829 all the bishops in the House of Lords, save one, voted against the abolition of this test. Even the one dissentient did not dissent on doctrinal grounds. All these doctrines, so solemnly and completely and undoubtingly repudiated by their predecessors, are now accepted and strongly held and openly professed by the Anglican vanguard, many of whom also admit the primacy, and some even, it would seem, the supremacy, of the occupant of the See of St Peter. They still, most of them, but ever more tremulously, question the validity of the Vatican Council upon the weak ground that the only English bishops summoned to attend it were, very naturally, those who were then in communion with the Holy See; but they have long ceased to say, like their own Thirty-nine Articles, that even General Councils can err. Those who are logical, like Dr Gore, fight, with increasing doubt and pain, against the conviction that the road travelled so far must lead them, if followed to the end, into the unity of the real, or visibly realised, Catholic Communion. Elective affinity must in the end separate them, one by one, by a process of gradual detachment from the Protestant Church to which they still outwardly and formally belong, and blend them with the Catholic Church to which they inwardly and essentially already belong. Then form in them will correspond with

reality. An outside attracting reality divides elements weakly and artificially combined. Already the two parties in the Church of England will hardly enter each other's churches. The hidden cause of this is the magnetic attraction of Rome—to apply deep words of Dante, the “*Amor ch' a null' amato amar perdona.*” Even repulsion is evidence of the working of an attracting force, for in this sphere of things it is felt resistance to attraction, a fear of love. The repulsion universally felt, for instance, to a mass of decaying matter is one thing; repulsion of some from something which also powerfully attracts is quite another.

Meanwhile, Rome can and will as little surrender or modify in any degree the doctrine finally formulated in 1870 as any other previously defined and vital doctrine. It cannot sell its soul to gain any kingdom. It cannot abandon the Petrine doctrine in order to reconcile, as a whole, the Church of England, or the Church of Russia, or the Church of Constantinople, or the Lutheran Churches of Germany or Scandinavia, any more than it can modify its doctrine of the Mass in order to win Calvinists. Rome has so marked out its position, drawn up so clear and strong a line of battle, that no one can mistake or misunderstand. Well that it should be so; for, as Bacon said, “Truth emerges more easily out of error than out of confusion.” If Rome is in error, Rome will decline and fall; if not in error, will reconquer the Christian world. Misty confusion, in place of definite thought and action, serves only to delay. Men must choose; not halt for ever on some *via media* between two opinions, enveloped in a fog of dubitation and indecisiveness. Choose whether to be something or nothing. What is deadlier to the soul, or cause of more bitter remorse, than not to take action when action could and should be taken? Occasion missed is a great torment and disturbance. There is something even in Luther's “*Pecca fortitur.*” Better even sin boldly than hang ever suspended between Yea and Nay. No doubt it is a difficult pass between thought and action, between conviction and conversion. But we believe that attraction, when felt, to join the Catholic Church should be followed. It is an invitation to be accepted; declined, is at the refuser's peril. As a great Frenchman of the seventeenth century said, “*Il faut aller où Dieu mène, et rien faire lachement.*”

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CHURCH AND STATE IN CONFLICT.¹

ROMOLO MURRI.

THE champions of the respective rights of Church and State have been at war ever since the birth of Christianity, if not before ; but within recent times their several positions have been substantially modified.

Time was when both parties alike based their claims on some fixed and eternal principle—be it natural right, disclosed by reason, or be it the yet higher divine right, sanctioned by a supernatural revelation—by the strict law of which the changing incidence of human affairs must be regulated. It could only be a question of the true interpretation of the sacred texts, or the logical development of the very conception and definition of the institution itself which the one or the other champion had undertaken to defend. Codes of law, precedents of history, principles of jurisprudence, considerations of diplomatic convenience or political advantage, could only be taken as subsidiary make-weights, and could, at best, only be allowed as evidence that the ideal and constitutive principles involved in the definition of the one or the other institution had vindicated themselves historically.

Even now, so far as Latin and Catholic countries are concerned, one of the two parties still holds to the consecrated method. The appeal of the Church is still to her divine origin and divine institution and to the classical definition of her being and her nature. Since she draws her sanction from the immutable will of God, she must be superior to all that stands outside herself, and specifically to the unstable impulses of fallen man. The Church of Rome, as conceived by her theologians and canonists, still retains the unqualified authority over all states which her direct divine investiture conferred upon her. Moreover, the divine revelation she claims is inseparably welded with the Thomist-Aristotelian

¹ Translated from the Italian by P. H. Wicksteed, Litt.D.

philosophy, according to which every scheme of human right is illuminated and controlled by the Right which is Divine.

In Protestant countries, however, the experience of protracted and multiplied variations, and the principle of free interpretation, have imposed a more cautious attitude on the supporters of the established churches. In the first place, the authority of the Bible is confined to the religious and spiritual life of the individual, while historical developments and the pressures rising out of them are allowed a voice in determining the institutional forms of the several Confessions and their relations with the State. And, in the second place, the fertile principle of the freedom and self-direction of the human spirit, the living and perennial power of human thought and action to mould and remould institutional forms and historical inheritances, has debouched into a reasoned conception of society in which Church and State alike, together with all other political or economic institutions, reveal themselves as so many external self-registrations of Humanity, bearing witness to its creative presence and power, penetrating ever wider circles, gathering together and unifying external nature with the plurality of living individuals and the historic past.

So now the theory of a transcendent Divinity whence flows an authority over the affairs of man, stands face to face with the theory that all historic forms of right are but incidents in the progress of the human consciousness towards an ever-growing fulness of life. We may even acquiesce in the loftiest claims of theocracy; but only with the proviso that such a conception, corresponding to a certain epoch of historical experience and adapted to certain given conditions of life and social development, derives from them a validity of the same order as that which justifies, in the same limited sense, all other historical institutions for the period which produced them and the human consciousness of which they were the expression. On the other hand, we must necessarily reject and condemn any theory whatever of Church and State and their mutual relations which claims to rest on the immutable nature of things, or to be capable of an independent and self-sustained existence as an eternal Platonic Idea, or Prototype, to which the inexhaustible transformations and transitions of historical reality must always and everywhere adapt themselves.

Now, to the philosopher and the historian of to-day it is impossible to draw a sharp line between Church and State, between religious and civic sociability. Now that neither the one nor the other is any longer regarded as an entity

standing by itself outside and above the vital stream that flows with and through it, now that they can no longer be treated as the fixed moulds into which the plastic realities of conscious life must be poured, or the unalterable dies by which they must be stamped and minted, now that they themselves, on the contrary, must be drawn back into the life of the spirit and fused into it, must be looked upon as the creatures of that very life of the spirit which they affected to control—creations, moreover, that are perpetually reconstructed—it follows that the study of all such juridical institutions must of necessity be subordinate to the study of the actual requirements of the human life out of which they rose, the commands of which they must obey, the instruments of which they are, subject incessantly to its reforming and renovating action.

And so both Church and State must be envisaged, above all, as two factors of the spiritual life. The State represents the claim of the human will, asserting the right to practical action, giving man effective control over things, co-ordinating and subordinating in a hierarchy the sum of forces and efforts that constitute the unified and collective life of a tribe, a people, or a nation. The Church vindicates the claim of the inner life; the recognition of absolute and eternal values that transcend all the accidents of time; the higher loyalty to a higher law and a higher justice, which are not, but ought to be. In the court of conscience the Church condemns all yet existing and established Right as already containing an element of injustice and as the negation of a fuller liberty of spirit.

Thus Church and State, religion and law, essentially presuppose and imply, while perpetually straining against, each other. Law would be smitten with the immobility of death did not an everlasting thirst for a more human justice than can be afforded by rights that have to be "enacted" ceaselessly assert itself against the constituted laws and their organs. Nor could there be a Church, or indeed any other society at all, unless the rules and sanctions of civil life and the social co-operation they enjoin were accepted, and the constituted laws and authority obeyed, with reservation only of extreme cases in which the violated conscience protests.

It follows that in its forms and institutions, and in the practical relations it establishes, every Church must itself partake of the nature of a State, for it must form a system of regulated relations, enforced by the necessary sanctions. It must have its finances and its concrete claims and demands, all which are of a civic nature. At times Church and State

may be one and the same, both *de jure* and *de facto*; and in the Middle Ages the Catholic Church actually was a juridically-organised international Super-state, governed by its own code of laws in industrial and civic no less than in spiritual matters, and empowered to intervene and define, in case of controversy, with respect to the fundamental constitutional relations between sovereigns and their subjects. Subsequently, when the conception of prerogative, and with it the claim of the State to complete autonomy, had become clear in men's minds, Church and State found themselves face to face as two legally constituted and independent institutions, in bitter conflict over the terms of the Concordats that were to determine their mutual relations, rights, and duties.

And in like manner there is no such thing as a State that is not in a certain sense a Church. For the State, as a body of persons associated together for the realisation of certain purposes of practical life, depends for its existence on the acceptance of a certain moral standard amongst its citizens, and can only realise itself as a trend towards a certain ideal of free civility. Nor can a system of law run if it relies only upon force applied by power; for law in its very nature implies the recognition of an ideal justice and an attempt to approach it, transcending the State and all its concrete manifestations, and fed by a faith in absolute and divine values.

The modern State is an outcome of the process of purgation of society from ecclesiasticism. It could never have succeeded in gradually asserting its authority as against the Church had not the conscience of the lay world, in that magnificent spiritual movement which we call the Renaissance, unloosed the chains of sacerdotal authority over many branches and forms of human activity. The cry of joy in men's minds which greeted the rediscovery of Greek and Roman antiquity was in reality the cry of the liberated spirit, re-entering upon possession of itself and finding a new spiritual significance in the actualities of human nature which had been so severely repressed and mortified by the mediæval asceticism.

But the process was extremely slow. The respective rights and duties of Church and State were interminably discussed, though all the while they continued, in fact, like body and soul, to be different aspects of a single organism. It was only in the later Renaissance, and pre-eminently in the mind of Machiavelli, that this organic unity was actually broken up, and the right of the Church to exist as a social and legal institution contemptuously and absolutely denied;

while a sort of political atheism was asserted, wherein the Prince, as representative of the State, rises solitary above individual egoisms, as the embodied collective Right, released from all moral responsibility either to heaven or earth.

Theoretically the conception was absurd, and it can only be explained as a violently exaggerated protest against the ecclesiastical and pontifical pretensions of the Middle Ages and the aims of the Roman Curia, which had already revealed themselves in the time of Machiavelli as incurably antagonistic to Italian unity.

The Protestant Reformation prepared the way for the modern conception of the State, while marshalling the forces that were to produce it. For the Reformation, while proclaiming the aspirations of religion, and specifically of Christianity, as the supreme norm of life, at the same time stripped the Church and its hierarchy of the monopoly of divine administration, and confided the regulation of faith and conduct to the individual conscience itself, guided by a more spiritual interpretation of the Bible and the Christian tradition. But it still remained to systematise a network of legalised relations and of statutory institutions in which the newly-formed evangelical communities were intimately concerned.

A further step in advance was made, on the separation of the several associations and confessions, when some at least of the various Churches accepted the common law of the land for all their civil affairs and, asking nothing more from the State, learned to cultivate and develop their religious life in complete liberty and independence of the civil power.

Amidst all this complex of developments and variations of religious establishments the Church of Rome stands solitary. She has not officially renounced a single one of the principles on which her powers rested in the Middle Ages. She still asserts herself to be the "perfect society," with an aim superior to the merely "earthly" aims of the State, invested by God with the mission of governing souls, as the exclusive depository of truth and grace, with inherent authority to determine by her own fiat the recognition, the support, and the privileges, which are due to her from the civil power. It matters not that there is no longer a single State in which she can take the position that she claims. Her own doctrine is still the thesis, while the accommodations and renunciations forced upon her by circumstances are but hypothesis.

It is easy enough to see the significance, in such a system, of the temporal power. A Church which thus claims, of

divine right, a sovereignty that extends to the person and property of all its members, over-riding those of the State, cannot itself be contained in a State. It must be in a position to treat with all the States on a footing of juridical equality, with an allowed claim to full independence and autonomy in all matters of international right. And this necessitates a certain minimum of territory, in which this sovereignty receives historic expression. In lack of this the recognition, by the State that gives it hospitality, of such and such specified rights and attributes of sovereignty, granted to it as to a subject in international law, must ever remain dependent on the will of the State that grants them, and must wound, or at the very least obscure, the freedom of the Church in the eyes of Catholics the world over.

The thesis is an anachronism, but none the less it is the ground, to this day, of the demands of the Papacy. On this it bases its refusal to regard the question of Rome as closed. The significance of the conflict does not really lie within the limits of the terms of law and policy under which it is conducted. These have been virtually decided for centuries. The protraction of the struggle and its only too pressing actuality in Italy are the index of the internal strain, nay, the spiritual tragedy, of a people whom the interests of the Papacy, in its contest with Protestantism, have subjected to a spiritual and political slavery so long drawn out that, as a people, it has yet to find its true modern consciousness.

These pretensions of the Papacy are the mere débris of a civil supremacy of the priesthood which is dead and gone; and the very modesty of its effective claim—sovereignty over a palace and a garden—is a sufficiently ironical comment on the theoretical principle on which it claims to rest. The Papacy, clinging to the last vestige of a sovereignty that is not built on the will of the people but depends from a divine right, is simply claiming sanctuary in its final stand against the spirit of democracy—that spirit which has actually invaded the religious association directed by the Papacy itself, and threatens to engulf it.

When the Italian State, under growing pressure from the civic sense of a resolute minority, did actually occupy Rome and at the invitation of the cardinal secretary of Pio Nono (who perhaps thought that by aggravating the evil he might hasten the providential interference) entered the Leonine city itself, the Papacy promptly declared its position intolerable. A year later, when the "*Legge delle Guarentigie*" gave a generous definition of the sovereign rights of the Papacy in the exercise of its spiritual and diplomatic govern-

ment, and assigned it a revenue of about three million lire from the public funds, the Holy Seat rejected the proposal with contempt. Nor has it yet recognised this legislative act, although at the present moment a Catholic, belonging to the Popular Party, is the *Ministro dei Culti*, who is, as such, responsible for carrying it out.

The principle is maintained in its integrity, but step by step, in process of time, the definite claims of the Papacy have practically shrunk.

It would be a long tale to recount the successive renunciations. It was the constant aim of Leo the Thirteenth's diplomatic action to secure allies for the Holy Seat against the State of Italy. He leant first on Germany, then on France, but always on Austro-Hungary. The breach of France with the Vatican was provoked and developed by the vigorous protest of Pius X. on occasion of the visit paid to the King of Italy, in Rome, by Loubet, the President of the French Republic. This action of the sovereign representative of a Catholic country was a direct violation of a Pontifical prohibition that had been in force since 1870. But a recent Encyclical issued by Benedict XV. has officially withdrawn the prohibition, in order to remove an obstacle in the way of the renewal of diplomatic relations between France and the Vatican. After the breaking out of the European War, Germany sent Erzberger on a special mission to try to secure the influence of the Holy Seat on Italian Catholics and the country generally in favour of neutrality; and when that failed, Erzberger, as he tells us himself in his *Memoirs*, worked out and submitted a scheme for restoring to the Pontifical power a portion of the city of Rome, with free access to the sea. But in view of the hostility provoked in the countries of the Entente by the Pontifical attitude, especially as revealed in the celebrated Latapie interview, Cardinal Gasparri, in July 1915, officially declared, in an interview with a Roman Catholic journal, that the Holy Seat now relied on the sense of justice and the wisdom of the Italian people itself for the satisfaction of its legitimate desires.

Thus the Roman question ceased to be the subject of negotiations, to the prejudice of the State of Italy, between the Holy Seat and the other Powers.

It was supposed for some time, especially towards the close of the pontificate of Pius X., that another path might open. The idea was that the immunities and rights secured to the Holy Seat by the "*Legge delle Guarentigie*" should be put under international sanction. But such a solution

was regarded as inadequate and illusory by the Roman Church, and as an infringement of its sovereignty and freedom by the Italian State, and it is no longer under consideration.

Notable changes have taken place too, with reference to the internal politics of Italy. From 1870 onwards the Papacy endeavoured to secure the allegiance of Italian Catholics in the interests of its own demands, to the exclusion of those of United Italy, and forbade them to take a part either as candidates or voters in political elections. In 1900 the writer of these notes, after a brief but strenuous period of Christian-democratic propaganda, joined a number of those who are now the leaders of the Popular Party in founding a political organisation of Italian Catholics; whereupon Leo XIII. gave him to understand that the Holy Seat reserved to itself the right of judging of the opportuneness of any such political action on the part of Catholics, and forbade the formation of the new party. The same prohibition was subsequently repeated, and the present writer, to escape a sentence of excommunication, consented to make a declaration in form that Catholics owe absolute obedience to the ecclesiastical authority in political and social as well as in spiritual matters.

The war has profoundly modified this state of affairs. It would have been a crime to maintain such an attitude of indifference and agnosticism towards the State at a moment when the very life of the nation itself was at stake. Neither the Vatican, the Church, nor the great mass of Italian Catholics committed this crime. The Vatican enjoyed full and undisturbed freedom in its relations with the countries hostile to Italy throughout the war, and the "Legge delle Guarentigie" passed victoriously through its ordeal of fire. Meanwhile, directly following upon the armistice, the turbid and threatening sequelæ of the war declared themselves. A Bolshevik revolution would have involved State and Church in a common ruin. No time must be lost in enlisting such portions of the lower middle and working classes as had remained faithful to the Church, to fly to the succour of menaced society and co-operate in restoring the State and enabling it to pursue its task of pacification at a moment of such critical peril. The Holy Seat determined, accordingly, to allow the formation of the Popular Party, which speedily rose to such practical significance that it holds a hundred and sixteen of the five hundred and thirty-five Parliamentary seats, and has three ministers and five under-secretaries in the actual Government.

The Popular Party declared, at its birth, that it accepted

the national unity as actually constituted, that it meant to work on strictly constitutional lines, and that it demanded nothing more than the guarantee of "liberty for the Church in the exercise of its spiritual mission," leaving it the responsibility and the duty of declaring what measures were needful for that end.

There are many who think that the moment has at last arrived for a reconciliation. Last June, when a Roman journal suggested that the question of the relations of the Vatican with Italy might be taken up again in the new and less strained atmosphere that now surrounds it, the whole Press interested itself in the matter, and gave ample proof that many a prejudice on either side had been dropped. A Liberal Roman journal accepted the contention of the Vatican that its true and sovereign territorial rights over the minimum area it actually possesses should be fully recognised. All the others confined themselves to generalities; and shortly afterwards the *Osservatore Romano* pronounced the discussion purposeless and ineffective. The documents of this journalistic campaign were collected and reissued in a Green Book under the auspices of the Foreign Office.

Thus the Roman Church, while refusing to modify her conception of herself as the perfect society, divinely endowed with infallible authority over individuals and States and responsible to no earthly power, has been compelled in practice to retreat from the actual positions in which she could once see her pretensions take definite shape and stamp themselves upon history; and she is slowly retreating, under pressure of events, towards new constitutional forms and changed conditions of life.

What appear to the superficial observer as the changing and alternating fortunes of a struggle between Church and State reveal themselves on closer inspection as phases and internal adjustments in a movement of the spirit that is driving the Church herself towards the conquest of her liberty and autonomy.

The long conflict between the rising civic consciousness of the Italians, determined to reinstate themselves as a nation, and the Papacy, temporal sovereign of a great part of Italy and welded to the interests of Austria and the Bourbons, ended in the victory of the Liberal State and of United Italy and the defeat of the temporal power of the Popes. But the determining factor in this victory was the broad stream of conviction that had gathered force amongst the Catholics themselves. Manzoni, Rosmini, and Gioberti

had seen in the return of the Church to a beneficent spiritual mission, freed from material preoccupations, an emancipation of the Church herself that must be pressed forward at every cost. Indeed, Gioberti in particular—with his grandiose vision of a Papacy, in harmonious fellowship with civil liberty, restoring Italy to her spiritual hegemony—effected at least as much for Italian unity amongst the Catholics as Mazzini, with his more radical programme, effected upon another field.

Cavour, Ricasoli, and the great leaders of our historic Right, including the Cadorna himself, who opened the walls of Rome in September 1870, were Catholics. In stripping the Church of many of her ancient privileges which were incompatible with public liberties, in emptying innumerable convents, and in taking Rome from the Popes, they believed themselves to be consulting the interests of the Catholic religion; and they testified to their profound respect for the Church in the exercise of her spiritual mission.

And as it was then, so is it now. To Cavour's formula of the free Church in the free State Giolitti has added another, comparing the two institutions to parallel lines that run their course side by side but never meet. We might add that mathematicians allow their parallels to meet at infinity; but, unfortunately, a sense for the infinite is of extreme rarity amongst our men of affairs whether of Church or State!

It seemed to be within the scope of Modernism to take a decisive step in advance in the conception of the relations between religion and politics, between Church and State. Between 1892 and 1902, Catholic Italians, who had up till then held aloof from the public life of their country, were deeply stirred by a movement towards democracy and an emancipated culture. Its representatives at first took up Gioberti's idea, and sought to prepare the way for a triumphant return of the Church and the Papacy to their leadership in the advance of civilisation. The illusion soon vanished, and, under pressure of the suspicion and persecution of the Vatican, their second thought was to demand a clean cut between religion and politics, so as to remain firmly attached and obedient adherents of the Church as believers, while recognising no rule but that of their own conscience in political and social action. But this position was quite unstable, for it is impossible to hold at one and the same time two opposite systems of faith: the one modelled on an orthodoxy that prostrates itself before ecclesiastical authority; the other free and personal, such as could breathe into the social and civic relations of men a new spirit of religion, sensitive to the needs of our time.

And so the conflict went on. The boldest and most consistent Christian Democrats, cast out by the Church, looked to the programme of a democratic religion and a lay Christianity, competent to inspire all the relations between religious and civil society, under the auspices of a genuine and authentic liberty.

The formula "Freedom of the Church" adopted by orthodox Catholicism is equivocal and misleading. The only seat of freedom is the conscience. And spiritual action is only free when, in time and place, it spontaneously designs and creates the outward institutes of religion and politics, in which its own ethical individuality reflects and realises itself.

Freedom of the Church ought to mean freedom of such as have consciously organised themselves into a Church and are making themselves felt in associated action, to repel the intrusion of an external power that would coerce the intimate life of their souls. At present, in Italy and not in Italy alone, the freedom of the Church too often means the enslavement of consciences that the Church herself treats as her properties and lays under a cruel and superannuated external discipline. A free State cannot recognise or protect this liberty to oppress; but rather, with all the means which its power commands and its nature allows, must it defend and vindicate the rights of conscience against an institution that violates them.

Church and State, as I have said, move on different planes. The one concerns itself with the inner life, the other with the claims of civil institutions. The formal regulations necessary to the Church as an institution and a society are allowed by the State, without reference to their special contents; provided always that they do not outrage the common ethical sense and the collective national purposes. The religious society is based on the free association of its members, with doors open to receive or to release. Personal experience of the divine impulse, the voice that speaks within to the individual believer, is the primal determinant; but associated efficacy follows in measure of the range of sympathy to which the sense of spiritual values it expresses appeals. In this sense Christ is still the foundation of the unity of all his disciples; for in him they recognise the deepest and most revealing religious experience, and expression in life of the precept of fraternal love. But they only are truly united to him who renew that experience in themselves, and transfuse it into life and action. The tradition, with all the varieties of doctrinal and ritual standards that it carries, serves as an educational agency to lead the catechumen to an inward and personal faith which reproduces and renovates, in con-

sciousness and in action, the faith that nurtured it. Else it were but a bundle of empty signs and dead formulæ. Yet adherence to the tradition, and compliance with it, may have its own value, in so far as it safeguards the universality—that is to say, the unity through time and space—of the generations of believers; albeit this safeguard is but external, subject to discussion and actually discussed in its details, and standing in constant need of the living force of the act of faith, ever new and creative, by which alone it can reconquer and continuously preserve its validity.

And the union of the faithful, sought in vain in concordats and compromises, can only flow from the fountal life of religion itself—that is to say, the love that pours itself out in the recognition of my neighbour even within myself, and the recognition of God in that spiritual link that makes the many one. It is humility and not pride. It is giving, not receiving. Nay, it is the self-giving, and not the self-appropriation, even of the very self. It is a habit of mind that can find no place for the bickerings and wranglings that the Churches have multiplied. It is in itself the glorious and perennial source of brotherhood and unity.

In such “associations of free personalities, to proclaim life as the spirit of universality and unity, and action as the realisation of brotherhood,” the question of relations with the State retains but small significance. Francis of Assisi taught his brothers to feel that when they were insulted, mocked, repelled, stripped, and wronged in every fashion, “here was the joy of the minor friars.” The settlement of the Church in the pleasant quarters of privilege, competing for the acquisition and retention of the things that pass away, and the gathering of riches and immunities, are all counter to the fountal and divine impulse that draws us upward. From the true point of view of a spiritual association the precept of Christ holds good: “Be ye not anxious as to what ye shall eat or wherewith ye shall be clothed.” All that is in the care of the Father. To seek the Father, to feel the Divine presence and make it felt, to conquer one’s own soul no matter at what temporal cost: this is the concern of the Churches.

The legal and institutional distinctions and oppositions, the temporal and quantitative divisions and sharings between the here and the hereafter, between the representatives of the life on earth and the life eternal, the realm of God and the realm of Cæsar, have been the fruitful source of false issues, and misconceptions of spiritual things. There are no contrasted “here” and “hereafter,” no realm of time and realm

of the absolute, no heaven and earth. There are only consciences realising and seeking the infinite reality that underlies them, envisaging alternately the one and the other phase, negating evil by overcoming it, giving to the ephemeral the aroma and the values of the absolute, and striving thus to realise the Kingdom of God. Religion is the abiding force of this aspiration of the soul towards the absolute. It is faith. It is the consciousness of a call to rise superior to all present reality. It is that love which is the will to gather multiplicity into unity, and so to make it divine.

This was the sense of liberty which Catholic Modernism proclaimed aloud. It is still forcing its hidden but irresistible way to conquest in the consciences of men. The conversion of Rome, which the Italian State was too poor in spiritual life to be able to foster, will be the fruit of this grand internal revolution in the Church herself; and to every devout spirit in the civilised world the new sense of God Immanent, with his spiritual discipline of liberty and unity, will shine the clearer when it ceases to be veiled by that vastest of all religious institutions, the Church of Rome—that institution out of which all intimate religious life is continuously ebbing, but which, with its traditional authority, pre-eminence, and far-spreading dominion, can still overcloud with its huge shadow so great a world of souls.

The last words of this article had hardly been written when Benedict XV fell into the sickness that ended in his death. The incidents rising out of this event, the Conclave from which Cardinal Achille Ratti came out as Pope, and the first acts of the new Papacy, have turned the light full upon the present relations between the Papacy and Italy, but in no way affect the main lines laid down above.

At their actual points of contact State and Church appeared to be freer than ever before from the ancient animosity and distrust, and even to be animated by a certain mutual goodwill. Two of the King's ministers, belonging to the Popular (Catholic) group, called during the illness, and immediately after the death of Benedict XV, to make inquiries and to offer condolences; but it was in their personal capacity and in mufti. It was, however, the first time since 1870 that ministers of the King had crossed the threshold of the Vatican in open day. All the public edifices displayed the black-edged banner for five days. The Press, with the rarest exceptions, spoke in terms of high appreciation of the deceased Pontiff, and of the Church; and but for the crisis

that befell the Bonomi cabinet at this very time, Benedict XV would have been formally commemorated by both the legislative assemblies on the resumption of their labours.

These courtesies, however, were in every case limited by the fear of impinging on the breach which still remains officially unclosed. The most authoritative Italian journal, of moderate tendencies, the *Corriera della Sera*, spoke of "a complete agreement as to the strict maintenance of the traditional and radical breach." In this phrase the paradox of the present situation is focussed.

Indeed, the official organ of the Holy Seat, the *Osservatore Romano*, declared apropos of the ministerial visit that it had taken place, like all the other visits, without any previous arrangement, and that the ministers had no conversation with Cardinal Gasparri, who was the representative at the moment of the Holy Seat. At the same time it denied that the death of the Pope had been officially announced to the Italian State, and explained that such a thing would have been impossible. The most authoritative organs of the Liberal Press have themselves been quick to acknowledge that the Papacy could not make peace with Italy without losing a great part of its authority over the Catholics of other countries; for it would raise the suspicion—and the enemies of Italy and of the Papacy alike would not be slow to nurse it—that it portended a subordination of the religious interests of Catholicism to the political interests of Italy.

Immediately on his election the new Pope broke with the continuous precedent of his three predecessors, since 1870, by pronouncing his blessing, from the external loggia of the Basilica, on the populace assembled in the Piazza S. Piero. But the aforesaid journal did not fail to offer the official explanation that he had done so "with all the reservations demanded by the inviolable rights of the Church and of the Holy Seat which he had sworn to assert and defend."

All who know the new Pope declare that in this direction he will in no way depart from the policy of his predecessor. He is credited with the intention of putting an end to the voluntary captivity within the Vatican which the Popes have maintained since 1870; but he will only do so if he is assured that it will not prejudice the "sovereignty" that the Papacy claims or its international prestige.

So my remarks in the article above retain their full force, and do but receive a fresh confirmation from the events of these recent days.

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ROME.

THE SUPERNATURAL UNDER DOMESTICATION.

THE REV. T. J. HARDY.

WE have always been a people devoted to the Commandments—not necessarily to keeping them. The Reformation, for example, was even more a revolt from certain features of the Renaissance than from Rome. Puritanism was in the blood long before it came out in the Ironsides. We English have always, though in a manner peculiar to ourselves, held conduct in high regard. It was reserved, however, to the nineteenth century to raise Conduct to the dignity of a capital letter, and to regard religion as its great auxiliary. The splendid energies which for centuries had winged the soul on her adventurous way and transformed the world with spiritual loyalties and *acta sanctorum* were, like the forces of nature, harnessed to the task of production. Salvation was “laid on,” like gas and water; spirituality tapped, after the manner of the petroleum spring. The Utilitarians found a use even for religion and hastened to lay it under contribution with that thoroughness with which, taking a leaf out of theology, it might be said Man was in Mill reconciling the world to himself.

The representative critic of that time, its lawgiver and prophet, declared Conduct to be “three-fourths of life.” What determined the fractional proportion remained a mystery to many of us, but it was a telling and no doubt to the critic himself an intelligent way of stating a utility value in a numerical age when bald-headed gentlemen who had gone out in the Mathematical Tripos ran the priesthood close. Solemn people in Manchester and Birmingham received the declaration as from Sinai. For the first time since the Commonwealth England was governed by an oligarchy of morals whose apotheosis was set up in an open space in South Kensington and—despite Mr Lytton Strachey—is with

us to this day. One of my earliest recollections is that of a steel engraving on a sheet of notepaper whereon was depicted the image aforesaid, and beneath it a gentleman, immaculate in the costume of the period, pointing it out with a slender umbrella to a little boy whose upward gaze betokened early piety. Somehow the picture suggested the Sabbath. Probably the diffusion of the character there embodied was due less to this "Memorial," and even less to the *Letters of a Successful Merchant*, than to the facile genius of that lady whom we are so tardy in recognising as *par excellence* the interpreter of the nineteenth century; who constructed over a thousand characters, that is to say over a thousand varieties of one character—that of the man of great abilities, of "noble intellect," of unimpeachable rectitude, concerned, like Job of old and reader of the *Spectator* to-day, in "maintaining his integrity." To advance in the world after the manner of this moral being, to stand well with one's employers, to earn the admiration of those in inferior station, to marry into the Firm, and into the Firm's fortunes, to bring up a large family "with about as much religion as my William likes," and, finally, in a respected old age, full of riches and honours, to surround oneself with every dull convention, from decennial claret to devoted clergymen—such was life's core and coronation when Conduct had become supreme.

The same prophet who gave us the fractional estimate of conduct defined religion as "morality touched by emotion." Here his meaning was not embarrassed by numerical values. It was perfectly clear. He meant that religion was the emotion that touched morality. Even those who were untouched by his particular emotion—lords spiritual and pillars of nonconformity—succumbed to this view of the matter. They sat loose to such features of religion as had no obvious bearing on "practical life." Social obligation became paramount. Everyone asked: Who is my neighbour? Only Herbert Spencer: Who is my God? In fact, religion, while retaining its old terminology, became at heart Positivist. France, beaten under Napoleon, conquered us under Comte. All England lay under the dispensation of practical religion—not the practice of religion, but—a vastly different thing—the application of religion to what we are pleased to call the practical. There arose a new catholicity, not the catholicity of the creed and the Crusades but the catholicity of a common platform in the interests of social organisation and efficiency. It was the catholicity of planks—such planks as hospitals, temperance, industrial

reform, above all the art of so handling charity as to guarantee the privilege of wealth. On these planks it was claimed that men of "widely differing views" could meet and find in social service a panacea for religious disruption. The latter claim was perhaps utopian; at any rate it has not yet been realised. But meet they did and pool their principles in the interest of those measures best calculated to advance Conduct.

It is rather significant that about the same time "Christian Evidences" came into demand. Paley's essay, principally based on the testimony of those who laid down their lives for their belief, was no longer felt to be quite relevant. Martyrdom would plainly defeat a religion which was a process rather than an end. Henceforth the truth of Christianity was evident, if evident at all, in the moral revolution it had effected. The test question was: Did Christianity tend to make men better citizens? Those, on the other hand, who attacked Christianity did so on the score, not of its failure as a religion, but of its failure as a policeman. Their shrewdest weapons were pluralities and the pornocracy. With the exception of the Pentateuch and some vague anticipations of "criticism," the religious wars of the nineteenth century were fought on the field of ethics. The believer defended his faith on the ground of its usefulness; the disbeliever maintained that with a clear recognition of the claim of Conduct the religious sanction was no longer necessary. The net result was to identify religion with morality. The supernatural was brought under domestication.

Compared with this, pure religion and undefiled is that of the ancient Briton. I know very little of the religion of the ancient Briton, but what I do know of it tells me that he existed for it, and did not even suspect that it could exist for him. I imagine that when his turn came to be offered in sacrifice he tasted the wild intoxication of life's accomplishment. He ascended the altar to show people how to die with that elasticity of spirit with which Mr Spurgeon mounted the rostrum to tell people how to live. He did not attend Stonehenge and other places of worship with a view to "getting good," nor did he recommend religion because it clothed him with blue paint and kept his neighbour from stealing his coracle. He was religious because of a certain wild necessity within him, just as he was hungry and propagative. He was religious because the universal within him sought the universal outside him. When we descend from these bold flights of the wayward spirit to the idea of religion

current amongst us to-day, that it tends to make us better men—or, that it is no longer essential to our improvement—we gain some conception of the distance we have come from the primordial religious impulse.

Not that I am writing in the interests of Dionysos or posing as proselyte of Pan. I do not wish to imply that religion and morality are necessarily opposed. I do not deny that there may be accidental points of contact in which religion may confirm a moral tradition and touch it to finer issues. I do not deny that you may embank the Thames or the Tiber and fit it with locks and fill it with shipping. I only demur to your identifying the river with the uses to which you put it, or imagining that the river providentially took its course to suit your enterprise. I would remind you that it had a life of its own many thousands of years before the Thames Corporation or the Società di Tevere came into existence; that floods may sweep away your wharves and frosts paralyse your traffic. I would merely distract your attention from the argosies and barges to the hills of Arezzo and the cloudy Cotswolds, the rains of heaven and the insatiate sea.

On the whole the illustration, though somewhat clumsy, is no very bad one. The embankment and the mercantile accessories bear much the same relation to the force and volume of the stream as I conceive morality to bear to religion. For consider; morality is artificial and multiform. No other human product has shown itself so prolific in varieties as the moral ideal. It is at bottom an affair of convenience. It is a code of co-existences. Religion, on the other hand, is existential and eternal. It springs from a relationship which is unchanging. It would have been exactly what it is if the decalogue had never been. Rightly considered, there is only one commandment—the one universally broken—"Thou shalt have none other gods but Me." Again, morality comes of the accident that man is many—which is not only an accident in the logical sense, but an accident in the same sense as a railway accident; religion, on the other hand, belongs primarily to man the *one*, and is only realised in his unity. Morality, again, is transient; its standpoint is ever fluctuating; a new morality comes to birth with every Government, almost with every municipal election—at least the London Municipal Society hope so. On the other hand, it is impossible to conceive such a thing as a new religion. Mr Bernard Shaw has told us we need one, but has wisely confessed himself unable to imagine what it will be like. Mr Chesterton

set out to invent one, and the finished product turned out to be Christianity.

No ; the river may be "patient of" wharves and sluices, just as certain familiar expressions are said to be "patient of interpretations" not originally imparted, or an elephant is patient of a cargo of babies ; but the river is no more a tranter than the elephant is a perambulator. A bit of the Thames, say, Chelsea Reach, by Whistler, will give you a saner idea of the river in the majesty of its inhuman purpose, with man's utilities unsubstantial in the haze, than all your half-yearly dividends. I refrain from quoting the inevitable tag from Tennyson, and as I do not know the purpose of the river, and never met any one who did, I will merely say that the attitude of the Indian to his Ganges would serve as a fine example of our attitude towards religion.

For not only is religion a-moral ; it is even antagonistic to morality. Reflect what happens when Christianity is introduced into a primitive community—at once its morals vanish ! If, for example, our lot had fallen in the Solomon Islands, we should to-day be bemoaning the decline of cannibalism and financing societies for its preservation. The whole history of Christianity is similarly a ruthless bending of morality to the purpose of religion. The Thessalonian Jews were not only perfectly right but morally justified when they cried out in alarm that the men who had turned the world upside down were come thither also. If religion were really what we accept its being to-day, a useful adjunct to morality, it would have promoted the cults of Thessalonica, and evangelised the Solomon Islands with cargoes of missionaries for home consumption. As a matter of fact, morality has so blunted our imagination that we forget that the pagan practices to which Christianity gave no quarter were part and parcel of a fixed morality unquestioned and unashamed. When the Apostle warned his readers to "flee fornication," he was saying something absolutely and eccentric. Nor was there any reason for such an exhortation save the mystic reason he alleged, that such lusts "war against the soul." It was not "morality" ; it was the life of the soul that religion invaded the world to rekindle ; and everything had to go down before it.

It is said that Christianity has given us all we value in our national life—our national unity, our law, our Parliament, our hospitals, education, city guilds, our very language, even better—our home. The growth of such institutions is complex, but I do not deny that a fairly respectable case might

be made out in favour of the proposition. To view these advantages, however, as the calculated objective of Christianity is at once to be overtaken with absurdities. Did Augustine come hither to give us the House of Commons? Did Cuthbert come over as harbinger of the steam-engine? That the House of Commons and the steam-engine—both so dear to the nineteenth century—have sometimes proved to work smoothly is a fact as remote from the Christian religion as that they have also produced civil wars and appalling catastrophes. In fact, as we have had trouble enough with all our national institutions, a counterblast to the above proposition might easily be elaborated, showing the mischievous results of Christianity. Christians must not be greedy. They cannot always have it both ways. From the standpoint of morality, at any rate, they will find it hard to claim for religion a monopoly of benefaction. Many good things which have been placed to the credit of Christianity will be found to be due to quite other causes. Many obviously inconvenient things, such as persecutions, imprisonments, and martyrdoms, will be found to be the direct result of religion.

It is startling to reflect that the crucifixion of Christ, regard it how you will, belongs to the record age of Jewish morals. The principles for which He was crucified cannot be called moral. They do not fall into any moral category. They are not self-regarding; they are not other-regarding; they are God-regarding. They are little understood amongst us and seldom acted upon. Many of them are frankly considered to be "counsels of perfection." The term is well chosen, for they bear no relation except to the Perfect Will. They establish, or they seek to establish, a supernatural claim on the whole of human life. They may, or they may not, tend to social order and moral improvement. That is what we have to find out; and the irony of the situation is that we can only find out by abandoning ourselves to them—which no one seems prepared to do. Christ plainly declared that the secret of His "Kingdom" was open only to those who were willing to "forsake all." Religion takes all risks; morality takes no risks—it would cease to be moral directly it did. It is quite true there is a good deal in the New Testament which, for lack of a better word, has to be reckoned ethical. Yet the emphasis is always on the Divine claim; never on the merely moral values of the action. When the apostle expostulates with his peccant converts, it is not on the score of lowering the moral ideal, but of coming short of the glory of God.

I have likened religion to a river. The comparison is

trivial. It is much more like some meteoric ship-of-stars whose conjunction with this planet gives man his chance of eternal life. But why invent illustrations? The true analogue is the cosmic process. By some unfathomable "accident" the human race has been caught in the tremendous curve of a force supernatural. Other forces you harness to your looms and dynamos; this force harnesses *you*—if you are lucky, or, as the apostle would put it, if you are "called." Such, roughly speaking, is the conception I take to be intended by the *Kingdom* of God, as distinguished from the *utility* of God.

This explains why it is men and women tell us they have no use for religion. We are all too desperately eager to be conformed to this world to listen to proposals for transformation. We are far too busily engaged in saving to worry about being saved. We have given up regeneration for regimentation. We have frankly accepted what Pater called "the tyranny of things visible." We use what windows we have, not to look at the world beyond, but to gaze on the reflection of ourselves. We can sincerely parody the classic dictum and say: I am man; I consider everything super-human alien from me.

Let us not misconstrue the position, however. We are not doffing religion for the more violent sensualities. It would not surprise me to be told that we are on the whole more moral than were our fathers. I can well imagine we are less hypocritical, for some pretence is inseparable from aspiration, whereas flat conformity has no disguises. The truth about us is that we are simply and consistently mundane. We have our religion, such as it is, as Mr Barkis had matrimony. Not an exhilarating picture of the married state to set before Corydon and Thyrsis—this penurious pantaloons, ageing fast and rocky on his pins, nosing slyly the capabilities of his Peggotty, her turn for apple pasties and general cooking, and whether she is likely to keep down expenses and wear herself to the bone; truly a flat-footed courting! Nevertheless Barkis are we, annexing religion as a maid-of-all-work. Thank Heaven, men still fall in love; but we have heard the last of falling into religion! All that concerns us now is the finality of comfort. We must have a religion that will help us "to make the world a better place," that will further the redistribution of wealth by taxation, a more efficient education in cunning, the elimination of risk as represented by individual responsibility, the mechanicalisation of life, the dodging of consequences, the endowment of motherhood, ante-natal clinics, the post-natal stud-farm, triennial

re-marriage, and the card-index system. These are a sample of our most pressing projects. It is thus we answer the old question: What is the chief end of man? We used to be assured religion would advance our cause, but of late we are grown more shrewd. After all, will religion accommodate itself to our programme? We have long suspected the patronage of the Churches as an essay in exploitation. That there may be some sort of truth at the back of religion we do not deny, for the last thing in the world we desire to be accused of is intolerance. But we are more and more convinced that it is not the sort of truth we have any use for. We are in earnest where Mr Birrell is in sport: we do not ask, What is truth? we ask, What are trumps?

There is a story of an American who purchased a sculptured angel of an undertaker in the hope that, with a little manipulation, it might serve as a statue of William Penn. Several adepts were called in, and tried in turn their chisels. But the chippings only proved the metamorphosis impracticable, and finally the angel was broken up for road metal. Let him that readeth understand.

The modern man who says he has no use for religion is perfectly right. He hasn't. In his sense of the word no one ever had. The people who are wrong, who are holding us up and wasting our time, are the people who are trying to chip away religion to the cut of the New Worldliness. The more they try, the less angelic does the figure become without in the least resembling the image set up upon the plain of Babylon. The Churches would be well advised to give up the new stunt and return to the new birth. Up to the present they cannot be said to have made much headway with "social reconstruction." And the reason, as the newspapers put it, "is not far to seek": man is not socially reconstructed; if reconstructed at all, he is spiritually reconstructed. Like the poet—and I do him the honour of saying that a poet he is, every inch of him—he is born, not made. It is just possible that he may be born again. It is entirely impossible that he should be manufactured.

There is a deep and tremendous sense in which Nietzsche was right after all—though he was even less aware of it than his humblest student. He was right in his revolt against a conception of religion which reduced it to a sort of German *Hausfrau* attendant upon "Noth und Brot." He gazed steadily at "the little laws that lacqueys make" till he saw through them and perceived something "beyond good and evil." What he did not see was that his Something was really the Kingdom of Heaven, a Kingdom independent, in

its absolute nature, of all relative moral estimates, existing and breaking in upon man with a Purpose all its own. What Nietzsche did see—and we ought to have the courage to thank him for it—was the blazing fact that religion can never be “the mere communal sanction of what is useful to men in general.” Nietzsche was the Nemesis of utilitarianism as applied to the things of the spirit. If his doctrine be the devil’s parody of Christianity, the kind of Christianity he found invited the parody. A “slave-morality” it was, though not in the sense he meant; not the religion of slaves, but the slavery of religion; not the handmaid of the Lord, but the handmaid of the landlord. A religion which could start off on the scent of “eternal life” and then abandon the pursuit for that of general provider invited anything! When we get Nietzsche’s values right, we see in them a restoration of the apostle’s conception of religion: “Be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your minds”—and this, not to become a “viewless song” somewhere in the empyrean of the Higher Thought, but “that ye may know what is the perfect Will of God.” There is the whole object of religion—to bring men under subjection to the Supreme Will and crush and re-make them in the process. There is probably no passage in all Christian literature in which the heart of Christ’s meaning beats more palpably. “Be not conformed . . . be transformed.” That is the essence of all Christ proclaimed from the Sermon on the Mount to the Commission to the Eleven. It reveals Religion transcendent. It gives the everlasting lie to the idea that a spiritual life is so much gas and water laid on to be tapped at convenience. It blows to atoms the present-day confusion of Christianity with citizenship. Yes, Nietzsche was right. It was an anticipation of the shrivelling of conventional values when the Lord in His fury created Nietzsche.

Well, then, religion is a movement of other than human origin, having scope and issues beyond any immediate ethical interest. If I have stated my case extremely, it is because it is an extreme case—for the Supernatural is out of bounds altogether. You cannot domesticate it; all you can do is to let it make of you a stranger and a pilgrim. Attempt to subject it to Utility, and you merely produce a monstrosity—the nineteenth century. The real issue, of course, is whether you are out for adventure, or whether you would be in Jerusalem in the corner of a bed; whether you dare “live dangerously,” or go through life under an anæsthetic. If you want excitement and sensation, there is still a chance in the

transforming force that has caught us in its curve; if you prefer being dull, the world is a very good Burial Place. I am quite prepared to see Western Europe sloughing off what hold the Supernatural still has on it, and arranging its life without benefit of clergy; there seems no reason why a race should not appear—now that we have eugenics—entirely moral yet entirely non-religious; yet nothing will deliver me from the conviction that the result would be like that of a man who had lost all pain at the cost of losing all sensation. It is not man that would cease to exist, but existence that would cease for man. I can conceive of no deadlier dulness than life under rationalistic humanitarianism. All the dry decorum of cathedral life fades in comparison! I imagine myself in a world from which the Supernatural has been dismissed, bored to extinction by automatic virtue and shouting for at least one priceless inconsistency.

Here, however—presumably—lies the difference between the majority of my readers and myself: they fear that if religion goes man will lose his liberties; I fear that if religion goes man will lose his life.

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THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT AND THE NATURAL MAN.

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GOOD character and conduct derive their value and authority not from any supernatural or external source, but from their inherent virtue and appeal. The human reason is the proper instrument for the discovery and application of the principles and rules of a good life. The social nature of man makes it serviceable for seekers after this rational good to help one another by organised co-operation, and to win from this communion a clearer inspiration and a firmer purpose. These statements I think would be accepted generally as fundamental to the Ethical Movement. Now the age in which we live might appear particularly favourable to the growth of such a Movement. For the hold of the orthodox Churches upon the educated—or shall I better say the wealthier?—classes has long been weakening. Belief in a divine personality, another world of bliss or torment, the scheme of redemption and the entire metaphysics of Christianity has worn into an extremely attenuated acceptance. A more rationalistic attitude towards human character and conduct, the slow product of the evolutionary teaching, especially of the applied physical sciences, has broken the spell which chance, miracle, and special Providence formerly exercised upon the credulity of Man. The utter impotence of organised Christendom to prevent the crimes of War and Peace, or sensibly to moderate their physical and moral injuries, ought to have discredited finally the claim of supernatural religion to be the guardian either of public or of personal morals. It might have been expected that the moral devastation wrought by this catastrophe upon every human institution, from the family to the embryonic international order, would have compelled myriads of minds in this, as in other countries, to look with favour on a Movement which claimed to present a rational morality as

the alternative to spiritual anarchy. Allowing for the host of hastily improvised new superstitions which seek to displace the old, there must, it would appear, be large numbers of intelligent men and women who should find in these societies just the sort of moral support and intercourse which they require. Why, then, does so small a fraction of this multitude enrol themselves in our ranks? What is lacking in our appeal? It may be that most of those who have broken with orthodox religion and have given up church-going feel no need of any substitute. Some possibly are suspicious of the constructive radicalism in politics and economics with which some or all of our groups are more or less associated. For free-thinking on matters of religion among the well-to-do educated classes carries little implication of political, still less of economic, liberalism. Many, again, who are keen social reformers, prefer to give their time and thought to movements of a more directly practical order. Even the occasional experiments in Labour Churches have depended for their brief success upon the personal appeal of some enthusiastic leader rather than on any widespread recognition of the need for spiritualising the Labour Movement.

But in seeking to understand why so many of those who ought to be working with us, and whose co-operation we need, are not attracted or are repelled by our Movement, I think it is profitable to make a closer inquiry into certain evident defects in our appeal. I have posed the problem by confronting the Ethical Movement with a being called the "natural man." I have taken this course because the body of ethical conceptions and values in general acceptance by our Societies is not likely to be widely divergent from that current among the more serious-minded adherents of our Protestant Churches. The abandonment of supernatural sanctions does not itself involve any considerable alterations in the rules and valuations of a good life. If, therefore, there is any narrowness or other inadequacy in our ethical conceptions, it may best be discovered in the processes by which our Churches moulded morals in the light of their theology and imposed them on successive generations of the faithful. Now the whole theological system, held with minor variations by the Churches, stood upon a single fundamental moral assumption, that of the natural depravity of man. Man is born bad, and the whole scheme of salvation is devoted to his rescue. That rescue consists in a transformation or conversion of his natal make-up. This is as much the root assumption of the Catholic Churches as of the Nonconformist, though standing

on a very flimsy Biblical foundation. The article of our Church of England puts the matter quite uncompromisingly. "Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam—but is the fault and corruption of each man's nature."

Pauline theology was terribly concerned for the "desperate wickedness" of the human heart. It is easy to understand how acceptable this doctrine must be to any profession of spiritual healers. The more desperate the disease, the more difficult the remedy; the more difficult the remedy, the more valuable the magic of the medicine-man. To disparage human nature has, therefore, always been the practice of the Churches. But the sacramental treatment applied by Catholicism did not carry that deep sense of personal reprobation—the sense of the exceeding sinfulness of sin—which emerged as the most conspicuous feature of most Protestant Churches. For in these latter the impersonal authority of the Church, operating amid an elaborate traditional environment of ritual magic, was displaced by an immediate congregational interest in the concrete shortcomings of the individual sinner, enforced by a livelier sense of what was due to happen to him in another world unless he went through some definite conversion. Puritanism, as its name came to imply, carried to an extreme this attitude, and its theology was hardened and mechanised into a terrible instrument for suppressing whole departments of human nature. The notorious Blue Laws of some New England States are a surviving register of this intolerance and narrow-mindedness in its more extreme form.

But we are more closely concerned with the milder, more mixed, and more opportunist ethics of British evangelicalism, especially as found in the Nonconformist bodies. Puritanism was a dramatic protest against the character and outlook (*Weltanschauung*) of the Cavalier, depicted as free-lover, gamester, sportsman, tippler, fighter, wastrel, showy, arrogant, disorderly, and irreligious, an adept in all the vanities of the world, the lusts of the flesh, and familiar with that prince of "gentlemen," the devil. The Puritan protest as it blossomed out in bourgeois virtues needs no fullness of statement here. Nor does it here concern me to dwell upon the often cited economic explanation of the success of Protestant ethics. The selection and fostering of the characteristics of personal and group success under the conditions of modern capitalism were processes quite clearly realised by those who employed them. Sobriety, industry, forethought and thrift, orderliness, perseverance, honesty were the staple ingredients of positive Puritan ethics, and they admirably accommodated themselves to the conditions of the struggle for personal

wealth and power in the new era. Even that rigid Sabbatarianism which counted so much for righteousness had its business value. Stamped on many generations of commercial townsmen by the united discipline of Church and family, this became the accepted ethics of respectability, not only for the dominant middle class, but, by imitation, of large sections of the working classes, thus kept docile and useful in this life and looking for an inexpensive reward in another. Older members of our Societies, brought up in middle-class Mid-Victorian families, will be well aware how strong was the hold this typically Puritan ethics then retained. Handed down, virtually intact in substance and direction, though doubtless weakened in intensity, from the seventeenth century, the attitude not only towards sexual irregularities, drinking and gambling, but towards the innocent amusements of music, the theatre, and the fine arts, nay even towards poetry and the whole literature of imagination, and indeed towards any scientific study likely to engender scepticism or intellectual pride—this attitude hung like a subtle atmosphere over the whole conduct of life.

Much of this has passed away from our more liberal Churches, but what remains—and this I hold to be most significant—is the retention of the older and in large measure Puritan conception of the sphere of ethics. Sport, the fine arts, recreation, literature, science are accepted by serious-minded people not only as innocent, but as desirable activities, but moral or ethical values are not ascribed to them, they are not real contributions towards a good life. Now I am very well aware that some of the most active workers and thinkers in our Ethical Societies have broken down for themselves this distinction between the ethical and the non-ethical activities of life, and recognise that any strong grasp of the organic unity of a good life must incorporate in that goodness every accepted form of the desirable—health, the enjoyment of physical beauty, every kind of knowledge and aptitude contributory to human well-being. What keeps many people from joining us is sheer misapprehension of our aims and objects, due perhaps in part to the abstract terms in which those aims and objects are set forth, terms like “the good life” and the “supreme purpose of humanity,” which they associate with a cold and vague formalism. Even when they penetrate far enough to recognise something of our wider purpose, they are still apt to think that we are pinning on the recreative and cultural arts of life as mere appendages to the good life instead of treating them as integral parts of that life.

In some measure our problem was envisaged by Matthew Arnold in his protest against the excessive Hebraism which robbed our life of those qualities of sweetness and light demanded for true culture. But expressed in such general terms, the true difficulty is but faintly realised. I would begin lower down than Matthew Arnold. I am envisaging what I call the natural man, "God's Englishman," seeking some Society which shall make due recognition of all his wholesome wants that claim satisfaction through co-operation with his fellows. Will our Movement give him all he wants, and is he simply mistaken in thinking it will not? I do not pretend to give a positive reply to this question, but only to set out before you some further considerations bearing upon the manifest inadequacy of our present appeal. Some of these are put with force, skill, and humour by Dr Jacks in his latest volume, *Legends of Smokeover*. Civilisation, as commonly presented, consists in the increasing elimination of the dangerous, the disorderly, the uncertain, the incalculable from our lives. It claims to give us peace, security, and regularity. It provides various instruments and spheres of government. Our external life is to be provided with all its requisites by an elaborate mechanism of industry, our inner life by an equally elaborate mechanism of institutions working with the same regularity to produce a thoroughly reliable society. Now this, as Dr Jacks complains, is literally a deadly conception of human ends. It makes no provision for the play of the creative instincts. This play requires and involves irregularity of material and method, risks and losses, large elements of the unknown and incalculable. Dr Jacks expresses this by his insistence on "sportsmanship" as a principle of life. "A sportsmanlike principle is interwoven into the very stuff of reality. Life itself, if you study its origin, was a win against enormous odds—hence all the greater virtues of mankind, courage, magnanimity, loyalty, and love. In the beginning was the wager!" Now this is what I mean in saying that our natural man is *par excellence* a sportsman. He finds his keenest satisfaction in pitting his strength, or skill, or cunning, or his natural resources, against some not too closely calculable risk. He may find his sphere of sportsmanship in war, hunting, mountaineering, or other field of physical exploit, or in the world of business or politics. He may back his intellect and training against some baffling problem of pure or applied science, or may grapple, like Nansen, with some supreme task of philanthropy. This sporting instinct may even be regarded as one of the con-

tributories to the artistic interest through which the creative impulse works more delicately. For personal exploit is one form of that self-expression, which, when the self is worthy and interesting, gives its value to all art work. In every sphere the artist also is a risk taker, he too backs his personal powers against the difficulties of a more or less intractable and irregular medium, handling amid difficulties and with uncertainty the colours, sounds, materials, language, at his disposal. Here too the mechanical principle is his enemy, invading his art and threatening to reduce it to artificial reproduction. The only time I ever heard Ruskin lecture he ended a scathing indictment of the triumph of mechanics by describing it as engaged in the blasphemous attempt to "turn on God." The natural man demands free play for the sporting and artistic instincts. We may regard gambling as a morbid excess of risk-taking, but the strong survival of this crudest love of hazard, differing from sport and art in eliminating the factor of personal prowess, should give us pause in planning processes of civilisation. For it is noteworthy that the gambling habit obtains its strongest hold among those classes and peoples who are kept for their livelihood to mechanical drudgery, like our factory hands, or are otherwise engaged in heavy, dull, incessant toil for a bare living, as are Chinese coolies. Imprisoned in their work, they demand in their leisure a violent and a miraculous outlet. With too little energy left for the active and concentrated application of the creative instinct through art or sport, they seek a quick sensational expenditure for their baulked impulses in the excitement of betting or some game of chance, where quick unforeseen success gives them a sham sense of personal achievement. The superstitions and the pretended skill in calculation which gamblers often adduce to qualify their recklessness, furnish a curious example of the endeavour of the gambler to rationalise his irrational conduct and to escape from the clutches of bare chance into some realm of personal achievement.

The prevalence of gambling is thus a most withering testimony to the failure of society to furnish decent conditions for the outlet of the creative instinct of man. The true sportsman, the true artist, the inventor and explorer are not gamblers. For skilled risk-taking is the reverse of gambling. But skilled risk-taking demands that some elements of danger and uncertainty shall be incorporated in our conception of a good life.

Safety, order, calculability are the foundation-stones of all civilised existence. But we are now told we must not

try to live too safely, too orderly, and too certain in our plans. There is no fear of that, some will say, the infinite variety of environment and of events will always outrun calculation and provide a world of hazard for adventurous souls. Indeed, they go further and insist that the very end and object of each repression of personal liberty involved in social order, each reduction of an area of danger and caprice to orderly routine, each provision of security against the primary risks of life, is the opening up of larger and loftier areas of freedom, adventure, and personal achievement. This is the reply which defenders of mechanical industry sometimes make to the upholders of primitive handicrafts. It is the reply which the socialist makes against those who charge him with attacks on personal liberty. It is the reply of the philanthropist and moralist against the cruder charge of scientists that their social protection promotes the survival of the unfit and reduces the average value of human life. As in the individual life, so in the social, the reduction of certain primary activities to routine subconscious processes liberates more energy for conscious and creative work in higher spheres. It is clearly a case for compromising or harmonising contrary interests, so as to reach some ultimate economy of life. But this general principle does not carry us very far. It sometimes threatens to seek too hastily to stamp out or reduce the lower instincts, evolved for biological survival in early times, in favour of a more refined and spiritual life. Here again the protest of the natural man comes in, to claim consideration for what are called the animal needs and creature comforts. He accuses the uplifters, the organisers of a higher life, of disparaging the claims of the world and the flesh. Nay, more, he requires that his conception of "good living," even in its ordinary sense, should find some place in the ethical conception of the good life. Does it? For it is relevant to my task to take account of these popular conceptions of good living. Nor need we confine ourselves to the luxurious conception of a gourmet. The insurance company knows what it means by "a good life," and, still more significant, the English clergyman, the provided representative of Christian ethics, has a plain and not too elevated conception of "a good living" as one affording a handsome income to its holder.

Now all these are true though very incomplete revelations of the requirements of the natural man from life. Does our ethical conception make adequate provision for them?

I am not sure that we can truthfully say it does. Are the reasonable satisfactions of our animal wants, and the tastes

and arts which appertain thereto, actually incorporated in our ideals? If they are not, then we have one plain explanation of the failure of the Ethical Movement in its appeal to the natural man.

Now, though our natural man does not himself philosophise, his objection stands on a philosophic basis, viz. a denial of any ultimate or real opposition between body and spirit, the material and spiritual universe. This opposition, with its degradation of the body, has always lain at the root of the popular dislike, distrust, and fear of priests, scholars, philosophers, and moralists, all of whom they suspect of disparaging the body for purposes of spiritual and intellectual self-esteem.

A novel danger has been recently imported into this situation by the new psychology. There the naked origins of human nature are found to reside in animal instincts and impulses. The play of these original instincts has been modified and complicated in the progress from animalism to barbarism and barbarism to civilisation, but they have never been got under sufficient control and are always liable to revert to type, or otherwise to find violent primitive expressions which play havoc with the securities and delicacies of modern life. Psychologists now urge that a more scientific economy should be applied to these more troublesome instinctive forces. They should be "sublimated"; that is, drawn away from their original channels, and put to operate in ways in which their energy can be made not merely innocent but humanly serviceable. These new paths must have sufficient resemblance to the original paths to evoke enough of the vital satisfaction attached to the performance of the primal activities. We know this can be done. The fighting instinct can find a useful and pleasurable scope in football. The zest of hunting may pass into scientific research. Sex feeling may be canalised into art or even religion. Curiosity, the instinct of leadership or of submission, the sense of awe, can all be transformed into powerful feeders of a constructive social order.

I want, however, to ask a question here and interject a caution. How far and fast can we get rid of the awkward factors of animal instinct by sublimating them? It is accounted a gain that force sometimes gives place to public opinion as a mode of settling disputes. Men count heads instead of cracking them. I do not wish to disparage this advance. But we should remember that the practice of counting heads, *i.e.* of electioneering, may be almost as dangerous, as literally deadly, in its consequences as the

earlier and cruder practice. The general election of 1918 has been directly responsible for the death of millions of human beings. Is the fighting instinct safely sublimated by making it turn the wheels of a party machine? Again, the hunting instinct, set to track out heretical opinions in religion, politics, or even science, may be more destructive in its persecuting zeal than in any of its primitively useful origins. Or take the instinct of property, and the sentiment of personal power which it engenders and expresses. It is sometimes suggested that, if we could, by socialisation or communalisation of material wealth, remove the play of this instinct from the economic into the intellectual field, we should be immune from the selfish power it implies. But there is some ground for holding that vested interests and the power of property in intellectual wealth and its machinery of production are more devastating than any other enemy in their attacks on intellectual liberty and progress. Or, finally, take that most insistent of all instincts, the sexual, vitally creative and conservative. By some subtle alchemy this force may be transmuted on its creative side into artistic impulse or mystical religion, on its conservative side into philanthropy or social mothering. But can we feel quite sure that these rushes of creative instinct, repressed in their simple and direct outlet, into these artistic, religious, and social channels may not be responsible for dangerous neurotic excesses? I do not desire to overstress the perils of a too hasty and easy acceptance of the theory of sublimation of the instincts. But the economy of such a process must be extremely delicate, and I would commend to its over-confident supporters the wisdom of the ancient saw, "*Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*"

What I am afraid of is the tendency of some moralists to accept too readily devices for subjugating, repressing, or rendering innocuous those elements in man's animal outfit which they find it awkward to fit in with their preconception of a good life. I suggest that it may be safer and more profitable in the long run to consider how far the set of valuations and institutions which express the good life should not itself be revised, so as to include and make adequate provision for the simpler satisfactions of the natural instincts. You cannot get rid of these instincts, even if you ought to desire to do so. There is no ground for holding that any adequate satisfaction of them is attainable by methods of sublimation, therefore you are bound to find a proper place for them in your conception of a good society. The adoption of this view may, no doubt, seriously cramp us in some of our

aims at reforming society. It may oblige us to concede the impossibility of the total extinction of physical conflict between individuals and groups. It may lead us to dismiss for ever the notion of expelling profiteering completely from the whole economic system. It may compel us to furnish much enlarged facilities both to marriage and divorce, perhaps even to modify that institution of monogamy which has now received general acceptance and enforcement.

Do we want to claim the title Humanist, indicating that the whole of Humanity is our concern? Now the natural man is a little suspicious of these large unfamiliar terms, and is apt to direct against them a quality which humanists could do well to take into account because its name should recommend it to them, the quality of Humour. For the natural man is certainly a bit of a humorist, and claims for Humour a definite and considerable place in life. Now this humour is particularly directed against persons whose language or bearing indicate that they take themselves too seriously. In the sharper thrusts of this humour there is, as Freud, and Hobbes long before him, have recognised, a considerable spice of malice and self-glory. But there is much more than this. Socrates did not invent, though perhaps he was the first to apply systematically an ironic humour to the deeper work of criticism. The disconcerting judgments, the sudden contradictions, thus revealed in lofty principles or well-seeming professions, were essentially strokes of humour. Now the work of Socrates needs constantly to be done over again, for there exists a perpetual tendency for thinkers who handle the larger and the higher concepts to become dupes of specious formulas and attractive theories. The natural man has always scoffed at these products of high intellectualism. But the intellectualists easily ignored his shallow gibes. Modern psychology, however, is forcing the intellectualist and the high moralist alike to confront the duty of a self-analysis that is exceedingly disconcerting in the light it sheds upon the methods by which history, philosophy, economics, and all the moral sciences are moulded so as to satisfy the secret demands of man's instincts and the interests derived from them. To display theology as man making Gods in his own image, Morality as man pumping the pressure of his animal cravings into sacred obligations to be enforced by States and Laws, Philosophies as man's affectation at escaping his natural bonds and heritage and soaring into a realm of high abstractions, Economics designed to help defend his property or to break institutions which deny him his proper share in the good things of life—the whole of

this process of "rationalisation" of institutions, rules, theories, motives, which derive their real force and origin from primitive demands of human nature is an immense new field for the operations of what Meredith termed "the comic spirit."

It will not hurt us. It will do us good, if it destroys many of the sham sanctities we have set up by forcing us to see their origins. If it compels us to see that we have no right to take ourselves so seriously, to realise the foolishness of pretending to escape long ages of heredity, and to scrutinise more closely the intrinsic value of our valuations, it will be a purifying humour.

How far the criticism implied in some of the considerations I have set before you is rightly applicable to our ethical teaching I will not pretend to decide. But I think I have shown reason to hold that some of the inheritance of the Puritan Nonconformist conscience and morals is inherently likely to have embedded itself in our ethical creed, and that in any case the natural man, resentful of interference with his cruder desires, is likely to suspect its presence. It is not quite enough to make the formal reply that the ethical creed claims "to see life steadily and see it whole." It is much more difficult in practice to expel the long traditional suggestion of the cleavage of animal and spiritual life, and firmly to accept the view that all, even of the most sublimated and refined of our sentiments and processes of thinking, are in origin and nature products of this animal humanity of ours. The notion that we are shedding animalism, letting ape and tiger die, in the evolution of civilisation is erroneous. We are only evolving and elaborating the potentialities of animal life. If we resent the materialistic degradation of such a view, we had best proceed, not by constructing some new turn of fallacious dualism, but by lifting the whole process of evolution into some neutral zone where neither the grossness of materialism nor the vagueness of idealism is chargeable. The close, constant, and intricate interactions between the separately conceived worlds of matter and mind, the physical and spiritual processes, are reinforced continually by new discoveries on both sides, in physics and psychology, and the bridge across the secular gulf, hitherto so rickety a structure, is becoming solid and substantial to most modern thinkers. This philosophical position should have strong ethical reactions, and our Movement, released from the shackles of a cramping theology with its legacy of original sin, should be able to work out with great advantage the practical implications of this clearer conception of Unity in

various fields of conduct. The intricate interrelations of body and mind thus established should have profound reactions on methods of education, medicine, penology, and indeed every department of personal and social reform.

This true and more scientific view of human nature would go very far to reconcile "the natural man" to the Ethical Movement. But there still remains one consideration which may make him shy of us. Our natural man claims the right to remain "natural." By this I do not mean that he claims to be allowed to follow freely every impulse, to say and do exactly as he pleases. His second nature has overlain his first with countless coverings of convention inside which he has come to move easily and naturally. What he objects to is continually being called upon to mind his P's and Q's, scrupulously to balance rights and wrongs, and to inspect his moral secretions. The earnest conscientiousness of such a life bores and repels him. Does sound ethics, even of the more enlightened order, make this demand? Most thoughtful ethicists would probably repudiate such austerity and might even move towards the acceptance of Hazlitt's maxim that "it is sometimes good to give yourself an airing outside the strict diocese of the conscience." But there is no more difficult problem in life than the economy of holidays. It brings us back by another route to the question I propounded earlier in this address: "How earnest, how industrious, how regular, how intellectual should we strive to be?"

The consciousness of a great mission is apt to be overwhelming; the very urgency of the present need to make reason prevail in the political and moral ordering of our ruling world may tend to a degree of moral earnestness, of intellectual intensity, likely to alarm some of those we seek to carry with us in our elevating mission. If we are wise, we shall recognise this and walk discreetly.

But, even so, we may be apt to overlook the essential wisdom of the natural man's recalcitrance. Carried along by a burning zeal to improve ourselves and others, we may make the mistake of "allowing for" the weaknesses of human nature. This superior view blinds us to the wisdom, or perhaps it would be best to say the common sense, of the natural man. He may not know why he resents and resists the invitation to be rational, earnest, conscientious, and orderly. He only knows that it is too dull and the strain of it too much for him. This attitude I have attributed in part to the irrepressible nature of the sporting principle in instinctive revolt against excessive order, security, and certainty. But modern psychology gives a new testimony

to the teaching of the poet, "that we can feed this mind of ours in a wise passiveness."

"Think you, 'mid all this mighty sum
Of things for ever speaking,
That nothing of itself will come
But we must still be seeking?"

How far we should endeavour to organise the rational will, and consciously to take control of our lives, or how far we should allow ourselves to draw upon the hidden resources of our own and the wider Nature, to cultivate "a wise passiveness" is perhaps the most delicate of all questions of personal economy. Ultimately each person *will* answer it for himself. But it is important to get him to confront the question, to realise that within limits it is his duty, is worth his while, to be reasonable, and to seek to order his activities, so as to conform to the best harmony of his nature and to that of the society of which he is a member. If in doing so he keeps in the foreground of his consciousness the keen sense of life as a spiritual adventure in which his powers of body and mind are alike engaged, the personal zest of such an attitude will prevent him from ever being oppressed by the dullness and smug security of a too narrowly conceived "good life."

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LONDON.

FAITH AND ITS EXPRESSION IN THE ARTS.

G. P. BAKER.

AN artist friend—whose own art has in it something akin to genius—built a studio in his garden ; and, doubtless after some consideration, painted on the door :

PRAYER
IS THE
STUDY
OF ART

and left the more heathen contemporaries to make what they could of that baffling problem. For it was a problem. I walked into that garden one day just about the time when the spring rains were over and the plum blossom was out under a blue sky, and the air was full of sunshine. I started when I saw the inscription, scanned it two or three times to see how it really construed, and went up the path into the wood.

What did it mean ? Considered even as an ingenious sort of acrostic or puzzle, how can any sense be got out of it ? Something in the human mind is greatly attracted by puzzles, oracular sayings, and riddles, which have about them, it may be, some of the air of interest that a rabbit hole has to a healthy dog. What is inside ? Is anything really there ? If so, how to get it out ? Let us sit down watchfully before this puzzle, for the idea within it might prove interesting.

Of course, faith without works is dead. There is something in the nature of faith and of all other spiritual activities which brings it about that they die unless constantly translated into action. No matter how bold a man may be, if he never does a single daring action in his life he will not be so bold at the end of it as he was at the beginning. A

man may be the kindest-hearted of men ; but if he never once actually performs a kind action that spiritual quality of care for and good feeling towards others will insensibly die. . . . St Paul's view was reasonable and right. Show me (he says) a single brave action that is not the result of the moral quality of bravery. You cannot : therefore it is not the action but the quality which caused the action which is the noble thing. This, if complicated, is true. St James's reply is equally to the point. Without ever actually doing a brave action, show me, he says, the moral quality of bravery. You cannot : and therefore a moral quality which is never expressed in action is dead. To all intents and purposes a moral quality does not exist except in so far as it is exercised. The puzzle of the simple-minded, old-fashioned atheist about the soul, which cannot be seized or separated or its existence divined except through its bodily activities, is repeated in the case of the moral qualities. That there is such a quality as valour, we cannot and do not doubt. But it is only perceptible in the form of actions. No spiritual quality is capable of being known apart from actions.

This is what we mean when we talk of " self-expression." We might (when we hear and read some people) imagine that self-expression was a strange and exotic luxury, tinged with effeminacy—its object the painting of eccentric pictures and the modelling of peculiar sculpture. But self-expression is a plainer, more sensible, more natural thing than they would give us to understand. It is merely the necessity we are under of actually doing and creating, if we would retain our human quality. We must do brave actions if we would remain brave ; we must do good if we would remain good ; we must express ourselves if we would remain ourselves. This is a law of human life so deep and universal that we may well call it absolute. We must expend our wealth in order to keep our wealth. We must sacrifice ourselves to preserve ourselves ; in order to live we must die : which is only a way of saying that " Whoso will lose his life, the same shall save it. . . ."

The difficult thing is to convince the unlicked human person that this principle is wise, true, and prudent. In his passion for safety he will run into the greatest dangers : he cannot be persuaded that (as every practical man knows) the apparently dangerous way is really the safe one. There must be no fumbling and clinging when we get into a boat with a sea on : we must meet it to the second, let go instantly, walk straight, and never think of danger, but only

of the perfect art. Every boy knows before he is fourteen that he simply must not at the peril of his life funk a fast bowler. He must hit the ball. The man to defeat a fast bowler is the man who will run out to hit him. But even men who know this as an isolated fact do not always know that the fact is merely one illustration of a general rule.

We do not really lose anything by that process of self-dissipation which we variously call self-sacrifice and self-expression. A certain motion outwards is part of the nature of our constitution: we only live by keeping it going—by becoming, as it were, fountains, the checking of whose stream is stagnation and death. This hardly deserves to be called a mystical truth: it is the most obvious truth we could think of, and it is capable of being illustrated in a hundred ways. All truths are no doubt mystical when we trace them to their origin; that is another story. But the outward current of life is not a homogeneous stream, all alike, as a stream of water is—it is infinitely varied and broken into a prismatic scale to which we can set no limits and which we only imperfectly explore. We may say that we do not know of life save in the form of expression. Just as we cannot find and fix the soul apart from its activity, nor the moral qualities apart from their embodiment in action, so we cannot even conceive life, except in the form of its expression: a man himself is but a marvellous writing on a wall inscribed by whom we know not, a chord played by an unknown musician: every man is an invisible man recognisable only by the individuality of his choices. His face itself, that most marvellous of creations, is nothing but expression: we read there his history and that of his ancestors, if we are able to read. It is nothing to say that we have no knowledge of God apart from His works. We have no knowledge even of our next-door neighbour apart from his works. The world is a vast art gallery. We know the artists by their art, but we have no other knowledge of them.

To carry on the thesis another step: we cannot separate the arts from the general creative power of men. All are fundamentally the same thing and obey the same laws, although their particular objects and methods may be different. They begin as dreams or visions of the imagination; they gain expression in concrete actuality with a purpose to fulfil, which only that same imagination can understand. They all point towards the same final aim, namely, the construction of a human environment, which shall be at one and the same time an expression of our own faith and a

guide and record for the use of others and to ourselves also. They are all one thing, the parts whereof may be distinguished but not separated. Gothic cathedrals, mediæval kingship, Catholic theology, you cannot well have apart as Augustus Welby Pugin discovered. They are all different things, but their ultimate identity lies in that they are all the creation of men inspired by one religion. The creative power is absolutely one : it is identical in motive and nature, whether it be in creating legal codes, religious theories, administrative systems, or the front of an Amiens cathedral, or a porridge bowl for a peasant to eat out of—only its technique differs. This technique is, of course, simply the question of the material, which is a very great and serious question, but not relevant to our present purpose. We habitually admit that an art, a religion, and a civilisation are coincident by the very phrases we use in speaking of them. We speak of "Egyptian" art and "Greek" art, of "Christian" art and of "Mohammedan" art, implying an art attached to a particular religion and a special type of civilisation. Geographical distinctions enter chiefly as subdivisions of these, as when we speak of Byzantine and Italian Romanesque, of French and English Gothic, or Moorish and Persian art. We recognise, too, that the art, religion, and politics of any people have inter-relation between themselves and definite distinction from those of others. We know equally well that, for instance, the profound change in Roman art which begins to be noticeable about the time of Diocletian is significant of great changes in religion and political organisation ; that the classical influences of the Renaissance are intimately connected with the religious and political changes which we call the Reformation. There has never been a great change in one of the three that was not accompanied by corresponding changes in the others.

Let us drop politics out of the question for the present. It may possibly be said : "Ought we to mix up religion and art ? Art surely is one thing, religion another. Art ought not to be limited by theological dogma." But this is inherently to misconceive both the nature of religion and that of art. Theological dogmas cannot be expressed in art any more than a legal code can be ; for they are themselves expressions already fulfilled in their own medium. That religious sense which lies at the root of all the civilisation of a people is something anterior to theology ; it is a habit of choice, a taste in life, a point of view, an orientation of the faculties . . . if we prefer it, an attitude of worship. It is a path, if we like better this way of putting it—it is the way

. . . we go . . . ; or, if we revert to our image of a fountain, it is the channel through which that rainbow flood pours, duly directed and banked. Now this is not only expressible in art ; it is, properly speaking, expressible in no other way. Theology is not the whole of religion ; even ceremonial worship is not ; even conduct, as we commonly take the word, does not exhaust the content of religion. Religion affects all our material surroundings, our houses, household goods, fields, cities, villages. As the vast first choices continue their operation, they affect in turn every trifling detail ; nothing escapes. As we go to meet our God, all our things go with us. The exquisite formalism of Egyptian religion filters down to the very chairs and boats ; something ugly and cheap in Protestantism comes out in the Victorian front parlour and its mahogany furniture ; the austere, bright, and barren creed of Mohammed shines in an art which has given all the Moslem world the same qualities. The chaos and uncertainty of modern European religion, in which few know what their neighbour believes—or even what they themselves believe—is visible in the fruitless chaos of modern European art, which is all promise and no performance. The ugliness of our days is neither an accident nor a puzzle—it is simply the result of uncertainty as to our aim and method of life. You will find many individuals who know what they want and what their way is : these have a strange ancient clarity and coherence in their surroundings, so far as their own influence can affect them : but of the mass, of us as a society, a nation, a polity, it can only be said that we are uncertain, and therefore indeterminate. We are full of contradictions and incompatibilities, and consequently of discords. But it is the essence of art to be determinate and harmonious. Self-expression is a self-commitment ; we cannot play with it or dip our finger in and then turn back ; one cannot be vague and indeterminate and yet be an artist ; our commitment must be clear and complete ; our repentance, if need be, equally clear, equally complete. “Never cobble a bad job,” said William Morris ; “do it again.” This essential lucidity is almost the definition of harmony ; you arrive by the same *coup de main* at that vivid definition of statement which is the perfection of style and that consistence of the parts, that mutual agreement and concord which is harmony. . . . The whole process is a linked chain, and once the first choices are taken, we are committed to the succeeding choices by a terrible logic there is no escaping. Hence the governing importance of those first choices which are religious. Whatever is there

dubious, hesitating, vague, will be shown in the art which springs from it. Whatsoever is there imperfect will be an imperfection in the art.

This is speaking as if self-expression were always complete: but, of course, that is far from being the case. We learn it by degrees as we learn everything else, arriving at its final perfection by a long progress of accumulating experience. We are driven to learn it, because we know instinctively that unless we do so we stand in peril of losing that Self. We must create, or perish. So, while a religion is the indispensable origin and preliminary of art, religion cannot itself come into full existence until expressed through art: that is, through all the creative arts and incidentally those we know as architecture, painting, sculpture, and the minor crafts. The fallacy of Puritanism can be put in this way. It holds that some parts of human life should not be expressions of religion. It deprecates the senses and instincts and deems these last unfit for the worship of God. It therefore rejects visible and audible beauty, and the result is that all the Puritan creeds, however complete in theology, are hopelessly incomplete as *religions*; some integral part of the spirit of man perishes beneath them for want of expression, and the religion itself struggles on but cannot realise itself. Men therefore borrow the art of alien creeds as a substitute, and these foreign arts finally split Puritanism in twain. To remain itself and to grow, a religion must accept and sanctify every element composing the spirit of man, and must accept their expression, for such a completeness as this is indispensable to its life.

Then there is another point necessarily linked with this. All art is religious. "Religious" art in the narrow sense is not specially religious but only especially ecclesiastical; it is connected with the ritual and teaching of the priesthood, and the wealth of priesthoods tends to make their own particular works very permanent. Greek and Egyptian temples still stand when the houses of the peasants and merchants have been swept away these thousands of years. Mediæval cathedrals remain fresh and usable when the manor house, the castle, and the cottage are changed, or ruined or replaced. Hence we tend to think of religion in art as being ecclesiastical or ritual, centred round the services and teaching of the church. But that which made ecclesiastical art religious, made secular art religious; the same beauty present, the same spirit inspiring, the same world recreated. The platen and chalice had no other shape than the dish and cup on the dining table; if they were richer and more

splendidly wrought, it was only that God's table was greater than man's. If one imaged the Kingdom of God, so did the other. This is even more clear in other and older cases. Regard the Parthenon sculptures or those of Ægina; we can hardly tell whether they are religious or secular, nor, if religious, what makes them religious rather than secular. We only know that they are a world apart from ours, a language unlike ours, a hint at mental attitudes, hereditary customs of body and mind eternally divided from us. Now, this means that we are looking at the work of a different religion—a religion which is one and indivisible whether priestly or laic; it is all one, from the temples themselves and the miracles of art upon them, down to the tombstones and the broken pottery which the archæologist turns up and treasures. One general stamp is on them—and it is the stamp of a religion.

Part of the secret of beauty is an inner harmony which it shows forth, a coherence and significance that have all the aspect of being one cause expressing itself in a multitude of forms which speak to a common meaning. Nothing irrelevant intrudes, nothing is present without a reason. We see this compactness in all great art; it is a very large part, though not the whole, of what we recognise in it as "beauty." A Japanese painting shows it—so does a mediæval missal—we cannot confuse the two things. Most of all we cannot blend them or cross them. By no means whatsoever could the peculiarities of a Japanese painting be combined with those of a French thirteenth-century miniature. To continue the technique of a school you must absorb a particular mental attitude till it becomes a habit. To handle marble like a Greek you must think Greek, feel Greek, live Greek, be Greek. A mode of handling is not an acquired gift but a resultant one—resultant from a habit of mind, and even to some degree an hereditary habit of mind, which by repetition from generation to generation has impressed itself into the very physical organisation itself. Every new technical mode is crude at its beginning and has its archaic stage—perhaps many archaic stages—before it achieves the ease and perfection of mastery. . . . But that mastery is its final aim; to acquire such power over the material of art that in it we can express ourselves with ease and completeness.

. . . It is necessary to remember this, that such consummate power over material cannot have any upshot but the perfection of expression; we cannot attain it save by ourselves, growing as it grows, having more to say as we grow more able to say it; for the idea of technical mastery

on any other terms is a mirage. We build the two things together, and as we acquire that magic of hand and pen, so step by step we make clear and definite our personality and our own spirit ; so that at the last resort, if an artist has worked truly and well—though his other works should perish—one, and that the mightiest, would remain—*himself*.

If all this be true, there is a unity about every civilisation whichever way we look at it ; considered as a religion, it is inspired by one spirit, it is one artistic harmony. And looked at in the latter way there is one master-art which draws the main outlines and gives the limits within which all the other arts work. And that is the art of politics. . . . Do not regard this as a metaphor. Beyond architecture, which we have been taught to think the master-art, there is another which works on an even more magnificent scale, and with more delicate, more difficult material. Before there can be a Temple of Karnak there must be mighty foundations laid for it : an Egypt ordered, ruled, fed, and taught : all Egyptian character moulded to the divine pattern taught her by her priesthood, and this character defended against foes that it may work in peace. When this has been done, Karnak may arise. And when we think of Hellas, dotted with a hundred temples and cities, each an ivory casket for beauty and grace, let us bear in mind that Hellas herself was a work of art, carried out under the overruling command of her governors. Nations and national character and national conditions are not accidents, but creations and intentional creations ; as intentional as any painting or statue, for they are long meditated over, and built up step by step during centuries of time, and planned with deep counsel and carried out with conscious and deliberate choice. It may paint England green and blue and people her with a race strong and noble and free ; or paint her grey and black and fill her with an " industrial population." . . . The art of politics has in its time created both these effects . . . and, whether it creates one or the other, is dependent on the pattern it works to—its conception of God and His Kingdom. . . . For every statue is the statue of a man or a beast and every picture is the picture either of these or of a countryside ; and every carpet or pot is fitted for a house, and every house is conditioned by the life you lead ; and the men and the beasts and the countryside and the life they live in it, are designed by the art of politics ; and the art of politics is the expression of a religion ; and every religion is the imitation of a God. And if you would know the secret of them all—ask that God ; whoever he is.

We have come a long way round. . . . But we see that my artist was not without wisdom. The mental steps by which his brief aphorism can be justified stand revealed. He who first invented the saying, "To labour is to pray," was thinking of the same thing; that the effort to express ourselves, the desire to create, takes two forms which are sometimes mutually convertible—namely, the activity of the imagination which we call prayer and the activity of the will and body which we call work. Not only can they be mutually convertible, but often they enter as indistinguishable elements into a single process of creation.

"Activity of the imagination?" says the Girgashite, somewhat shocked. Yes, for prayer is by no means the repetition of forms of words—though such forms have their immense use, their indispensability as some of us think. Prayer is an activity of the mind which the will regulates and directs—an attempt to speak with God—and God is not limited either to the Latin language or to the English or to any human language at all, as the mystics have always rightly assured us. This is prayer: to define ourselves as we now are (which we call Confession)—to define ourselves as we ought to be (a harder task involving much thought)—to seek out and decide our relationships with all men and all things—and to *see* them all. It would take us too far afield to draw out the meaning of that word "*see*." But briefly things are not always what they appear to be and the delving into their appearances and the discovery of their successive disguises is no small part of our progress in knowledge. . . . This activity is obviously not one confined to the priest; it is proper to every human being and, whether deliberately and with arranged design or unconsciously and spontaneously, most human beings share in it. Now, as long as all this is confined to the mind and imagination, it is—not . . . perhaps incomplete, for in its way it is complete enough—but inconclusive. To fulfil the process we have begun we must carry it into action; we must realise it or express it. We may have a clear enough feeling of what we are and how we stand and what our relationship is with God and mankind and the world we live in. But that mere feeling is not enough; it is in peril of being merely sentimentality—a religious cloudland. We must realise and express; define it in words, give it intellectual system and organisation: express it in action, give it reality in conduct and manner: realise it in art, in the shape, proportion, colour, significance of all that vast world of things about us which serve us. And if we do this, then it returns to us with a new and

strange virtue in it, a particularity, a permanence, so that it can be regarded attentively and considered at leisure and criticised in detail and bettered; being so realised and externalised it leaves us free and vigorous for a fresh step. . . . But if we neglect this outward realisation it all remains a vague aspiration, a "sentiment," almost a fault rather than a merit; and it does not leave us free but remains poisoning the channel of our mind, preventing fresh action of the imagination.

Many artists with the impulse to create do not grasp these preliminary conditions of creation, and many religious people, fully appreciating the importance of prayer, have no conception at all of the instant and urgent necessity of expression. Hence art and religion both remain imperfect and narrowed in their scope. They are even at war. . . . And the result is that for us life is never completely integrated: that harmony is never attained, which is the "peace of God which passeth all understanding." We know that former generations attained it, for we can enjoy the glimpse of it in their work: for us it has not yet come, and it will never come until we learn to obey in its completeness the law we profess to believe.

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THE LAST CHAPTER OF ST JOHN'S GOSPEL AS INTERPRETED BY EARLY CHRISTIAN ART.

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WITH its emergence from the Catacombs Christian Art took on a changed spirit which dominated it for a thousand years, and is by no means extinct to-day. For three centuries before that time the believer's eyes had looked for the Dawn, whose lights seemed so near to him, and from the stirrings of whose breath he drew his life. To him Time was not. History had no more meaning to him than geography to the waif who stands on a vanishing sandbank in a wide sea. His vision ranged over an illimitable Eternity which had no beginning and no present: the Coming Age was the Age that had always been. Between the first and last words of John's Gospel, "In the beginning" and "till I come," there was only the vacuity of dreams. In that vast prospect there was no place for scenic shows. Feeble Art could only shadow them with symbol. John, the Evangelist of Puritanism, finds a spiritual meaning in "signs," and Old Testament record has no significance for him but as the image of Eternal Truth. For their subjects the fresco painters of the first Christian ages turned to his Gospel rather than to those of the Synoptists. Common among their designs are the Good Shepherd, the Lamb, the Vine, and the Raising of Lazarus.

With the emancipation of the Christian society in the reign of Constantine begins a new conception of Faith and Art. The anticipated Dawn was indefinitely delayed: the sandbank seemed to give an enlarged standing on fairly cultivable ground. The Church Dominant began to feel its place in Time and History, and to look for title deeds. Faith turned to retrospection, and Art became commemorative. Sacerdotalism grew, and Ritual displaced imagination. The

ordered mind of Rome had no taste for the Greek idealism and the Oriental arabesque that, in the work of the Catacomb painters, combined to lift the believing soul, as on angel wings, to the Actual and Unseen. In the sarcophagi, which, from the middle of the fourth century, took the place of wall-paintings, miracle begins to appear, not as a symbol, but as incident in narrative, and the Synoptic story encroaches on the ground once occupied by John. Nevertheless, old traditions long survived in the sculptor's craft. The Old Testament types of Moses and the Rock, Jonah and the Whale, Daniel in the Lions' Den were constantly repeated, and in any connected series of designs taken from the New Testament the Resurrection of Lazarus was almost certain of a place. One other subject, drawn from the older convention, is persistently iterated in the sculptures of the fourth and fifth centuries—the Meal of Loaves and Fishes.

Another result, perpetuated in medieval Art, came from the substitution of a narrative for a symbolic motive. Sorrow begins to overshadow Hope, the crucified Lord to occupy the place of the Jesus on whom death had no dominion. Roman gravity, holding in suspicion the mysticism which it once called "superstition," might easily come to such a conception of Christianity if, by withdrawing its attention from the covert sign, it centred its contemplation on the material facts of the Founder's sufferings and death, especially as the story was told by the Synoptists. Even though we should turn our eyes away from the physical agony and the sorrow unto death, all over the landscape depicted by the Synoptists, from the gloom of Gethsemane to the gathering shadows of Emmaus, there is elemental darkness. More than that—there is an atmosphere of fear and doubt. The last words of Mark are "they were afraid," almost the last words of Matthew "some doubted." Mark leaves us at the empty grave. Matthew and Luke are agreed that the first manifestations of the risen Lord produced fear, amounting to panic,¹ among those who witnessed them. It is true that they add that the fear was attended, or succeeded, by "great joy"—a feeling not easily to be reconciled with the situation. If the eleven were men of ordinary human minds we may question whether joy was their predominating emotion on receiving the stupendous commission to make disciples of all nations. Poor, ignorant, distracted among themselves, bereft of their light and leader—how should they leave their little lot of stars in Galilee to wander the wide world on an errand so perilous—how stand before kings and governors? If their

¹ πτοηθέντες, Luke xxiv. 37.

feeling was not one of sheer bewilderment, it must have been, as Luke describes it, joy mixed with disbelief.

Remark how John deals with the same situation. With its attendant discourses the story of the events surrounding the Passion and the Resurrection fills a larger part in his Gospel than any that the Synoptists give to it. But painful details are omitted or softened in the telling. There is no Agony, no Apocalyptic terror, no sad Testament of Death. The lesson in humility takes the place of the ambitious dissensions of the apostles. The discourse is of peace, joy, comfort, love. On the Cross the human heart overflows with tenderness for the bereaved mother and the loved disciple. Over all the scenes that follow the Resurrection there is a soft glow of quiet, which is as far removed from "great joy" as it is from doubt and fear. Need we be surprised, remembering how John's Gospel and Catacomb Art mutually reflect one another, if we find that the painters of the first three Christian centuries never reproduce the Crucifixion or the sad scenes preceding it? The Crucifixion is, indeed, recalled by the symbol of Daniel in the Lions' Den, but it is Daniel with the lions at his feet, powerless to destroy. More remarkable still is the absence of the Cross, as an emblem, in any Catacomb monument of earlier date than 370.

Of all the beautiful chapters in the story of Jesus there is none more surpassingly fair than this last of John, and it is all so naturally told that wonder ceases and assurance is implicit. Take the narrative just as it is told, or as we may reasonably supplement it.

The scene is laid at the old, familiar resort beside the Galilean lake, where the Gospel began and the first disciples were called. Not far off is Capernaum, the Master's own city, where he taught in the synagogue. At hand are the fishermen's cottages, in one of which one of his first acts of healing was wrought. Day breaks over the grassy spot beyond the lake where once at evening the multitude was fed. The disciples have not lingered in Jerusalem, the cruel city, doomed by their Master. If they heard the great commission which, Matthew says, was given them, they have not so far heeded it. As simple men would, they have gone home to their old avocations. It is early dawn. The long night of fruitless toil is spent, but they are still in their boats, as they were when the call came to them. A solitary, unnoticeable figure appears, perhaps in shepherd's garb (verse 16), and gives them such advice as a casual passer might. Something, perhaps gesture as at Emmaus, perhaps the voice, perhaps the result so nearly recalling the Miraculous Draught, suggests

to the familiar friend that it is the Lord. The revelation is gradual. There is no fear, no marvel, no extravagant joy. A simple fishermen's breakfast in the open day takes the place of the supper in the dim upper chamber. The mysterious fire of coals, with fish already laid on it, declares that the meal is of the Lord's preparing. The shadows have fled. The Life that is the Light is here. In the beautiful talk that follows the meal there is the passionate searching for the love that once seemed extinct in the follower who most protested his devotion, and a suggestion that the loved one, equally with the Lover, lives on into eternity. Agape is written over it all.

Does it mar the simplicity of the tale if it is suggested that there is a motive behind it? Criticism suggests a doubt of the authenticity of this last chapter. We need not be much concerned with criticism. Whoever wrote this chapter, it is manifestly an after-thought, an appendix to the foregoing matter, perhaps a correction. The close correspondence in detail with Luke's account of the Miraculous Draught involves the inference that the writer had that account in his mind, and for some reason transferred the incident from the middle of the earthly career of Jesus to its end. It must be because the uncommented story of Luke lacked spiritual meaning; that in this last meal shared by the risen Lord with his followers there was a sanctity commending it to Christians in all time to come.

Though John in his story relates some of the most surprising "miracles" in all the Gospel narratives, he attaches little value to them as miracles. To him they are "signs," or symbols of latent spiritual truths, serving the purpose taken by parable in the Synoptic Gospels. The miracles of the Feeding of the Five Thousand, the Healing of the Paralytic, the Raising of Lazarus are all followed by explanatory discourse, and it is worth observing that all of them were popular subjects of Catacomb Art. The miracle of Cana is an exception. We are left to guess its significance, and it is to be noticed that the fresco painters could make nothing of it, and generally left it alone.¹

¹ I say *generally*. De Rossi does not suggest that the subject is contained in any Catacomb painting. But there is one scene (fig. 30 in vol. ii. of Northcote and Brownlow's *Roma Sotterranea*, and there described simply as "A feast") which, I think, undoubtedly is meant to be the Cana miracle. Six persons, three men and three women, sit at a table, before which are placed four large *hydriæ*, or water-vessels. There is nothing to suggest a sacred character in the meal: one of the men holds aloft a cup, from which he discharges liquor towards his mouth. The banqueters have the featureless faces of all the feasting groups in Cata-

The Art of the Catacomb painters suggests that its motive was something very different from that which informed Christian Art in later times; different too from the impressions on matters of faith and usage which are conveyed in the writings of Fathers, such as Tertullian and Irenæus, who were contemporary with the artists. It is the Art of an essentially popular religion, a religion spontaneous, simple, imaginative, in the highest degree reverent. Ritual and sacerdotalism have no part in it. Whence did it derive its qualities? Scarcely from Paul. The artists have no conception of an ordered Church such as was shadowed by Paul in his letters. Before the age of Constantine they make no distinction between priesthood and laity: even of the Apostles the trace is faint. Religion is very much a social matter, and in the family or friendly group there is little place for Ceremonial. In the whole range of this Art it is impossible to find a single scene or symbol which has any clear reference to the Pauline Eucharist of Bread and Wine. The omission is the more significant in that scenes of baptising and symbols of Baptism are frequent.

The authority for the perpetuation of the Lord's "Supper," "This do," comes solely from Paul's statement to the Corinthians that he received it "from the Lord": for the identical passage in Luke's Gospel is generally admitted to be an incorporation from Paul's epistle. There is little in John's Gospel to substantiate the facts relating to the Last Supper—much that is out of harmony with them. Deliberately he destroys the ceremonial character of the meal by dissociating it from the Passover ritual, which included bread, meat, and wine. The persons present are not described as "The Twelve," but merely as "disciples." There is no hint of the solemn consecration of the Bread and Cup. In place of it John gives us the Washing of the Feet; but he gives it, not as a rite enjoined by the Lord Jesus and to be

comb paintings, and the men are, as always, beardless. But at one end of the table sits a figure which has some pretension to portraiture. He does not wear the *clavis angustus* of the other men, and he has a beard. Catacomb art almost invariably represented Jesus as bearded, and the earliest written descriptions of his person are in support of the tradition. To this figure, who points with the left hand to a *hydria*, another, whose arm only is visible and who stands apart from the group, reaches a cup. Similarly, the much mutilated painting, which is represented in fig. 29 of the same volume of Northcote and Brownlow, and there described as "Two Guests at a Feast," is, I make no doubt, an illustration of the Supper at Emmaus. Two men sit at a table, on which are laid three loaves and a fish. Before the table stands a bearded figure, so blurred in the present condition of the painting that the attitude of the arms is indecipherable, but I think that it is meant for the mysterious Fellow-guest.

embalmed in the remembering hearts of his followers, but merely as ὑποδείγμα, a suggestion or example to govern their future conduct. Ceremonial ordinance, whether Baptism or Eucharist, has no part in his Gospel. The one, "the new" commandment of the Master is Agape, love. Baptism and the Agape meal were existing customs in the Christian communities when this Appendix was written. The former is symbolically explained in the discourse with Nicodemus. The origin and interpretation of the latter is the motive of the Appendix writer.

The third chapter in John's Gospel, in which the new birth, typified by Baptism, is interpreted to Nicodemus, is to be compared with the sixth, in which Jesus similarly interprets the eating of his flesh and drinking of his blood. The parallelism is complete. In either case the writer is dealing with an ordinance assumed by others, but not by him, to be the final instruction and legacy of Christ himself to his immediate followers. But it is not to the Twelve that the discourses in John's Gospel are addressed, but in one case to a Jewish ruler, in the other to a synagogue audience. In both instances the discussion begins with an incredulous inquiry: "How can a man be born when he is old?" and "How can this man give us his flesh to eat?" As it proceeds the physical action of Moses in lifting the serpent and in giving manna is cited, not so much as evidential fact as in illustration; and in the later chapter the thaumaturgic value of Moses' action is discounted by the remark that the fathers who ate the manna "are dead." Similarly, in the estimation of the writer, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, considered as ritual performance, have no value. The material water of Baptism, indicating a transitory cleansing from impurity, is ineffectual, unless it is accompanied by the Breath whereby life is continued, perpetuated, and eternised. Bread in this earthly wilderness is no preservative from death in the wilderness. But washing and eating, incidents of ordinary daily life, have a constant significance to the believer. The testament of the dying Lord has no place in his thought; but in the common meal of Love he has evidence that all who eat the spiritual food have life eternal. As the writer of the First Epistle of John says, "We know that we have passed out of death into life *because* we love the brethren."

Like John, the Catacomb painters turn their eyes from the shadow of Ritual to the illumination which is behind it. For them there is no Death, nor have they any symbol of it. Daniel and Lazarus only figure its impotence. There is no

hint of sorrow for martyred saints, no suggestion of the yearning for the beloved dead which is read on tombstones in churchyards of to-day. Instead, there is Hope, typified over and over again in the anchor symbol, and the happy assurance that the living-dead are "In Peace." Another word, constantly used in Catacomb inscriptions, to describe the condition of the departed, is *refrigerium*, refreshment. It is also employed to designate the Agape meal. In pictures of that meal it is perhaps intended to indicate that the living and the departed are equally participators in it. The conception of such reunion at the domestic meal was general in the heathen world, and it is conceivable that the portrayal of the funeral feast, called *περίδειπνον*, on Greek sepulchral monuments offered a suggestion to the Catacomb painters for similar scenes of Christian gatherings. The flat stone covering a grave was known to both Christian and heathen as *τράπεζα, mensa*.

The relation of the Agape to the sacramental meal of Bread and Wine is obscure, and this is not the place to review all that has been written of it. Custom probably varied in the scattered Churches of the first Christian ages, and the use of Rome may not have been that of Corinth. In one place, perhaps, both practices prevailed, in another only one of them, or the two may have been blended in a continuous ceremony.¹ Probably there was no essential difference in the character of either celebration, and from Paul's first letter to the Corinthians we gather that it was only in its commemorative aspect that the Eucharist was distinguished from the ordinary repast shared by the community: indeed, until the church appointed specially ordained ministrants, it could hardly be otherwise. As practised at Corinth the meal consisted of bread, meat, and wine. At such meetings, whether Agape or Eucharist, it is clear from the statements made by Paul and in the Epistles, 2nd Peter and Jude, that much latitude was prevalent, sometimes amounting to disorderly license. One difficulty, which had to be countered by Paul, was that of the use of meat sold in the shambles, and therefore of necessity "offered to idols." Another was that meat and wine were luxuries such as poor men could not contribute to the common stock. Selfish rich men did not share their contribution with their humbler neighbours, and un-Christian social distinctions

¹ Pliny's letter to Trajan (96) shows that in Bithynia the Christians held their "meetings on an appointed day" at two separate times. The first, at which a *sacramentum* was taken, was before daybreak: later in the day they assembled again to share an ordinary meal.

resulted. Yet more serious was the scandal involved in the abuse of wine.

These were difficulties which Paul does not attempt to remove, further than by recommendations which could only be effectual if they were loyally attended to by each member of the community. He was debarred from altering the character of the meal by the fact that its type had been "delivered" to the Corinthians on the personal authority of his statement that he had received divine instruction on the matter. John does not accept the Pauline tradition of the origin of the meal. Deliberately he omits all mention of its institution, and in the Appendix he substitutes for it another kind of meal, not as an ordinance of Christ, but as a pattern of the simplicity which should mark the practice of the faithful, and which, no doubt, actually prevailed in other communities than that of Corinth. From that meal meat and wine are absent. For meat, the bloody sacrifice, *ἱερεῖον*, fish is the substitute. It was the usual diet of the poor,¹ and had the further recommendation that in the common offerings to Greek and Roman gods fish was never an element.

May we discover in John's Gospel the motive which he had in writing the Appendix and for his silence on the subject of the Paschal meal of Bread and Wine? It lies in his disapproval of the ceremonial use of wine. It is scarcely necessary to say that his delicate sense of his Master's purity of life did not allow him so much as to mention the calumny that he was a wine-bibber. John's story suggests that Jesus was merely an onlooker at the marriage-feast of Cana. His comparison of himself to the Vine is to the growing tree. Though in the discourse in chap. vi. Jesus speaks of the drinking of his blood as essential for obtaining eternal life, the language is purely figurative, and there is no suggestion of a material application to "the child of the vine," as there is in the Synoptic accounts. On the contrary, the spiritual drink, which does not need the "oft" renewal of sacramental wine and gives eternal life, is twice compared to water (iv. 14 and vii. 38). Consider too the curious detail of the "blood and water" in xix. 34, and notice the strong assertion of the truthfulness of the witness of the incident which follows. The assertion is pointless unless it is made to establish some matter in controversy. It becomes highly significant if we compare it with the almost identical declaration in verse 24 of the Appendix. Both are meant to give

¹ Probably *τάριχος*, dried fish, was the food usually supplied at the Agape. "Cheaper than dried fish," was a proverbial expression (Aristophanes, *Vespæ*, 491).

sanction to the customary meal, in which wine was not a necessary element.

It is a remarkable fact that, whereas representations, emblematic or actual, of the common Christian meal are numerous in Catacomb paintings, in no single instance is there a clear suggestion of the Eucharist of Bread and Wine. If the rite were familiar we should expect that no feeling of reverence would prohibit its figuring in emblem at least, as Moses striking the Rock is the oft-repeated symbol of Baptism. But the obvious type of Melchizedek is wanting, and the subject of the Marriage at Cana is very rare, and has no apparent reference to the use of wine in the Eucharist. Vases of various shapes occur frequently in decorative painting, but nothing whatever that definitely is meant for a chalice.

But it would be an unwarrantable inference that the use of wine was positively prohibited in the social meal depicted in the Catacombs, which we may call the Agape : ritual not being in question, some latitude in practice was permissible. Adhering to the plaster in the *loculi* are many fragments of glass, evidently portions of vessels used at funeral meals, and some of them show traces of wine. Fig. 29 in the second volume of Northcote and Brownlow's *Roma Sotterranea* shows a scene of five persons, men and women, seated at a *sigma*, or segmental table. On the table is a fish and on the floor there is an amphora. In front of the table stands a small figure holding a cyathus, towards which the others reach their hands. Above one of the sitters is written *Agape misce mi*, which indicates that the scene is an Agape meal. Above another are the words *Irene da calda*. The name, Irene, clearly recalls the word *Irene*, "Peace," habitually inscribed on Christian tombs.¹ I am unaware of any evidence that warmed wine, *calda*, was used in the Eucharist.

If the meal of Bread and Wine, as a subject for his Art, is practically unknown to the Catacomb painter, that of Bread and Fish is of all subjects that which is most familiar to him. Sometimes it is the group assembled for the meal which he depicts, oftener the emblem of the Fish, or Fishes, and Loaves. Nor is the subject confined to Catacomb painting of the first three centuries. It is constantly reproduced in the bas-reliefs of sarcophagi belonging to the fourth and fifth centuries. In sculpture, in gems, on glass, and on terra cotta the symbol appears in innumerable examples from different parts of the Western Empire : as

¹ But the inscriptions quoted by Leclercq, *Manuel d'Archéologie Chrétienne*, ii. 171, show that Agape, Irene were perhaps personal names rather than personifications.

an isolated device the Fish is of all emblems of the Saviour the commonest.

The group scenes in Catacomb painting are mostly of one pattern. Seven men are seated at a couch or table;¹ but in one instance they are represented standing, and there is no table. Before them are fishes on platters and baskets of loaves. The fishes are always two, as in the narrative of the Feeding of the Five Thousand (John vi. 9), but the number of the baskets varies. As the men are seated at a table it is clear that the picture does not present the actual scene of chap. vi. or of the Appendix, but is a blending of details in both of them with those of an Agape meeting.

In places other than Rome, instances occur of the introduction in works of art of Loaves and Fishes in scenes where they might seem least likely. From a catacomb at Alexandria comes a mutilated painting which is reproduced in fig. 11 in Northcote and Brownlow's second volume. On the spectator's left are two standing figures, the one identified by the writing above it as "Jesus," the other, which is nearly obliterated, as "the Holy Mary." Near them are four or five seated figures labelled *παιδιά*. The scene intended might seem to be the Marriage at Cana. But the *παιδιά* (*διάκονοι* in the Gospel story) are sitting on the ground, and there are no water-pots. Possibly the painter meant to blend the two subjects of the Conversion of Water into Wine and the Multiplication of the Loaves and Fishes. In the story of the latter miracle it is mentioned that the multitude sat on the ground, and that there were children (*παιδιά*) among them. On the right side of the picture is a group of three persons seated on the ground between trees and labelled *τὰς εὐλογίας τοῦ χριστοῦ ἐσθίοντες*. *Εὐλογία* was the name for the elements of the Eucharist—perhaps also of the Agape—but the scene is perhaps to be taken as that of the Feeding of the Five Thousand. In the centre are figures of Jesus, Peter, and Andrew, so indicated by writing above them. Andrew bears two fishes in a dish, and at the feet of Jesus are two baskets containing loaves.

It has already been remarked that a common type of the Crucifixion is Daniel standing between two lions, with his arms raised so as to give a cross-like appearance. Into this design, incongruously enough, the figure of the prophet

¹ The number *seven* recalls verse 2 of the Appendix. It is never *eight*. In the Appendix story Jesus does not partake of the meal (contrast Luke xxiv. 42). It has not been prepared by the disciples, as the Passover meal was in the Synoptic accounts. The painters imply that the Lord is present in the Loaves and Fishes.

Habakkuk is often intruded. The reference was to the legend told in the book of *Bel and the Dragon*, that Habakkuk was carrying pottage and broken bread in a bowl to reapers in the field, when he was accosted by an angel, who lifted him by the hair and carried him to the lions' den, and that so Daniel was sustained with food. In most representations of the story Habakkuk carries either a pail or a basket of loaves. But in one, figured on a grave at Miannay, he holds in one hand a pail, in the other a large fish.

With Habakkuk's pail we must connect another common emblem in Catacomb paintings—the milk-pail. In two instances a fish is depicted bearing on its back a basket of loaves. On a gravestone, dug up at Modena, two fishes are represented with seven loaves between them, and the inscription above them, *Συντρόφιον*, clearly identifies the design with the common meal. Instead of this device, in three cases we get that of a lamb carrying a milk-pail. In fish and lamb we are to recognise the Saviour. Analogy suggests that milk in the one instance, as bread in the other, was a usual element of the sacred repast. The story that St Perpetua, in a vision, received from Jesus, as the Good Shepherd, curds of milk in her crossed hands has an apparent reference to the usage. Tertullian tells us that among practices traditionally accepted by the Church, though not prescribed, was that of giving a cup of milk and honey to the neophyte who partook of the rite of Communion after Baptism.

Towards the end of the fourth century the beautiful practice of the Love-feast, held in private houses as well as in churches and cemeteries, died out in the Western Church. The concurrent evidence of Augustine, Chrysostom, and other Fathers shows that its primitive simplicity, lacking disciplined control, degenerated into license; and as the Church widened its borders to include many whose profession of faith was nominal, superstitious observances, derived from heathenry, began to corrupt the evangelical sincerity of an earlier age. Probably the Church had another reason for discountenancing the Agape entertainment. Confronted with growing Heresy and Barbarism it suspected a secret enemy, as Imperial Rome had done, in the untutored enthusiasm which attended these private and unofficial gatherings. Heresy is unauthorised Faith. So the Johannine tradition of the Resurrection feast, which based itself on nothing surer than the Master's example, gave way to the Pauline Death ceremony, which claimed authority from his direct commission.

IS DETERMINISM RATIONAL?

HOWARD V. KNOX.

FOREWORD.

My aim in this article is to show that whether Determinism is formulated as (a) "Whatever is, *must* be," or (b) "The real is rational," or (c) "All voluntary action is necessary," it is (1) indisputable, (2) meaningless, (3) indisputable *because* meaningless. This result, moreover, is a necessary consequence of applying Formal Logic to psychic fact. The will can then be treated as real or unreal, according to the varying needs of deterministic polemic. Thus empty verballity and implicit self-contradiction are made to appear as important truth.

I.—THE DOCTRINE OF "NECESSITY" AS A NECESSARY TRUTH.

The *a priori* argument for Determinism has never been expressed with greater terseness, vigour, or clearness than in the following utterances of Mr F. H. Bradley :—

"We must insist that every act is a resultant from psychical conditions. . . . This would be denied by what is vulgarly called Free Will. That attempts to make the self or will, in abstraction from concrete conditions, the responsible source of conduct. As however, taken in that abstraction, the self or will is nothing, 'Free Will' can merely mean chance. If it is not that, its advocates are at least incapable of saying what else it is. . . . Considered either theoretically or practically, 'Free Will' is, in short, a mere lingering chimera. Certainly no writer, who respects himself, can be called on any longer to treat it seriously."¹

"Chance belongs to the world of existence and

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd edition, p. 435 and n.

possibility to thought; but each contains at bottom the same defect, and each, against its will, when taken bare, becomes external necessity. . . . The identity, in the end, of possibility with chance, and of chance with external or brute necessity, has instructive consequences. It would obviously give the proper ground for an estimate of that which vulgarly is termed Free Will. This doctrine may in philosophy be considered obsolete, though it will continue to flourish in popular ethics. As soon as its meaning is apprehended, it loses all plausibility. But the popular moralist will always exist by not knowing what he means." ¹

"There is no such thing as absolute chance, or as mere external necessity, or as unconditional possibility. The possible must, in part, be really, and that means internally, necessary." ²

The points to note in this argument are:—

- (a) The dichotomy of necessity and chance.
- (b) The identification of freedom with possibility, in virtue of their common identity with chance.
- (c) The assertion that there is no such thing as absolute chance: which seems to mean that the appearance of "chance" is always due to our ignorance; so that what appears to be accidental is really necessary.
- (d) The consequent disappearance of real possibility or freedom.

This argument seems incisive and conclusive enough. It would also be simple, but for the somewhat surprising introduction of something called "external or brute necessity." This has affinity not with the more reputable sort of "necessity," but with "chance." Indeed, its identity with "chance" is emphasised. We are not, however, told that it leads to a Super-Reality, uniting "necessity" and "chance" in a higher synthesis. In fact, if "necessity" and "chance" are to remain distinct, and Mr Bradley's argument is not to be destroyed, "external" necessity can have nothing but the name in common with the "internal" necessity that pervades reality.

Nevertheless, Mr Bradley makes it clear that his fundamental objection to "freedom" is not that it is unreal, but that it is essentially *unintelligible*. It is not even a necessary illusion of our finite intelligence. It is the very negation of reason, as such, and has a purely verbal mode of existence in the mouths of "moralists" who do not know

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 393 and n.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 393.

what they mean. It is this that makes Mr Bradley such a good representative of Determinism¹: for in the last resort all determinists fall back on this charge. Even an "empiricist" like Bain can say in his chapter on "Liberty and Necessity" in *Mental Science* :—

"The prediction of human conduct is not less sure than the prediction of physical phenomena. . . .² We do not convert mental sequences into pure material laws by calling them sequences and maintaining them (on evidence of fact) to be uniform in their working. Even, if we did make this blundering conversion, the remedy would not lie in the use of the word "free." We might with equal appropriateness describe the stone as free to fall, the moon as free to deviate under solar disturbance; for the stone might be restrained, and the moon somehow compelled to keep to an ellipse. Such phraseology would be obviously *unmeaning and absurd, but not a whit more so than in the application to the mental sequence of voluntary action.*³

II.—DETERMINISM AND "LOGIC."

The fundamental contention, then, of Determinism is that freedom is theoretically inadmissible, because only the "necessary" is intelligible. Now, this argument necessarily exhibits Determinism as not merely a psychological theory of the nature of Will; but also, and even more fundamentally, as a logical theory of the nature of Intelligence. It

¹ From Mr Bradley himself, however, we might reasonably have expected a rather more generous and detailed treatment of freedom as an *appearance*. In his view, all "appearance" *as such* is self-contradictory and unintelligible. It necessarily follows that self-contradiction and unintelligibility do not in themselves disqualify a given entity for a place in that world of "appearance" to which the plain man, in his ignorance, refers as "the real world" *par excellence*. Why, indeed, should freedom be denied the "degree of reality" accorded to time, the self, and causation—all of which are "self-contradictory"? To be consistent, Mr Bradley should have shown that freedom is somehow *more* unintelligible than the other "self-contradictions" of common sense. But perhaps that would have brought too clearly to light that the necessary counterpart of his theory of "degrees of reality" is a theory of degrees of self-contradiction. Unfortunately, that there can be degrees of self-contradiction is just what the formal law of contradiction denies. The final source of all this confusion is, of course, Mr Bradley's failure to perceive that his reduction of *everything* to self-contradictory "appearance" is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the formal law of contradiction.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 397.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 399–400. The italics are mine.

may be analysed further into its logical and psychological components.

A. Determinism, as a theory of Intelligence, assumes that the function of intelligence is to understand; and to understand is to explain. The particular function of "proof" falls within this general definition. For to "explain" a given fact is to show that, in the relevant circumstances, just this fact *must* arise, and no other. The principle that "Whatever is, *must* be," becomes, therefore, the necessary presupposition of intelligence, as such. This we will call the *Deterministic Principle*. It is the common inspiration of such nominally divergent schools as "scientific" materialism and Kantian "idealism"; and it forms the basis of the traditional "Logic."¹

B. Determinism, as a theory of Will, professes to explain voluntary action as the "necessary" resultant of certain antecedent "conditions," which are generally described as "motives." This theory we will call *Psychical Determinism*.

The deterministic argument is the passage from the Deterministic Principle to Psychical Determinism. It seems at first sight logically irrefutable. And it is logically invincible, in the sense that the claim of traditional Logic to deal with the *whole* of Reality stands or falls with the deterministic argument. Determinism appears to be the very embodiment of pure reason, because the traditional Logic is *deliberately* deterministic. But, like every argument under the sun, the deterministic argument may be taken in one of two ways: either as establishing the truth of its conclusion, or as discrediting the assumptions from which it started. It may be taken *either* as a proof of Determinism, *or* as a proof that all is not well with the Deterministic Principle.

Now, on examination, it will be found that the Deterministic Principle, together with the Logic which it inspires, and on which it in turn relies, has its Achilles' heel in the very fact that it severs will from intelligence. In so doing, it *assumes* that the proper function of intelligence is contemplation rather than creation. It is the Logic of the *fait accompli*: it regards "Reality" as something which we find, and do not in any sense make.

¹ Cf. e.g. Sigwart's *Logic* (translated by H. Dendy), vol. i. p. 9: "Since . . . actual Thought can and does miss its aim, we have need of a discipline which shall teach us to avoid error and dispute, and to conduct Thought in such a manner that the judgments may be *true*—that is, necessary and certain—that is, accompanied by a consciousness of their necessity, and therefore universally valid. Reference to this aim distinguishes the logical from the psychological treatment of Thought."

As the Deterministic Principle severs will from intelligence, so the deterministic argument, in applying that principle to the "special case" of volition, treats will primarily as an *object* of intelligence. This "object" is, indeed, *psychical*; but *qua* "object" it must conform to the "necessary presuppositions" of intelligence. Moreover, not only does the deterministic argument take the intelligibility of "necessity" for granted; but it also *assumes* that "necessity" remains intelligible when voluntary activity is brought formally within its sphere. Determinists profess to find freedom unintelligible. For that very reason they must now be asked what they themselves mean by "necessity."

III.—A PARENTHESIS ON FORMAL LOGIC.

The deterministic argument, as we have seen, simply applies the Deterministic Principle to the special case of voluntary action. Judged by the canons of Formal Logic, its reasoning is unexceptionable. Unfortunately, it also provides an unsurpassed illustration of certain fundamental defects of Formal Logic. Of these, the most fatal is that Formal Logic is by its nature debarred from affording any protection against the fallacies of *ambiguity*. The effect of ambiguity is that a statement in one of its "meanings" may be true; while in another, subtly different, "meaning" it may be false. Because ambiguity corrupts meaning without affecting form—identity of form being indeed a condition of its existence—ambiguity cannot be regarded as a merely *formal* fallacy.

It was perhaps well for Formal Logic that it did not make this painful discovery for itself long ago; for the discovery is its death-blow. If ambiguity is *not* a formal defect, no perfection of syllogistic or symbolic form can guard against it. The mere fact that an argument is word-perfect is quite consistent with its possessing *as* an argument no meaning at all. For, as Mr Alfred Sidgwick (whom I have here freely used¹) has continually shown, when ambiguity comes in at the door, meaning flies out at the window. When an argument is convicted of "effective ambiguity," nothing can restore meaning to it except a radical reconsideration both of the "facts" in the case and of the "principles" concerned. And with every fresh application of a "principle" the *possibility* of ambiguity arises, just because the application necessarily reacts on the "meaning."

¹ See especially his *Distinction and Criticism of Beliefs*, and *The Use of Words in Reasoning*. Cf. also Dr F. C. S. Schiller's *Formal Logic*.

Since every application of a principle to particular facts does not merely bring those facts within the scope of the principle, but also involves an *interpretation* of the principle as truly applicable thereto, it follows that it is only in its *applications* that we can discover what the principle "really means." A principle may be indisputable "in the abstract"—i.e. when we have no other clue to its meaning than its verbal formulation,—and yet may become false and even self-contradictory when some unforeseen application reveals its latent "meaning." Nothing therefore is more irrational than such blind faith in an abstract principle as will impel us to "follow the argument whithersoever it may lead," without paying any heed to where we are going. Such faith is not faith in reason, but faith in words and formulas.

IV.—THE INITIAL DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM.

So long as the "special case" of voluntary activity is kept in the background, "necessity" appears as merely the correlative of "chance": it seems as if everything must be referred to one or the other of these categories. But the assertion that "Voluntary action, like everything else, is *necessary*," immediately necessitates a revision of this formal definition of "necessity." Determinism drags volition into its "system" as light-heartedly and triumphantly as the Trojans dragged the wooden horse within their fortress walls. And it suspects as little as the Trojans what a fatal capture it is effecting.

For, voluntary action at the very least *appears* to provide a *tertium quid* to the simple dichotomy of "necessity" and "chance." *Prima facie* it is neither necessary nor accidental. It is intentional and purposive. *Qua* intentional, it is the very opposite of blind "necessity": *qua* purposive, it is the very opposite of blind "chance." This purposive character it does, indeed, share (in a sense) with vital "phenomena" as a whole. But as *conscious pursuit of real ends* voluntary activity seems to be peculiar. For common sense, there is not merely a difference, there is all the difference in the world, between suffering something because we cannot help it, and doing something because we choose to; just as there is all the difference in the world between what happens "by accident" and what is done on purpose. In so far, indeed, as anything is *absolutely* beyond our control, it makes no difference *practically* whether we call it "necessity" or "chance" or "fate."

At the very outset, then, Determinism is confronted with

this dilemma: "Necessity," to be universal, must *include* purposive (*i.e.* voluntary) action; but purposive activity, on the face of it, *excludes* "necessity." This situation has received the singularly inappropriate name of the "Problem of Free Will." A less question-begging description of it would be the "Paradox of Universal Necessity."

At first, no doubt, an easy solution seems practicable. Let it be denied that purpose really exists at all. This would dispose of the discrepant fact of volition, and would once more leave "necessity" formally in possession of the whole field of "reality." But, unfortunately, Psychological Determinism professes to deny, not the reality of will, but only its "freedom." The "necessity" of volition is, in fact, deduced directly from its "objective reality." The deterministic argument, therefore, appears most singularly to combine the characteristics of a *petitio* and a self-contradiction: at best its "meaning" is, to begin with, wholly problematic. Hardly an auspicious start for a theory which professes to be the embodiment of perfect rationality.

It is not, be it observed, the abstract notion of "necessity" which is *prima facie* self-contradictory; but only the notion of an *universal* "necessity" which *excludes* "chance," but *includes* purposive or voluntary activity. We may now definitely raise the question whether the *meaning* of "necessity" does not depend on its *limitation*. In particular, we have to inquire whether the *scientific* use of "necessity" supports the deterministic theory. For if deterministic "necessity" is *not* to be identified with scientific "necessity," we may at any rate say of it in this connection what Mr Bradley said of freedom in connection with chance: "If it is not that, its advocates are at least incapable of saying what else it is."¹

V.—THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "NECESSITY" AND PURPOSE.

We have spoken of "necessity" as "blind," to point the contrast with purposive, or voluntary, activity, which is characterised by *foresight*. The "laws" of mechanics may fairly be taken as the typical example of scientific or natural "necessity." And this means that the notion of natural "necessity" is in a special way associated with the behaviour of inanimate objects. Conversely, the distinctive mark of the inanimate, as such, is its complete indifference, not only to human welfare, but also to any end whatsoever. The inanimate knows nothing of values, because it presumably

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 701.

knows nothing at all. It is, in fact, exclusively, and unambiguously, an *object* of intelligence. Not only may we grant that the behaviour of objects *in this sense*—i.e. objects which do not themselves display intelligence—is characterised by “necessity,” but we may assert that *in this sense* “objectivity” and “necessity” are, in principle, one and the same.

That the notion of natural “necessity” receives its primary *verification* in the study of inanimate objects is generally recognised.¹ That it is expressly designed to rule out “final causes” should, for that very reason, be sufficiently obvious.

This notion of scientific or natural “necessity” takes tangible shape and receives experimental verification in the manufacture of machines. But the “purely scientific” point of view concentrates on the internal “necessity” of the machine, and ignores, or abstracts from, the mind of the inventor. It seeks to know only *how* things work, not *why* they were made. It emphasises the distinction between “theory” and “practice,” and disclaims all “utilitarian” intent. In a word, the scientific outlook is (in intention and of set purpose) impersonal, non-ethical, and non-teleological; and the “necessity” which expresses it necessarily shares these characteristics. In the words of Mr Bertrand Russell:—

“The kernel of the scientific outlook is a thing so simple, so obvious, so seemingly trivial, that the mention of it may almost excite derision. The kernel of the scientific outlook is the *refusal* to regard our own desires, tastes, and interests as affording a key to the understanding of the world.”²

Volition, on the other hand, is, strictly speaking, the sole object of ethical judgment; it is the essence of personality; and it is literally nothing if not teleological, or purposive.

Wherever, therefore, the notion of natural “necessity” *can* be significantly applied, it *ipso facto* displaces the teleo-

¹ Cf. the opening sentences of Clerk Maxwell’s *Matter and Motion*: “Physical science is that department of knowledge which relates to the order of nature, or, in other words, to the regular succession of events. The name of physical science, however, is often applied in a more or less restricted manner to those branches of science in which the phenomena considered are of the simplest and most abstract kind, excluding the consideration of the more complex phenomena, such as those observed in living beings.” This preliminary exclusion of “living beings” involves a preliminary abstention from the study of anything that is *in any sense* purposive—except actual machines.

² *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 42 (italics mine).

logical, voluntaristic, or animistic explanation of "phenomena," and, within its universe of discourse, rules out will as a *vera causa*. In short, there is only one kind of natural "necessity"; and that is *physical* "necessity." On these terms, and only on these terms, the idea of "necessity" may be applied to the "phenomena" of life. That is to say, it can be so applied, just so far as will is treated as negligible or ineffective. That, for instance, is the precise significance of Darwinism as a "naturalistic," or scientific explanation of the apparent purposiveness displayed in organic "adaptations." Adaptive structures, on this theory, are brought about without the will or consent of the organism concerned—and without any *intention*, anywhere, to bring about that result. At every stage in the evolution of any organ, the structure is the "necessary" resultant of the precedent "conditions." The explanation is held to be scientific, just because it is *not* teleological. *Per contra*, it is only where we are compelled to fall back on a teleological explanation, that we find it necessary to postulate the intervention of will. Hence, to include the volitional within the sphere of the "necessary" necessarily destroys the meaning both of volition and of "necessity." To assert that "voluntary" acts are "necessary," is to assert that they are not *really* voluntary.

It follows, also, that the scientific conception of "necessity," when extended to voluntary action, produces not Psychical Determinism, but "*Behaviourism*." We must now say, not that psychical "events" are "necessary," but that "consciousness does not exist." So long as our attitude to "objective phenomena" is that of the "disinterested" *spectator*, we are at perfect liberty to make the "methodological assumption" that purely physical "laws" are completely adequate to the "explanation" of those "phenomena." But if that assumption is capable of complete *verification*, then Occam's razor cuts out mind, as an "objective reality," altogether.

VI.—THE IDENTITY OF WILL AND INTELLIGENCE.

The clear differentiation of the inanimate from the animate is what distinguishes the outlook of civilised man from that of the savage. In what *we* regard as the "blind forces of nature," the savage sees the working of a mind, or minds, akin to his own. "Natural necessity" has no meaning for him, just because he "explains" everything by will. Behaviourism, it will be observed, is a simple inversion of this primitive "superstition." For the behaviourist, conscious-

ness does not exist, just because he "explains" everything as "necessary."

Because the savage attributes to the things of nature powers similar, but superior, to his own, he seeks to *propitiate* nature rather than to subdue it. His "magical" practices are the natural expression of his theoretic outlook. Unfortunately, it is a doubtful compliment to say of anything that it "works like magic"; for magic, so far as we can see, does not work.

Nevertheless, as a speculative venture, primitive Animism has points. It starts from the conscious subject's immediate experience of passion and activity. It proceeds, that is, from the known to the unknown. Primitive Animism, moreover, is the earliest attempt to "explain the world by a single principle"—which many still regard as a legitimate philosophic ambition. Its weak point, as already indicated, lies, like that of most philosophies, in its practical futility. But it does not achieve the supreme futility of priding itself on this.

Having once succeeded in distinguishing between the animate and the inanimate, men of the "higher culture" naturally regard it as a waste of time to appeal to the better feelings of inanimate objects. In the act of making this distinction, we have found a better way. We have made the wonderful discovery that in nature's neutrality lies our great opportunity. For, in so far as things have no will of their own, they cannot set themselves to thwart *ours*. The more we know of nature's ways, the more nature becomes subservient to *our own* intelligence. For with foresight there enters into the world-process the possibility of guidance, or *control*.

Control is a "function" (in the mathematical sense) of intelligence. So much is obvious. But intelligence, *as exercising control*, is indistinguishable from volition. The deterministic treatment of will as merely an *object* of intelligence is, therefore, a mere question-begging device.

The essential identity of will and intelligence is, indeed, patent even from the point of view of the spectator. As applied to behaviour, the words "voluntary" and "intelligent" are strictly synonymous. As James says:—

"The pursuance of future ends, and the choice of means for their attainment, are the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon."¹

And again:—

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 8.

"Will and Belief, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the Self, are two names for one and the same *psychological* phenomenon. All the questions which arise concerning one are questions which arise concerning the other."¹

VII.—WILL AS CAUSE.

That intelligence, in the form of will, is itself a factor in the shaping of the reality which it "knows," is obvious to the plain man. Nor has any logician "ever dreamt of denying it"—in so many words. But it is, for all that, a fact which the traditional "Logic" has chosen systematically to ignore. And the Deterministic Principle, which is the basis of that "Logic," certainly *means*—so far as it means anything—to convert that abstraction into a systematic denial of the fact. Let us, *per contra*, enumerate a few of the consequences that flow from an unequivocal and straightforward acceptance of an efficacious intelligence or will.

(a) Since control is a "function" of intelligence, and since from the strictly scientific, or biological, point of view, there is no other *object* in thinking, it seems to follow that controllability, rather than the abstraction called "pure necessity," is the necessary presupposition of intelligence. That is to say, the admission of mind as a vital "phenomenon" means that the science of *Life* has already begun to transcend the category of "necessity."

(b) The fact that control is a "function" of intelligence discredits, at a single stroke, the abstract distinction between the "subjective" and the "objective"—a distinction which is continually used to suggest the inferiority, and often to suggest the "unreality," of the "subjective." It discredits that distinction, because it forces us to recognise that, through the medium of volition, the most "subjective" thing about us, namely, our *preferences*, may decide the course of events in nature.

(c) It impugns the theoretic value of the distinction between "fact" and "value," because now we are compelled to recognise that our valuations may determine the occurrence of the facts.

(d) It discredits the distinction between "theory" and "practice," seeing that intelligence can now no longer be treated as merely contemplative.

(e) It shows that the *utility* of knowledge is nothing that intelligence need be ashamed of, or disown as foreign to its

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 321.

essential nature. For such utility is a corollary of the fact that intelligence is, to some extent, *creative*.

All these abstract antitheses—between “objective” and “subjective,” between “fact” and “value,” between “theory” and “practice,” between “truth” and “utility”—are, obviously, systematically inter-related. That in each case the distinction is *absolute* appears to be the necessary presupposition of the traditional, or deterministic “Logic.” But precisely the opposite assumption appears to be the necessary presupposition of any *intelligence* that is itself a constituent of reality. The traditional “Logic,” in short, is an attempt to conceive the world as a “system” which is *uninfluenced* by the presence within it of intelligent beings. Just so far as that abstraction is applicable and useful, “Logic” may possess its own peculiar kind of truth. When the abstraction is taken as the whole truth, it manifestly becomes self-contradictory and meaningless.

VIII.—DETERMINISTIC “LOGIC” VERSUS DETERMINISTIC “PSYCHOLOGY.”

The antitheses briefly reviewed in the last section are all ancillary to the basic intellectualist antithesis between the so-called “logical” and “psychological” points of view. Orthodox “Logic” avowedly “has nothing to do with psychology.” Conversely, orthodox “psychology” disclaims all interest in the truth or falsity of the “ideas” or “states of consciousness” which it professes to study.¹

This is perhaps the master-stroke of intellectualist, or

¹ Cf., e.g., Sigwart, *Logic*, i. p. 9 (in continuation of the passage quoted on p. 704, n.): “The psychological treatment of Thought . . . is concerned with the knowledge of Thought as it actually is, hence it seeks the laws according to which, under certain conditions, a certain thought appears in just one way and no other. Its task is to explain all actual Thought accordingly to the general laws of psychical activity, and as arising from the particular conditions of the individual instance, thus dealing with all Thought alike, whether erroneous and disputable, or true and generally accepted. The antithesis of true and false is no more a psychological one than is the antithesis of good and bad in human action.” (On the very same page, however, Sigwart recognises—with startling inconsequence—that logical “necessity” implies *psychological freedom*: “Instruction in an art which claims to ensure success for the activity to which it gives rules presupposes that this activity is completely free and voluntary. . . . If there is to be an Art ensuring the production of necessary and universally valid Thought, by means of which we may know the Truth, we must assume that all the conditions lie within our grasp, and, that at any given time we are completely free to control our Thought in accordance with its rules.” *Vide op. cit.*, pp. 9–10. The italics are mine.)

deterministic, theory. For, from neither of these two "points of view" does *purpose* form a feature of the landscape. The "logical" point of view refuses to consider the efficacy or *utility* of intelligence, in virtue of which intelligence is purposive or *creative*. The "psychological" point of view correspondingly shuts out the significance, and even the reality, of *foresight*; inasmuch as "psychology" has no official cognisance of the distinction between truth and error. Thus the orthodox severance of "Logic" from "psychology" automatically makes of the world a mere "object" of contemplation; and at the same time, while pretending to preserve the "reality" of mind, makes of mind the meaningless reduplication (or misrepresentation, as the case may be) of a soulless mechanism.

In other words, through the gap between "Logic" and "psychology," freedom and purpose are silently thrust out of sight, out of mind, and out of existence. And this dark deed is done in the name of the "disinterested" love of Truth. Whosoever attempts, in the name of common sense, to restore to purpose, in theory, the predominant position it occupies in Life, is coldly informed that as a philosopher he has not learnt the rudiments of his business. He is "confusing Logic with psychology," and allowing "merely practical" considerations to distort his "theoretic" vision of "the whole."

Without doubt, this is a shrewdly conceived scheme; and it has *de facto* been remarkably successful in its primary purpose of *making* freedom unintelligible. Its bold and masterly use of the *petitio* seems to ensure its internal coherence; even as its practical futility attests its theoretic "purity." Nevertheless, taken strictly on its own merits, it is profoundly *incoherent*. For consider:—

The traditional, or deterministic "Logic" sees in our emotional and volitional nature nothing but a "subjective" hindrance to the "disinterested" pursuit of "objective" truth. In intelligence it sees, "in Plato's magnificent phrase," nothing but the Spectator of All Time and All Existence.

On the other hand, for deterministic *psychology* our emotional and volitional nature is certainly quite *objective*. Our emotions are given causal efficacy under the name of "motives." Volition is treated as a perfectly natural phenomenon. Intelligence itself, under the name of "cognition" (though purged of truth and meaning), forms part of the eternal film which unrolls itself to the gaze of the unmoved Spectator.

The "Logic" and the "psychology" of Determinism are

thus hopelessly at cross purposes. Everything which from the "point of view" of the first is *purely* "subjective" is necessarily treated by the second as *purely* "objective." And yet the former point of view must "somehow" include the latter, or perish in the attempt.¹

It follows that while the deterministic scheme as a whole is an elaborate *petitio*, at the very heart of its "Logic" there is a fatal contradiction. For the "logical" point of view is *ex hypothesi* that of an *all-inclusive system* of "truth": and yet its distinctive character resides in its *systematic exclusion* of the "psychological" point of view.

In its "Idealistic" form, the scheme professes to *identify* Thought and Reality, Meaning and Existence. Yet the distinction it makes between "Logic" and "psychology" is based on an *absolute distinction* between the "meaning" and "existence" of Thought itself. To Intellectualism, in all its forms, will must always remain an insoluble problem; for will is precisely *the point at which intelligence becomes a real factor in the shaping of reality*. All that Intellectualism *can* do with such an inconvenient entity is to explain it away altogether: but in doing so it destroys the *connection* between "intelligence" and "reality."

IX.—"INDISPUTABILITY" VERSUS TRUTH.

We can now see wherein lies the real difficulty of dealing with Determinism. The exigencies of debate compel us, in the first instance, to treat it as a genuine system of "belief"—as something the content of which can be adequately expressed in the form of a judgment, or system of judgments. But the more closely we consider the "system," the less are we able to find any consistent meaning. Determinism now appears to be, rather, a subtle "disposition," or—in Freudian terms—a "complex"; which is, indeed, bent on expressing itself in rational terms, but remains essentially irrational.

Deterministic psychology, in particular, professes to deny, not the reality of will, but only its "freedom." The essential ambiguity of this position should now be evident. And the ambiguity is of a kind that can only be described as purposive and systematic, or, in one word, as "malicious." It seems to be expressly designed to treat purpose as

¹ I have not here thought it necessary to draw attention to a point which the critics of "Idealism" seem unanswerably to have established—namely, that the "idealistic" theory of "truth" makes *error* unintelligible. So that, after all, its "Logic" is as incompetent as its "psychology" to *distinguish* between the true and the false.

illusory, without in so many words denying its "objective reality."¹ This we may now take as the inmost, or *effective* "meaning" of Determinism. In a purely controversial setting, we are bound to treat it as a mere "confusion of thought." But once we have established its logical character, the ingenuity of the scheme, in its details, must extort our reluctant admiration.

We are now in a position to review the deterministic argument, as a whole, from this more liberal standpoint. And, first of all, we must take account of the fact that Determinism, as now defined, has captured and corrupted practically the whole vocabulary of "Logic." Thus, to "explain" *means*—in "Logic"—to "explain as necessary"; "system" *means*—in "Logic"—a system of "necessity"; and "necessity" *means*—in "Logic"—"*absolute* necessity."

This manœuvre—which is equivalent to the capture of the "machine" in party politics—is strengthened by the fact that the traditional "Logic" apparently regards indisputability as the hall-mark of truth. And this puts a premium on purely verbal arguments; which, in the nature of the case, are verbally indisputable. Thus the capture of the vocabulary of "Logic" enables determinists to represent what is really a self-contradiction as being a "necessary truth."

It is at least certain that the traditional "Logic" attaches no special importance to the *distinction* between indisputability and truth; as is shown, *e.g.*, by the importance it *does* attach to the "laws of thought." In particular, the "first law of thought"—that "Whatever is, is"—seems definitely to identify *verbal* indisputability with truth. It condones, and in fact glorifies, pure tautology, instead of following common sense in condemning it as meaningless.²

A truism is, in a sense, indisputable. But so also, in essentially the same sense and for the same reason, is a formal, or obvious, self-contradiction. If a truism "means" what it says, this is only because it really says nothing at all. *Therefore* it is absurd and meaningless to *deny* it. In the

¹ In that crudest form of deterministic theory, which is called "Epiphenomenalism," the reality of "will" as an *effect* is formally admitted, while its reality as a *cause* is overtly denied. All other forms of Determinism try, in one way or another, to avoid betraying so clearly the secret springs of the "theory." For what Bergson says of time is even more obviously true of will: "If it *does* nothing, it *is* nothing."

² The position which in the text I have tried to defend in a manner free from any suspicion of irony, has been more pithily expressed by that legendary Sage of Cadiz, who said: "Everything is what it is. Hence, if asked, 'What's a spade?' just reply, 'It's a spade': then your friend will know *what* a spade is."

same way, solemnly to *deny* an admittedly (or formally) self-contradictory statement is to credit it with some real meaning in virtue of which it *can* be denied. And *that* is really self-contradictory.

But, in practice, a truism is seldom so innocuous or so idiotic as it pretends to be. Just because an out-and-out truism, like the "first law of thought" itself, if it means anything at all, *must* mean something different from what it says, it may be made to mean almost anything under the sun. And whichever of its "meanings" we can prove to be untenable or misleading, its adherents can always pretend that, for that very reason, it must "really mean" something else. This is notoriously the case with the "first law of thought." Even those who profess to regard it as the foundation of all reasoning seem to admit that though its "*truth*" is indisputable, its *meaning* is not. This is necessarily implied in the mere fact that they profess to *explain* the "meaning."

We come, then, to this fundamental point. Verbal indisputability is no guarantee against real ambiguity, but rather the reverse. And conversely, ambiguity can most effectively cast the cloak of indisputability over a dubious assertion. Ambiguity, in fact, precisely because it is fatal to real meaning, is *controversially* the greatest asset that a radically unsound position can possess. It is not merely that it *seems* to make the assertion indisputable. It actually does so; in that, until we know what "meaning" the assertor intends to stand by, there is really nothing for us to *deny*. Ensnared in ambiguity, the greatest absurdity may enjoy an honorific career as a "necessary truth." Taken separately, the several "meanings" may be indefensible and even ridiculous: taken collectively and in the mass, they will be literally unanswerable.

X.—THE AMBIGUITY OF DETERMINISM.

Without pretending to exhaust all the possibilities of the deterministic equivocation, we may yet indicate its main features: in the hope not so much of convincing our opponents as of showing where they really stand.

If we accept the deterministic identification of the "intelligible" with the "necessary" at its own valuation, as *indisputable*, then its real ambiguity is made evident by the fact that, *as applied to will*, it is self-contradictory.

The deterministic assertion that "Voluntary action, like everything else, is necessary" is *prima facie* self-contradictory, for the reason that "necessity" in the

scientific sense *excludes* volition. It may, however, avoid *direct* self-contradiction, under one or the other of the following interpretations. (a) The assertion may mean that there is no "objective" or recognisable difference between "voluntary" and reflex action. Or it may mean (b) that action which *really is* voluntary, *i.e.* intentional and purposive, must, in the interests of "pure theory," be treated as non-teleological. That is to say, in order to "understand" purpose, we must treat it *as if* it were an illusion.

Under interpretation (a), the statement that "voluntary action is necessary" becomes the assertion that the actions which we call "voluntary" are *in reality* "necessary." And this means that for the scientific consciousness, "consciousness does not exist." This appears to be the position of Behaviourism. While apparently admitting the ideal distinction between will and "necessity," it makes "necessity" *de facto* universal. Though, as just stated, it is verbally self-contradictory, we may perhaps grant that it is not necessarily meaningless. But Determinism, thus interpreted, drops all pretence to "necessary truth," and also the pretence of believing in the reality of will. This interpretation, therefore, affords no support to *Psychical* Determinism.

Nevertheless the possibility of so interpreting the deterministic formula ("Voluntary action is necessary") that it shall not necessarily be meaningless, has, quite illegitimately, inured to the benefit of *Psychical* Determinism—as will be shown in the next section. Conversely, the supposed indisputability of the *abstract* Deterministic Principle ("Whatever is, *must* be") has, quite illegitimately, inured to the benefit of Behaviourism. Behaviourism appears to its supporters as the *logical development* of an indisputable logical principle. Thus it is not recognised as the *only* means of rescuing the deterministic position from patent absurdity.

Under interpretation (b) Determinism relies on the *a priori* identification of the "intelligible" with the "necessary." This seems, in fact, to be the nearest and most plausible approach to a real meaning that *Psychical* Determinism can make.

So interpreted, however, *Psychical* Determinism appears to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Deterministic Principle—the principle that only the "necessary" is intelligible. If its adherents refuse to see it in this light, it still remains a *petitio principii*. For a *petitio* consists in nothing else than this: that one of the parties to a dispute insists on regarding as a demonstrable "truth" a conclusion which *in the eyes of his opponents* discredits the principle it is derived from. And

even so, the "meaning" we have now arrived at is highly dubious.

For it is not enough to identify the "intelligible" with the "necessary": we must also identify the "real" with both of these, so as to form the equation—"the 'real' = the 'rational.'"¹ Unless we do this, Determinism *as a theory of Reality* collapses forthwith. It is, in fact, precisely on its identification of the "real" with the "rational" *in this sense*, that Determinism, like Idealism (from which in this respect it is indistinguishable) founds its claim to perfect "rationality." To say, therefore, that purpose, *as it really is*, is unintelligible, directly destroys the ultimate basis of Determinism. Thus, if Psychological Determinism *maintains* its pretence of treating will as real, it contradicts itself. If it *drops* that pretence, it relapses into Behaviourism. This, no doubt, is why it prefers to remain ambiguous.

XI.—THE DETERMINISTIC "ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY."

If the deterministic argument be thrown into the form of an argument from analogy—as, for the sake of appearance, is usually done by "empiricist" writers—we obtain exactly the same result as before.

Physical science naturally, and rightly, treats *purely* physical, *i.e.* non-purposive, events as "necessary." That is, it treats them as non-teleological. As mind implies purpose, so purpose, in the full sense of the word, implies mind. Hence the physicist—who is not, after all, bound to take the whole realm of reality for his province¹—is fully justified in leaving the consideration of purpose to the psychologist. But if he treats of purposive events at all, he *is* bound, *qua* physicist, to treat them, *so far as possible*, as if they were non-purposive.

Enter now the deterministic psychologist. He is overcome with admiration of the methods and presuppositions which, he emphatically proclaims, "have proved so universally applicable and fruitful in physical science." He takes no account whatsoever of the fact that no physicist has yet, *e.g.* succeeded in predicting the exact course of events throughout the next year, or minute, within his own parish, to say nothing of the Universe; or explained in detail, *on purely physical principles*, the sequence of events in any historical movement, great or small. The deterministic psychologist, that is to say, in effect treats the behaviourist postulate as if it were already and indisputably verified as a

¹ See *supra*, p. 708, footnote.

method for "explaining" the concrete facts of human behaviour.

Accordingly, he announces his intention of imitating the physicist. Since the physicist treats all matters within his province as "necessary," he, the psychologist, will do likewise. He assumes, therefore, that will—which *is* purpose—must, like everything *else*, be "necessary." Which means that its special character must be ignored: it, too, must be treated as if it were *not* purposive. He does not perceive that he has begun with a *petitio* and ended with a self-contradiction. On the contrary, he appears, in general, to be full of intellectual contempt for the puzzle-headed people who fail to acclaim his position as purely rational and self-evident. Is he not, after all, merely claiming that the "real" is "rational," and that the "rational" is "real"?

When the deterministic psychologist *does* see, more or less clearly, what is wrong with his position, he does not throw overboard the Deterministic Principle. Rather than do that, he jettisons *mind*, and himself appears as that intellectual sans-culottist, the behaviourist. He may continue to *call* himself a psychologist; but he has (in theory) for ever done with *Psyche*.

If, *per contra*, the chain of physical "necessity," as known to us, is *not* complete; if the world of the physicist is *not* demonstrably a self-sufficing, closed "system"; then physical "necessity," as such, is *not* demonstrably absolute. In that case, the bottom falls out of the deterministic argument from the absolute "necessity" of the physical world to the absolute "necessity" of the world of mind—quite apart from the intrinsically self-contradictory nature of the conclusion. There remains, on the contrary, room for another principle than that of "necessity," and for an alternative method of explanation. Mind conceived as the vehicle of purpose is such a principle; and teleology is its method. Conceived in any other way, mind fails to fulfil the purpose of the conception.

XII.—CONCLUSION.

The general result, then, that we arrive at is this. In order to uphold the principle of absolute and universal "necessity"—in the scientific sense of "necessity"—it is necessary to suppress the reality of purpose. But this abstract relation between "universal necessity" and purpose does not in any way compel us to admit either that "necessity" *is* universal, or that purpose *is* "unreal." What the necessity of sup-

pressing purpose for the purpose of upholding "universal necessity" *does* prove is this : (1) that "universal necessity" is *not* a "necessary presupposition" of intelligence ; (2) that *Psychical* Determinism is essentially self-contradictory.

This result does not establish Voluntarism as a "theoretically necessary" system : in itself it leaves us free to choose between Voluntarism and Behaviourism. But it obviously calls for further critical examination of the notion of "theoretical necessity."

For the moment we must be content with this reflection : that in a psychological sense Determinism means too much, and in a logical sense too little, in that its various "meanings" psychologically support, but logically cancel, each other. Nevertheless, its subtle attempt to *exclude* Will from Reality is logically equivalent to the admission that in a world which *includes* mind, "necessity" is not the final word.

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THE CONFESSIONS AND HOPES OF AN EX-INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS.

EDMOND G. A. HOLMES.

SOMEWHERE in these islands there is a churchyard which contains a nameless grave ; and on the headstone of that grave are inscribed the words, "*Here lies a great but repentant sinner.*" When my life as a school inspector came to an end those words might well have been my epitaph. My life as a school inspector lasted nearly thirty-six years. During the first eighteen or twenty years I did as much mischief in the field of education as I possibly could. I spent the next ten or twelve years in realising, little by little, what mischief I had done. And I spent the last four or five years in making solemn vows of amendment and reparation—vows which, since my official death, I have been trying to keep.

I entered the service of "My Lords," as we called the Board of Education in those days, on April 1st, 1875, and was straightway initiated into the administration of the most fatuous and most pernicious educational system that the mind of man had yet devised. I bore the august title of Her Majesty's Inspector of Schools. In reality I was an examiner of little children, and an examiner of the worst possible type. It was my duty to examine each individual child in each standard in each of the three R's, and to examine each standard, as a class, in what were known as "class subjects," viz. geography, grammar, history, and needle-work. On the results of that examination depended the bread and butter of the teacher and the financial stability of the school. So many shillings were paid for each pass in the three R's, and so many shillings on each unit of average attendance, for each of two class subjects. A grant was also paid for singing. Where it was taught by ear, the children sang a song for sixpence. Where it was taught by note, the grant per head was a shilling.

A few years later a Commission was appointed to investigate the problems of elementary education in general, and of the payment of grant in particular. After many months of arduous labour the mountain of Whitehall gave birth to a ridiculous mouse. Instead of so many shillings per head being paid for each of the three R's, the percentage of passes in the whole school was worked out, and a penny for each unit was paid on the number of children in average attendance. For example, if the percentage of passes in a school which had an average attendance of 200 was 90, the grant paid for the three R's was 90 pence, or 7s. 6d. $\times 200$, which equalled £75. Separate grants were still paid for the class subjects and for singing, and a variable special merit grant was introduced.

A few years later these various grants were abolished, and their place was taken by two block grants: a grant of 14s. (or 12s. 6d.) for instruction, and a grant of 1s. 6d. (or 1s.) for discipline. The idea of paying 1s. 6d. (or 1s.) a head for discipline will probably move my readers to derisive laughter; but it seemed quite right and reasonable in those days. Need I add that complete immobility on the part of the children was a feature of the discipline which entitled their school to the higher grant? Their strength was to sit still. About the same time, if my memory does not fail me, examination by sample in the three R's was introduced, and was supposed to be a great improvement on the examination of all the children in all the three subjects. In point of fact, it left things pretty much as they were. For it was found that the fairest and most convenient way of examining by sample was to divide a class of (say) thirty children into three groups of ten each, and examine Group A in reading, Group B in writing, and Group C in arithmetic.

Such were the changes—none of them essential—which took place in the first twenty years of my official life. During the whole of that time the one essential feature of the education given in our elementary schools was that the teachers had to prepare their pupils for a yearly examination on a narrow and rigid syllabus, prescribed, and even formulated in the fullest detail, by the Education Department.

Let us consider what fruits such a system was likely to bear. I have said that on the results of the yearly examination depended, not only the financial stability of the school, but also the very bread and butter of the teacher. In far too many cases the teacher had a share of the grant, and, in any case, his value in the market tended to vary directly with his ability to secure a large grant for his school. It

was therefore to his interest to work hard and to make his subordinates and his pupils work hard. The result was that the school in those days was a hive of industry.

But much of its industry was misdirected energy. The State, in formulating in the fullest detail a syllabus which had to be followed in all the subjects of instruction in all the schools in the country, did for the teacher what he ought to have tried to do for himself. It relieved him, in large measure, of the necessity for thinking, purposing, planning, contriving. It provided him with his educational ideals, or rather—for an ideal offers itself to those who are able to respond to its appeal—with his educational aims, larger and lesser; and, through the yearly examination on the official syllabus, it controlled his methods to an extent which was fatal to the true interests of education.

Let us ask ourselves what the preparation of young children, year after year, for a rigorous and inquisitorial examination would be likely to do to its victims. At its best, and even when applied to adult men and women, an examination is a very imperfect test of mental progress. In the examination game there are two principal players—the examiner and the teacher or crammer—each of whom is ever trying to outwit and out-manceuvre the other. The examinee, except when he is old enough and clever enough to be his own crammer, plays but a minor part. The function of the teacher is to pump into his pupils the kind and amount of information which the examiner is likely to demand, and to put them up to the tricks and dodges which will enable them, on the examination day, to use to advantage the information which they have accumulated. If the examination is to be passed with credit, both the teacher and his pupils must use their wits. But the greater part of the thinking must be done by the teacher, whose superior age, wisdom, knowledge, and experience of the examination game make it necessary that the task of outwitting the examiner should, in the main, devolve upon him, and that his pupils should leave themselves, largely if not wholly, in his hands. The natural result of this is that the pupils, instead of learning to rely on themselves and to use their own powers and resources, become more and more helpless and resourceless, and gradually cease to take any interest in their work for its own sake, the results of the examination being the only things that matter in their eyes. The university student who has got up a certain book for a certain examination and had no question set from it, will tell you, without shame or hesitation, that the time which he gave to it was wasted.

If these are evils incidental to the examination of adult students, it stands to reason that they will be greatly aggravated when the examinees are young children. For, in the first place, the younger the child the more delusive is an external examination as a test of mental progress, the divergence between the outward and the inward results of education—between an examiner's marks and the actual development of the child's mind—being so great in the early years of life, that only by arresting mental growth can we make the outward results in any way commensurate with the inward. And, in the second place, the younger the child the more ignorant he is, and the more helpless in matters which do not happen to interest him, and therefore the more ready to lean upon the teacher and to look to him for instruction and guidance.

It follows that to make a formal examination on a prescribed syllabus the test of a child's mental progress is to compel the teacher to look at education from a radically wrong point of view. And it follows further that the teacher who has been authoritatively deprived of freedom, initiative, and responsibility, as the teachers of England were in the latter part of the nineteenth century, must, in self-defence, do to his pupils the wrong that has been done to him. For it is only by doing so that he can play his allotted part in the general scheme of education. If you turn a teacher into a marionette, he must turn his pupils into marionettes, or he will not be able to respond to the strings which control his own movements. We can see, then, that in crushing the freedom and stifling the intelligence of its teachers the State was taking effective measures, through all the dark years of payment by results, to arrest the mental growth of the boys and girls of England, and to make their education as uneducational as possible.

When inspectors ceased to examine and began to inspect they realised what mischief had been done. The children in the lower standards had been drilled in the contents of their reading books until they almost knew them by heart ; but if you asked them to read or take down from dictation a simple passage which was new to them, they too often failed ignominiously. Even in the highest standards there were many who had not the least idea how to tackle an unfamiliar word. As for enjoying or taking an interest in what they read, this was the last thing which they or their teachers thought of. In arithmetic they worked abstract sums in obedience to formal rules day after day and year after year, and were put up to various dodges which would, it was hoped, enable them

to find out by what rules the questions on the arithmetic card were to be answered. But no attempt was made to train their arithmetical sense ; and they were therefore liable to be floored by the simplest of problems, and to be upset by any change of procedure on the part of the inspector. If, for example, instead of saying, "From 95 take 57," the inspector said, for a change, "Take 57 from 95," the chances were that half the class would try to subtract the larger from the smaller number. They learned a few lines of poetry by heart—twenty lines were considered a year's work for Standard I. and forty for Standard II.—and committed all the "meanings and allusions" to memory, with the probable result that they hated poetry for the rest of their lives. In history, geography, and English they were assiduously crammed with uninteresting and unprofitable information, which was kept, by periodical questioning, as near the surface of memory as possible, so that they might be able to disgorge it, to the inspector's satisfaction, on the examination day. And so on. No attempt was made, except in a small minority of the schools, to interest the children in what they were doing ; and scarcely a thought was given to the thing that really mattered—the fostering of their mental, moral, and spiritual growth. The dark shadow of the approaching examination lay on the school from the first day of the school year to the last. To secure a high percentage of passes and a large grant was the teacher's main concern. The distrust and suspicion on which was based the whole policy of the Board were necessarily passed on from the teacher to the child. The child was not allowed to do anything for himself which his teacher could do for him. He had to do what he was told to do, to say what he was told to say, to think what he was told to think, to believe what he was told to believe, to feel what he was told to feel. And the directions given to him were, as far as possible, complete and minute. The less room he was allowed for free action, the smaller was the chance of his going astray. It was the function of the skilful teacher to foresee possible aberrations and provide against them ; and each of such acts of foresight and precaution was a fresh encroachment on the freedom of the child.

Such was the old regime—the regime of Code despotism and payment by results. The aim of those who were responsible for it was, I believe, to remove the stain and reproach of illiteracy from this country. But the critic who studied it in itself, and without regard to the circumstances of its inception, might be pardoned for thinking that it had

been framed for the express purpose of deadening faculty and distorting growth. For he could not fail to see that, far from fostering the great expansive instincts which are latent in every child, it must have been ever tending to eradicate them, one and all; or, if that was impossible, at least to arrest their development. Its defenders will perhaps contend that it atoned, in part, for this work of wanton destruction by making the child obedient and industrious and (within very narrow limits) accurate and thorough. But the answer to this argument is that enforced obedience and enforced industry are not virtues of a high order, and that accuracy and thoroughness, when divorced from intelligence, are the virtues of a machine.

I have brought grave charges against the old regime. But my indictment of it is not yet complete. Its crowning defect was that, deliberately and of set purpose, it repressed the outgrowth of that sense of well-being which is the surest indication of health—in the widest sense of the word—and which goes by the name of *happiness*. The children were not happy in their school life; and, what is more, it was not intended that they should be happy. They were working against the grain of their nature; and it was the purpose of those who educated them that they should so work. They were being treated as potential rebels and congenital block-heads; and it was being taken for granted that they would not exert themselves except in response to two base motives—competitive selfishness and fear. Their initiative, their spirit of adventure, their instinctive love of activity were being systematically repressed. And every care was being taken that the seeds of social life, which are dormant in every breast, should not germinate, that the spirit of comradeship should not awake in the school. Can we wonder that when the scholars were released at the end of the morning or the afternoon session they rushed out into the road with wild war-whoops of exultant relief?

What was I doing during all those dreary years? Alas! I was a dutiful, industrious, and almost ultra-conscientious official; and the pity of it is that when an official is administering a pernicious system, the more dutiful, industrious and conscientious he is, the more mischief he is fated to do. That is why I think of myself in those old, unhappy, far-off days as one of the chief of sinners. So potent was the pressure of the system under which we all worked that it drove me deep into the deadly grooves in which it imprisoned the teachers and the children. I saw that the system had many defects, but I regarded these as inherent in any and

every scheme of education for the masses ; and I was well content to play my appointed part in that vast complex of machinery which had been elaborated by the wisdom and was controlled by the authority of Whitehall. It has been said that custom doth make dotards of us all ; and it certainly came near to making a dotard of me.

But in the middle of the last decade of the past century a momentous change took place in the policy of the Education Department, a change which was carried out with but little previous warning. The Annual Parade Day, as the more enlightened teachers derisively called it, was abolished, and the examination system was virtually scrapped. Inspectors ceased to be mere examiners, mere appraisers and tabulators of cut-and-dried results, and became, or were expected to become, inspectors in the proper sense of the word—observers of ways and works, students of method, critics of the atmosphere, the moral, and the spirit of a school, centres of sympathy and encouragement and friendly advice.

What effect did this dramatic change have on the teachers of England? What effect was it likely to have? If one who had long dwelt in darkness were taken out, without warning or preparation, into the light of noonday, would he not be dazzled to the verge of blindness by this sudden exposure, and would he not be glad to creep back into the familiar gloom? If you treat a man as a machine, and do your best to turn him into a machine, it is unfair to expect him to act, at a moment's notice, as an intelligent and responsible being. The grooves into which thirty years of Code despotism had driven the teacher had become too deep for him. The routine which had been forced upon him had too strong a hold upon him. Was it reasonable to expect men who had been authoritatively deprived of freedom and responsibility to give any measure of freedom and responsibility to those who were under them? The teacher could indeed relax his own severe pressure on the child. And this he did, perhaps without intending to do it ; for, when the motive for exerting pressure is withdrawn, pressure tends automatically to relax itself. What happened in many schools was that the teaching remained as mechanical and routine-ridden as ever, but that the child gradually became slacker and less industrious. For the yearly examination had been his chief incentive to industry ; and when this was abolished there was nothing to take its place. Had the teacher, when emancipated by the Board, been able to give his pupils a real interest in their work, they might have exerted themselves as they had never done before.

But this would have involved a radical change in his attitude towards education ; and to expect him to make such a change in a day or even in a year was unfair and unwise. What could the average teacher do but keep his pupils on the examination treadmill, which had for many years provided them with their chief mental exercise, and with the routine of which he and they were only too familiar ? But the treadmill had ceased to be dangerous ; and the pupils gradually discovered that they could take things easy on it without coming to grief. It might have been expected that the younger teachers would take advantage of the freedom which had been given them, and that a new spirit would gradually permeate the educational world. Unfortunately, the younger teachers had spent their own childhood and adolescence on the treadmill—for both the Pupil Teacher Centre and the Training College were, as a rule, cramming establishments in those days ; and when they took service under a headmaster of the conventional type, they found no difficulty in falling in with his ways and carrying out his wishes. The rebels, if there were any, soon had “ the nonsense knocked out of them,” and were compelled to toe the line with the rest of the staff. It is true that even in the ranks of the older teachers there was a minority which had always been in secret revolt against the despotism of Code and Syllabus and Schedule. These were now given their chance. The future of education was in the hands of them and their disciples. But the leaven of new ideas and new ideals works slowly, and it was long before these pioneers could make their influence felt.

What effect did the change from examination to inspection have on me as a typical inspector ? I have briefly described the state of things which it revealed to me. I saw that things were bad—in some respects as bad as they could be, and I began to ask myself, gropingly and tentatively, how they could be made better. Like Goethe in Matthew Arnold’s poem, I could “ strike my finger on the place ” and say “ thou ailest here—and here ” ; and I could even go so far as to suggest what seemed to me appropriate remedies. But that was not the way to reform education. Patching and mending and tinkering and filling up holes would not take me or the teachers very far. One thing, indeed, of paramount importance was borne in upon me—that far too much was being done for the children, that they were being treated as automata and reduced to a state of helpless dependence on their teachers. I fought against this tendency to the best of my knowledge and ability ; and little

by little I groped my way towards the vital truth that the child must in the main work out his salvation for himself.

But it took me many years to reach that goal. An emancipative leaven was at work in me, but it worked very slowly. The shadow of my impending retirement from official life had begun to fall on me when I was introduced by a friend and colleague to a certain school in his district. The day of my first visit to that school was the date of my conversion to what I have ever since regarded as the true gospel of education. But conversion has been happily defined as "the effective realisation of admitted truth"; and the saving truth that the child must be given freedom for self-development had long been familiar to me as a theory and a conclusion. What that day did for me was to change it into a *conviction*, and so give it the driving power which it had hitherto lacked.

The school to which I owe so much was a village school in the south of England. It was attended by about a hundred and twenty children, who were taught in three rooms. The older children, those above Standard II.—some fifty in all—were taught in the main room by the headmistress, single-handed; and it was there that the real work of the school was done. I have described the school pretty fully in a book which I called *What Is and What Might Be*, and I will not now do more than call attention to two of its most salient features.

The first thing that struck me was that the children, one and all, were radiantly happy. The whole atmosphere of the school was electrical with the *joie de vivre* of the scholars. This experience was new to me, and it naturally set me thinking. In my indictment of the old regime, the crowning charge which I brought against it was that of making their school life repugnant to the children, and so giving them an unhappy childhood. But this is what education seems to have aimed at doing ever since it began. I must not let my readers think that the theory of education which I, as a school inspector, was compelled to put into practice had its origin in the perverse ingenuity of "My Lords." There was nothing really novel about it. For thousands of years education had been dominated by the assumption that children are, by nature, naughty, stupid, and helpless (except indeed for mischief), and therefore that their salvation must be worked out for them, dogmatically and dictatorially, with bit and bridle and spur, instead of their being encouraged and helped to work it out for themselves. Deliberately, therefore, and of set purpose, the teacher in all ages has made it his business to give his pupils a bad

time. The author of "Ecclesiasticus," who gave excellent advice on many matters, can find nothing better to say about the bringing up of children than this: "He that loveth his son causeth him oft to feel the rod, that he may have joy of him in the end. . . . Cocker thy child, and he shall make thee afraid; play with him, and he will bring thee to heaviness. Laugh not with him, lest thou have sorrow with him, and lest thou gnash thy teeth in the end. Give him no liberty in his youth, and wink not at his follies. Bow down his neck while he is young, and beat him on the sides, lest he wax stubborn, and be disobedient unto thee, and so bring sorrow to thine heart. Chastise thy son and hold him to labour, lest his lewd behaviour be an offence to thee." This advice has, I fear, been followed only too conscientiously by parents and teachers in all ages and in all parts of the world. What "My Lords" did was to apply the traditional theory and practice of education, without reflection and almost as a matter of course, to the children of the masses. Finding in the ignorance and illiteracy of the masses a *tabula rasa* ready to their hands, they were able to put the orthodox theory into practice with a ruthless thoroughness which is not often possible; and it was this and the greatness of the stage on which the drama was enacted that made the greatness of the tragedy.

Why were the children in Egeria's¹ school so happy? For many reasons, which may perhaps be summed up under two main heads. The first is that they lived in an atmosphere of goodwill, sympathy, and trust. Their teacher believed in them, and expected the best from them. This made them feel that all was well with them; and, feeling this, they were happy. The second reason is that they were not only allowed, but encouraged, to energise freely and naturally, in many directions, under the inspiration and guidance of their teacher. Has not Aristotle said that *ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια* is one of the chief elements in happiness? Unimpeded energy was certainly one of the most striking features of that school. I have described some of the activities of the children in *What Is and What Might Be*. Their programme of work was varied, elastic, and well balanced. The three arterial instincts—the sympathetic, the æsthetic, and the scientific,—with their great sub-instincts—the literary and the dramatic, the artistic and the musical, the inquisitive and the constructive,—instead of being ruthlessly repressed, were all skilfully and successfully fostered.

¹ "Egeria" is the name which I gave to the headmistress in *What Is and What Might Be*.

The natural result of this was that the children were making vigorous and harmonious growth on all the planes of their being ; and their consequent sense of well-being was realised by them as happiness. One might say of them what Pestalozzi (that large-hearted lover of children) said of his pupils at Stanz : "They willed, they had power, they persevered, they succeeded, they were happy."

How happy they were and how well they loved their school will be gathered from the following incident. One afternoon, when school was over, I walked back towards my headquarters with a girl who had lived near the school and had recently moved to a village about three miles away ; and she told me that she still attended school and would continue to do so till her school days were over. I asked her what she would do if she lived six miles from her old home instead of three. She answered, without a moment's hesitation, " I would come just the same." Shakespeare's

" Whining schoolboy, with his satchel
And shining morning face, creeping like snail
Unwillingly to school,"

would not have crept unwillingly if he had been one of Egeria's pupils. He would have been more likely to start off at a brisk trot so as to make sure of getting to the school before its doors were opened.

The happiness of the children was at once the proof and the cause of the success of their school. In education, as in other matters, there are " circles " which are the reverse of " vicious." Here is one of them. If you educate children in the right way you will make them happy, and if you make them happy you will be able to educate them in the right way. And the happier they become, the greater will be their response to your appeal to them, and the richer will be the harvest which you, the sower of seed, will reap. A wise and gifted teacher—a woman also, let me say in passing—recently said to me : " I try to make my pupils happy, for I find that when they are happy I can get anything I like out of them." How the happiness of Egeria's pupils reacted on their mentality and their character I have told elsewhere. But there is one of its reactions to which I have never yet done justice, and of which I now propose to speak.

I have said that the first thing which impressed me when I visited the school was that the children were radiantly happy. The next thing that impressed me was that the wells of their happiness were ever overflowing into the channel of comradeship. Looking back to the days that I

spent in the school, I can say without hesitation that, owing to the strength and unselfishness of its spirit of comradeship, it was a perfect social community. The ideal of "each for all and all for each" was fully realised in it. The co-operative spirit had killed the competitive. Though the children were all working at the top of their respective powers, competition among them was undreamed of. Prizes were as far beyond the horizon of their outlook as punishments. Places in class, merit marks, orders of merit, and the like were unknown; and had they been introduced into the school, the first to resent their introduction would have been those who, under a competitive regime, would have been at the head of their respective classes. If anyone was specially proficient at any subject, his reward was to be allowed to help others to rise towards his own level. Dramatic performances were a feature of the curriculum. The children decided among themselves who were to perform what parts; and this was done without any jealousy or heart-burning. Nowhere in the machinery of the school was there any of the heat which is generated by friction. All the bearings were lubricated by the oil of mutual goodwill.

Why should happiness overflow into the channel of comradeship? Wordsworth, in the opening lines of a beautiful sonnet, has answered this question:

" Surprised by joy—impatient as the wind
I turned to share the transport."

Is not this what each of us instinctively does when he is happy with the pure unselfish happiness of joy; when he is happy, not because fortune has favoured him and his path is smooth before him, not because he has acquired this thing or achieved that, not because he has been able to gratify his vanity or his love of power or his love of pleasure—but because a sense of spiritual expansion has uplifted and transported him, and because, under the stress of the vitalising forces which are at work in him, he feels that he must go out of himself into the lives of others? In the poet's case the sense of spiritual expansion was tempestuously sudden—so sudden that in a moment of forgetfulness he turned to share the transport with a dear dead friend. In the case of our village children the sense of spiritual expansion was generated by the steady, healthy, harmonious growth which they were making in mind and heart and soul. And they too had to share their happiness with others, and they naturally shared it with one another, and so became a band of brothers—and sisters.

For what is essential in the spontaneous overflow of goodwill from the springs of happiness is that it is absolutely disinterested. There is no *arrière pensée* of self about it; no subconscious profit-and-loss calculation; no secret pride in performance or possession. In this it differs from all other forms of communal feeling—from *esprit de corps* (which you may find in a band of robbers), from family or tribal clannishness, from patriotism, from professional or party loyalty, from racial sentiment. In each of these devotion is given—in part at least—in return for what the community has done or may be expected to do for the giver. And in each case there is a latent sense of proprietorship, a feeling that the community is one's own, that one is the citizen of no mean city. But when the spirit of comradeship is in the ascendant, goodwill to one's neighbour and devotion to the community to which oneself and one's neighbour happen to belong, are given freely, lavishly, uncalculatingly; given because one cannot help giving them; given because of the joy of giving.

It was for this reason, I think, that I never stayed long in Egeria's school without feeling that there was an element of religion, in the real sense of the word, in its atmosphere. It is true that the religious knowledge displayed by the children did not always satisfy the Diocesan Inspector; but that proved nothing except that they had not been crammed in preparation for a test which their teacher regarded as neither adequate nor fair. I have said nothing in my retrospect about the religious training of the young. I was supposed to know nothing about it. In point of fact, I knew a good deal. I will say nothing about it now except that if we seriously believe we are making the masses religious by cramming them as children for a yearly examination in scripture and the rudiments of theology, we are deluding ourselves on a matter with regard to which delusion is fatal; and that if an examiner thinks he is testing religious knowledge when he asks such questions as "Was Absalom caught by his head or his hair?" he is the victim of a grotesque misconception of the meaning of the words "religious knowledge." Religious knowledge is knowledge of God, and knowledge of God is not to be won except through love of God. Now, we know from experience that devotion to a community or a cause must always have at the heart of it devotion to a larger community and a higher cause; for if not, there will be a germ of selfishness in it which will sooner or later eat the heart out of it. That being so, it is clear that the ultimate object of disinterested devotion,

by whomsoever or to whomsoever it may be given, is God. For there is no community so large but we can dream of a larger, and no cause so high but we can dream of a higher; and therefore there is no rest for us, in our search for an adequate object of the heart's devotion, except in the infinitude of God. And so, whenever a man or a child gives goodwill and affection and sympathy, freely, lavishly, and uncalculatingly, he is laying an offering on the altar of God,

“ the Receiver and the Lord
Of every sacrifice.”

Egeria's children were not consciously religious. They were too healthily natural for that. But in their spirit of comradeship, in their goodwill to one another and their devotion to their school, and—above all—in their readiness to translate goodwill and devotion into service, they

“ worshipped at the Temple's inner shrine,
God being with them, when we knew it not.”

“ For love is of God, and everyone that loveth is born of God and knoweth God.”

So much for my confessions and my memories. Now for my hopes, which are still in the stage of dreams. It was Egeria's school that first set me dreaming; and I have been dreaming, on and off, ever since. I dream of a world in which the spirit of comradeship—comradeship between man and man, between class and class, between party and party, between nation and nation, between church and church—will have mastered and dispersed the fog of ambition and greed, of self-assertion and self-seeking, of envy, jealousy, hatred, suspicion, and mistrust, which has long obscured our vision and paralysed our energies, and seems to-day to be denser and more poisonous than it has ever been. But if that dream is ever to be fulfilled, the spirit of true comradeship, the spirit of uncalculating devotion, of willing service, must be fostered in the young. We grown-ups are not past praying for—my own “conversion” took place when I was well on in the fifties,—but most of us have grown hard in the moulds in which, first, a dogmatic and dictatorial education and, then, the prejudices which are engendered by environment—caste prejudice, class prejudice, political prejudice, national prejudice, racial prejudice, religious prejudice—have imprisoned us; and it is not easy for us to change our outlook on life. It took me ten or twelve years, from the time when my eyes were opened, to find salvation; and my conversion might never have been consummated had I

never visited Egeria's school. The difference between youth and maturity, in respect of the capacity for vital change, is the difference between the tenderness and flexibility of the sapling and the hardness and stubbornness of the full-grown tree.

Our hope lies in the young. There is a strain of spiritual idealism, of altruism, there is a capacity for self-sacrifice in human nature, the seeds of which must have been implanted in nearly every human breast. If we could but cultivate these and bring them to maturity during the period in which growth is most rapid and most vigorous, all would be well. But how is this to be done? Is altruism, is unselfish love, is self-sacrifice to be taught as a subject in our schools? God forbid! For fifteen centuries, more or less, we have taught religion—the religion of Christ—to the child, the adolescent, and the adult, taught it by the most approved methods, dogmatically, dictatorially, with threat of punishment and promise of reward. And what has been the result? The horrors of the late war and the miseries and iniquities of the so-called peace suggest to us that the teaching of religion in Christendom has been, to say the least, ineffective. Devout Christians tell us, with tears in their eyes, that the Western World is relapsing into paganism. Does not this amount to a confession that the experiment of making men religious by drilling religion into them has proved a disastrous failure?

But the idea that what is inward and spiritual can be forcibly imposed on the young is still widely prevalent. One meets it where one would least expect to find it. The late Benjamin Kidd, in his book *The Science of Power*, promised us a new world at a comparatively early date if we would but give him the young. For my own part, I would not have given him the young, for the reason that he had not studied the problems of education with sufficient care. As a writer he is still living, so I will speak of him in the present tense. He believes that there is a strain of altruism, of selfless devotion, latent in every child. There I go with him. And I go with him in the distinction which he draws between the social and the protoplasmic heritage of the individual, and in the predominance which he assigns to the former. But I cannot go with him when he proposes in all seriousness that "the emotion of the ideal," as he calls it, shall be cultivated by quasi-Prussian methods; that altruism shall be taught as a subject in our schools, just as patriotism was taught in the schools of Germany in pre-war days. The teaching of patriotism to the youth of Germany by the will and under the direction of the State,

our author seems to regard as an unqualified success. I am inclined to think that it was an unqualified failure. We are told that in thirty years it changed the character of the German people. Perhaps it did; but if so, it changed it, from all accounts, for the worse.

For this there are two reasons. The first is that education of the conventional type is ever tending to change character for the worse. One of the charges which I brought against the old regime was that it arrested growth. But to arrest growth is to distort it. For the forces which are at work in the growing child do not cease to work when they are checked and thwarted by education. The urge from within is too strong to allow them to do that. They continue to work; but they work in the dark and in wrong directions and within unduly narrow limits; and so, though the process of growth is not actually suspended, it is stunted and misdirected, just as the growth of a tree on the west coast of Ireland is stunted and misdirected by the pressure of the Atlantic winds. We talk glibly and almost recklessly of forming character in school, as if character was so much clay or putty in our hands. It would be well if we sometimes asked ourselves whether we were not deforming character in the very attempts that we make to form it. It is easy for education to deform character. The best way to form character—but this is far from easy—is to help it to form itself.

This is one reason why the teaching of patriotism in Germany changed the character of the people for the worse. The cramping pressure of dogmatic education on character was stronger in Germany, especially in Prussia, in the decades before the war than it had ever been before. But this was not the only or the chief reason. There was one feature of the teaching of patriotism which Kidd seems to have overlooked. Apart from the call for self-sacrifice, there was no strain of idealism in it. On the contrary, it was a hard, narrow, jealous, exclusive, grasping, domineering, vain-glorious, self-centred type of patriotism which was officially taught; and it was to this feature of the teaching, not less than to the call for self-sacrifice, that the people seem to have responded. For we are all prone to indulge and assert and exalt self; and when this tendency receives the sanction of official recognition, when—to speak plainly—it is deliberately exploited by the State, it is but natural that its influence for evil should be raised to a high power.

Can we wonder, then, that the German people, with their traditional reverence for authority, should have responded,

more or less readily, to the appeal which was made to their lower nature, during the impressionable years of childhood and adolescence, by the high authority of the State? Did they also respond to the call for self-sacrifice when the hour of their trial came? Undoubtedly they did; but so did all the belligerent nations. Kidd speaks in ecstatic terms of the "unparalleled sacrifices" which the Germans, as the result of the compulsory teachings of patriotism, made during the war. But all the belligerent nations made unparalleled sacrifices. We British made unparalleled sacrifices; and, owing to there being no conscription in our country, there was a voluntary element in our self-sacrifice which was wanting in Germany. In Kidd's own words, "The capacity for sacrifice in men . . . gave civilisation the example of millions of men enrolled by Great Britain and her peoples by voluntary enlistment with a cheerful and considered judgment on a scale which under such conditions is without any precedent in history." Yet there is no country in Europe in which the formal teaching of patriotism has counted for so little as in ours. Why have we neglected to teach it? Because we have felt instinctively that what is vital in patriotism, the element of love and self-sacrifice, cannot possibly be taught. "Le patriotisme," says a French writer, "c'est comme l'amour. Ça échappe au commandement." Love and self-sacrifice have secret springs of their own which do not flow at the word of command. If they are not there, you cannot produce them by turning on an official tap. If they are there, no tap can hold them back.

What, then, was the nett gain to Germany of the great educational experiment which Kidd would have us imitate, *altruism* being substituted for *patriotism* as a subject on the time-tables of our schools? A *minus* quantity. The character of the people suffered, and their patriotic ardour was not strengthened. If anything, it was weakened. The spontaneous element in it was repressed by dogmatic direction, and the spiritual element was driven into the background by the authoritative appeal to base and selfish motives. Lüdendorf tells us that the downfall of Germany was due to the patriotism of Germany having given way under the triple strain of privation at home, moral infection from Russia (after the Revolution), and incipient defeat in the field. The privations of the German people were no doubt much greater than ours. But they were not so great as the privations of the Serbians, the Belgians, or the inhabitants of the devastated parts of France. Yet the spirit of those peoples was never broken. They "bore it out even

to the edge of doom." There were centres of moral infection in all the belligerent countries. And severe defeats on land as well as terrible losses at sea were endured without flinching by the nations which eventually won the war. That being so, it is surely a significant fact that the one country in which patriotism gave way at last under the prolonged strain of the war was the country in which it had been most assiduously and most systematically *taught*.

As a final comment on the teaching of patriotism in Germany in pre-war days I will quote the following words from a German writer: "By means of regulation, instruction, and apologetical justification, patriotism is to-day taught by zealots like a common school-lesson, with a merciless rigid catechism. Love to the Fatherland is made mechanical; it is drilled into pupils like a dead, disbelieved religion." Could patriotism be *taught*—taught as a school-lesson, taught as a subject which has a place of its own on the time-table—by any better method than this? I doubt it. The aim controls the means; and if you wish to mechanicalise a natural sentiment, you must mechanicalise the education which is to produce this result. But be that as it may. What is certain is that not by such methods as this is the emotion of the ideal, the spirit of unselfish devotion, to be kindled in the young.

Yet the broad fact remains that if we are ever to have the better and happier world of which we dream, the spirit of unselfish devotion must be kindled—or shall I say *evoked*—in the young. How is this to be done? Let us go back to our village school. There the children were idealists without knowing it. They were idealists because they were happy in their school life, because their happiness was ever overflowing into the channel of comradeship, and because in comradeship, so far as it is spontaneous and uncalculating, there is a latent spirit of self-sacrifice which is capable of climbing to the loftiest height of spiritual achievement. Their happiness was the realisation in consciousness of well-being. Their well-being was due to the fact that they were making healthy, harmonious, and many-sided growth. And the reasons why they were making such growth were these: they were being given freedom for self-development through self-activity, and, with freedom, help and guidance and inspiration; and they were living in the stimulating atmosphere of sympathy and trust.

The moral to be drawn from this is that if we are to reform the world we must first, or perhaps concurrently, reform education along some such lines as those which have just

been sketched. How this is to be done is a problem which every educator who desires reform along those lines must solve for himself. The problem is complex and difficult, and demands much thought, much labour, and much patience. Yet the attempt is well worth making ; for success in solving it, or even the approach to success, will be abundantly rewarded. I cannot promise a new world within the lifetime of the present generation. The mills of God grind very slowly, and the transformation of the ideals of a whole profession is not to be accomplished in a generation, or even in a century. But that need not discourage us. The reward will always keep pace with the effort that deserves it. As the new educational ideas gradually diffuse themselves, a new spirit—new, and yet immemorially old—will gradually awake and accompany them in their movement, and help to vivify them and spread them,—the spirit of generous comradeship, of unselfish devotion, a spirit which has thirst for the ideal at the heart of it, and which, on its way to the Ideal of all ideals, to the highest and holiest of all altars, will gradually regenerate the world.

E. G. A. HOLMES.

Kew.

THE WISDOM OF EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT.

NORMAN MAC MUNN.

1. THE IMPLICIT CREED.

THE education of every child, no matter along what lines, must always be experimental. Probably the greatest experiment of all, though not the least frequent, is that in which an active little boy or girl, with strongly individual traits, is deliberately stripped of scope for individual living, and treated as a part of the mechanism of an ordinary school. I believe it would be scientifically justifiable to go much further—even to the point of asserting that there is far less experiment about letting a child develop on natural lines, with no interference beyond positive inspiration and a reasonable care for health and physical safety, than in subjecting him to an artificial and pervasive system of adult control. This is in reality saying no more than that it is more experimental to deflect nature into the channels of artificiality than to allow it to follow its own laws of development. However this may be, I here use educational experiment in its commonest sense of a deliberate departure from current school practice, making no defence based on widespread support, and only pleading from the fruits of practical experience.

To have arrived in actual practice at the ideal of a school free from rewards and punishments—from compulsion of any sort; to have reduced subjects pursued in common to the small minimum of two; to have eliminated the class and based all on individual taste and choice—this is to imply a new and not yet an easily-digested educational creed. Even if the general theory of reform of method has gained a sort of acceptance based on concessions to Herbert Spencer or to Madame Montessori, it must not be assumed that the

acceptance is much more real than, say, the theoretical acceptance by an ever-ready pugilist of the desirability of turning the other cheek to the smiter.

Let us consider the nature of this newer educational creed—for it exists implicitly in the mind of every experimenter, even when he seems to himself to be proceeding along more or less empirical lines. Two articles are probably never wanting in this creed—one based on the physical, mental, and moral needs of the child; the other on the same needs of society. The experimenter implies by his behaviour a belief that the natural activities of the child are to be used and not thwarted; that his spontaneously moral acts cannot be adequately replaced by the sanctions of an artificial and adult-inspired discipline; that the lessons of co-operative living are more valuable even than the stoical acceptance of an alien and deforming system based on the principle of forcible direction from above. He will hold also the views—perhaps somewhat more palatable—that all knowledge does not come through the ear; that keen work closely allied to play is a child's best work; and if he is with the idealists in some of his tenets, he will join the business man in the demand for a more realistic and concrete presentation of truths. He will be far less wedded to particular "subjects" than his more orthodox contemporaries; and he will seek far more a growing power of general analysis and synthesis than a measurable acquirement of exact knowledge. With him a child's voluntary and enthusiastic work in any reasonably profitable field is better than unwilling concentration on matter that may seem, by inference from grown-up analogies, to be of far greater importance. Lastly he will probably believe that no collective teaching can, in the long run, compete with good auto-didactic method.

On the social side he will be no less troublesome. He will suspect much of the fetichism of the fashionable school, and much of the ready didacticism of the schools of the people. He will chafe at the sham "self-government" of schools in which little boys are handed over, as though for expert psychological analysis and ideally sympathetic treatment, to their athletic demi-gods in the "Sixth." He will wonder at all those bells governing work and play in the preparatory school; at the Prussian perfections of the "best" of the council schools; at the general absence of scope to gain social wisdom through the natural reactions of full living. He will have noted that certain lies are obligatory, and that others are flogged out (or in) by the headmaster; he will have realised that the moral virtues of *esprit de corps*

depend on the value of both *esprit* and *corps*, and that the mere watchword is not enough. All these considerations will have weight with him, but there is another in comparison with which they lose in importance. It is this—that the whole system is based on force. Force is lurking everywhere at every moment, a potential queerer of the pitch in every play of individual freedom. Sometimes it is “only” potential, but the “only” is merely hypocritical. It is really a diplomatic way of saying: “Do what I say and you will be free; do what I don’t say and you will be in danger; do what I forbid, and for long enough, and you will be crushed.” No surface appearance of mildness of discipline can count against the potency of this force in reserve. It makes for repression and suppression at every turn; it creates phobias, plays havoc with the nervous, encourages the brute, and easily turns the victim of the cane to one of those disastrous people who, with especial zest, prepare the world for “the next war.”

2. EXPERIMENT IN DISCIPLINE.

This question of the use of force—in its widest sense of compulsion—is obviously of colossal importance. No sane man, it is to be supposed, uses force for force’s sake. We do hear such stories as that of the man who, having no fault to find with his son’s past, provided for his future by giving him a sound thrashing; but probably that man’s sanity would not be assumed anywhere outside a Court of Assize. There are, indeed, neo-Spartans who are especially Spartan at the expense of others, but their number is small and declining. We may fairly, I think, regard this perpetuation of forcible methods of discipline as due, almost universally, either to unquestioning habit or to assumption that children are innately capricious beings, whose spontaneous energies must be constantly canalised or checked.

So long as schools are largely places of boredom for a child, it seems as though this grotesque view of innate capriciousness will be largely held. It should never be forgotten that all collective teaching of immobile groups of children, with prolonged bouts of sitting (a posture to which the young of man is not yet fully adapted), is profoundly unnatural. “Fidgetiness” shows an appetite for movement as healthy as a hungry child’s appetite for food. “Inattention” often misleads us from the truth that the child is attending only too well—to matters that seem to him of more vital moment. Buffoonery again is generally

Nature's vengeance for neglect to transfer healthily and usefully the universal impulse to shine in some field of endeavour.

It is a striking fact that the children of most savage races are, prior to initiation, sufficiently purposive in their rehearsal of the drama of later living to require almost no grown-up intervention, let alone severe punishment, which usually only begins after contact with the white man. The North American Indians were at first horrified that Englishmen could beat their children. The unpunished little Eskimos, on evidence from many sources, are among the most truthful and polite children in the world. Further arguments derived from savage childhood will be found in the chapter entitled "The New Discipline" in my book *The Child's Path to Freedom*.¹

These analogies drawn from savage life have value only as showing the innate tendency to spontaneous adaptation to a given environment—a tendency which is side-tracked and seldom given scope in European methods of education. Such a child movement as the Children's Crusade showed, *per extremum*, the possibilities of spontaneous child idealism and self-sacrifice.

But better than all the *a priori* arguments in the world is a few years' experience with the natural, unfettered child. In ten years of experiment I have watched free groups of children from every social class; but they were children fitting into a framework itself adapted to their needs. Without that adaptation the freedom—allowing for the claims of a definite social and a tendencial intellectual purpose—could not have been real. Inactive childhood, childhood robbed of a proper play for spontaneous endeavour, must inevitably become morbid (even though the morbidity figures for a few years as a sort of physical supernormality in the direction of athleticism and the expression of the crowd spirit). The teacher, if he has ideals, must put himself to school again, and he must face his problems in an entirely new way, which includes, among other things, but before all, the provision of apparatus and material allowing the child to act from his own initiative and to work in the spirit of play.

These conditions once granted, the social evolution will begin—with a powerful preliminary reaction to the disorderly and the irresponsible. The art of living has to be learned—and much of the artificially acquired art of living has apparently to be unlearned. The polite little boy may

¹ London: G. Bell & Sons, 1921.

grow noisy and exacting—sometimes he will go through days of sheer savagery. Within what for young children is a very short period—usually a week or so—all will have settled down to reasonable co-operative living. Later on there will be the coming of an indefinable atmosphere of trust, confidence, happy spontaneity. The old separation between work and play will have diminished. Counter-reaction will keep many of the boys to their work longer than even a harsh detention-master would have dared to keep them; and gentle intervention is necessary, until they have found their proper balance, to get them to take the necessary outdoor exercise. Openness of mind, friendly candour, tact, hospitality, the utter absence of shyness or constraint—all these things will abound in rare degree. They will mistrust the rule of force increasingly, but this very attitude, instead of leaving them “soft,” will give them an air of quiet strength and manliness.

3. INTELLECTUAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

It is obvious that a school maintained on these lines—a school such as ours at Tiptree Hall, Essex—could follow no common curriculum. Here we find ourselves, willy-nilly, on a formidable battlefield. Our action is flat rebellion against the traditions of civilised man since he first began to educate. Have we any justice on our side?

Now the child is not the only egoist. We all share in the distinction, though in varying degrees, from the cradle to the grave; and parents and teachers are not necessarily the least offenders. One of the peculiarities of our common fund of egoism is the desire to hear our own voices, and to take care that others hear and heed them too. Would it be so very surprising that even a whole complicated educational system should have been built up on the foundations of this human weakness? Of course there would be what the psycho-analyst calls “rationalisation”—the finding of dignified and even learned reasons *après coup*. And I admit that each generation has not begun again at this point of almost unmixed motive, that the tradition has taken on stays and braces of pseudo-psychology or of “the wisdom of the ages” and “absolute necessity” order. Anyhow, the whole mechanism is firmly based on the social system, and one generation is unlikely to do much to unfasten it, even after it has manifested itself as a complicated absurdity.

The “subject” is one of the fetiches of traditional education, and the right parts of “subjects” have to be

studied with a methodic regularity as respectable as the progress of the planets. Interrelations are sometimes noted—subjects are “correlated”—but even that beneficent work is carried out with a blushing apology to both ends of the interrelation. If somebody wrote a child’s class-book, say on fire—having at once physical, chemical, ethnological, and economic references—the schoolmasters would regard it, most of them as an absurdity, and all of them as something inapplicable in the work of the school. (It might just pass muster as a “reading-book,” but there would be no other possible place for it in the work of the classroom.) Now that book, if well done, would answer to the mental organisation of a young child. Naturally his knowledge-areas will grow outwards from the nuclei of familiar experience. There is nothing “shallow” in the fruits of this widening-out process; there may be something very profound because very real and potently engrossing.

Teachers often judge their system only by its best products. They are apt to forget that majority with whom the speed is too fast or too slow, the matter uncongenial or misunderstood, the attention so intermittent that the belauded thoroughness applies mostly to their unnecessarily thorough selves.

Now if the nuclear ideal of learning is well-founded there is only one possible way of meeting the situation. The classes must be disbanded, and such varied intellectual material must be put before all that each can develop as a separate individual from his own tastes, aptitudes, and capacity.

This is not the place to describe in detail the hundred devices we have introduced at Tiptree Hall to evoke the activities of each child on the interests of his choice. I will merely mention the fact that children’s lasting interests, when they work on the principle of free choice, are fundamentally encyclopædic and synthetic. At the present moment eight out of nine boys are making picture encyclopædias on the card index plan. This entails handwork in the making of drawers and in cutting and pasting pictures, the application of analytic and synthetic principles in classification, the gain of a clearly-visualised impression of objects and phenomena; besides such more obvious matters as handwriting, the business of buying books and magazines for cutting up (incidentally the work satisfies the collecting impulse), and alphabetical sense. The boys also are part owners of a general encyclopædia of upwards of 26,000 cards (the cream of hundreds of illustrated volumes), and

any of them found in a few seconds. This "big index" works in with more specialised devices, and gives a reality to things that generally remain vague and implicit. There is constant free moving and talking, so that the old principle of "no impression without a corresponding expression" is in constant process of justification.

How are we to judge the fruits of this sort of work? If we compare these boys with most school boys, ours will show gaps, but so will the others as compared with ours. A fear of gaps, at its best, shows a lack of understanding of the mechanism of the mind, and of realisation of the obvious fact that the best of minds when judged by mere knowledge are less notable for their oases than for the extent of their deserts. We have been too pedantic, and it is a pedantry so universal that the humblest artisan is apt to explain the technique of his calling with a professorial air (to which, perhaps, he has ultimately as much right as anyone else).

The younger child, as I see him, makes these mental claims on his surroundings: he wants to stake out the world for future reference; he wants to extend his fields of special interest; he wants to collect facts much as he collects postage stamps; and he wants to solve clearly-presented puzzles. If the work he does is keenly pursued on these lines, the knowledge he gets will be vital and adequately associated.

Children whose school life has counted for much are invariably over-taught. The geniuses alone have quite escaped stultification, because their school life counted with them for so little. Even dancing has to be taught, though taught dancing is hideous as compared with the lovely movements children devise themselves. A fortune awaits the stage manager who educates a troupe of young dancers in perfect freedom, and makes selective encouragement his sole sphere of influence. Any father or mother among my readers with half a dozen children who have friendly confidence in them may make the following experiment—which will soon prove something in its own sphere and much besides. The best musical instrument in its appeal to children being a gramophone, play over a good orchestral record, and then tell the children that if they will move to the music according to their own ideas the result will be beautiful. If coloured stuffs are available for draperies, so much the better. The dancers will drape themselves in their own way, and they will gain further confidence from their disguise. If this experiment is persisted in, and the work treated with honest respect, such a result will be secured as should lead logically

to the stopping of the dancing class and the evolution of a fresh field of beautiful growth in the home.

4. PREPARATION FOR LIFE.

One excuse for the Spartanism and the monotony of schools, that this sort of thing prepares for life, has always seemed to me to be patently false. Work done in the spirit of stoic resignation has always been, and always will be, bad work. Good work has in it something of the spirit of play; great work is play itself. The school that secures deep playful concentration prepares for ardent, playful work in life.

Secondly, the schools train to passivity, and passivity has as little value in the world of affairs as in the world of ideals.

Thirdly, verbalism defeats reality. The school of free activities shows the way to a clear sense of realities and to a healthy distrust of verbal formulæ.

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But the experimental school—if we must keep a name which is in so many ways less applicable to the new than to the old—makes its first claim on the ground of its implicit ideals. It is a school of the positive and the hopeful; it is the only sort of school in which children can really live and let live. It is possibly the only hope of eventually saving the world—for it alone shows a new race of child setting aside sectionalism and strife, and learning from the surprising sweetness of its own co-operation that the pessimists (who really cause all the trouble) are, as the children themselves put it, simply “unfree.” Every free child believes that “unfreedom” is at the root of the world’s troubles—and every free child knows.

NORMAN MAC MUNN.

TIPTREE, ESSEX.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.

PROFESSOR JOHN LAIRD.

THE new psychology is the game of all of us and the serious concern of not a few. Impetuously bursting the banks of the traditional and the professional doctrines, it has swept our doctors, our biologists, our novelists, and even some of our distinguished philosophers, along in its conquering tide; and if some of the captives seem to rejoice too hastily in the illusory freedom of this headlong progress, and if others suffer from their preoccupation with the detritus of the flood, there are reasons for hoping, none the less, that the permanent channel of psychology may be scoured, and deepened, and bettered by all this portentous vehemence.

To be sure, it is not very easy (perhaps, even, it is quite impossible) to know for certain what this new psychology is. To vary our metaphor, the new psychologists are rushing pell-mell into the diggings in their undiscovered country, and their jubilant confidence that there is room for all in it makes them content, for the most part, to wave their flags in mutual encouragement and to leave the task of pegging out claims, respecting one's neighbours' landmarks, and establishing a legal status to some future race of Development Commissioners. Even now, it is true, there are occasional skirmishes among groups of these pioneers, and some of the sager ones are trying to organise a sort of sheriff's law in the backwoods. But, for the most part, eagerness and goodwill reign. Wearied with the rovings of the day, the behaviourist lies down with the psycho-analyst in this God's own country where intellectualists and introspective psychologists cease from troubling; and if any taint of the old leaven remains with them, it can be sublimated, quite painlessly, in the crucible of their dreams.

To drop parables, the new psychology offers us what, for

the time being at least, is a working alliance between a number of psychological tendencies, and the chief of these are behaviourism (or the attempt to explain psychology, without residue, in terms of the only technique which is open to students of comparative psychology), psycho-analysis (a method and body of doctrine derived from the study of neuropaths), and the psychology of the crowd and of the herd (a mode of thinking too inchoate for satisfactory description but elaborated with some plausibility in works like Mr Trotter's or M. Le Bon's). The motives which originally underlay this movement were, negatively, a reaction against the narrowness, dryness, and "intellectualism" of previous psychological and political theories, and, positively, a growing appreciation of the significance for psychology of the obscure hinterland of the mind revealed in "psychic" phenomena, hysteria, and neurology, together (more recently) with a very real advance in the study of animal behaviour. Of the last of these motives it is enough to say that it is the flower of the seed which Darwin watered, and that the immense progress made during the last ten years in the laboratory study of animal reactions gives excellent promise of fruit. The other positive motive may be summed up in a few sentences of James's appreciation of Frederick Myers :

"Even with brutes and madmen, even with hysterics and hypnotics admitted as the academic psychologists admit them, the official outlines of their subject are far too neat to stand in the light of analogy with the rest of Nature. . . . Nature is everywhere gothic, not classic. She forms a real jungle, where all things are provisional, half-fitted to each other, and untidy. When we add such a complex kind of subliminal region as Myers believed in to the official region, we restore the analogy ; and, though we may be mistaken in much detail, in a general way, at least, we become plausible."

It is impossible to believe seriously, I think, that all, or even most of the lavish hypotheses, the generous enthusiasms, the brilliant *aperçus*, and the wearisome, if cynical, ingenuousness of this movement can bear the test of calm investigation. Indeed, it may be contended, with great show of reason, that most of these accounts of the play of "basic forces" and "insatiable urges" show a poverty of reflection and a prodigality of quasi-scientific verbalism which make psychology cut a very poor figure in comparison with other sciences ; and there are excellent grounds for believing, as a recent writer has shown, that much in the

new psychology is the work of "slumpers" who mistake names for causes after the fashion of the "faculty" psychology which is erroneously alleged to be dead. After all, it is not really very illuminating to ascribe a man's selfishness to an impulse towards self-assertion (or even to an ego-complex) when all that is meant is that the man is a selfish fellow and that he seems to have been born selfish; and this second way of putting it is more scientific because it does not pretend to be an explanation. On the other hand, sitting tight is always easy, and pioneer work is always very hard. There is no satisfaction but in proceeding, and whenever there is life in new theories (as there certainly is in these ones) it is usually better to try to develop some of their consequences than to regard them as museum specimens about which the last word can be said. And this is what I wish to do in this paper. It is worth while, I think, to take the new psychologists very much at their own rating, to assume with them that instinct and impulse (conscious or unconscious) are the roots of psychology, that three parts at least of what we call reflection are only a way of finding excuses for what we are bent on doing, that the new researches into the unconscious (if you will) bid fair to provide an Open Sesame to the mysteries of the soul, and, in the light of these assumptions, to ask a thoroughly pragmatic question. If these theories are true, or true enough to work with, what difference should they make to our lives, and in particular how would they affect the important question of moral responsibility.

The notion of responsibility, as all moralists have recognised, is beset with difficulties; and it is full of pitfalls even when it is considered simply as a practical legal convention. As Mr Graham Wallas has recently pointed out, the legal importance of the idea would lead us to expect that the organised common sense of the law would have evolved an intelligible working theory of legal accountability; and yet we find very little of the kind. Even Sir James Stephen, Mr Wallas tells us, has nothing better to say on the point than that responsibility is an affair of voluntary acts, and that a voluntary act is "a motion or group of motions accompanied or preceded by volition and directed towards some object. Every such action comprises the following elements—knowledge, motive, choice, volition, intention; and thoughts, feelings, and motions, adapted to execute the intention." This, even if it is sound, is not very helpful, and it is not very comforting to be told (as an eminent legal professor informed Mr Wallas privately) that "you can

generally shunt really difficult questions of psychology on to the jury." Twelve good men and true who are capable enough in the ordinary business of life are not the best judges of such perplexities, and women jurors—dare we hint it?—need not be infallible psychologists.

Our moralists, of course, cannot shunt these questions on to any else, and, to do them justice, they have seldom tried to do so. On the contrary, they have discussed several aspects of this question (and particularly its relation to determinism) very fully indeed. Yet the perplexities continue, and one of the principal reasons for this notorious circumstance is that the problem has commonly been approached from two radically different standpoints. The lawyer's point of view refers, very naturally, to the problem of a man's responsibility for this or the other act or limited series of acts. It is for these that a culprit can be brought to book; and many moralists, again for natural reasons, are accustomed to envisage the question from this point of view also, with the sole difference that they substitute the forum of conscience for the courts of the realm. Undoubtedly this is an attitude which all of us, both for our good and for our sins, frequently have to adopt. We have to take the responsibility for particular actions, and we are sometimes made to feel it; but it is not the only reasonable attitude towards the problem, and (as many think) it is not the most important attitude. While it is often essential to consider particular "motions or groups of motions" and our choice of them, it is *always* essential (except for some limited purpose) to run the question back to the agent's character and to his life as a whole, and to deal with his "formed will" or his "concrete personality" as well as with his relatively isolated actions and deliberations.

The reason for assigning predominant importance to this second aspect of the problem is very easily found. Although we feel our responsibility tingling within us in particular acts of choice (and, it may be, asserting itself magisterially and breaking with the past) we know perfectly well (quite apart from metaphysical subtleties concerning freedom) that this feeling is very largely illusory, that the apparent initiative and the sense of authorship in a crucial decision often contains, at the most, only a tiny dose of undiluted creativeness, that the moment of beginning a responsible course of action can scarcely be more than an instant of *recueillement* in a growing life—in a word, that our responsible acts are only transitory perchings in the steady flight of our lives. And this is the point, precisely, where the new theorists have something highly important to say.

Even before their time, to be sure, it was plain to every thinking man that our moral responsibility could not be simply an affair of conscious deliberation and decision. Very few would have doubted, it is true, that such decisions play a most important part in our moral development, but nearly everyone felt also that they were not the whole of it. Indeed, it may be doubted whether even those enthusiasts who considered a "conversion" worthless unless its date could be remembered and avowed, seriously supposed that this moment of adopting the new life was (under Providence) the sole cause of it; and any reasonable observer who remembered the slow, half-conscious way in which ideas mature in men, in women, and in epochs, or the common experience that a man usually misses the most significant things in his life, must have admitted that much in our character grows in a way that we seldom wot of, and that this growth of our character determines much of our responsibility. Quite apart, then, from the more recondite (but still practical and manifest) difficulties which arise from the influence of congenital endowment, training, and circumstance upon the responsible part of us, this way of regarding the question had a serried force of palpable experience behind it; and it could be, and was, mightily reinforced by the commonplace observation that others, often, can see what we are driving at far better than we can ourselves, and that very few of us are by any means such estimable persons as we take ourselves to be.

On the face of them, what the new theories principally do is to lay enormous stress upon this type of consideration. One of them, indeed—the theory of behaviourism,—apparently denies the very existence of conscious acts of deliberation. Certainly, it is resolved to ignore them, and to offer us various grosser substitutes in their place. It is needless, however, to go to such extreme lengths in order to point the fashionable moral, and the new psychology (except for this *enfant terrible* of behaviourism) is not committed to it. For the most part, the new theorists are content to point out that conscious deliberation is at best a symptom and not a cause of our actions; that our instincts, our impulses, and our unconscious wishes make up our minds for us; and the like. Here many stop short, but others, having something of the preacher's zeal still smouldering within them, are anxious to go further, and even to take the risk of running their theory on a rather obvious snag. Pretty clearly, if our conscious intentions really were entirely impotent, it would not matter whether we had them or not, and it would be absurd to bother

about trying to alter them. Some of the new psychologists, therefore, for purposes of exhortation at least, are ready to maintain that they really have some influence. They are quite strong enough, in fact, to do a world of mischief; and so we are adjured to give rein to our impulses so far as we can, and to abandon, so far as is practicable, the tiring, unsatisfying, pitifully frigid life of reflective "desire." These writers admit, in fact (quite in the ordinary sense of language and in terms of the ordinary theories), that we *are* responsible for much of the fretting and the strain of our pallid lives.

Some readers may think, perhaps, that this attempt to scold "rationalising" for the harm it is doing and at the same time to mock it for its impotence, needs rather desperate contortions to maintain even the semblance of balanced consistency, and almost anyone must concede that the new psychologists are apt to make their task far too easy by a significant omission in much of their argument. If motive, intention, choice, and the rest of them meant only the motive, choice, and intention which a man avows to himself after deliberate self-conscious reflection, then Mr Russell, for example, would have as much truth as wit on his side when he explains that "so long as we refuse to allow ourselves, even in the watches of the night, to avow any contrary desires, we may be bullies at home, shady in the city, skin-flints in paying wages, and profiteers in dealing with the public; yet if only conscious motives are to count in moral valuation, we shall remain model characters. This is an agreeable doctrine, and it is not surprising that men are unwilling to abandon it." The conscious intentions for which men are held to be responsible need not be of this kind, however. All that is necessary is that a man should know what he intends to do at the time he makes his choice. In that case he is responsible if he does *not* ask himself what kind of a fellow would do a thing like that, quite as much as if he *does* ask this exceedingly pertinent question. Yet, when all due reservations are made, it is plain that the new doctrines have a direct logical bearing upon the problem of responsibility, and it is important to consider precisely what this bearing is.

The chief effect of the new theories would seem to be a resolute constriction of the sphere of genuine responsibility. Although, as we have seen, no reasonable person can seriously maintain that the whole of responsible conduct can be summed up in particular acts of conscious deliberation and choice, it is commonly held that there can be no responsibility *without* these conscious acts, and consequently that an integral

part of the problem turns upon their actual efficacy. In maintaining, then, as a cardinal point in its theory, that instinct or impulse is always the determining agent in conduct, that it is a trivial matter whether such instincts and impulses are conscious or unconscious, and that our consciousness (if it exists) is always so deceitful as to be wholly worthless, the new psychology seems to sweep aside (or, at any rate, immensely to curtail) almost everything that common sense means by responsibility. This, of course, is no objection to the new theories. On the contrary, they glory in it. But it certainly seems to be a plain consequence.

No doubt other views begin to emerge when the argument shifts its ground. This happens, for example, when we are told that we ought not to starve our lives by repressing our instincts, or that morality is but the anodyne wherewith senile arteries seek to mask the passing of lusty blood. In this case, however, as we have seen, although the aim of our lives should (perhaps) be altered profoundly, the means for accomplishing this end, according to the new doctrines, would seem to be simply the decried mechanism of the customary theories. From this aspect, therefore, our views of the character of responsibility would remain, *pro tanto*, undisturbed.

In another way, however (and this consequence, I think, is very seldom drawn), some of the new theories would seem to imply that the sphere of our responsibility should be greatly enlarged. Orthodox moralists have always admitted that we are responsible, in part at least, for the growth of habit, and for the maturing of character. We are responsible, they tell us, for failing to check recurrent temptations when it was still in our power to inhibit them. We ought to have the sense to keep on our guard against these dangerous promptings, and, by the same logic, we ought to foster desirable tendencies as patiently and as tactfully as we can. For the most part, indeed, the new psychologists have little to add to the principle, and not very much to the details of this doctrine, whatever they may think of its applications. Psycho-analysis, for example, at any rate on its therapeutic side, seems to rely upon the efficacy of conscious catharsis—that is to say, it attempts to effect a cure by getting the patient to realise the character of the impulses that are tearing him in sunder, and by inducing him to weave them consciously into the fabric of a healthier personality. On the other hand, some few of the fashionable theories appear to advocate a radically different, and a distinctly novel, method

of dealing with our souls. According to Coué, Baudouin, and the new Nancy School the very worst thing we can do in the most important part of the business of living is to think or to resolve. Instead of this we ought to make suggestions to ourselves. We should choose the moments between sleeping and waking, if we can, and hypnotise ourselves into the belief that all will be well with us ; that our moral fibre will be strengthened ; that the zest of living will refresh us once more ; that our warts, and perhaps even our phthisis, will disappear. This we can achieve if we repeat to ourselves, somnolently and persistently, some general formula to this effect, and if we supplement it, in course of time, by gradually introducing more specific suggestions. Indeed, as I gather, it is possible to affect our dream life in this way—at any rate Mrs Arnold-Foster says so—and the methods she adopts seem very similar indeed to those of Coué and Baudouin.

These ideas, I think, indicate a great extension of the sphere of responsibility which is currently recognised. Moralists have seldom troubled themselves with the problems of dream iniquity, and Plato himself admitted that the just man, after a good meal, must expect the intrusion of unruly desires in his sleep. If suggestion, then, be the truly effective mechanism for developing the soul, we should certainly fail in our duty if we did not adopt it, and although, in a way, suggestion itself might be included by the old theories if they were stretched a little—since the beginnings of this sleepy rhythm of suggestion would seem to be due to conscious intention—it is surely clear that our ideas of the nature of responsible conscious control would be changed in most material particulars.

Assuming, then, that this is the general trend of the new doctrines, let us try to consider what heed we ought to pay to them.

It would be a mistake, perhaps, to suppose that the legal view of responsibility ought to be profoundly modified if these modish theories came to be endorsed by the bulk of mankind. Certainly, it is most desirable that the practice of shunting psychological difficulties on to the jury should decline, and the good of the community would be immensely enhanced if judges and barristers came to recognise the profound importance of a sound training in criminal psychology. The law courts, however, deal, and must continue to deal, with the offences which it is expedient to blame and to punish ; and the experience of mankind has shown conclusively that the punishment of criminals on the general lines of

current legal procedure is both expedient and necessary. Legal punishment and the fear of it are needed for the health of the community, and they must remain a part of the machinery of the State whatever the ultimate theory of punishment may be, and however necessary it may be to revise our penalties and to sweeten our prisons.

On its first look, indeed, this fact, for fact it is, might seem to be a crushing refutation of the deductions which the new psychologists draw. Unlike the Erewhonian magistrates, we do not punish people for their diseases or their physical defects. We do not punish them simply because they spread diseases (even granting that we have to segregate our "typhoid Marys"), and we do not punish them for ruining the prospects of their children by slipping on orange peel. On the contrary, we punish them only for acts which we think they can impute to themselves when the character of these acts is brought home to them, and we always require the presumption, at least, that the malefactor was conscious of his actions when he performed them, and able to control them in consequence. It is possible, no doubt, as writers of many shades of opinion declare very confidently, that part of the reason for our current practice in these affairs is only the parchment legacy of an unexamined theory. According to this way of looking at the question, we are very apt to hoodwink ourselves with the traditional conceptions of guilt and sin, together with mistaken notions of the actions which men, in fact, are able to control; and it is not at all unlikely that if all these ideas had to be utterly changed, much of the practical efficacy of our present procedure would change with them. On the other hand, the principal reason for the continuance of our punitive machinery is just the fact that it works, and this fact is admitted by anarchists as well as by their judges. Punishment for intentional actions chastens and deters, while the infliction of jury-made suffering in the case of other actions effects absolutely nothing in the way of prevention or cure.

This circumstance, however, may not really refute the new theories. Even if our practice in this matter deals, in fact, with symptoms and not with causes, it is just conceivable that the symptoms may indicate quite precisely the point where we ought to strike. It is not unthinkable that mankind should have stumbled on an appropriate method on the ground of a mistaken theory. Men might have hit upon a device for saving society although they were ignorant of the way in which the salvation really worked, and the device, in all probability, would continue to work even if a part of its

virtue oozed away when the mistake in the grounds for it came to be recognised.

It is scarcely possible, however, that moralists would be satisfied with an answer that might be sufficient for a lawyer. Their proper business is just to investigate the grounds of the lawyer's practice, and therefore they would be bound to think furiously on first principles if they gave their assent to the new psychology. It would still be necessary to punish even if words like guilt, and sin, and wrong-doing turned out to be almost meaningless, and if responsibility were only the name for a useful legal fiction; but in that case, *justice*, as we commonly consider it, would be a fiction too. We have the habit, it is true, of speaking of an evil, a loathsome, or even of a wicked subconsciousness, but there is more than a suspicion of metaphor in these descriptions, and the metaphor would scarcely be pressed if subconsciousness were not a slippery notion including just as much and just as little of mindfulness as we want to include at any given time. An unconscious agency may do harm, of course, just as an earthquake or the angry sea can do, but plainly we cannot be said to be responsible for our actions in any ordinary sense if our wishes and impulses cannot be controlled when we give our minds to the task; and, equally plainly, it is quite absurd to speak of guilt or wrong-doing if we have no knowledge of the guilty actions and no consciousness of the wrong.

We must agree, then, that the new psychology, if it is true, has very important consequences for the business of living, and therefore the difficulty which has harassed us more than once already must be faced again. As we have seen, if reflection is in fact wholly impotent, all that follows is that deliberate action and deliberate self-control are empty names for something which is not at all what we take it to be, and in that case no amount of reflection in the light of the new theories can have the slightest effect upon what we do. On this extreme view, therefore, the optimism which many reviewers discern in the new doctrines is simply mouthing and wind. Freedom from cant, we are told, and the emancipation of the spirit through a generous surrender to the *libido*, is the slogan of the new army. The slogan is well enough, although the new theories themselves might lead us to suspect that there is something of cant in this nervous anxiety to parade our freedom from it, and although the slogan itself, if the new army is right, can mean only that it is desirable to strengthen—shall we say?—our more romantic impulses at the expense of conventional ones. But the

slogan is not a precept unless we *can* make a difference to ourselves by acting up to it, and this is precisely what we cannot do if our choice, reflection, and resolve are nothing but otiose symbols.

If, on the other hand, it is held that we can really improve our lot by paying heed to the new revelation, the question, surely, is changed altogether. According to this way of it, whether by drowsy suggestion or by tense resolve, we *can* control our lives, in effective measure, by taking heed, and we *ought* to control them by acting as steadfastly as we can in the light of the aims which we deem to be best. On this hypothesis, then, the usefulness of the new psychology lies principally in the spade-work it is doing. It is immensely important on any theory to know, or to try to know, how far our rational control of ourselves extends, and what price we have to pay for the use (and for the abuse) of this or the other persistent inhibition; and the more the new science (or any other) can tell us on this head the better it will be for our souls. The pity is that so much of this spade-work raises such clouds of dust. If these clouds were left to settle it might be possible to see, as we have suggested, that the strength of the new doctrines lies in amending rather than in supplanting.

It is a commonplace, surely, that the ordering of our lives is always the ordering of our impulses, instincts, and desires. Consequently, if these can be ordered, the essential problem is plainly which of them are best worth fostering, and how far our control of them extends. The first part of this question is a problem of values, and men will continue to argue about it so long as their sense of values continues to differ. The second part of the question is a problem of psychological fact, and it would be settled if we could determine the relative powers and potencies of the different impulses in different men (including, of course, the reflective impulses). If our argument is sound, therefore, the value of the new psychology lies precisely in the serious attempt it has made to grapple with the second part of this question. Perhaps we may concede, even, that it has succeeded in showing that much which is currently thought to be morally magnificent is in fact wasteful in every way. It is squandered control, misplaced conscientiousness, over-rationalisation. And if the new gospel has not succeeded so triumphantly as it is apt to boast, it has done an invaluable work none the less; for it has forced all the thinkers of the present hour to give a serious and not merely an official recognition to aspects of moral and of social problems which are as fundamental as they are perturbing.

On the other hand, it should also be remembered that the complexity of man's life in society makes it necessary for us to qualify even the most inspiring of half-truths. Even if it is true, for example, that at least half of humanity's daily toil is forced and irksome, and that an uncomfortably large proportion of moral rules and responsibilities are only seigneurial shackles for the herd, it must also be remembered that this decried drudgery, and the clipped hedge of sanctions that surround it, has also brought comfort and decency in its train. These things do not belong to the order of gothic nature, and they should be kept in mind by those who look earnestly for the cure of civilisation. If we have to bridle our impulses more than the cave-dwellers did (before they immeshed themselves in taboos), and even if we groan, at times, under a dreary dispensation of excessive bridling, it is at least conceivable that our lot is more tolerable than theirs. Certainly, this circumstance is not an excuse for easy optimism. If we believe, in earnest, that reflection pays, we should seek, most intently, to reflect more wisely than before. *Because* of our belief we should make a point of learning from our mistakes. Yet however anxious we may be to avoid cant and drudgery and conventional anæmia, and however warmly we may be drawn towards many of the new investigations into our powers, our weaknesses, and the needless price of our discipline, we ought also to remember that it is easy to overlook qualities which should not be cheap although they should not make a show. If self-control is irksome and sometimes dangerous, it is not therefore despicable. It is not a paltry thing for a man to school himself into following his convictions and ensuing his ideals. In short, there is another name for the most essential quality discussed in these pages, and the name of this quality is self-respect.

JOHN LAIRD.

BELFAST.

SELF-SUGGESTION AND RELIGION.

REV. THE HON. EDWARD LYTTTELTON, D.D.

It is not the purpose of this article to estimate the success of M. Coué's therapeutics, nor to express the gratitude all must feel for his disinterestedness and steadfast pertinacity of aim : viz. to lighten the burden of suffering humanity. It cannot be said that just for the moment and in this country there is much danger of the new teaching being undervalued, or of apathy being displayed where eager attention is demanded. Rather it has become advisable to inquire (1) how far self-suggestion is a novelty ; (2) whether its influence is entirely wholesome ; (3) how far it militates against a religious view of sickness and health and is compatible with prayer, or a substitute for it.

It should be remarked, first, that supposing an adverse verdict should be given in answer to all these questions, I am not so sanguine as to suppose that any appreciable difference will be discernible either in the numbers of the votaries of this cult or in their enthusiasm. There will be no decline in either as long as M. Coué's recommendations are found to be effectual in diminishing pain ; and it is to be feared that, however patent the evidence of a morbid element in the practice of self-suggestion might be, the doctrine will continue to carry all before it as long as it is believed to make for healing. Hardly at any period of human history has physical well-being commanded such a body of worshippers or been so madly and exclusively pursued as in Western Europe at the present time. Nevertheless there are still a few observers of modern life left who wish to ascertain how far truth enters into this movement, as they cannot suppress a misgiving that it may owe its prestige more to the attractiveness of one man's personality than to anything really distinctive in the theory, and also that its relation to religion is essentially too close to be ignored, though M. Coué,

not without good reason, has carefully dissociated the one from the other.

1. Suggestion as a form of therapeutics is at least as old as human maternity. Mothers have assumed its efficacy whenever they have soothed distress in the nursery by sounds and movements, implying that things are really going well, though the child may be convinced of the contrary. Or they have diverted the attention from the *malaise* to some extraneous interest, without caring to inquire whether there is a physical derangement which requires not crooning but instruction if peace is to be regained. That is to say, from time immemorial it has been instinctively recognised that if a sufferer can be induced to *think* in a certain way curative effects of the most satisfactory kind are to be expected. Moreover, it has been for some time a matter of common knowledge that though the belief that is implanted by suggestion may be delusive—that is, based on a lie—it is none the less efficacious, and the strictest moralist would not object to the use of sham pills and coloured water; that is, to the hoodwinking of the patient for his own relief. One serious objection to such treatment has nothing to do with its unveracity, but with the more prosaic fact that as soon as its secret is found out its power is gone. In short, as knowledge grows, suggestion becomes inoperative. It depends largely on ignorance, and nowadays people talk so universally and freely of their most intimate bodily disorders that the old-fashioned halcyon days of superstitious trustfulness are gone for ever. How far may this description be applied to M. Coué's teaching? In other words, Does its success depend on belief in anything scientifically dubious?

It is claimed for that teaching that it is based through and through on truths of our human nature; on physiological and psychological laws. Those laws concern the mysterious but indisputably real entity known as the subconscious mind. The distinctive element in the teaching is that it appears to elucidate the process of all suggestion; and hence M. Coué has gained a solid amount of confidence in his theory which has no doubt contributed largely to the success of his practice. But I gather he depends far less than other suggesters on the use of delusion for effecting the required change of mind. He assumes that delusions are wholly unnecessary, though they may be useful with the uneducated or in extreme cases of nervous debility. In a general way the sufferer is called upon to set his mind on a fact of his own being: viz. that the recuperative power is within him, and that if he wishes he can set it free to operate. He is not far from the Christian Science

dogma, that pain is not an objective fact in any sense, but a phantasmagoric sensation which, when the position is truly gauged, sooner or later vanishes. But M. Coué is credited with having discovered not a new law but a very simple method of working it. Whereas we have hitherto been encouraged to believe that we are really in good health however ill we may feel, we are now bidden to say so in general terms daily; and when pain begins, to insist to ourselves on the contrary fact: "This toothache is passing," or "This shooting corn will soon be quiet—soon be quiet—soon be quiet," because rapid repetition even to the point of gabbling tends to fend off the wrong suggestion, viz. that the tooth continues to hurt and the corn evidently intends to go on shooting: if this gloomy view of the situation is entertained, self-suggestion is bound to fail, because in fact it is not fairly tried. It is supposed, however, that it makes far less demand on "faith" than other forms of "spiritual" healing, the patient being only required to desire his cure sufficiently to be willing to gabble the form of words.

There is, of course, something a little ridiculous about this practice, but that is not a reason for our tabooing it. We are being taught to exercise a faculty of which most of us were ignorant, not in a furtive self-tricking way, but openly and avowedly, using the self-conscious mind to dispel a delusion and work, it appears, an actual change in the tissues.

That the faculty exists can only be proved by experience; but if it does, and we are only beginners in the use of it, we must not be surprised if something slightly comic is to be noticed. So a child learning to walk or talk is often comic; but no one makes that a reason for him to remain dumb or permanently crawl.

But critics deride the notion of audible talking, almost mechanical repetitions, having any effect on the subconscious mind as if the latter had ears to hear. But the objection is hollow. Experience proves the method to be astonishingly efficacious with children; and even adults are more or less conscious that the repetition of the *Te Deum* is wholesome for their souls, if, that is, they see the meaning of the words. So it may well be, if fine and appropriate words are chosen for healing purposes, and if the patient does not allow the contrary suggestion: "This is probably all fudge."

It is idle for anyone to use the device if he is sure it is a sham, but I submit that not only evidence but reason go to show it is not a sham. We know there is such a thing as a subconscious mind, but nobody has the faintest knowledge of its way of working, or the nature of its contact with our

consciousness. If this were known the word subconscious would have to be changed.

2. Is this method of healing tainted in any way with morbidity? This is a vastly interesting question, because of all M. Coué's successes, the most arresting are the rapid and certain cures of *moral* infirmities of children; just the very cases which stir a misgiving among thinking people. Granted that the quarrelsome temper passes off, is that character-training? Has not the need of self-conquest disappeared, and with it all chance of solid growth? Again the misgiving rests on hollow assumptions. Most moral infirmities, especially among young children, are largely physical in character; at least the temptations are allowed to be needlessly strong, and we are in duty bound to mitigate the force of temptation when we are sure that it is in our power to do so, and also to continue striving with what remains. To be alarmed lest life should be too easy is to vex ourselves for nothing; nor can we fancy any mother who knows of the method and its results abstaining from using it and looking on while the child's temper gets worse day by day.

Moreover, we are all believers in character-training by indirect means, even when all occasion for painful self-conquest is apparently put away. Why else do we believe in games for schoolboys? Doubtless they are a physical benefit, but it is equally clear that they tend to lessen the temptations to animalism, and to plant the habit of co-operation; all the more effectually if no appeal is made to the will. To dispute the advisability of this practice is to agree with a peculiarly English opinion about education, viz. that it matters little what subject you get a boy to work at so long as all the time he hates it!

3. But a far more serious difficulty is, that M. Coué's method seems to contravene the vital principle that true goodness of character depends on self-forgetfulness; whereas the precept to begin each day by saying "I am getting better and better *in all respects* every day," certainly turns the conscious mind on to the ego, and there is nothing that has caused so much uneasiness among the well-wishers of this movement as this apparently defiant challenge to a great moral principle.

The answer to this objection brings us to the third subject proposed, viz. the relation between self-suggestion and the religious view of life. For already people are saying that it is a substitute for prayer, and far more efficacious. But if this contention is sound, that the method encourages egoism, it will certainly operate sooner or later in increasing mental

disorder instead of allaying it. If insanity is not simply egoism, it is very closely bound up with it. Hence if M. Coué has shown neurasthenics how to brace their own nervous systems it must be that, in spite of the apparent encouragement to conceit given by the matutinal self-congratulation, the latter expresses truth; such truth as we are told "will make us free." Also we should be forced to conclude that self-congratulation that is based on a lie is a beneficial form of human effort; a way of spending time which is sure to improve mankind in the largest sense of the word.

If this conclusion is forced upon us life might become more painless, but ethics would certainly develop into the most bewildering of all branches of philosophy. Let us see, however, if the matter stands as so stated.

"In all respects": M. Coué is very emphatic as to these words. Of course they are meant to embrace moral and spiritual improvement. Now if self-forgetfulness is a condition of the highest type of goodness and of power and of beauty of character—if it is, in short, an essential ingredient in all the noblest moral achievement, and if it is also true that M. Coué's formula helps to make this achievement possible, can it be that our rooted dislike of self-complacency, conceit, swagger, etc., will have to be toned down; that boastfulness has become a virtue, and that when, for instance, Liddon compared Cicero to a big tom-cat always purring its own praises, the preacher was not disparaging the orator but commending him?

This hypothesis is not worth discussing. It remains, then, that the self-suggestion method as it has been given us has to a considerable extent succeeded not because of its egoistic flavour, but in spite of it. That is to say, it must enunciate a truth which is so potent for good that it tells against the influence of its setting. The truth is the general improvement of the individual's whole being: the setting is the double implication (1) that the improvement is the work of the individual, not due to any influence other than the ego; (2) that good is done by the individual directing, regularly and repeatedly, his deepest and most intimate thought to the satisfactory condition of the self. Now if self-complacency, conceit, etc., are to be deprecated, we are forced to the conclusion that while M. Coué's affirmation is sound and often beneficial, there is something in the way it is used which is dangerously near to being morbid. Need this be so?

Certainly not. But the way of avoiding the mischief, and the only way, is to grip firmly the Christian view of the

situation which retains and stresses the fact affirmed, but translates it as God's action through man's experience. At once the morbid associations and hints disappear. But the affirmation is immensely strengthened and sublimated by being made to rest on all that the Christian knows of and hopes from our relation to our Maker. This will hardly be disputed if we turn the formula in question into a statement based entirely on the teaching of Christ, and breathing the same assurance but an infinitely enhanced confidence. This is easily done if we recall the mighty promise (wrongly translated in our Bible as "Be ye perfect") "Ye shall be perfect," and then our formula would become something of this sort, "Jesus Christ tells me I am to be perfect to-day."

I have no hesitation in saying that the difficulty of accepting this proposition is simply its sublimity. We are staggered and almost appalled at the demand made upon us, till we remember that unless we assume Jesus Christ to have been a heartless mocker of men, we are bound to treat each command as a promise. In other words, there is no limit set to our possible growth in holiness. The only check to it is caused by the languor of our desire for the fulfilment of the promises: due to the secret doubt as to whether God is concerned to fulfil them, or has the power. M. Coué's teaching on both these questions is pertinent and valuable.

What, then, ought to be the attitude of convinced Christians to the new movement?

It behoves them to discriminate between the sound principles on which M. Coué's teaching is based and the dubious method of applying them; acknowledging meantime that if the oral repetition of a formula tends to produce satisfactory curative results, it is evident that we are getting into closer contact with a psychological law. We shall do well to reflect carefully on how far Christianity embodies all that is true in self-suggestion, but to beware of the timid indolence of mind which has often in the past constrained Churchmen to oppose any advance in science, especially if they do not happen to feel the need of it themselves.

Rather let religious people welcome this movement and interpret the teaching so as to show that the cardinal message is essentially not a therapeutic novelty but an echo of the New Testament, and in startling agreement with its tenor, its cautions, and its hopes. We have to notice that M. Coué calls on sufferers "to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest" a truth of their being, viz. that their normal condition is one of health, bodily and mental. Now if that teaching is true, it is not surprising that the apprehension of it should

work curative effects on the being of man, since we know how in the most manifold fashion optimism of spirit quickens bodily vitality. But there is a vast difference between bare self-suggestion, however successful, and the severely triumphant message of the Gospel, "Know ye not that your bodies are temples of the Holy Ghost!" Not only is there a far ampler field covered by the Apostolic challenge—for it deals with the restoration of the whole of humanity and gives us a warrant for accepting the words of Christ quoted above, as referring to spiritual, mental, and bodily potentialities of man—but it rivets the assurance on the indestructible conviction of nine-tenths of the human race, that we exist in vital dependence on a Higher Power and are being gradually raised to a nobler order of being by the imparting to us of the divine life itself. M. Coué explains how the reception of this "unspeakable gift" depends on our believing in it as a fact and acting on it in a peculiarly simple fashion which is dictated by, and in turn increases, our faith. This is exactly the Gospel demand. Our salvation requires not a constant laborious effort of will fighting against forces of unknown strength, but the quiet confidence that we are already given and may now put into action "the powers of the world to come."

It is not within the horizon of our imaginations to measure the greatness of the difference between the two doctrines. Two further points, however, may be mentioned. Both methods or doctrines or systems of treatment of human ills seem likely to be marked in the future, as they have been in the past, by recurrent failure. Self-suggestion by itself—that is, detached alike from Theism and Christianity—is not only dumb in presence of this adversary, but suffers in its own very essence because by each defeat its central claim is undermined. To be successful it requires some confidence: as failure ensues, after each experiment it needs more confidence, for the resistance is shown to be formidable; but it has to work with less and less. It is as if of two armies starting equal, the defeated one lost at once by transfer a thousand men to the victorious foe; and the issue of any further conflict would be easy to forecast. But the Christian knows that, as he is in the hands of a divine Person who is working for his salvation, failure to obtain a wished-for boon only means that something more desirable is being bestowed.

Secondly, Christians will be very chary of accepting the assumption that in the treatment of illness there is no need to call on the will. First, because it is very doubtful if the imagination can be concentrated on the facts without effort

of will: but more emphatically because the renewal of human will-power (after its disablement from sin) by the Incarnation of Christ is a cardinal doctrine of Christianity. The right treatment of any evil assumes, not that our will is feeble, but that it is splendidly strong.

Such is the confidence of hope into which every child of man is called upon to enter. It is based not on any recondite theory of the relation between the human and the divine, but simply and directly on the deeply rooted almost universal instincts which have from time immemorial caused the generations of mankind to put their trust in Prayer. Unless all prayer is a complete and hollow delusion, the principle of it is the principle of auto-suggestion, which is now revealed afresh in a limited department of human needs, and it remains for all who believe in God to translate it into something no less glorious than a fresh imparting of the Life Eternal.

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THE SELF AND "THE UNCONSCIOUS."

LEONARD HODGSON.

THE early Christians and their contemporaries lived, so they thought, among a large population of unseen spirits, powerful for good or evil. A kind of natural pessimism seems to have led most of those who paid much attention to the existence of this unseen population to have chiefly in mind those spirits which were evil. By an inference hardly surprising under the circumstances they ascribed various ills in human life, especially ills which befell the mind, to the agency of these malignant powers. Men were said to be under the influence of, or to be possessed by, devils. But these ills were not incapable of cure. One might meet a healer who had power in the spirit world and was stronger than the devils, who would drive them away or cast them out, and so free the victims from their control. In the first few centuries of our era there were many who were thought so to have been cured.

We live to-day, so we think, with our minds shading off into a vast region called "the unconscious," the home of various "complexes," powerful for good or evil in our lives. When we think much of these, a kind of pessimism is apt to seize us, and our imagination is prone to become captive to the fear lest some evil complex which now, perhaps, lies hidden in "our unconscious" may some day rise up with evil portent for our future. It is not surprising that more and more we are coming to explain human action, and especially the action and mental condition of those who are deranged in mind, as due to the influence of these complexes. Moreover, with growing success we adopt this hypothesis in the treatment of mental diseases. Healers may be met who have power to bring to light the hidden complexes of "the unconscious," and, when the patient has seen them face to face, he is freed from their tyranny. There are many men and women alive to-day who have so been cured.

We believe in complexes; we do not believe in devils. What advantage has the one belief over the other? All the advantage, we should say, of being scientific instead of superstitious, of being based on the careful collection of instances and the verification of hypotheses in experience. So far so good, and I do not suppose that anyone who has taken the trouble to study any of the work of those experimentalists who have investigated the subject at first hand can doubt that great additions have been made to our knowledge worthy to be called assured results of science. But truth is apt to be discovered entangled in much that is of less value, as precious metals are found embedded in base rock; and to disentangle the assured results from less certain theories is a work always rendered necessary by any fresh advance in knowledge. Here the layman may play his part by stating the problems which are suggested to his mind as he reflects on the work of the discoverer. He is anxious to be scientific in his beliefs and not superstitious. But sometimes he is puzzled as to how much in what is offered him is strictly scientific, and, if he wishes for truth, he must put his questions.

Devils, he gathers, are not scientific. At any rate it is not usually claimed on their behalf that they are. "The unconscious," on the other hand, does claim to be a scientific discovery, and to a large extent it makes good its claim. Men probe into its depths, and find what their previous experience would lead them to expect. But frequently it is not merely "the unconscious" of which we hear; it is "the unconscious self" of which men speak. The complexes which may influence Jones's life are found in Jones's "unconscious self." It is here that the puzzles begin.

Let us take our stand alongside the early Christian. We are confronted with Jones whose mind is out of order. It seems simple to say that the facts are the same for us both, only we explain them differently. The early Christian says "devils." We say "complexes." But the difference between us is deeper than at first sight appears. The early Christian has little doubt about what he means by "Jones." Jones is a man such as he is himself, with a clearly-defined body, soul, and spirit, who has got his mind into the power of devils. But for us Jones is a self of which only a small part is known either to us or to him. It is nothing clearly defined. Like an iceberg floating in the sea with vast masses hidden from view, Jones has vast depths in his self "beneath the threshold of consciousness"—his consciousness and ours.

Here at once, when we speak of Jones's "unconscious

self," there is an ambiguity in the word "unconscious." It means, of course, that there is more in Jones than he knows of. But does it also mean that Jones is capable of thinking without knowing it? Is it merely as an object of thought that he exists below as well as above the threshold of consciousness, or is he to be found there as thinking subject too? It is clear from the language used that both are often included. We are shown facts which are said to be explicable only on the theory of so-called "unconscious cerebration." The "unconscious self" is an active mental entity.

This is a very difficult conception indeed. Thought is known to us in the activity of thinking, as will in the activity of willing, and emotion in the activity of feeling; while what we mean by "the self" is the subject of these activities. When Descartes tried to find something of whose existence he could be absolutely sure, he found it in himself as the subject of consciousness—*cogito ergo sum*. But now it is the self as unconscious of its own activities that we are interested in—a curiously objectivist result of that devotion to psychology initiated by the subjectivism of Descartes.

It is probable that the language of John Locke is largely responsible for this turn of events. His famous description of the mind as a *tabula rasa* is clearly capable of interpretation in such a way as to open the door for the present development. It may suggest that the mind is not an active subject of consciousness, but a passive something on which impressions make their mark. It is fatally easy to forget that the analogy of the clean sheet of paper is only an analogy, to forget the element of consciousness in the mind under the influence of the metaphor. If we approach the subject thinking of the mind as receiving impressions in the same way as the sheet of paper receives the impressions of a pencil, it is easy to transfer to the mind the unconsciousness of the paper. But in doing this, disguise it as we will, there is a materialism in our thought. We are thinking of the mind, not as the spiritually alive subject of consciousness, but as some sort of a substance existing whether conscious or no. We may not, perhaps, think of it as extended in space, but we certainly think of it as extended in time; and what do we mean by "matter" if it be not that which is unconscious and extended? The idea of the mind, or of the self, as some sort of an unconscious substance is undoubtedly materialistic. The layman, then, cannot but ask if he can only accept what is scientific at the cost of becoming a materialist.

The question is, what is to be meant by the word "self"? How is that word to be used? Is it to be confined to the

spiritually alive subject of consciousness, or must we make the plunge into materialism and speak of "the unconscious self"? Are the facts of recent psychological discovery such as to drive us to this? Or can we accept as "scientific" all that is being learned about "the unconscious" without going on to commit ourselves to belief in "unconscious selves"? How much progress can we make towards assimilating the new knowledge while confining our use of the word "self" to the description of the subject of consciousness?

So limiting our own use of the word, let us see how far we can get.

We will not at first consider "the unconscious" at all, but will ask what we mean by "the self" in the ordinary world of the plain man—the world of the early Christian. This is no easy question to answer, as any plain man may soon discover by reading such a book as Professor Laird's *Problems of the Self*. But we may, perhaps, assume this much, that by a self we ordinarily mean a conscious subject of experiences with a certain continuity born of self-consciousness and memory. He is accustomed to distinguish himself from what in philosophy has been called the not-self, which we may perhaps call, in less pure but more ordinary English, his environment. We may not always be able to make up our minds where to draw the line between the self and the environment, but, if we have learned what Professor Pringle-Pattison has to teach us, we shall not refuse to make distinctions because we cannot draw lines.

But if a self be a self-conscious unity of experiences, it is clear that we do not come into existence ready-made, so to speak. The self is a growing being, and it grows by feeding upon the experiences provided for it by the environment. It learns *risu cognoscere matrem*, it hears nursery rhymes and is taught the alphabet, it reads books, plays games, looks at pictures, and listens to music. From this point of view, the world around—the world of the not-self which is its environment—exists to provide experiences which the self may weave, so to speak, into the fabric of itself. But it has a power of rejecting as well as of accepting the proffered experiences. My environment contains an infinity of potential experiences, among which only a certain number may go to the making of myself. Sometimes I can choose which I will experience. There are more books in my shelves than I am ever likely to be able to read: there are more unmarried women in the world than I can ever marry. Sometimes I cannot help undergoing an experience I would

rather avoid. We need not now go further into this than to see that in the environment of the self are an infinite number of potential experiences of which it can actually experience only a certain number, and that it has some degree of choice over those which are to be woven into the fabric of its being.

We may, perhaps, express a doubt whether it is justifiable to include in a man's self, in the true sense, anything for which he cannot be held responsible. Certainly, the self in which a man is himself interested is that which, if he believes in a Day of Judgment, he expects then to be judged. He is, of course, directly responsible for certain elements in his environment as well as for his "self." If he has hung his room with lewd pictures, or has murdered a man and hidden his body in a wood, he has incurred very grave responsibilities. There is a relation of mutual interaction between the environment and the self. It can provide him with experiences, and he can wreak his will upon it. Moreover, since for each man the whole world of the not-self is his environment, it is different for each self, and, since for all practical purposes he only comes in touch with certain nearer ranges of it, in the case of each man we may speak of his particular environment. It is that which has influence upon him and provides those experiences which go to the making of himself. That, too, he in turn has influenced, and to some extent he is responsible for its condition.

Now, if the position thus briefly and inadequately sketched is a tenable one, is there any reason why the so-called "unconscious" should not be looked on as an extension of the environment rather than of the self?

First we must deal with the body. Is the physical body to be looked on as belonging to the self or to the environment? It seems to me necessary to assign it to the latter. It is, maybe, the nearest environment of the self; but it is environment for all its nearness, for it is material, and its work is to provide the self with experiences, not to experience them itself. But if we agree to class the body as environment, then at once a large element in "the unconscious" is already accounted for. Whatever of instincts, tendencies, passions, etc., we inherit by physical descent from our ancestors, come to us as materials to be woven into the fabric of ourselves or to be cast out and rejected; but only as accepted and woven in do they become part of the self. Perhaps when we become conscious of them we may refuse to admit them. Certainly, so long as they remain in "the unconscious" they are in our environment.

Then there are all those past experiences which we have forgotten, but which have left their mark upon us, as in the case of a woman who had been shut up in a dark cupboard at the mercy of the bogey man when she was a child, so that years afterwards she had an unreasoning fear of the dark which she could neither account for nor subdue until a healer "re-associated the complex" and set her free. Now in what would be a very common account of this case it is easy to see the pressing beyond its due of such an analogy as that of a wax tablet. We may think of a particle of ferrous matter falling on the surface of the wax and sinking in until the surface is again smooth, though the particle is now within, and of that particle being again drawn to the surface by a magnet. But what right have we to assume that the mind has an inside and an outside, a top and a bottom, an above the surface and a below the surface? These are all metaphors from space. All that we are entitled to say is that a child had the experience of being shut up in the dark in great terror, and that from this she wove into the fabric of her self a fear of darkness and afterwards forgot how this fear had arisen—as she might have acquired the knowledge that two and two make four and afterwards forgotten where she first learned it. Many years afterwards, in a state of trance, she recalls the incident. But that incident, as a fact of past history, is an element in the environment of the mind at the present, which can be contemplated in memory just as the proceedings in Parliament to-day are an element in the environment and can be followed by sitting in the gallery or reading the newspapers. The fact that things are sometimes remembered in a state of trance which are forgotten by the fully-conscious mind is neither here nor there. The question is whether memory necessitates the belief that past events are *in* the mind as a particle of grit may be *in* a tray of wax. If we do not hold the materialist conception of mind, which alone can justify us in refusing to recognise the purely metaphorical use of the word "in" as referred to the mind, we may surely conclude that to believe that past events are "in the unconscious mind" is mythology—like the belief in devils.

Then there are all those suppressed desires which may be revealed in our dreams. Here again, it seems to me, the hypothesis of an "unconscious self" is unnecessary. We have definitely refused to weave into the fabric of our selves some possible and offered experience. What if we do remember that offer again at a time when the reins of our self-control are slackened by sleep? It is no more part of our selves now than it was then.

It would be impossible in a brief paper such as this to attempt to deal with the whole catalogue of such contents of "the unconscious" as have been discovered. That, moreover, were a task better attempted by someone more familiar with them than that enquiring layman, the present writer. All he can do is to suggest a possible hypothesis for some competent student to verify.

The hypothesis, in brief, is this. In our ordinary waking life we are in touch with an environment which provides us with experiences, and we grow by weaving them into the fabric of our selves. The investigation of consciousness in other states than that of waking life seems to reveal the fact that this environment is not all that can go to the making of us—we are also in touch with "the unconscious." I would suggest that what we mean by "the unconscious" is a vast extension of the range of our possible experiences, of the environment of our selves. What each of us can there come in touch with will vary in each case, as in the environment of our waking life. Each has "his environment" in the one sphere as in the other, and there are elements in both for which he is responsible. What are the contents of that environment which we call "the unconscious" only patient investigation can reveal. There would seem at any rate to be the forgotten facts of our past history—but are there only our own past experiences? Who can say? Perhaps one day we may even discover devils, if not God Himself.

Sometimes I wonder, do the devils laugh?

LEONARD HODGSON.

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DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"INDIA'S REVOLT AGAINST CHRISTIAN CIVILISATION."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1922, p. 447.)

It is occasionally doubtful whether Mr Hamilton intends the arguments of his article to be taken quite seriously, but, if he does, his conclusions seem to call for criticism. Having, with rather excessive facility, identified Western civilisation with Christianity, and even utilitarian ethics with Christian ethics, he comes to the conclusion that India in its rejection of Western civilisation has rejected Christianity, and that because of this composite rejection and because also retrogression to a more paternal form of government and the present dyarchy are alike impossible, our only dignified course is to abandon India altogether. We must, however, do everything we can to make it appear that this abandonment is wholly voluntary—otherwise our dignity will suffer irreparable damage, and, in passing, he suggests that we should spend the last two years of our occupation in floating a loan wherewith India could pay off her indebtedness to Britain, it being assumed that this loan would be gladly over-subscribed by Indians themselves for the sake of the pleasure of getting rid of us.

This pessimistic estimate of the situation suggests, amongst others, three considerations.

In the first place, is Mr Hamilton justified in his easy identification of Western civilisation with Christianity? One could wish that he were, but it is necessary to face facts. Mr Hamilton says, "the religion of the State is Christian, the ethics studied are Christian or utilitarian." Two paragraphs further on Mr Hamilton makes it plain that he regards Christian and utilitarian ethics as interchangeable terms. But surely, however much so-called Christian ethics may at times depart from idealism, only a superficial study of ethics could suggest such an identification. As to the statement that "the religion of the State is Christian," it is true, of course, that there is an ecclesiastical establishment in India, under which certain bishoprics and chaplaincies of the Church of England and the Church of Scotland are endowed by the Government. But so far is this provision from being regarded as a normal consequence of the State being Christian that the devotion of public money to the support of ministrations to civilian congregations has within the last ten years or so been made a special point of criticism by Indian politicians, and during recent months the advisability of it has been seriously questioned by the authorities of the Church of England herself.

Moreover, the policy of the Government is in general one of religious *neutrality*; and so careful are the Government officials not to depart from this policy in favour of Christianity that they have more than once been accused of giving preference to institutions under non-Christian management in cases where the claims of institutions under Christian control were, on purely educational grounds, distinctly superior. Moreover, however loyal and cordial may be the support which many individual Europeans give to Christian work in India, it is hardly possible to argue—any more than in regard to England—that the attitude of the general European population is decidedly Christian. Many of them seem to be peculiarly successful in concealing the fact that they have any interest in the religious observances usually associated with Christianity. Hindus are frequently puzzled by the fact that the Europeans appear to pay less attention to their professed religion than the Hindus themselves do, and Indian Christians are on occasion bewildered when they are sneered at for being Christians, not by their Hindu or Mohammedan compatriots, but by their so-called Christian employers. It is impossible to conclude, as Mr Hamilton does, that because India has rejected Western civilisation she has therefore rejected Christianity.

Besides, he must take his argument both ways. If the rejection of certain forms of Western civilisation is to be taken as a rejection of Christianity, would not the acceptance of certain other phases have to be regarded as indicating an acceptance of Christianity? But we do not find that Mr Hamilton ventures to suggest that the crowded attendance of Indians at race-meetings and football matches (in their present forms distinctly Western importations) is to be taken as a proof of the progress of Christianity in India.

Occasionally, as in his fourth paragraph, Mr Hamilton becomes conscious that the Christianising of India is something different from the infusion of Western civilisation, but this consciousness supervenes only to give place to a certain amount of misrepresentations of the actual situation. After such emphasis as he places upon the crowded population of India, Mr Hamilton can hardly consistently argue that in any district missionaries are too numerous, however mistaken, according to him, they may be in their purposes. Further, missionaries do not nowadays estimate their influence or their success simply by counting heads, so that disparaging references to the paucity of converts is a somewhat antiquated form of criticism. Again, Mr Hamilton alludes to the low caste of many of the Christians. Missionaries, as preachers of a gospel and not of a class-privilege, welcome men from all castes, but they are not unaware of the dangers of merely "mass" movements and are doing their best to obviate these. But, at the same time, it is not the case that "few Indians except outcastes have been converted and baptised." The Christian community includes men of the highest castes, showing a sturdy spirit of independence, occupying high governmental and academic positions, and holding their own socially with their non-Christian associates.

Mr Hamilton's misapprehension of the actual position of Christi-

anity in India is still further shown by his remark that "all the schools and colleges of India are strictly secular." This is true of Government schools and colleges (though hardly reconcilable with the idea that "the religion of the State is Christian"); but is Mr Hamilton ignorant of the great impetus given to education in the later nineteenth century by the large missionary colleges, and is he unaware of their present existence with a policy which cannot be described as secular? Is he unaware also of the fact that the pioneers in primary education (especially of the education of girls) have in very many districts been Christian missionaries, and they certainly have not given, and are not giving, merely secular education.

Secondly, to come back to Mr Hamilton's main contention regarding the rejection of Western civilisation, we may ask whether this rejection has been as complete as he supposes? There are some people who, as Mr Edwyn Bevan has impressively pointed out in his recent book (*Hellenism and Christianity*), think that unless influence results in complete identification, it is practically non-existent. But though we have not moulded Indian civilisation into an exact replica of our own, and although imitation of our institutions and customs will become less overt as the years go on, it does not follow that the impact of Western civilisation has been of no abiding value to India. We must not look to this detail or that, but to interpenetration of spirit, and we must not expect monotonous uniformity as the result. There is room for differences in that ideal of the future which East and West may work out together.

Mr Hamilton selects as illustrations of his argument our failure to inculcate a love of truth and to develop a spirit of nationality amongst the Indian people. It might have been thought that any one having an Indian experience reaching back for two decades would have been more chary as to the effect of generalisations about Oriental untruthfulness. Such generalisations are always unfair to the many sincere and honourable men who are to be found in India as well as elsewhere. And they inevitably provoke a *tu quoque*, for unfortunately it is not only in India that, on occasion—to quote Mr Hamilton's words—"the countenance which conceals the real thoughts is more admired than the mouth which speaks from the fulness of the heart." Political exigencies in other lands also have been known to call forth such admiration.

Mr Hamilton argues at one point that it is the strength of the national spirit which has led to the rejection of Christianity, and at another that we failed to produce a spirit of nationality in India. Passing by this inconsistency and admitting that a true nationality for the whole of India has not yet been developed, we may ask whether there is not here a confusion between the nation and the state? Is our ideal for India a nationality or a state? The former is bound to be exclusive and productive of racial antagonism. The latter may include within India herself many different nationalities and may reach out hands of friendship across the sea to the other nationalities which may be bound together into the unity of the state of the British Commonwealth.

Finally, Mr Hamilton's conclusion is pessimistic. He thinks that if we left India to intestine warfare, no great harm would be done, for the population is already in excess of natural resources and would be none the worse of diminution. But surely this Malthusianism is out of date, and development of Indian resources is possible without the introduction of all the horrors of Western industrialism which Mr Hamilton so justly deplores. I agree with Mr Hamilton that a reactionary policy in government is impossible, and also that it is fundamentally undesirable. But I do not agree that the only alternative is abandonment of our task in India, with a backward look to the preservation of our commercial interests. I believe that there is a higher ideal of co-operation in which those who come from the West to take part in the government may make good as individuals of goodwill—ready to help and advise, even if they lose something of the prestige which has hitherto belonged to the *ex officio*, but hampered and restricted, member of a ruling class.

W. S. URQUHART.

CALCUTTA.

"MODERNISTS AND UNITARIANS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1922, p. 419.)

AFTER reading and repeatedly re-reading the January article on "Modern Churchmen or Unitarians" the non-theological lay reader is impelled to exclaim, "Words! words! words!" Albeit not wholly in disparagement; for is not all *theology* concerned with its literal meaning—the *word* about God, as *religion* is concerned with His *spirit*? and we are still far from having outgrown the need of the former word, though certainly moving towards that outgrowth.

"All truths are but shadows save the last," as the writer reminds us; and those who are not afraid to face the full implications of this avowal may discern some of the verbal shadows which make possible the arguments "about it and about" on which this article is based. We are reminded of another essential factor in the discussion, viz. "The Unitarians are not a static Body; they are in process of evolution." This might to-day be asserted with almost equal truth of the Church, though at the risk of hurting the feelings of some of its members; and it would greatly elucidate discussion and understanding.

For instance, the doctrine of the Trinity—rightly assumed to constitute a chief distinction between Churchmen and Unitarians, is thus luminously explained by Dr Martineau!

"To understand the Father of the early Church," he says, "you must go back till you reach a primeval solitude. Not mere vacancy do you find there, but a poised and brooding cloud. To this dormant potency, that is, but does not breathe, theologians gave the name of Father. The Father contemplated in Himself, presents only a bare immensity—a dark blank of possibility—the occult potency of all perfection, but itself realises none."

This view is supported also by Mr T. R. Glover (one of the most winning and convincing writers about Jesus Christ) when he declares, "Apart from Jesus, God is little better than an abstract noun ; and to people who are serious, abstract nouns are of less and less use."

And again, the Catholic writer W. S. Lilley is quoted as affirming, "For all practical purposes 'God' means the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."

One is impelled to demand what human being's aspirations after a complete personality would be satisfied by the mere recognition of His Fatherhood, and nothing more ? It is remote indeed from the image of the Father contained in the teachings and parables of Jesus.

While it would be incorrect to describe the God of Unitarianism as lacking in "the occult potency of all perfection," these attributes of supreme Power and Wisdom are regarded only as the foundation on which are built up the better comprehended Beauty, Love, Mercy—demanded by finite humanity to constitute a God who can command its adoration. Thus "the Father" of Unitarianism comprises in Himself that which the Church, proceeding on other lines, embodies as a second Person, to whom is rendered the homage and devotion for which the human heart must perforce find an object. In the same way the Holy Ghost or Spirit is included and worshipped by Unitarians in the "One God and Father of us all." In the Greek and Roman mythologies almost all the separate attributes known and prized by mankind were typified as individual Divinities, worshipped and invoked according to the immediate necessities of the moment, and a like differentiation survives in the Calendar of Saints in the Roman Catholic Church.

True, the Unitarian makes another sort of differentiation, in reserving his actual worship for his "One God," while his devotion to and adoration of Jesus is, or should be, expressed in the ethical and practical ways of daily life and conduct. That this distinction is actually apparent in the comparative lines of conduct of orthodox and unorthodox Christians, it would be rash to assert, although most Unitarians, and probably all Churchmen would admit the categorical imperative.

During the war-fever, for instance, many of the Church's spiritual leaders seemed to transfer their allegiance to the "brooding cloud," the "dormant potency," or the "Man of War Deity" from the Prince of Peace, whose doctrines were temporarily in abeyance. "We are not talking about Jesus Christ—we are talking about the war," was the impatient rejoinder of a patriot to an inopportune quotation : but this impatience was not peculiar to adherents of any one sect, hatred and blood lust claimed their disciples from every class and creed—save one, which was persecuted and denounced by all.

But for this dark and shameful memory, how might we not exult over the steady progress—so largely due to the influence, through many years, of the *Hibbert Journal*—of the spirit of reason, toleration, and true brotherhood in truth-seeking !

"And yet—it moves !"

C. C. OSLER.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

THE issue of the twelfth and closing volume of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark) gives one the opportunity of congratulating Dr Hastings and his publishers upon their striking achievement. The *Encyclopædia* has already taken its place in the world of scholarship ; the more it is used, the more it is valued ; and alike in contents and in get-up it is a shining credit to all who have been concerned in its publication. All that is now required is an index volume, and this is promised. Meanwhile we shall take the twelfth volume as a convenient outline for our present survey.

The most notable article in the volume upon theology in general is Professor A. E. Taylor's on Theism, a fresh and characteristically lucid discussion of the entire subject. He concludes his brilliant survey by arguing that for those who cannot accept any theory of logical pluralism Kant's moral argument is final, *i.e.* "the argument from the reality of absolute moral values to the all-wise, all-holy, and all-powerful Supreme Being." He defines theism as "the doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters of being (a) intrinsically complete or perfect, and (b), as a consequence, an adequate object of unqualified adoration or worship." The philosophical basis of this belief is restated with real analytic power. On an equal level of excellence are the articles on Time by Professor C. D. Broad, Theosophy by Dr Paul Oltramare, Teutonic Religion by Miss Kershaw, Totemism by Dr E. S. Hartland, Vedic Religion by Dr A. A. Macdonell, and War by Professor W. P. Paterson. Even in good encyclopædias there are often articles that move a reviewer who is a reader to moan with Byron, "Job be my model, and Lethe my beverage !" There are no such articles in this volume of Dr Hastings' *Encyclopædia*, and there are some, particularly those first mentioned, which lend distinction to the book.

André Longuet's posthumous monograph on *L'Origine Commune des Religions* (Paris : Félix Alcan) starts by arguing that, as thought begins by distinguishing, primitive man was first attracted by opposites : God made light and darkness, male and female, etc. The

sense of antitheses all through life produced a tendency to dualism, which nevertheless implied a synthesis. He works this out in cosmology and ethics and theology, illustrating the development from ancient religion, in particular from Greece. The book is really a study in comparative mythology, at the root of which the author finds what he calls "le mythe dualiste, c'est-à-dire l'exposé des rapports complexes des deux divinités primitives." Even in Hebrew monotheism he professes to discover this, for Eve is viewed as originally an ancient goddess like Isis or Persephone. This ultra-speculative element in his interpretations, and the undue significance which he attaches to sex in the formation of religious ideas, are drawbacks to the argument; but there are often suggestive hints thrown out, and M. Longuet had evidently read widely in the region of comparative religion as well as thought for himself. The comparative religion articles in the *Encyclopædia* include a succinct essay on Zoroastrianism by Professor A. J. Carnoy. He holds to his explanation of "magi" as "the helpful, the curers or averters of evil spirits," argues that the stoic contradiction between an ethical dualism and a cosmic pantheism is only explicable as the result of Eastern or Magian influence, but hesitates to admit that any book of the Bible except Tobit is directly inspired by Mazdean ideas. In the *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses* (January, pp. 1-12), Cumont shows, as against M. Prosper Alfarc, that Zervanism was simply a Mazdean heresy, never accepted by any except a minority of dissenters in Iran, whose descendants were attacked about 400 A.D. by Theodore of Mopsuestia. Mr Louis H. Gray, in *The Harvard Review* (January, pp. 87-96), "strongly inclines to regard Zervanism as the prevailing sect in the Sassanian period"; his article is mainly a review of Pettazzoni's *La Religione di Zarathustra*, a standard work which evidently appeared too late (1920) to be included in Professor Carnoy's bibliography. Zoroastrianism is further mentioned in the *Encyclopædia's* large composite articles on Sun, Moon, and Stars, and on Worship; in connection with the latter, Mr E. Edwards notices that in Parsi worship still the individual is rarely fused in the collective worship of the gathering.

In an article on Under World, Canon M'Culloch mentions the early Hebrew conception of this region; but an elaborate treatment of the whole subject is now given by Professor L. B. Paton in *Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity* (Hodder & Stoughton), the most comprehensive and reliable treatise which we now have in English upon the subject. Dr C. J. Ball's commentary on *The Book of Job* (Oxford) is the outstanding contribution of English scholarship recently within this department of theological study; no survey could pass over it, and yet no survey could possibly do justice to its wealth of suggestion and stimulus. M. E. Podechard's notes on the Psalms are generally full of suggestion; his paper on the 49th Psalm (*Revue Biblique*, pp. 5-19) argues that the refrain of verse 12 (20) ought to be repeated at the end of each stanza, viz. after verses 4, 8, and 15, and also that verse 11 should begin, "Their tombs are their dwellings for ever." Dr J. M. Powis Smith shows, in *The Journal of Religion*

(pp. 58-69), how the Psalter reflects the ritual piety of the later Judaism. "The original use of the Psalms was largely in the interests of ritual, and they are to be thought of as to a great extent lyrical interpretations of the acts of worship"; this element, he thinks, was partly stimulated by contact with Babylonian institutions and practices, even by the influence of Babylonian hymnology. The ideas of the article are put in fuller form, along with others, in the same writer's *Religion of the Psalms* (Cambridge University Press). A cognate subject has been retouched by Mr H. St John Thackeray in his Schweich lectures on *The Septuagint and Jewish Worship* (Mitford), which breaks new ground, and offer some data for fresh estimates of familiar problems. An English translation of *The First Twelve Chapters of the Book of Isaiah* (Cambridge: Bower & Bower), by Mr H. W. Sheppard, does not preserve the rhythmical form, but adheres to the order of the Hebrew words, probably for teaching purposes. Thus xi. 8 becomes: "And frolic shall sucking child at hole of cobra, and on light-hole of great viper weaned child his hand hath set." In x. 9 read "is" for "it." Dr Ernst Sellin's commentary on *Das Zwölfprophetenbuch* (1922), in the Old Testament series which he is editing, contains a number of textual conjectures by his teacher, A. Klostermann, one of which emends Amos v. 26 into: "Ye shall be moved off along with the tabernacle of your king, and with your God whom you have made for yourselves" (*i.e.* the golden calf of Bethel). Sellin, accepting this reading cordially, points out that it proves Amos to have belonged to Judah. He is equally ingenious on his own account; *e.g.* he gets over the difficulty of Hosea iii. 1-8 by omitting verse 2 as a gloss, and reading "say" for "I said" in verse 3, just as he simplifies Jonah iii. 3-4 by reading, "Then Jonah arose and went to Nineveh, according to the word of the Lord—Nineveh was a great city before the God—to wander through it for three days. And Jonah arose to enter the city on each day's journey and to preach, etc." The commentary is clearly planned; a translation heads each paragraph, there are no footnotes, and the notes are much to the point. As for the later Judaism, we have to chronicle one or two items. In the *Revue Biblique* (pp. 31-54) Dom de Bruyne makes out a good case for the theory that there were, prior to Lucian, two recensions of the Greek text of the Books of Maccabees, one represented by our Greek manuscripts, and the other, very different, represented by the Latin version. Mr R. A. Aytoun, in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (pp. 172-180), argues that the Targum specifically identifies the servant of the Lord with the Messiah, and also eliminates from his career, by ingenious exegesis, the experience of suffering. This, Mr Aytoun thinks, is not due to a reaction against Christianity, but reflects a conception already known to Jesus and the early Church. As this problem had been already discussed, it does not enter into Professor T. B. Kilpatrick's *Encyclopædia* article on Suffering. But a cognate question is raised by Dr G. F. Moore in the *Harvard Review* (pp. 41-86); he investigates the conception of intermediaries like Memra, Shekinah, and Metatron, in Jewish theology, and denies that Memra is even a hypostasis or used in a personal sense, while

"Shekinah" is merely a reverent circumlocution for God. Dr Abrahams' article on the Targums in the *Encyclopædia* is disappointingly brief—not half a column long. But it is a welcome addition, in this department, to have an English translation, with notes, of the *Tractate Berakoth* (S.P.C.K.), from Dr A. Lukyn Williams.

Owing to the incidence of the alphabet, this volume of the *Encyclopædia* offers little or nothing that bears directly upon New Testament criticism. But in the *Harvard Review* for April Professor Hans Windisch surveys carefully the relevant foreign literature which has appeared between 1914 and 1920; he calls attention, among other things, to Lietzmann's argument that the Gothic version, especially of Paul's epistles, goes back to the oldest form of the Koinê text, and to Zahn's remarkable reconstruction of the second-century Latin version and "Western" text of Acts—an essay which is pronounced "far and away superior to the 'Western' texts of Blass and Hilgenfeld." He also draws attention to a Roman Catholic book of 1915, on *Die Theorien des modernen Sozialismus über den Ursprung des Christenthums*, in which the author, F. X. Kiefl, refutes the notion that primitive Christianity had a proletarian programme, and regards socialism as the real anti-Christ. The survey closes with a notice of Reitzenstein's recent occupation; that scholar has abandoned Egypt for Persia, and now finds even the Son of Man idea in Iranian sources, "with the surprising result that Jesus himself had the consciousness that he was Enoch"! One or two contributions have been made to the criticism of the Fourth Gospel, including a thoughtful little book upon *The Miracles in St John's Gospel and their Teaching on Eternal Life* (Longmans), by Mr T. W. Gilbert, and a paper by Mr John P. Naish on "The Fourth Gospel and the Sacraments," in the *Expositor* for January. But the main contribution is Professor Burney's *Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel* (Oxford), which states, with an ample and ingenious array of proofs, the thesis that this gospel is a translation of some Aramaic original, and that it originated in an Aramaic-speaking province like Syria, probably at Antioch, where "there must [?] have been a large substratum of the population to whom Aramaic was" more familiar than Greek. The arguments adduced to corroborate this conclusion do not sound impressive, e.g. the minimising of the Alexandrian influence. Nor is the deduction plausible that such a trained rabbinic scholar as John could write the Apocalypse. But the main force of the argument lies in its linguistic evidence, into which there is not space here to enter. I only suggest that an Aramaic source is not invariably necessary. For example, in ii. 22 the use of ἐλέγεν in a pluperfect sense may be explicable on Dr Burney's theory (p. 108), but, as the context shows, it is equivalent to εἶπεν in the Johannine, as it is to ἐλέξεν in the Thucydidean style, even if we hesitated about accepting Dr Abbott's view that "the habitual sayings of a Jewish teacher might easily be confused with his sayings on special occasions." The book will call attention to the problem of the Fourth Gospel, however, along new lines, and it is certain to stir fruitful discussion, especially as Dr Burney inclines to believe that John was not the apostle but

a young Jerusalemite of priestly family. In a pamphlet on *Stoic Origins of the Fourth Gospel* (printed for private circulation), Dr Rendel Harris argues that the seventh chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon is a Stoic hymn, to which the prologue of the Fourth Gospel is a pendant, teaching that the Logos, not Wisdom, was divine. The wider region of such speculations has been entered boldly by Hans Leisegang's *Pneuma Hagion: der Ursprung der Geistbegriffs der synoptischen Evangelien aus der griechischen Mystik* (1922) a sequel to his previous monograph on *Die Vorchristlichen Anschauungen und Lehren vom Pneuma und der mystisch-intuitiven Erkenntnis* (1919), in which he sought the roots of the Spirit-idea, especially in its Philonic presentation, within the region of Greek philosophy. He still ignores Jewish anticipations of the idea, and this is a drawback to his study, although he is careful to plead that he simply sets out to find what a Greek would understand by the Gospel references to the Holy Spirit, not what these references ultimately sprang from. The dominant theory is that Hellenistic mysticism explains most, if not all, of the phenomena, and that this mysticism has affected the Lucan traditions of the birth and baptism of Jesus in particular. One trace of this is to be seen, according to Leisegang, in Luke's treatment of the Sermon on the Mount, which reveals "the complete lack of understanding on the part of a Greek before the deepest meaning of the Gospel." What makes the monograph valuable is its collection of material from Hellenistic mysticism rather than its considered judgments.

Porphyry's letter to Marcella gives Mr W. J. Ferrar (*Church Quarterly Review*, April, pp. 85-97) the opportunity of discussing afresh this notable neoplatonist. It is perhaps late, but not too late, to call attention to the appreciation of Porphyry in J. Geffcken's *Der Ausgang des Griechisch-Römischen Herdentums* (1920), pp. 53-77, a penetrating and well-balanced survey of the third and fourth centuries in particular. The earlier phase of gnosticism is to the front in several contributions. For example, to the *Encyclopædia* Professor E. F. Scott contributes a lucid study of Valentinianism, one of the articles on gnostic theories which have been so notable a feature of the work. He points out how this great master of gnosticism, "one of the most gifted and versatile minds of the early Church," aimed at drawing gnosticism and the Church together. Jean Rivi re, in the *Revue des sciences religieuses* (1921, pp. 297-323), which is issued by the Roman Catholic faculty of theology at Strassburg University, concludes his survey of the Marcionite view of redemption as that is reflected in the writings of the Armenian Eznik. The Marcionite doctrine, he thinks, passed through three stages: first, the assertion of redemption as a fact, then the advance to a theory of ransom (as is evident in the fourth century), and finally, the curious Armenian Marcionite notion that the death of Christ was due to the Old Testament God's abuse of His own power. Professor Fulton writes the *Encyclopædia* article on the Trinity, with another short one on Tritheism; in the *Studi Filosofici e Religiosi* (1921, pp. 257-285) G. Furlani begins a series of studies upon Apollinaris of Laodicea by discussing his conception of

the Trinity; and in the same journal Maria Fermi begins a careful discussion of St Paul in relation to the Greek apologists of the second century (pp. 456-472). Mr R. S. Moxon's *Doctrine of Sin* (Allen & Unwin) is partly historical, partly constructive, a book of vital interest, which, among other points, enters a protest against the domination of St Augustine's theory. M. Hippolyte Gallerand's study of "La rédemption dans Saint Augustine" (*Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses*, pp. 38-77), an exhaustive survey of the subject, concludes by inferring that he regarded Christ's death as the means of destroying the reign of the devil over the children of Adam. The *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (1922, pp. 5-33) again opens its pages to a discussion of Pascal. Paul Wernle sets him in the line of Christian apologists, but much lower than St Paul or St Augustine; he warns Protestants that the Catholic heritage of Pascal is a handicap upon his apologetic by its element of "synergism." M. Reymond, in reply, demurs to a critic drawing sharp theological inferences from a work so unfinished as the *Pensées*, and restates some of the views in his previous article (see *Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1921, p. 356). By "synergism" Wernle, of course, means the collaboration of the human will with divine grace, as indicated by the Council of Trent. The technical sense of the term, as a name for the Protestant doctrine which developed in and after Melancthon, is brought out clearly by Mr Donald Mackenzie in the *Encyclopædia*.

The last article in the *Encyclopædia* is a sympathetic and critical sketch of Zwingli by Professor Hugh Watt. H. Henri Strohl has published, in connection with the University of Strassburg, an important monograph on *L'Évolution Religieuse de Luther* (1922), which traces the development of the reformer's thought down to 1515. It is a work of singular value. The writer begins by reviewing recent criticism of Luther, noting especially the tacit repudiation of Denifle and Grisar by their fellow-Romanist Kiefl, but pointing out that, while Kiefl recognises the essentially religious origin of the Reformation and of Luther's propaganda, there are aspects of Luther's early life which still require to be analysed in the light of religious psychology. He then states the problem with insight and historical candour. When Erasmus

" Chose through his own glass to scan
Sick Europe, and reduced unwillingly
The monk within the cassock to the man
Within the monk, they called it heresy."

Luther's effort, which was deeper, they called heresy and worse. But, as M. Strohl has shown with unusual ability, Luther's aims and motives were profoundly Christian. It is a pleasure to welcome French historical criticism to this problem, and to learn that the author has a second volume in preparation. Mr T. F. Lockyer's *Paul, Luther, Wesley* (Epworth Press) is, as the sub-title explains, "a study in religious experience, as illustrative of the ethics of Christianity"; it is an appreciative, popular estimate of the great German reformer on well-known lines.

The ethical articles in this volume of the *Encyclopædia* are not specially numerous nor are they important. We miss in Miss Gardner's pages on Superstition the convenient definition or description which Ruskin gives in his lecture on *The Study of Architecture*; and Professor H. J. Rose's introductory discussion of Suicide might have been illustrated from Balzac's *Peau de Chagrin*, as well as from Tolstoy and George Borrow. Dr Sophie Bryant's article on Sympathy and Professor Morgan's on Trust are models of brief, thorough discussion. The Greek sense of "temperance," however, deserved more attention than it receives in the article upon that narrowed virtue. The Rev. John Dow writes with sense and knowledge on Usury (Christian), and there is an oddly favourable article on Vegetarianism by Dr E. Lyttelton, who seems rather perplexed by the argument that Jesus was not a vegetarian. There is no article on Zeal, but there is one on Yawning.

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REVIEWS.

The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy. By Bernard Bosanquet, Fellow of the British Academy.—London : Macmillan & Co., 1921.—Pp. xxviii + 220.

THE latest of Dr Bosanquet's books possesses two qualities which are, indeed, recognisable in most of his work, but which are nowhere so clearly displayed as here. One is the sheer range of his philosophical scholarship. For width of reading and accuracy of knowledge there cannot be many to challenge comparison with him—certainly not among those of us whose time is mainly absorbed by our professional duties of teaching and administration. We can only acknowledge, with unstinting admiration, his mastery. There does not appear to be any really important book in contemporary philosophy which Dr Bosanquet has not swept into the stream of his argument. Upon Croce and Gentile, M'Taggart and Haldane, Bergson and Whitehead, upon Alexander and a host of other realists, he brings to bear a mind trained by a lifelong study of Plato, Spinoza, Hegel, Green, and Bradley. The other quality is sympathy—a sympathy which springs from sheer freshness and elasticity of mind, and which enables Dr Bosanquet, for all that he holds firmly to his own views, to put himself with real insight at the point of view of others. His attitude towards all the diverse movements in contemporary thought is one of generous welcome for what each has to contribute towards the common enterprise of "speculative philosophy." Even when he has to insist on differences of view, he yet writes as one who seeks, and offers, co-operation in a common task, rather than as one anxious to refute or condemn. Hence his polemics are, in temper and method, gentle and serene. He never lapses into the acerbity which makes Bradley's polemical manner polished but not polite. Still less is he ever guilty of that superior scorn which as a rule exhibits only the critic's failure to understand what he criticises. Thus, whether we agree with Dr Bosanquet or not, we must at least acknowledge that in knowledge and in sympathy his book is a model of what a philosophical treatise ought to be.

The "extremes," the meeting of which Dr Bosanquet exhibits, would have to be distinguished by their current labels as (1) "neo-idealism," *i.e.* Croce, Gentile, and their school, with Bergson in a more detached position ; (2) "realism," which may be either "new," *i.e.*

Alexander in England and "the Six" (Perry, Holt, *et al.*) in America, or "critical," *i.e.* Strong, Sellars, and others; and (3) "old idealism," or "absolutism," or, as Dr Bosanquet himself prefers to say, "speculative philosophy," as represented by Bradley and himself on the basis of Plato and Hegel. But it is precisely one of Dr Bosanquet's most fundamental points that these labels are altogether misleading; that they proclaim divisions which are either superficial or obsolete, and which hide both disagreements which are significant, and, even more, agreements in which extremes veritably meet. In short, the old labels disguise new realignments. They tend to keep discussion focussed on issues from which the life has ebbed, and thus distract attention from the living issues on which we really agree or differ. Absolutist, for example, is found agreeing with realist against neo-idealist on the objectivity of nature (the world of perception); realist agrees with neo-idealist against absolutist on the ultimate reality of change and time; neo-idealist differs from absolutist, realist differs from realist, on the metaphysical import of religion. It is these meetings and these differences, cross-sectioning in all directions the boundary-lines fixed by our labels, which form Dr Bosanquet's topic. Penetrating beneath the shibboleths of schools, he has attempted to make contemporary thought conscious of whither the various tendencies in it are leading. He looks to this critical self-consciousness to help us recognise which tendencies lead us astray and which bring us back, with fresh appreciation, to the old and true insights of "speculative philosophy." "The neo-realist, the man of comparative science, and the empiricist, are everywhere at work to-day . . . building the foundations of that speculative philosophy whose superstructure already exists. Of course, in doing so, they immensely enrich and effectively amend it" (p. 75).

There are, amidst a wealth of minor details, four main topics on which philosophical opponents are found to meet. They are: (1) the treatment of sense-data; (2) the inclusion of the "imaginary," from dreams to art, in the "real" of metaphysics; (3) the problem of time, change, progress; (4) the justification of a religious, as distinct from a merely moral, attitude towards the universe. So far as the limits of a review permit, I shall attempt to indicate the main points in Dr Bosanquet's handling of each of these four topics.

1. *Sense-data*.—Dr Bosanquet welcomes Dr Moore's *Refutation of Idealism* at least so far as its purport is to insist on the objectivity of sense-data. He quotes Bradley effectively as rejecting with emphasis the view that an object of perception is nothing but an observer's "state of mind." In so far as the assertion, by the Italian neo-idealists, of the creation of objects by pure acts of thought amounts to such "mentalism," realism and speculative philosophy alike reject it. Dr Bosanquet endorses the moral of Whitehead's exposure of the "fallacy of bifurcation," by insisting that to treat sense-data as "subjective" and "mental" (and, therefore, non-physical) is to split nature in two, and rob it of the beauty which is so important an element in our experience of it. Sense-data are not "sensations" in an exclusively mental sense, but simply phenomena,

which are what they are, but the nature and occurrence of which are dependent on a multitude of conditions, *i.e.* imply, and are implied by, the nature of the universe as a whole. The problem is to analyse these conditions as completely as we can; and if what Whitehead calls "percipient events" are among them, what of it? No actual element of experience is diminished in its reality by the discovery of the conditions in the presence of which it must occur and in the absence of which it cannot occur. But it is a mistake to confuse "objectivity" with "absolute self-existence," *i.e.* with independence of all conditions whatsoever. The same applies to the "things" of ordinary perception. Things are the colours, sounds, etc., in which they appear, and again the problem is to correlate each appearance with its conditions, and thereby to remove the contradictions which would otherwise seem to exist between some of the appearances. The mistake here to be avoided is once more the bifurcation of the thing into its appearances, on the one side, and a transcendent "thing-in-itself," on the other. The "critical" realists, Dr Bosanquet shows, have fallen victims to this mistake, through confusing the transcendence of *immediacy* which is characteristic of all thought, with the transcendence of all *experience* whatsoever which yields the bogey of the "thing-in-itself." On the other hand, the "critical realists" supply a valuable corrective to the tendency of other realists to claim for sense-data an unconditioned self-existence, by insisting upon all those aspects and connections of sense-data which have commonly been treated *sub voce* "sensation," and without which our study of them as actually experienced remains incomplete. In short, though we must reject the classification of sense-data as "mental," if that implies "bifurcation," we must retain the contributions to a study of them as phenomena which have been made under cover of that label. As regards, finally, "scientific objects," like electrons, our right to assert their reality is guaranteed for "speculative philosophy" precisely by the principle that thought transcends the immediately-given by following out all that is implied in the given. Thus no realisms are needed to supply the philosophical foundations for physics as an empirical science. At any rate, the "old" idealism, whilst including ranges of experience which science does not draw upon, provides for all that science needs or cares about. Incidentally, the old idealism agrees with realism in the assertion of a common world, and in the use of the social criterion for this world; and the theory of the American realists that a mind is a cross-section of the object-world comes near to differing only in words from the old-idealist position (chap. i.).

2. *The imaginary ("unreal") and the real.*—Dr Bosanquet's discussion proceeds on a principle which, in the Preface (p. xi), he formulates in the words, "I hold no experience . . . to be destitute of metaphysical implication," and which he expands into the philosophical programme of a "critical survey of experience," in the execution of which our diverse experiences are transmuted "from an unaccountable congeries into a system with a connected structure" (p. 33). It is part of this survey to sort out, according to the

special interests and conditions which determine them, various sorts of experiences into subordinate systems, and thus we get the worlds of dreams, of art, of religion, etc. Among these worlds, what we currently call the "real" world is but one, a special selection or construction, "arbitrary, though unavoidable" (p. 30), certainly not all-inclusive and still less the standard for "reality" in the metaphysical sense. From this angle, the "absolutist" programme for metaphysics, as rejecting no form of experience from among the data for a theory of the universe, has obvious affinities with Meinong's programme for a *Gegenstandstheorie* which shall include all objects whatsoever of which in any kind of experience we become aware. And in so far as realists of all schools use the distinction between "subsistence" and "existence" to include in the scope of their inquiries the "real" as well as the "unreal," the "meeting" between them and the absolutists is evident.

In the course of this discussion, Dr Bosanquet criticises me for having supported, in my *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, a view of Mr Russell's which he finds incompatible with the positions just laid down. I had quoted a passage in which Mr Russell contrasts the "reality" of Napoleon with that of Hamlet, and declares Hamlet to be real "only as thoughts and feelings" in the minds of Shakespeare and of his readers. Against the metaphysical theory of art implied in this language, Dr Bosanquet has no difficulty in bringing conclusive arguments of his own as well as a formidable array of authorities—Stout, Alexander, Bradley (again a meeting of extremes!). I acknowledge the correction gladly, and admit that I was careless in trying to support my argument by means of a quotation from Russell which carries so much further than I meant to go. But the point which I sought to make, and which is much less ambitious than a theory of art, still seems to me valid when stated with the reservations which I now see it requires. My problem was concerned with the methods of thought employed in making, within the whole field of experience, the selection which in practice (not in metaphysics) we call the "real" world. We are constantly compelled to test the claims of objects which offer themselves as candidates for a place in that world, and which are even treated by many people as belonging there. Take, *e.g.*, the *bona fide* belief of children in fairies, or of savages in evil spirits. Again, during one period of the war, the rumour that a German spy, disguised as a high British officer, was exploring the front line was so persistent that men were actually detailed to watch for and capture him. How is the status of such objects to be tested? My argument was that these candidates for inclusion in the "real" world of ordinary life must, if real, *appear* there, *i.e.* manifest themselves in the form of sense-data which cannot otherwise be accounted for (Dr Bosanquet's "This or Nothing" principle certainly applies). In other words, if real, they must be *realised*; *e.g.* an occasion must come when the watchers can truthfully say, "This (=actual sense-data) is our man." I do not think there is anything in Dr Bosanquet's chap. ii. which traverses this problem or the solution proposed.

But the whole problem leads Dr Bosanquet on to a discussion (chaps. iii. and iv.) of the status of the ontological argument at the present day, and of the relation of Essence to Existence, with special reference to Spinoza. These chapters are, to my mind, the most original in the book, and repay repeated study. I would draw especial attention to the way in which Dr Bosanquet applies his principle of the ontological value of every form of experience to instinct and emotion which, precisely because they are responses to the universe, mediate revelations of its character. From this angle he is able to endorse Alexander's interpretation of religion as an instinctive demand for a universe deserving of worship, a demand which the universe meets.

3. *Change, Time, Progress.*—Dr Bosanquet makes an extraordinarily bold and startling approach to these problems by the suggestion (chap. v.) that the clue to their solution is one with the correct analysis of categorical propositions, such as " $7 \text{ plus } 5 = 12$." "I take for consideration this simplest case, in which, as I believe, the whole decision upon the ultimate reality of time and progress and the just criticism of moral perfectibility as a world-principle in opposition to religious self-transcendence can be shown to be contained in principle" (p. 103). On its logical side, his contention is that in every judgment, as a living act of thought, we have an "eternal novelty," not an analytic or tautological identity. He presses this point especially against Bergson's criticism of "intelligence," and against Gentile. "To know it (viz. that $7 \text{ plus } 5 = 12$), we must connect it with the whole; and to connect it with the whole, in principle and ultimately, we must revivify the whole in its connection with the living present of thought. . . . The life of reality is one; and the reason why we expect our truth to continue true, if ever it was true, is that it belongs inherently to the universe which persists, and with which, as a whole, our thought and activity are bound up, and which our constructive thinking enriches in maintaining and maintains in enriching from moment to moment" (pp. 111, 112). Bosanquet's use of "thought" and "thinking" must, throughout, be interpreted in the light of such passages as these: "Every object of thought is real, and every object of thought is transcendent of immediate experience" (p. 145); "what governs thought and finds utterance in its coherence is simply the nature of things" (p. 176); "Thought . . . is the objective order of things, not a course of ideas in finite experience" (p. 204). If, with principles such as these, we approach the problem whether the universe *as a whole* is in time and changes and progresses as a whole, or whether time, change, progress are predicable only of finites *within* the universe, the result for Dr Bosanquet is not in doubt. "The whole can be said to change only if it departs from its unity of character and value. . . . The whole of what exists cannot move away from its fundamental characters—say its categories—and values" (p. 193). To raise against such a view the bogey of James's "block-universe," or of Royce's "*totum simul*," is mere irrelevance. There is no attempt to deny whatever cases of change and progress empirically occur, but

the real issue is whether in its fundamental and pervading character the universe changes so that in the course of time it is replaced by a universe of entirely different fundamental character. That such substitution in fundamentals is "impossible in *rerum natura*" (p. 179), Dr Bosanquet believes to be capable of demonstration even by abstract and formal speculative argument. But he prefers to rely, not on such argument, but "on the suggestions of life and experience" (p. 177). In short, nobody really believes in such change who attaches any weight at all to religion, and especially to that "normal mystical experience" which "is really a universal characteristic of human nature, and makes us feel our self-transcendence and continuity with the greater world as an inevitable factor of our being" (p. 70).

4. *Morality and Religion*.—And so we come to the antithesis between meliorism ("the end is progress"), with its belief in the perfectibility of the human race by its own efforts, and the mystical response to, and identification with, that pervading and abiding character of value and satisfactoriness in the universe which evokes from us the attitude of worship. Here the Italian neo-idealists meet the American realists in rejecting the mystic's religion as superstition, and asserting the supremacy of morality, *i.e.* of the effort after human perfection and happiness in this world, glorified as the "religion of humanity." Over against them, a realist, like Alexander, meets an absolutist, like Bosanquet, in asserting the necessity and reasonableness of the mystic's attitude as well as its difference from morality as above conceived. But, again, Alexander and Bosanquet differ in that the former asserts the creative evolution of the universe in time towards the quality of "deity," whereas to the latter this quality is an abiding and eternal feature of the universe, though displayed in ever fresh forms in the stream of time. That existence must be a succession of events *ad infinitum* is common ground to all sides in this debate, but for Dr Bosanquet "a revelation of spiritual meaning is another and a larger thing than an accumulation of advantages along the lines of humanism and philanthropy" (p. 207). And there is undeniable justice in his accusation that the meliorist, though in his metaphysical moods he may predicate progress of the universe "as a whole," is actually thinking only of the progress of the human race on this earth, and that when he talks of eliminating evil from the "universe," he is emphasising rather the outward obstacles to human well-being than the roots of evil in the human heart. Even when the moral argument is put at its highest as an unceasing advance towards a perfection never finally and completely attained, still what religion calls the assurance of salvation is not yet thus accounted for. "For us it [the Absolute] is the living source of the [temporal] series, a source with which we can identify ourselves by faith and will, and therefore can unite ourselves with its perfection, although not in factual existence transcending the temporal series. . . . It does not move from its nature, but reveals it; and the moral point of view itself becomes another thing and loses its self-contradictoriness when its constant aspiration after self-transcendence becomes the necessary consequence of a will, which is in principle and assurance identified

with the supreme good in a stable universe, and is a form of its self-utterance" (p. 216).

I will conclude with one general comment. Clearly such a view as this cannot by argument be demonstrated, or even made plausible, to anyone to whom this language conveys no meaning, either because he lacks the mystical response to the universe, or else because he distrusts that response too much to use it in his efforts to think out and express the nature of the universe. In the last resort, all the divergences in contemporary philosophy would seem to spring from this single root, that philosophers, misled in part by current distinctions between "feeling" and "thought," or between "cognition" (or "science") and "volition" (or "practice"), or between "knowledge" and "faith," rely too often in their metaphysics on one side only of some such antithesis, and thus neglect to explore, with Dr Bosanquet, the metaphysical import of every kind and mode of experience. The carrying out of this programme, however, requires skill in "dialectic" (in Plato's sense and Hegel's). In short, one might condense the whole of Dr Bosanquet's survey of contemporary philosophy into this thesis: that no single movement of thought in it is either "synoptic" enough or "dialectic" enough, but that, taken all together in their manifold agreements and disagreements which cut so perplexingly across all party labels, they offer the picture of a *total* effort which is both truly synoptic in its scope and truly dialectic in its antitheses. That the contemplation of this total effort should fill Dr Bosanquet with high hopes for the future of philosophy may well encourage and inspire us all.

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The Elements of Social Justice. By L. T. Hobhouse, D.Lit., LL.D., Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London. —London: George Allen & Unwin.—Pp. 208.

IN this work Professor Hobhouse undertakes the task of applying the principles of ethics reached by him in his *Rational Good* to the main problems of social organisation. Upon this task he brings to bear not merely the ripened results of many years of inquiry in the varied fields of philosophy and sociology, but also a very wide experience of affairs and of the working of social institutions. The book before us has thus the advantage of embodying the rare combination of a profound grasp of fundamental principles with an insight into the difficulties and perplexities of actual life.

In his former book the good was shown to be generally a harmony with some disposition of mind, and the rational good a harmony carried consistently through the world of mind and its experience. Self-development was rationally desirable only in so far as it was capable of harmony with the development of others. Further, while

insisting on the importance of feeling, as emphatically as any writer in recent times, Professor Hobhouse was able, in the light of a fresh analysis of the springs of conduct, to correct the errors of the Utilitarians, while at the same time doing justice to what was valuable in their theory, and thus, while refusing to separate happiness from the modes of life in which happiness is attained, he defines the good as "happiness in the fulfilment of vital capacities in a world adapted to mind."

The theory of harmony may appear to some purely formal and empty of content. In the hands of Professor Hobhouse it proves itself wonderfully rich and fertile. In this work he applies it with marked success to the problems of democracy, of liberty and equality, of economic justice and the organisation of industry, and in each case it is shown to furnish important principles for our guidance. In particular, the theory of harmony avoids, on the one hand, the false separation between the individual and the social effected by the individualists, and, on the other, the tendency to merge individuality into a colourless absolute, so noticeable in much of the social philosophy of the idealists. Professor Hobhouse has supplied a social philosophy which does justice at once to individual personality and to the spiritual unity which binds men together in the common good. The latter is conceived by him as "neither the sum of individual goods as independently determined, nor another kind of good opposed to them. It is the harmony of which each individual good is a constituent." This notion of the common good as a harmony underlies Professor Hobhouse's whole discussion. Thus rights are claims to the conditions requisite for the fulfilment of personality in harmony with the common good. Such rights must not be conceived as prior to or independent of social relationships—they are elements in social welfare. This was of course recognised by Green, but the latter's metaphysics required him to say that everything which exists must be in somebody's mind, and that therefore there is no right but thinking makes it so. Professor Hobhouse is able to put the matter in a clearer light by insisting that rights and duties are based on the conditions of harmony. Accordingly there are rights wherever there are individuals in relation and conditions requisite for their harmonious development. Moral rights do not, therefore, depend essentially on recognition, though such rights must be distinguished from legal rights, which require varying degrees of recognition. Moreover, rights and duties are not absolute, "not conditions limiting the common good from without, but conditions constituting the common good in the varying situations of life and the intermingling relations of men."

The notion of harmony is further utilised by Professor Hobhouse in his illuminating discussion of moral and social freedom. Freedom implies negatively the absence of external constraint, and positively self-determination. But the latter has often been interpreted in a narrow sense as meaning determination by law—though a law imposed on the individual by himself. Such determination may, and often does, lead to the cramping and narrowing of character.

True freedom there is, only when there is harmony, *i.e.* when the impulses are adapted and shaped by the requirements of life as a whole, and when the active unity of the self finds expression in and through the harmonious co-operation of the impulses themselves.

In his account of social freedom Professor Hobhouse may be said to supply the philosophical principles that ought to inspire all radical legislation. The ultimate foundation of liberty is that it is a condition of spiritual growth. Spiritual unity in the common good can only flourish in a spiritual medium, and cannot be obtained through compulsion. This general liberty, however, must be differentiated into "liberties," *i.e.* rights. "The system of rights is the system of harmonised liberties." The problem of restraint is put in a new light when looked at from this point of view, for clearly restraint may be used to prevent the violation of rights. This theory is applied by Professor Hobhouse to the problems of State control of contracts as in factory legislation, to the rights of free discussion, to religious toleration, to the problems of conscientious objection, etc.; and upon all of them he throws new light.

The treatment of justice and equality is so full that only a very inadequate summary can be given here. The fundamental principle of equality follows from the theory of harmony as the good, and consists in the claim that each has upon the common good, proportioned to his own qualifications for sharing it. The conditions of harmony constitute the only ground for differential treatment. Distributive justice is defined as "equal satisfaction of equal needs, subject to the adequate maintenance of useful functions." Perhaps the most interesting parts of Professor Hobhouse's book are to be found in the chapters dealing with the principles that should regulate economic organisation. The requirements of the community must be harmonised with the requirements of each performer of function by rewards proportioned to the value of his work, while for non-function and mis-function curative and preventive treatment must be provided. From these principles important conclusions emerge. Firstly, the economic organisation must be such as to maintain the necessary economic functions; in other words, the needs of the workers must be prescribed for in harmony with their function. Secondly, there is no functionless wealth. Thirdly, the minimum remuneration is that which will maintain the least capable worker actually required by the industrial system in a condition of normal healthy development. Fourthly, beyond that minimum there must be reward proportionate to value, determinable by experience. The system advocated is one of free exchange, and is thus more in harmony with Social Liberalism than with Socialism proper. The analysis of property and of the individual and social factors of wealth that Professor Hobhouse next undertakes confirms the main results of his treatment of social justice. For it leads him to the conclusion that the community ought to be the owner of land, of all natural resources, and of all capital accumulated by past generations, while the individual should have as his own property his salary and personal accumulations. The ultimate control of industry must be

vested in the community. The industrial organisation that is finally recommended is one in which unearned wealth would accrue to the community, in which industrial management would be in the hands of joint boards of producers and consumers, the municipality, co-operative associations, and private enterprise, according to the particular requirements of the industry. The general conditions of work and remuneration would be laid down by law and applied in detail to each case by Trade Boards. The scheme as a whole does not differ, it seems to me, quite as much as Professor Hobhouse implies, from the later forms of Guild Socialism, though Professor Hobhouse lays greater stress than do the Guild Socialists upon co-ordination of functions.

The book is not polemical but constructive, and the manner in which Professor Hobhouse has contrived to combine in his own theory all that is best in other systems of social philosophy, while correcting their limitations in the light of fundamental principles, furnishes an excellent example of the theory of harmony.

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A History of Indian Philosophy. By Surendranath Dasgupta, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Sanskrit, Government College, Chittagong, Bengal. Vol. I.—Cambridge: University Press, 1922. Pp. xvi + 528.

THE outlines of the chief Indian systems have been for now about a century accessible to European readers in the essays of the great scholar Colebrooke. It may be said that even to-day it is hardly necessary to seek such outlines in any other quarter. For an acquaintance with the Indian manner of discussing philosophical questions we may refer to a delightful group of writings which are now generally neglected. These are works of Christian apologists, contending on more or less equal terms with Indian disputants. These apologists—they belonged to the middle of the nineteenth century—were men of sound philosophic culture, and those among them who were of Indian birth were in several instances thoroughly at home in their native systems and methods. Thus from such books as K. M. Banerjea's *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy* (1861), Ballantyne's *Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy* (London, 1859), FitzEdward Hall's *Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems* by N. N. Sastri Gore (1862), and the anonymous *Dialogue of the Knowledge of the Supreme Lord* (Cambridge, 1886), we obtain a clear insight into the views which their authors were combating, even if, from later advances in European thought, it may sometimes appear that they were dealing with ideas more subtle than their own.

At the present day the interest of European philosophers in Indian ideas cannot be said to be keen. The time of Schopenhauer's

enthusiasm for the Upanishads is gone; and the only attempt to incorporate the Indian contribution in a general history of philosophy, that of Deussen, is felt to be infected with a slight suspicion of "Schwärmerei." Modern philosophers are, in fact, a little impatient of Indian analogies and anticipations. The fault is not entirely on the side of the popularising theosophists, neo-Buddhists, and Vedantists, or of books eloquent in Eastern terminologies and too prone to blur the sharp outlines of European doctrines in their zeal for comparison. The feeling is deeper. Behind the philosophy of modern Europe there are the great advances of modern science, with its refined ideas, its methods of enormous power, and its immense masses of verified fact. The recent developments of mathematical logic, mathematical theories of the infinite, physical and psychological methods—the doctrines which live in this milieu are too unequally matched with systems based upon an embryonic science, an intuitive psychology, and for the most part on too intimate terms with religion. Moreover, the Indian philosophies have hitherto been known in Europe chiefly from translations of relatively easy or secondary texts, in many cases literary or religious. It is not realised that the Indian pandit is, in spite of his limitations, a logician and metaphysician in his bones, that he is fertile and dauntless in speculation, that he wields a language of unrivalled suppleness in discrimination, and has worked out a logical terminology of heroic and almost mathematical consistency.

Another awkward feature of Indian philosophies is that they generally profess to be disciplines also. Their truths are not only to be heard and understood; they are to be realised by meditation. The Vedantin holds that by means of meditation and practice he can reach successively wider intuitions, and the Yogin that by asceticism he can attain the power of seeing the atoms and so forth. This is, in fact, rather a poser for our European thinkers, who would generally admit that various passions and biases are an obstacle to the acquisition of truth, and might in some cases allow that civilisation and science are based upon renunciation in various stages, but would hardly in modern times agree that systematic spiritual discipline would much facilitate the realisation of the highest truths. They would be apprehensive of auto-suggestion; but they would hardly claim to have tried the method.

Professor Dasgupta's work is the first attempt at a comprehensive exposition of the Indian philosophies generally. Max Müller's *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* was the work of a brilliant scholar at home in Indian literature and in philosophic thinking also. But it would be idle to pretend that he was familiar with any of the more technical works, in the same way as was Colonel Jacob, whose *Handful of Popular Maxims* is a mine of information on practical points of logic and dialectics. Much work has been done of late years in connection with Buddhist logic, metaphysic, and epistemology, and we have accurate translations by Thibaut, Dr Ganganath Jha, and others of important works belonging to other systems. For Indian logic generally we have an excellent essay in German by

Professor Jacobi of Bonn, a useful treatise (especially as regards the syllogism) by a Japanese scholar Sugiura (Philadelphia, 1900), and a really systematic exposition in Professor Suali's *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia Indiana* (Paris, 1913), not to mention more recent books. But Professor Dasgupta's work is of much ampler design than any of these. He is thoroughly at home in all the important and difficult texts, and he has received a training in European philosophy. His intelligence is alert and candid, and he has the historical sense. We can sincerely commend both his method, which is that of exposition, eschewing all comparisons with European ideas, and his style, which is untrammelled, full, direct, and flowing. From this book the English reader can obtain an accurate idea of the questions which have occupied the Indian philosophers and of their manner of dealing with them. The short introductory chapter stating the present position of these studies is really admirable.

Professor Dasgupta's work is based upon primary sources, and in some large matters he develops independent views. In regard to Buddhism he points out that the doctrine of *Sūnyatā*, or "the void," the entire denial of any measure of substantiality, whether in the object or in the subject, was prior to Nāgārjuna, who merely systematised it. The theory of *Tathatā* or an absolute experience, which presents such an interesting analogy to Dr Bradley's views, really arose and fell with Asvaghosha; and the *ālaya-vijñāna*, or "repository cognition" of the Vijñānavādins, which among other functions serves partly the same purpose, is in some texts acknowledged to be merely a concession to the weakness of the public, which was frightened by an unmitigated sensationalism. Of that wonderfully poetic doctrine, the Sāṅkhya, Professor Dasgupta brings to light an early form, elicited from the medical work of Charaka, and showing agreement with an outline known from the Mahābhārata. He also lays stress upon a view evidenced in several passages, but surely unorthodox, according to which the three attributes of the Sāṅkhyan primordial substance *prakṛiti* are substantial, so that the *prakṛiti* itself becomes a mere state, adjectival. The account of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is excellent, and the view that these systems are somehow connected with the Mīmāṃsā, so largely occupied with the principles of theological and legal exegesis, seems to contain an element of truth. For it is reasonable to hold that in India, as in Greece, logic arose from grammatical and exegetic studies. Of course there are other elements in this philosophy, such as its categories and its atomic doctrines, for which we must find another origin. The system may claim a special interest at the present time by reason of its affinities with mediæval scholasticism and modern realisms. We cannot review Professor Dasgupta's treatment of all the systems. He gives a good outline of Jainism, with its doctrine of limited truths or aspects, the *Syādvāda*; and in his account of the Vedānta, where he points out that primarily Sankara is more a theologian than a philosopher, he is original in drawing attention to the logical category of "the indeterminate," which was an impor-

tant development of the later and more difficult works. This later literature will be the subject-matter of a second volume, which will include also the sectarian philosophies, Vaishnava, Saiva, etc., and which can hardly fail to be of at least equal extent.

Professor Dasgupta's work will not dispense the student who wishes to inspect the different doctrines in their precise bearings from seeking them *in situ* in their systematic expositions. The like may, of course, be said in regard to any compendium of European philosophies. The distinguishing feature here is that so large a proportion of the original texts is at present inaccessible except in Sanskrit. Professor Dasgupta admits that, and explains why, he has not given us a history strictly so called; but we get a historical perspective. If we may hope for some revision in a later edition, it is in regard to some points of scholarship. What is meant by the "touch of untouch," on p. 423, we cannot guess; nor do we follow the translation of the sentence in which it appears. "Arising after getting" (p. 93) is not a good rendering of *pratitya-samutpāda* ("arising in relation to something else"). To find in the Pāli *āsava* any reference to "intoxicants" was possible only so long as the real etymology was unknown; and in giving "bio-motor force" as the equivalent of *prāna* (p. 250), or *vāyu* (p. 262), which properly denote air-currents supposed to perform physiological functions in the body, Professor Dasgupta is yielding to decidedly tendencious influences.

It has been said that what modern Europe at this date requires from ancient and oriental cultures is not their ideas (which may be supposed to have been anticipated or absorbed), but their intuitions. Even if that were true, justice demands that the ideas should be accorded their rightful historical position: and, apart from that again, it is a matter of human and also scientific interest to know what these matters were and how they arose. Europe and America supply a rather good market for the inferior products of Indian thought: why not for the best? But a mere Indianist may also perhaps venture to inquire whether in this sphere all the ideas have been absorbed. It may turn out that idealism in its Platonic or Hegelian form was never even approached in India; but most other views have been suggested, adumbrated, or worked out by Indian thinkers in their way; and at the present time, when logic and epistemology are so much in the foreground, it may be interesting to inquire what Indian doctrines there were concerning validity and truth, how far the Indian thinkers grasped the pragmatic idea, what use they made of their *apeksha-buddhi* "awareness of relation," what Kumārila meant by his doctrine that knowledge was not directly known, but inferred from a "knownness" in the object, or how the Vedānta deals with that last inquiry addressed to any philosophy, professing to be not only beautiful, but true, namely, how far the system is consistent with the fact of its exposition or discussion.

F. W. THOMAS.

The Legacy of Greece. Edited by R. W. Livingstone.—Oxford University Press, 1921.—Pp. xii + 424.

DESPITE its obviousness, the title of this book is a happy choice, and its suggestiveness will be apparent to every reader. It has the effect of an "open sesame," and is a signal that he is in for very good things—not so much that they are all new, but that they are gathered together, both old and new, into one convenient place. That it is so arranged is perhaps the reason why the editor in the preface calls it "the first (book) of its kind in English." The "legacy" bequeathed to us by the Greeks is a composite one, and its parts are discussed in twelve different chapters by eleven different writers, and a master of his craft is responsible for each chapter. The subjects dealt with in the volume range from "The Value of Greece to the Future of the World," by Professor Gilbert Murray, to "Architecture," by Sir Reginald Blomfield, and coming in between are chapters on religion, philosophy, mathematics and astronomy, natural science, biology, medicine, literature, history, politics, and art. The net is thus sufficiently spread to catch readers of various tastes and interests, but the bulkiest portion is naturally for those who prefer the less technical subjects, as religion, philosophy, and literature. It is difficult to state clearly in a few words the object of the book beyond its bare title. "The purpose of these little essays," says one of the contributors (p. 161), "is to help though ever so little to defend and justify the study of the language and the vast literature of Greece." This statement does not quite cover all that the several writers have in view, for, to mention only one thing, it does not include (that is, specifically) a very important element which clearly runs through the work, namely, the scientific principle of evolution. This principle, nevertheless, is just hinted at in the preface, where we read that our study of Greek thought and literature discovers to us our own younger faces with fewer lines and wrinkles.

The writers are evidently desirous of restoring Greek and Greek things to the position of respect they once held. No one can mistake their enthusiasm, and in their appraisalment of what the Ancient Greeks achieved "in various realms of the spirit and the intellect" they are not unmindful of the old Greek principle, *μηδὲν ἄγαν*—nothing in excess.

Ours is a commercial age, and there seems to be little interest in the "humanities." Dollars play a big part in our ordinary estimate of things, and we hear a good deal about "careers." Professor Thompson recalls an amusing story from *The Vicar of Wakefield*. The vagabond scholar applied to the Principal of Louvain (not Leyden, by the way) University for a mastership in Greek, and this is what he got for his pains: "I have had a doctor's cap and gown without Greek; I have ten thousand florins a year without Greek; I eat heartily without Greek; and, in short, as I don't know Greek, I don't believe there is any good in it." We have all heard some such things these last few years. Did not a well-known captain of industry, a millionaire and a philanthropist, say not long since that

Greek was of no more use than Choctaw ? The anti-Greek spirit is pretty widespread. France, for example, has neglected the humanities with rather bad results, and what happens in this respect in our own country is familiar enough. About the teaching of Greek there has been a long-standing controversy, and one result of the Great War has been to accentuate it. Under these circumstances, there is some reason for the appearance of a book such as this. By its advocacy of ancient Greek culture it may do something to modify the views of extremists, and it will certainly give heart to those lovers of Greek literature who are on the apparently losing side.

Anything written by Professor Gilbert Murray on or about Greek has naturally a claim to attention, for, as he himself says, he has been in the habit of living among Greeks and Greek things. His essay on "The Value of Greece to the Future of the World" is exceedingly attractive. It is "concerned almost entirely with the artistic interest of Greece"; dealing analytically with the outstanding qualities of the Greek mind, showing how these are reflected in its literary productions and artistic achievements, and pointing out the beauty of the language. The literature is characterised by "directness, truthfulness, and simplicity"; and "the language is the natural expression of keen and noble minds." It often puzzles us to think how a small nation with hardly any history behind it should, in a few centuries, have achieved so much and in so many ways. We may witness a modern instance in Japan. In the main, the only background is nature, and that nature often savage, without any of the entanglements and incrustations of a prior civilisation. This consideration may account for the Greek freshness, simplicity, and sincerity. The concluding passage of this essay is an eloquent tribute to ancient Greece.

A delightful essay is that on "Literature," by the editor, R. W. Livingstone; and for its popular appeal it must run the first pretty close. The handling of our modern literary realists by the author may be somewhat severe, in that they compare unfavourably with the tragic presentations of the Greek masters. More allowance might perhaps have been made for the distance of time and what that distance includes, between 400 B.C. and, say, 1920 A.D.

Every student of philosophy will, of course, turn first to Professor J. Burnet's fine essay on that subject. He shows how the first problems of Greek philosophic thought were not merely theoretical but also practical, and that these have in essence survived to our day, and that a true study of the subject does justice to both elements.

The religious legacy is discussed by Dean Inge, who maintains that Christianity is indebted to the Greek thinkers for many things—"the Hellenistic combination of Platonic metaphysics and Stoic ethics, the ascetic element, mystery and sacramentalism, the Incarnation, eschatology," and, finally, the recognition that "the knowledge of Truth is not beyond our reach." In these days when theories of political and social government are in the melting-pot, A. E. Zimmern's essay on "Political Thought" is worth consulting. Professor Percy Gardner, writing on "The Lamps of Greek Art,"

makes use of Ruskin's well-known work. He limits his discussion to sculpture, and discovers these features—eight lamps, viz. humanism, simplicity, balance and measure, naturalism, idealism, patience, joy, fellowship. Among the other essays, that on "Medicine" has been extremely interesting to one reader at least.

The number and beauty of the illustrations make a valuable book still more valuable.

JAMES EVANS.

BIRMINGHAM.

Allitteratio Latina: or, Alliteration in Latin Verse reduced to Rule.

By Walter J. Evans, M.A., Principal of the Presbyterian College, Carmarthen, and sometime Scholar of Jesus College, Oxford.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1921.

SINCE Principal Evans belongs to a Church which has always prized learning and to a nation famous for its love of poetry, it is not surprising that he should write a book of this sort, and very natural that he should have been led to the position he holds by a characteristic phenomenon of Welsh verse. It is well known that in that language the bardic technique is founded upon certain regularly recurring alliterations, or, as Principal Evans conveniently calls them, rhymes; as for instance,

"Minau af | dros yr afon,"

which the author illustrates in English by "In fact he was acting."

Close inspection of practically the whole of classical and sub-classical Latin verse has led him to the conclusion that the Roman poets obeyed similar laws, which he sums up in the following statement (p. 43): "Subject to certain indulgences, every ictic syllable must rhyme with some other ictic syllable in its own line."

By "ictic syllable" is meant what is generally called the arsis, *Hebung*, or rise of the foot. By rhyming is meant, that the long vowel (short vowels do not count) or one of the consonants preceding or following the vowel, must recur in another rise within the same line (the last term, by the way, never being defined by Principal Evans). This is the minimum for a normal line; the poet is at liberty to introduce as many more of these "rhymes" as he chooses, as in the verse

"Iamque Peloriaden Lilybaeaeque iamque Pachynum,"

where a large group of letters is involved in the rime-system. On the other hand, "certain indulgences" are allowed, which Principal Evans lists and classifies; and arrangements of varying complication are to be found.

It is clear that this cannot be adequately criticised without a wealth of technical detail, interesting only to specialists. In particular, it would be desirable to investigate mathematically the likelihood of such alliterations being the result of mere accident, and perhaps to check the calculation by throwing words together into verses, regardless of sense and grammar, and seeing whether the resulting nonsense would obey the rules. Personally, I think

Principal Evans has found something psychologically more interesting than a conscious and artificial rule of verse, namely, an unconscious tendency. The existence of such a phenomenon is abundantly illustrated. Cicero wrote most elaborately rhythmical prose, capable of being expressed in the complex terminology of Zielinski; but the inadequacy of his own attempts to explain his rhythms shows how largely they were unconscious. In verse, while many minor writers indulged in what Martial called *stultus labor ineptiarum*, it is hardly conceivable that such men as Vergil and Catullus obeyed consciously such a series of rules and exceptions as Principal Evans traces, and thus rendered their task as complex as that of any writer of isopsephic couplets or palindromes. Yet, when all allowance for mistakes in detail and for accident have been made, it will probably be found that these rules are fundamentally obeyed. The interesting question is, what obeyed them?

We have a good parallel in the grammar of the more complex inflected languages. Every student knows how delicate and how hard to grasp are the subtleties of the Greek grammar, even when the difficult forms of the accidence have been mastered. Yet these subtleties grew out of the attempts of unlettered men to express plain ideas, before ever they came under the notice of Ionian sophists or modern grammarians. If the unconscious or partly conscious mental activity of a people could produce such a marvel, it is in no way difficult to suppose that the semi-conscious activity of so able a body of men as the Latin poets—that complex of processes which we commonly name “ear” or “taste”—evolved a series of word-harmonies which its authors never thought of reducing to rule, but which on investigation prove to be as regular as the laws of modern musical composition, themselves for the most part the result of what, to the ear of various musicians, has sounded melodious or concordant.

H. J. ROSE.

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The Approach to the New Testament. By James Moffatt, D.D., D.Litt., Hon. M.A. (Oxon.). London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921.—Pp. 240.

THE new Hibbert Lectures are in the best sense modern. In them Dr Moffatt has faced the needs of those who, having lost faith in the doctrine of verbal inspiration and in the conception of the New Testament as containing a code of doctrine and arbitrary rules for conduct, are in danger of regarding the New Testament writings as of no value whatever. This attitude is more prevalent than is generally recognised by scholars, and it is all to the good that a scholar so richly gifted and equipped as Dr Moffatt should undertake the task of bringing out “the positive value of the New Testament literature for the world of to-day.” In doing this he will influence a larger constituency than his previous work on the New Testament has reached. This is saying a great deal.

It is not necessary to occupy space in following the method pursued in these stimulating lectures. Many results of criticism are taken for granted. Though not argued, these are again and again brilliantly illustrated. Examples may be found in chap. v., "The Historical Method at Work." Perhaps this will serve as setting forth the position taken, and also as an example of clarity of style. "The position now is, that the New Testament is not a code any more than a deposit or a germ; it presents not even materials for a code which can be applied to ecclesiastical and social life, but a spiritual impulse which creates a moral consciousness of unrivalled range. The spirit or creative power pours from the life of Jesus Christ and from those whom he inspired; it is a life, the method of life. It expresses itself in his words and deeds primarily, then in the thoughts and actions of his followers as communities. These expressions in the New Testament are always related to specific historical situations; they are not abstract statements thrown into the air, but struck out from the clash of the Christian spirit with definite occasions. The first way to distinguish what is fundamental in any expression, and to appreciate the temporary elements, is to realise as exactly as possible the historical conditions under which the particular statement was made" (pp. 206-7). And this also: "The criticism to which the New Testament has been exposed has made it impossible any longer to regard it as a collection of books dictated by God to form a code for men, or as a compendium of infallible truth, or as a mosaic of texts to be fitted into proofs of dogma. But it has also done away with the notion that the New Testament is the book of a timid little conventional society, which shrank from contact with the facts of life and sheltered itself behind ingenious deductions about God and the world" (p. 21). This last sentence brings us up against the most adventurous element in Dr Moffatt's exposition of the meaning of the New Testament. Its purpose, as he conceives it, is to make for social revolution; although here also it proceeds by means of ideals, and not by definite detailed legal enactments.

All this is very modern. To commend the New Testament to reason by an appeal to history, and to connect it with the social purpose that characterises human effort to-day, are indeed necessary if interest in its contents is to be maintained. The trouble of Professor Henry Sidgwick in the later decades of last century is the trouble of multitudes now. He rejected Christianity because its theological implications, as asserted then, did not commend themselves to his intellect, and he did not see the need of a theological basis for social purpose. He says: "I find that I grow more and more, on the one hand, to regard Christianity as indispensable and irreplaceable—looking at it from a sociological point of view; and, on the other hand, to find it more and more incomprehensible how anyone whom I feel to be really akin to myself in intellectual habits and culture can possibly find his religion in it." In regard to the necessity of social purpose being rooted in theological dogma, in a paper read to the Synthetic Society he says: "The difficulty that I find is in convincing myself that this untheological morality is really

abnormal, and does not rather represent the beginnings of a more advanced stage in the development of the moral consciousness. It seems to me a tenable view that the development of scientific sociology and of social sentiment in average man tends ultimately to disconnect morality from its present theological scaffolding, and exhibit it as simply the outcome of social feeling guided by a rational forecast of social consequences." But Bishop Gore relates that in a conversation with him towards the close of his life, "He was telling me at some length what were the reasons which in quite early days had led him to feel that the arguments for the orthodox belief about our Lord, about Jesus Christ, were inadequate; and then, with a touch which was so characteristic of him, he said he had sometimes felt that he had not followed sufficiently the turn of modern criticism, and that he sometimes wondered whether the modern critical attitude was not one which was both broader and more hopeful, and one which might put a new aspect upon what for a time he had more or less abandoned thinking about." To such an attitude of thought and belief these lectures have much to say, and it is said confidently and effectively.

From every view-point this book is important. Its supreme importance is its emphasis upon the too often forgotten fact that the need of to-day is to understand the teaching of the New Testament—to take it for what it is and not for what it is not. This is the immediate duty of Christians; it is urged also as the duty of leaders of social reform or revolt, who regard Christianity as the bulwark of clericalism and capitalism. To commend the New Testament to the reason and to reveal its aliveness to social purpose will not achieve all that religion demands. The soul lives by other things than intellect and social passion; there are realities for which it can give reasons beyond reason. Yet the task undertaken by Dr Moffatt was necessary. His new translation of the New Testament is made more valuable by means of this exposition of what the New Testament is and the true method of approaching and appropriating its contents.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

CHELMSFORD.

The Origin of Paul's Religion. By J. Gresham Machen, D.D.
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921.

THIS is really a learned plea for a verdict of *non licet* upon a number of current hypotheses about Paulinism. Also, it is occupied with the problem not of Paul's religion but of his theology. It is true that his religion and his theology are not to be separated. Professor Machen insists that "religion in Paul does not exist apart from theology, and theology does not exist apart from religion" (p. 168). Granted. But this does not affect the argument that in Paul, as in any great religious genius, say as in the case of Augustine or Luther, the religious experience is often larger than the theological expression of it, whether that expression is apologetic or speculative. Augustine was not a Neoplatonist in later life, but he owed some strains in his dogmatic system to Neoplatonism; his rich religious experience was

crossed by Neoplatonic ideas. So, it may be argued, while Paul was consciously indebted for his central experience as a Christian to Jesus Christ, he may well have been influenced by Jewish or Hellenic conceptions as he worked out his theology. To deny or ignore such a probability is to leave the origin and development of the Apostle in the air.

This, however, is a minor issue. The strength of Dr Machen's volume lies in its critical and penetrating examination of some theories about the genesis of Paulinism. It is a conservative pronouncement of some importance. He begins by recognising frankly the divergence from Paul's theology which characterises the second century, when the leading thinkers in the old Catholic Church showed an extraordinary inability or indisposition to grasp the vital ideas of the very apostle whom they hailed as "*the Apostle*." The reasons for this he does not profess to explain. What underlies them is the tendency which Mr Campbell N. Moody has analysed in his remarkable book upon *The Mind of the Early Converts*, where a similar phenomenon is shown to occur among Chinese converts at the present day, *i.e.* the combination of a real religious and moral experience of Christianity with an indisposition to assimilate the evangelical Paulinism of their Western instructors. Dr Machen does not refer to this contribution, however. He proceeds to admit quite frankly that the Gentile mission of Paul had no precedent in the teaching of Jesus (pp. 13 f.), since, even apart from the doubtful statement in Matt. xxviii. 19-20, Jesus did not teach that converts were to be made without circumcision. The words of Mark vii. 15 may have been "revolutionary in their ultimate implications. But there is no evidence that they resulted in revolutionary practice on the part of Jesus"; and the disciples after the resurrection did not understand them in any such sense. It was Paul who first worked out the principle of religious freedom, thanks to his insight into the spirit of the Lord.

The early life of the Apostle is then analysed in order to prove that Paul's environment could not suggest any such insight. Dr Machen has a comparatively easy task in disposing of the objection to Paul's early contact with the Christians at Jerusalem—the elimination of which has been regarded by some critics as necessary if the origin of Paul's Christology is to be explained. On the other hand, Dr Machen thinks "there is no clear evidence for supposing that Paul saw Jesus before the passion" (p. 57), though he heard about him. What he received at his conversion was "a new interpretation of the facts and a new attitude toward them." But how? Dr Machen does not say. He insists on the sudden and complete transformation of Paul by a supernatural vision, and depreciates any idea of psychological development. "The will of Christ is resistless; all opposition is in vain" (p. 62)—such, we are told, is the meaning of *It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks*. Now, to represent Paul's conversion as the climax of a slow, long, logical process, is psychologically inadequate; but surely there is a mean between that and this magical transformation unmediated by any reflection. For, with all respect to Dr Machen, "magical" is the word for it, on his hypothesis.

In the third chapter he adopts with needless hesitation the equivalence of Gal. ii. 1-10 and Acts xv. 1-29, minimises James's responsibility for his emissaries, and unconvincingly explains the omission of Paul's quarrel with Peter and Barnabas from Acts (p. 106), on the ground that Luke was not concerned with such unimportant, personal details! The fourth chapter argues that not only Peter but the rest of the twelve were in substantial agreement with Paul—which is incompatible with the claims made by the Judaism in their propaganda. Opposition to Baur has carried the Princeton scholar too far. The rest of the chapter upon the vital dependence of Paul on Jesus is well worked out, but it contains little or nothing that breaks new ground.

We get much more sound reasoning in the following chapters, in which, with acute insight, Dr Machen criticises (a) the theory of Wrede and Brückner that Paulinism was indebted to apocalyptic Judaism, with an infusion of ideas about Wisdom (Windisch), and (b) the various forms of the alternative hypothesis which deliver Paulinism from contemporary paganism or the mystery-religions. A final chapter deals with the cognate view, popularised by Bousset, that Paul owed the conception of "Lord" to the Christian communities of Antioch, Tarsus, and perhaps Damascus, where the term was already familiar as a divine title. These last three chapters are the best in the book, although Professor H. A. A. Kennedy has already covered the ground for British readers. Dr Machen knows the ins and outs of the controversy, and, without posing as an authority upon the mystery-religions, he contrives to put his negative conclusions with force. The argument is that without a historical Jesus the origin of Paulinism is incomprehensible, and that this Jesus must have been what Paul believed Him to be, "the eternal Son of God, come to earth for the redemption of man, now seated once more on the throne of His glory, and working in the hearts of His disciples through His Spirit, as only God can work" (p. 312). But it is the positive genesis of this belief in Paul's mind that Dr Machen fails to bring out. He objects to his fellow-countryman, Professor Bacon, for minimising the "redemptive" element in Jesus. "This latest investigator of the problem of 'Jesus and Paul' has betrayed a salutary consciousness of the fact that the Pauline conception of Jesus' redemptive work is inexplicable unless it finds some justification in the mind of Jesus Himself. Only, the justification which Bacon himself has found—particularly his account of the way in which the idea of expiation is supposed to have arisen in Jesus' mind—is entirely inadequate" (p. 197). Perhaps it is. Yet it will not do to disparage Professor Bacon. He at any rate has come to feel the need of a religious unity in the New Testament, and tried to account for the sequence between Jesus and Paul. Dr Machen, in his eagerness to demolish the "literal" interpretation, has not put anything satisfactory in its place. What he has given us is a trenchant, comprehensive review of theories which, in his view, fail to do justice to Paulinism. It is well to have the weak points of these theories exposed, even although in some cases it is slaying the slain. Dr Machen also writes

with vigour, and out of a full acquaintance with his subject. Still, his book is a barrister's speech in many sections rather than a judicial pronouncement. There are times when we are wearied of the name of "psychology" in modern theology, but we do miss some psychological account here of what may be called the "faith-mysticism" of Paul.

Is it "the only natural interpretation" (p. 23) of Rom. ix. 5, that Paul applies the term "God" to Jesus? Is it accurate to say that "even dependence of both (Philo and Paul) upon the same type of thought is highly problematical" (p. 251)? On p. 15 Dr Machen for once indulges in a speculative view of the New Testament text. In speaking of the parable of the wicked vine-dressers, he thinks it hardly possible that the words of Matthew xxi. 41 "refer exclusively to the rejection of Jesus by the rulers"; they must also, in all likelihood, "apply to a rejection by the people as a whole. But the full implications of so mysterious an utterance may well have been lost sight of in the early Jerusalem church." This seems unnecessary and unlikely. The whole point of the parable in its original form is to censure and warn the unworthy leaders of Israel. While it is the vineyard which is blamed in the Isaianic parable, here it is the vine-dressers. And they are warned in the very words of a Maccabean psalm, which triumphs over the misjudgment of the Jewish authorities, who thought the Maccabean movement useless for Israel. The "others" to whom Jesus declares the vineyard is to be transferred are His own apostles.

JAMES MOFFATT.

GLASGOW.

Der dreieinige Gott in religionshistorischer Beleuchtung. I. By Dr Ditlef Nielsen.—Pp. xv + 472.—Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1922.

DR NIELSEN's study of the idea of the Triune God in the light of the history of religion belongs to those "religious-historical" investigations by Gunkel, Jeremias, Bousset, Reitzenstein, and others, which have gradually been building up new conceptions of the interrelations between early Christianity and old Semitic religion. The author is one of the very few experts on the ancient Arabian or South Semitic inscriptions, and the use he has made of them is not the least valuable feature of his book. Obligated to handle critically some of the methods and theories of Robertson Smith and other scholars, he contributes ably to many of the more general problems of religion. By the avoidance of technicalities, and with the help of seventy illustrations of archæological and other interest, he is able to appeal to readers other than experts. By reason of its subject and the way he has handled it, his book deserves a fuller and more careful attention than can be given it in these pages, and it must suffice to indicate briefly the main argument, to add a few general criticisms, and to comment upon its suggestiveness for modern Trinitarian problems.

Dr Nielsen argues that the content of early Christianity is derived from Semitic (or, more accurately, Oriental) belief and practice. The

Trinity is the lineal descendant of an ancient and persisting family triad consisting of Father, Son, and Mother. Among the Arabian or Southern Semites society is collective; there are no rulers, but elders, and God is thought of as near at hand, as an elder or sheikh, or, more particularly, as a father. Among the Babylonians, Hebrews, and other North Semites, God is more remote. Here the second deity, who with the third is more of a nature deity in the South, occupies a prominent place as Sun-god. The family relationship of gods and men is replaced by one of servility, and the king, the divine representative, is an intermediary. The king as Son of God is more divine than the elder of South Semitic society, and the God (*i.e.* the second member of the triad) assumes more human traits (p. 297). We now have a rich development of myth and of Messianic ideas, and the appearance of typical titles, notably King, Baal (Adon, Mar, etc.), and Kyrios, the last being the title ultimately given to Jesus. As for the goddess, she never attained high rank among the Semites (in contrast to other peoples), whether as mother or virgin; but after the Hellenistic age, when the deities were more spiritualised, she became the "Holy Spirit," which, as we know, was sometimes regarded as female.

The main argument is based upon a wide survey, and involves many interesting and important side issues. We are shown the numerous vicissitudes of the Son-God, the curious changes of sex: the moon is male among the South Semites, as also was Athtar or Ishtar—Astarte. The Father-God is an Arabian conception. It was brought north by the Israelites, who contended persistingly against North Semitic ideas of a mother-goddess, the Son-God mythology, and the sacrifice of the young Son by the divine Father. Hence Judaism contained a twofold strain—North Semitic and Arabian or nomad; and Jesus was in the line of Israelite prophets when he exalted the idea of the Father-God. The gulf between the Synoptic and the Johannine and Pauline writings corresponds to the cleavage between the South Semitic idea and the North Semitic (outside Judaism); and the last function of the old Semitic religion was to create Johannine and Pauline theology. The source of the Jesus-cult is North Semitic (outside Judaism), and Jesus comes before us as the last and supremest prophet of a people whose religious history in Palestine belongs to the close of the history of Semitic religion. It was just because Israel arose so late in Semitic history, and came late from the desert, that it preserved so much of the old Semitic genius, the best examples of which are to be found among the Arabs.

This summary may be enough to show that Dr Nielsen has gone seriously to work. His chief weakness is the common modern tendency to simplify unduly, and to turn characteristic vicissitudes or conditions into unique absolute processes. Opposed to the exaggerated use of the "Babylonian key," he has reverted to the "Arab" solution of Robertson Smith and Wellhausen, and uses the Arabs and Arabia as typical of primitive Semitism. But it is misleading to speak of the survival of the ancient Arabs as though the modern Arab is older than the Jews (pp. 172 *seqq.*); and physical and cultural differences should be drawn between the Arab bedouins and

the particular South Arabian states (Minæan and Sabæan) which flourished and died before the days of Mohammed. Again, although attitudes of freedom and confidence in religion will give place to feelings of awe, servility, and so forth, it is an unsafe generalisation to speak, with Robertson Smith, of primitive religion as happy (p. 48).¹ He tilts at Robertson Smith's totemism (p. 138 *seq.*), but the real point is, whether a theriomorphic or pre-anthropomorphic stage is universal—we may compare the "Teddy-bear" stage of the child. Nielsen thinks the Semitic gods were nature powers before they became human-like (pp. 366 *seq.*, 373; *cf.* pp. 125, 199). Yet whether it be a totem or a lifeless object that is venerated, the individual treats it as personal, and Nielsen appears to fuse our ideas of the animal or natural object with the attitude of people who admittedly had only rudimentary ideas of human personality.²

It is true that we find relatively more socialism and collectivism among simpler societies, but there is no absolute evolution from these to individualism and to ideas of private property. Gunkel's "law" (p. 364) exaggerates the data. Even herds will have leaders, and men of some individuality will be found among very rudimentary folk. It is an exaggeration to say that once there was no essential difference between gods and men (p. 82). The whole world of Tabus cries out against this: besides, we cannot derive heterogeneity from pure homogeneity. It is the great merit of Nielsen's book—the promised second volume of which will be awaited with keen interest—that he

¹ Although various Semitic and Egyptian triads are known, the Jewish evidence (*e.g.* Gen. xviii. 1-16) is precarious (despite p. 369). The triad of the Jews of Elephantine (p. 113) probably associates Yahweh with two female deities, corresponding to the two consorts of the Egyptian Khnum (also of Elephantine), whom a Greek inscription identifies with Hera and Hestia. To assume a single Semitic triad worshipped under many forms, like the Christian Trinity in Europe (p. 133), is to forget that a specific teaching lies behind the latter, and that only a theory requires (and in this case unnecessarily) that a specific dogma existed among the primitive Semites. This is Pan-Babylonism, which Nielsen himself rejects. Similarly we cannot assume (as on p. 250) a common Semitic god who bore the name King as a *nomen proprium*. This applies with greater force to the theory of a primitive God (*El, Ilu*); see above.

² In like manner *we*, it is true, do distinguish ideas of physical and spiritual relations between gods and men (p. 63 *seq.*); but the "physical" could be in some measure ethical, and it is strange that Nielsen should consider that sexual abstinence implies the ethics of a higher religion (p. 343 *seq.*), whereas sexual tabus are familiar among the "lower" peoples, and sometimes are ethical, or at least have the germs of ethical development. His discussion of religious prostitution requires attention to Hartland's searching analysis; and when he seems to regard this and human sacrifice as arising from myths of the loves of Ishtar and of the sacrifice of the Divine Son by the Divine Father respectively (p. 367), he does not consider what social conditions the former implies, and how, in the case of the latter, the idea could ever have arisen. It has been the fundamental error of the "mythologists," astral and other, that they do not consider *why* people should have thought of the gods, or the heavenly bodies, as they did. Finally, although "matriarchy" is no longer regarded as absolutely primary (p. 363 *seq.*), there are times and places when it is relatively prominent; it then leaves its traces, long after it has disappeared: it is *we* who are tempted to assume that a particular transitional feature is the first stage of an absolute process, and less faulty conceptions of the evolution of thought are as necessary in our research as in our theories of social progress.

provokes deeper inquiry in all the cases where we feel obliged to dissent. He seems to regard the divine king as necessarily on an equality with the god. Yet there was a typical insistence upon the essential difference between the god and his human counterpart, and the relationship between them will remind us, *mutatis mutandis*, of that between God and Christ, in so far as the two were in some sense both distinct and one and the same. Next, Nielsen urges that the king represented, not God Himself, but the second male deity, that is, a particular Sun-God (pp. 89, 304): the Supreme God Himself could not, for example, be born on earth (p. 383). But are these distinctions drawn by us, or by the Semites? Did they distinguish the God-Father, the Son-God and his divine human counterpart? The facts of the divine kingship do imply an at least rudimentary "theology," and Nielsen raises a vital problem. What seems to be true is that men from time to time are conscious of a Power that transcends current, familiar, and orthodox conceptions of the gods or of God. They go behind the theology of the day, and in a spirit of new and near relationship cry, Abba, Father. Current thought then becomes clarified, developed, reshaped. This consciousness of God, which so powerfully affects the thought, is it, however, that of a God long ignored or neglected and distinct from the God who was recognised and, it may be, known through a divine human representative? The old divine kingship with its descendants in Messianism and Christology raises problems of modern significance. We need, in the first place, a better analysis of monotheism. That there are different kinds of monotheism Nielsen rightly sees (p. 378): it is at all events obvious that the purely emotional "theism" of Moplah and other fanatics must be kept distinct from the ethical, theological, monarchical, and metaphysical aspects. Furthermore, it does not follow that, because one word (*El*, *Ilu*) is used of deities in general, there was a primitive recognition of a One God, of whom all these are manifestations. There is no evidence for a primary, explicit idea of a Supreme God; although only a repeated consciousness of that Power which we call God seems to account for the stages in the history of religious development. Next, we have to consider the place held by the Supreme God when the divine king represented, say, the Sun-God. It is the system and its vicissitudes which here demand attention. No doubt the divine representative served to shape men's ideas of the God in question, but he could also hamper further advance. This twofold function of the human representative or incarnation is of the first importance in the history of religion. A clear-cut personality, like a clear-cut doctrine, can in fact be the "pedagogue" to lead men to God; but from time to time men cannot pass outside the circle of these conceptions, and "God" as the ultimate reality is to them essentially their particular conception of God. New and wider conceptions of God then become necessary. Hence, from the historical-religious point of view, there is a profound difference between the modern call, "Back to Christ," and a return to "God," which, on all analogy, would lead to a dynamic reinterpretation of the personality and work of Christ.

Nielsen recognises that the Semitic problem is significant for modern Christology. We are reminded how Robertson Smith realised that his new treatment of Semitic religion was bound to be pregnant for Christian theology. Nielsen's book, popularly written, is bound to exercise influence upon its readers, and only lack of space has prevented me from dwelling upon its many good points. There are, as it strikes me, some serious weaknesses; but it is a book to reckon with, and it is a further illustration of the new and growing interconnection between purely Semitic studies and the reconstruction of religion. The Semitic evidence for the divine kingship may seem to be the concern of Semitic scholars alone, but the problem in the Semitic field cannot long be kept apart from the greater problem of theodicy.

STANLEY A. COOK.

CAMBRIDGE.

St Francis of Assisi. By Father Cuthbert, O.S.F.C.
Third Edition.—London: Longmans & Co., 1921.

THE appearance of this third edition is important, not only as testifying to the enduring interest of the saint's life, but also in its relation to modern methods of history. Father Cuthbert is the best exponent of the Franciscan ideal among English-speaking peoples; and he rightly claims that there is need of a Roman Catholic biography of the saint side by side with Sabatier's. In one sense he has entered into all Sabatier's labours (for there is no established fact of real importance in this book which was not already in the other); in another sense he has very usefully complemented Sabatier by giving us a picture of his own from a different angle. History is the richer for his book so long as we do not forget this angle, and so long as we test all important differences between Father Cuthbert and his predecessors or contemporaries in the light of original documents. The present review aims at applying this test at three important points, where the book has remained practically unchanged through its three editions.

A whole chapter (VI.) deals with "Francis at the Fourth Lateran Council." Four years before Father Cuthbert's first edition, Luchaire had published his monograph on that Council, on p. 50 of which he wrote: "Il n'y a pas, dans les sources les plus anciennes de la vie de Saint-François, un seul mot qui permette d'attester la présence du saint au concile de Latran." Yet Father Cuthbert, while quoting other passages from Luchaire's studies on Innocent III., wrote (p. 172): "Innocent III. had convoked a General Council to assemble at the Lateran on St Martin's day, and Francis, as the founder of a new order, was bidden to be present." This dogmatic statement is so slightly modified in the present edition that, in connection with other equally dogmatic statements in the context¹ and in the title, it still leaves the reader under the definite impression that the author has actual documentary evidence for this event which he thinks important enough to fill a whole chapter. He relies upon just two texts:

¹ E.g. p. 209: "Francis had been called to Rome either by the Pope himself or by the Cardinal Protector."

“ Fortunately we have the evidence of the Dominican author of the *Vita Fratrum* (*vide infra*, p. 181) and of Angelo Clareno (*infra*, p. 177).” So little is he concerned to alter this, that even the false Latin (*Vita*) and the old page references are allowed still to stand in the third edition, though quite false in that connection; so also with the false reference to Angelo Clareno, which should be not p. 557 but 559.¹

The few readers who are near enough to first-rate libraries to verify these two references will find their value to be as follows. The *Vita Fratrum* was written, at earliest, more than forty years after the Council. The anecdote which Father Cuthbert quoted from it forms part of what is the most incredibly miraculous legend, perhaps, in the whole of this book, which is confessed by its Dominican editor to be “*forsitan nimis credulus*.” Thirdly, even if we take the anecdote at its face value, there is nothing in it to prove Francis’ presence at the Council; it simply asserts that the two saints met in Rome, on an unspecified occasion which will suit the following year just as well as the council year, and in words which render it unlikely for the author to have omitted all mention of the Council if, in fact, it was sitting at the time of the event which he relates. The second document, after we have corrected Father Cuthbert’s reference by reading two pages farther than he directs us, is even more inconclusive. It simply tells us, on the word of Angelo Clareno, who wrote a whole century after the event, how “Pope Innocent announced to all men in the General Council that it was by his authority and obedience that St Francis had taken up the evangelical life and Rule and had promised at Christ’s inspiration to keep it, as the holy brother Leo writes and brother John (*sic*) of Celano.” These references, as Father Ehrle points out, are to *Tres Socii*, c. 12, and *I. Celano*, c. 13. Apart from the blunder in Celano’s Christian name, which may be a mere slip of Angelo’s pen, it is evident that these two passages refer not to the year 1215 but to 1209 or 1210; nobody but Clareno has ever referred them to the year of the Lateran Council. Moreover, here again, even if we take Clareno’s words at their face value, they are far from bearing out Father Cuthbert’s contention. Innocent at that Council discussed Abbot Joachim’s doctrines; yet we know that Joachim was not present; how can we possibly infer the actual presence of Francis from Innocent’s ratification of his Rule? Yet on these flimsy foundations Father Cuthbert builds up five octavo pages describing Francis’ feelings as he listened to Innocent’s discourse at the Council.

Another still more important point is that of the Franciscan Nuns and the Rule of Poverty. This, like the poverty of the Friars themselves, is one of the weightiest questions in medieval social history; Father Cuthbert tells us he has paid renewed attention to it in this third edition; yet here, as in the first, it is no exaggeration to say that he ignores half the actual evidence. He still leaves the reader

¹ Nearly all the slips in Latin accident, titles of books, etc., which we had noted in the first edition have been printed again without change in this third; e.g. *magnus frigus*, *De Episcopus Bonon.*, *sub speci Seraph*, first edition, pp. 67, 302, 343; cf. others, some scarcely less glaring, on pp. 11, 75, 165, 171, 172, 232, 241, 279, 310, 319, 326, 335, 396, 397, 399, 416, 430, 434, 440.

(as in his other writings) under the impression that St Clare won a substantial victory, and that she made the Rule of Poverty a real thing. He makes no attempt to discuss the contrary evidence adduced not only by the Protestant Wauer, but also by Father Oliger, a Franciscan as orthodox as Father Cuthbert himself, and one who has taken the trouble to study all the contemporary documents. Oliger writes, on the same page on which he challenges another of Father Cuthbert's pronouncements on this subject: "The examples which we have quoted show clearly the double course upon which the Clarisses entered in the matter of possessions. But, while there are a few examples of absolute poverty, far more frequent are the cases where possessions are confirmed, or even given to them, by the Pope; so that, as Wauer judges, in the fourth decennium of the thirteenth century there were few convents of Clarisses professing perfect poverty."¹

The last point is that of St Francis' stigmata. In Father Cuthbert's first edition, he described these in the text according to Celano's words, written two years after the saint's death: "In his hands and feet were the scars of wounds, and in the scars were the impressions of nails, so formed that they might be taken for the nails of the Cross; the round heads black in appearance, protruding in the palms of the hands and on the insteps of the feet; whilst on the back of the hands and on the soles of the feet were the bended points of the nails." In the footnote he added: "For description of the stigmata see also the letter of Brother Elias," etc. Here it is clearly implied that Celano is our main authority, and that Elias's evidence, thus casually alluded to, is only secondary. But the reverse is the case; Elias's testimony has an importance almost unique in the whole history of medieval miracles; it is a circular, written within a few hours of the saint's death to the ministers of the Order, and describing the phenomena observed on his corpse. Those phenomena are all consistent with perfectly natural causes; his hands and feet had "*quasi puncturas clavorum, ex utraque parte confixas, reservantes cicatrices et clavorum nigredinem ostendentes.*" Although this first-hand and immediate description is not explicitly inconsistent with the later second-hand version, it cannot be said to corroborate the purely miraculous element in that later story. A sore on the inside of the hand, with a corresponding sore on the other side, each scarred over and showing a black core, would fully satisfy the vague description of Elias's letter; indeed, it would seem rather more strictly consistent with that description than Celano's later version is. When Father Cuthbert, in his present justificatory preface, translates Elias's "as it were punctures of nails" by "*wounds* made as it were with nails," he unconsciously distorts the words in his own sense; the *quasi* really qualifies the *puncturas* as well as the nails; a purely *superficial* scarred sore might thus be described, so long as it had a corresponding superficial sore on the other side of the hand or foot. He stretches the sense equally in rendering this "blackness of nails" by "the black *appearance* of nails"; and, meanwhile, he leaves his text unchanged. It is not

¹ *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, tom. v. (1912), p. 416; cf. pp. 428, 438, 442, 443.

really fair to the reader to take the words of Celano—who, after all, was a fairly typical medieval hagiographer—as the basic evidence, and to vouchsafe only the merest footnote allusion to that almost unique official testimony of Elias which has fortunately come down to us. It is as if a writer on the French Revolutionary wars should tell us the story of the sinking of the *Vengeur* in the words of some panegyrist, and only refer us in a footnote to the contemporary story of an eye-witness which, without absolutely excluding the marvellous details of later legend, does at least fail to corroborate them. Thiers, as we know, did write French history in this fashion; and therefore Thiers, in this later generation, is neglected even by Frenchmen. Father Cuthbert deals in an equally cavalier fashion with other serious difficulties in the earliest versions of this legend; he ignores Merkt's exhaustive monograph as completely as he ignores Wauer and Olinger on the question of the Clarisses. This, in the long run, is an impossible attitude. The modern public, with its growing interest in history, is more and more urgent in its demand for historical history; looking back at the progress of the last hundred years, it hopes for a time when even religious parties shall have come to the same sort of agreement upon matters of fact as has already been reached between French and English writers as to the main features of the Napoleonic legend. This public, while asking of every writer, "Does he make mistakes?" lays still more emphasis on that farther question: "Can we depend upon him to correct the mistakes which are natural to us all?" From that point of view, the real point of view of the future, Father Cuthbert has missed a great opportunity in this third edition: on three very important points he tries to maintain a position which it is difficult to believe that the most conservative writer will defend in the next generation.

G. G. COULTON.

CAMBRIDGE.

Ibsen and his Creation: A Psycho-Critical Study. By Yanko Lavrin.—London: Collins, 1921.

IN a previous issue of this Journal we reviewed an able psycho-critical study of Dostoevsky by Mr Lavrin, and we have now before us a similar study of the Norwegian dramatist Ibsen. The author's aim in the present work is to create, or rather to reconstruct, from the plays, Ibsen's mental struggles and development; and our interest in this reconstruction is increased by the knowledge that Ibsen himself came to the conclusion that the only hope for the future lay in the development of individual character. To thus reconstruct the mental development of an author would appear no easy task, and we must admit, considering that Mr Lavrin is one of the pioneers of this special kind of criticism, that his success is no mean achievement.

Mr Lavrin, then, does not deal with the early Ibsen, and such plays as *The Warriors in Helgeland* and *Love's Comedy* have no place in his book, as they do not enter into the psychological phase that is here being outlined. Our author commences his critique of the man who was "like a mystery sealed with seven seals" by an admirable

chapter on "Ibsen's Dramas and the Drama of Ibsen." Starting with some general remarks on the relation of the artist to the ideas of his era, he proceeds to show how this was especially the case with Ibsen, who more than any other writer has so filled his plays with ideas; but with Ibsen ideas were only the raw material of art, for he was as much artist as philosopher, and as Mr Lavrin says, in an admirable piece of criticism, "his plays often seem deliberate and intentional; his characters also appear, on the whole, to be put into the general scheme with the precision of a mathematician. But while his rather scientific intellect provides the skeleton, his artistic intuition builds up the body of the work. As soon as the whole intentional scheme is complete, there begins a subtle working of the artist and psychologist. The skeleton may be shaped according to the dictates of one or another 'Idea,' yet this rarely involves the subjugation of Ibsen's subsequent intuition to any preconceived purpose and tendency: it only gives to it the direction, and, this once fixed, the 'intuitive' process strives to develop towards its own independent conclusions."

A little later, however, his criticism seems not so original, as when he says that, "if we examine Ibsen's so-called ideals and constructive ideas separately from his art, we see that as 'prophet' and builder he has not much to say." This is of course true to a certain extent, but it must be remembered that he never claimed in any sense to be a teacher of morals, but rather an investigator, and, as such, necessarily destructive.

Ibsen's hatred of art for art's sake is also clearly stated, together with some cogent criticism of "Ibsen as Artist," and this is followed by an equally penetrating criticism of his play *Brand*, which is generally acknowledged as the play which placed Norwegian literature on a level with the greatest European literature. Brand is a moralist of tremendous will, which endeavours to assert itself morally and so subdue the world; but he fails because he has nothing to offer but Will—although he was near achieving greatness when the avalanche buried him. This is one stage of Ibsen's mental evolution. He then turned, in *Peer Gynt*, and stated the other side of the problem; for Peer Gynt "subdues his will to life, and so commits an outrage upon himself." Brand had sacrificed happiness to his will: Gynt sacrificed everything to happiness. Both failed; there is always the dilemma; and, as Mr Lavrin remarks, it is also our dilemma, and one which Ibsen did not overcome.

We have kept pretty closely to the book under review, in order that the reader might get some insight into Mr Lavrin's method (which he applies to several other important plays); but we should add that Ibsen's notes explain, to a great extent, the relationship between his mental struggles and his plays. Nevertheless, Mr Lavrin's task was well worth attempting, and the result is a helpful and sound piece of critical work, which should appeal to all who are interested in the psychology of the artist.

We notice that Mr Lavrin promises two more critical works, which we shall await with interest.

WILLIAM JOHNSON.

NOTTINGHAM.

INDEX.

ARTICLES.

- ATONEMENT AND NEW KNOWLEDGE, 140.
- CHINESE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS, THE: A HISTORY OF THE MIND OF
MAN, 5.
- CHRISTOLOGY, MODERNIST, AND THE PLAIN MAN, 411.
- CHRISTOLOGY, THE IMPASSE OF MODERN: STILL AT IT, 401.
- CHURCH AND STATE IN CONFLICT, 643.
- CHURCH OF ENGLAND, THE MODERN MOVEMENT IN THE, 220.
- CHURCH, THE, AT THE CROSSROADS, 554.
- CHURCHMAN'S UNION, THE CAMBRIDGE CONFERENCE OF, IN 1921, 193.
- CHURCHMEN, MODERN, OR UNITARIANS? 208.
- CLASS DIVISIONS, THE RELATION OF, TO SOCIAL CONDUCT, 507.
- COLUMBA: SAINT, STATESMAN, AND POET, 521-1921, 236.
- DEATH, THE RELATIVITY OF, 536.
- DETERMINISM, IS IT RATIONAL? 701.
- EDUCATION, ADULT, THE TASK OF THE CHURCHES IN, 542.
- EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONALISM, 335.
- EDUCATION, THE CURE FOR SOCIAL DISCONTENT, 158.
- EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT, THE WISDOM OF, 740.
- EPICURUS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF—AN UNCLOSED CHAPTER IN HUMAN
THOUGHT, 88.
- ETHICAL MOVEMENT, THE, AND THE NATURAL MAN, 667.
- FAITH AND ITS EXPRESSION IN THE ARTS, 680.
- HOLY SPIRIT, THE, WHAT DO WE MEAN BY? 622.
- INDIA'S REVOLT AGAINST CHRISTIAN CIVILISATION, 447.
- INGE, DEAN, THE GLOOM OF, 317.
- INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, LITERATURE AND, 461.
- KARMA: ITS VALUE AS A DOCTRINE OF LIFE, 20.
- LOGIC AND THE IMAGINATION, 289.

- MAN, THE NATURE OF, 324.
 MIRACLES, MORE ABOUT, 150.
 MUSIC AND THE MUSES, 124.
 NATIONS, THE SALVATION OF THE, 113.
 OCCULTISM, I., 46, AND II., 251.
 OCCULTISM, MATERIALISM AND, 269.
 ODE IN A GERMAN CEMETERY, WHERE MANY VICTIMS OF THE GREAT
 WAR WERE INTERRED, 358.
 PIETY, NATURAL, 609.
 PLATO'S LAWS, THE VALUE OF, TO-DAY, 277.
 "POLTERGEIST," PESTERED BY A, 487.
 PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND HUMAN WELFARE, 64.
 RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY, 35.
 REPARATION, THOUGHTS ON, 99.
 RESPONSIBILITY, MORAL, AND THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY, 748.
 RESPONSIBILITY, THE QUESTION OF, 353.
 ROME AND THE ANGLICANS, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A ROMAN
 CATHOLIC LAYMAN, 632.
 SCHOOLS, THE CONFESSIONS AND HOPES OF AN EX-INSPECTOR OF, 721.
 SELF, THE, AND "THE UNCONSCIOUS," 768.
 SELF-SUGGESTION AND RELIGION, 760.
 SOUL, THE CONCEPTION OF, IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY, 76.
 ST JOHN'S GOSPEL, THE LAST CHAPTER OF, AS INTERPRETED BY
 EARLY CHRISTIAN ART, 690.
 STATE, THE FATHER OR THE, 307.
 STATE, THE THREEFOLD, 472.
 SUFISM, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF, 524.
 SUPERNATURAL, THE, UNDER DOMESTICATION, 657.
 SYNOPTIC GOSPELS, THE RELIGIOUS TEACHING OF THE, IN ITS
 RELATION TO JUDAISM, 435.
 SYNOPTIC PROBLEM, THE, FRESH LIGHT ON, 103.
 TELEPATHY, 497.
 UNITARIANS, MODERN CHURCHMEN AND, 419.
 WEST, THE, IS IT CHRISTIAN? 456.

Adam, Mrs A. M., The Value of Plato's Laws To-day, 277.
Adams, E. W., The Philosophy of Epicurus—An Unclosed Chapter in
 Human Thought, 88.
Alexander, Samuel, Prof., LL.D., F.B.A., Natural Piety, 609.

- Bagenal, Philip H.*, The Modern Movement in the Church of England, 220.
- Baker, G. P.*, Faith and its Expression in the Arts, 680.
- Bary, Richard de, Rev.*, The Relativity of Death, 536.
- Beck, L. Adams*, The Chinese Pilgrim's Progress : A History of the Mind of Man, 5.
- Bidwell, Edward J., Rev., Bishop of Ontario*, Modernist Christology and the Plain Man, 411.
- Bousfield, W. R., K.C., F.R.S.*, Telepathy, 497.
- Cammaerts, Emile*, Literature and International Relations, 461.
- Clodd, Edward*, Occultism, I., 46, II., 251.
- Cook, E. Wake*, Materialism and Occultism, 269.
- Davies, William Watkin, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.*, Education for Internationalism, 335.
- Dougall, Lily*, The Salvation of the Nations, 118.
- Farquhar, J. N., D.Litt.*, Karma : Its Value as a Doctrine of Life, 20.
- Ferrar, W. J., Rev., M.A.*, The Gloom of Dean Inge, 317.
- Gray, Arthur, M.A.*, Master of Jesus College, Cambridge, The Last Chapter of St John's Gospel as interpreted by Early Christian Art, 690.
- Hamilton, W. S., I.C.S.*, India's Revolt against Christian Civilisation, 447.
- Hardy, T. J., Rev.*, The Supernatural under Domestication, 657.
- Hobson, J. A., M.A.*, The Ethical Movement and the Natural Man, 667.
- Hodgson, Leonard*, The Self and "The Unconscious," 768.
- Holland, Bernard, C.B.*, Rome and the Anglicans, from the Point of View of a Roman Catholic Layman, 632.
- Holmes, Edmond G. A.*, The Confessions and Hopes of an ex-Inspector of Schools, 721.
- Household, H. W., M.A.*, Education, the Cure for Social Discontent, 158.
- Jackson, F. J. Foakes, Rev., D.D.*, The Cambridge Conference of the Churchman's Union in 1921, 193.
- Jackson, George, Rev., D.D.*, What do we mean by the Holy Spirit ? 622.
- Kerr, Nigel*, Pestered by a "Poltergeist," 487.
- Keyser, Cassius J., Prof., Ph.D., LL.D.*, The Nature of Man, 324.
- Know, Howard V.*, Is Determinism Rational ? 701.
- Laird, John, Prof., M.A.*, Moral Responsibility and the New Psychology, 748.
- Lyttelton, Edward, Rev. the Hon., D.D.*, Self-Suggestion and Religion, 760.
- Mackenzie, J. S., Prof., LL.D.*, The Threefold State, 472.
- MacMunn, Norman*, The Wisdom of Educational Experiment, 740.

Major, Henry D. A., Rev., B.D., Modern Churchmen or Unitarians ? 208.

Martin, Anna, The Father or the State ? 307.

Marvin, F. S., M.A., Is the West Christian ? 456.

Mellone, S. H., Rev., M.A., D.Sc., Modern Churchmen and Unitarians, 419.

Mercer, J. Edward, Right Rev. Bishop, Music and the Muses, 124.

Montefiore, C. G., M.A., The Religious Teaching of the Synoptic Gospels in its Relation to Judaism, 435.

Murri, Romolo, Church and State in Conflict, 643.

Perry, W. J., M.A., The Relation of Class Divisions to Social Conduct, 507.

Petre, Miss M. D., Still at it : The Impasse of Modern Christology, 401.

Radhakrishnan, S., Prof., M.A., Religion and Philosophy, 35.

Reid, Louis Arnaud, M.A., Logic and the Imagination, 289.

Schulze-Gaevernitz, von, Prof., Thoughts on Reparation, 99.

Shah, Ikbāl Ali, The General Principle of Sufism, 524.

Shawcross, H. C., The Question of Responsibility, 353.

Skrine, J. H., Rev., D.D., Atonement and New Knowledge, 140.

Stebbing, T. R. R., Rev., F.R.S., More about Miracles, 150.

Stobart, Mrs M. A. St Clair, The Church at the Crossroads, 554.

Streeter, B. H., Rev. Canon, D.D., Fresh Light on the Synoptic Problem, 103.

Tarrant, Dorothy, M.A., The Conception of the Soul in Greek Philosophy, 76.

Thaw, Alexander B., Psychical Research and Human Welfare, 64.

Watt, Lauchlan Maclean, Rev., D.D., Columba : Saint, Statesman, and Poet, 521-1921, 236.

Wilder, Amos N., Ode in a German Cemetery, where many Victims of the Great War were interred, 358.

Yeazlee, Basil A., The Task of the Churches in Adult Education, 542.

DISCUSSIONS.

Editor, "A Chinese Pilgrim's Progress," 362.

Osler, C. C., "Modernists and Unitarians," 778.

Ovenden, Chas. T., D.D., "Occultism," 562.

Ozanne, C. H., "Karma," II., 364.

Smith, William Benjamin, D.D., A Correction, 368.

Urquhart, W. S., Prof., M.A., "India's Revolt against Christian Civilisation," 775.

Welland, Cecil B., "Karma," I., 362.

REVIEWS.

- Astley, A. H. J. Dukinfield, Rev., D.D.*—S. Rolles Driver and G. Buchanan Gray, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Job*, 597.
- Bartlet, Vernon, D.D.*—Robert Mackintosh, *Historic Theories of Atonement, with Comments*, 391.
- Broad, C. D., Prof., M.A., D.Litt.*—J. M. E. M^cTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, vol. i., 172.
- Cook, Stanley A., D.Litt.*—J. Estlin Carpenter, *Theism in Mediæval India*, 587.
Ditlef Nielsen, *Die dreieinige Gott in religionshistorischer Beleuchtung*, 808.
- Corrance, H. C., M.A.*—Hakluyt Egerton, *The Holy Catholic Church : An Anglican Essay*, 191.
- Coulton, G. G., D.Litt.*—Father Cuthbert, *St Francis of Assisi*, 812.
Lynn Thorndike, *Mediæval Europe*, 608.
- Drummond, W. H., Rev., B.A.*—Shane Leslie, *Henry Edward Manning : His Life and Letters*, 606.
- Evans, James, Rev., M.A.*—R. W. Livingstone, *Ed.*, *The Legacy of Greece*, 800.
- Geikie-Cobb, W. F., Rev., D.D.*—John Glasse, *The Mysteries and Christianity*, 581.
- Ginsberg, Morris, M.A.*—L. T. Hobhouse, *The Elements of Social Justice*, 793.
L. T. Hobhouse, *The Rational Good : A Study in the Logic of Practice*, 175.
- Graham, J. W., Principal, M.A.*—Vincent Taylor, *The Historical Evidence for the Virgin Birth*, 395.
- Granger, Frank, Prof., Litt.D.*—G. B. Foster, *Christianity in its Modern Expression*, 185.
- Hazlitt, Victoria, M.A.*—Morris Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society*, 591.
- Herford, R. Travers, Rev., B.A.*—W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *A Short Survey of the Literature of Rabbinical and Mediæval Judaism*, 398.
- Hoernlé, R. F. A., Prof., M.A.*—Bernard Bosanquet, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, 787.
- Jacks, L. P., Rev. Principal, M.A., LL.D., D.D.*—*A Gentleman with a Duster, Painted Windows : A Study in Religious Personality*, 572.
- Johnson, William, M.A.*—Yanko Lavrin, *Ibsen and his Creation : A Psycho-Critical Study*, 815.

- Mackendrick, Alexander.*—B. Paul Blood, *Pluriverse: An Essay in the Philosophy of Pluralism*, 384.
- Mantripp, J., Rev.*—James Moffatt, *The Approach to the New Testament*, 803.
- E. W. Smith and A. Murray Dale, *The Ill-speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia*; and S. Pollard, *In Unknown China*, 602.
- Moffatt, James, Rev. Prof., D.D.*—J. Gresham Machen, *The Origin of Paul's Religion*, 805.
- Muirhead, J. H., Prof., M.A., LL.D.*—Graham Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, 179.
- Richardson, C. A., M.A.*—H. Reinheimer, *Symbiosis*, 382.
- Rose, H. J., Prof., M.A.*—Walter J. Evans, *Allitteratio Latina: or, Alliteration in Latin Verse reduced to Rule*, 802.
- Lewis R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality*, 582.
- Sadler, Gilbert T., Rev., M.A., LL.B.*—R. J. Campbell, *The Life of Christ: A Short Study*, 189.
- Schiller, F. C. S., M.A., D.Sc.*—L. P. Jacks, *The Legends of Smokeover*, 380.
- Scullard, H. H., Rev. Prof., D.D.*—Evelyn Underhill, *Essentials of Mysticism, and Other Essays*, 388.
- Tarrant, Dorothy, M.A.*—W. T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, 386.
- Taylor, A. E., Prof., M.A.*—Baron Friedrich von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, 576.
- Thomas, F. W., D.Litt.*—Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. i., 796.
- Urquhart, W. S., Prof., M.A.*—Archibald R. D. Alexander, *The Shaping Forces of Modern Religious Thought*, 182.
- Watson, Foster, D.Litt.*—J. Clerk Maxwell Garnett, *Education and World Citizenship: An Essay towards a Science of Education*, 592.

SURVEY OF RECENT LITERATURE.

- Philosophical Literature.* By Professor G. Dawes Hicks, 165 and 565.
- Theological Literature.* By Rev. Professor James Moffatt, 370 and 780.

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